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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 12/10/2015

File Folder USSR (12/22/82-12/24/82)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 23

SKINNER

293

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171143	MEMO	M. WHEELER TO L. PAUL BREMER RE SHCHARANSKY CASE	1	12/22/1982	B1
	R	4/8/2013	CREST NLR-748-23-30-1-8		
171144	MEMO	P. DOBRIANSKY TO W. CLARK RE SHCHARANSKY CASE	2	12/16/1982	B1
171145	MEMO	BREMER TO CLARK RE SHCHARANSKY	2	12/10/1982	B1
	R	4/8/2013	CREST NLR-748-23-30-3-6		
171146	CABLE	STATE 355585	2	12/23/1982	B1
	R	4/8/2013	CREST NLR-748-23-30-4-5		
171147	CABLE	STATE 356692	1	12/23/1982	B1
	R	4/8/2013	CREST NLR-748-23-30-5-4		
171148	MEMO	BREMER TO CLARK RE THE ATTACHED	1	12/23/1982	B1
	R	4/8/2013	CREST NLR-748-23-30-6-3		
171149	Q&A	RE ANDROPOV'S SPEECH	10	ND	B1
	R	4/8/2013	CREST NLR-748-23-30-6-3		

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171150	PROFILE SHEET	NSC/S	1	12/23/1982	B1
	R	4/8/2013	CREST NLR-748-23-30-6-3		
171151	CABLE	MOSCOW 15572	3	12/24/1982	B1
	R	4/8/2013	CREST NLR-748-23-30-7-2		

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NLRR 748-23-30-1-8

BY CTD NARA DATE 12/10/85

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

8586
(S/S 8238015)

171143

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 22, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER, III
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Shcharansky Case: Possible New Steps (U)

We have reviewed and concur with State's proposal that James Giffen, President of Armco International, be authorized on behalf of the Executive Branch to transmit a message to Arbatov about the Shcharansky case. The verbal message would state, "that the Executive Branch will do nothing to take propaganda advantage of any unilateral Soviet gesture to help Shcharansky's plight" and that "we will work with Congress and private groups to discourage commentary that the Soviets were forced to give in or that U.S. policies have triumphed." We also concur that Giffen indicate "if no White House meeting were made a condition of Shcharansky's release, this condition would be honored." However, as Giffen will be utilizing an "unofficial" channel, he should not make this or any other statement on behalf of the President -- only on behalf of the Executive Branch or the Administration. (C)

Michael O. Wheeler

Michael O. Wheeler
Staff Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ AttachmentNON REMOVAL
CLASSIFIED
12/10/15 EAB

December 22, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL O. WHEELER

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY (P)

SUBJECT: Shcharansky Case

Although Judge Clark approved the package attached at Tab II last week and State was advised, they need the memo attached at Tab I showing the decision in writing for their records.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve Disapprove

Attachments:

Tab I	Memo to State
Tab II	Original Pkg.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Attachment

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 12/10/2015

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USSR (12/22/82-12/24/82)

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171144	MEMO P. DOBRIANSKY TO W. CLARK RE SHCHARANSKY CASE	2	12/16/1982	B1

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Washington, D.C. 20520

December 10, 1982

171145

82 DEC 10 PIO: 35

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

WEST OF
SITUATION ROOM

SUBJECT: Possible New Step to Help Anatoliy Shcharanskiy

Following on the President's letter to Brezhnev, there have been a number of official and unofficial U.S. attempts to raise with the Soviets the plight of imprisoned Soviet dissident Anatoliy Shcharanskiy. Unfortunately, these attempts have been almost uniformly rebuffed. In Madrid, Max Kampelman sent a letter on November 24 to Soviet delegation leader Kovalev requesting reconsideration of the Sakharov, Orlov and Shcharanskiy cases. The letter was returned. In Moscow, Senator Dole raised the Shcharanskiy case with USA/Canada Institute Director Arbatov, who rejected linking the case with other issues of interest to the Soviets. Also in Moscow, our Embassy attempted to pass a letter from Avital Shcharanskiy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, asking that it be forwarded to Anatoliy Shcharanskiy. The letter was returned, with a note stating that our request to facilitate its delivery "was completely inappropriate."

The least negative signal on Shcharanskiy was given by Arbatov in conversations with members of the U.S. Trade and Economic Council (USTEC), which met in Moscow during mid-November. On that occasion, Arbatov said that he did not think that taking action on Shcharanskiy at this time was necessarily a good move since people would then argue that present U.S. policies were working. He also noted that dissidents, when let out, tended to make a lot of noise, and that the first thing that would happen if the Soviets released Shcharanskiy would be that he would meet in the White House with President Reagan. Arbatov said that if he were to approach someone who could release Shcharanskiy, he would need answers for these questions.

USTEC personnel could not, on that occasion, speak for the U.S. government, and therefore had no answers for Arbatov. In view of past Soviet performance on this issue, we doubt that, even if the USG does answer Arbatov's questions to his satisfaction, it would make much difference in the Shcharanskiy case. However, there is still a good reason for trying to get back to Arbatov. Avital Shcharanskiy recently met with Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Mark Palmer to ask whether -- in the wake of the Soviet leadership changes -- it wouldn't be a good time to take another initiative with the Soviet authorities on behalf of her husband. Specifically, her idea was that we send a "special

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NLRR 74823-3-3-6

BY 600 NARADATE/2/91

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DECL. OADR

emissary" (someone like Henry Kissinger) to talk to the Soviets about her husband. Palmer was understandably pessimistic about the prospects for such an effort, but agreed that the USG would consider the proposal.

We now understand that USTEC member James Giffen (President of Armco International) may be returning to Moscow before Christmas for business reasons. The Soviets have suggested that they would like to use USTEC Co-chairman C. William Verity as a "special channel" of communication to build towards a Reagan-Andropov summit and expanding trade. We have naturally warned USTEC officials that this Soviet line is not new and is probably just a ploy to probe U.S. policy intentions without commitment from the Soviet side.

However, the fact that the Soviets have themselves opened up this "special channel" does mean that messages should be able to go both ways, and it has the advantage of being not quite official in the Shcharanskiy case, since Verity raised the issue with Arbatov with our encouragement but not in the name of the Administration. We think it should be used to satisfy Mrs. Shcharanskiy's desire for additional efforts on behalf of her husband, and can be used for this single purpose without committing us to a broader and more durable extra-official "channel" to the Soviets of a type inappropriate to relations at this point. Accordingly, we recommend that the USG give Giffen a message to take to Arbatov on Shcharanskiy. We recommend that the message be that the Executive Branch will do nothing to take propaganda advantage of any unilateral Soviet gesture to help Shcharanskiy's plight, and we will work with Congress and private groups as well to discourage any commentary suggesting that the Soviet side was "forced" to give in or that U.S. policies have "triumphed." We would also recommend that Giffen be authorized to say, on behalf of the President, that if no White House meeting were made a condition of Shcharanskiy's release, this condition would be honored (in our informal contacts with Mrs. Shcharanskiy and the Israelis about possible conditions the Soviets might impose for Shcharanskiy's release, both parties have supported this strategy).

As noted, we do not think that such assurances, if passed to Arbatov, stand much chance of moving the Soviets on the Shcharanskiy issue. But we should at least be on record as having made our best effort to help Shcharanskiy. In doing this, we will have gone most of the way toward satisfying Mrs. Shcharanskiy's request, and we will have deprived the Soviets of the ability to reiterate the Arbatov arguments in any credible manner in the future.



L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

468

National Security Council
The White House

Package # 8586

02 DEC 16 P 7: 17

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>Ken</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>		
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

URGENT

COMMENTS

Note that the recommendation for approval does not refer to the President. This is intentional. We do not believe we should refer to the President in this unofficial channel.

NSC/S PROFILE

SECRET/CODEWORD

ID 8208586 ⁸

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

RECEIVED 14 DEC 82 17

12/15/82 CDS

TO CLARK

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 10 DEC 82

KEYWORDS: USSR

HUMAN RIGHTS

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE NEW STEP TO HELP ANATOLIY SHCHARANSKIY

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: 17 DEC 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DOBRIANSKY

PIPES

ROBINSON

MYER

LORD

COMMENTS

REF# 8238015

LOG 8207088

NSCIFID

(N /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

Clark	X	12/17 Gov decision		
		12/17 Clark approved		DO, W
Wheeler	S	12/22 reopened for S.G	12/22	
	C	12/22 Wheeler Sgd report to Bremer		Do, inv.
				DO, inv.

DISPATCH 12/22

W/ATTCH FILE PA (10)

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

171146 9

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 55851 DTG: 230314Z DEC 82 PSN: 049370
SIT821 DATE 02/20/83 TOR: 357/1334Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB KEMPBSIT

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: NODISKLIST--CHECKLISI-----RTHR DISSEM.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #5585 3570308
O 230314Z DEC 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-23-30-45
BY ICOS NARA DATE 12/10/85

TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1138

~~SECRET~~ STATE 355585

~~NODIS~~

FOR THE AMBASSADOR

E.O. 123566: DECL: OADR

TAGS: TNUC, SCSA, PARM, UR, US

SUBJECT: NEXT ROUND OF US-SOVIET NON-PROLIFERATION TALKS

REF: (A) STATE 351439 (B) TOSEC 170311

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. YOU HAVE ALREADY RECEIVED A BRIEF REPORT OF THE RESULTS OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION CONSULTATIONS HELD HERE DECEMBER 15-17, AND, AS ARRANGED WITH MIKE JOYCE, WE WILL SOON SEND BY POUCH A COMPLETE RECORD OF THE EXCHANGES. AS NOTED REFTEL, THE TALKS WERE CONSTRUCTIVE, BUSINESSLIKE AND USEFUL. AND THE SOVIETS INVITED THE U.S. DELEGATION TO MOSCOW FOR ANOTHER SESSION NEXT YEAR, POSSIBLY IN NOVEMBER. AMBASSADOR KENNEDY ACCEPTED THE INVITATION IN PRINCIPLE. WITH THE EXACT DATES TO BE WORKED OUT THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.

3. MOROZOV'S SUGGESTION THAT WE MIGHT HOLD THE NEXT SESSION IN NOVEMBER APPEARS TO BE A VERY TENTATIVE OFFER, DESIGNED TO AVOID SUBSTANTIVE OVERLAP WITH IAEA GOVERNORS' MEETINGS IN FEBRUARY, JUNE AND SEPTEMBER AND

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THIS ROUND'S AGENDA. WE WOULD LIKE THE SOVIETS TO UNDERSTAND, HOWEVER, THAT AMBASSADOR KENNEDY WOULD BE ABLE TO COME TO MOSCOW FOR BILATERALS, IN CONJUNCTION WITH HIS VISIT TO VIENNA FOR THE GOVERNORS' MEETING, IN JUNE. WE DO NOT WISH TO PRESS THE MATTER OR BE EXPLICIT ABOUT DATES, BUT HAVE PREPARED THE FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS TO CONVEY OUR ATTITUDE; WHETHER YOU WISH TO USE IN YOUR MEETING WITH GROMYKO FRIDAY IS OF COURSE FOR YOU TO DETERMINE.

4. BEGIN TALKING-POINTS:

-- I HAVE RECEIVED A REPORT ON THE US-SOVIET BILATERALS ON NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUES HELD IN WASHINGTON DECEMBER 15-17. BOTH DELEGATIONS SEEM TO HAVE FOUND THESE TALKS

~~SECRET~~

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10

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 55851 DTG: 230314Z DEC 82 PSN: 049370

BUSINESSLIKE AND CONSTRUCTIVE, AND I NOTE THAT THERE WAS DISCUSSION OF ANOTHER SESSION NEXT YEAR IN MOSCOW.

-- AS AMBASSADOR KENNEDY INDICATED IN HIS RESPONSE TO AMBASSADOR MOROZOV'S INVITATION, WE ARE RECEPTIVE TO THE IDEA OF ANOTHER SESSION AT A MUTUALLY CONVENIENT TIME.

-- WE COULD BE READY FOR SUCH A MEETING SOMETIME IN THE MIDDLE OF NEXT YEAR, PERHAPS AS A SIDE-TRIP TO SCHEDULED IAEA MEETING IN EUROPE. ONE THOUGHT WOULD BE TO AVOID DEALING WITH DETAILED IAEA TOPICS IN SUCH MEETINGS, EXCEPT WHERE STRICTLY USEFUL, AND TO MAINTAIN THE BROAD POLICY FOCUS OF THE TALKS LAST WEEK.

-- IN ANY EVENT, WE WILL REMAIN IN TOUCH ON THESE ARRANGEMENTS. SHULTZ

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11

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

171147

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 6692 DTG:232315Z DEC 82 PSN: 050813
SIT768 DATE 12/27/82 TOR: 358/0938Z

ISSUE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF BULGARIA AND ITALY.

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

-- IN KEEPING WITH ITS LONGSTANDING ALLIANCE TIES WITH ITALY AND THE CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR GOVERNMENTS IN THE MATTER OF COMBATTING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS OFFERED THE GOI SUCH ASSISTANCE AS MAY BE HELPFUL IN INVESTIGATING THIS CRIME.

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP EOB SIT BLAR

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: --CHECKLIST-- T

-- U.S. OFFICIAL STATEMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT HAVE BEEN RESTRAINED AND WE HAVE GENERALLY AVOIDED PUBLIC, PERSONAL CRITICISM OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP. THIS STANDS IN SHARP CONTRAST TO THE PERSONAL ATTACKS ON HIGH U.S. OFFICIALS WHICH APPEAR ALMOST DAILY IN THE SOVIET MEDIA.

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

-- IN VIEW OF THE INTEMPERATE AND ENTIRELY INAPPROPRIATE LANGUAGE OF THE SOVIET ORAL STATEMENT OF DECEMBER 21, THE U.S. SIDE CANNOT BUT CONCLUDE THAT IT REFLECTS THE ATTITUDES OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP ON PROSPECTS FOR US-SOVIET RELATIONS.

MESSAGE:

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SECSTATE WASHDC 6692 DTG:232315Z DEC 82 PSN: 050813

TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1180

INFO AMEMBASSY SOFIA IMMEDIATE 0577
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 1876
BT

NLRR 748-23-305-4

BY ktg NARA DATE 12/19/15

~~SECRET~~ STATE 356692

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PTER, UR, BU, US

SUBJECT: FORMAL REJECTION OF SOVIET PROTEST CONCERNING
PAPAL ASSASSINATION ISSUE

REF: STATE 353254

1. 48 - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. DEPARTMENT BELIEVES IT ESSENTIAL TO CHALLENGE FORMALLY THE UNFOUNDED AND INSULTING SUBSTANCE AND TONE OF THE SOVIET "PROTEST" OF DECEMBER 20. EMBASSY IS THEREFORE INSTRUCTED TO CALL ON MFA AT APPROPRIATE LEVEL TO REJECT FORMALLY THE SOVIET "PROTEST," DRAWING UPON POINTS IN PARA 3.

3. TALKING POINTS:

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

-- I HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO UNDERScore THE INFORMAL COMMENTS MADE BY UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER TO CHARGE BESSMERTNYKH CONCERNING THE SOVIET "PROTEST" OF DECEMBER

20.

-- THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MUST REJECT THIS PROTEST AS WHOLLY FALSE IN CONTENT AND INSULTING IN TONE.

-- SPECIFICALLY, THE CLAIM THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT OR ANY OF ITS AGENCIES IS ORCHESTRATING A CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE USSR AND BULGARIA IN CONNECTION WITH THE MAY 1981 ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT ON THE POPE IS COMPLETELY UNFOUNDED.

-- THE U.S. GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS THIS MATTER TO BE AN

~~SECRET~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

171148

DECLASSIFIED

December 23, 1982

NLRR 748-23-30-6-3BY COB NARA DATE 12/10/85MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Guidance on Andropov Speech

Attached as requested are interagency cleared Q's and A's on the nuclear arms control aspects of General Secretary Andropov's December 21 speech.


L. Paul Bremer III
Executive SecretaryAttachment:

As Stated.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-23-30-6-3

13

PRESS GUIDANCE

BY CTDB NARA DATE 12/10/85 December 22, 1982

171149

ANDROPOV'S SPEECH: START

Q: What is your reaction to General Secretary Andropov's comments on START?

A: As you know, the President has proposed substantial reductions in strategic forces. The U.S. START proposal calls for major reductions in the most destabilizing systems in order to achieve a more stable strategic balance. The U.S. seeks reductions to 5000 ballistic missile warheads (one-third below current U.S. and Soviet levels); 2500 ICBM warheads; and 850 deployed ballistic missiles (a reduction of 50 percent from the current U.S. level).

Andropov's comments on START contained little that is new, and were quite vague as to the numbers and types of systems to be reduced. The Soviet START proposal, in our view, does not adequately address the task of reducing strategic arms.

At the same time, it is important to note that the Soviets have accepted the concept of reductions in the levels of nuclear forces, and are prepared to go beyond previous agreements which limited strategic launchers alone.

However, while this is a positive step, the Soviet proposal calls for far more modest reductions than envisaged under the U.S. proposal, and does not focus on reducing the more destabilizing ballistic missiles.

Contingency Qs and As

Q: What are the deficiencies of Andropov's offer to reduce strategic nuclear delivery vehicles by 25 percent, and to reduce nuclear warheads substantially as well?

A: While the Soviet proposal contains some positive elements, it is not an acceptable basis for the kind of far-reaching, stabilizing, and equitable agreement that the U.S. seeks.

First, the Soviet proposal does not go far enough to reduce the two countries' forces. It would reduce strategic delivery vehicles by only 25 per cent from the 2400 level that would have been established by SALT II, whereas the U.S. proposal would reduce deployed ballistic missile forces by roughly one half, and ballistic missile warheads by about one third.

Second, the Soviet proposal does not focus reductions on the most destabilizing class of strategic systems: ballistic missiles, and especially land-based ICBMs, which are most vulnerable. While the Soviet proposal would reduce to some unspecified level the number of nuclear weapons (warheads), it fails to distinguish between the more destructive nuclear weapons on ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons carried on slow-flying systems such as our B-52s, which are suited principally for retaliatory missions, and which face a massive and unconstrained network of Soviet air defenses.

Q: What is your response to the Soviet charge that the U.S. proposal would reduce only Soviet forces, while leaving the U.S. a free hand to build up its strategic arms?

A: This charge is groundless. The U.S. START proposal would require substantial reductions on both sides. U.S. and Soviet levels of ballistic missile warheads are roughly the same and so the burden of reductions would be shared equally by both countries. It is true that the USSR would have to dismantle a greater number of deployed ballistic missiles and ICBM warheads than the U.S., but this simply reflects the fact that the USSR added more of these highly destabilizing weapons to its forces at a time when the U.S. showed relative restraint. The end result of the U.S. proposal would be equal force levels on both sides -- what is one-sided about that?

Q: What about the Soviet charge that the U.S. proposal excludes bombers and cruise missiles.

A: The President has stated many times that nothing is excluded from consideration in START.

Q: What is your reaction to Andropov's threat that the USSR will deploy a counter to the MX?

A: The Soviet threat of a counter to the MX is somewhat ironic, given the fact that the USSR already deploys 308 SS-18 ICBMs (larger and heavier than the MX, with 10 warheads per missile) and more than 300 SS-19 ICBMs (roughly equivalent to the MX in size). Moreover, the Soviet Union is already testing a new type of ICBM.

Q: How do you assess Andropov's comments on the President's proposals for nuclear confidence-building measures?

A: President Reagan made a number of proposals to reduce the risk of war by accident or miscalculation in June in Berlin, and detailed them in his letter to General Secretary Andropov in November. As the President has instructed, the U.S. Delegations in Geneva have begun negotiations on these important matters.

We welcome as a positive step the expressed willingness of the Soviet Union to explore confidence-building measures within the nuclear arms reductions framework. We will be pursuing this question vigorously as the negotiations proceed in Geneva.

SOVIET INF POSITION

Q. What is your response to the announcement this morning by Andropov that the Soviet Union is ready to reduce the number of its missiles in Europe to the number of missiles deployed by the UK and France?

A. -- The President has proposed the elimination of the entire class of longer-range land-based INF missiles, the systems of greatest concern to both sides. These include our planned deployments of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles and the SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5 missiles on the Soviet side. The U.S. proposal has been reaffirmed in recent days by the defense and foreign ministers of the NATO Alliance.

-- The approach described by Mr. Andropov is not new. We have seen it in the negotiations and studied it. Our judgment is that the proposal is inadequate as a solution to the INF issue.

-- The Soviet proposal fails to meet the fundamental criterion of equality. It would perpetuate a dangerous military imbalance and prevent our ability to counter the threat posed to NATO by Soviet longer-range INF missiles. It would permit the Soviets to retain a substantial force of SS-20 missiles while blocking NATO's planned deployment of any modernized U.S. longer-range INF missiles. A Soviet monopoly over the United States in longer-range INF missiles is unacceptable.

-- Moreover, Mr. Andropov's proposal would allow the Soviet Union to retain and even increase the large force of SS-20s it deploys in the Asian USSR. Because of their long range and transportability, Soviet SS-20s in the Asian USSR pose a threat to NATO as well as to our friends and allies in Asia. If the Soviet missiles now in Europe were simply withdrawn to the Asian USSR, they too would continue to pose a threat to NATO.

-- The talks in Geneva are explicitly bilateral negotiations focusing on U.S. and Soviet longer-range INF missiles. Justifying a continued Soviet monopoly over the U.S. on the basis of UK and French missiles is unacceptable -- the U.S. simply cannot bargain on the forces of other countries in a bilateral negotiation, nor can it accept the notion that the Soviet Union is entitled to have nuclear forces equal to those of all other powers combined.

-- The Soviet proposal appears to be designed to eliminate the U.S. nuclear presence in Europe while allowing the Soviets to maintain their forces.

-- Although the Soviets have a considerable advantage in nuclear capable aircraft, we believe the talks should focus on longer-range INF missiles, which are the systems of greatest concern to both sides. In any case, the Andropov proposal for reductions in nuclear-capable aircraft is vague, and we have no reason to expect that it is anything more than a repetition of previous Soviet attempts to reduce the U.S. contribution to NATO's conventional and nuclear deterrent without accepting comparable constraints on their own air power.

-- The United States and its Allies -- as reaffirmed at recent Ministerial meetings -- continue to believe that the zero-zero solution, which would eliminate all U.S. and Soviet longer-range land-based INF missiles anywhere in the world, is the best and most equitable arms control result. Nothing in Mr. Andropov's speech alters that view.

INF -- UK AND FRENCH FORCES

Q. The Soviets are suggesting that their missiles in Europe be reduced to the level of UK and French missiles. Since the UK and France are U.S. Allies, why does the U.S. refuse to take account of UK and French systems in the INF negotiations?

A. -- The Soviet argument that an agreement must include UK and French nuclear forces is intended to substantiate their contrived claim that a balance in so-called "medium-range" forces exists in Europe, and to bring about a result that would decouple the U.S. from its European allies. It should be noted that the Soviets have in the past reached agreement with the U.S. based on equality of U.S. and Soviet forces without reference to the forces of other countries.

-- The Geneva INF talks are explicitly bilateral negotiations focusing on U.S. and Soviet longer-range INF missiles. The UK and France are sovereign nations. The U.S. cannot negotiate or discuss compensation for their independent nuclear forces.

-- The forces of the UK and France represent minimum national deterrents deemed necessary by those sovereign countries.

-- UK and French systems are not comparable in roles or characteristics to the land-based longer-range INF missiles of the U.S. and USSR.

-- In essence, the Soviet position amounts to a demand that the Soviet Union be granted the right to maintain nuclear forces equal to those of all other powers combined. This totally contradicts the principle of equality in U.S.-Soviet arms control agreements.

INF -- SOVIET MOVEMENT?

Q. The previous Soviet position would have allowed the USSR to maintain a force of up to 300 SS-20s in the European USSR. The position disclosed today by Mr. Andropov could require the reduction of a large number of Soviet missiles, including some SS-20s. Doesn't this show movement on the part of the Soviets?

A. -- Soviet expressions of willingness to reduce their LRINF missiles indicate the Soviets may be coming to recognize the problem created by their overwhelming superiority in longer-range INF missiles.

-- However, these Soviet expressions have to be seen in the context of the overall Soviet position.

-- This position entails the same basic outcome sought by the Soviets since before the negotiations began -- preservation of a substantial LRINF monopoly over the U.S. which poses a threat to our friends and allies. Such an outcome is unacceptable.

-- Moreover, the "hundreds" of missiles which Mr. Andropov has offered to reduce would consist mostly of aging SS-4s and SS-5s which already were slated for retirement. But the Soviets would retain a large force of modern, triple-warhead, mobile SS-20 missiles which are capable of striking targets throughout all of Europe and much of Asia and North Africa.

U.S. RESPONSE

Q: Will you be formally responding to the Andropov proposal when the negotiations resume in January?

A: -- The Soviet position will be among the things we discuss when the next negotiating round begins on January 27. As we have indicated, the Andropov proposal is not new and has been found inadequate as a solution to the INF issue. However, we intend to continue negotiating seriously and are willing to consider any constructive Soviet proposal that adequately addresses the security concerns of NATO. But as we have repeatedly stated, we continue to believe that the zero/zero outcome, which would eliminate the entire class of longer-range INF missiles, provides the best arms control solution.

NON FIRST USE

Q: What is your reaction to Andropov's proposal for a pledge on non first use of conventional as well as nuclear forces?

A: -- THE NATO ALLIANCE HAS ALWAYS MAINTAINED A POLICY OF THE NON-FIRST-USE OF FORCE. NATO WILL NEVER USE FORCE - NUCLEAR OR CONVENTIONAL - UNLESS ATTACKED FIRST.

-- SOUND ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS CANNOT BE BASED ON SIMPLE DECLARATIVE PLEDGES WHICH PROVIDE NO REAL RESTRAINT IN TIME OF WAR OR CRISIS. IT IS OUR POLICY THAT GENUINE ARMS CONTROL MUST REST ON THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY IN COMPARABLE SYSTEMS, SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS AND VERIFIABILITY.

-- WE WOULD NOTE THAT THE NON USE OF FORCE IS ALREADY A REQUIREMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND IS EMBODIED IN THE UN CHARTER.

Q: Andropov asserted that it was untrue that the Warsaw Pact has an advantage in conventional armaments. What are the figures?

A: It is absolutely clear NATO forces in Europe are dramatically outnumbered by Warsaw Pact forces in Europe in manpower, main battle tanks, artillery/mortars, armored personnel carriers, combat aircraft and mobile vehicle mounted anti tank weapons. We refer you to NATO paper on force comparisons for details.

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Q+A

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SECRET SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 15572
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, US, UR
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH GROMYKO, DECEMBER 24

REF: STATE 346201

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: IN MEETING WITH GROMYKO AMBASSADOR RESPONDED TO DOBRYNIN'S QUESTIONS ON MX IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFTEL AND PROBED FOR FURTHER CLARIFICATION OF ANDROPOV'S DECEMBER 21 SPEECH. GROMYKO SAID MX CANISTERS AND SILOS WERE PARTS OF A SINGLE ENTITY AND AS SUCH CONSTITUTED VIOLATION OF SALT II. HE REFUSED TO GO BEYOND LANGUAGE OF ANDROPOV SPEECH ON EITHER INF OR START. IN AN EXCHANGE ON SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARDS BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS, GROMYKO DISMISSED THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY AND STRESSED THAT THESE SYSTEMS MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN CALCULATING THE OVERALL BALANCE. GROMYKO SAID HE WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS DESPITE U.S. STATEMENTS OF SATISFACTION WITH PROGRESS AND SERIOUSNESS OF APPROACH. HE BELIEVED REACHING

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AGREEMENT WAS OF EQUAL IMPORTANCE TO THE U.S. AND USSR AND URGED THE U.S. TO MOVE TOWARDS AGREEMENT ON A REALISTIC BASIS. ALTHOUGH GROMYKO'S POSITIONS WERE UNYIELDING, HIS TONE WAS CORDIAL AND HE EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH THE PROCESS OF U.S.-SOVIET DISCUSSIONS ON VARIOUS ISSUES SINCE HE MET THE SECRETARY IN NEW YORK. END SUMMARY.

3. THE AMBASSADOR MET FOR 90 MINUTES WITH GROMYKO ON DECEMBER 24. ACCOMPANYING THE AMBASSADOR WAS POL COUNSELOR KAMMAN; GROMYKO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY DEPUTY MINISTER KOMPLEKTOV AND INTERPRETER BRATCHIKOV. THE AMBASSADOR PROVIDED A NON-PAPER CONTAINING DETAILED ANSWERS TO DOBRYNIN'S QUESTIONS ON MX, CONSISTING OF REFTEL POINTS WITH SOME SHORTENING OF REPLIES TO

HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ABM AND ADDITIONAL MX MISSILES. IN HIS ORAL PRESENTATION, THE AMBASSADOR INDICATED THAT THE BASING MODE CONTEMPLATED FOR THE MX WAS CONSISTENT WITH SALT II AND THAT, DESPITE CONGRESSIONAL ACTION BEFORE THE RECESS, THE MX QUESTION WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE WITH US IN ONE FORM OR ANOTHER IN THE COMING YEAR. HE REMINDED GROMYKO THAT THE DECISION TO DEVELOP MX HAD BEEN TAKEN BEFORE THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION TOOK OFFICE AND WAS THUS ALREADY WELL KNOWN TO MOSCOW WHEN IT MADE ITS CALCULATIONS ABOUT STRATEGIC BALANCE IN SALT II. THE AMBASSADOR STRESSED THAT THE CSB CONCEPT WAS NOT A FIXED LAUNCHER BUT A MOBILE MISSILE MODE OF DEPLOYMENT. THE MX WAS A SELF-CONTAINED SYSTEM WHICH COULD BE MOVED FROM ONE HOLE TO ANOTHER. ALL ITS LAUNCHING ELEMENTS WERE CONTAINED IN THE MOVABLE CANISTER.

4. GROMYKO SAID HE COULD NOT ACCEPT THE U.S. VIEW THAT CSB DOES NOT VIOLATE THE TREATY. NO AMOUNT OF VERBAL "TIGHTROPE-WALKING" COULD CONCEAL THE FACT THAT CSB IS IN EFFECT A FIXED-LAUNCHER SYSTEM. THE SILO AND CANISTER WERE "ORGANIC PARTS OF THE SAME SYSTEM" WHICH COULD NOT BE SEPARATED BY EVEN THE MOST DEFT SURGERY. THEY CONSTITUTED A SINGLE ENTITY, AND AS SUCH THEY VIOLATED THE TREATY. THIS WAS A SHARPLY NEGATIVE STEP IN THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AT A TIME WHEN THE ARMS CONTROL SITUATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE WERE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BOTH PRECARIOUS.

5. THE AMBASSADOR URGED GROMYKO TO CONSIDER THE DETAILED POINTS IN NDN-PAPER LEFT WITH HIM. THE AMBASSADOR REITERATED THAT THE MX WAS NOT A FIXED-LAUNCHER SYSTEM, AND WAS THEREFORE PERMITTED UNDER THE TREATY. AS A MOBILE SYSTEM IT WOULD HAVE BEEN CONTRARY TO THE PROTOCOL, BUT THE PROTOCOL HAD EXPIRED.

6. THE AMBASSADOR, WHO HAD SEEN THE SECRETARY IN LONDON A FEW DAYS AGO, CONVEYED THE SECRETARY'S GREETINGS TO GROMYKO. NOTING THAT THE ANDROPOV SPEECH OF DECEMBER 21 HAD OCCURRED AFTER THE LONDON CONVERSATIONS, THE AMBASSADOR ASKED WHETHER GROMYKO COULD ELABORATE AND CLARIFY SOME OF ITS POINTS. WE HAD BEEN PLEASED TO HEAR ANDROPOV'S STATEMENTS ABOUT REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC WEAPONS, BUT WE WONDERED WHETHER THE SOVIETS COULD GO BEYOND WHAT THEY HAD SAID IN GENEVA ABOUT REDUCING LAUNCHERS AND SPECIFY HOW THEY WOULD REDUCE WARHEADS. ON INF, ANDROPOV HAD SAID THE SOVIETS WOULD REDUCE WEAPONS "IN EUROPE." WAS THIS A QUESTION OF MISSILES THAT COULD STRIKE TARGETS IN EUROPE, I.E., THOSE SYSTEMS LOCATED JUST BEYOND THE URALS AS WELL? AND

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WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO THE SS-20'S WHICH THE SOVIETS WERE WILLING TO REDUCE? IT WOULD BE HELPFUL FOR OUR NEGOTIATORS TO HAVE SOME CLARIFICATION OF THESE POINTS AS THEY PREPARED FOR THE NEXT ROUND.

7. GROMYKO SAID WE COULD RELY ON THE FACT THAT ANDROPOV HAD MENTIONED SS-20'S EXPLICITLY, AND HAD SAID THESE WOULD BE REDUCED BY "TENS." HE QUOTED ANDROPOV'S WORDS TO THE EFFECT THAT THESE WOULD BE MISSILES "IN EUROPE." HE HAD NOTHING FURTHER TO ADD.

8. TURNING TO START, GROMYKO SAID HE COULD TALK ABOUT THIS FOR HOURS, BUT HE WANTED TO LEAVE THE THOUGHT THAT SOVIETS BELIEVED THEIR PROPOSALS PERMITTED PROGRESS TOWARDS AN AGREEMENT. HIS OWN OPINION, FRANKLY, WAS THAT ALTHOUGH WASHINGTON HAD EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH START PROGRESS AND THE SERIOUSNESS OF APPROACH IN GENEVA, HE COULD NOT BE OPTIMISTIC BASED ON WHAT HE KNEW OF THE U.S. POSITION. THE U.S. DELEGATION DIDN'T WANT TO MOVE ONE CENTIMETER. (BACKTRACKING, HE SAID THIS MIGHT BE TOO PRECISE -- BUT THE U.S. WAS UNWILLING TO

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

MOVE FIVE CENTIMETERS). HE COULD ONLY HOPE THAT MORE SOBER VIEWS WOULD PREVAIL IN WASHINGTON. HE RECALLED THAT DIFFERENCES HAD BEEN RESOLVED IN SALT II BY SOLVING PROBLEMS STEP BY STEP. HE REGRETTED THAT THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION DID NOT ACCEPT THE VIEW EXPRESSED BY FORMER PRESIDENT CARTER AND ECHOED BY U.S. MILITARY LEADERS THAT SALT II REPRESENTED APPROXIMATE PARITY. HE DISAGREED WITH ASSERTIONS NOW BEING MADE THAT THE BALANCE HAD COME TO FAVOR THE USSR.

9. GROMYKO CITED AS AN EXAMPLE THE SOVIET INSISTENCE ON TAKING ACCOUNT OF BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS IN CALCULATING THE NUCLEAR BALANCE. HE HAD DISCUSSED THIS QUESTION WITH FORMER PRESIDENT CARTER, WHO HAD

ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE PROBLEM WAS REAL FOR THE SOVIETS, BUT HAD SAID HE DIDN'T KNOW HOW IT COULD BE DEALT WITH. GROMYKO DECLARED THAT THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION, IN REJECTING THE UNDERSTANDINGS REACHED PREVIOUSLY, HAD IN EFFECT REJECTED THE PARITY THAT HAD EVOLVED OVER DECADES. GROMYKO REGRETTED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAD TAKEN SUCH A POSITION. THE TASK FACING BOTH COUNTRIES AT THIS TIME WAS TO FIND COMMON LANGUAGE, DECIDE WHERE TO GO NEXT, ESTABLISH THE CORRECT BALANCE, AND MAINTAIN IT AT A LOWER LEVEL OF ARMAMENTS.

10. AMBASSADOR MADE THREE BRIEF POINTS IN RESPONSE. FIRST, IT WAS OUR IMPRESSION THAT MORE WORK HAD BEEN DONE IN THE PAST YEAR AT START IN DEFINING THE ISSUES THAN IN PREVIOUS SALT NEGOTIATIONS. SECOND, THE U.S. WAS LOOKING NOT ONLY AT THE EXISTING ARSENALS BUT AT TRENDS. THE WHOLE ISSUE OF FIXED LAND-BASED MISSILES WAS REALLY A QUESTION OF MODERNIZATION. THE PROBLEM BEFORE THE NEGOTIATORS WAS HOW TO ARREST THE TREND EQUITABLY. FINALLY, THE UK AND FRANCE REGARDED THEIR SYSTEMS AS STRATEGIC, DEVELOPED FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSES OF DETERRENCE. THESE HAD NOT BEEN DISCUSSED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, BUT PRESUMABLY THE USSR HAD TAKEN THEM INTO ACCOUNT IN SALT II. BUT THE USSR COULDN'T EXPECT TO MAINTAIN FORCES EQUAL TO ALL ITS ADVERSARIES TOGETHER; IT COULDN'T ADD THE U.S., FRANCE,

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BRITAIN AND CHINA AND CLAIM THE RIGHT TO MATCH THE WHOLE LOT. THIS WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE U.S. THE AMBASSADOR ADDED THAT FRANCE AND BRITAIN WERE SOVEREIGN, AND THEIR NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE A SENSITIVE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY TO THEM.

11. GROMYKO REPLIED THAT WHATEVER CATEGORY -- STRATEGIC OR INTERMEDIATE -- APPLIED TO THE FRENCH AND BRITISH SYSTEMS, THEY WERE STILL NUCLEAR. AND THEY WERE NOT UNDER ANY CONSTRAINTS. AS TO SOVEREIGNTY, THIS WAS A HIGH-SCHOOL ARGUMENT. THE BRITISH AND FRENCH REGULARLY DECLARED THEIR LOYALTY TO THE ALLIANCE. NEITHER WASHINGTON NOR MOSCOW COULD AFFORD HIGH-SCHOOL LOGIC -- THEY MUST BASE THEIR POLICIES ON ADULT CONCEPTS. IN GROMYKO'S VIEW, MORE AND MORE PEOPLE IN THE WEST WERE REACHING THE CONCLUSION THAT THE USSR WAS QUITE JUSTIFIED IN WORRYING ABOUT FRENCH AND BRITISH SYSTEMS. THE USSR WAS NOT SUGGESTING REDUCTION IN FRENCH AND BRITISH SYSTEMS -- JUST THAT THEY BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN THE BALANCE.

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SUBJECT: MEETING WITH GROMYKO, DECEMBER 24

12. SUMMING UP, GROMYKO SAID THE USSR HAD MANY MORE COMPLAINTS (PRELENZII) TO RAISE WITH THE U. S. ABOUT TYPES OF WEAPONS, QUALITY OF WEAPONS, TIMING, AND CIRCUMVENTING OF TREATY OBLIGATIONS. BUT HE WANTED TO STRESS HIS BASIC VIEW THAT THE USSR HOPED THE U. S. WOULD SERIOUSLY SEEK AGREEMENT ON ARMAMENTS. THE TWO COUNTRIES HAD EQUAL INTEREST IN AN AGREEMENT. IF THERE WERE PEOPLE IN THE U. S. WHO THOUGHT THE U. S. WOULD SOMEHOW BE BETTER OFF THAN THE USSR IN A NUCLEAR WAR, THEY WERE UNREALISTIC AND GROSSLY MISTAKEN. EVERYBODY HAD THE SAME INTEREST IN MAINTAINING AND DEVELOPING PEACE. HE URGED THE U. S. TO STUDY ANDROPOV'S NOVEMBER 22 AND DECEMBER 21 SPEECHES, AND TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ALL POSSIBILITIES FOR PEACE.

13. GROMYKO ASKED THAT HIS REGARDS BE CONVEYED TO THE SECRETARY, RECALLING THAT THEY HAD AGREED IN NEW YORK THAT FURTHER MEETINGS OF THE TYPE HELD TODAY WOULD BE USEFUL. GROMYKO THOUGHT THE DISCUSSION IN NEW YORK

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

HAD BEEN POSITIVE, AND THAT THE CONVERSATIONS (MENTIONED EARLIER BY THE AMBASSADOR) ON SOUTHERN AFRICA, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND NON-PROLIFERATION HAD BEEN POSITIVE. GROMYKO THOUGHT IT WAS PROBABLY DIFFICULT TO SET FORTH A WHOLE SCHEDULE OF MEETINGS FOR 1983, BUT HE BELIEVED IT WAS USEFUL TO CONTINUE MEETING ON ISSUES OF COMMON INTEREST AND TO SCHEDULE MEETINGS ONE-BY-ONE AS THEY CAME UP. THE AMBASSADOR MENTIONED THE EXPECTED VISIT OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY-DESIGNATE BURT IN LATE JANUARY, WHICH WOULD ALLOW FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES RAISED TODAY. HE AGREED WITH GROMYKO THAT THE PROCESS OF ESTABLISHING A DIALOGUE WAS POSITIVE AND WISHED THE MINISTER A HAPPY NEW YEAR. GROMYKO RECIPROCATED THE GREETING, AND KOMPLEKTOV ADDED A MERRY CHRISTMAS. HARTMAN

~~SECRET~~