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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** Latin American Affairs Directorate, NSC: Records

**Withdrawer**

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**File Folder** FALKLAND / MALVINAS: NSC AND STATE MEMOS,  
1982 (9)

**FOIA**

F01-027/4

**Box Number** 91170

O'DONNELL

22

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
129430	LIST	WORKING GROUP ATTENDEES	1	ND	B3
129431	PAPER	FALKLANDS CRISIS: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS AND POLICIES	17	6/17/1982	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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RECEIVED 08 JUN 82 12

TO WHEELER

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 07 JUN 82

KEYWORDS: LATIN AMERICA FALKLAND ISLANDS  
ARMS TRANSFERS IG

SUBJECT: NOTIFICATION OF IG MTG ON US - LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS - POST  
FALKLANDS / 9 & 11 JUN

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE: STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

S/S 8215908

3982

June 7, 1982

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: NSC - Mr. Michael O. Wheeler  
DOD - Col. John Stanford  
JCS - Maj. Dennis Stanley  
CIA - Mr. Thomas B. Cormack  
AID - Mr. Gerald Pagano

SUBJECT: Notification of IG Meeting

The Interagency Working Group on U.S.-Latin American Relations--Post Falklands will meet twice this week as follows:

Wednesday, June 9, 10:00 AM -- Room 6909 N.S.

Agenda: (1) Arms Transfer Issues  
(2) Role of Brazil

Papers on these items will be tabled in the meeting.

Friday, June 11, 10:30 AM -- Room 6909 N.S.

Agenda: Review June 4 draft, as revised,  
of the main policy study

The June 4 draft was circulated on June 7 by separate mailing, with request for comment by June 9.

Assistant Secretary Enders will chair the meetings. Attendance is restricted to the persons who attended the session of the IG on Friday, June 4. Addressees are asked to confirm their representation to Mr. Tain Tompkins, at 632-5804, by COB Tuesday, June 8.

L. Paul Bremer, III  
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~

GDS 6/7/88

DECLASSIFIED

Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

BY WJ NARA, DATE 01/27/2012

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POST FALKLAND ISLANDS

(THE FUTURE OF THE OAS AND THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM) .

\* \* \* \* \*

"The policy of the United States of America in regard to European colonies in the Western Hemisphere has been one of opposition to the extension of such colonies or of European political influence in this Hemisphere. This policy has been strongly asserted on several notable, I might say, historical, occasions.

With respect to the current disputes under discussion here, the Delegation of the United States would feel compelled to refrain from supporting any resolution which would appear to prejudge the conflicting claims of friendly nations. It is the hope of the United States Delegation that the interested parties will redouble their efforts to seek equitable solutions based on law and justice, and in conformity with our highest inter-American traditions and ideals."

-- Secretary of State George Marshall  
before the OAS 9th Inter-American  
Conference of American States,  
Bogota, Colombia, March 3 - May 2, 1948  
before voting on a resolution having  
to do with American territories under  
non-American control and peaceful  
means for eliminating colonialism and  
the occupation of American territories  
by extracontinental countries.



ORGANIZACION DE LOS ESTADOS AMERICANOS  
ORGANIZAÇÃO DOS ESTADOS AMERICANOS  
ORGANISATION DES ETATS AMERICAINS  
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

17th Street and Constitution Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20006

June 15, 1982

FOR: Ambassador J. William Middendorf, II  
SUBJECT: POST FALKLAND ISLANDS (The Future of the OAS and the  
Inter-American System)  
FROM: John W. Ford & Caroline M. Casselman

Encouraged by your letter of May 28th, 1982 about the consequences of the Falkland/Malvinas crisis for the Inter-American System, we submit the following observations, additional to those contained in our letter of June 8th, 1982 (Attachment A)

Critical Predictions Without Precedent

We have read hundreds of articles from Latin America and the United States and without question this current crisis has caused the greatest outpouring of predictions concerning the demise of the OAS and the Inter-American System that we have ever experienced.

A glance at the attached series of quotes from varied sources from 1962 to present does tend to show that the OAS is no stranger to crisis and has lived with them, shown flexibility, and thus far has survived even the worst of them. It has produced at the same time some monumental inaccuracies in the press concerning OAS history and actions of the past.

OAS Crises (1962-1982)

It might be helpful to list OAS crises historically: (at least as viewed by many of us who were present on the occasion).

1. The Cuban Missile Crisis (1962). The U.S. Government was concerned over whether or not it could obtain a two-thirds vote in the OAS for a quarantine, but Latin America was unified behind the United States, unquestionably because they perceived the missile threat as one not only directed toward the United States but toward them as well.

2. The Exclusion of Cuba (1962)
3. The Riots in Panama (1964-65)
4. The Dominican Republic --dispatch of U.S. Marines (1965)
5. Coups in Panama and Peru (President Arnulfo Arias seeks asylum in Canal Zone (1968)
6. Break in diplomatic relations between Costa Rica and Panama (1968)
7. Salvador-Honduras War (1969): The concern of the Foreign Ministers was very much in evidence over whether or not the OAS under the Rio Treaty would prove to be sufficiently powerful as to bring about Salvadoran troop withdrawal from occupied Honduran territory.
8. U.S. sponsored Physical Integration Task Force: (1970)  
Unilaterally developed by the White House without consultation with the U.S. Mission, Latin American opposition quickly developed and the concept had to be abandoned.
9. Cancellation by Dominican Republic of its Hostship of OAS Assembly: (1970)
10. Terrorism Convention with Walkout of Brazil, Argentina, Haiti, etal. (1971)
11. Fishboat Dispute with United States: Ecuador charges United States with violation of OAS Charter Article 19 (economic aggression) (1971)
12. Riots in Trinidad and Tobago and Movement of U.S. Warships toward Horizon (1971 circa)
13. Latin American Complaints Over U.S. Imposition of Surtax: President Nixon's call for Summitry
14. British Show of Force With Aircraft Carrier Off Coast of British Honduras (1973)
15. The Restructuring of the Inter-American System: (1973)

This issue which dominated the OAS General Assembly of 1973, had little to do with the structure of the OAS but rather (in the opinion of the U.S. Mission) had to do with a Latin American effort "to rewrite the rules of the road for US/LA relations: disputes and differences of opinion



over expropriation; control of natural resources, the U.S. political veto in the Inter-American Development Bank; Cuba and continuing sanctions against Cuba, the Panama Canal and assertive Latin nationalism."

16. Addressing Economic Problems under the New Dialogue in Mexico and in Washington: (1974)

The OAS was totally bypassed and not even its Secretary General was invited to participate in this initiative started by the U.S. Government.

17. The United States Trade Act of 1974 (Venezuelan and Ecuadorean Presidents) bring action into OAS Permanent Council over discriminatory features of U.S. Trade Act caused by their OPEC membership.

18. The Failure of the OAS Meeting of Consultation in Quito on Cuban sanctions because of inability to muster sufficient votes (the U.S. maintained neutrality on issue) (1974)

19. The Panama Canal Treaties: (1979)  
If a favorable vote in the U.S. Congress was to be assured, both the United States and Latin America needed to show solidarity with Panama. Faced with the problem of having to invite the Cuban Government, particularly if the signing event were held in Contadora Island, the OAS was asked to host the ceremony. This was a time when solidarity with Panama was not total. (Guatemala had broken relations with Panama and some countries among member states were not happy over the idea of Panama assuming full sovereignty.)

20. The Near War Between Argentina and Chile: (1978).  
The United States alerted the OAS to the crisis. Chile brought the matter to the OAS, Argentina to the UN, and the Vatican offered good offices, continuing to the present day

21. The Nicaraguan Crisis of 1979: (the fall of Somoza)

Once more, like the situation which actually developed in Quito over the Cuban sanctions issue, it appeared for a long time that the Foreign Ministers would have to return home and the meeting would close without the ability of the OAS mustering the needed votes to pass any resolution. Argentina provided the missing vote for a resolution condemning the Somoza Government and asking for its departure.

22. The Malvinas/Falkland Island Crisis: (April 1982)

\* \* \* \* \*

## SOME OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

We have listed some twenty-one crises weathered by the OAS, crises which at the time of their occurrence were considered as ones seriously affecting the OAS and the Inter-American System.

There are those writers who will add to this list of ours the crisis of 1953 (Guatemala) and claim that the CIA involvement in that country began the deterioration of the OAS and the Good Neighbor policy. Professor Bryce Wood of Brookings is to publish shortly a review of that crisis involving Ambassador Jack Peurifoy, the OAS and the United Nations.

U.S. Government concern over the financial crisis of the OAS was reflected in early 1981 at which time the Department of State alluded to the fact that a U.S. failure to meet its obligations would give credence to the oft-repeated allegation that the U.S. is withdrawing support for the Inter-American System and the political repercussions which would ensue within the Hemisphere, should the OAS be singled out as one of the two low priority organizations among international bodies.

The OAS has become a convenient target for any and all. The writings and speeches of a former Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs: "the real grist of our relationships are bilateral... we know the System is in crisis. We can paper over the crisis by going back to Buenos Aires and allow the OAS to stumble along.... or we can give a real push toward restructuring the OAS..."; and of the current member of the OAS Human Rights Commission, a U.S. citizen currently also its President, who recommended turning over the OAS peacekeeping functions to the United Nations and concluded the OAS "has a future simply because it has a past", have contributed to the sentiment that the United States is not truly interested in this multilateral institution. In 1975 a University professor cleared for an ARA participation in the policy making processes concluded that the Inter-American Bureau's policy toward the OAS was one "of knowing it exists but not knowing what to do with it and hoping it will go away."

Crisis #13 in our listing (Latin American Complaints Over U.S. Imposition of Surtax: President Nixon's call for Summitry), occurred at a time when the U.S. had discarded its old conceptual framework of its national interests in Latin America based on the security concerns of the Cold War --but it had no new conceptual framework to put in its place. Lacking any overarching notion of U.S. purposes in the region, swamped by domestic crises, and preoccupied with constructing a new relationship with its adversaries, the U.S. drifted into a situation in Latin America where old problems were allowed to fester and new issues were not addressed. Following President Nixon's 1969 speech, the one notable new policy pronouncement affecting our relations with Latin America was the Presidential statement of January 1972 threatening a cut-off of U.S. economic assistance to countries which expropriated American property without compensation.

It was in November 1972 that President Nixon, faced with the mounting Latin American complaints over the 10% surtax imposition on exports from the developing world, the threatened cut-off of economic assistance, the lack of a new Trade Act, etc. wanted OAS Secretary General Galo Plaza to call for an immediate meeting of Presidents (on or about December 11, 1972) in Bariloche, Argentina. As the Secretary of State at that time noted "we have reneged on every promise we ever made to Latin America." For many reasons including ARA's own misgivings, this summit meeting never took place.

At least for the past five years the OAS has been in continual reduction in force (RIF), a situation which has had growing impact on morale and we would judge it also responsible for an increasing number of officials seeking and obtaining employment with other international organizations, depriving the OAS of some much needed talents.

From the above narrative and review the conclusion is drawn that the OAS historically has shown considerable ability to survive crises, whether they be political, financial, or simply ones of disinterest on the part of one or more member states.

The durability of Latin American memories can be seen when one examines Crisis #4 (the Dominican Republic --dispatch of U.S. Marines), a crisis which began and has endured in Latin American actions and statements, ever since the April 28th, 1965 dispatch of U.S. Marines. Five years after the 1965 episode the Dominican Republic offered to host the first OAS General Assembly of Foreign Ministers, but turmoil in the country was such that the offer of hostship had to be withdrawn. Ambassador Robert Hurwitch later informed us that had the Foreign Ministers come to the Dominican Republic in April-May 1970 they would have had to be housed and their meetings would have had to take place within a military establishment in order to protect them.

In 1973 in the negotiations for a new Rio Treaty (Protocol of San Jose) the Dominican Republic crisis of 1965 was frequently cited with the allegation that the United States by its unilateral actions (although under the Charter) had shown it had no regard for the Rio Treaty.

In 1974 when Frank Carlucci and John Ford headed the U.S. delegation to the Dominican Republic for a meeting of the Council for Science, Education and Culture of the OAS heavy bodyguards were in evidence because of a still lingering though quite latent memory of 1965.

In 1979, and despite repeated advice to the contrary because of this background, the U.S. Secretary of State in the Meeting of Consultation concerned with the downfall of Somoza in Nicaragua introduced the idea of an Inter-American peace force, causing an overwhelming rejection of the idea by Latin American countries and damaging other initiatives which had not been fully developed.

In 1969 at the height of the war between El Salvador and Honduras which occurred only four years after the Dominican Republic episode, there was prompt approval by other member states of the United States supported helicopter patrols. The Dominican Ambassador at the time (Enriquillo del Rosario) initially did not wish to be transported to the war scene aboard United States military aircraft but quickly changed his mind when he realized that such transport was the only quick and reliable transport available. The Dominican Republic was represented constantly on the Committee of Seven Ambassadors during the major portion of this conflict.

From the above a conclusion can be drawn that Latin American historical memories of past incidents will remain latent for a decade and more but need not necessarily interfere with other peacekeeping activities which, as was the case in 1969, we brought by another member state to the OAS under the Rio Treaty.

ARA officials have in the past always been concerned over "divisive" issues that might surface in the OAS as for example the Cuban sanctions issue which was continually before the OAS but was resolved by a "formula" adopted in 1975 in San Jose known as the "freedom of action" resolution which would allow member governments to maintain the nature and level of relations with Cuba which they desired. In this connection it is interesting to note the voting spread in the two main crises of the Inter-American System:

1965 (Dominican Republic  
Under OAS Charter, an OAS Inter-  
American Peace Force, OAS member-  
ship being 21)

14 in favor  
5 against (México, Uruguay,  
Chile, Ecuador and Peru)  
1 abstension (Venezuela)  
1 Cuba not permitted to  
participate

—  
21

1982 (The Malvinas/Falkland  
Island Crisis, the 20th Meeting  
of Consultation under Rio Treaty:  
call for cease fire and US ces-  
sation of sanctions and assistance  
to Great Britain)

17 in favor  
0 against  
4 Abstensions (U.S., Chile,  
Colombia, and Trinidad and  
Tobago)  
1 Cuba not permitted to  
participate

—  
22

We do not believe despite the avalanche of unfavorable publicity and high emotion that the current crisis of 1982 has generated that it is a situation that is irreversible. It will require patience and careful attention to Latin American sensibilities so as not needlessly to provoke the use of OAS fora as ones of propaganda, in retaliation.



Over the years in the United States Government there have been many discussions concerning the development role of the OAS, and even whether the OAS should be providing technical assistance at all. In 1977 the Department of State in analyzing the OAS and its role in the area of development, had this to say:

"This lack of a clearly defined role for the Organization, combined with more immediate differences within the region, suggests that we should do some serious rethinking of our views about the OAS if the Inter-American System as presently constituted is to survive."

Our vision of the OAS role in development has been influenced greatly by political concerns. Our ideas are best expressed in the following numbered statements:

1. The technical assistance role of the OAS is one evidence of an OAS "presence" in a country, essential in our judgement if the OAS political role of peace-keeping, resolution of disputes, and human rights inquiries, is to be meaningful, understood and effective.
2. The OAS must have the day to day reputation of helping in a humanitarian sense, small and insignificant as it may seem today. The OAS technical assistance role should be increased and made better known in the interest of helping make its political role more digestable.
3. Where doubts exist about their efficacy and utility, OAS technical assistance programs can be independently evaluated with prior OAS consultation. Visits by U.S. officials to OAS projects, in the field, for example, should be the rule.

Most simplistically we are attempting to show the "linkage" between the political role and the technical assistance role. We have always felt that the best peace-keeper in a country is one who can show a previous record of humanitarian concern. We cannot abandon the OAS technical assistance role without detriment or damage to the political role. This latent linkage was evident in the Consensus of Viña del Mar (May 1969) and was thus expressed:

"The principles of solidarity underlaying inter-American cooperation in the political field and in matters of security should necessarily be applied also in the economic and social field. Their non-observance in this regard can disrupt relations among the countries and imperil their peace and security." (Article 8)

Rarely has the United States initiated action in the OAS (either under the Rio Treaty or under the Charter), and the instances in which it has done so have produced some interesting results:

- |      |   |  |
|------|---|--|
| 1951 | Invasion of South Korea by North Korea and Chinese armed forces | Prompt measures were undertaken to insure the military defense of the Hemisphere.  |
| 1962 | Cuban Missile Crisis  | A vote which resulted in unanimous backing of the United States.   |
| 1979 | Nicaraguan Crisis: (fall of Somoza)                             | A vote barely able to approve the resolution condemnatory of the Somoza Government, BUT also a rejection of the United States sponsored idea of a Peace Force. |

The current call by some Latin American countries for a new security pact (ex-President Carlos Andres Perez and Panama's President Royo) or a new defense alliance for the Western Hemisphere, from conversations we have had with Latin Americans would not appear to evoke any real sympathy. We have pointed out that it would take at least four years or more for the ratification process involved in any juridically binding new agreement, and furthermore under the current Rio Treaty, which permits no veto, Latin America, if it can be unified is always able to outvote the United States. One Latin American colleague nevertheless pointed out that much as the Latin Americans did some time ago,\* they would like "their own institution of mutual defense", one in which their resolutions and debate do not have the U.S. looking over their shoulder.

\* Creation of SELA with Cuban Membership

Over the past couple of months we have reviewed thousands of articles which allude to the current crisis of the OAS and the Inter-American System and include from time to time the concept of an OAS without the United States and also the "threat" of moving the OAS headquarters away from Washington to a site in one of the Latin American Countries.

A review of previous crises will show that these kinds of statements are almost endemic in the course of OAS history and we would tend to agree with the observation of 1973 that:

"It would be intriguing to learn whether the Latin American States faced with the greater necessity of dealing with each other, which American (meaning U.S.) withdrawal from the OAS would mean, would be as eager as many of them now seem to watch the United States go."

A careful examination of the numerous quotes from Latin American officials during this current crisis of the Malvinas/Falklands will also show considerable variations in tone and content depending upon the person within the government making the statement. Already perceivable is a toning down of the extremist type statements and a caution to await for a more calm approach when it is possible to view the situation from without the center of the volcano.

The idea of moving the OAS out of Washington is one that is also endemic and is heard repeatedly whenever the OAS is faced with a crisis. Once more this is an issue in which Latin America, if it can ever be unified on a topic, can easily make a decision. U.S. policy has always been one of pointing out soberly that the U.S. has no hold on the location of the OAS headquarters and will abide by the majority wish at any time. Thus far in OAS history Latin America has not been able to obtain any real sympathy for such a move for many reasons among which are the obvious facts: a) Washington is the diplomatic capitol of the world; b) to move the OAS to Latin America would bring about its true demise; c) it would be more costly for Latin America for where else can there be double representation such as is possible in Washington.

There are many things that need to be done if the conclusion is that a viable OAS is in U.S. policy interest, and we believe it is. Most importantly is to insure that the OAS has useful things to do. As was done on several occasions in the past during disasters, U.S. funds can be diverted to the OAS for a specific purpose (the \$2 million for corrugated roofing at the height of the Peruvian earthquake). The U.S. Mission efforts in the past to insure an OAS role in AID funded projects is a case in point.

There are major efforts also needed to improve the OAS image and knowledge on the part of member states governments and people as to what the OAS role historically has been. As a former representative of the Canadian Parliament said to us this week, you should begin by establishing throughout the Hemisphere, Inter-American Societies to insure continuing attention to this Hemisphere.

Enclosures

QUOTES AND REFERENCES REGARDING THE  
INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM: 1948-1982



THE FUTURE OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES

POST MALVINAS

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"The obituary of the OAS is being written in the media all over Latin America...the longer hostilities last, the stronger becomes the possibility that some Latin American Government will seek to create an all Latin counterpart either to the OAS or the Rio Treaty, leaving out the United States and possibly the Caribbean states that also support Britain."

--Enterprise, Brockton, Mass. May 11, 1982

\*\*\*\*\*

"We face the most difficult and critical situation that has ever confronted the Inter-American System in all its history. No matter how serious have been other situations, never was there present an action of war by an extra-continental power, nor an event which so affected the structure of collective security of the System."

The gravest aspect of this crisis for the Continent is that it has placed Member States in the position of following two divergent paths. I have the firmest conviction that this situation is not irreversible, but we will have to pay a certain price for it during a certain period of time. That time period and that price will be less to the degree that the System demonstrates its willingness to prevail over the circumstances of the moment. I have no doubt that it will prevail."

The crisis demonstrated Latin American unity. That unity, that is an imperative of its history, will bring forth its most fruitful results, serving to vitalize the Inter-American System and permitting it to fulfill its mandates and responsibilities."

--Alejandro Orfila, Secretary General  
May 21, 1982

"...important that we continue to work together closely to maintain the integrity of the Inter-American System..."

--Alexander Haig, Secretary of State  
April 30, 1982

"Contradictory resolutions have been taken, the OAS taking a parochial stand, while the UN recognizes that aggression should not be rewarded by allowing an invader to negotiate while they occupy invaded lands..."

--Ranger, Riverton, Wyoming  
April 28, 1982

"The OAS Foreign Ministers Meeting in a skillful act of diplomacy, refused to deepen the crisis by considering any sanctions against Britain or any offer of military support for Argentina...the OAS resolution... called on Buenos Aires' Junta to refrain from any acts that could aggravate the situation and recognized the interests of the islands' inhabitants."

--Herald, Miami, Florida  
April 29, 1982

THE FUTURE OF THE OAS AND THE  
INTER AMERICAN SYSTEM  
(POST FALKLAND ISLANDS)

"If the Anglo-Argentine war has not yet finished off the Organization of American States (OAS), it has nonetheless left the Organization mortally wounded, not to mention what used to be considered the Organization's single most valuable tool: the Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance Treaty (Rio Treaty)... Mexican Ambassador Rafael de la Colina, dean of representatives to the regional Organization....not long ago said that the 'funeral of the OAS might not be far off.' ....there are very few observers in Latin America who do not consider the OAS already dead."

--The Latin American Times, June 1982

"This lack of a clearly defined role for the OAS....suggests that we should do some serious rethinking of our views about the OAS if the Inter-American System as presently constituted is to survive."

--Weekly Issues, ARA: (The OAS:(Is the OAS an Anachronism or Useful Political Tool?) Department of State Study, June 1977

"The real grist of our relationships are bilateral. ....we know the Inter-American System is in crisis. We can paper over the crisis by going back to Buenos Aires and allow the OAS to stumble along with a new Secretary General and more and more US money....or we can give a real push toward restructuring the OAS and in the process reduce the opportunities for bloque confrontation...."

--Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, June 1975

"A balkanization of the Hemisphere, a hemisphere fragmented, at war with itself, will be of unusual detriment to development and human rights. ...The OAS cannot survive on human rights and peace-keeping alone. The need for all member governments to better identify the OAS future role is most evident."

--Letter to President Carter from Secretary General Orfila, 3-22-78

"The next day, Tuesday, was the important meeting of the OAS previously mentioned. It was anticipated that we might have difficulty obtaining the two thirds vote of support necessary for the ordering of the quarantine. But the Latin American countries, demonstrating a unique sense of unity, unanimously supported the recommendations of the United States. In fact, a number contributed men, supplies, and ships during the several weeks that followed..... The President composed a letter to Khrushchev, asking him to observe the quarantine legally established by a vote of the OAS making it clear that the U.S. did not wish to fire on any ships of the Soviet Union...."

--McCalls Magazine, November 1968 issue  
Robert Kennedy memoirs

"....unfortunately, most of those leaders (of the United States) found the pressure too strong and approved overt or covert unilateral measures to deal with a given situation. At least one of these, the Bay of Pigs episode, was disastrous to our own interests. They have all brought discredit on the United States and have impaired Latin American acceptance of collective OAS responsibility."

--Retired FSO Edward A. Jamison  
in letter to Congressman Michael  
D. Barnes, January 22, 1982

"It would be intriguing to learn whether the Latin American States, faced with the greater necessity of dealing with each other, which American withdrawal from the OAS would mean, would be as eager as many of them now seem to watch the United States go."

--Washington Post, April 1973

"Pan Americanism has not gone beyond the stage of lofty ideas and the OAS is a body that really rubber stamps U.S. policies in the Hemisphere. The OAS cannot be a sanctuary of accommodated principles and even less an instrument for unacceptable acquiescence." ...the inter-American treaties and declarations of the last fifteen years are virtually worthless."

--Latin American declarations before and  
during OAS General Assembly, April 1973

"Such a major U.S. failure to meet its obligations would give credence to the oft-repeated allegation that the U.S. is withdrawing support for the Inter-American System...the political repercussions within the Hemisphere that the OAS has been singled out as one of the two low priority organizations are obvious...the \$4.7 million shortfall is already bringing the OAS close to a financial crisis...."

--January 1981 discussions in USOAS

"The failure of the Tlatelolco Dialogue in its endeavor to find through informal consensus the solution to the economic and commercial problems that have frequently divided us is highly instructive. In the end the OAS apparatus survived."

--OAS Amb. don Rafael de la Colina of  
Mexico, May 10, 1979

"I believe with the deepest conviction that this Organization can be destroyed in the process of too drastic and too sudden budgetary reductions, and along with it, important U.S. security interests. If we irreparably damage the institution of the OAS, we do not have to my knowledge a suitable replacement. And the U.S. will end up paying a terrible financial and political price."

--John W. Ford, October 19, 1979  
in letter to Ambassador Henry Owen,  
Special Representative to the President



STATEMENTS OF UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT  
OFFICIALS OVER THE YEARS

(1947 - 1982)

"The South Atlantic conflict could put into danger the principles and institutions we have constructed so laboriously and which have served us so well. We must protect the integrity of our institutions so that they can serve us in future crises,(which could affect any of us), as well as they have served us in the past."

-- Secretary of State Alexander Haig,  
before OAS 20th Meeting of Foreign  
Ministers, under Rio Treaty,  
Washington, 5-27-82

\* \* \* \* \*

"If this controversy over the title to territories which command the access to Antarctica grows still more serious, not only will the security of both Argentina and Chile be prejudiced, but the peace of the entire hemisphere may be endangered by contingencies which seem as yet remote."

"An immediate initiative on the part of the Inter-American System is demanded. An attempt should be made by all the American republics to agree through consultation upon a common policy."

"What is equally important at this moment of world crisis is that no such breach between three leading nations of the West should be permitted to weaken the solidarity of the democratic front."

-- Former Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles  
from an article published in the Washington  
Post, March 3, 1948

\* \* \* \* \*

"The Delegation of the United States of America wishes to record its position that the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro has no effect upon the sovereignty, national or international status of any of the territories included in the region defined in Article 4 of the Treaty."

-- Report of U.S. Delegation to the Inter-American  
Conference for the Maintenance of Continental  
Peace and Security, Quitandinha, Brazil,  
August 15-September 2nd, 1947

\* \* \* \* \*

"The position of the United States can be briefly stated: the reaffirmation or confirmation of its devotion to the general principle that peoples of dependent territories should be helped to attain a constantly increasing

measure of self government; and its earnest desire that disputes should be settled by peaceful means...The policy of the U.S. in regard to European colonies in the Western Hemisphere has been one of opposition to the extension of such colonies or of European political influence in this Hemisphere.....

-- Secretary of State George C. Marshall,  
9th Inter-American Conference,  
Bogota, Colombia, 3-30/5-2; 1948

RECEIVED 17 JUN 82 16

TO CLARK

FROM DILLON, WILTON S

DOCDATE 16 JUN 82

*Fontaine*

KEYWORDS: FALKLAND ISLANDS

ARGENTINA

DAVIDSON, WILLIAM R

GREAT BRITAIN

POWS

FOOD

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE US ASSISTANCE IN FEEDING POWS IN FALKLANDS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 21 JUN 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

RENTSCHLER

FONTAINE *rec'd 7/20*

COMMENTS

REF#

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ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>State</i>	<i>D 6/24</i>	<i>Draft reply for WH Sig</i>	<i>7/1</i>	<i>RE</i>
	<i>7/16</i>	<i>Rec'd of draft reply</i>		<i>FOV</i>
<i>Rentschler</i>	<i>S 7/16</i>	<i>Prepare memo for Clark</i>	<i>7/19</i>	

DISPATCH *6/24 Clm* W/ATTCH FILE (C)



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

8217741

Washington, D.C. 20520


July 15, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SECRET

Subject: Food Assistance for Argentine Prisoners of War

Attached is a draft response to a June 16 letter to you from Wilton Dillon, requesting that we offer food assistance to Argentine prisoners of war.

  
L. Paul Bremer, III  
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Draft letter.
2. Incoming correspondence.



Department of State  
Suggested Reply

Dear Mr. Dillon:

Thank you for your letter of June 16, concerning the conflict in the South Atlantic.

When British forces on the Falklands took an unexpectedly large number of Argentine prisoners, we shared your concern regarding their humanitarian needs. We made clear that we were prepared to respond affirmatively to requests for assistance.

Now that the prisoner repatriation effort is almost completed, a relief effort by the US does not appear necessary. We have no reports that the smaller number of remaining prisoners lack food or medical assistance.


Thank you for sharing your suggestions with us and for forwarding a copy of the Foreign Policy article by Messrs. Davidson and Montville.

Sincerely,

Mr. Wilton S. Dillon,  
Director,  
Smithsonian Symposia and Seminars,  
Smithsonian Institution.

7249

17 J'N 1982



SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION

Washington, D.C. 20560  
U.S.A.

Personal and Unofficial

June 16, 1982

The Hon. William P. Clark  
National Security Council  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Judge Clark,

I am writing to inquire whether we are offering both the Argentines and the British some help in feeding the POW's in the Falklands/Malvinas. As an anthropologist much interested in gift exchange and the symbolism of gifts, I am reassured by Argentine citizens in Washington that we might benefit a little in a humanitarian gesture toward the POW's which would help all sides. Indeed, apart from the political implications, we would most be helping the Argentine soldiers maintain their health while returning home to resume more peaceful pursuits.

A former Roman Catholic priest at the Smithsonian thinks that the Catholic Relief Services might also be interested in this opportunity.

Sincerely yours,

Wilton S. Dillon  
Director  
Smithsonian Symposia and Seminars

PS The enclosures may be of interest to you; the senior author of the Foreign Policy article, Dr. William D. Davidson, strongly supports the view that we offer food to the POW's.



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

8217118

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4169

June 17, 1982

~~SECRET~~

Senior Interagency Group No. 24

TO :

OVP	- Mrs. Nancy Bearg Dyke
NSC	- Mr. Michael O. Wheeler
ACDA	- Mr. Joseph Presel
AID	- Mr. Gerald Pagano
CIA	- Mr. Thomas B. Cormack
Defense	- COL John Stanford
ICA	- Ms. Teresa Collins
JCS	- MAJ Dennis Stanley
Treasury	- Mr. David Pickford
UNA	- Amb. Harvey Feldman
USTR	- Mr. Dennis Whitfield

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward Latin America

Attached is a revised draft of the policy study discussed June 16 in the IG meeting on U.S. Policy toward Latin America in the post-Falklands environment. This paper will be the subject of the SIG to be held Tuesday, June 22, at 4:30 p.m. It is intended that the SIG hold a discussion rather than a decision meeting.

*Katherine Shirley for*  
 L. Paul Bremer, III  
 Executive Secretary

Attachment:  
Draft Study

*use Nonyl (Turkey)  
 assess Colombia*

~~SECRET~~

RDS-3 6/17/02

DECLASSIFIED  
 Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997  
 BY LSN NARA, DATE 01/27/2012

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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FALKLAND / MALVINAS: NSC AND STATE MEMOS, 1982 (9)

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129431	PAPER  FALKLANDS CRISIS: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS AND POLICIES	17	6/17/1982	B1

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The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing  
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.



ANNEXES

- I. ARMS TRANSFERS TO LATIN AMERICA AFTER THE FALKLANDS
- II. U.S. STRATEGY IN POST-MALVINAS SOUTH AMERICA: PURSUING THE BRAZILIAN OPTION