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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 12/11/2015

File Folder USSR (1/4/83-1/18/83)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 23

SKINNER

302

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171274	MEMO	P. DOBRIANSKY TO W. CLARK RE SOVIET LEADERSHIP SUCCESSION R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-39-1-9	1	1/4/1983	B1
171275	MEMO	W. CLARK TO VICE PRESIDENT, SEC. OF STATE ET AL RE REENTRY OF COSMOS 1402 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-39-2-8	2	1/5/1983	B1
171276	MEMO	G. WEISS TO W. CLARK RE RECOMMENDATIONS OF COSMOS 1402 COMMITTEE	1	1/5/1983	B1
171277	CABLE	MOSCOW 0267 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-39-4-6	4	1/7/1983	B1
171287	CABLE	SAME CABLE TEXT AS DOC #171277 (MOSCOW 0267) R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-39-4-6	2	1/7/1983	B1
171278	CABLE	STATE 05919 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-39-5-5	2	1/8/1983	B1
171279	CABLE	STATE 04007 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-39-6-4	2	1/6/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

File Folder USSR (1/4/83-1/18/83)

KDB 12/11/2015

Box Number 23

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

302

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171280	CABLE	MOSCOW 0442 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-39-7-3	2	1/12/1983	B1
171281	CABLE	MOSCOW 0447 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-39-8-2	2	1/12/1983	B1
171282	CABLE	MOSCOW 0499 PAR 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-39-9-1	2	1/13/1983	B1
171283	CABLE	MOSCOW 0515 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-39-10-9	1	1/14/1983	B1
171284	CABLE	MOSCOW 0548 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-39-11-8	2	1/14/1983	B1
171285	MEMO	DOBRIANSKY TO CLARK RE SEN. LUGAR'S BILL	1	1/13/1983	B1
171286	MEMO	L. PAUL BREMER TO W. CLARK RE SOVIET SPEAKING NOTE ON SA-5S IN SYRIA (INCL. ATTACHMENT) R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-39-13-6	4	1/18/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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**National Security Council
The White House**

486 1

Package #

0065

06 JAN 4 P 7: 18

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>I</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>I</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 4, 1983

CONFIDENTIALINFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY

SUBJECT: Soviet Leadership Succession

DECLASSIFIED

NLR 748-23-39-1-9

BY EDR NARA DATE 1/1/83

Norman Bailey forwarded me an interesting analysis (Tab I) of the Soviet leadership succession written by John T. Jackson, Vice Chairman of the Business Council for International Understanding in Philadelphia. Some of his insightful, unique conclusions are summarized below.

1. Andropov's background and personality is not necessarily germane in predicting what domestic and foreign policies the Soviet Union will pursue. Jackson states, "Although some very interesting observations are now surfacing as to the personality of Mr. Andropov, he may not necessarily be the right object to focus upon in the search for the answer as to what to expect of the Soviet Union." *agree*
2. The most relevant issue is not who is Mr. Andropov, but rather what are the circumstances of his elevation. Specifically, Jackson cites two factors which he perceives as having contributed to Andropov's consolidation of power: a) a general dissatisfaction with Brezhnev's policy mix which in turn, has harmed Chernenko's candidacy, b) Andropov's ability to harness and exploit the resources of the military and the KGB.
3. The military and the KGB will seek to eradicate industrial and agricultural mismanagement and impose greater economic efficiency.
4. Lastly, there will be some reduction in Soviet international sabre-rattling so as to instill a greater feeling of security in the West.

I do not agree, however, with Jackson's reference to the formation of a "Solidarity" in the USSR comprised of the military and the KGB for this conception clearly overlooks the prominent role of the Party. ~~Rather~~, it is those hardline elements in the party aligned with the military and the KGB that are likely to prevail.

cc: Norman Bailey

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

Paula

INFERENTIAL FOCUS
Business Inferential Scanning

December 8, 1982

*Copies for:
John H. Hutton
Fred Iovine
To WPC?*

FOCUS: RUSSIA

During World War II, German pilots were trained to use the corners of their eyes to spot enemy planes in the darkness of night. Although seemingly illogical, peripheral vision in darkness is superior to a direct look. This, however, forces the observer to look away from an object of interest, which is not the normal reflex of a day-oriented creature. Maybe this technique should now be employed in piercing the darkness enveloping the stance which the Soviet Union will adopt under the leadership of Yuri Andropov.

Although some very interesting observations are now surfacing as to the personality of Mr. Andropov, he may not necessarily be the right object to focus upon in the search for the answer as to what to expect of the Soviet Union. It could conceivably be that the personality line is fed to us to divert our attention from the real clues.

Just eight months ago, Kremlinologists followed an obvious line of succession which did not even include Yuri Andropov. On March 9th, David Satter, reporting from Moscow for the Financial Times, said that: "The conventional wisdom is that neither Mr. Ustinov nor Mr. Andropov could achieve leadership of the party, because, although the Army and the KGB are the two principal instruments of power in the country, the party has always guarded against their potential domination."

Well, so much for the "conventional wisdom," which somehow reminds us of the last weeks of the Shah of Iran when the conventional wisdom of that time, according to President Carter, held that that country was an "island of stability in the Middle East." The interesting thing is that, post factum, it was determined that the proper information was available, but it was too peripheral to consider. Likewise, in the case of Mr. Andropov, we find that, while in all our reading we saw names like Chernenko, Kirilenko, Griskin, Romanov and Gromyko, it was in personal conversations with two Eastern Europeans that we learned not only about Mr. Andropov, but also that the die had already been cast.

All of the above leads us to suspect that the question to ask is not who is Mr. Andropov, but why it is him and not Mr. Chernenko that got the job. The most obvious reason would be the identification of Mr. Chernenko with the policies of Mr. Brezhnev. Those policies must have been a bit of an embarrassment when one considers the agricultural setbacks four years in a row, the Afghanistan fiasco, Polish Solidarity, the Siberian pipeline wrangle, and the quality-of-arms question as a result of the Iraqi/Irani and Lebanese wars.

The less obvious answer, however, is that Mr. Andropov was already in power and that, during 1982, without being aware of it, we have been witnesses to an historical fade-in/fade-out. For instance, note the unprecedented action

in the early part of this year when the KGB arrested Mr. Buryetia, who was a close friend of Mr. Brezhnev's daughter.

Another hint comes from the newest edition of the official Soviet encyclopedia, which carries no mention of the mass purges of the Stalin era, originally put into the record during the Khrushchev leadership. The purges were carried out by the infamous NKVD, the predecessor of the present KGB, of which Mr. Andropov was the head until very recently. According to the November 22nd Christian Science Monitor, the new encyclopedia was prepared for publication last March, which was well before the passing of Mr. Brezhnev. The action seems clearly designed to remove an unpleasant flavor from the KGB's history, and only Mr. Andropov would have a vested interest in this.

Another decision which looks suspiciously like Mr. Andropov's is the drastic cut in telephone links between the Soviet Union and the West, which we have commented on before. The Russians finally admitted that it was not the difficulty with the equipment, but that the sophisticated Western equipment was needed for domestic uses. Shortly after, it was observed that the domestic users were the new headquarters of the KGB and the military.

A few other observations lead us to suspect that the ascendancy of Mr. Andropov is a far more significant event than is generally perceived. On the day of Mr. Andropov's election, army units were much in evidence surrounding the building in which the meeting took place. After the election, the uniformed Marshal Ustinov moved all the way up the line to stand next to the new leader in official photographs. A few days later, Geidar Aliyev, an important KGB personage, was added to the Politburo. All of this adds up to the conclusion that Mr. Andropov is the front man of the two principal instruments of power — the military and the KGB, neither of which has ever in the past dominated the party. (Remember the swift demises of Beria and General Zhukov when they grew too big for their britches?) Now, those two instruments of power have joined forces and switched from the role of servant to that of master.

The coalition gave a few hints of what to expect of it. On November 22, Mr. Andropov addressed the plenary session of the Communist party central committee, at which time he made the somewhat conflicting promise of both more guns and more butter. The butter, however, will apparently be produced domestically with the help of the carrot and stick method. Even more so, the tone was strangely menacing in comparison with the Brezhnev stance. Said Mr. Andropov: "Conditions both economic and organizational should be provided to encourage quality and productive work, initiative and enterprise....conversely, shoddy work, laziness and irresponsibility should have an immediate and unavoidable effect on the earnings, official status and moral prestige of workers." Wielding the stick of the "unavoidable effect" will most likely be left to the KGB, which for the past year has exhibited an unusual degree of eagerness to stamp out corruption in high places.

As for the guns, Russian equipment's poor showing on the Middle Eastern playground suggests that a higher level of sophistication is in the offing; but this will show up amid the framework of overall expansion. For instance, the Navy base at Liyepaya, Latvia, was so extensively enlarged that it required the relocation of the USSR's second largest fishing collective. Interestingly, this also predated Mr. Brezhnev's death by five months.

Finally, the recent appointment of Mr. Vladimir Alkhimov to the central committee may be suggestive of how the Soviets plan on paying for all this. Mr. Alkhimov is reputedly one of very few Soviet officials who understand the workings of Western capital markets. Inference: the banking industry as a "best bet" to start discovering new Russian business opportunities?

5


What all of this ultimately means to the West will depend upon how successful the new rulers are in transforming the country from a dictatorship of the proletariat to a dictatorship of the uniform. Comparisons could be made with Yugoslavia, Hitler's Germany and Fascist Italy. The last two are particularly good examples of the symbiotic relationship between the police and the army. We have even one more recent example, which may be the real key to the answer — Poland. With the obvious approval of the Soviets, General Jaruzelski usurped power, and, using the despised ZOMO, brought the country to heel.

With the two militaristic organizations forming their own Solidarity in Russia, mismanagement that has plagued agriculture and industry will be little tolerated in an attempt to whip the economy into shape. At the same time, international sabre-rattling will probably be kept to a minimum compared to recent years, in order to quell Western fears of the new military bloc. In fact, we would not be surprised to see their present military positions rescinded somewhat in an attempt to give the West a sense of security and to further strengthen the overextended Russian economy.

But this new coalition does appear to present an inherent real danger, as now the fox has gained control of the chicken coop. But this fox appears to have a savvy command of manipulative techniques, implying that, while a new detente may develop in order to exploit the West's resources, we should expect internal control and surveillance to be strengthened. And, of course, the ultimate result of past military control in other places and times cannot be forgotten. When the soldiers have the key to the arsenal and the governor is in accord, they have in the past ultimately been unable to resist playing with the arsenal's toys.

* * *

THE NEW KREMLIN WALLFLOWERS:



Tass via United Press International

Yuri V. Andropov, at the microphones, the new General Secretary of the Communist Party, delivering the eulogy for Leonid I. Brezhnev yesterday from the Lenin Mausoleum at the Kremlin wall. With him were, from the left: Dinmukhamed A. Kunayev, party leader of Kazakhstan; Vladimir V. Shcherbitsky, Ukrainian party chief; Marshal Dmitri F. Ustinov, Defense Minister; Prime Minister Nikolai A. Tikhonov; Konstantin U. Chernenko, a party secretary; Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko; Viktor V. Grishin, Moscow party leader, and Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Minister of Agriculture.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

December 23, 1982

TO: PAULA DOBRIANSKY

FROM: NORMAN BAILEY



420 LEXINGTON AVENUE, NE ~~ORR CITY 10017~~
212-490-0460
BUSINESS COUNCIL FOR INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING

1

Dr. Bailey,

The enclosed was sent to me by my
Chairman, John T. Jackson, Vice
Chairman of IU International in
Philadelphia. Thought it would
interest you.

JOHN HABBERTON

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ID 8300065

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 04 JAN 83 19

TO CLARK

FROM DOBRIANSKY *12/14/83 (CAB)*

DOCDATE 04 JAN 83

KEYWORDS: USSR

ANDROPOV, YURI

JACKSON, JOHN T

SUBJECT: SOVIET LEADERSHIP SUCCESSION

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

BAILEY

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

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ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

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(C) ~~28~~

9

NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET/NO FORN DIS~~

ID 8390006

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES
12/14/15 KDS

RECEIVED 05 JAN 83 16

TO CLARK

FROM WEISS

DOCDATE 05 JAN 83

KEYWORDS: USSR
NSDD

SPACE PROGRAMS

SUBJECT: RE-ENTRY OF COSMOS 1402

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE	DUE:	STATUS C	FILES SII
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FOR ACTION
CLARK

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS

REF#	LOG	NSCIFID	(B / B)
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ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	C JAN 06 1983	Clark spj		

DISPATCH	JAN 06 1983	D Sheet 4 CDX	W/ATTCH FILE	(C)
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DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II
90006

10

NLRR-14823-39-2-8

BY COB NARA DATE 4/8/0

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

171275

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

January 5, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
 THE SECRETARY OF STATE
 THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
 THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
 THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
 THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
 CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
 DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
 ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND
 SPACE ADMINISTRATION
 DIRECTOR, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: Reentry of COSMOS 1402 (S)

The Soviet Union has apparently lost control of their satellite COSMOS 1402 which is powered by a nuclear reactor. The President has directed that the following positions be taken by the United States to deal with contingencies posed by this situation.

1. If requested by foreign governments, the United States will offer all possible assistance in locating radioactive debris and in the decontamination of that debris.

2. The United States will continue to publish tracking and impact prediction data for 1402 as part of the normal NORAD reporting procedure. The Soviet Union should bear responsibility for supplying their tracking and impact prediction data to affected countries. Within the United States, the Department of Defense will report the NORAD data. (~~S/NF~~)

The President has directed that discussions below the Ambassadorial level be held between the State Department and Soviet Embassy personnel. The questions posed by State should be similar to those posed for the reentry of COSMOS 954, with such added questions as may be required to determine what, if any changes have been made to satellites of the 954 type to prevent impact of radioactive debris. State is directed to prepare these questions. (~~S/NF~~)

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~


~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

-2-

State will draft and appropriately clear a cable to all United States Posts and USUN describing the problem posed by COSMOS 1402. Instructions within the cable should state that inquiries received from foreign governments should be referred to Washington for response. Within the same cable, posts should be instructed to offer information to local governments, and offer to provide additional information as it becomes available to the United States. The cable should say that if host countries require further data they should make their requests to the Soviet Union. State is also directed to undertake to focus attention of governments to Soviet responsibility for damage resulting from reentry of the satellites.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency will act as the lead agency in preparing appropriate plans for a reentry in the United States. For reentry on foreign territory, the Department of Energy will be the lead agency for preparing contingency plans to respond to requests for assistance.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:



William P. Clark

cc Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DISTRIBUTION RECORD

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES
Log Number 90006

12/14/1500B Date 6 JAN 1983

Subject: REENTRY OF COSMOS 1402 (S)

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET SECRET CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

_____ Judge Clark	_____ Mr. Fontaine	_____ Mr. Lord	_____ Mr. Posa	_____ Mr. Tams
_____ Mr. McFarlane	_____ Mr. Fortier	_____ Mr. Manfredi	_____ Mr. Raymond	_____ Mr. Teicher
_____ Adm. Poindexter	_____ Mr. Guhin	_____ Mr. Martin	_____ Mr. Reed	_____ Mr. Tyson
_____ Sit. Room	_____ Mr. Helm	_____ Mr. McGaffigan	_____ Ms. Reger	_____ Mr. Weiss
_____ Mr. Bailey	_____ Mr. Kemp	_____ Mr. McMinn	_____ Mr. Robinson	_____ Mr. Wettering
1 _____ Cmdr. Blair	_____ Mr. Kimmitt	_____ Mr. Morris	_____ Col. Russell	_____ Col. Wheeler
1 _____ Mr. Boverie	_____ Mr. Kraemer	_____ Ltc. Myer	_____ Col. Rye	_____ NSC Secretariat
_____ Ltc. Childress	_____ Mr. Laux	_____ Mr. Nau	_____ Mr. Sapia-Bosch	_____ NSC MSG Center
1 _____ Mr. De Graffenreid	_____ Mr. Levine	_____ Mr. North	_____ Mr. Sigur	_____ Admin. Office
_____ Ms. Dobriansky	_____ Col. Lilac	_____ Mr. Pipes	_____ Capt. Sims	
_____ Cmdr. Dur	_____ Ltc. Linhard	1 _____ Mr. Pollock	_____ Mr. Sommer	

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

	# CYS	Date	Time	Received/Signed For By:
THE VICE PRESIDENT	1	Jan 6, 1983	3:10	John H. Stevens
THE SECRETARY OF STATE Exec sec/Room 7241	LDX	JAN 0 5	1983	Sent by Sit Room
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY Main Bldg/Room 3422	LDX	JAN 0 6	1983	Sent by Sit Room
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE The Pentagon				
DIRECTOR, ACDA Room 5933/Dept. of State				
CHAIRMAN US START DELEGATION C/o ACDA, 5933 State				
DIRECTOR, CIA Langley, Va/or Pickup	LDX	JAN 0 5	1983	Sent by Sit Room
CHAIRMAN, JCS The Pentagon	LDX	JAN 0 5	1983	Sent by Sit Room
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE 14th & Const. Ave. NW, Room 5851				
DIRECTOR, OMB Room 252 OEOP				
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY GA257, Forrestal Bldg	LDX	JAN 0 5	1983	Sent by Sit Room
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION 400 7th Street S.W.	1	46	1400	Don [unclear]
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO UNITED NATIONS Room 6333, State Dept.				
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 10th/Const. NW, Room 5119	1	1-6-83	2:29	Ashia M. [unclear]
DIRECTOR, OSTP Room 360, OEOP	1	Jan 5, 1983	1:13p	D. Williams
DIRECTOR, USIA 1750 Penna. NW				
THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR 18th & E. Street NW				
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE Independence & 14th SW				
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE Room 209 Winder Bldg 17 & F St NW				
THE DIRECTOR, FEMA 500 C Street,	1	Jan 6 83	1400	Paul [unclear]
DIRECTOR, JOINT PROGRAM OFFICE (JPO) 1300 Wilson Blvd. #1051, Arlington, VA				
MANAGER, NATL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM (NCS), 8th & SO Courthouse Rd, Arlington, VA				

DATE, TIME & SIGN THIS RECEIPT & RETURN TO: BT MERCHANT, SITUATION ROOM, WHITE HOUSE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DISTRIBUTION RECORD

Log Number 90006

13

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

Date 6 JAN 1983

12/14/15 608

Subject: REENTRY OF COSMOS 1402 (S)

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET ~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	# CYS	Date	Time	Received/Signed For By:
DIRECTOR, AID Room 5942, New State				
THE SECRETARY OF HHS 100 Independence Avenue, NW				
THE SECRETARY OF HUD 251 7th Street SW				
THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION (HEW) 100 Maryland Avenue SW				
THE SECRETARY OF LABOR 100 Constitution Avenue, NW				
DIRECTOR, FBI 8th & Pennn. Avenue, NW				
DIRECTOR, NASA Ft. George Meade, MD				
DIRECTOR, DIA Room 3E258, Pentagon				
DIRECTOR, U.S. SECRET SERVICE 1800 G. Street, NW				
CHAIRMAN, CEA Room 314, OEOB				
CHAIRMAN, CEQ 722 Jackson Place, NW				
ADMINISTRATOR, GSA GSA Bldg., 18th & F Street, NW				
ADMINISTRATOR, NASA 400 Maryland Avenue, SW	1	1/6/83	18130	<i>John P. ...</i>
CHAIRMAN, PFIAB Room 340, OEOB				
DIRECTOR, IDCA Room 3942, Dept. of State				
CHAIRMAN, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, 1717 H. Street, NW				
PRESIDENT, EXPORT-IMPORT BANK 811 Vermont Avenue, NW				
ADMINISTRATOR OF VETERANS AFFAIRS 810 Vermont Avenue, NW				
ADMINISTRATOR, EPA 401 M Street, SW				
POSTMASTER GENERAL 475 L'Enfant Plaza West, SW				
DIRECTOR, SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM 1023 31st Street, NW				
CHAIRMAN, BOARD INTL. BROADCASTING 1030 15th Street, NW				
CHAIRMAN, FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 20th & Constitution Avenue, NW				
CHAIRMAN, FEDERAL COMMUNICATION COMMISSION, 1919 M. Street, NW				
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT. 1900 E Street, NW				
ADMINISTRATOR, NATL SCIENCE FOUNDATION (NSF), 1800 G Street, NW				
ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (FAA) 800 Independence Avenue, SW (DOT)				
MARITIME ADMINISTRATOR (Dept. of Transportation), 400 7th Street, SW				

DATE, TIME & SIGN THIS RECEIPT & RETURN TO: BT MERCHANT, SITUATION ROOM, WHITE HOUSE

WASHFAX ¹⁴

83 JAN 5 P 8: 08

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

-6 JAN 1983 13 06

NMCC-(W)

SITUATION ROOM

C

DECLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES
12/14/15 (CDB)

MESSAGE NO. 894 CLASSIFICATION SECRET/NOFORN PAGES 2

FROM Judge William P. Clark/NBC X2255 GE/01
(NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Reentry of COMUS 1402 (S)

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>EXTENSION</u>
<u>BRAVO</u>	<u>Secretary Of State</u>		
<u>INDIA</u>	<u>Secretary Of Energy</u>		
<u>ALPHA</u>	<u>Director Of Central Intell.</u>		
<u>DELTA</u>	<u>Chairman, Joint Chief Of Staff</u>		
<u>//</u>	<u>SEC DEFENSE</u>		

REMARKS:

URGENT

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Log Number 90006

Date 6 JAN 1983

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Subject: REENTRY OF COSMOS 1402 ~~(S)~~

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Subject: REENTRY OF COSMOS 1402 (S)

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16 P1:21

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Judge Clark	4	<i>[check]</i>	A
John Poindexter	5	<i>[initials]</i>	
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171276	MEMO G. WEISS TO W. CLARK RE RECOMMENDATIONS OF COSMOS 1402 COMMITTEE	1	1/5/1983	B1

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O 071544Z JAN 83 ZFF-4
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4/8/03
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 00267
NODIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, UR, US
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE ON SOVIET SA-5'S TO SYRIA
REF: STATE 004007

1. ~~C~~ ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: IN JANUARY 7 DEMARCHE TO SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KOMPLEKTOV, THE AMBASSADOR CONVEYED POINTS INSTRUCTED REFTEL, SEEKING CLARIFICATION OF SOVIET INTENTIONS AND VIEWS WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENT OF SA-5 MISSILES IN SYRIA. REFUSING TO BE DRAWN INTO THE DETAILS OF THE ISSUE, KOMPLEKTOV REAFFIRMED SOVIET SUPPORT FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND REJECTED ANY SUGGESTION OF SOVIET RESPONSIBILITY FOR CURRENT OR FUTURE TENSIONS IN THE REGION. AS A GENERAL PRINCIPLE, HOWEVER, HE QUESTIONED THE CONSISTENCY OF THE U. S. SUPPLYING ARMS TO ISRAEL WHILE SEEKING TO DENY ITS NEIGHBORS THE RIGHT TO DEFEND THEMSELVES. KOMPLEKTOV AGREED WITH THE AMBASSADOR'S SUGGESTION THAT THE OPPORTUNITY PRESENTED BY THE PALESTINIANS' RELATIVELY MORE POSITIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT NOT BE LOST BUT REITERATED SOVIET OBJECTIONS TO THE U. S. APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT. END SUMMARY.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. THE AMBASSADOR CONVEYED POINTS REFTEL TO SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KOMPLEKTOV JANUARY 7, EMPHASIZING THAT DEPLOYMENT OF SA-5'S COULD HAVE NEGATIVE AND UNFORESEEN EFFECTS ON EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON, THE AMBASSADOR MADE CLEAR THAT SOVIET UNION WOULD BEAR RESPONSIBILITY FOR POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH DEPLOYMENT. HE NOTED THAT PURPOSE OF U. S. DEMARCHE WAS TO CLARIFY SOVIET INTENTIONS AND VIEWS ON THIS ISSUE
4. IN RESPONSE, KOMPLEKTOV:
 - REAFFIRMED SOVIET SUPPORT FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT
 - IN THE MIDDLE EAST, NOTING THAT THE USSR HAD PUT
 - FORWARD SPECIFIC PROPOSALS AND TAKEN SPECIFIC
 - ACTIONS TO THIS END IN THE PAST, INCLUDING SUCH

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PAGE 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 0267 92744 DTG: 071544Z JAN 83 PSN: 067531

- COOPERATIVE EFFORTS WITH THE U. S. AS THE OCTOBER
- 1977 JOINT AGREEMENT ON PRINCIPLES FOR A SETTLEMENT.
- KOMPLEKTOV STRESSED THAT THE USSR HAD THUS PROVED
- ITS "DESIRE AND WILLINGNESS" TO WORK TOWARD A JUST,
- COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT.
- REJECTED ANY SUGGESTION THAT THE USSR "CAN OR WILL"
- BEAR RESPONSIBILITY FOR CURRENT OR FUTURE TENSIONS
- IN THE REGION OR FOR LACK OF PROGRESS TOWARD A
- SETTLEMENT.

5. KOMPLEKTOV STATED THAT WHILE HE SAW NO PURPOSE TO DISCUSSING THE DETAILS OF THE U. S. AND SOVIET APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM OF THE MIDDLE EAST, HE WISHED TO RAISE A POINT OF "PRINCIPLE." THE SITUATION IN THE MIDEAST WAS PRIMARILY A RESULT OF THE "AGGRESSIVE" ACTIONS OF ISRAEL. ISRAEL, HE NOTED, "IS AND HAS BEEN OBTAINING" ARMS WHICH ARE "NOT OF ISRAELI MANUFACTURE." THIS RAISED A QUESTION: WHY SHOULD ONE STATE BE ALLOWED TO CONDUCT AN "EXPANSIONIST FOREIGN POLICY" WHILE ITS VICTIMS ARE DENIED THE MEANS TO DEFEND THEMSELVES.

6. KOMPLEKTOV WELCOMED U. S. EXPRESSIONS OF WILLINGNESS TO TAKE STEPS TO REDUCE TENSIONS -- IF THESE LED TO A SETTLEMENT CORRESPONDING TO THE "VIEWS OF THE ARABS AND TO OBJECTIVE FACTS." ON THE SPECIFIC QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON, THE SOVIET POSITION WAS WELL KNOWN. IT WAS EMBODIED IN SC RESOLUTIONS 508 AND 509, WHICH HE NOTED, WERE PASSED

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WITH U. S. SUPPORT AND THE PROVISIONS OF WHICH WERE UNAMBIGUOUS.

7. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT KOMPLEKTOV'S COMMENTS, LIKE THE AMBASSADOR'S PREVIOUS CONVERSATION WITH KORNIYENKO ON THE MIDDLE EAST, HAD CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED DIFFERENCES IN THE U. S. AND SOVIET POSITIONS ON THE PATH TO A JUST, COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. SOVIETS SOUGHT TO APPROACH THE PROBLEM ON THE LEVEL OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES -- SOME OF WHICH WERE NOT SHARED BY ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED. THE U. S. APPROACH SOUGHT TO ISOLATE PROBLEMS AND SOLVE THEM ONE AT A TIME. THE U. S. APPROACH HAD RECENTLY SHOWN SIGNS OF PROGRESS IN RECONCILING THE DIFFERENCES AMONG THE VARIOUS PARTIES. THE VISITS OF THE FEZ GROUP AND THE RECENT HUSSEIN VISIT HAD HELPED. IT WAS IN THE INTEREST OF NEITHER SIDE THAT FURTHER

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2152

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 00267
NODIS

COMPLICATIONS BE INTRODUCED AT THIS STAGE. THE U. S.
WAS RAISING THE SA-5 ISSUE TO AVOID SUCH COMPLICATIONS.

8. KOMPLEKTOV CLAIMED TO SEE AN INCONSISTENCY IN THE
U. S. POSITION -- AGAIN ON THE LEVEL OF PRINCIPLE. ON
THE ONE HAND, "COUNTRY A" SHOULD ORGANIZE ITS DEFENSE
WITHIN THE CONFINES OF ITS BORDERS -- A PERFECTLY
LEGITIMATE, REASONABLE PROPOSITION. ON THE OTHER,
"COUNTRY B" SHOULD SEE TO ITS DEFENSE BY MEANS OF
"STRIKES" AGAINST ITS NEIGHBORS. "FOR PURPOSES OF
LOGIC OR INTERNATIONAL LAW," THE SECOND POSITION IS
INCONSISTENT WITH THE FIRST.

9. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT KOMPLEKTOV'S DESCRIPTION
DID NOT CONFORM TO THE FACTS. MOREOVER, IT IGNORED
THE FACT THAT THE INTRODUCTION OF SA-5'S NOW WOULD
CREATE A RISK OF WIDENING THE CONFLICT. THIS WAS IN
NO ONE'S INTEREST.

10. KOMPLEKTOV DID NOT DISPUTE THE POINT, BUT NOTED
IT WAS EASY TO RATIONALIZE THE ACTIONS OF THE SIDE
WITH WHICH ONE SYMPATHIZED. RETURNING TO THE QUESTION
OF THE MERITS OF THE U. S. AND SOVIET APPROACHES, HE
CLAIMED THAT THE U. S. STEP-BY-STEP POLICY HAD NOT, IN
PRACTICE, PROVED TO BE "PRACTICAL," NOTING THAT SO

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FAR IT HAD SUCCEEDED ONLY IN ISOLATING THE CONSEQUENCES
OF REPEATED ACTS OF ISRAELI AGGRESSION. THE TIME HAD
COME TO CONSIDER ANOTHER APPROACH. THE AMBASSADOR
OBSERVED THAT KOMPLEKTOV WAS OVERLOOKING THE GREATER
WILLINGNESS ON THE PART OF THE PALESTINIANS TO WORK
TOWARD A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. KOMPLEKTOV AGREED THAT
THIS WAS A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT BUT NOTED IT WAS
INADEQUATE. IN A COMPLEX SITUATION LIKE THAT IN THE
MIDDLE EAST, IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO SINGLE OUT THE
PALESTINIANS. THERE MUST ALSO BE CHANGE ON THE PART
OF ISRAEL -- AND OF THE U. S.

11. IN A MORE PHILOSOPHICAL VEIN, KOMPLEKTOV NOTED
THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE CURRENTLY FEELING "TEN FEET
TALL." THIS WAS INTERFERING WITH WHAT HE DESCRIBED
AS THE TRADITIONAL FORESIGHT OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE

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PAGE 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 0267 92744 DTG: 071544Z JAN 83 PSN: 067533

(A TRAIT, HE NOTED IN AN ASIDE, WHICH MADE THEM SUCH GOOD CHESS PLAYERS). IT WAS ALSO RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR CURRENT INTRACTABILITY. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT, WHILE THE ABSENCE OF A SOVIET DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE MAY HAVE MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR MOSCOW TO APPRECIATE THE FACT, CHANGES WERE TAKING PLACE IN ISRAEL, AND THE U.S. REMAINED HOPEFUL THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD ADOPT A MORE POSITIVE APPROACH.

12. THE AMBASSADOR IN CONCLUSION REITERATED OUR CONCERNS WITH RESPECT TO THE POSSIBLE IMPACT OF SA-5 DEPLOYMENTS IN SYRIA. HE NOTED THAT, WHILE THIS AND OTHER EXCHANGES WITH THE SOVIETS MADE CLEAR THE DIFFERENCES IN OUR APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM, IT WAS USEFUL TO CONTINUE SUCH DISCUSSIONS. KOMPLEKTOV AGREED. HARTMAN

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, UR, US
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE ON SOVIET SA-5'S TO SYRIA
REF: STATE 004007

1. ~~C~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: IN JANUARY 7 DEMARCHE TO SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KOMPLEKTOV, THE AMBASSADOR CONVEYED POINTS INSTRUCTED REFTEL, SEEKING CLARIFICATION OF SOVIET INTENTIONS AND VIEWS WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENT OF SA-5 MISSILES IN SYRIA. REFUSING TO BE DRAWN INTO THE DETAILS OF THE ISSUE, KOMPLEKTOV REAFFIRMED SOVIET SUPPORT FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND REJECTED ANY SUGGESTION OF SOVIET RESPONSIBILITY FOR CURRENT OR FUTURE TENSIONS IN THE REGION. AS A GENERAL PRINCIPLE, HOWEVER, HE QUESTIONED THE CONSISTENCY OF THE U.S. SUPPLYING ARMS TO ISRAEL WHILE SEEKING TO DENY ITS NEIGHBORS THE RIGHT TO DEFEND THEMSELVES. KOMPLEKTOV AGREED WITH THE AMBASSADOR'S SUGGESTION THAT THE OPPORTUNITY PRESENTED BY THE PALESTINIANS' RELATIVELY MORE POSITIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT NOT BE LOST BUT REITERATED SOVIET OBJECTIONS TO THE U.S. APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT. END SUMMARY.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. THE AMBASSADOR CONVEYED POINTS REFTEL TO SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KOMPLEKTOV JANUARY 7. EMPHASIZING THAT DEPLOYMENT OF SA-5'S COULD HAVE NEGATIVE AND UNFORESEEN EFFECTS ON EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON, THE AMBASSADOR MADE CLEAR THAT SOVIET UNION WOULD BEAR RESPONSIBILITY FOR POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH DEPLOYMENT. HE NOTED THAT PURPOSE OF U.S. DEMARCHE WAS TO CLARIFY SOVIET INTENTIONS AND VIEWS ON THIS ISSUE.

4. IN RESPONSE, KOMPLEKTOV:
-- REAFFIRMED SOVIET SUPPORT FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT
- IN THE MIDDLE EAST, NOTING THAT THE USSR HAD PUT
- FORWARD SPECIFIC PROPOSALS AND TAKEN SPECIFIC
- ACTIONS TO THIS END IN THE PAST, INCLUDING SUCH

- COOPERATIVE EFFORTS WITH THE U.S. AS THE OCTOBER
- 1977 JOINT AGREEMENT ON PRINCIPLES FOR A SETTLEMENT.
- KOMPLEKTOV STRESSED THAT THE USSR HAD THUS PROVED
- ITS "DESIRE AND WILLINGNESS" TO WORK TOWARD A JUST,
- COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT.
-- REJECTED ANY SUGGESTION THAT THE USSR "CAN OR WILL"
- BEAR RESPONSIBILITY FOR CURRENT OR FUTURE TENSIONS
- IN THE REGION OR FOR LACK OF PROGRESS TOWARD A
- SETTLEMENT.

5. KOMPLEKTOV STATED THAT WHILE HE SAW NO PURPOSE TO DISCUSSING THE DETAILS OF THE U.S. AND SOVIET APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM OF THE MIDDLE EAST, HE WISHED TO RAISE A POINT OF "PRINCIPLE." THE SITUATION IN THE MIDEAST WAS PRIMARILY A RESULT OF THE "AGGRESSIVE" ACTIONS OF ISRAEL. ISRAEL, HE NOTED, "IS AND HAS BEEN OBTAINING" ARMS WHICH ARE "NOT OF ISRAELI MANUFACTURE." THIS RAISED A QUESTION: WHY SHOULD ONE STATE BE ALLOWED TO CONDUCT AN "EXPANSIONIST FOREIGN POLICY" WHILE ITS VICTIMS ARE DENIED THE MEANS TO DEFEND THEMSELVES.

6. KOMPLEKTOV WELCOMED U.S. EXPRESSIONS OF WILLINGNESS TO TAKE STEPS TO REDUCE TENSIONS -- IF THESE LED TO A SETTLEMENT CORRESPONDING TO THE "VIEWS OF THE ARABS AND TO OBJECTIVE FACTS." ON THE SPECIFIC QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON, THE SOVIET POSITION WAS WELL KNOWN. IT WAS EMBODIED IN SC RESOLUTIONS 508 AND 509, WHICH HE NOTED, WERE PASSED

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WITH U.S. SUPPORT AND THE PROVISIONS OF WHICH WERE UNAMBIGUOUS.

7. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT KOMPLEKTOV'S COMMENTS, LIKE THE AMBASSADOR'S PREVIOUS CONVERSATION WITH KORNIYENKO ON THE MIDDLE EAST, HAD CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED DIFFERENCES IN THE U.S. AND SOVIET POSITIONS ON THE PATH TO A JUST, COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. SOVIETS SOUGHT TO APPROACH THE PROBLEM ON THE LEVEL OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES -- SOME OF WHICH WERE NOT SHARED BY ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED. THE U.S. APPROACH SOUGHT TO ISOLATE PROBLEMS AND SOLVE THEM ONE AT A TIME. THE U.S. APPROACH HAD RECENTLY SHOWN SIGNS OF PROGRESS IN RECONCILING THE DIFFERENCES AMONG THE VARIOUS PARTIES. THE VISITS OF THE FEZ GROUP AND THE RECENT HUSSEIN VISIT HAD HELPED. IT WAS IN THE INTEREST OF NEITHER SIDE THAT FURTHER

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 0267 6 DTG: 071544Z JAN 83 PSN: 067533
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DE RUEHMO #0267/02 0071549

O 071544Z JAN 83 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

MOSCOW 0267 6 DTG: 071544Z JAN 83 PSN: 067533

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2152

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 00267

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COMPLICATIONS BE INTRODUCED AT THIS STAGE. THE U.S. WAS RAISING THE SA-5 ISSUE TO AVOID SUCH COMPLICATIONS.

8. KOMPLEKTOV CLAIMED TO SEE AN INCONSISTENCY IN THE U.S. POSITION -- AGAIN ON THE LEVEL OF PRINCIPLE. ON THE ONE HAND, "COUNTRY A" SHOULD ORGANIZE ITS DEFENSE WITHIN THE CONFINES OF ITS BORDERS -- A PERFECTLY LEGITIMATE, REASONABLE PROPOSITION. ON THE OTHER, "COUNTRY B" SHOULD SEE TO ITS DEFENSE BY MEANS OF "STRIKES" AGAINST ITS NEIGHBORS. "FOR PURPOSES OF LOGIC OR INTERNATIONAL LAW," THE SECOND POSITION IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE FIRST.

9. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT KOMPLEKTOV'S DESCRIPTION DID NOT CONFORM TO THE FACTS. MOREOVER, IT IGNORED THE FACT THAT THE INTRODUCTION OF SA-5'S NOW WOULD CREATE A RISK OF WIDENING THE CONFLICT. THIS WAS IN NO ONE'S INTEREST.

10. KOMPLEKTOV DID NOT DISPUTE THE POINT, BUT NOTED IT WAS EASY TO RATIONALIZE THE ACTIONS OF THE SIDE WITH WHICH ONE SYMPATHIZED. RETURNING TO THE QUESTION OF THE MERITS OF THE U.S. AND SOVIET APPROACHES, HE CLAIMED THAT THE U.S. STEP-BY-STEP POLICY HAD NOT, IN PRACTICE, PROVED TO BE "PRACTICAL," NOTING THAT SO

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FAR IT HAD SUCCEEDED ONLY IN ISOLATING THE CONSEQUENCES OF REPEATED ACTS OF ISRAELI AGGRESSION. THE TIME HAD COME TO CONSIDER ANOTHER APPROACH. THE AMBASSADOR OBSERVED THAT KOMPLEKTOV WAS OVERLOOKING THE GREATER WILLINGNESS ON THE PART OF THE PALESTINIANS TO WORK TOWARD A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. KOMPLEKTOV AGREED THAT THIS WAS A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT BUT NOTED IT WAS INADEQUATE. IN A COMPLEX SITUATION LIKE THAT IN THE MIDDLE EAST, IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO SINGLE OUT THE PALESTINIANS. THERE MUST ALSO BE CHANGE ON THE PART OF ISRAEL -- AND OF THE U.S.

11. IN A MORE PHILOSOPHICAL VEIN, KOMPLEKTOV NOTED THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE CURRENTLY FEELING "TEN FEET TALL." THIS WAS INTERFERING WITH WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS THE TRADITIONAL FORESIGHT OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE

(A TRAIT, HE NOTED IN AN ASIDE, WHICH MADE THEM SUCH GOOD CHESS PLAYERS). IT WAS ALSO RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR CURRENT INTRACTABILITY. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT, WHILE THE ABSENCE OF A SOVIET DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE MAY HAVE MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR MOSCOW TO APPRECIATE THE FACT, CHANGES WERE TAKING PLACE IN ISRAEL, AND THE U.S. REMAINED HOPEFUL THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD ADOPT A MORE POSITIVE APPROACH.

12. THE AMBASSADOR IN CONCLUSION REITERATED OUR CONCERNS WITH RESPECT TO THE POSSIBLE IMPACT OF SA-5 DEPLOYMENTS IN SYRIA. HE NOTED THAT, WHILE THIS AND OTHER EXCHANGES WITH THE SOVIETS MADE CLEAR THE DIFFERENCES IN OUR APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM, IT WAS USEFUL TO CONTINUE SUCH DISCUSSIONS. KOMPLEKTOV AGREED. HARTMAN

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 59192744 DTG: 082102Z JAN 83 PSN: 069121
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NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

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DE RUEHC #5919 0082112
O 082102Z JAN 83 ZFF6
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DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-23-39-5-5

BY 66DB NARA DATE 4/8/03

TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1470

INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 4488
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 465
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 005919
NODIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: UR, SY
SUBJECT: EAGLEBURGER-DOBRYNIN MEETING RE SA-5'S TO SYRIA

REF: (A) STATE 4007 ; (B) MOSCOW 267

1. ~~S~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER CALLED IN AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN ON JANUARY 7 TO STRESS OUR CONCERN OVER THE SOVIET SUPPLY OF SA-5 MISSILES TO SYRIA. ALSO PRESENT WERE NEA ASSISTANT SECRETARY VELIOTES, EUR ASSISTANT SECRETARY-DESIGNATE BURT AND P STAFFER JOHNSON (NOTETAKER).

3. EAGLEBURGER BEGAN BY NOTING THAT AMBASSADOR HARTMAN HAD ALREADY PRESENTED OUR POINTS TO THE MFA IN MOSCOW (REB B), BUT THE SECRETARY WANTED DOBRYNIN TO BE INFORMED AS WELL TO UNDERSCORE THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO THE ISSUE.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

4. AFTER READING THE NON-PAPER, DOBRYNIN SAID HE WAS NOT INFORMED ABOUT THE MATTER, BUT HE SAW THREE POINTS TO MAKE IN RESPONSE: FIRST, BY OUR OWN ACCOUNT, THE MISSILES WERE IN SYRIAN TERRITORY, AND WERE GROUND TO AIR MISSILES CLEARLY INTENDED TO DEFEND SYRIA AGAINST ISRAELI AIR RAIDS.

WERE WE SUGGESTING THAT SYRIA DID NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO DEFEND ITSELF? SECONDLY, THIS ISSUE HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE PRAGUE MEETING OF WARSAW PACT LEADERS OR THE STATEMENTS WHICH WERE ISSUED THERE. THIRDLY, THE SOVIET UNION HAS AGREEMENTS UNDER WHICH IT PROVIDES ARMS TO SYRIA TO HELP IT DEFEND ITSELF. BUT THE US PROVIDES FAR MORE WEAPONRY TO ISRAEL, AND THIS IS THE SOURCE OF THE PROBLEM IN THE REGION. THE ISRAELIS ARE STILL OCCUPYING LEBANON

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AND THREATENING OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION.

5. EAGLEBURGER REPLIED THAT THE KEY POINT OF OUR CONCERN IS THE RANGE OF THE MISSILES: THEY CAN REACH ALL OF LEBANESE AND MUCH OF ISRAELI AIRSPACE, AND THIS INCREASE IN CAPABILITIES IS DESTABILIZING. SHULTZ

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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SIT803 DATE 02/20/83 TOR: 007/0318Z

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NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

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DE RUEHC #4007 0062352
O 062330Z JAN 83 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1409

INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 4610
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 4456
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 5877
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~~SECRET~~ STATE 004007
NODIS
FOR AMBASSADOR HARTMAN
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, US, UR, SY, IS, XF
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE TO THE SOVIETS ON DELIVERY OF SA-5
- - - MISSILES TO SYRIA

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR 748-2J39-6-4
BY 1603 NARA DATE 4/8/73

1. ~~(S)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. UNDERSECRETARY EAGLEBURGER WILL MEET WITH AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN ON FRIDAY, JANUARY 7 TO MAKE THE POINTS BELOW ON THE PROSPECT OF SOVIET SUPPLY OF SA-5 MISSILES TO SYRIA. WITHOUT WAITING FOR A REPORT OF THIS MEETING, YOU SHOULD ARRANGE AN APPOINTMENT WITH GROMYKO OR KORNIYENKO TO MAKE THE SAME POINTS. WE HOPE THEREBY TO IMPRESS THE SOVIETS WITH THE SERIOUSNESS OF OUR CONCERN ON THIS ISSUE AND TO INCREASE CHANCES FOR ELICITING A HIGH-LEVEL REACTION REGARDING SOVIET INTENTIONS CONCERNING THESE MISSILES.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. BEGIN TALKING POINTS TO BE USED BY UNDERSECRETARY EAGLEBURGER:

--OUR INFORMATION INDICATES THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS PREPARING TO SUPPLY SYRIA WITH THE SA-5 GROUND-TO-AIR MISSILE. I AM CERTAIN THAT YOU ARE AWARE OF THE RECENT ISRAELI GOVERNMENT STATEMENT THAT THE SYRIANS ARE

CONSTRUCTING TWO BASES FOR SUCH MISSILES WITHIN SYRIA. ONE CAN ONLY ASSUME THAT THEY WILL BE MANNED BY SOVIET TECHNICIANS AT LEAST INITIALLY.

--IF THE SYRIANS ARE TO RECEIVE SUCH MISSILES, WE WOULD REGARD THIS AS AN IMPORTANT NEGATIVE DEVELOPMENT IN THE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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REGION--AN EVENT WHICH WOULD CREATE NEW APPREHENSIONS AND UNCERTAINTIES AND THUS INCREASE CHANCES FOR RENEWED CONFLICT IN THE AREA.

--THE RANGE OF THESE MISSILES COULD CREATE CONFUSION AS TO WHETHER THEY WOULD BE USED IN OPERATIONS BEYOND SYRIA'S BORDERS. WHAT WOULD BE THE PURPOSE OF DEPLOYMENT OF SUCH LONG-RANGE WEAPONS?

--MOREOVER, THE INTRODUCTION OF THESE WEAPONS COULD HAVE NEGATIVE AND UNFORESEEN EFFECTS ON THE ONGOING EFFORTS TO INDUCE ALL EXTERNAL FORCES TO LEAVE LEBANON. WE STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON WOULD ENHANCE THE SECURITY OF LEBANON'S NEIGHBORS.

--THE SOVIET UNION IS AWARE OF THE UNPREDICTABLE RESULTS AND THE CYCLES OF VIOLENCE WHICH HAVE OCCURRED BECAUSE OF PREVIOUS MISCALCULATIONS AND UNCERTAINTIES IN THIS REGION. THOSE WHO COULD HAVE TAKEN STEPS TO PREVENT AN ESCALATION OF TENSIONS BUT HAVE INSTEAD EXACERBATED THE SITUATION THROUGH THE SUPPLY OF ARMS AND THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF EXTREMISM HAVE HAD TO PAY THE CONSEQUENCES FOR THEIR ACTIONS. THE SOVIET UNION WILL BEAR THE FULL RESPONSIBILITY SHOULD IT PROCEED WITH THIS NEWEST DEPLOYMENT.

--SUCH A STEP SEEMS HARDLY IN KEEPING WITH THE TONE AND CONTENT OF THE WARSAW PACT COMMUNIQUE, AS REPORTED BY THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

MEDIA. IF THE SYRIAN DEPLOYMENT WERE TO PROCEED, IT WOULD INDICATE THAT THE PRAGUE STATEMENT LACKED SERIOUSNESS.

--BOTH THE U. S. AND THE USSR ARE ALSO AWARE OF THE DAMAGE WHICH REGIONAL INCIDENTS HAVE OFTEN INFLICTED ON THE OVERALL STATE OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS. BOTH OUR COUNTRIES HAVE RECENTLY EXPRESSED A DESIRE FOR IMPROVED BILATERAL RELATIONS. WE HAVE BOTH NOTED THAT SUCH AN IMPROVEMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE BASED ON CONCRETE ACTIONS, AND THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO DO ITS PART.

--WE HOPE THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS THE SAME INTENTION. RESTRAINT AND PRUDENCE ON YOUR PART WOULD BE A SIGNIFICANT SIGN OF YOUR COMMITMENT TO THIS NEW SPIRIT. SHULTZ

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

171280

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 0442 1124 DTG: 121609Z JAN 83 PSN: 074285
SIT775 DATE 01/18/83 TOR: 012/2056Z

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

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DE RUEHMO #0442/01 0121613
O 121609Z JAN 83
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2267

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN 4125
AMEMBASSY LONDON 5826
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AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 3865
USLO RIYADH 0058
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 00442
EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UR, PLO, XF
SUBJECT: ARAFAT'S VISIT TO MOSCOW

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

REF: AMMAN 258

1. ~~ENTIRE~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: ARAFAT RECEIVED A LOW-KEYED RECEPTION UPON HIS ARRIVAL IN MOSCOW JANUARY 11, IN KEEPING WITH THE COOLING IN RELATIONS SINCE THE JUNE INVASION OF LEBANON. IF THE SOVIETS SHARE AMMAN'S FEELINGS THAT ARAFAT MAY BE NEARING A DECISION ON PALESTINIAN PARTICIPATION IN TALKS WITH THE ISRAELIS (REFTEL), THE VISIT PROMISES TO BE A ROUGH ONE. END SUMMARY.

3. YASSIR ARAFAT ARRIVED IN MOSCOW JANUARY 11 TO A

LESS THAN ROUSING WELCOME. THE GROUP WHICH MET HIM AT THE AIRPORT WAS HEADED BY DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT, KAREN BRUTENTS, AND INCLUDED DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KAPITSA. EVENING TELEVISION NEWS MADE ONLY FLEETING REFERENCE TO ARAFAT'S ARRIVAL, WHICH TASS DESCRIBED AS "A BRIEF, WORKING VISIT." (PROTOCOL-CONSCIOUS MOSCOW STILL CANNOT SEEM TO DESCRIBE ARAFAT'S VISITS AS "OFFICIAL" DESPITE BREZHNEV'S ELEVATION OF THE PLO'S OFFICE HERE TO "EMBASSY STATUS" IN OCTOBER 1981.)

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 74823-39-73

BY COT NARA DATE 4/8/13

4. MFA OFFICIALS WERE COY ON THE PURPOSE OF ARAFAT'S VISIT, SAYING ONLY THAT "SUFFICIENT TIME" HAS ELAPSED SINCE SOVIET LEADERS HELD DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PLO LEADER. ARAFAT WAS IN MOSCOW FOR BREZHNEV'S FUNERAL LAST NOVEMBER, BUT SOVIET OFFICIALS HAVE MAINTAINED IT PROVED "IMPOSSIBLE" TO ARRANGE ANY DISCUSSIONS AT THAT TIME.

5. IN FACT, RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIETS AND ARAFAT, IF NOT FATAH AND THE PLO, APPEAR COOL IN THE WAKE OF MOSCOW'S DO-NOTHING POLICY FOLLOWING ISRAEL'S INVASION OF LEBANON LAST JUNE. SOVIETS HERE HAVE NATURALLY SOUGHT TO DISMISS ANY CHANGE IN RELATIONS, BUT HAVE TAKEN PAINS LATELY TO DESCRIBE ARAFAT TO US AS "ONLY ONE OF THE LEADERS OF THE PALESTINIAN LIBERATION

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

MOVEMENT." SOVIET PRESS ATTENTION TO ARAFAT'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS HAVE ALSO TRAILED OFF IN RECENT MONTHS. WHILE PRAVDA OR TASS HAS OCCASIONALLY NOTED ARAFAT'S STATEMENTS POINTING OUT SHORTCOMINGS IN THE REAGAN INITIATIVE, FOR EXAMPLE, OR PRAISING SOVIET SUPPORT, SOVIET MEDIA HAVE TENDED TO FOCUS ON ALTERNATIVE PALESTINIAN SPOKESMEN SUCH AS PLO EXCOM MEMBER KHALIFA (ACCORDING TO OUR RECORDS A MEMBER OF SAIQA), HAWATMEH, OR GEORGE HABBASH.

6. WE EXPECT THE SOVIETS WILL USE THEIR MEETINGS WITH ARAFAT TO A) GLEAN FIRST-HAND INFORMATION ON THE STATE OF PLAY OF THE PLO-JORDANIAN TALKS AND B) PRESS HIM NOT TO MOVE TOO FAR TOWARDS ANY ACCOMMODATION ON THE REAGAN INITIATIVE. WE EXPECT MOSCOW WILL URGE THAT ARAFAT ADHERE STRICTLY TO THE FEZ DECLARATION AND MAY TRY TO NUDGE HIM TOWARDS REVIVIFYING THE STEADFASTNESS FRONT AS A MEANS OF STIFFENING HIS POSITION ON PALESTINIAN STATEHOOD.

7. MOSCOW UNDERSTANDS FULLY THAT IT MUST TRY TO REFORGE LINKS WITH ITS MAIN ALLIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST IF IT IS NOT TO BECOME FURTHER ISOLATED, ALONG WITH SYRIA, FROM THE MAINSTREAM OF EVENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH THE PLO WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT COMPONENT OF SUCH A POLICY AND WOULD HELP AUGMENT MOSCOW'S LONGER TERM OBJECTIVE OF BLOCKING PROGRESS ON

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 0442 1124 DTG:121609Z JAN 83 PSN: 074286
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O 121609Z JAN 83
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2268

- INFO AMEMBASSY BONN 4126
 - AMEMBASSY LONDON 5827
 - AMEMBASSY PARIS 2993
 - AMEMBASSY ROME 8237
 - USMISSION USNATO 3052
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 - USLO RIYADH 0069
- BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 00442
EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UR, PLO, XF
SUBJECT: ARAFAT'S VISIT TO MOSCOW
U.S.-SPONSORED INITIATIVES. NEVERTHELESS, IF THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SOVIETS SHARE THE FEELING IN AMMAN (REFTEL) THAT ARAFAT
MAY BE MOVING CLOSER TO ASSENTING TO THE FORMATION OF A
JOINT JORDANIAN-NON-PLO DELEGATION FOR PEACE TALKS WITH
ISRAEL, MOSCOW CAN BE EXPECTED TO EXHORT CONSIDERABLE
PRESSURE ON HIM TO PREVENT IT.

8. LATE ITEM: TASS REPORTED THAT ARAFAT WAS RECEIVED
BY ANDROPOV JANUARY 12 BUT GAVE NO DETAILS. HARTMAN

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

171281

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 0447 1124 DTG: 121716Z JAN 83 PSN: 074053
SIT777 DATE 01/18/83 TOR: 012/1741Z

QUESTIONS PUT TO HIM BY VOGEL BE PROTECTED, SINCE VOGEL HAS APPARENTLY NOT SHARED THEM WITH THE PRESS OR EVEN WITH HIS OWN PARTY YET.

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O 121716Z JAN 83
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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BY COB I

JATE 4/8/0

4. ANDROPOV WAS GENERALLY CRITICAL OF ALLEGED U.S. DRIVE FOR MILITARY SUPERIORITY, CITING U.S. PLANS TO DEPLOY NUCLEAR MISSILES IN EUROPE, U.S. REARMING OF JAPAN AND U.S. CREATION OF CENTCOM. VOGEL REFUTED THIS VIEW AND ASSURED ANDROPOV ON BASIS OF WASHINGTON VISIT THAT U.S. LEADERS WANTED PEACE. HE SAID HE WAS CONVINCED THAT ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS BETWEEN U.S. AND USSR ARE FEASIBLE.

5. ANDROPOV OFFERED HIS STANDARD LANGUAGE ON START -- THERE SHOULD BE A 25 PERCENT REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC ARMS, ENCOMPASSING ALL TYPES OF SYSTEMS.

6. ON INF, ANDROPOV DENIGRATED THE U.S. ZERO OPTION. HE REPEATED HIS DECEMBER 21 OFFER TO REDUCE SOVIET MISSILES TO LEVEL OF FRENCH AND BRITISH MISSILES. HE SAID THE FRG, BY ACCEPTING DEPLOYMENT OF US INF MISSILES, WOULD MAKE ITSELF THE BULLSEYE OF THE TARGET FOR SOVIET COUNTERMEASURES, AND ITS SECURITY WOULD THUS BE REDUCED. PREVIOUS FRG GOVERNMENT HAD MADE A GRAVE ERROR IN BACKING NATO DECISION, AND SOVIETS HOPED

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2278

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USMISSION USNATO 3060
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BT

MOSCOW 0447 1124 DTG: 121716Z JAN 83 PSN: 074053

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SPD IF IT CAME TO POWER WOULD REMEDY THIS. ANDROPOV ALSO REITERATED INITIAL SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR REDUCTION OF INF SYSTEMS TO ONE-THIRD OF EXISTING LEVELS. VOGEL RESPONDED BY STRESSING SPD DESIRE TO ACHIEVE RESULT IN GENEVA THAT WOULD OBIVIATE NEED FOR DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. MISSILES, FOR WHICH SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION OF SS-20S WOULD BE REQUIRED. HE PRAISED POSITIVE ASPECTS OF DECEMBER 21 PROPOSAL -- ITS EMPHASIS ON REDUCTIONS AND ITS WILLINGNESS TO TREAT MISSILES AND AIRCRAFT SEPARATELY.

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 00447
EXDIS

USINF/USSTART
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MNUC, PARM
SUBJECT: VOGEL - ANDROPOV MEETING -- ARMS CONTROL ASPECTS

1. ~~8~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: ANDROPOV LEANED HEAVILY ON SPD LEADER VOGEL IN JANUARY 11 MEETING TO AVOID DEPLOYMENT ON GERMAN SOIL OF U.S. INF MISSILES. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION, ANDROPOV SAID INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TO BE REDUCED UNDER HIS DECEMBER 21 PUBLIC PROPOSAL WOULD BE EITHER DESTROYED OR WITHDRAWN BEHIND AGREED LINE. SOME MISSILES WOULD BE RELOCATED TO FAR EAST, AS COUNTERWEIGHT TO U.S. WEAPONS IN JAPAN. ANDROPOV INDICATED THAT INF BALANCE COULD BE DRAWN WITH RESPECT TO WARHEADS AS WELL AS LAUNCHERS, AND NOTED ALLIED PLANS TO EXPAND WARHEADS. END SUMMARY.

7. VOGEL ASKED WHETHER SOVIETS PLANNED TO NEGOTIATE WITH FRANCE OR BRITAIN, OR TO LINK INF WITH START. ANDROPOV SAID SOVIETS WERE CURRENTLY NEGOTIATING ONLY WITH U.S., BUT COULD NEGOTIATE WITH BRITAIN OR FRANCE IF NECESSARY. HE STRESSED THAT SOVIET OBJECTIVE WAS NOT NECESSARILY REDUCTIONS OF FRENCH OR BRITISH SYSTEMS, BUT TO HAVE THEM TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN OVERALL AGREEMENT.

3. ANDROPOV MEETING WITH SPD CANDIDATE FOR CHANCELLOR HANS-JOCHEN VOGEL LASTED TWO-AND-A-HALF HOURS, OF WHICH 15 MINUTES WAS TETE-A-TETE. BASED ON FRG EMBASSY BRIEFING, FOLLOWING ARE KEY POINTS IN ARMS CONTROL SPHERE (OTHER SUBJECTS WILL BE REPORTED SEPTEL TOGETHER WITH REPORTS OF VOGEL'S ADDITIONAL MEETINGS). FRG EMBASSY ASKED THAT DETAILS OF ANDROPOV'S ANSWERS TO SPECIFIC

8. VOGEL ASKED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO MISSILES REDUCED UNDER ANDROPOV'S DEC. 21 FORMULA. ANDROPOV SAID A PART OF THEM WOULD BE DESTROYED, WHILE ANOTHER PART WOULD BE WITHDRAWN BEHIND AGREED LINES, RELOCATED TO THE FAR EAST, WHERE THEY WOULD SERVE AS A COUNTERWEIGHT

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SECRET

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O 121716Z JAN 83
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 00447

EXD15

USINF/USSTART

TO NEW U.S. ARMS IN JAPAN. FOR THE MOMENT, USSR WAS TALKING IN GENEVA ONLY ABOUT EUROPE. PERHAPS AT A LATER DATE SOVIETS WOULD TALK SEPARATELY WITH CHINA AND JAPAN.

9. VOGEL ASKED HOW UK AND FRENCH SYSTEMS SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT--BY LAUNCHERS OR WARHEADS. ANDROPOV SAID THE USSR WAS READY TO ESTABLISH A BALANCE WITH REGARD TO WARHEADS AS WELL AS LAUNCHERS. VOGEL ASKED WHETHER THIS MEANT REDUCING TO 162 WARHEADS. ANDROPOV

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PARRIED THE QUESTION BY MENTIONING WESTERN PLANS FOR "EXPANSION."

10. VOGEL ASKED WHETHER AGREEMENT ON AIRCRAFT WOULD BE PURSUED IN INF TALKS OR ELSEWHERE. ANDROPOV SAID THIS SUBJECT HAD ALREADY COME UP IN INF, BUT U.S. DID NOT WANT TO DISCUSS IT. HE SAID SOVIET GOAL WAS NOT FORMAL PARITY, BUT PARITY IN SUBSTANCE (OR ESSENTIAL PARITY). THE TWO SIDES NEEDED TO FIND A COMMON DENOMINATOR.

11. VOGEL ASKED ABOUT SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES. ANDROPOV SAID THE USSR HAD NO PLANS FOR EXPANDING ITS SHORT-RANGE POTENTIAL, BUT WOULD RESSOND IF THE WEST DID SO. THE USSR RREFERRED A "REEL" ZERO OPTION, BUT

12. ON MBFR, ANDROPOV ADOPTED THE STANDARD SOVIET APPROACH, ARGUING FOR REDUCTIONS WITHOUT AGREEMENT ON DATA. HE SAID THAT SOVIETS WOULD "IN ADDITION TO REDUCTION OF 20,000 TROOPS ALREADY IMPLEMENTED" BE PREPARED TO REDUCE AN ADDITIONAL 20,000 TROOPS IN EXCHANGE FOR U.S. REDUCTION OF 13,000.

13. GERMANS ANTICIPATED THAT SOME OF THESE POINTS WOULD BE AMPLIFIED IN MEETING BETWEEN BAHR AND PONOMAREV ON JAN. 12, READOUT OF WHICH IS NOT YET AVAILABLE.
HARTMAN

SECRET

M²

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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O 131602Z JAN 83
FM ANEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2306

INFO USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 3066
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SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 00499

EXDIS
USINF/USSTART
DEPARTMENT PASS USNMR SHAPE BE
E.O. 12336: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MNUC, PARM
SUBJECT: GERMAN DIPLOMATS URGE SHIFT OF BRITISH AND
FRENCH SYSTEMS FROM INF TO START

REF: PARIS 1267

1. (S) SUMMARY: GERMAN DIPLOMATS IN MOSCOW THINK SPD

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

LEADER VOGEL HAS NOT YET MADE UP HIS MIND ON INF DEPLOYMENTS. [REDACTED] THE GERMANS HAVE TOLD FRENCH COLLEAGUES HERE THAT, WHEN VOGEL IS IN PARIS JANUARY 13, THE FRENCH SHOULD SEEK TO PERSUADE HIM THAT BRITISH AND FRENCH FORCES OUGHT TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN START RATHER THAN IN INF. ACCORDING TO THE GERMAN RATIONALE, THIS MIGHT MAKE IT EASIER FOR VOGEL NOW TO BACK NATO INF DEPLOYMENTS. IN OUR VIEW, THE IDEA THAT SHIFTING THE THIRD COUNTRY PROBLEM TO START WOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR THE USSR TO DISMANTLE ITS SS-20 FORCE REPRESENTS WISHFUL THINKING. END SUMMARY.

2. (S) [REDACTED] GERMAN DIPLOMATS IN MOSCOW HAVE PASSED TO FRENCH DIPLOMATS

THE FOLLOWING ANALYSIS:

- VOGEL HAS NOT YET MADE UP HIS MIND ON INF DEPLOYMENTS. HE LISTENS TO EVERYONE FIRST.
- HE IS CAREFUL AND THOROUGH.
- PAUL WARNKE, CYRUS VANCE AND BOB HUNTER, BILL HYLAND AND OTHERS HAVE SAID THAT THIRD-COUNTRY SYSTEMS WERE MORE OR LESS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN SALT I AND II.
- IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE, THEREFORE, TO CONVINCE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS THAT THIRD-COUNTRY SYSTEMS CANNOT BE COUNTED AT ALL. VOGEL'S MIND IS STILL OPEN, HOWEVER, ON WHETHER THEY SHOULD BE COUNTED IN INF OR START.
- THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS ARE ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INF AND START TALKS. THEIR APPROACH TO THIS QUESTION IS GUIDED BY A DESIRE THAT NATO NOT HAVE TO DEPLOY U.S. INF MISSILES.
- VOGEL CANNOT BREAK WITH SCHMIDT'S POLICIES. IF HE CAN BE CONVINCED THAT U.S. INF MISSILES ARE NEEDED TO ENSURE THE CREDIBILITY OF COUPLING BETWEEN NATO FORCES AND U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES, VOGEL MIGHT EVEN SUPPORT THE IDEA THAT NATO NEEDS INF DEPLOYMENTS.
- WHEN VOGEL IS IN PARIS, THE FRENCH SHOULD SEEK TO PERSUADE HIM THAT BRITISH AND FRENCH FORCES OUGHT TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN START RATHER THAN IN

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

- INF.
- THE ADVANTAGE VOGEL WOULD SEE IN THIS IS THAT NATO MIGHT THEN HAVE A BETTER CHANCE OF AVERTING INF DEPLOYMENTS. IN THE MEANTIME, IT WOULD BE EASIER FOR VOGEL TO SUPPORT INF DEPLOYMENTS, PENDING AN OUTCOME IN THE GENEVA TALKS.

COMMENT

3. (C) UNTIL NOW WE HAVE NOT HEARD OF EUROPEANS PUSHING THE IDEA OF SHIFTING THIRD-COUNTRY SYSTEMS FROM INF TO START, ALTHOUGH OVER THE PAST YEAR VARIOUS SOVIET STRATEGIC ANALYSTS IN MOSCOW HAVE HINTED THAT THE USSR MIGHT AT SOME POINT CONSIDER THIS STEP. PRESUMABLY EUROPEAN AUTHORITIES REALIZE THAT THE U.S. COULD NOT ACCEPT A START AGREEMENT THAT LEFT THE U.S., EXPLICITLY

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O 131602Z JAN 83
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2307

INFO USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 3067
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 6547
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 00499

EXDYS

USINF/USSTART

OR IMPLICITLY, IN AN INFERIOR POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE
USSR. FURTHERMORE, THE IDEA THAT SHIFTING THE ISSUE
TO START WOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR THE SOVIETS TO DISMANTLE
THEIR SS-20 FORCE -- SO THAT NATO COULD THEN CANCEL INF
DEPLOYMENTS -- STRIKES US AS WISHFUL THINKING ABOUT
LIKELY SOVIET BEHAVIOR. HARTMAN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

171283

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BY 1608 NARA DATE 4/8/03

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ MOSCOW 00515
FOR AMBASSADOR BURNS FROM HARTMAN
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UR, GE
SUBJECT: VOGEL VISIT TO MOSCOW

(C) THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR HERE, ANDREAS MEYER-LANDRUT, TELLS ME EGON BAHR IS PLANNING TO GIVE YOU A BRIEFING ON VOGEL'S RECENT TRIP TO MOSCOW, WHICH WE ARE REPORTING SEPTELS. THE SPD DELEGATION APPARENTLY WENT DIRECTLY TO PARIS FROM HERE, AND HAS NOT YET HAD A CHANCE TO REPORT TO THE SPD AND FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER, SO THAT MAY CAUSE SOME DELAY. BUT I ASSUME YOU WILL BE HEARING FROM BAHR SOON. I WANTED YOU TO KNOW THAT, WHEN I SAW BAHR AT THE GERMAN RECEPTION FOR VOGEL, HE MADE SOME PRETTY UNFLATTERING REMARKS ABOUT U.S. POLICY AND THE PRESIDENT PERSONALLY. THESE WERE SO NASTY THAT I JUST WALKED AWAY FROM HIM AFTER REMARKING THAT HE DIDN'T SEEM TO BE SHOWING MUCH WESTERN SOLIDARITY. BEST REGARDS. ART. HARTMAN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

171284

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 0548 1156 DTG:141711Z JAN 83 PSN: 077327
SIT916 DATE 01/18/83 TOR: 014/1722Z

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DE RUEHMO #0548/01 0141714
O 141711Z JAN 83
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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BY C.D.S. NARA DATE 4/8/83

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2360

INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0979
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 6562
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 0548
FROM THE AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: ILO, ELAB, PORG, UR
SUBJECT: FORCED LABOR IN THE SOVIET UNION
REF: (A) STATE 007652; (B) 82 STATE 316520
(C) 82 STATE 269372

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: ANY ATTEMPT TO RESURRECT THE 1953 ECOSOC-ILO REPORT ON SOVIET FORCED LABOR IN THE ENVIRONMENT OF 1983 IS VERY UNLIKELY TO SERVE U.S. INTERESTS AND COULD BACKFIRE ON US BADLY. END SUMMARY.
3. THERE IS NO QUESTION WHATEVER THAT FORCED LABOR IS USED IN THE SOVIET UNION AND USED WIDELY. THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT POLITICAL PRISONERS ARE ROUTINELY SUBJECTED TO FORCED LABOR OF VARIOUS KINDS. WHETHER THIS FORCED LABOR IS USED DIRECTLY ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF A PROJECT SUCH AS THE SIBERIAN GAS PIPELINE OR

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ONLY ON INFRASTRUCTURE WHICH CONTRIBUTES TO THE PROJECT MAKES LITTLE IF ANY DIFFERENCE TO THE MORAL QUESTIONS INVOLVED. WE SHOULD BE IN NO DOUBT, AND OUR ALLIES SHOULD BE IN NO DOUBT, THAT THE USE OF FORCED LABOR WILL BE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE SOVIET ECONOMIC SYSTEM FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

4. THE QUESTION WE SHOULD ADDRESS IS HOW BEST TO ACCOMPLISH OUR OBJECTIVES OF SETTING A RATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR DOING VARIOUS KINDS OF BUSINESS WITH THE SOVIETS. FORTUNATELY, THE ISSUE OF USE OF FORCED LABOR ON THE GAS PIPELINE WAS DISCOVERED BY THE EUROPEANS AND HAS BEEN HOTLY DISPUTED IN THE MEDIA ON THEIR SIDE OF THE ATLANTIC. THIS IS ALL TO THE GOOD. WE HAVE NOTHING WHATEVER TO GAIN BY GETTING OUT IN

FRONT ON THIS ISSUE. MANY EUROPEANS ALREADY BELIEVE THIS IS AN ARTIFICIAL ISSUE MANUFACTURED BY THE AMERICANS. FOR US TO SPONSOR A REHASH OF THE 1953 STUDY WOULD SIMPLY CONVINCE OUR ALLIES THAT THE EXERCISE IS NO MORE THAN A PUBLIC RELATIONS STUNT ON OUR PART. THIS COULD PROVIDE ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY FOR THE SOVIETS TO PRACTICE THEIR WEDGE-DRIVING EFFORTS. IT WOULD CHEAPEN OUR EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF HUMANITARIAN OBJECTIVES BY RAISING SUSPICIONS THAT WE ARE SEEKING TO UNDERMINE THE FRAGILE CONSENSUS RECENTLY ACHIEVED ON THE PIPELINE CONTROVERSY.

5. THE REASONS WHY THIS IDEA IS A NON-STARTER ARE SUMMARIZED WELL (IF SOMEWHAT INDIRECTLY) IN PARAGRAPHS FIVE THROUGH NINE OF STATE 007652. TO PUT THE PROBLEMS IN PLAIN LANGUAGE:
 - THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOT IN THE ILO IN 1953; IT IS TODAY AND HAS PLENTY OF LEVERAGE TO PREVENT A REPORT TELLING THE TRUTH ABOUT WHAT IT DOES AT HOME.
 - THERE IS A MULTITUDE OF NEW MEMBER COUNTRIES INVOLVED, MANY OF THEM NOT FRIENDLY TO THE U.S. OR AT LEAST SUBJECT TO SOVIET PRESSURE. A STUDY OF SOVIET FORCED LABOR MIGHT END UP BEING A CRITICISM OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S HANDLING OF THE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS' STRIKE.
 - OUR ALLIES WOULD NOT WANT TO FOLLOW OUR LEAD ON THIS ONE. IF THEY WANT TO PURSUE THE ISSUE, FINE.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

- LET THEM DO IT.
- THINGS ACTUALLY HAVE CHANGED IN THE SOVIET UNION SINCE STALIN WAS ALIVE. THE PENAL SYSTEM HERE REMAINS DRACONIAN BY ANY REASONABLE STANDARDS OF HUMANITY, BUT ANY 1983 STUDY IS BOUND TO CONCLUDE THAT THE GULAG IS NOT WHAT IT WAS IN 1953.
- NO REPRESENTATIVE GROUP OF ILO MEMBERS WOULD PRODUCE A REPORT OF THE KIND WE WOULD WANT. JUST FOR ARGUMENT'S SAKE, IMAGINE THAT THE COMMITTEE CONSISTED OF THE SAME THREE COUNTRIES AS THIRTY YEARS AGO (INDIA, NORWAY, PERU). DOES ANYONE REALLY IMAGINE THAT SUCH A COMMITTEE IN 1983 WOULD PRODUCE A REPORT WHICH TOLD EVEN THE BARE-BONE FACTS ABOUT SOVIET USE OF FORCED LABOR? OR THAT SUCH A REPORT WOULD EVER RECEIVE THE IMPRIMATUR OF THE ILO AS A WHOLE?

6. IN SHORT, WE DO NOT HAVE THE INFLUENCE IN INTERNATIONAL DEBATING ORGANIZATIONS TODAY WHICH WE HAD THIRTY YEARS AGO. THIS IS SIMPLY A FACT OF LIFE. AS FAR AS THE GAS PIPELINE GOES, DISSIDENTS HERE (INCLUDING SAKHAROV'S WIFE) TELL US WE ARE BARKING UP

MOSCOW 0548 1156 DTG:141711Z JAN 83 PSN: 077327

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2361

INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0980
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 6563
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 00548
FROM THE AMBASSADOR
THE WRONG TREE. IF THE ILO IS TO CONDUCT AN INVESTI-
GATION, LET THE EUROPEANS KEEP OUT IN FRONT WHILE WE
LET THEM MAKE THE RUNNING. THIS IS A CASE WHERE TOO
MUCH ZEAL WILL NOT SERVE OUR INTERESTS.
HARTMAN

CONFIDENTIAL

7916 A⁰

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 17, 1983

Dear Dick:

The informal interagency group formed to consider your bill and develop some recommendations has concluded its review. It strongly agrees with your idea to expand and support Soviet studies in this country in behalf of national and international security interests.

However, the interagency group recommends that this money should not be funneled through the National Council for Soviet and East European Research. Instead, a new "Board" should be established. It also suggests that no organizations (such as IREX and the Woodrow Wilson Center) be listed by name as beneficiaries in the text of S.2919.

I have asked NSC Staff Member Paula Dobriansky to be in touch with your Legislative Director to consult on the development of the bill.

Once again, thank you for your consideration in sharing your thoughts with me. With all best wishes in your new leadership capacity.

Sincerely,



William P. Clark

The Honorable Richard G. Lugar
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

501A

National Security Council
The White House

Package # 7910

'83 JAN 13 P 6:50

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			<u>D</u>
Staff Secretary	<u>5</u>		
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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November 30, 1982

Dear Dick:

Thank you for your letter of November 8 describing the bill which you have introduced to provide funds for Soviet studies. At a time when our relations with the Soviet Union are entering a new and complicated phase, it is more essential than ever to train and provide opportunities for Soviet experts in this country. An annual infusion of some five million dollars into the field would undoubtedly have a major impact on the field of Soviet studies which has been allowed over the past twenty years to decline appreciably.

I am asking an informal interagency group to take a look at your bill and come up with recommendations. As soon as its work has been completed (and that should be before the end of the month), I will communicate with you.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,



William P. Clark

The Honorable Richard G. Lugar
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

44

NSC/S PROFILE

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ID 8207910

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 10 NOV 82 12

TO CLARK

FROM LUGAR, RICHARD G

DOC DATE 08 NOV 82

PIPES

18 NOV 82

KIMMITT

23 NOV 82

KEYWORDS: USSR

CCO

BIDEN, JOSEPH R

SUBJECT: REQUESTS FOR SUPPORT OF S-2919 RE FUNDS FOR SOVIET STUDIES

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: 23 NOV 82 STATUS X FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

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PIPES

DOBRIANSKY

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REF# LOG 8208109 NSCIFID (H / H)

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<i>Clark</i>	<i>x</i>	<i>1/13</i>	<i>Re-open for signature</i>		
		JAN 17 1983	<i>Clark sp etc</i>		<i>DO, PS, RK</i>

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NSC/S PROFILE

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ID 8390052

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
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RECEIVED 18 JAN 83 12

TO CLARK

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 18 JAN 83

KEYWORDS: USSR

SYRIA

SUBJECT: USSR SPEAKING NOTE RESPONSE RE SA-5 MISSILES IN SYRIA

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ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: STATUS S FILES SII
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FOR ACTION

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KEMP

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REF# 8301587

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 21, 1983

TO: BRIAN MERCHANT

FROM: GEOFF KEMP

RETURNED FOR YOUR FILES.

NAAR



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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09 JAN 19 P12: 33
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NLRR 148-23-39-13-6
BY KOB NARA DATE 4/8/0

January 18, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Soviet "Speaking Note" on SA-5's in Syria

Attached is a "speaking note" on the Soviet Union's deployment of SA-5's to Syria which Soviet DCM Bessmertnykh presented to the Department late yesterday. We will forward an analysis of the "note" shortly.

L. Paul Bremer, III
L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~
~~DECL: OADR~~

SECRET/NODISUnofficial translation

With regard to the presentation made by the U.S. side on the question of deployment in Syria of the anti-aircraft missiles, which are called in the West SAM-5 missiles, we would like first of all to point out that the concern that has been expressed in this respect is totally unfounded and even unjustified. To pose that issue, the way the U.S. side does, means to prejudice the inalienable right of every sovereign state to self-defense recognized by the UN Charter. It becomes even more obvious in this case, since the matter concerns anti-aircraft systems deployed on the territory of the defending state itself.

We have made and continue to make no secret of the fact that we are supplying the victims of the Israeli aggression with certain types of weapons to ensure their legitimate defense requirements.

In the light of the continuing Israeli aggression in Lebanon and unending threats being made by Israel against Syria, it is only natural and rightful for the leadership of Syria to take measures to strengthen the security of that country.

The anti-aircraft systems supplied by the Soviet Union serve no other purpose than to defend Syria from air attacks. Therefore, those systems may cause concern only with those who would contemplate such attacks, that is a new aggression. In other words, if such a threat on the part of Israel to the ~~Syrian~~ security ^{of Syria} is ruled out - and it is the U.S. that can play a key role in that respect - there will be no need whatsoever to use the said anti-aircraft systems supplied to Syria for self-defense.

We categorically decline the attempt by the U.S. side to make the Soviet Union responsible for a further possible aggravation of the situation in the Middle East as well as to put in doubt the policy of the Soviet Union directed at the lessening of the international tensions and resolving of conflict situations by peaceful means. This policy has represented and continues to represent a position of principle of the USSR and its friends. It was again reaffirmed with all due emphasis in the Prague declaration of the Warsaw Treaty member states.

The Soviet Union invariably stands for a political settlement of the Middle East crisis. It has offered a concrete way to achieving a just peace in the Middle East - its proposals in this regard practically coincide fully with the position of the Arab states, as it was formulated in the decisions of the Fez meeting.

The tensions and the dangerous situation in the Middle East were created and are being fueled by the aggressive policy and acts of violence perpetrated by Israel. The whole world knows, too, that none other than the United States supplies Israel with ever more destructive and sophisticated means of warfare, thus encouraging Israel to commit new acts of brigandage against the neighbouring Arab states.

If the United States is genuinely interested, as it says, in easing the tensions in the Middle East and in reaching a political solution there, it possesses ample possibilities to make Israel cease the perpetration of arbitrary and lawless acts. Instead, the U.S. government takes upon itself the unseemly role of an advocate of the aggressor and attempts in one way or another to

make it easier for Israel to attain its aggressive and expansionist aims with regard to the sovereign Arab states.

Accordingly, also, the full burden of responsibility for a further possible aggravation of the Middle East situation will rest, along with Israel, on those who support its aggressive policy and enable Israel to carry out its acts of aggression.