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*NLS**

ID# 305256

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

00125

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: JUNE 05, 1985

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT:

SUBJECT: ~~UNOPENED~~

I congratulate you & all of rural America on the Commemoration of fifty years of rural Electrification

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C D	COMPLETED YY/MM/DD
ROBERT C. MCFARLANE		ORG	85/06/05			<i>85/10/28</i>
REFERRAL NOTE:			<i>/ /</i>			<i>/ /</i>
REFERRAL NOTE:			<i>/ /</i>			<i>/ /</i>
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REFERRAL NOTE:			<i>/ /</i>			<i>/ /</i>

COMMENTS: ~~ORIGINAL TO LORETTA BRAXTON~~

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA: S INDIVIDUAL CODES: _____
MI MAIL USER CODES: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

*ACTION CODES:	*DISPOSITION	*OUTGOING	*
*	*	*CORRESPONDENCE:	*
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION	*A-ANSWERED	*TYPE RESP=INITIALS	*
*C-COMMENT/RECOM	*B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL	* OF SIGNER	*
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE	*C-COMPLETED	* CODE = A	*
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET	*S-SUSPENDED	*COMPLETED = DATE OF	*
I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC		* OUTGOING	*
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *		*	*
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE *		*	*
*X-INTERIM REPLY *		*	*

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

MALACAÑAN PALACE

MANILA

29 May 1985

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C.


Dear Mr. President:

On behalf of the Filipino people, I congratulate you and all of rural America on the commemoration of fifty years of rural electrification in the United States. Your electrification program has served as an inspiration not only to the Philippines but also to other developing countries of the world.

When I participated last May 27 in the Memorial Day Service at the American Military Cemetery outside Manila, I was once again moved by the strong ties that bind our two nations together. I pondered over the many cooperative efforts that we have undertaken towards peace and progress. Rural electrification is the best example of these endeavors. Our own program under the National Electrification Administration (NEA) was started with assistance from your government just 15 years ago. Today, over 15 million of our rural population enjoy the benefits of electricity and our electric cooperative movement has emerged as a potent force in the socio-economic life of Philippine rural society. We owe this achievement in part to the continuing support of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association (NRECA).

Once again I offer my sincere congratulations for your fifty years of success in lighting up the American countryside.

Sincerely,





STANDARD CONTRACT NO. 1234

1950

Faint, illegible text covering the majority of the page, likely representing the main body of a contract or document.

NOV 21

ID# 316698

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

CO125

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: JUNE 25, 1985

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE TOM LOEFFLER

SUBJECT: ENCLOSURES COPY LETTER FROM RENE KNECHT
REGARDING THE ESTATE OF JOHN M. BRADLEY

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACTION ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C D	COMPLETED YY/MM/DD
M. B. OGLESBY		ORG	85/06/25	<i>MO</i>		<i>A 850627</i>
	REFERRAL NOTE:					
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	REFERRAL NOTE:					
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COMMENTS: _____

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: _____ MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1240 _____
MAIL USER CODES: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

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*ACTION CODES:          *DISPOSITION          *OUTGOING          *
*                        *                        *CORRESPONDENCE:  *
*A-AAPPROPRIATE ACTION *A-ANSWERED          *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM       *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL *           OF SIGNER *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE      *C-COMPLETED        *           CODE = A  *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET *S-SUSPENDED        *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*                        *           OUTGOING *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *                        *                        *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE       *                        *                        *
*X-INTERIM REPLY       *                        *                        *
*****

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REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

June 27, 1985

Dear Tom:

This is to acknowledge your June 20 letter forwarding correspondence to the President from your constituent, Mr. Rene de la Riva Knecht.

Mr. Knecht's case is one of a legal/professional nature and, for obvious reasons, the President cannot offer assistance or professional opinions on such matters.

I regret that we are unable to provide a more favorable response for your constituent.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

M. B. Oglesby, Jr.
Assistant to the President

The Honorable Tom Loeffler
Member, U.S. House of Representatives
40 NE Loop 410
Suite 415
San Antonio, Texas 78216

MBO:KRJ:MDB

WH RECORDS MANAGEMENT HAS RETAINED ORIGINAL INCOMING

TOM LOEFFLER
21ST DISTRICT, TEXAS

CHIEF DEPUTY WHIP

ALAN M. KRANOWITZ
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT

#316698

ROOM 1212
LONGWORTH HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
(202) 225-4236

COMMITTEE ON
APPROPRIATIONS

SUBCOMMITTEES:
MILITARY CONSTRUCTION
INTERIOR

COMMITTEE ON
THE BUDGET

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

June 20, 1985

Mr. M. B. Oglesby
Assistant to the President for
Legislative Affairs
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500


Dear B.:

Enclosed for your attention is a copy of the correspondence I received from Mr. Rene de la Riva Knecht regarding his concerns. Mr. Knecht sent this correspondence last January and has yet to receive a response.

I would appreciate your reviewing this matter and responding to me at your earliest convenience.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,



TOM LOEFFLER

TL:bbp

Enclosure

Please send response to:
40 NE Loop 410, Suite 415
San Antonio, Texas 78216

John & Cristina Bradley

HOTEL FREDERIC
BUENDIA BLVD COR
F B HARRISON
MANILA PHILIPPINES
TEL 831-09-96

10387 SAHARA DR NO 6E
SAN ANTONIO
TEXAS 78216
U S A
TEL NO (512) 340 7175
(12) 899 2662

January 14, 1984

Mr. Ronald Reagan
President of the United States of America
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

As executor of the will of the late John M. Bradley, a United States citizen (he was incidentally a cousin of General of the Army Omar Bradley), and on the authority of the Hickenlooper Amendment (76 Stat. 260-61 as amended, 22 U.S.C.* 2370 (c)(1)), I respectfully request the President to suspend assistance to the government of the Republic of the Philippines under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or any other Act on the grounds hereafter stated.

Prefatory statement

The late John M. Bradley was a resident of Manila, Philippines, for over twenty-five years. On November 22, 1977, he married the widow Cristina de la Riva-Knecht. Having suffered harassment from the Marcos administration, they left the Philippines for San Antonio, Texas, on February 25, 1980. On November 21, 1982, John M. Bradley died - leaving his estate to his widow solely during her lifetime and, upon her demise, to his son Andrew Bradley and stepson Rene Knecht. The latter he named as the executor of his will.

First ground

Mr. and Mrs. John M. Bradley owned the disco nightclub named "Velvet Slum" located on the mezzanine of the Hotel Frederic which was owned and operated by Rene Knecht. The hotel was situated at Pasay City which is a part of Metro Manila. All the sound and lighting equipments of the disco "Velvet Slum" were imported with the dollar funds of Mr. John M. Bradley.

In the evening of April 6-7, 1981, Rene Knecht joined the protest caravan led by former Philippine Senator Eva Estrada Kalaw and the wife of former Philippine Senator Salvador Laurel. There was then a country-wide protest against the oppressive and corrupt Marcos regime. On April 8, 1981, the newspapers widely published the arrest of the members of that Kalaw-Laurel protest caravan and, because Rene Knecht looked white, the Marcos-controlled newspapers took and showed his photographs and demeaned the opposition by statements that it "rides ritzy cars, speaks English and French but rarely Filipino, has red-dyed hair and milky skin, and enjoys the company of the international jet set."

On April 9, 1981, the Director of the Bureau of Tourism Services issued an "order of closure" of the Hotel Frederic and its "Velvet Slum" by virtue of the powers vested in the Ministry by P.D. (Presidential Decree) 1463". On April 20, 1981, the Mayor of Pasay City sent Rene Knecht an outrageous demand and, on May 13, 1981, issued an "order of closure" of the Hotel Frederic and its "Velvet Slum." On May 10, 1981, the Manila Electric Company - the power company of the Lopezes which was taken over by the Marcos' military - sent the Hotel Frederic a bill for electrical consumption for the period from April 6 to May 11 when the hotel and Velvet Slum were closed in a sum more than double the previous month's consumption when they were in operation.

Rene Knecht had previous causes to protest.

On December 12, 1972 or the early part of martial law declared by Marcos, he was arrested and detained by the military without warrant and without charges.

On February 2, 1973, he was released with the help of Marcos' sister, the Ilocos' governor Elizabeth Marcos-Keon.

Rene Knecht then owned and operated the Tower Hotel in the heart of the tourist belt of Manila. Imelda Marcos induced the construction of seventeen new hotels in Metro Manila with government financing. Hotel occupancy and rates plummeted down. The new hotels were exempted from inception from paying amortizations on their government financing for the first three years and later extended by Marcos declared moratoria. Rene Knecht was however refused

similar moratorium for his Tower Hotel by the government controlled Development Bank of the Philippines.

Elizabeth Marcos-Keon offered her services to Rene Knecht to obtain a restructuring of his loan for the Tower Hotel from the Development of the Philippines, to obtain the release of his Durisol Philippines Inc. real properties and to collect P1 million in receivables from the military for its billeting of Muslim surrenderees at his Tower Hotel. Saying that she did not like to appear an influence-peddler, she asked Rene Knecht to execute an ante-dated and fictitious deed of trust whereby she, with purportedly 50% interest in the equity of the Tower Hotel (in truth she did not put in a single centavo), supposedly constituted him as mere trustee in the management of said hotel. Rene Knecht trustingly did so. Then, while he was in Australia, Elizabeth Marcos-Keon forcibly took over the management of the Tower Hotel and, when he arrived, he was barred from even entry into the hotel. Then, the Development Bank of the Philippines - government-controlled as earlier stated - foreclosed on the mortgage over the Tower Hotel, acquired it at said foreclosure, and, even before the expiration of the one-year period of redemption, supposedly leased the Tower Hotel to the secretary and cousin of Elizabeth Marcos-Keon. Worse, Elizabeth Marcos-Keon appropriated the Tower Hotel bank accounts and collected for herself the P1 million receivables from the military.

Incidentally, Rene Knecht's investments in the Tower Hotel and Frederic Hotel were really held by him in trust for his mother Mrs. Cristina Bradley and she was 87% stockholder of Durisol Philippines Inc. whose real properties were mortgaged to the Development Bank of the Philippines. Under both Philippine and Texas laws, the income during the marriage of those paraphernal properties of Mrs. Cristina Bradley belonged to the conjugal partnership of Mr. and Mrs. John M. Bradley.

Second ground

Mrs. Cristina Bradley owns as her paraphernal property a compound of houses for rent in Pasay City. One of those houses she and Mr. John M. Bradley occupied as their conjugal abode. Again, the income of that paraphernal property belonged to the conjugal partnership of Mr. and Mrs. John M. Bradley.

On February 20, 1979, the Marcos government filed a complaint to expropriate part of that compound so as to construct an extension of a road. Mrs. Bradley resisted the suit. On October 30, 1980, the Philippine Supreme Court sustained her opposition and denied expropriation on the ground that the choice of a new line through which the road should be extended in lieu of the line previously recommended and approved by experts was arbitrary. On December 7, 1982, Marcos approved a law passed by his Batasan Pambansa expropriating the same lands including Mrs. Bradley's along that same line the expropriation of which the Supreme Court had declared unconstitutional.

Third ground

Mr. and Mrs. John M. Bradley owned another disco nightclub called "Gaiety Palace" - whose sound and electrical equipments were also imported with the dollar funds of Mr. John M. Bradley. It was closed and lost on execution of a judgment obtained by a purported creditor of Rene Knecht but the intervention of the Marcos government was patent. Thus,

Rene Knecht ordered carpeting for the Tower Hotel. As previously stated, Elizabeth Marcos-Keon forcibly ousted Rene Knecht from control of the Tower Hotel. Universal Far East Corporation sued and obtained judgment for the balance of the purchase price of said carpeting. It could not execute its judgment against the Marcos-Keon controlled Tower Hotel though the carpeting was still installed at and being used by the Tower Hotel. So, it executed against Gaiety Palace.

Mr. John M. Bradley's holding company Philserve Inc. filed a third-party claim. The judge, who was not only appointed by Marcos but his province-mate, required evidence that Rene Knecht no longer controlled legally Tower Hotel. The government-owned and controlled Development Bank of Philippines refused to give Philserve Inc. a copy of its lease of the Tower Hotel to Elizabeth Marcos-Keon's secretary. Then, the sheriff accepted a ridiculously low indemnity bond from Universal Far East Corporation and, when Gaiety Palace's managers were not in the premises, dismantled and carted out its sound and audio systems, light fixtured and controllers and air-conditioners - when the sheriff could have merely garnished the nightly proceeds of the club. The Marcos government wanted Gaiety Palace closed.

During the lifetime of Mr. John M. Bradley and with his approval, Mrs. Cristina Bradley wrote a letter dated October 13, 1981 to Your Excellency, President Ronald Reagan, reporting the harassments on them by the Marcos administration and pleading for assistance. With the "Ninoy" Aquino assassination and Ferdinand Marcos' brazen lies at its "cover-up," Mr. John M. Bradley's claim of Marcos' harassments and illegal and unconscionable seizures of properties, both those naked and outright and those accomplished through restrictive actions, can now be easier accorded belief.


I thank you for Your considerate attention.

Respectfully,



RENE KNECHT
(Executor of the
estate of John M. Bradley)

I concur with the foregoing.


CRISTINA BRADLEY
(widow and heiress of
John M. Bradley)

The first of these is the fact that the
 paper is of a very high quality and
 is very strong and durable. It is
 also very smooth and has a fine
 texture. The second is that it is
 very light and easy to handle. It
 is also very cheap and is available
 in large quantities. The third is
 that it is very versatile and can be
 used for a wide range of purposes.

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 middle of
 the page

NASH

ID# 327718

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

CO125

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: AUGUST 15, 1985

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE TOM LOEFFLER

SUBJECT: ENCLOSURES LETTER FROM RENE DE LA RIVE KNECHT
REGARDING HIS CONTINUING PROBLEMS IN THE
PHILIPPINES

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION	
		ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
M. B. OGLESBY		ORG	85/08/15	<i>NAN C</i>	<i>85/08/27</i>
	REFERRAL NOTE:				
	REFERRAL NOTE:				
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	REFERRAL NOTE:				
	REFERRAL NOTE:				

AB

COMMENTS: *Handled by phone - advised office that Pres. cannot become involved in legal matter, as was stated in previous mbo ltr to Loeffler*

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: 1240
MAIL USER CODES: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

- ```

*ACTION CODES: *DISPOSITION *OUTGOING *
* * * *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION *A-ANSWERED *CORRESPONDENCE: *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE *C-COMPLETED * OF SIGNER *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET *S-SUSPENDED * CODE = A *
I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY * * OUTGOING *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE * * *
*X-INTERIM REPLY * * *

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REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE  
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590  
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING  
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS  
MANAGEMENT.



5  
TOM LOEFFLER  
21ST DISTRICT, TEXAS

CHIEF DEPUTY WHIP

ALAN M. KRANOWITZ  
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT

#327718

ROOM 1212  
LONGWORTH HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING  
(202) 225-4236

COMMITTEE ON  
APPROPRIATIONS

SUBCOMMITTEES:  
MILITARY CONSTRUCTION  
INTERIOR

COMMITTEE ON  
THE BUDGET

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

August 13, 1985

Mr. M. B. Oglesby  
Assistant to the President  
for Legislative Affairs  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear B.:

Enclosed for your attention is a copy of the correspondence I received from Rene de la Rive Knecht regarding his continuing problems in the Phillipines.

I would appreciate your reviewing this matter and responding to me at your earliest convenience.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,



TOM LOEFFLER

TL:bbp

Enclosure

Please send response to:  
40 NE Loop 410, Suite 415  
San Antonio, Texas 78216

512-229-5880

*John & Cristina Bradley*

HOTEL FREDERIC  
BUENDIA BLVD. COR  
F B HARRISON  
MANILA, PHILIPPINES  
TEL 831-09-96

10387 SAHARA DR., NO. 6E  
SAN ANTONIO  
TEXAS 78216  
U S A  
TEL NO (512) 340-7175  
(512) 899-2662

San Antonio, 1st August 1985

President Ronald Reagan  
President of the United States of America  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President,

Further to my letter to you of 16th May 1985 in which I informed you of various anomalies of the Marcos dictatorship with regards to the estate of my step-father and my family in general, I am writing again to submit concrete proof of the illegal subdivision of the Knecht Compound, and sale there-of to a notorious brothel operator in a last desperate attempt to subvert the Supreme Court decision in the EDSA extension case.

In my previous letter I enclosed copies of two tax assessments, covering two properties, which are not legally existing, since the registered owner has never applied for its subdivision with the Land Registration Commission of the Philippines. Coincidentally, the new technical descriptions, are exactly as per the law passed in the Batasan Pambansa (Parliament) unconstitutionally over-ruling the Supreme Court of the Philippines, whose decision that the EDSA extension diversion from Cuneta to Del Pan Avenues was arbitrary. This decision was rendered since 1980 and would consequently demolish most of the motels that are owned or operated by the Salem Investment Corporation who are now claiming ownership to our family compound. This is really adding insult to injury.

As can be clearly seen from the tax assessments sent dated July 2, 1984, and mailed September 27, 1984, the administrator of the property was Cristina Knecht et al, 45 Del Pan St. Pasay City, Metro Manila. It subsequently turns out that notice was sent to Tower Hotel, and an entire legal proceeding was held in default, two properties allegedly sold at auction to dummies of the Salem Investment Corporation, two titles consolidated and subsequently consolidated in the name of Salem Investment Corporation, all without the legal owner of the property having the slightest notion of the entire proceedings. In fact the two new titles are not even numbered consecutively (86670 and 94049) another anomaly.

My mother has therefore been forced to file suit, see enclosed copy, on June 24th, 1985, after our lawyer having written the City Treasurer, Pasay



City, on her behalf on 11th June 1985 giving him ten days to answer, which he naturally has not done, being one of the principal accomplices and manipulators in these proceedings. "Without prejudice to our filing an action in court for the annulment of your sale of the aforesaid property, my clients elect to exercise their right of redemption under section 78 of Presidential Decree No. 464 known as The Real Property Tax Code. It appears that the order of the Regional Trial Court, Pasay City Branch CX, cancelling the title of my clients was registered with the Register of Deeds only on July 27, 1984. etc." Needless to say, although we have tendered funds for redemption, this has been refused, admitting arguendo that the entire proceedings were legal in the first place. It is therefore very plain that the Marcos dictatorship is determined to ram the EDSA extension down our throats, for although my mother and step-father left the Philippines since 1980, the alternate address on the title since 1963, was 206 E. Agarita, San Antonio, Texas where she resided till 1982 and from where mail is still forwarded, her sister having sold the house on installments, and is consequently still collecting monthly payments.

The fact that the Marcos cohorts have been resorting to such tactics to have their way regarding the EDSA extension, four years after they had all our businesses closed by the use of similar psuedo legal shenanigans, is complete and absolute proof that the entire legal system is no longer a farce, but a charade. What is more, they have been doing this to us, who have had the services of Norberto J. Quisumbing, who is generally considered the foremost legal practitioner in the Philippines, since 1967. What chance then do the simple people have for legal redress, when they do not even have enough resources to purchase three square meals daily?

Is it any wonder then that the communist insurgency is growing? The refusal of your Administration to employ stronger methods to force the return of democracy is delivering the entire nation to the New People's Army and the communist movement, not on a silver platter, but on a platter of pure gold encrusted with gem stones as startling in their extravagance and costliness as those that adorn Mrs. Marcos' corrupt person. What do the people care what kind of government they have? There is no law of any kind anyway other than that of the jungle; they have grabbed everything worth grabbing and are so stupid that they do not even know how to manage their plunder. When sugar went over US \$.60 a lb. they hoarded further instead of selling, in order to finally dispose of it on a barter arrangement with China for paraffinated Chinese oil at US \$.075 a lb. thus clogging the Philippine refineries. In addition the sugar had rotted, requiring its reprocessing, thus ending with almost a total loss, instead of earning billions of US \$ for our country and lessening our foreign debt. They wanted to own all the sugar mills, and have almost succeeded, yet the bulk of these mills are moth-balled, the US marketing agreements at preferential prices having been cancelled. As a consequence, half a million sugar workers are jobless, and over thirty children on the average are recorded dying of malnutrition on the island of Negros alone every week. And yet officials of your government drink toasts to the adherence of democratic process and principles of this megalomaniac despot who belongs in an insane asylum and who has proven being the most corrupt man of the XXth century. What then are my countrymen to do? Do you blame them for joining the NPA? What have they got to lose? They have nothing anyway! Perhaps under the communists they can hope for a second meal a day, since most only have one today. And yet Washington continues to play games because they are afraid



an imbecile is going to throw them out of Clark and Subic to which there are valid leases till 1991; and how would he do this? He cannot even pay his bills. Is this America the Beautiful... the America that the Pilgrims fought persecution etc. to create so that their descendants can be the perpetrators of even worse persecution.

I regret Gentlemen, that embracing trash is not the answer to the Philippines' or the World's problems. The time has come to grab the Bull by the horns, and stop dancing around his tail! Time is running out, Fifty-two million people deserve a better chance than starvation while our Nation gradually disintegrates because its leaders are choking on ill gotten spoils borrowed largely from US banks, who expect to be repaid yet! How can these loans be repaid when the assets are either non-productive, or producing elsewhere?

The time for the minuet is over. It is time to give Marcos a final ultimatum to restore democracy, or the Hickenlooper Amendment (76 Stat. 260-261 as amended, 22 U.S.C.\* 2370 (c)(1); and The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961) will be invoked. He knows the existence of your laws. What then are you so afraid of? A malarial mosquito stinging the Bull Elephant? This is really ridiculous! At the rate we are going Manila will be the next Beirut, and the Luzon countryside the next Kampuchea. I beg of you to wake up before it is too late. Show the World that America's only experiment at Colonialism and the attempted transplantation of the American system has not been a complete and dismal failure and that you will not end the XXth Century as a second rate Power, which you certainly will become if the Philippines goes, as the next major landfall is already on your shores!

I pray for your favourable consideration. Thank you.

Respectfully,

Rene de la Riva Knecht  
Executor  
John M. Bradley Estate



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THE WHITE HOUSE  
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

CO/25

DATE RECEIVED: SEPTEMBER 03, 1985

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: MOST REVEREND WILLIAM G. CONNARE

SUBJECT: EXPRESSES CONCERN ABOUT THE WELFARE OF  
FATHER RUDY ROMANO, A REDEMPTORIST PRIEST,  
RESIDING AND WORKING IN CEBU CITY IN THE  
PHILIPPINES

| ROUTE TO:<br>OFFICE/AGENCY | (STAFF NAME)                      | ACTION<br>ACT CODE | DATE<br>YY/MM/DD | DISPOSITION<br>TYPE RESP | C COMPLETED<br>D YY/MM/DD |
|----------------------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------|------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|
| CARL ANDERSON              |                                   | ORG                | 85/09/03         |                          | C 85/09/04                |
|                            | REFERRAL NOTE: <i>referred to</i> |                    | <i>85/09/04</i>  |                          |                           |
| <i>✓ Rpt. Reilly</i>       |                                   | <i>A</i>           | <i>85/09/04</i>  |                          | C 85/09/30                |
| <i>✓ State Dept</i>        | REFERRAL NOTE:                    |                    |                  |                          |                           |
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COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: \_\_\_\_\_

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*ACTION CODES: *DISPOSITION *OUTGOING *
* * *CORRESPONDENCE: *
*A-AAPPROPRIATE ACTION *A-ANSWERED *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL * OF SIGNER *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE *C-COMPLETED * CODE = A *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET *S-SUSPENDED *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC * OUTGOING *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY * * *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE * * *
*X-INTERIM REPLY * * *

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REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE  
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590  
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING  
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS  
MANAGEMENT.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8529381

Date 10 OCT 1985

For: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane  
National Security Council  
The White House

Reference:

To: President Reagan From: Rev. William G. Connare

Date: 8/30/85 Subject: Concern about welfare  
of Rudy Romano


WH Referral Dated: 10/3/85 NSC ID# 8529381  
(if any)

         The attached item was sent directly to the  
Department of State

Action Taken:

- A draft reply is attached.
- A draft reply will be forwarded.
- A translation is attached.
- X   An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
- We believe no response is necessary for the reason  
cited below.
- The Department of State has no objection to the  
proposed travel.
- Other.

Remarks:

  
Nicholas Platt  
Executive Secretary



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 4, 1985

Most Reverend William G. Connare  
Bishop of Greensburg  
Diocese of Greensburg  
723 E. Pittsburgh Street  
Greensburg, PA 15601

Dear Bishop Connare:

I am pleased to reply on behalf of the President to your letter of August 30, in which you expressed your concern over the disappearance in the Philippines of Father Rudy Romano

In my letter to you dated September 6, I provided you with the information the Department had on the case at the time and described our diplomatic efforts to encourage the Government of the Philippines to investigate Father Romano's disappearance. Since then, the following developments have taken place. The Father Superior of the Redemptorists in the Philippines has met with the Minister of Defense who stated that he was not aware of any military or intelligence operation involving Father Romano. The Father Superior, accompanied by the Papal Nuncio, met with President Marcos on September 4. President Marcos denied that the government was involved in Father Romano's disappearance and promised a thorough investigation would be conducted. The Philippine Supreme Court ordered an extensive examination of the facts surrounding Father Romano's disappearance. Supreme Court hearings on the government's findings resumed on September 23.

The Department of State will continue to bring its serious concerns and those expressed by the Congress and private citizens about Father Romano's disappearance to the attention of Philippine Government officials in Manila, Cebu and Washington. Also, the Department will continue to press Philippine officials for as full an accounting as possible on all the circumstances surrounding this most regrettable incident.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "John F. Maisto".

John F. Maisto  
Director  
Office of Philippine Affairs



## T H E W H I T E H O U S E O F F I C E

## REFERRAL

OCTOBER 3, 1985

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

## ACTION REQUESTED:

DIRECT REPLY, FURNISH INFO COPY

REMARKS: AND / OR APPROPRIATE ACTION

## DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 328380

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED AUGUST 30, 1985

TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN

FROM: MOST REVEREND WILLIAM G. CONNARE  
BISHOP OF GREENSBURG  
DIOCESE OF GREENSBURG  
723 EAST PITTSBURGH STREET  
GREENSBURG PA 15601SUBJECT: EXPRESSES CONCERN ABOUT THE WELFARE OF  
FATHER RUDY ROMANO, A REDEMPTORIST PRIEST,  
RESIDING AND WORKING IN CEBU CITY IN THE  
PHILIPPINESPROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN  
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE  
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE  
(OR DRAFT) TO:  
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSESALLY KELLEY  
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON  
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

8529381



## DIOCESE OF GREENSBURG

723 E. PITTSBURGH ST. • GREENSBURG, PENNA. 15601

August 30, 1985

President Ronald Reagan  
 White House  
 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue  
 Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear President Reagan:

With many others I am concerned about the welfare of Father Rudy Romano, 44, a Redemptorist Priest, residing and working in Cebu City in the Philippines. Father Romano has been missing since Thursday, July 11. Witnesses have reported to me that he was seen riding his motorcycle when he was stopped by a car bearing Philippine government license plates. Several men in civilian clothes, carrying guns, got out of the car, approached him, forcefully pushed him into their car, and drove off.

I join with many who fear for the safety of this young man, who has dedicated himself to the service of the people of the Philippines. I share their fear also in the escalating violence in the wake of expanding militarism which seems rampant in the country. I hope our government through diplomatic intervention can help resolve the plight of Father Romano and bring a measure of peace to the Philippines.

With all prayerful good wishes, I am

Devotedly yours in Christ,

Most Reverend William G. Connare  
 Bishop of Greensburg



1862

REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE LAND OFFICE

FOR THE YEAR 1862



The following table shows the amount of land sold by the Land Office during the year 1862, and the proceeds therefrom. The land was sold in several tracts, and the proceeds were used for the purchase of land for the use of the Government.

The total amount of land sold was 1,234 acres, and the proceeds were \$123,456.78. The land was sold in several tracts, and the proceeds were used for the purchase of land for the use of the Government.

The following table shows the amount of land sold by the Land Office during the year 1862, and the proceeds therefrom. The land was sold in several tracts, and the proceeds were used for the purchase of land for the use of the Government.

July 22, 1985

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F0003-02

Dear Mr. Ullman:

Thank you for your message and for sending along your study, "The Philippines - Promoting an Orderly Succession Contingencies for U.S. Policy."

Ambassador Palmer's work was interesting and you can be sure that I, and the other members of this Administration, appreciate this contribution to our discussions on this important issue.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Donald T. Regan  
Chief of Staff to the  
President of the United States

Mr. Harlan K. Ullman  
Center for Strategic & International Studies  
Georgetown University  
Suite 400  
1800 K Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20006

cc: NSC w/copy of incoming ✓  
DTR/MLO/frw (7DTR)



DTR/mlo

Dear Mr. Ullman:

Thank you for your message and for sending along your study,  
"The Philippines - Promoting an Orderly Succession Contingencies  
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Sincerely,

DTR

Mr. Harlan K. Ullman  
Center for Strategic &  
International Studies  
Georgetown University  
Suite 400  
1800 K Street Northwest  
Washington, D.C. 20006

cc: NSC w/copy of incoming



Center for Strategic & International Studies  
Georgetown University • Washington DC

July 11, 1985

*DTR 7*

The Honorable Donald Regan  
Chief of Staff  
The White House  
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. Regan:

Major changes in Soviet leadership occurred last week that raise interesting opportunities as well as challenges and uncertainties for the West. These changes took place at the same time the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting in Geneva was announced for November. Meanwhile, Mikhail Gorbachev has done in months what took previous Soviet leaders years to do - he has cemented his leadership of the Soviet system. The elevation of Andrei Gromyko to President and the installation of Eduard Shevardnadze as Foreign Minister will add to speculation about future Soviet policy direction.

Perhaps no subject is more central to these considerations than the need to reduce the risks of nuclear war and maintain superpower relations on a more or less even keel. Central to all this is the range of negotiations at Geneva on strategic and theater nuclear weapons, and space.

Rodney Jones and Steven Hildreth provide an important and instructive analysis of these negotiations including space, the Strategic Defense Initiative, and the future of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty signed in 1972. Their timing could not be better nor could their subject be of greater relevance to U.S. security.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Harlan K. Ullman". The signature is written in black ink and is positioned above the printed name.

Harlan K. Ullman





Center for Strategic & International Studies  
Georgetown University • Washington DC

May 29, 1985

The Honorable Donald Regan  
Chief of Staff  
The White House  
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. Regan:

One of the most widely discussed and important succession issues in international politics involves the future of the Philippines after President Fernando Marcos leaves office. Clearly, the manner of succession may be as important as the actual succession. Given the long and close political, financial and security involvement between the United States and the Philippines, this issue has major significance for U.S. policy. The geostrategic questions involved are well known. U.S. access to basing rights in the Philippines enables the United States to maintain the capability to project military power into the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans. An orderly and constitutional succession in which democratic norms and values would be affirmed has the potential to strengthen Philippine political stability, enhance the U.S. relationship with this key ASEAN nation and protect the wide array of U.S. interests in the Philippines.

Ambassador Ronald Palmer, CSIS Visiting Scholar, writes on these issues with unique experience and insight. Our former Ambassador to Malaysia, Ambassador Palmer has also served in the Philippines. His enclosed analysis, therefore, is highly instructive and very relevant to the policy choices which the United States must inevitably face in terms of the Marcos succession.

Ambassador Palmer is on detail to CSIS from the Department of State and his views and opinions do not necessarily reflect those of the Department or the United States Government.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'H. Ullman', is written over a horizontal line.

Harlan K. Ullman

Enclosures

C • S • I • S

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CONTINGENCIES PROJECT

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC &  
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES  
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY





THE PHILIPPINES - PROMOTING AN ORDERLY SUCCESSION  
CONTINGENCIES FOR U.S. POLICY

R. D. Palmer

May 28, 1985



The Philippines - Promoting an Orderly Succession  
Contingencies for U.S. Policy

R. D. Palmer

President Ferdinand T. Marcos' recurrent bouts of illness and incapacitation over the past two years have resulted in periods during which he has not been able to exercise the tight control over his own New Society Party (KBL) or the Philippine political scene in the deft manner that has hitherto characterized his nearly 20 years of rule. Marcos was essentially confined to his palace from November 1984 until March 1985. He began actively seeking to reassert his authority in early March 1985, when he fired Foreign Minister Arturo Tolentino and censured Labor Minister Blas Ople for outspokenly criticizing his style of authoritarian leadership. Both Tolentino and Ople are possible presidential aspirants, so incurring Marcos' wrath may paradoxically help them politically among the disaffected within the KBL and in the non-communist opposition.

These actions of President Marcos signal his intention to keep political power in his hands and clamp down on the growing restlessness of key members of his KBL team who wish to prepare themselves politically for the situation that might arise if Marcos should die or become incapacitated. Other, more cautious, possible KBL presidential aspirants include Minister of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile, Marcos-crony Eduardo Cojuangco, Prime Minister Cesar Virata and, of course, First Lady Imelda Marcos.

The KBL sources of strength are appointed and elected local office holders who provide Marcos with an organization that reaches every village. The organization encompasses village and ward leaders, members of women's and youth groups, and volunteer militia units. Drawn from the lower and lower-middle classes and favored, funded, and sometimes armed by the Marcos government, the KBL rank and file has been passionately loyal to Marcos. The armed forces have been another source of dedicated support for the president, particularly senior officers who have been selected in disproportionate numbers from Marcos' home province and owe personal loyalty to him.

Nevertheless, the president's control over this organization has been impaired in the past two years by his periodically weakened physical condition and by the antigovernment hostility and political activity unleashed by the killing of opposition leader Benigno Aquino. The president has had to accede to opposition demands to open up the political system to greater participation by political forces opposed to KBL domination. In addition to retreating before demands for political reform, deteriorating economic conditions have forced the president to accept stringent IMF-imposed economic reforms.

These retreats have strengthened the hands of moderate elements inside the KBL, as well as the non-communist opposition. The dismissed Tolentino had played a particularly strategic role inside the KBL leadership by stubbornly insisting that Marcos take corrective action on such issues as clarifying the succession process, eliminating arbitrary detention, and abolishing the president's decree-making power under Amendment 6



of the 1973 Constitution. On these issues, as well as a growing demand for reform of the armed forces to counter the spreading New People's Army (NPA) insurgency, voices from within the KBL leadership have sounded much like non-communist reformist voices outside the president's party.

President Marcos reluctantly went along with demands, including pressures from the U.S. government, for National Assembly elections on May 14, 1984 to provide an outlet for such energies. The KBL was repudiated in the Manila region and had to resort to election fraud in some rural areas, even though the elections were reasonably fair by past standards.

Still, the KBL handily retained control of the National Assembly, winning 124 of 183 seats. The opposition holds 59 seats, a third of the National Assembly, and now has a legal platform from within the government structure to continue its criticisms of the Marcos government. The temptation will be strong for some KBL members, particularly the younger and more ambitious ones, to become a kind of semi-opposition, speaking out against the Marcos government when feasible and siding with the government as necessary.

The Aquino murder gave the Marcos opposition a rallying point, and traditionally moderate Marcos oppositionists have had their ranks augmented by Catholic activists and business and professional groups. By and large, outrage over the murder helped the opposition to remain united in the months of street demonstrations and protests that took place in 1983 and 1984 prior to the National Assembly elections. Although, however, the United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO), an umbrella

coalition, won 49 of the 59 opposition seats, its leaders have long histories of personal and political animosities, and Marcos has been able to exploit their differences in the past.

What is likely to happen, however, is that new and younger leadership will emerge within both the formal, parliamentary opposition and moderate opposition elements outside the formal government structures.. This process is still in its early stages, but the pace of political activity will quicken dramatically in the coming year as preparations intensify for the May 1986 elections for mayors and governors. The prospects are that President Marcos will have difficulty holding his KBL organization together, and the opposition is likely to extend its reach into the provincial areas and also strengthen its national organization.

The 1986 elections are an absolutely key event in terms of building local and provincial political organizations for the 1987 presidential elections. President Marcos has already said he will run in 1987. Barring collapse of his health or worsening conditions that might cause him to retire -- such as catastrophic economic deterioration or a critical deepening of the communist insurgency -- he is likely to do so. The president's apparent primary goal for the foreseeable future is merely to retain power. He has no inherent interest in political reform that, in his view, can only have the effect of limiting and diluting his political control. Such interest as he may have in economic reform can be attributed mainly to going along with the minimum requirements external creditors and the IMF force him to accept



in order to keep the economy going.

Despite evidence that the NPA insurgency has grown because of army and Philippine Constabulary ineptness and abuse of authority, President Marcos is clearly opposed to demands for military reform simply because the present military leadership is one of the chief sources of support for his regime. Marcos has announced his intention to reinstate General Fabian Ver, an indicted conspirator in the Aquino murder case, as armed forces chief of staff, if the prosecution acquits the alleged conspirators. Acquittal seems increasingly likely because an apparent atmosphere of intimidation exists toward possible prosecution witnesses, virtually all of whom have refused to testify and some of whom have disappeared.

The obvious inference to be drawn from the president's announcement about the planned reinstatement of General Ver is that the president not only plans to continue with politics-as-usual but that he will use Ver to manipulate the armed forces and intelligence services to do whatever is necessary to try to regain lost authority and retain political control. Marcos' plans rest on the assumption that he will be up to the political demands of the coming two years of frenetic physical activity and that he will be able to out-manuever the opposition. His plans also suggest he believes the United States will continue the support for his government he has enjoyed for the past 20 years.

Contingencies for U.S. Policy  
What Should the U.S. Policy be toward President Marcos'  
Plans to Run in 1987?

The United States should discourage President Marcos from running for president in 1987. The United States should encourage the president to involve himself, instead, in a process that will set the stage for a peaceful and democratic transfer of leadership in 1987. Clearly, the president would make himself a lame duck if he were to commit himself prematurely to retiring in 1987 as his political authority would wane. Present trends indicate, however, that Marcos' control and authority will be affected negatively in the next two years in any event if he doggedly persists in simply trying to maintain the status quo. Realistically, the status quo was unequivocally altered in 1978 when the National Assembly was formed. Even though the 1978-84 National Assembly was almost totally dominated by the KBL, it nevertheless represented movement away from one-man rule. The lifting of martial law in 1981 was a further movement toward more open politics. Although the opposition is weak, divided, and poorly organized and democratic institutions are fragile, President Marcos is no longer politically unassailable. He is particularly likely to face increasing difficulty in controlling ambitious leaders in his own party who will be seeking to form coalitions against him inside the KBL as well as with the non-Communist opposition.

How Can the U.S. and President Marcos Work Together to Promote  
a Democratic Succession?

While the president is alive he can influence events. Unless he begins a process soon that would encourage an evolution



of the democratic process leading to an orderly transfer of power, he runs the risk of death or incapacitation and leaving a political legacy that will be uncertain at best and anarchic or chaotic at worst. In short, the president's place in history is at stake. He can continue on a short-term, politically expedient course trying merely to hold on to personal power and run the risks all autocrats face when a system based on personal power inevitably collapses. Authoritarianism and autocratic power have shallow roots in the Philippine political system. The culture of democracy, by contrast, has deep roots in the Philippines and represents the underlying strength of the political system. President Marcos has taken the Philippines on a long journey away from its past since he declared martial law in 1972. His greatest contribution to his nation would be to illuminate a path that could lead to a restoration of democratic freedoms and institutions.

Choosing to risk democracy is something only President Marcos can decide. U.S. leverage to force the president in a U.S.-chosen direction is limited. Philippine nationalism is strong and latent anti-Americanism is virulent, and President Marcos could easily marshal these forces against U.S. pressures and threaten U.S. interests in the Philippines if he felt cornered.

Similarly, taking the necessary measures to promote political and economic stability, again, is something only the president and his advisors can do. The United States can support a reform agenda including the revitalization of democratic

institutions, the dismantling of crony capitalism, allowing the Philippine economy to respond to free market forces, reforming the judiciary to promote the rule of law, and restoring professional apolitical leadership in the Philippine military. Only the Philippine leadership, however, can make these things happen, presumably because President Marcos and others might come to believe the reform agenda can be made to fit their needs as well as those of the opposition.

What the Philippines needs from the United States at this point in history is the sincere, unaggressive candor of a concerned friend and ally. Cut-offs of U.S. aid would serve no useful purpose. Similarly, promises of U.S. assistance conditioned on the undertaking of fundamental political and economic reforms would appear to be patronizing and would surely lead to great irritation and difficulty in implementation. In any case, reform is primarily in the Philippine interest and must come about as a consequence of Philippine effort. Reforms have the potential of creating more stable conditions in which U.S. interests would be better protected, and generous and timely United States assistance may be helpful in bringing about such conditions.

The United States cannot bail President Marcos out economically or politically, however. What it can do is try to help him come to realize that his remaining historical contribution is to pave the way for a peaceful and orderly succession in 1987.





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Washington, D.C. 20006  
(202) 887-0200



C · S · I · S

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CONTINGENCIES PROJECT

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# Space, the SDI, and Arms Control: The Soviet Challenge

Rodney W. Jones and Steven A. Hildreth

July 1985

## The Soviet Campaign

The focal point of U.S.-Soviet relations has shifted to Geneva where the superpowers are ending round two of their negotiations on nuclear and space arms control. The Soviet return to the bargaining table reflects anxiety about the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and the competitive technological stimulus it represents. But the renewed Soviet interest in nuclear negotiations owes as much to what the Soviets believe are opportunities to manipulate Western nuclear anxieties in hopes of distancing the United States from Europe and dividing West Europeans from one another.

Against this backdrop in Geneva comes the ascent of a more dynamic Soviet leader, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, who could give the Soviet political challenge to the West added impetus. Gorbachev's peace offensive aims to sow dissension in the West by projecting a benign image of the Soviet Union as the more serious nuclear peacemaker or the true opponent of a nuclear arms race. The Soviet campaign to shift the onus of nuclear threat and the image of military aggressiveness has begun with unilateral but temporary moratoriums on the fielding of more Soviet SS-20 missiles and on the testing of Soviet space weapon systems. It remains to be seen, however, whether Gorbachev is willing and able to advance serious proposals that would allow a meaningful arms control deal to be struck. This possibility should be tested rather than dismissed as a matter of course.

## The Central Issues

Three substantive issues dominate the strategic stakes at Geneva. How they are linked in negotiations and any potential agreements could be pivotal to Western security:

- The first issue is whether strategic offensive weapons of generically destabilizing varieties can be substantially reduced in numbers and destructive power, leaving equal or equivalent capabilities on either side.
- The second is whether strategic defensive weapons of the ABM type can be adopted proportionally on both sides to complement and stabilize deterrence and further reduce the risks of the outbreak of nuclear war.



- The third is whether the testing, deployment, or use of strategic weapons in outer space can be effectively and verifiably curtailed by arms control agreements or procedures, including those now on the books.

The role of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972 is a central link in each of these issues. It was a prerequisite in SALT I for accepting ceilings on strategic offensive delivery systems. It not only stringently restricted deployment of conventional (fixed, ground-based) ABM weapons, but prohibited the development and testing of mobile and space-based ABM systems and components. It also barred, except as might be negotiated subsequently, the development and testing of ABM systems or components with "new physical principles," such as laser and other directed-energy weapon principles, that were foreseen as especially suitable for space-based ABM interceptors.

Soviet "peace offensive" tactics inside and outside Geneva are focused on the military use of space and specifically on the U.S. SDI, which conceptually emphasizes the possibility of forward ballistic missile defense (BMD) by the use of interceptors in space. Although the SDI is put forward as a research and technology (exploratory) program, it's implied optimism regarding the BMD potential of space--and the popular imagery conjured up by the journalistic appellation of "Star Wars"--unfortunately seems to confirm Soviet propaganda that the United States is pressing an arms race into outer space.

The preservation of the ABM Treaty is now an expedient theme in the Soviet campaign. Strong emotional attachments to the treaty are natural enough in the West because it is a cornerstone of SALT I. It was thought to shut off an intense offensive-defensive arms competition and remains a rare instance of adversaries agreeing to refrain from extensive deployment of strategically significant weapons. The consensus on the virtue of the ABM Treaty in the heyday of SALT makes current U.S. policies that raise questions about the future of the treaty politically divisive both at home and in Western Europe. Although President Reagan has made it clear that the SDI research program will conform to the ABM Treaty restrictions through his second term, it remains true that the SDI would have little practical meaning unless a negotiated modification of or withdrawal from the treaty are regarded as future options.

The best way to cope with divisiveness is to reforge consensus on arms control and strategic policy objectives. This requires a forthright discussion of how the strategic context has changed and an openness to finding a broadly supported remedy. Such discussion must take the U.S. allies into confidence. It must also be dispassionately open to an examination of the utility of defensive weapons and the integration of offensive and defensive strategic principles. It would be prudent to eschew unequivocal commitment to a pure defense dominant strategy, however, because it remains to be proved whether this is technically feasible. In the meantime, to engage public belief



in near-perfect strategic defenses could undermine public support for the traditional strategy of nuclear deterrence, storing up future trouble.

Efforts to forge a consensus should not treat the ABM Treaty and its arms control benefits lightly, but neither should emotional attachment to the treaty stand in the way of an objective assessment of its future relevance or of the value of potential modifications.

### The Changed Strategic Context

Western reevaluation of the ABM Treaty must take into account three essential points:

- First, that U.S. acceptance of the ABM Treaty was conditional; it assumed follow-on arms control agreements would so limit hard-target offensive weapons that the danger of a successful "first-strike" or a preemptive attack on U.S. retaliatory forces would be precluded.
- Second, that the Soviet Union has been pursuing an SDI of its own, without fanfare but with large investments, combining the elements of a rapidly-deployable, nationwide, conventional ABM system with major research and demonstration projects in the same directed energy and space-related BMD technologies that the press has popularized as "Star Wars."
- Third, that technological advances may have outstripped the verifiability of a number of ABM Treaty prohibitions related to the development of novel non-nuclear ABM capabilities in space.

The conditionality of the ABM Treaty needs to be understood in the context of the 1980s. U.S. land-based strategic forces have become vulnerable to a preemptive or disarming strike by the Soviet Union using a fraction of its own ICBMs. Soviet accumulation of very large numbers of hard-target warheads on modern, heavy ICBMs poses a preemptive threat that is inherently destabilizing. This Soviet capacity emerged within the framework of SALT I and SALT II; awareness of this liability accounts in part for the U.S. Senate refusal to ratify the second SALT agreement.

Recall in this light the U.S. delegation's May 9, 1972 "unilateral statement" on the ABM Treaty, later embodied in the record of U.S. Senate ratification of the treaty:

"The U.S. Delegation has stressed the importance the U.S. Government attaches to achieving agreement on more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms, following [SALT I].... [The SALT II objective] should be to constrain and reduce on a



long-term basis threats to the survivability of our respective strategic retaliatory forces.... If an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms were not achieved within five years, U.S. supreme interests could be jeopardized. Should that occur, it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty." [brackets added]

This statement explicitly based U.S. acceptance of the ABM Treaty on the future willingness of the Soviet Union to accept arms control limits that would ensure the survivability of retaliatory forces. Agreements for substantial reductions in Soviet heavy MIRVed ICBMs that could have served this purpose were spurned by the Soviet Union at the outset of the Carter administration and midway in the Reagan administration.

In the meantime, the Soviet Union continued a large and multifaceted strategic defense program that technically conformed for the most part to ABM Treaty provisions but seemed inconsistent with its arms control purpose. Evidence of a specific Soviet violation of ABM Treaty prohibitions on the location of large phased array radars near Krasnoyarsk (the Abalakova installation) surfaced in 1983. Also important strategically are:

- Soviet development of inherently nationwide ABM "breakout" capabilities in rapidly deployable, fixed-site and mobile, high-altitude, missile interceptor systems and radar components.
- Soviet experimentation with directed energy weapon systems at power levels that suggest the ultimate objectives are strategic defense and the capability to attack space targets.
- Soviet pursuit of a prodigious, military-dominated space program with an established ASAT and potential space-based ABM capability.

It is now a serious concern that Soviet strategic defense investments have been so far reaching for so long that the Soviet Union could, if it chose, unilaterally dispense with the ABM Treaty and rapidly deploy ABM systems.

Today the ABM Treaty also must be viewed in a more complicated and rapidly evolving technological context. The treaty's prohibitions on ABM development are not comprehensive, and, to be strictly verifiable by customary means, could not be. Although the treaty bans the development and testing beyond the laboratory stage of mobile and space-based ABM systems and components, it does not preclude the development and testing of ABM-relevant weapon systems and components when such activities are carried out for other purposes, such as for defense against aircraft and tactical ballistic missiles (ATBM), or for anti-satellite (ASAT) purposes. Inherent, mobile ABM capabilities can be embodied in weapon systems for high-altitude, air-defense and



ATBM missions, and novel, space-related ABM capabilities can be advanced through ASAT development.\*

This is not to say that arms control limitations on advanced ABM and space weapons cannot be conceived of theoretically; it does reflect the fact, however, that the verifiability and enforceability of limits on advanced weapon technologies applicable to outer space is technically difficult, quite apart from whether it is politically feasible.

### Policy Principles

In dialogue with the Soviet Union, the United States must be constant, temperate, and patient. It will be crucial to know what is strategically imperative and non-negotiable, to know where deals could be made as a matter of mutual interest, and to have the will to conclude good agreements should the opportunities arise. It will be necessary in any case to recover lost ground in strategic modernization. It will always be vital to the stamina of democratic societies to explain effectively the rationale for strategic strength, which is also indispensable to moderation.

The following road map of fundamentals and options should be an integral feature of U.S. leadership on strategic policy and arms control.

-- The arms control objectives of the United States are to obtain reductions in strategic offensive weapons that threaten crisis stability, to generate open reconsideration of force structures that embody active strategic defense (thereby flushing out covert Soviet strategic defense activities), and to explore the degree to which reliance primarily on the threat of nuclear retaliation could be balanced with active defensive measures for greater overall safety against the risks of nuclear war.

-- Without Soviet agreement to cut sharply present levels of hard-target ICBM warheads--the principal preemptive capability--it is doubtful that formal arms control agreements on long-range ballistic missiles could have much value for crisis stability. An informal process with unilateral or mutually tacit arms control measures could still be beneficial.

-- Without such Soviet offensive weapon cuts, however, it will be imperative for the United States to adopt strategic

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A significant U.S.-Soviet understanding reportedly was reached recently in Geneva to ban simultaneous testing of air-defense and ABM systems. If this understanding is incorporated in a verifiable agreement, it will add a constraint not present in the ABM Treaty. See Leslie Gelb, "Soviet May Ease 'Star Wars' Stand," New York Times, July 9, 1985.



countermeasures. Such countermeasures would include new strategic offensive weapons and new means for ensuring their survivability against preemptive attack. Layered terminal BMD systems using non-nuclear interceptors are likely to be viewed in the 1990s as a viable means of reducing the chances of a Soviet preemptive attack.

-- The Soviet attempt to get the United States to sacrifice SDI research and technology exploration as part of an arms control deal is deceptive; research cannot be banned because its verification is impossible, a fact recognized by the ABM Treaty. Constraints on BMD or other advanced weapon research would be counterproductive in any case for a host of reasons. Financial commitments can be scaled, of course, to accelerate or slow programmatically dedicated research; informal Soviet self-restraint on its SDI could eventually be detected and informally reciprocated, but the burden here also lies on the Soviet Union.\*

-- There should be flexibility on the perpetuation of the ABM Treaty, to the degree the Soviet Union is willing to contemplate verifiable cuts in destabilizing offensive arms. One way to visualize this is a two-track approach. One track would consider strengthening the treaty in certain respects, but by bringing its conditionality into sharper focus. The other track would entail negotiated modifications to the treaty to permit limited BMD deployments--presumably for terminal defense purposes. Under either approach, Soviet infringement of the existing treaty provisions would have to be challenged forthrightly; if compliance problems are not satisfactorily resolved, the United States would have the prerogative of declaring commensurate freedom of action without otherwise suspending or abrogating the treaty.

-- As it stands, the treaty clearly prohibits the full-scale development, testing, or deployment of nationwide, mobile, and space-based ABM systems or components--activities that the U.S. SDI program (or the Soviet counterpart) eventually would have to turn to in order to validate operationally certain technological capabilities. The treaty at present allows either side to withdraw on six month's notice that its supreme interests have been jeopardized. The treaty could be strengthened to lengthen the period of notice to between three and five years--providing the other party a more generous lead time for response that would limit its risks against a deployment breakout or technological

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The Gelb report cited earlier also discusses recent informal indications by the Soviet negotiators at Geneva that the Soviet Union may be moving away from its demand for a flat ban on SDI research to a position that makes it possible to discuss more realistically the boundaries between permissible research or technology demonstrations and the full-scale development and testing of ABM systems and components of new types that are prohibited currently by the ABM Treaty.



surprise. This measure could be supplemented by making the five-year reviews of the treaty critical to its continuation in force on the basis of whether destabilizing offensive weapons have in fact been successfully reduced--bringing the conditionality principle front and center. Dealing with this core issue now may be the only way to reaffirm the longer term viability of the treaty. This attempt should have priority.

-- Alternatively, substantial modification of the treaty provisions may have to be considered, emphasizing the possible incorporation of terrestrially-based BMD in limited, terminal defense deployments to enhance the survivability of retaliatory forces. The extent to which such deployments might be regarded as desirable would hinge largely on the degree to which hard-target attack weapons could be reduced by agreement to tolerable limits. ABM deployment modes and capabilities well short of nationwide defenses could be described and verified within satisfactory limits, provided there is a Soviet will to agree and comply. Although there would under these circumstances be no total guarantee against breakout potentials, the results would offer the United States a reasonable opportunity to balance Soviet "gray area" developments informally, case by case, improving the self-enforcement incentives of the treaty.

-- Effective restraints on ASAT development are less likely to be achievable through formal arms control agreements. However, a combination of agreements that prohibit certain types of dedicated ASAT might be workable as a limited regime, covering non-nuclear weapons in space. Such agreements, for example, might include prohibitions on ASAT testing and deployments in outer space; prohibit and enumerate classes of destructive actions against space objects; and embody mutual acceptance and awareness of inherent deterrent capabilities (the ability even with weapons not dedicated to ASAT, for example, to react punitively in space against attacks on space assets). Although peacetime detection of violations of such agreements by technical means might be imperfect or imprecise, a pattern of cumulative Soviet violations (such as electronic interference or laser blinding of satellites) would be impossible to conceal. The potential for reactions in kind could be expected to deter egregious violations.

-- A lucid and sensitively managed approach to these issues should minimize strains in allied relations. Western restraint in responding to the Soviet INF threat told its own story and ultimately strengthened Western understanding of the common defense. Appreciation in Western Europe and Japan of the research emphasis of SDI and the absence of a specific BMD deployment agenda is gaining ground. The two medium nuclear powers, Britain and France, are capable of recognizing the difference between the near-term option of limited, terminal BMD and longer-term options. Broader European interest in SDI research cooperation is growing and should be welcomed. There are merits in encouraging the European countries to join together in some common institutional framework to foster a more uniform



basis for SDI research participation and, where appropriate, technology sharing. To put everything on a bilateral level could entail jockeying and fragmentation of effort.

On the one hand, political difficulties and risks lie ahead for the United States and its allies in dealing with Gorbachev and the Soviet peace offensive. On the other hand, there are important strategic policy considerations that the United States must face, including whether or how to proceed with ASAT and the SDI. The arms control talks at Geneva provide a genuine opportunity for facing these challenges forthrightly. The United States must remain firm in its purpose to maintain national security, increase stability, and reduce the risks of nuclear war.

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