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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name Latin American Affairs Directorate, NSC: Records

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SRN 1/30/2012

File Folder FALKLAND / MALVINAS: NSC AND STATE MEMOS,
1982 (11)

FOIA

F01-027/4

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24

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
129650	SUMMARY	MEETING SUMMARY - SENIOR INTERAGENCY GROUP MEETING ON U.S.-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS - POST-FALKLANDS, 06/22/1982	1	6/24/1982	B1
129657	LIST	PARTICIPATNS IN SIG MEETING ON U.S.-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS, 06/22/1982	1	6/22/1982	B3
129667	MEMO	JAMES RENTSCHLER TO WILLIAM CLARK RE: RE-DO OF THE PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO KING JUAN CARLOS ON THE FALKLANDS	1	6/28/1982	B1
129668	MEMO	WILLIAM CLARK TO THE PRESIDENT RE: SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE TO KING JUAN CARLOS ON THE FALKLANDS	1	ND	B1
129670	DRAFT LETTER	PRESIDENT REAGAN TO KING JUAN CARLOS I RE: FALKLANDS	2	ND	B1
129672	CABLE	STATE 146427	2	5/27/1982	B1
129676	MEMO	JAMES RENTSCHLER TO WILLIAM CLARK RE: SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE TO KING JUAN CARLOS ON THE FALKLANDS	1	6/21/1982	B1

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129690	MEMO	WILLIAM CLARK TO THE PRESIDENT RE: MILITARY LESSONS	1	7/27/1982	B1
129693	MEMO	THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TO THE PRESIDENT RE: MILITARY LESSONS	4	7/19/1982	B1
129697	MEMO	WILLIAM CLARK TO CASPAR WEINBERGER RE: MILITARY LESSONS	1	7/27/1982	B1
129700	MEMO	ROBERT HELM TO WILLIAM CLARK RE: MILITARY LESSONS	2	7/22/1982	B1

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TO WHEELER

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 24 JUN 82

KEYWORDS: LATIN AMERICA

FALKLAND ISLANDS

SIG

SOC

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS OF JUN 22 SIG MTG ON US - LATIN AMERICAN
RELATION

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE: STATUS C FILES IF

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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June 24, 1982

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Senior Interagency Group No. 24

TO : OVP - Mrs. Nancy Bearg Dyke
NSC - Mr. Michael O. Wheeler
ACDA - Mr. Joseph Presel
AID - Mr. Gerald Pagano
CIA - Mr. Thomas B. Cormack
Defense - COL John Stanford
ICA - Ms. Teresa Collins
JCS - MAJ Dennis Stanley
Treasury - Mr. David Pickford
UNA - Amb. Harvey Feldman
USTR - Mr. Dennis Whitfield

SUBJECT: SIG Meeting Summary of Conclusions

Attached is the Summary of Conclusions for the SIG Meeting on U.S.-Latin American Relations — Post-Falklands held on June 22, 1982.

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Summary of Conclusions
2. List of Participants

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(With ~~SECRET~~ Attachment)

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	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>

129650 SUMMARY

1 6/24/1982 B1

MEETING SUMMARY - SENIOR INTERAGENCY
GROUP MEETING ON U.S.-LATIN AMERICAN
RELATIONS - POST-FALKLANDS, 06/22/1982

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129668	MEMO WILLIAM CLARK TO THE PRESIDENT RE: SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE TO KING JUAN CARLOS ON THE FALKLANDS	1	ND	B1

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129670	DRAFT LETTER PRESIDENT REAGAN TO KING JUAN CARLOS I RE: FALKLANDS	2	ND	B1

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Jacque Hill	3	_____	_____
Judge Clark	4	_____	X
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
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 John

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William King

LATIN AMERICA
A RENAISSANCE OF POWER POLITICS IN ~~LATIN AMERICA~~?

Introduction

Latin America is commonly and complacently regarded as a region with singularly low potential for interstate conflict. And, indeed, given the history of the area, particularly over the course of the past century, there would appear to be good reason for this reputation. The military establishments of Latin America have remained intimately involved in the political life of almost every regional actor and have frequently been preoccupied with popular unrest, guerrilla activities, coups d'etat and the wider course of national development. In spite of this pattern, however, military expenditures have remained unusually low by world standards and the armed forces of the major Latin American nations have not confronted one another militarily for nearly a century.

It is important to recognize, however, that this unusual record is solidly grounded in a peculiar combination of geopolitical circumstances. And it is even more critical to appreciate that this set of circumstances is already well advanced in a process of ^{profound change,} ~~rapid evolution~~. A steadily accumulating body of evidence, in fact, seems to point toward a ~~profound~~ ^{marked} alteration in the traditional pattern of conduct. This change has been most manifest in the increasing number of bellicose news items emanating from Latin America in recent times. During the past several years we have witnessed a period of acute crisis between Chile, Peru and Bolivia over Bolivian pretensions to regain access to the sea (1975-1976) and a near confrontation between Brazil and Argentina over disputed water rights in

the Parana Basin (1977). At present Venezuela is threatening to become involved in the growing tension between Costa Rica and Nicaragua while Argentina and Chile are poised uncomfortably near the brink of conflict over their disputed maritime boundary in the South. This pattern of incidents does not represent mere unhappy coincidence -- but rather is indicative of significant changes in the nature of inter-Latin American relations.

The Traditional Latin American Security Environment

① Traditionally, a number of basic factors have served to mute international rivalries in the Latin American region. In the first instance, the principal power centers of the area are generally isolated from one another by a difficult geographic and climatic environment. Central America and the islands of the Caribbean are widely separated from the centers of South American power. And although the majority of Latin American states possess extensive coastlines, the region, as a whole, has not developed a ^{particularly} vigorous and independent maritime tradition. On the South American continent dense jungles, enervating climates, enormous distances and the precipitous Andes mountains have served notably to isolate continental "neighbors" from one another.

② In addition the capabilities of regional actors have not been particularly substantial and their governments have often been weak, unstable and/or overwhelmingly preoccupied with domestic events. Certainly the organizational and technical requisites to meaningfully influence developments in

neighboring countries have, in general, been quite limited. These basic realities have been reinforced by the economic and cultural perspectives of local societies -- which looked toward Europe, and later the United States, as their principal points of international contact.

Naturally there have existed exceptions to these general propositions. And, in spite of the basic geopolitical impediments, there evolved during the first half century following independence an increasingly integrated subsystem featuring some measure of balance of power competition among prominent regional actors. In particular the two most powerful South American actors (Argentina and Brazil) faced each other across a disputed borderland that was both desirable and ²mainly traversable. The result was a predictable pattern of competition and warfare (The Platine Wars of 1825-1828 and 1839-1852) which resulted in a stalemate and the institution-^{al}ization of the Uruguayan buffer state as a compromise. The rivalry continued, however, with each side seeking advantage over the other and the establishment of preponderant influence over the smaller border states. The two rivals managed to cooperate, however, to ^psuppress the grandiose and expansive ambitions of a Paraguayan dictator (The War of the Triple Alliance, 1865-1870) and prevent the emergence of a third power contender in the Platine Basin.

Meanwhile on the Pacific coast the pretensions of Lima to reunite the old Viceroyalty of Peru came into increasing conflict with the emerging power of the Chilean state. Santiago (which did, in fact, develop ⁵a respectable maritime tradition) frustrated an intended union between Peru and Bolivia

(The War of the Confederation 1836-1839) and defeated the two again (The War of the Pacific, 1879-1883) -- annexing the entire coastline of Bolivia and the rich southern provinces of Peru as well.

During this period the countries of northern South and Central America played an insignificant role in the power politics of the region as a whole. After the dissolution of Gran Colombia in 1830, the weak successor states (Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador) remained severely plagued by domestic instability. Further to the north, Mexico was likewise so pre-occupied by domestic unrest (and its ultimately catastrophic rivalry with the United States) that it only occasionally mustered the capacity to ineffectually interfere in the chaotic affairs of the contentious Central American republics.

Thus between independence and the dawn of the new century there occurred five major regional wars involving the principal Latin American nations. In addition lesser disputes, conflicts with extra-regional ^{powers} ~~actors~~ and a number of war scares (most notably between Argentina and Chile over their hotly disputed border) contributed to a climate of considerable agitation at the interstate level. Since 1900, however, there has been in evidence a notable ¹⁰ moderation in this pattern of behavior. During this century only three significant military conflicts have disturbed the regional ambience--~~two~~ between very minor actors and one involving a "major power" in little more than a police action against a much weaker opponent. (The Chaco War, 1928-1938, the Soccer War of 1969, and the border war between Peru and Ecuador in 1941 respectively.)

The relative absence of interregional conflict in this century can be attributed to the addition of certain new factors to the more basic realities that traditionally have served to minimize the potential for conflict among Latin American nations. In the ~~Platine~~^{La} Basin a reasonably satisfactory balance of power continued to obtain between Brazil and Argentina. Meanwhile on the Pacific coast the continuing military superiority of Chile served to discourage Peru and Bolivia from efforts to recoup their losses.

In addition there can be no doubt that the increasing role of the United States in hemispheric affairs exercised a moderating influence upon regional actors. In the wake of the First World War the influence and growing power of the United States progressively discouraged the Latin American nations from resort to war. Possessing both an economic and a political interest in hemispheric stability, Washington actively attempted to assuage and mediate regional conflict. The economic weight of the United States, its political influence and military capacity became ~~even~~^{fe} more critical to relations among its relatively weak regional neighbors. Few governments wished to forego the goodwill of Washington through aggressive conduct. And even nations such as Argentina, which furiously resisted the spread of North American influence, did not desire to risk confrontation with a neighbor that might be directly supported by the United States.

The Second World War ultimately consolidated the inter-American system and enhanced the power and prestige of the United States. In addition during the subsequent Cold War epoch various regional elites sought U.S.

support in order to combat subversion of the region's social order by communist and other radical elements. The disposition of the United States during the post-war period to disperse considerable quantities of economic and military assistance (or alternatively to undermine antagonistic regimes) also contributed to respect for the stabilizing policies of Washington. As a general rule, U.S. military assistance (an area in which it enjoyed a near monopoly) was distributed in such a way as to limit Latin American military capabilities and keep them balanced vis-a-vis potential antagonists. As a result of this reinforcing interaction of basic geopolitical realities and these more temporary international political circumstances, the Latin American subsystem assumed a singularly pacific aspect.

The Changing Regional Security Environment

If, indeed, the factors enumerated above provide the basic explanation for the restrained nature of security competition among Latin American states, then observers of the region ought to be well prepared for a marked alteration in the traditional pattern of conduct. For at least the last decade, there has been a clear and progressive erosion of all the identified moderators ^{of} ~~and~~ intra-regional security contention. And although the logical consequence of this development--actual conflict among the South American states--has yet to materialize, there is already in ample evidence a notable escalation in the level of politico-security rivalry among regional actors which could well comprise its precursor.

It is recognized that there persist powerful inhibitory factors to the emergence of conflictual relationships among Latin American nations and that new barriers to such a development are also in the process of evolution. Latin America possesses a long tradition of aspirations toward cultural, political and economic community and a profound sense of psycho-cultural identity vis-a-vis the remainder of the world (most particularly the United States). Moreover, the exigencies of the developmental process would seem to impel concentration on domestic matters and an emphasis on cooperation of developing nations in their evolving relations with the industrialized world. Additionally, legal-moral strictures and the interests of residually powerful extra-regional actors (at least for the time being) argue against carrying interregional contention to extremes. It would be hazardous, however, to assume that these cooperative imperatives will prevail and factors impelling rivalry and even conflict command careful attention.

Outside the region the advent of detente and multipolarity and the qualified withdrawal of the United States from its overarching hemispheric role has provided the nations of Latin America with far greater latitude in the conduct of their foreign policies. For a variety of reasons Latin America is one area where the Soviet Union has eschewed heavy-handed subversive efforts for the past decade. The conservative Nixon and Ford Administrations, progressively assuaged of their fears for hemispheric security and preoccupied by events in other world areas, demonstrated (with a few newsworthy but temporary exceptions) precious little interest in the course of Latin American events. The great

economic aid programs of the Kennedy Administration, already in the process of atrophy under Johnson's term, were brought to a rapid halt. And to the extent that the Republicans possessed a policy toward Latin America, it consisted of reliance on the regional influence of an emerging constellation of conservative military regimes in the context of the Nixon Doctrine.

Liberal American opinion, on the other hand, particularly as expressed through an increasingly vociferous Congress, tended to grate against the emerging pattern of Latin American realities. As prospects for democracy in Latin America dimmed during the late 1960s and early 1970s with the emergence of an increasingly pervasive pattern of military dictatorships, growing criticism was voiced over the social policies and human rights records of these regimes. As a corollary, the increasingly generalized desire of Latin American regimes for more modern military hardware to refurbish their modest arsenals encountered an unsympathetic reaction within the American legislature. By the late 1960s military aid had been sharply reduced, and onerous restrictions, both in terms of the volume and quality of equipment that could be sold to Latin American nations, had been imposed by Congressional mandate.

Simultaneously, the pervasive regional influence of Washington was being undermined by the definitive advent of the nations of Western Europe and Japan as credible economic alternatives to the United States. By the end of the 1960s, the European Economic Community, as a collectivity, had already come to surpass the United States in terms of Latin American

trade and Japan had already shown itself as the region's most dynamic new point of international economic interaction. Analogous trends were also visible in the realms of investment and technology transfer.

In the intervening decade these tendencies have persisted. And although U.S.-Latin American economic relations have continued to grow in absolute terms, the degree of the region's economic dependence on Washington has steadily diminished.

Within Latin America the ability to have accounted a notable increase in the economic, social and political capabilities of the regional actors. The aggregate impact of long standing developmental trends has profoundly altered the characteristics of the entire Latin American societies. Obviously there continue to exist serious social classes expressed by the rigors of underdevelopment. But at the same time, the principal Latin American nations have now come to be dominated by increasingly large and dynamic modernized social sectors. These nations now disport substantial and diversified economies. And perhaps more importantly there is ample evidence within these societies of a steady proliferation of the habits and skills associated with a self-sustaining continuation of this developmental trajectory.

The inability of the nations of Latin America to support stable and effective political systems have long been the bane of the region. And it can not be denied the political difficulties continue to afflict many of the local societies. But at the same time, increasingly sophisticated bureaucracies, and networks of transportation and communication have

immeasurably enhanced the ability of the central governments to direct the nations' affairs. Similarly improved methods of revenue collection and greater control achieved over the activities of foreign enterprises have provided these governments with the resources to prosecute their policies,

Regional political institutions are also in the process of profound evolution. And although progress in this regard is considerably more ambiguous, there appears in evidence a certain amount of movement away from traditional elite group rule and/or ineffectual copies of North Atlantic institutions and toward autonomously derived systems, which, however unattractive, may be more capable of providing political stability and sound macro-developmental direction in the frequently harsh Latin American environment.

The growing level of Latin American capabilities has naturally spawned a proliferating range of interests and an enhanced measure of self-assertiveness, which has substantially eroded the traditional nature of ties with the developed nations (most particularly, the United States) and impelled the emergence of a growing array of direct and sustainable conflicts of interest.

The enhanced capabilities and augmented independence of the Latin American nations are certainly evident in the military sphere where the severance of tutelary security ties, expanding military budgets and the acquisition of increasingly sophisticated armaments technology has wrought a substantial improvement in the traditionally

feeble military capabilities of regional actors. Military spending has only increased in proportion to the impressive growth of the regional CNP as a whole. And, in fact, it has declined perceptibly as a percentage of expenditure by the central governments of the region.

In both absolute and relative terms, the result is not particularly impressive when measured against the patterns prevalent in the remainder of the international system. And, in fact, Latin America remains the world area devoting the lowest level of its resources to military affairs. Nevertheless, the impact within the Latin American system itself is to have made available, by traditional standards, truly impressive sums to the region's defense establishments.

With increasing sums available and military governments at the head of most major Latin American nations, a strong desire to upgrade the effectiveness of the region's armed forces was quite predictable. All the more so since, in the mid 1960s, the military capabilities of the Latin American states were, objectively speaking, quite rudimentary in nature. With the exception of Cuba, the region's armed forces possessed only small numbers of antiquated hardware -- the great bulk of which were U.S. castoffs of World War II and Korean War vintage. Not even the more substantial states possessed so much as a single modern jet fighter, battle tank or missile frigate.

The emerging Latin American demand for modern hardware first manifested itself in modest requests to the United States. But as mentioned, these desires encountered a notably unsympathetic reaction.

As a result, the increasingly independent nations of the region simply began a rapid and portentous turn toward extrahemispheric sources of supply. Between 1968 and 1973, the United States transferred no major modern weapons systems to Latin America, while the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, the Soviet Union and various other nations entered the regional arms market in force.

It became increasingly obvious that the U.S. arms embargo on Latin America was not having the desired effect. And, in fact, it could well be argued that American withdrawal from the market actually increased regional arms acquisitions while costing the United States both revenue and political influence. By 1973, the American Congress in authorizing sales of F-5 fighters to six countries, indicated that it had reconsidered the matter. And the United States has since resumed a respectable place in Latin American arms traffic. Washington cannot, however, hope to regain its formerly dominant position, either in terms of supply or influence over the regional arms balance.

A closely related trend has been the development, on the part of the more technologically capable regional actors, of home-grown defense industries. This approach, to the extent that it is feasible, "has the additional advantage of upgrading local technological capacity providing domestic employment, defraying import costs, and bolstering national pride and independence." Substantial strides have been made along these lines, particularly by Argentina and Brazil. Both nations are now capable of supplying not only their needs in rudimentary war

materials such as transportation and communications equipment, small arms and munitions, but increasingly a wide variety of heavier and more sophisticated hardware. On their own or through licensing agreements (which almost invariably envisage the eventual nationalization of production) Brazil and Argentina now both produce armored vehicles, light-fighter aircraft, modern naval craft and simple missile systems.

The result of this reinforcing pattern of developments has been the extirpation of Latin America's traditional arms supply relationship with the United States and the diversification of the residual dependency among a group of nations with no particular inhibitions about selling the Latin American nations any weapons for which they can pay. On the contrary, most extrahemispheric nations look upon the transfer of arms as extremely desirable transactions with considerable fallout in other economic areas and perhaps in the political realm as well.

In view of the volume and sophistication of arms acquired, it would be premature to speak of a precipitous arms race in Latin America. But at the same time, it is clear that the new generation of hardware already in place and the trajectory established, frees the regional actors from previous constraints and confers upon them the ability to transcend traditional geographic obstacles and apply unprecedented levels of coercive force.

These increasing capabilities, however, are not proceeding in accordance with traditional proportion. And, in fact, the principal

power balances upon which regional stability has historically rested have been completely upset. In particular, the enormous increase in Brazilian capabilities has completely outstripped those of Argentina and there has emerged the spectre of a Brazilian threat to the remaining Spanish-American countries. On the Pacific coast, the comfortable Chilean superiority with respect to its traditional antagonists has completely evaporated and, in fact, Peru has acquired a clear superiority -- at least in terms of military hardware. In addition, Venezuela, with the support of petrodollars, is rapidly emerging as a new and unpredictable factor in the regional security balance.

The Brazilian Imbalance

During the course of the last decade the emergence of Brazil to a position of regional primacy is undoubtedly the most significant change in the traditional Latin American politico-security environment. The rise of Brazil in general terms, so well documented elsewhere, has just as clearly been paralleled in the security sphere. Without any particular strain, the spectacular growth of the Brazilian economy has permitted the diversion of resources sufficient to begin realization of the nation's long-latent military potential.

Steady increases in military spending, commensurate with the growth of the economy as a whole, now allows Brazil to expend an amount broadly comparable to the remainder of South America combined. This trend permitted an across-the-board upgrading of the nation's military capabilities to a level which is at least qualitatively equivalent to

any of its regional neighbors. In the case of Brazil, qualitative parity combined with its inherent quantitative advantages have combined to bring about a growing regional primacy in terms of conventional military capabilities.

Thus far, the Brazilian authorities have exercised considerable restraint both in terms of accruing and applying their military capabilities. But if occasional charges of "Brazilian imperialism" are as yet unfounded, contemporary Brazil is certainly a dynamic actor with an expanding range of interests beyond her borders. This development, in combination with traditional fears on the part of her Spanish-speaking neighbors, has given rise to a general trepidation which manifests itself in varying ways along the entire length of her extensive borders.

Despite the apparently cooperative intent of Brazilian initiatives culminating in the recent advent of the Amazon Pact, the nations sharing this enormous undeveloped area with Brazil remain extremely wary of her ultimate objectives. Natural population migration and the thrust of national development programs are establishing a steadily growing Brazilian presence in the Amazon Basin. The Amazon provinces of the Andean nations, in contrast, remain extremely underdeveloped and quite remote from their respective centers of national power. Substantial numbers of Portuguese-speaking settlers are already finding their way across these ill-defined borders and economic currents in the entire region are tending to follow the immutable flow of the Amazon. These

trends are particularly disquieting to policymakers in Venezuela, Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, since they vividly recall the traditional method of Luso-Brazilian expansionism. These issues remain latent at present, disguised in fact by the vacuous aspirations toward cooperation embodied in the Amazon Pact. Agreements of this nature, however, rarely withstand real conflicts of interest among the parties and tensions could quickly be activated by any number of issues.

An active Brazilian presence is even more manifest among the smaller states along her southern frontier. Population movement and a swelling tide of economic activity in the areas of trade, investment and joint developmental ventures have already established an unprecedented level of Brazilian involvement in the affairs of Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay. In addition, a measure of political interdependence has been established in recent years as these conservative military regimes have leaned on the emerging Brazilian power for support both domestically and in international affairs.

The huge new hydroelectric complex currently under construction at Itaipu on the Brazilian-Paraguayan border is symbolic of the new level of Brazilian presence in the border states and of its potential for deep and unforeseeable political consequences. When completed in the early 1980s, this new complex will be both the largest factor in the Paraguayan economy and an absolutely indispensable source of electric power for the burgeoning Brazilian industrial base. Although theoretically jointly owned, the preponderant Brazilian financial and technical role

as well as the gross power imbalance between the two nations possesses obvious implications for the future. Involvement of this kind provides Brazil with a critical stake in Paraguay's political and economic development. And with the kind of leverage it now possesses, it is almost inconceivable that Brazil would tolerate any developments grossly adverse to her interests. The same considerations apply, in different measures, to circumstances in both Bolivia and Uruguay. And within the border states there is clearly developing a general situation pregnant with the complications inherent in an emerging hegemonic role.

The most critical and potentially volatile of Brazil's emergence to regional primacy has been its impact on the tenor of relations with its traditional Argentine rival. Historically, the greater sophistication of Argentina's economic, social and military institutions (together with the advantages of operating in a predominantly Hispanic regional environment) have been sufficient to balance off Brazil's greater geopolitical bulk and support pretensions to general regional leadership. In recent decades, however, Brazil's impressive developmental trajectory could hardly have contrasted more markedly with the poor performance of Argentina's political and economic institutions. And the result has been a complete upset in the broad parity of power that had characterized their relationship for at least a century.

In view of the traditionally tense relationship between the two governments, it is hardly surprising that this profound shift in the balance of power has given rise to serious security concerns on the part of Argentine policymakers (aggravated by the wound that this new situation inflicts on the legendary Argentine pride). Thus far, specific grist for this general concern has been generated principally by a progressive Brazilian penetration of the border states (in which Argentina had traditionally exercised the greater influence) and, more specifically, by the ongoing controversy over the uses put to the Parana River.

Basically Buenos Aires contends that Brazilian developmental initiatives on the upper courses of the Parana River (centering on Itaipu) imperil the Argentine ability to utilize the lower reaches of this enormous river system for the same purposes. At a broader level, of course, the capacity and inclination of Brazil to pursue these initiatives regardless of Argentine objections graphically symbolizes the altered state of international politics in the Platine Basin.

This situation is particularly critical because, as adverse as trends have been, Argentina has not as yet lost broad comparability with Brazil in conventional military terms. Moreover, Argentina has maintained superiority in certain specific technological areas -- most notably in the military potential of its nuclear program. In fact, it is altogether probable that this program will soon yield an atomic veto power to counterbalance Brazil's escalating conventional advantage.

In the meantime, Argentine policymakers have demonstrated that, even in their currently enfeebled state, they will not allow Brazilian pretensions to be carried too far. During the summer of 1977 the complete disinclination of Brasilia even to discuss its developmental plans with Buenos Aires nearly produced a serious rupture between the two governments. At that time, "purely technical" talks were arranged as a last minute face-saving device and have continued to the present. In practice, however, these discussions had little effect upon the momentum of Brazilian initiatives and mutual recriminations have predictably resurfaced in recent days. In the end, Brazilian policymakers do not really to push Argentina to any precipitous action. But, on the other hand, they have little intention of allowing Argentine desires to seriously interfere with realization of ambitions which they believe their interests dictate and their new-found capacities permit. Thus, the basic issues involved in the new nature of inter-Platine politics remain imperfectly resolved and uncomfortably balanced on the edge of potentially serious controversy.

The Pacific Coast

Meanwhile, on the Pacific Coast, it is the very restoration of broad parity between traditional rivals that threatens regional stability. Over the course of the past decade, the historically-clear economic, political and military superiority of Chile has completely evaporated -- opening prospects for revival of bitter quarrels having their origins in that nation's expansionist past.

It is clear that Chilean capabilities, relative to other Latin American states (most especially Argentina and Brazil) have been declining steadily for half a century. But it is only with the disastrous course of events in evidence since the accession of the Allende Administration in 1971 that Chile has lost its unquestioned dominance of the Pacific Coast.

The whipsaw of radicalism and the harsh military reaction of 1973 bitterly polarized Chilean society and left the nation's economy in ruins. Peru, meanwhile under a "military-socialist" government, after 1968 experienced moderate rates of economic growth and much-needed social reform. Ultimately, the visionary economic policies of the Lima regime left Peru bankrupt and military rule discredited while Chile has recently experienced something of a revival. The net effect of the past decade, however, is the reestablishment of broad parity between the two old rivals. Moreover, the Peruvian military during its tenure lavished large sums on the armed forces and acquired a truly substantial arsenal by regional standards (acquired in large measure from the Soviet Union).

Relations between Lima and Santiago are burdened by a legacy of deep bitterness and suspicion. And during this same critical transitional period, the relationship was complicated by Bolivia's vehement reassertion of its long-standing pretensions to secure renewed access to the sea. Of necessity, the satisfaction of any such claims could only be secured through Chilean concessions. On its own, Bolivia could not force a total satisfaction of its desires, and a "minimalist" settlement between La Paz

and Santiago would inevitably transgress on Lima's own claims. And any more substantial settlement could only be realized through the strongest Peruvian and Bolivian collusion against Chile. A combination to achieve such ends would almost certainly precipitate conflict. And for a period during 1975 and 1976, the aggrieved pair seemed on the verge of attempting to realize this unique opportunity to realize their ambitions. Since that time, Peruvian severe political and economic difficulties and a qualified renaissance of Chilean fortunes seem to have closed the door to temptation. But the basic grievances remain unresolved, and crisis could again be precipitated -- particularly should Chile be compromised by domestic or other foreign difficulties.

In addition to the instability impelled by the interaction of traditional rivalries and recent shifts in the local power balances, ideological discord contributes to a climate of heightened regional insecurity. Certainly the aggravating influence of ideological factors has declined substantially with the demise of Allende in Chile and the Peronist regime in Argentina. In fact, for a time, something approaching a philosophical community of interest seemed to appear for a time among the military regimes of the Southern Cone.

A certain level of tension persists, however, between the democracies of the Caribbean littoral on one hand, and the conservative military governments of the Southern Cone and Central America on the other. Mexico, and a newly prominent Venezuela, borne forward on the strength of markedly enhanced petroleum revenues, presently carry the liberal

banner in Latin America. Both governments have had a series of diplomatic incidents with various harsh military governments, and Caracas in particular has become deeply embroiled in the Nicaraguan-Costa Rican border troubles occasioned by the efforts of insurgents to overthrow the long-standing Somoza dictatorship. Nicaraguan incursions across the frontier of democratic, but substantially defenseless Costa Rica, have precipitated a defense agreement between that nation and Venezuela. And during a recent crisis modern Venezuelan fighter aircraft were dispatched on a "training mission" to Costa Rica as a clear warning to the Somoza government. The degree of Cuban involvement in the anti-Somoza insurgency is also a highly volatile issue within the region. And an even greater level of ideological dissention is latent in a region where liberal democracies, military dictatorship and socialism of both indigenous and Marxist origins uneasily coexist.

Finally and predictably, new and particularistic grievances are in increasing evidence as the scope of interests of regional actors expand. Often these controversies feature traditional rivalries aggravated by disputes over economic issues, particularly access to increasingly scarce natural resources. Bolivian claims to renewed access to the sea (and any portion of Chile's mineral-rich northern provinces she or Peru could acquire) have a profound economic dimension as do the disputes, overt and latent, over use of the water resources of the Parana and Amazon Rivers.

Figuring more prominently in the news during recent days has been the potentially volatile dispute between Chile and Argentina over the Beagle Channel. Continuing a long history of border problems between the two countries, the recent award of three disputed islets to Chile by an international tribunal was the ostensible precipitator of the crisis. In actual point of fact, however, it is the potential for a substantial expansion of Chilean claims in the Atlantic and in Antarctica based upon these awards that aroused Argentine ire. The result has been quite serious, and as of this writing actual conflict seems only precluded by tenuous talks in progress and Argentina's desire not to be seen as an aggressor in terms of international law. As a result almost any untoward event at present could precipitate a conflict in this remote and unaccessible area.

The abovementioned controversies are only the most presently newsworthy. And a host of others remain latent for the time being. And for the future a persistent border dispute between Ecuador and Peru, discord between Venezuela and Colombia over their potentially oil-rich maritime frontier, a Venezuelan-Brazilian rivalry in the Guyanas and the innumerable embroglios in Central America ought also to be taken into account.

Conclusion

A host of indigenous and broader international trends are combining to transform the nature of the traditionally inert Latin American subsystem and undermine long-standing, pervasive confidence with respect to its inherently pacific nature. The historically weak and unstable "powers" of the region are evolving into moderately potent national actors, possessed increasingly of the resources and technology to apply significant levels of coercive force against one another.

At the same time, dramatic alterations in traditional regional power balances aggravated by long-standing national rivalries, ideological discord and a growing agenda of more particularistic grievances are combining to heighten intra-regional tension. This course of development is occurring within a subsystem which is progressively free of the restraints which in past decades have been exercised from beyond its confines.

The trends adduced in this article do not necessarily demonstrate the inevitability of dangerous arms races and, eventually war within Latin America. In fact, the pattern of security contention among regional actors remains moderate by world standards and there persist serious barriers to the development of truly conflictual relationships. These developments do suggest, however, that absence of conflict is now a question of will rather than capacity. The Latin American subsystem is now composed of a group of ever more capable and contentious

national actors. In other such systems, this state of affairs has always yielded a fluid mixture of cooperation, contention and even conflict. And, realistically, it should not be expected that the powers of Latin America will comport themselves either better or worse.

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<i>Pres</i>	<i>IP 7/27</i>	<i>Info</i>		
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
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