

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country
File: Records

Folder Title: China, PRC [People's Republic of
China] (October 1981-November 1981)

Box: RAC Box 6

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digitized-textual-material>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/white-house-inventories>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/research-support/citation-guide>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

RBW 1/5/2009

File Folder CHINA, PRC OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 1981

FOIA

F02-025/1

Box Number 6

COHEN, WARREN

9

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
60192	MEMO	LILLEY TO ALLEN <i>R 10/18/2013 M386/1</i>	1	10/20/1981	B1
60194	MEMO	ALLEN TO HAIG <i>R 10/18/2013 M386/1</i>	1	ND	B1
60219	MEMO	ALLEN TO RR <i>R 10/18/2013 M386/1</i>	1	10/17/1981	B1
60196	MEMO	HAIG TO RR RE. MTG. <i>R 10/18/2013 M386/1</i>	1	10/16/1981	B1
60198	MEMO	LILLEY TO ALLEN [W/NOTATIONS] <i>R 3/8/2019 M386/1</i>	1	10/16/1981	B1
60200	CABLE	BEIJING 11484 <i>R 10/18/2013 M386/1</i>	5	10/17/1981	B1
60201	CABLE	BEIJING 11533 <i>R 10/18/2013 M386/1</i>	6	10/19/1981	B1
60202	CABLE	STATE 283240 <i>R 10/18/2013 M386/1</i>	1	10/23/1981	B1
60203	MEMO	ALLEN TO MEESE, BAKER, DEEVER [COPY OF DOC. 60175] <i>R 10/18/2013 M386/1</i>	1	10/28/1981	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

RBW 1/5/2009

File Folder CHINA, PRC OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 1981

FOIA

F02-025/1

Box Number 6

COHEN, WARREN

9

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
60206	CABLE	BEIJING 12005 <i>R 10/18/2013 M386/1</i>	1	10/29/1981	B1
60208	MEMO	LILLEY TO ALLEN <i>R 10/18/2013 M386/1</i>	1	11/4/1981	B1
60210	CABLE	BEIJING 12274 <i>R 10/18/2013 M386/1</i>	1	11/4/1981	B1
60212	CABLE	BEIJING 12536 <i>R 10/18/2013 M386/1</i>	2	11/10/1981	B1
60215	MEMO	CASEY TO ALLEN <i>R 3/12/2013 M386/1</i>	3	11/25/1981	B1 B3
60216	MEMO	ALLEN TO CASEY RE. MTG.S <i>R 3/12/2013 M386/1</i>	1	11/16/1981	B1
60218	MEMO	LILLEY TO ALLEN <i>R 3/12/2013 M386/1</i>	1	11/12/1981	B1 B3

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

6068

URGENT
VIA LDX


October 27, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER, III
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with PRC Vice Premier
and Foreign Minister Huang Hua

The President has agreed to meet with Chinese Vice Premier
and Foreign Minister Huang Hua at 11:45 a.m. on October 29th
for 30 minutes.

It is requested that the Department of State provide talking
points and background information to the NSC Staff for the
President's use by noon, October 28th.


Allen J. Lenz
Staff Director

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

RECEIVED

81 OCT 27 P 3: 39



Very Urgent

DEPARTMENT OF STATE



OCT 27 PM 4 03

SITUATION ROOM

MESSAGE NO. 0239 CLASSIFICATION UNCLASS No. PAGES 4
 FROM MR. ALLEN J. GENE
 (Name) (Extension) (Room Number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION President's Meeting with PRC Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Huang Hua

TO (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Dept/Room No.	Extension
<u>B</u>	<u>L. Paul Bremer III</u>		
	<u>S/S</u>		
	<u>S/S-S</u>		
	<u>SWO-INFO</u>		

REMARKS:

[Faint administrative form and routing table with various checkboxes and lines for tracking]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 27, 1981

MEMO FOR SIT ROOM

FROM: KATHY MCGRAW

SUBJECT: LDX

Please LDX the attached memo to:

L. Paul Bremer III
State/Secretariat -- 7th Floor
632-5804

Please send come-back copy to NSC/S.

Thanks much.

NSC/S:

Orig signed memo sent to
Sit Rm via tube

10/27 3:27 pm

Kathy

ACTION

October 27, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR ALLEN J. LENZ

FROM: JAMES LILLEY *JL*

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Huang Hua,
October 29th

Request you LDX the attached tasking memorandum to
the Department of State as soon as possible.

cc: C. Tyson

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Add-on 6068

MEMORANDUM

10/26/81

TO: RICHARD ALLEN
FROM: GREGORY ~~O~~. NEWELL
SUBJ: APPROVED PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITY

PLEASE IMPLEMENT THE FOLLOWING AND NOTIFY AND CLEAR ALL PARTICIPANTS. THE BRIEFING PAPER AND REMARKS SHOULD BE SUBMITTED TO RICHARD DARMAN BY 3 P.M. OF THE PRECEDING DAY.

MEETING: Meeting with Foreign Minister Huang Hua of PRC
DATE: Thursday, October 29, 1981
TIME: 11:45 am
DURATION: 30 mins
LOCATION: Cabinet Room
REMARKS REQUIRED: No
MEDIA COVERAGE:
FIRST LADY PARTICIPATION: No

cc: M. Brandon J. Parr
R. Darman B. Shaddix
D. Fischer L. Speakes
M. Friedersdorf Speechwriting and Research
C. Fuller S. Studdert
C. Gerrard N. Wormser
E. Hickey WHCA Audio/Visual
P. McCoy WHCA Operations
L. Nofziger

#6068

Delivered to Camera

JANET COLSON

g

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

gd

JANET COLSON

g

BUD NANCE

PETER

CY TO VP

SHOW CC

CY TO MEESE

SHOW CC

CY TO BAKER

SHOW CC

CY TO DEEVER

SHOW CC

CY TO BRADY

SHOW CC

Comments:

ORF
10/26/81

RECEIVED

81 OCT 19 P 5: 43

JANET COLSON _____

BUD NANCE _____

DICK ALLEN _____

IRENE DERUS _____

JANET COLSON _____

BUD NANCE _____

PETER _____

CY TO VP _____

CY TO MEESE _____

CY TO BAKER _____

CY TO DEEVER _____

CY TO BRADY _____

*To Jim Kelley
for further
action -
reducing proposal,
notification to
Hays, etc.*

SHOW CC _____

SHOW CC _____

SHOW CC _____

SHOW CC _____

SHOW CC _____

Comments:

RECEIVED

81 OCT 2 P 3: 30

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

PETER

CY TO VP

CY TO MEESE

CY TO BAKER

CY TO DEAVER

CY TO BRADY

Comments:

Staffing
 10/05

SHOW CC _____

SHOW CC _____

SHOW CC _____

SHOW CC _____

SHOW CC _____

60008
Colonel
12/19/68
3hr

RECEIVED

81 OCT 16 P 6: 50

JANET COLSON	<u>jc</u>	
BUD NANCE		
DICK ALLEN	<u>da</u>	
IRENE DERUS	_____	
JANET COLSON	_____	
BUD NANCE	_____	
PETER	_____	
CY TO VP	_____	SHOW CC _____
CY TO MEESE	_____	SHOW CC _____
CY TO BAKER	_____	SHOW CC _____
CY TO DEEVER	_____	SHOW CC _____
CY TO BRADY	_____	SHOW CC _____

Comments:

RECEIVED

81 OCT 26 P 4: 47

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

PETER

CY TO VP

CY TO MEESE

CY TO BAKER

CY TO DEEVER

CY TO BRADY

Comments:

For Staffing

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

60192

11

MEMORANDUM

6068

[Handwritten signature]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 20, 1981

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: JAMES LILLEY *[Handwritten signature]*
SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Chinese Vice
Premier Huang Hua (✓)

It is important that State convey to the Chinese the sense that a meeting in Washington requires success in Cancun, and that we begin to enforce some good behavior on our Chinese friends. This will be hard to get across but I will try. (✓)

Rich Armitage at DOD enthusiastically supports this approach and will convey his support to his superiors so that we should have Defense lined up behind us. (✓)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the attached memorandum (Tab I) to Secretary Haig.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I RVA memo to State
Tab II Schedule Proposal

cc: Charles Tyson

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M386/1 #60192

BY KML NARA DATE 10/18/13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on 10/20/87

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

60194

12

6068

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.
The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Chinese Vice
Premier Huang Hua (C)

The President has approved a meeting between him and Vice Premier Huang Hua when Huang Hua is in Washington on 29-30 October 1981. The Chinese should not be informed of this approval for the meeting until after the President meets Premier Zhao in Cancun. It is important that the Chinese understand that a meeting between the President and Huang Hua in Washington is linked to a successful meeting between the President and Premier Zhao at Cancun. (C)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Richard V. Allen
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M386/1 #60194

BY KML NARA DATE 10/18/13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on 10/20/87

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: MICHAEL K. DEAVER
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN

REQUEST: Meeting with Chinese Vice Premier Huang Hua of
the People's Republic of China (PRC)

PURPOSE: To pursue a strategic dialogue with a key PRC
leader and to strengthen bilateral US-PRC ties.

BACKGROUND: Huang Hua will be the highest-level Chinese leader
to meet the President. Chinese leaders met Haig in
June 1981 and we are reciprocating their courtesies.

PREVIOUS
PARTICIPATION: The President has not yet met Huang Hua. The President
did have his first meeting with PRC reps on 19 March
1981 in Washington and will have met Huang and the
Chinese Premier in Cancun on 21 October 1981.

DATE: October 29-30, 1981

LOCATION: The Cabinet Room

PARTICIPANTS: President, Vice President, Haig, Allen, Vivian Chang
(U.S. interpreter), Holdridge (State), Lilley (NSC
Staff). Huang Hua, Chinese Vice Foreign Minister
Pu Shouchang, Chinese-American Oceanic Division
Chief Han Xu, Chinese interpreter Yang Jiechi.

OUTLINE OF EVENT: One-hour meeting. Presentation of views - NOT a
negotiating session. Interpreter will be used
throughout.

REMARKS REQUIRED: President should present U.S. world view, strategy
for East Asia, his views of Taiwan, U.S. Chinese
cooperation against USSR.

MEDIA COVERAGE: Photo opportunity only.

RECOMMENDED BY: The State Department; concurred in by NSC Staff.

OPPOSED BY: None

cc: Edwin Meese III
James Baker
Richard Darman
Greg Newell

174

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Leontina

This was digitized
on 10/17

Jensen

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

The President has seen _____

October 17, 1981

BR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Allen*

SUBJECT: State Proposal that You Meet With
Chinese Vice Premier Huang Hua

Regarding the attached memorandum from A1 (Tab A), you may recall my mentioning some time ago that I expected you to receive a request to see the Chinese Foreign Minister, Huang Hua, at the end of this month.

I recommend that no commitment be made at this time, especially until we see what happens at Cancun. Huang Hua will be there with Premier Zhao Ziyang.

For your information, a Chinese Vice Premier, Fang Yi, was in town this week and was angry at not being received by you (a request was not made from State, but a meeting would have been unlikely in any event), and refused a meeting with the Vice President, saying that he "had to be in Los Angeles." I am told that the tone of Fang Yi's meetings was very unpleasant.

cc: Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M386/1 #60219

BY KML NARA DATE 10/18/13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review 10/17/87

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 16, 1981

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Alexander M. Haig, Jr. *AMH*

Subject: Request for appointment during
Huang Hua's Washington Visit:
October 29-30

Huang Hua, Vice Premier and Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, will visit Washington, October 29-30. This will be a vitally important visit for our bilateral relations and quite possibly a critical follow-up to previous discussions with Premier Zhao Ziyang in Cancun. I think it important that Huang's schedule include a meeting with you, preferably during the afternoon of October 30. It would also be important as a reciprocal gesture for my meetings in China last June which were at the very highest level.

As part of the program for Huang Hua, we will be holding a series of meetings in the State Department on foreign affairs. Huang will meet with the Secretaries of Defense and Treasury, as well as with the Director of the CIA. Vice President Bush has agreed to host a luncheon in Huang's honor.

Recommendation:

That you approve a meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua.

Approve *RR* Disapprove

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M386/1 # 60196

BY KML NARA DATE 10/18/13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GDS 10/5/87

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

6068

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

October 16, 1981

NLRR M386 # 60198
BY RW NARA DATE 3/8/19

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: JIM LILLEY

SUBJECT: State Proposal that the President meet with Chinese Vice Premier Huang Hua (C)

I will be in tomorrow, October 17th, at 10:30 a.m. and will discuss this with you at that time. (U)

It seems to me that we should make no commitment on this until we see how Cancun goes and how Huang Hua behaves there. This is something we can hold off pending how they conduct themselves. (C)

Handwritten notes:
The tone of Fang Yi's meetings was very unpleasant + you will want to understand the circumstances in the background to Cancun. Decision will be made on China.

Handwritten: Confid. Delus. [unclear]

Attachment

Tab A Memo from Haig to President

Handwritten: to P. M.B.D.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Review 10/16/87

Handwritten: P Regarding the attached memorandum from Al (TAB A), you may recall that ^{my} ~~my~~ ^{and} ~~and~~ some time ago that I expected you to receive a request to see the Chinese Foreign Minister, Huang Hua, at the end of this month.

Handwritten: I recommend that no commitment be made at this time, especially until we see what happens at Cancun.

Handwritten: Huang Hua will be there with Premier Zhao Ziyang.

Handwritten: For your information, ~~the~~ a Chinese Vice Premier, Fang Yi, was in town this week and was angry at not being ~~made~~ ^{from State} ~~made~~ (but a meeting would have been unlikely in any event) ~~as he~~ and refused a meeting with the Vice President, saying that he "had to be in Los Angeles." I am told that

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

60200

18

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 215

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 10/23/81//296

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M386/1 *60200

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

BY KML NARA DATE 10/18/13

ANNOTATIONS:

THE PRC VIEWS CANCUN PRIMARILY AS A POLITICAL EXERCISE AND DO NOT INTEND TO SEND AN ECONOMIC ADVISOR TO CANCUN. THE PRC SEES IT AS BEING IMPERATIVE THAT THE CANCUN CONFERENCE SUCCEED SINCE ONLY THE SOVIETS WILL GAIN IF IT FAILS.

MESSAGE:

HCE841
STU4366
DD RUEHC
DE RUMJPG #1484/01 2900220
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 170050Z OCT 81
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6448
INFO RUHQHQA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
RUMJDH/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 9254
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 11484

DEPT PLEASE PASS INFO ALL CANCUN COLLECTIVE
CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 10/16/01 (TAYLOR, JAY J.) DR-P

TAGS: ENSD, CH, US, PEPR, EGEN

SUBJECT: CONSULTATIONS ON CANCUN

1. ~~ENTIRE~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY AND COMMENTS: ON OCTOBER 16, DAS ALBRECHT AND EMBASSY OFFICERS MET WITH THE CHINESE TEAM HEADED BY DR. U SHAN TO HOLD CONSULTATIONS ON THE CANCUN SUMMIT. THE FOUR HOUR MEETING FOCUSED ON TRADE, INVESTMENT, ENERGY, AND AGRICULTURE WHERE THE U.S. TOOK THE LEAD, AND THE TOPIC OF GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS WHERE THE PRC OUTLINED ITS POLITICAL CONCERNS. THE CHINESE PROPOSED A "COMPROMISE FORMULATION" WITH RESPECT TO GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WOULD PROTECT, IN THEIR VIEW, THE AUTHORITY OF EXISTING SPECIALIZED INSTITUTIONS WHILE ALLOWING GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS TO PROCEED WITHOUT LIMITATION ON THE QUESTIONS DISCUSSED, BUT ON CONDITION THAT IMPORTANT ISSUES WOULD BE DECIDED BY CONSENSUS. THE EMPHASIS, SAID THE CHINESE, WOULD BE TO BEGIN DISCUSSION ON ITEMS ON THE GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS AGENDA ON WHICH THERE IS ALREADY A CONSENSUS. THE U.S. SIDE OUTLINED THE PRINCIPLES FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC GROWTH SET FORTH IN THE SERIES OF SPEECHES BY THE ADMINISTRATION, CULMINATING IN THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH OCTOBER 15.
3. THE PRC REPRESENTATIVES CLEARLY CONTINUE TO VIEW

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

CANCUN AS A POLITICAL EXERCISE. THEY SHOWED LITTLE INTEREST IN THE ECONOMIC ISSUES OR IN THE SUBSTANTIVE VALUE OF U.S. PROPOSALS, AND NO ECONOMIC OFFICIALS PARTICIPATED ON THEIR SIDE, (NOR WILL ANY ECONOMIC OFFICIALS BE ON THEIR DELEGATION AT CANCUN). THEY TIRELESSLY PRESSED THEIR VIEW THAT AGREEMENT AT CANCUN ON GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS (GN) WAS POLITICALLY CRUCIAL, NORTH/SOUTH TENSIONS WERE RISING AND U.S. AGREEMENT TO GO ALONG WITH GN WAS NEEDED TO AVOID A "FAILURE" OF CANCUN AND A SOVIET VICTORY. WHEN PRESSED, THEY COULD GIVE NO HARD EVIDENCE OF INCREASED NORTH/SOUTH TENSION BUT SEEMED CONTENT TO REITERATE THAT OTHER CANCUN PARTICIPANTS PUBLICLY FAVORED REACHING AGREEMENT ON GN AT CANCUN, AND THAT U.S. FAILURE TO AGREE WOULD LEAD TO "FAILURE." END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

4. DAS ALBRECHT PRESENTED THE U.S. POSITION IN THE MORNING SESSION AND GAV DETAILS ON TRADE, INVESTMENT AND FINANCE, ENERGY AND AGRICULTURE ALONG THE LINES OF THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH, COPIES OF WHICH WERE GIVEN TO THE PRC SIDE. ALBRECHT EMPHASIZED THE ADMINISTRATION'S DESIRE TO STRENGTHEN THE U.S. ECONOMY AS A FIRST PRIORITY IN THE CONTEXT OF A STRONG SECURITY POSITION AND THE U.S. DESIRE TO WORK WITH FRIENDS AND ALLIES TO PROVIDE A FRAMEWORK, BOTH POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY, IN WHICH REAL PROGRESS TOWARDS INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT CAN BE MADE. HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF OUR TRADE AND INVESTMENT PROPOSALS IN PROVIDING REAL, CONCRETE BENEFITS TO THE LDCS. THE CHINESE REACTION TO THE U.S. PRESENTATION WAS POLITE AND INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS:

- THE CHINESE "HAVE NOT GIVEN MUCH CONSIDERATION" TO SPECIFIC TRADE PROBLEMS.
- CHINA "DOES NOT UNDERSTAND" WHY THE U.S. IS OPPOSED TO THE ENERGY AFFILIATE.
- ON THE QUESTION OF AGRICULTURE, HAS THE U.S. CHANGED ITS POSITION WITH RESPECT TO THE FOOD RESERVE PROGRAM.
- CONCERNING FINANCE, DOES THE U.S. SUPPORT AN INCREASE IN SDRS AS REQUESTED BY THE LDCS.

BT
#1484
NNNN

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 212

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 10/23/81//296

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE845
UTS3903
DD RUEHC
DE RUMJPG #1484/02 2900250
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 170050Z OCT 81
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6449
INFO RUHQHQA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
RUMJDH/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 9255
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BEIJING 11484
DEPT PLEASE PASS INFO ALL CANCUN COLLECTIVE
CINCPAC FOR POLAD

THE AFTERNOON SESSION CENTERED ON THE PRC APPROACH WHICH FOCUSED ON THE QUESTION OF GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS. DR. PU PRESENTED THE FOLLOWING DETAILED PROPOSAL FOR U.S. REACTION, WHICH HE CHARACTERIZED AS A "PRELIMINARY CONCEPTION" ABOUT HOW TO "BREAK THE DEADLOCK" IN NORTH/SOUTH (N/S) RELATIONS. THE MOST IMPORTANT POINT OF CONTROVERSY, SAID PU, CONCERNS AGENDA AND PROCEDURE FOR GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS. THE CHINESE SUGGESTED THE FOLLOWING:

- (1) WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE COMPETENCY, FUNCTIONS AND POWERS OF THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND THE FACT THAT IMPORTANT ISSUES WOULD REQUIRE DECISION BY CONSENSUS, THERE SHOULD BE NO LIMITATION ON QUESTIONS DISCUSSED AT A GLOBAL NEGOTIATION CONFERENCE.
 - (2) TO AVOID FURTHER DELAY OF DISCUSSION OF AGENDA ITEMS AT THE GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS CONFERENCE, DISCUSSION SHOULD BEGIN ON THOSE SUBSTANTIVE ITEMS ON WHICH A CONSENSUS HAS BEEN REACHED. THE PARTICIPANTS SHOULD FIRST SOLVE THOSE ISSUES WHICH ZOLVOST PREUSING FOR THE LDC'S AND FOR WHICH CONDITIONS ARE MATURE.
 - (3) AGENDA ITEMS ON WHICH THERE IS NO CONSENSUS SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN THE COURSE OF THE GLOBAL ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS. THERE SHOULD BE NO HOLD UP OF NEGOTIATIONS ON SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS UNTIL THERE IS AGREEMENT ON ALL THE AGENDA ITEMS.
- FURTHER ELABORATING ON THE PROPOSAL, DR. PU MADE THE FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS:

-- THE NORTH/SOUTH ISSUE IS LINKED TO THE EAST/WEST ISSUE. CHINA IS CONCERNED THAT SUBSTANTIAL PORGRESS SHOULD BE MADE AT CANCUN; ONLY IN THIS WAY

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

CAN THERE BE RELAXATION OR IMPROVEMENT IN N/S TENSIONS AND STRENGTHENED EFFORTS AGAINST HEGEMONISM.

-- THE GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS PROCESS HAS BEEN ENDORSED BY A MAJORITY OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, AND BY MOST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AS WELL. SHOULD THE SUMMIT FULL, THIS WOULD BE SOMETHING DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE U.S.

-- THE ISSUE OF PROTECTIONISM, AND THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE MULTIFIBER AGREEMENT, WERE TWO EXAMPLES OF ISSUES ON WHICH DISCUSSION COULD START IMMEDIATELY WITHIN THE GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS CONTEXT.

-- IN GENERAL, THE LDC'S WELCOME THE CHINESE THREE-POINT PROPOSAL, THOUGH SOME HAVE RAISED QUESTIONS AND WOULD LIKE TO STUDY THE PROPOSAL MORE CAREFULLY.

-- THE CHINESE PROPOSAL "IS NOT NEW" AND IS NOT THE "CREATION OF THE CHINESE." THE CONCEPT OF GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS WAS WELL DEFINED AT THE 1979 34TH UNGA. MOREOVER, CERTAIN PHRASES IN THE CHINESE PROPOSAL, SUCH AS ALLOWING GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS "WITHOUT PREJUDICE" TO THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES, EMERGED IN UN DISCUSSIONS AND HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE LDC'S. IN RESPONSE DAS ALBRECHT RAISED THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- N/S TENSIONS ARE NOT AS HIGH OR INTENSE AS THE CHINESE DESCRIBE. U.S. RELATIONS WITH MANY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ARE GOOD, AND U.S. PROGRAMS ARE TAILORED AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE TAILORED ACCORDING TO THE PARTICULAR NEEDS OF A COUNTRY OR PROBLEM. THE MENTION OF "TENSIONS," SAID ALBRECHT, HAS TENDED TO INCREASE PRIOR TO CANCUN SIMPLY BECAUSE THE MEETING IS A FOCAL POINT FOR THE ISSUE.

-- THE U.S. IS CONCERNED WITH THE REALITY OF HOW BEST TO ACHIEVE ECONOMIC GROWTH AND AVOID EMPTY RHETORIC. AT THE SAME TIME, THE PRESIDENT IS GOING TO CANCUN TO LISTEN AND TO DISCUSS THE ISSUES. IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT THE PRESIDENT USED THE LANGUAGE THAT HE DID IN HIS SPEECH CONCERNING "HOW TO ORGANIZE AND CONDUCT" THE ECONOMIC DIALOGUE. AS THE SPEECH SAID, THE U.S. WILL CONCENTRATE ON PRACTICAL TASKS.

THE CHINESE ASKED WHETHER THE U.S. WOULD SUPPORT HAVING ANOTHER MEETING SUCH AS THE ONE AT CANCUN. ALBRECHT SAID HE SAW BOTH ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES, AND WOULD REFER THE QUESTION TO WASHINGTON. DR. PU ALSO ASKED IF THE INTERNATIONAL GRAIN AGREEMENT

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 214

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 10/23/81/1296

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

WOULD BE RAISED AT CANCUN, AND ALBRECHT SAID HE DOUBTED THAT IT WOULD.

THE CHINESE INDICATED THEY DID NOT INTEND TO HAND OUT A PAPER OR MAKE PUBLIC THEIR PROPOSAL "UNLESS IT RECEIVES FAVORABLE ATTENTION," AND SAID THE U.S. VIEW ON THEIR PROPOSAL IS AN IMPORTANT ONE." DR. PU CLOSED THE MEETING BY SPECIFICALLY ASKING FOR THE FURTHER COMMENTS BY THE U.S. ON THE PROPOSAL. THIS CALBE HAS BEEN APPROVED BY ALBRECHT.

HUMMEL

BT

#1484

NNNN

SENSITIVE

60201

23

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 178

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 10/23/81//296

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

DECLASSIFIED

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

NLRR M386/1 # 60201

MESSAGE:

BY KML NARA DATE 10/18/13

HCE296
UTS4686
DD RUEHC
DE RUMJPG #1533/01 2920900
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 190831Z OCT 81
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6470
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 11533
EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 10/19/01 (HUMMEL, ARTHUR W. JR) DR-M
TAGS: PEPR, MARR, CH, TW

SUBJECT: DENG XIAOPING DISCUSSION WITH HAROLD BROWN ON
TAIWAN AND ON US MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO PRC

1. ~~ENTIRE~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY. DURING HOUR-LONG MEETING BETWEEN VICE CHAIRMAN DENG XIAOPING AND FORMER SECDEF HAROLD BROWN OCT 18, CONVERSATION CENTERED ON THE TAIWAN PROBLEM AND ON BROWN'S VIEWS ON FUTURE US-PRC MILITARY SALES AND MILITARY COOPERATION. DENG ADDED SPECIFICITY TO PREVIOUS PRC WARNINGS OF POSSIBLE DETERIORATION IN US-PRC RELATIONS, CITING THE NETHERLANDS AS A PRECEDENT, AND SAID THAT THE PRC WOULD NOT DECIDE ON ARMS PURCHASES FROM THE US UNTIL AFTER THEY KNOW US INTENTIONS TOWARD TAIWAN. HE REPEATED THAT "MISHANDLING" OF THIS QUESTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THE CURRENT CHINESE LEADERS, INCLUDING HIMSELF. END SUMMARY.
3. BROWN WAS ACCOMPANIED BY GENERAL (RET) TIGHE (EX DIA) AND RICHARD SOLOMON (RAND CORP). AMBASSADOR HUMMEL AND NAVATT CAPT MONK ALSO ATTENDED, ALONG WITH VPREMIER/DEFMIN GENG BIAO AND OTHER PRC OFFICIALS.
4. BROWN OFFERED TO RE-CAP HIS VIEWS AS ALREADY EXPRESSED IN CONVERSATIONS WITH OTHER PRC OFFICIALS. BROWN SAID THAT ALTHOUGH HE IS NOW A PRIVATE CITIZEN, HE CONTINUED TO HAVE VIEWS OF HIS OWN ON THE IMPORTANT SUBJECT OF US-PRC RELATIONS AND HE HAD TALKED WITH (ALTHOUGH HE SAID HE DID NOT TRY TO REPRESENT) REAGAN ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS. HE SAID HE BELIEVED THAT THE USG AIM IS TO SUPPORT THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE TAIWAN QUESTION, THAT USG DECISIONS ON ARMS TO TAIWAN WOULD BE TAKEN WITH THAT AIM IN MIND, AND THAT THE USG WOULD DO

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

NOTHING TO OBSTRUCT EVENTUAL REUNIFICATION. THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION WOULD HAVE CONTINUED TO SELL ARMS TO TAIWAN.

5. BROWN SAID THAT STATEMENTS MADE DURING THE REAGAN COAMPAIGN LAST YEAR WENT BEYOND THOSE OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION, BUT STATEMENTS IN RECENT MONTHS HAD DEFLATED THE EXPECTATIONS OF CHIANG CHING-KUD ON TAIWAN. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAD NOT YET MADE BASIC DECISIONS ON ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN, AND THERE ARE SOME PRO-TAIWAN VIEWS AROUND THE ADMINISTRATION, ALTHOUGH NOT NECESSARILY WITHIN IT. BROWN SAID HE WAS NOT SURE WHAT THE DECISION WOULD BE BUT IT IS POSSIBLE THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN WILL LIMIT ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN TO REPLACEMENTS AT PRESENT LEVELS OF SOPHISTICATION, OR IT IS POSSIBLE THAAT SALES WOULD BE MADE AT HIGHER LEVELS, OR THAT NO FURTHER SALES WOULD BE MADE, WHICH OF COURSE IS WHAT THE PRC WISHES.

6. BROWN SAID HIS PERSONAL VIEW IS THAT CESSATION OF ALL SALES COULD PRECIPITATE UNREST ON TAIWAN THAT WOULD OBSTRUCT RE-UNIFICATION. TAIWAN MIGHT TURN TO OTHERS FOR WEAPONS SUPPLY, OR THERE COULD BE LOSS OF CONTROL AND A LAPSE INTO ANARCHY ON TAIWAN OR EVEN INTO WARLORDISM. THERE COULD ALSO BE A MOVE TOWARD INDEPENDENCE BY THE NATIVE TAIWANESE. BROWN SAID THAT IN HIS PERSONAL OPINION IT WOULD BE IN EVERYONE'S INTEREST FOR TAIWAN TO HAVE ENOUGH SELF-CONFIDENCE SO THEY CAN MOVE TOWARD PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION. THAT PROCESS WOULD TAKE SOME TIME -- AND VICE CHAIRMAN DENG WOULD HAVE THE BEST SENSE OF HOW MUCH TIME -- AND MARSHAL YE JIANYING'S NINE-POINT OFFER TO TAIWAN SEEMS VERY FORTHCOMING. HOWEVER, THE CONFIDENCE OF TAIWAN IS VERY IMPORTANT AND IF TAIWAN FEELS THREATENED BY US ACTIONS THERE COULD BE AN ADVERSE REACTION.

7. DENT RESPONDED THAT AT THE PRESENT TIME CHIANG CHING-KUD CAN COMPLETELY CONTROL THE SITUATION ON TIAWAN, SO SOME OF BROWN'S SCENARIOS DO NOT EXIST. SINCE THE PRC'S NINE-POINT PROPOSALS THERE IS EVEN LESS REASON FOR THE US TO PROVIDE ARMS. THE PRC HAS ELABORATED ON THESE VIEWS, AS BROWN KNEW, ON THE EVE OF NORMALI-ZATION BRZEZINSKI CAME TO CHINA, AND THE PRC DECIDED ON NORMALIZATION. ONE QUESTION AT THAT TIME WHICH PRESIDENT CARTER WAS GIVEN MORE TIME TO SOLVE WAS ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN, AND QUOTE TO BE FRANK WE ADOPTED A SOMEWHAT TOLERANT ATTITUDE. WE SAID WE WOULD DISCUSS IT FURTHER, AND THE PROBLEM WOULD NOT

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 180

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 10/23/81//296

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

DISAPPEAR; WE ONLY GAVE THE US MORE TIME TO CONSIDER,
WE HAVE ALWAYS SAID THAT ARMS SALES REPRESENT INTER-
FERENCE IN CHINA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. AS A MATTER
OF FACT, ARMS SALES CONSTITUTE AN OBSTACLE TO REUNI-
FICATIONMZO PEACEFUL MEANS. REGRETABLY, THE CARTER
ADMINISTRATION ALTHOUGH IT DID NOT UPGRADE ITS SALES,
CONTINUED THEM. WE HAVE ALWAYS STATED OUR POSITION
CLEALY HOPING THAT THE US WOULD RECONSIDER. PRESIDENT
REAGAN SAID OTHER THINGS DURING HIS COMAIGN AND MADE
US MORE CONSCIOUS OF THIS QUESTION. WE HAVE NOTICED
ITHAT SINCE PRESIDENG REAGAN CAME TO OFFICE HE HAS

BT

#1533

NNNN

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 175

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 10/23/81//296

SITUATION: . CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE297
STU6637
OO RUEHC
DE RUMJPG #1533/02 2920927
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 190831Z OCT 81
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6471
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BEIJING 11533

EXDIS

BEN QUITE PRUDENT IN ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN, AND WE APPRECIATE THIS, BUT THE QUESTION IS NOT OVER. THIS IS PRECISELY THE SHADOW HANGING OVER US-CHINA RELATIONS; WE HOPE THE USG WILL BE EXTREMELY PRUDENT IN HANDLING IT. IF IT IS NOT HANDLED PROMPTLY THERE IS DANGER THAT OUR RELATIONS WILL MARK TIME OR EVEN RETROGRESS. THE CHINESE PEOPLE REWCT VERY STRONGLY ON THIS ISSUE. WHEN PRESIDENT CARTER CAME FOR A VISIT IN AUGUST, I TOLD HIM THAT YOU PAY ATTENTION TO THE LOBBYISTS ON CAPITOL HILL BUT I HOPE YOU WILL ALSP PAY ATTENTION TO THE STRONG VIEWS OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE. WE ADOPTED A SERIOUS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE DUTCH SALES AND OUR APPROACH TO THAT QUESTION REFLECTED OUR PEOPLE'S VIEW. THIS WOULD NOT MERELY BE OUR ATTITUDE IN THE CASE OF THE NETHERLANDS ALONE, BUT I WILL NOT SAY MORE AT THIS TIME WHEN PRESIDENT REAGAN IS COMING TO A DECISION. UNQUOTE.

8. DENG CONTINUED QUOTE I THINK CLARIFICATION MUST BE MADE ON TWO VIEWS HELD IN THE US: (A) THAT IN US-PRC RELATIONS THERE IS NOTHING THAT THE US NEEDS, BUT CHINA REQUIRES MUCH FROM THE US, AND (B) THAT AS LONG AS THE US IS BEING TOUGH ON THE SOVIETS, CHINA WILL SWALLOW WHATEVER THE US DOES ON ARMS FOR TAIWAN. FRANKLY THESE KINDS OF JUDGMENTS HAVE DANGERS, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT WE HAVE ALWAYS APPROACHED US-PRC RELATIONS FROM A GLOBAL STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE, AND THIS WILL CONTINUE. I DO NOT THINK IT SERVES US-PRC INTERESTS TO ASK WHO NEEDS MORE FROM THE OTHER. CHINA IS BACKWARD AND POOR BUT NOT INSIGNIFICANT. THAT IS WHY WE HOPE THE USG AND THE US MEDIA WILL PAY CLOSE ATTENTION TO THIS QUESTION, IN OUR PRIVATE TALKS WITH THE US WE HAVE

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: CHECK

SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

SAID 'THERE IS A LIMIT' AND I REPEAT THIS, IF THOSE IN OFFICE IN CHINA (OF WHOM I AM ONE) DO NOT HANDLE THIS PROPERLY, THE PEOPLE WILL NOT SUPPORT US. UNQUOTE.

9. BROWN SAID THAT HE WAS AWARE OF DENG'S VIEWS AND THAT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION IS ALSO AWARE, INCLUDING CHINA'S ACTION TO DOWNGRADE RELATIONS AFTER THE DUTCH SALE TO TAIWAN. BROWN SAID HE HAD ALWAYS BELIEVED THAT US-PRC RELATIONS SHOULD BE BETWEEN EQUALS AND HE BELIFED THAT IS RECOGNIZED IN THE US. RELATIONS SHOULD STAND ON THEIR OWN. GOOD RELATIONS ARE IN THE INTEREST OF BOTH BECAUSE BOTH HAVE GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES.

10. BROWN SAID HE AGREED THAT CHIANG CHING-KUO IS IN CONTROL, BUT FOR THE US TO DECIDE THERE WOULD BE NO ARMS SALES WOULD CREATE A NEW AND UNPREDICTABLE SITUATION. BROWN THOUGHT THE RESOLUTION OF THIS QUESTION WOULD TAKE SOME TIME AND REQUIRE PRUDENCE.

11. DENG RESPONDED QUOTE YOUR SCENARIO DOES NOT EXIST BECAUSE NO-ONE WILL THREATEN TAIWAN. THE CRUX OF THE US APPROACH IS IN THE TAIWAN ISSUE. IN SUMMARY, WE HIPE US-PRC RELATIONS WILL PROGRESS, AND NOT MARK TIME, AND NOT RETROGRESS. UNQUOTE.

12. BROWN THEN OFFERED TO GIVE HIS THOUGHTS ON US-PRC MILITARY RELATIONS. HE SAID THAT THE NEW ADMINISTRATION HAD EVOLVED BEYOND CARTER IN OFFERING TO CONSIDER WEAPONS SALES TO CHINA, ALTHOUGH THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION HAD BEEN GOING IN THIS DIRECTION ALSO. BROWN SAID HE THOUGHT THE US AND PRC SHOULD PICK OUT A FEW HIGH PRIORITY ITEMS TO CONCENTRATE ON SUCH AS SURFACE TO AIR MISSILES AND ANTI-TANK WEAPONS. IN THE NON-WEAPONS FIELD BROWN SUGGESTED COMMAND AND CONTROL EQUIPMENT FOR COMBINED OPERATIONS, WHICH WAS VERY IMPORTANT FOR CHINA. BROWN THOUGHT ONE POSSIBILITY WOULD BE TO BUY A LIMITED NUMBER OF WEAPONS FOR SOME PRC TROOP UNITS VERY EARLY, AND THEN PROCEED TO CO-PRODUCTION, WHICH WOULD TAKE SOME TIME UNTIL CHINA ACQUIRED BETTER PRODUCTION CAPABILITY. AS FOR TIMING, THAT WOULD BE, SAID BROWN, FOR THE USG AND PRC TO TORK OUT, BUT HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE BEST FOR THE TIMING OF A WEAPON SALE ANNOUNCEMENT TO BE CO-INCIDENT WITH SOME EXTERNAL EVENT, SUCH AS A FURTHER SOVIET EXPANSIONIST MOVE, WHICH COULD PROBABLY BE EXPECTED BEFORE LONG.

13. BROWN SAID THAT SEPARATELY FROM ARMS TRANSFERS HE WOULD URGE MILITARY COOPERATION IN OTHER FIELDS,

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 177

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 10/23/81//296

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

INCLUDING EXCHANGES IN MILITARY EDUCATION AND IN DOCTRINE AND TACTICS. HE BELIEVED THE US AND PRC SHOULD ALSO DISCUSS AT A HIGH LEVEL POSSIBLE PARALLEL MILITARY ACTIONS IN CERTAIN CONTINGENCIES, WHICH IT WAS MUCH BETTER TO DO BEFORE THE EVENT.
14. DENG SAID QUOTE IF US-PRC RELATIONS PROGRESS, THERE IS GREAT SCOPE FOR PROGRESS, BUT WE CAN ONLY CONSIDER YOUR SUGGESTIONS AFTER THERE IS A CLEAR VIEW OF US INTENTIONS REGARDING TAIWAN UNQUOTE.
15. COMMENT: QUOTATIONS OF DENG'S REMARKS ARE VERBATIM, FROM THE AMBASSADOR'S NOTES.

HUMMEL

BT

#1533

NNNN

SENSITIVE

60202 29

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 71

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/10/81//314

SITUATION: STATE
SUBJECT CATAGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

EHA255
DD RUEADWW
DE RUEHC #3240 2962131
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
D R 232043Z OCT 81 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 6932
INFO RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 8058
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0605
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7434
RUEADWW/ WHITE HOUSE 6933
BT
~~SECRET~~ STATE 283240
NODIS
E.O. 12065: RDS 10/22/01 (HULDRIDGE, JOHN H.)
TAGS: KS CH US PEPR ETRD

SUBJECT: CHINESE VICE FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSSION ON KOREA
REF: BEIJING 11593

1. ~~8~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE WERE INTRIGUED BY VICE FOREIGN MINISTER PU SHOUCHANG'S SUGGESTION THAT CHINA MIGHT RECIPROCATE U.S. "INFORMAL" CONTACTS WITH NORTH KOREA IN ORDER TO BREAK THE DEADLOCK ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. DOES EMBASSY KNOW OF ANY PRECEDENT FOR THIS KIND OF APPROACH BY THE CHINESE? WITHOUT GOING BACK TO THE CHINESE, CAN EMBASSY SHED ANY ADDITIONAL LIGHT ON THE MEANING OF PU'S SUGGESTION? DOES EMBASSY HAVE ANY INSIGHT AS TO MEANING OF "INFORMAL" CONTACTS SUGGESTED BY PU, AND WHAT THE CHINESE MIGHT BE PREPARED TO DO VIS-A-VIS SOUTH KOREA? WE ARE LIKELY TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE WITH HUANG HUA.

CLARK
BT
#3240
NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M386/1 #60202
BY KML NARA DATE 10/18/13

SENSITIVE

Richard Allen 30

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 26, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: G. A. Keyworth *Gay*
SUBJECT: The Visit of Chinese Vice Premier Fang Yi

I hosted a successful visit by Chinese Vice Premier Fang Yi to Washington and the West Coast October 14-22. The occasion for Fang's visit was a meeting of the U.S.-PRC Joint Commission on Scientific and Technological Cooperation, which Fang and I co-chair. Fang is responsible for all civilian science and technology in China. He is the most senior Chinese official to visit the United States since your inauguration.

Our cooperation with China in science and technology has played an important role in the normalization of U.S.-PRC relations. In less than three years since normalization we have signed agreements to cooperate in seventeen fields, ranging from health to basic sciences. In several of the fields--such as space, hydropower, and agriculture--the cooperation will lead to commercial benefits for the U.S.

Fang and I agreed that the ongoing cooperative programs have been highly successful. We both pointed to problems which at times have hampered the cooperation. Fang mentioned our controls on high technology exports to China. I raised the problem of insufficient access for our scientists to some Chinese research facilities.

We agreed, however, that we could work out these administrative problems and that we would not allow them to stand in the way of further progress in our scientific relations. Fang stated that scientific cooperation with the U.S. had the highest priority for them. Fang also made it clear that they desire strong investment by the U.S. private sector in development of their oil and mineral resources.

A slightly negative note during the visit resulted from Fang's disappointment that he was not received by you. Fang did meet Secretary Haig and I had arranged for a call on the Vice President on the Vice President's first day back from South America, but Fang decided to leave the previous day for Los Angeles with the rest of his delegation. I believe that we offered Fang a reception appropriate to his rank, especially given your hectic pre-Cancun schedule, and that his disappointment is not of lasting concern.

RECEIVED

81 OCT 28 A 9: 45

JANET COLSON

JC

BUD NANCE

Wb

DICK ALLEN

id 2

IRENE DERUS

JC

JANET COLSON

JC

BUD NANCE

JC

PETER

JC

CY TO VP

JC

CY TO MEESE

JC

CY TO BAKER

JC

CY TO DEEVER

JC

CY TO BRADY

JC

Shuss This is cc - we never saw the original of copy sent to Kelley for info; JC

(Handwritten initials and scribbles)

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

Comments:

(Handwritten signature)

~~SECRET~~

60203

32

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

October 28, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR ED MEESE
JIM BAKER
MIKE DEEVER

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Dick*

We have asked repeatedly for a briefing memorandum from State on the Huang Hua meeting. You will recall that in Cancun Premier Zhao Ziyang said that he had two additional points to bring up with the President, but that (due to lack of time) he would give them to Huang to pass to Haig.

Al told me on the way back from Cancun that Huang told him the PRC wants a "date certain" for the termination of weapons deliveries to Taiwan. Al said that this is a "crisis," that it could lead to "disaster." He insists that the "Democrats are playing this issue for all it's worth," presumably "for 1984."

Al said that he would send me a memorandum of conversation on the Chinese visit "tomorrow," i.e., Sunday.

Since Monday we have asked for this memo five times, and we have not yet received it. Hence, since we do not have the results of his latest meeting with Huang, we are not able to provide the President with a thorough briefing. I suspect Al will come to us at the last minute with a paper describing a "must" position for the President.

In any event, I would like to brief the President on this meeting tomorrow morning.

~~SECRET~~

Review on October 28, 1987

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M386/1 #60203

BY KML NARA DATE 10/18/13

~~SECRET~~

60206

33

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 21

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/10/81//314

SITUATION: FAR
SUBJECT CATAGORY: EAST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE819
STU2323
OO RUEHC
DE RUMJPG #2005 3020937
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 290909Z OCT 81
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6793
BT

~~SECRET~~ BEIJING 12005

NODIS
E.O.M 12065: RDS-1 10/22/01 (FREEMAN, CHARLES W. JR) OR-M
TAGS: KS, CH, US, PEPR, ETRD
SUBJ: CHINESE VICE FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSSION ON KOREA
REF: STATE 283240

WE HAVE NO IDEA WHETHER PU SHOUCANG WAS DOING ANY-
THING MORE THAN SPEAKING OFF THE TOP OF HIS HEAD WHEN IN
AN EXPANSIVE MOOD. HE WAS QUITE EMPHATIC ABOUT THE
NEED FOR A BOLD MOVE TO EASE THE SITUATION ON THE KOREAN
PENINSULA. WE CANNOT ADD ANY FURTHER INTERPRETATION TO HIS
REMARKS, BUT THEY DO SEEM TO SUGGEST THERE MAY BE SOME
BOLD THINKING ALONG THESE LINES IN THE UPPER REACHES OF MFA.
PU IS, OF COURSE, IN WASHINGTON WITH HUANG HUA AND DEPARTMENT
OFFICIALS MIGHT INFORMALLY BROACH THE ISSUE WITH HIM.
FREEMAN

BT
#2005
NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M386/1 #60206

BY KML NARA DATE 10/18/13

SENSITIVE

pw 1/5/09

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 04 NOV 81 19

TO ALLEN

FROM LILLEY

DOC DATE 04 NOV 81

KEYWORDS: PRC

HUANG HUA

SUBJECT: CHINESE REACTION TO HUA VISIT

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

ALLEN

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(D /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

C 12/2 notes by RYA

chung

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

PA

(C)

adm

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

6435
apf

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

November 4, 1981

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

NLRR M386/1 #60208

FROM: JAMES LILLEY *W*

BY KML NARA DATE 10/18/13

SUBJECT: Chinese Reaction to Huang Hua's Visit *let*

Attached at Tab A is a State cable which you should read. I would like to make these points:

-- Ji Chaozhu is the man the President met in March and, as you know, he's smooth. He has tried to put a nicer gloss on a rough visit.

-- Ji says that the Chinese have not completed a full review of the meetings, which leaves the Chinese side open for a change of position - a positive hint.

-- On the other hand, he hasn't given away a thing in this message and there could be a hidden trap.

-- Ji is linking talks on Taiwan with a Premier Zhao trip to the U.S., believing that this gives them some leverage. He says that the "shadow" over our relations (Taiwan) would have to be removed before such visits, which means that the Taiwan question should be resolved to their satisfaction.

-- The Chinese are trying to draw us into early talks on Taiwan. They told the President that there should be a moratorium on arms sales while such talks are being carried on. The talks could in fact go on forever and therein lies the trap. *(C)*

-- However, in a seeming concession, they might be prepared to forego a moratorium on arms sales if we agreed to start talks on Taiwan with them. They know that such talks would cause a lot of heartburn in Taiwan, undermining its confidence in us.

-- Therefore, any talks we have with the Chinese should be broad-ranged and not confined to Taiwan at this stage. Secretary Regan's trip and Stoessel's trip should keep the range of discussions broad. *(C)*

A final note, Huang Hua never raised Taiwan with either Weinberger or Casey. The Chinese are probably trying to line up CIA and DOD on their side. At the same time, they want to preserve their equities with these two organizations, even if relations are downgraded. *(C)*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

60210
SINOVUS
36

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 01
EOB283

BEIJING 2274
AN009277

DTG: 040849Z NOV 81 PSN: 055189
TOR: 308/1421Z CSN: HCE957

DISTRIBUTION: BALY-01 LENZ-01 LILY-01 NAU-01 POAT-01 TYSN-01
/006 A1

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:
SIT: NAN COL VP JP EOB
EOB:

OP IMMED
STU6050
DE RUMJPG #2274 3080924
O 040849Z NOV 81
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6985

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BEIJING 12274

EXDIS
E. O. 12065: RDS-1 11/4/01 (TAYLOR, JOHN K.) OR-P
TAGS: PINT, CH, US, MX
SUBJECT: MFA OFFICIALS COMMENT ON CANCUN AND WASHINGTON BILATERALS

1. ~~Q~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AT A NOVEMBER 4 LUNCH WITH THE CHARGE, JI CHAOZHU DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE MF'S AMERICAN AND OCEANIC AFFAIRS INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT, SAID THAT THE MEETING BETWEEN PREMIER ZHAO AND THE PRESIDENT IN CANCUN AND HUANG HUA'S TALKS IN WASHINGTON HAD BEEN "VERY USEFUL." HUANG HUA RETURNED TO BEIJING ON NOVEMBER 2 AND JI SAID THAT THE MFA HAD HAD A READ-OUT OF THE MEETINGS BUT THERE HAD NOT BEEN A FULL REVIEW.

3. THE PROBLEM (OF TAIWAN) REMAINS, HE SAID, AND "THE IMPORTANT THING IS TO AVOID PRECIPITOUS DECISIONS" BEFORE THERE ARE FURTHER CONSULTATIONS. HE NOTED THAT PREMIER ZHAO HAD ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE THE PRESIDENT'S INVITATION TO VISIT THE US IN FEBRUARY AND THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD ALSO RESPONDED SIMILARLY TO ZHAO'S INVITATION TO HIM. "THE SHADOW" OVER OUR RELATIONS, JI SAID, WOULD OF COURSE HAVE TO BE REMOVED BEFORE SUCH VISITS COULD TAKE PLACE. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM WOULD REQUIRE FURTHER CONSULTATIONS.

FREEMAN
BT

EXDIS

EXDIS

EXDIS

EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M386/1 #60210

BY KML NARA DATE 10/18/13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

#6435

RECEIVED

81 NOV 5 A 8: 33

JANET COLSON	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	
BUD NANCE	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	
DICK ALLEN	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	
IRENE DERUS	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	
JANET COLSON	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	
BUD NANCE	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	
PETER	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	
CY TO VP	<u> </u>	SHOW CC	<u> </u>
CY TO MEESE	<u> </u>	SHOW CC	<u> </u>
CY TO BAKER	<u> </u>	SHOW CC	<u> </u>
CY TO DEAVER	<u> </u>	SHOW CC	<u> </u>
CY TO BRADY	<u> </u>	SHOW CC	<u> </u>

Comments:

NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8106450

RECEIVED 04 NOV 81 19

TO ALLEN

FROM LILLEY

DOCDATE 04 NOV 81

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R

BAKER, HOWARD

HELMS, JESSE

SUBJECT: INTERCESSION W/ SENATE ON CHINESE CONSULAR CONVENTION

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 06 NOV 81 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

ALLEN

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(M /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	<i>11/17</i>	<i>noted by LVA / for further action</i>		
<i>China Office</i>	<i>S 4/17</i>	<i>for further action</i>	<i>4/18</i>	<i>16 ✓</i>
	<i>C 11/9</i>	<i>for further action</i>		

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE *PA* (C)

con

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

6450

9/1

ACTION

November 4, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: JAMES LILLEY *JL*

SUBJECT: Intercession with the Senate on Chinese Consular Convention

At present the Consular Convention with the PRC is being held up in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by Senator Jesse Helms because he believes that it could be a tradeoff for other things he may want in the State Department.

For the reasons cited in the attachment, the State Department is understandably interested in getting this treaty ratified. I agree with their desires and I believe at this time, when we are going to shake up the relationship with Peking, that we should put out lines to Peking which will hold when the relationship changes shape.

What will break this loose, I am told, is a call from the White House to Senator Howard Baker. Senator Baker says that, armed with this, he believes he can break it out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I therefore suggest that an appropriate person in the White House call Senator Baker and seek his help.

RECOMMENDATION: That somebody in the White House whom you deem appropriate phone Senator Baker on this issue.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A Justification for Ratification of Consular Convention

*I have mixed emotions. —
Why can't State move
this forward?
I'd like stronger reviews,
if they are available*

RATIFICATION OF CONSULAR CONVENTION

Failure to complete ratification of the US-PRC Consular Convention would first and foremost limit and reduce our ability to serve and protect the interests of American citizens in China. Failure to ratify would be seen by the Chinese as evidence of the inability of the U.S. Government to follow through with carefully negotiated international agreements even in non-controversial areas such as consular relations. It would reinforce a perception that there is an anti-China bias in this Administration.

Since the signing of the Convention in September, 1980, the Chinese have voluntarily followed its provisions in dealing with consular matters. If the Convention is not ratified, we could lose many important guarantees, including:

1. That consuls will receive prompt notification of arrests of U.S. nationals and will have the right to visit regularly with them and to attend their trials.
2. That both nations will facilitate the reunion of families.
3. That both nations will facilitate travel by persons who claim dual nationality.
4. That consular protection will be extended to persons who claim dual nationality.

These latter provisions are especially important to the many Chinese-Americans who travel to or have relatives in China.

In addition, ratification of the Convention will almost certainly make it easier to proceed in other areas of consular relations important to U.S. citizens, such as mutual liberalization of visa procedures for businessmen.

17 November

Flo--

Mr. Gregg advises no further action
until he hears from State.

j.

6450

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

11/17
1020 hr

read RVA's note
to Janet in Gregg's
office this morning
when she called

re: attached

RECEIVED

81 NOV 5 A 8: 33

JANET COLSON

jc

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

Wald

IRENE DERUS

ijd 16/

JANET COLSON

jc

BUD NANCE

f

PETER

CY TO VP

SHOW CC

CY TO MEESE

SHOW CC

CY TO BAKER

SHOW CC

CY TO DEAVER

SHOW CC

CY TO BRADY

SHOW CC

Comments:

60212 44



NOV 81 11 21z
Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ NOD210

PAGE 01 BEIJIN 12536 101110Z
ACTION NODS-00 COPY _____ OF 20 COPIES
INFO OCT-81 AOS-00 /001 W
-----373207 101123Z /11
O 101052Z NOV 81
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7156

~~SECRET~~ BEIJING 12536

NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 3, 11/10/81 (HUMMEL, ARTHUR, W., JR.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PDEV, MASS, CH, TW
SUBJECT: CHINESE OFFICIAL ON TAIWAN ARMS SALES

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. DURING A BRIEF VISIT TO BEIJING, FORMER EA ASSISTANT SECRETARY DICK HOLBROOKE MET TWICE WITH JI CHAOZHU, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR AMERICAN AND OCEANIAN AFFAIRS IN THE MFA. JI CONFIRMED THE TOUGH POSITION ON U.S. ARMS SALES TAKEN BY VICE PREMIER/FOREIGN MINISTER.

3. HOLBROOKE FOUND JI WHO EXPECTS TO BE ASSIGNED TO THE CHINESE MISSION IN WASHINGTON IN JANUARY) SUBDUED AND RELUCTANT TO TALK. JI CLAIMED, UNDER QUESTIONING, THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGE IN THE CHINESE POSITION, WHICH HAD APPARENTLY BEEN MISUNDERSTOOD EARLIER BY THE U.S. HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PRC'S NINE-POINT REUNIFICATION PROPOSAL TO TAIPEI; ALLEGED THAT ITS IMPORTANCE HAD ALSO BEEN MISUNDERSTOOD IN WASHINGTON, AND EMPHASIZED -- IN A PHRASE HE HAVE SELDOM HEARD SINCE THE VERY DAWN OF U.S.-CHINA RAPPROACHMENT -- THAT "IT IS FOR HE WHO TIED IT TO UNDO THE KNOT," (JIE LING YOU XU XY LING REN), I.E. AMERICANS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M386/1 #60212

BY KML NARA DATE 10/18/13

N
O
D
I
S
N
O
D
I
S
N
O
D
I
S

44a

NOV-15-1950



Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02

BEIJIN 12536 101118Z

CREATING CHINA'S STATE OF DISUNITY AND AMERICANS MUST LIKEWISE BEAR RESPONSIBILITY FOR BRINGING IT TO AN END. JI SAID VEHEMENTLY THAT HE KNEW FOR A FACT THAT THERE WERE MANY IN WASHINGTON WHO ARE SEEKING TO ENGINEER THE EMERGENCE OF TWO CHINAS OR ONE CHINA, ONE TAIWAN.

4. JI DENIED THAT THERE HAD BEEN ANY "MAJOR" DECISION MEETINGS BETWEEN THE RETURN OF VICE FOREIGN MINISTER ZHANG WENJIN FROM NEW YORK AND HUANG HUA'S DEPARTURE FOR CANCUN AND WASHINGTON. HE ADDED THAT "SUCH MATTERS ARE NO LONGER DECIDED BY ONE MAN IN CHINA AS IN THE PAST BUT ARE DECIDED THROUGH A CONSTANT PROCESS OF MEETINGS AND CORRECTIVE DISCUSSION."

5. JI REITERATED THAT "NOW THAT A FORMAL NEGOTIATING PROCESS HAS ALREADY BEGUN," U.S. ARMS SALES PRIOR TO AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES WOULD CONSTITUTE "BAD FAITH" AND RESULT IN AN IMMEDIATE DOWNGRADING OF THE U.S.-CHINA RELATIONSHIP. HE ADDED THAT SUCH DETERIORATION IN RELATIONS WOULD AFFECT "ALL ASPECTS" OF OUR INTERACTION, INCLUDING TRADE AND EXCHANGE, THE CHARACTER AND LEVEL OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION, ETC.

6. HOLBROOKE SHARPLY AND REPEATEDLY WARNED JI THAT THERE WOULD BE VERY ADVERSE REACTION IN THE U.S. TO WHAT WOULD BE INTERPRETED AS AN UNWARRANTED AND DRASTIC CHANGE IN PRC POSITIONS. REACTIONS WOULD PRODUCE REVERSAL OF PREVIOUS POPULAR AND CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE PRC AND DO SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE TO OUR JOINT GOALS OF DETERRING SOVIET EXPANSIONISM. JI WAS APPARENTLY UNIMPRESSED BY THESE ARGUMENTS. HUMMEL

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED 12 NOV 81 18

TO ALLEN

FROM LILLEY

DOC DATE 12 NOV 81

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R

INTELLIGENCE

CASEY, W

FMS

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR PAPER ON CHINESE ATTITUDES TWD ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE

DUE:

STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

ALLEN

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M11-386 # 40215a

BY RW NARA DATE 3/12/13

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(D /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	C 11/16	RVA sig memo to DCI		DC, Index
None	12/30	for info		RK
	C 12/3	Noted by None & Colson		DC

DISPATCH

11/16

W/ATTCH

FILE

PA (C)

Handwritten signature and initials in a red circle.

47

MEMORANDUM

6587 add-on

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ajk

November 30, 1981

UNCLASSIFIED
w/SECRET Attachment

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES W. NANCE

FROM: DON GREGG *DG*

SUBJECT: Aftermath of Premier Zhao and Huang Hua Meetings

DCI Casey's note (Tab A) refers to RVA's memorandum of mid-November (Tab B).

Attachments:

- Tab A DCI ltr to RVA
- Tab B RVA ltr to DCI

UNCLASSIFIED
w/SECRET Attachment

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M11-386#60215b
BY RW NARA DATE 3/12/13

48

~~SECRET~~

60215

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D. C. 20505

25 November 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Richard V. Allen
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT: The Aftermath of Premier Zhao and
Huang Hua Meetings

We are preparing the response to your request. We
will have the final paper to you by 18 December 1981.

William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence

cc:
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M11-386 #60215
BY RW NARA DATE 3/12/13

~~SECRET~~

DRV CL BY 032931
RVW ON Nov 1987

60210
49
~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

6587

November 16, 1981

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY
Director of Central Intelligence


SUBJECT: The Aftermath of Premier Zhao and
Huang Hua Meetings (C)

In the recent meetings in Cancun and Washington, the Chinese have taken a harder line on future arms sales to Taiwan. The reasons for this and probable future Chinese courses of action need to be carefully analyzed. Therefore, I request that a paper be prepared by 18 December 1981. (S)

The paper should also include a current assessment of the position of Deng Xiaoping. This would update your excellent analysis of Deng and the FX. It would be important to include what kind of pressure Deng is currently under and from whom. (S)

It would also be useful if you could look at interest groups in the PRC which might favor a continuation of strong relations with the U.S., particularly in the fields of education and technology, at the expense of a hard-line Taiwan policy. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:



Richard V. Allen
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

cc:
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

~~SECRET~~

Review 11/12/87

bcc: Ed Meese
Jim Baker

11/16 get sent the back

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M11-386 #60210
BY RW NARA DATE 3/12/13

RECEIVED
81 DEC 1 P 5: 58

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

PETER

CY TO VP

CY TO MEESE

CY TO BAKER

CY TO DEEVER

CY TO BRADY

Comments:

JC
Bud

SHOW CC _____
SHOW CC _____
SHOW CC _____
SHOW CC _____
SHOW CC _____

RECEIVED

81 NOV 12 P 5: 25

JANET COLSON

[Signature]

BUD NANCE

[Signature]

DICK ALLEN

[Signature]

IRENE DERUS

[Signature]

JANET COLSON

[Signature]

BUD NANCE

PETER

CY TO VP

[Signature]

CY TO MEESE

[Signature]

CY TO BAKER

[Signature]

CY TO DEEVER

[Signature]

CY TO BRADY

SHOW CC _____

SHOW CC _____

SHOW CC _____

SHOW CC _____

SHOW CC _____

Comments:

~~SECRET~~

60218

51

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

6587

at

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

November 12, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: JAMES LILLEY *W*

SUBJECT: Request to DCI for Update on Chinese Position (C)

This paper we are requesting of Casey does two things:

-- It would take an objective look at Deng's current position and put into perspective flamboyant reporting on his vulnerability;

-- It would subject the bilateral meetings that State has had with Chinese leaders to objective scrutiny. (S)

We need to have a cool-headed appraisal of what the Chinese are up to and this is a beginning. (S)

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the memorandum to DCI Casey at Tab I.

Approve *W* Disapprove _____
SIGNED

Attachment

Tab I Memo to Casey

~~SECRET~~

Review 11/12/87

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M11-386 #60218
BY RW NARA DATE 3/12/13