

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country
File: Records

Folder Title: China, PRC [People's Republic of
China] (September 1981-October 1981)

Box: RAC Box 6

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digitized-textual-material>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/white-house-inventories>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/research-support/citation-guide>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

RBW 1/5/2009

File Folder CHINA, PRC SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1981

FOIA

F02-025/1

Box Number 6

COHEN, WARREN

7

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
60149	CABLE	BEIJING 10006 <i>R 10/18/2013 M386/1</i>	2	9/15/1981	B1
60150	CABLE	BEIJING 10135 <i>R 10/18/2013 M386/1</i>	6	9/17/1981	B1
60151	CABLE	210122Z SEP 81 <i>R 10/18/2013 M386/1</i>	2	9/21/1981	B1
60153	MEMO	LILLEY TO ALLEN [W/NOTATIONS]	2	9/21/1981	B1
60152	CABLE	210122Z SEP 81 [COPY OF DOC. 60151 W/NOTATIONS] <i>R 10/18/2013 M386/1</i>	2	9/21/1981	B1
60154	CABLE	231240Z SEP 81 <i>R 10/18/2013 M386/1</i>	8	9/23/1981	B1
60155	CABLE	270414Z SEP 81 <i>R 10/18/2013 M386/1</i>	5	9/27/1981	B1
60156	CABLE	STATE 262240 <i>R 10/18/2013 M386/1</i>	2	9/30/1981	B1
60157	CABLE	BEIJING 10995 <i>R 10/18/2013 M386/1</i>	11	10/7/1981	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

RBW 1/5/2009

File Folder CHINA, PRC SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1981

FOIA

F02-025/1

Box Number 6

COHEN, WARREN

7

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
60158	MEMO	LENZ TO PAUL BREMER RE. TALKS W/CHINA <i>R 10/18/2013 M386/1</i>	1	10/8/1981	B1
60159	MEMO	LILLEY TO LENZ <i>R 10/18/2013 M386/1</i>	1	10/7/1981	B1
60160	CABLE	BEIJING 11022 <i>R 10/18/2013 M386/1</i>	4	10/8/1981	B1
60161	CABLE	STATE 268842 <i>R 10/18/2013 M386/1</i>	2	10/8/1981	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE605
UTS9947
DD RUEHC
DE RUMJPG #0006 2580900
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 150852Z SEP 81
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5414
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ BEIJING 10006

E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 9/15/11 (FREEMAN, CHARLES W., JR.) DR-M
TAGS: ENSD, PORG, CH, US
SUBJECT: U.S. - CHINA CONSULTATIONS ON CANCUN SUMMIT
RER: STATE 243287

- 1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)
- 2. SUMMARY: ACTING DCM ON SEPTEMBER 15 MET WITH LI LUYE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, MFA, AND PASSED ON INVITATION FOR CHINESE DELEGATION TO VISIT WASHINGTON FOR PRE-CANCUN II DISCUSSIONS. LI SAID THE CHINESE WERE HEAVILY INVOLVED IN THEIR PREPARATIONS AND HE WOULD PASS THE INVITATION ON TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND RESPOND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. LI LISTED AREAS IN WHICH THE CHINESE HAVE SPECIFIC INTEREST AND REITERATED THE CHINESE DESIRE FOR COOPERATION WITH THE U.S. IN A BROAD SCHEME TO COPE WITH THE SOVIET REACTION TO THE SUMMIT. END SUMMARY.
- 3. ON SEPTEMBER 15, ACTING DCM MET WITH LI LUYE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, AND PASSED TO HIM THE INVITATION IN REFTEL FOR A DELEGATION TO VISIT WASHINGTON FOR FURTHER CONSULTATION OF CANCUN. LI WILCOMED THE INVITATION, BUT SAID TIME BEFORE THE SUMMIT WAS SHORT AND THAT THE CHINESE WERE IN THE MIDST OF THEIR PREPARATIONS. HE STATED HE WOULD PASS THE INVITATION TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER TO "CONSIDER THE ALTERNATIVES" AND TO MAKE A DECISION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. A/DCM TOLD LI WASHINGTON HAD NOT SPECIFIED ANY DATES, AND WE WOULD IMMEDIATELY INFORM WASHINGTON OF ANY DATES SUGGESTED BY THE CHINESE. HE DID NOT RAISE THE POSSIBILITY OF A U.S. TEAM COMING TO BEIJING.
- 4. WHEN ASKED FOR SPECIFIC AREAS OF CHINESE INTEREST IN THE CONSULTATIONS WITH THE U.S., LI SAID THERE WERE TWO: (1) THE QUESTION OF GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS, AND (2) WHAT SPECIFIC PROPOSALS THE U.S. WOULD MAKE. HE

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M386/1 #60149

BY KML NARA DATE 10/18/13

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

SAID THE CHIEF CONCERN OF THE CHINESE IN WORKING WITH THE U.S. WAS HOW TO "BREAK THROUGH THE PRESENT DEAD-LOCK" IN THE NORTH-SOUTH DEBATE.

5. LI SAID THE CHINESE WOULD PAY CLOSE ATTENTION TO U.S. RECOMMENDATIONS AND WERE INTERESTED IN THE U.S. "CONCRETE" SUGGESTIONS. THE CONCERN AT THE MEETING WOULD NOT ONLY BE HOW TO DEAL WITH THE DEVELOPING NATIONS, BUT ALSO HOW TO DEAL WITH SOVIET ACTIONS. IN THIS RESPECT, THE CHINESE WERE STUDYING WAYS TO ADOPT FLEXIBLE MEANS TO DEAL WITH PROBLEMS.

6. LI MENTIONED AS SPECIFIC AREAS OF CHINESE INTEREST, AGRICULTURE, COMMODITIES, INDUSTRY, MONETARY POLICY, AND FINANCE. HE SAID THE CHINESE ALSO WERE STUDYING THE PROPOSAL FOR AN ENERGY AFFILIATE TO THE WORLD BANK. CHINA, LI SAID, HAD NOT COME TO A DECISION ON WHETHER TO BACK THE PROPOSAL. HE ADDED THAT CHINA HAS BEEN INFORMED THE U.S. HAD RESERVATIONS ON THE ENERGY AFFILIATE AND WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION.

7. COMMENT: LI'S STATEMENT THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER THE ALTERNATIVES IN LIGHT OF BEIJING'S PREPARATIONS FOR CANCUN MAY INDICATE THE CHINESE WILL BE UNABLE TO SEND A DELEGATION TO WASHINGTON TO DISCUSS CANCUN.

FREEMAN

BT

#0006

NNNN

PAGE 1 - 249

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/30/81/273

SITUATION: CHECK
 SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE365
 STU9019
 OO RUEHC
 DE RUMJPG #0135 2600940 (AD262026 UTS2906 CCY PARA2&3 436)
 ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 O R 170858Z SEP 81
 FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5498
 INFO RUEHCR/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 3248
 RUEHCR/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 2751
 RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI
 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 8270
 RUMJDH/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 8822
 RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1340
 BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 1 OF 3 BEIJING 10135

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT PARAS 2 AND 3)
 E.O. 12065: RDS-3 9/17/01 (FREEMAN, CHARLES W., JR.) OR-M
 TAGS: PINT, CH

SUBJ: CHINESE VICE FOREIGN MINISTER ZHANG WENJIN'S
 SEPTEMBER 22 MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY

REF: A) STATE 242196, B) BEIJING 9722, C) BEIJING 9945

1. ~~1~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: CHINESE VICE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ZHANG WENJIN, IS SCHEDULED TO MEET WITH THE SECRETARY IN NEW YORK ON SEPTEMBER 22. IN HIS TALKS WITH THE SECRETARY, ZHANG'S MAIN OBJECTIVE WILL BE TO STRESS ONCE AGAIN THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE TAIWAN ISSUE FOR THE FUTURE OF SINO-US RELATIONS. THE CHINESE ARE STILL DEBATING HOW FAR AND HOW FAST TO PROCEED WITH THE US ON ARMS TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS. ZHANG MAY HOPE TO OBTAIN SOME FURTHER CLARIFICATION OF THE US POSITION ON THE SALE OF ADVANCED WEAPONS TO TAIPEI AND ON THE TIMING OF THE NEXT ARMS SALES PACKAGE TO TAIWAN. THE CHINESE ARE CONCERNED THAT ISRAELI ACTIONS ARE OPENING UP OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE SOVIETS IN THE MID-EAST AND ZHANG WILL HOPE TO HEAR THE SECRETARY'S ASSESSMENT OF THE MID-EAST SITUATION IN LIGHT OF BEGIN'S RECENT TALKS IN WASHINGTON. THE CHINESE HAVE SIMILAR CONCERNS ON THE NAMIBIAN ISSUE, AND ZHANG WILL BE INTERESTED IN ANY DETAILS THAT THE SECRETARY CAN PROVIDE ON US STRATEGY AND EXPECTATIONS REGARDING IMPLEMENTATIONS OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 435.

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M386/1 #60150

BY KML NARA DATE 10/18/13

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

TACTICAL DIFFERENCES ALSO EXIST ON THE KAMPUCHEAN ISSUE. THERE ARE, HOWEVER, FEW DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OURSELVES AND THE CHINESE ON SOUTH ASIAN ISSUES. ZHANG WILL VERY LIKELY STRESS THE IMPORTANCE FOR PAKISTAN OF AN EARLY DELIVERY OF THE PROMISED F-16 AIRCRAFT. IN ADDITION, ZHANG MAY BE INTERESTED IN A BRIEFING BY THE SECRETARY ON THE FORTHCOMING TALKS WITH GROMYKO AND ON US EXPECTATIONS REGARDING FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. THE MFA EARLIER PROPOSED DETAILED CONSULTATIONS WITH THE US ON THE CANCUN SUMMIT AND ZHANG MAY POSSIBLY RAISE THIS SUBJECT. END SUMMARY.

3. VICE FOREIGN MINISTER ZHANG WENJIN, HAS BEEN CLOSELY INVOLVED WITH THE SLOW, STEADY IMPROVEMENT IN SINO-US RELATIONS SINCE THE EARLY SEVENTIES. HE HELPED DRAFT THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE. HE WAS APPOINTED A VICE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN JANUARY 1978 AND ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR COORDINATION OF NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS IN DECEMBER 1978, THE MONTH THAT SINO-US NORMALIZATION WAS ANNOUNCED. HE SUBSEQUENTLY PARTICIPATED IN CLEARING AWAY THE OBSTACLE THE CLAIMS/ASSETS PROBLEM POSED TO FURTHER DEVELOPMENT IN SINO-US RELATIONS. HE PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE IN THE OPENING OF CONSULATES IN BOTH COUNTRIES. HIS TALKS DURING A SPRING 1980 VISIT TO CINCPAC AND THE DEPARTMENT WERE DESCRIBED BY THE THEN SECRETARY AND DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE AS COMPARABLE TO DISCUSSIONS HELD WITH THE BRITISH AND CANADIANS IN TERMS OF CANDOR AND RELAXATION. VICE FOREIGN MINISTER ZHANG IS SOFT SPOKEN AND SELF-EFFACING. HIS ENGLISH IS EXCELLENT, BUT HE OFTEN PREFERS TO SPEAK THROUGH AN INTERPRETER.

BT

#0135

NNNN

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE366
UTS2997
OO RUEHC
DE RUMJPG #0135/02 2600950
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 170858Z SEP 81
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5499
INFO RUEHCR/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 3249
RUEHCR/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 2752
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 8271
RUMJDH/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 8823
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1341
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 2 OF 3 BEIJING 10135
EXDIS

4. BILATERAL

THE MFA US AFFAIRS DEVISION HAS INFORMED US THAT THE CHINSE SIDE HAS ACCEPTED THE AGENDA SUGGESTED IN REF A WITH THE ADDITION OF AN ITEM ON TAIWAN. THE CHINESE ARE STILL APPARENTLY DEBATING HOW FAR AND HOW FAST TO PROCEED WITH THE US ON ARMS/ TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS. ONE SCHOOL APPARENTLY WISHES TO PUSH AHEAD, ANTICIPATING THAT THIS EXPANSION OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WILL GIVE THE US A GREATER STAKE IN THE RELATIONSHIP, THUS CONSTRAINING US DECISIONS ON ARMS TRANSFERS TO TAIWAN, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME EXPANDING THE CONSTITUENCY WITHIN CHINA SUPPORTING THE OPENING TO THE US. DENG XIAOPING AND SOME ELEMENTS IN THE MILITARY MAY FAVOR THIS APPROACH.

5. OTHERS, NOTABLY IN THE MFA AND POSSIBLY ALSO CONSERVATIVE ELEMENTS IN THE MILITARY APPEAR TO BELIEVE THAT THE PRC SHOULD HOLD OFF DECISIONS ON ARMS TECHNOLOGY PURCHASES FROM THE US PENDING A CLARIFICATION OF THE SCOPE OF FUTURE US ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN. THE MFA IS APPARENTLY ARGUING THAT DECISIONS, AND POSSIBLY THE VISIT OF DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF LIU HUAQING, SHOULD BE DELAYED UNTIL AFTER PREMIER ZHAO ZIYANG HAS A CHANCE TO DISCUSS SINO-US RELATIONS, INCLUDING THE TAIWAN ISSUE, WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN.

6. ZHANG MAY HOPE TO OBTAIN SOME FURTHER CLARIFICATION

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

OF THE US POSITION ON THE SALE OF ADVANCED WEAPONS TO TAIPEI. HIS REMARKS ON SEPT 9 TO THE CHARGE (REF B) AND VICE PREMIER JI PENGFEI'S SEPTEMBER 7 STATEMENT TO JAPANESE PARLIAMENTARIANS (REF C) REFERRED TO THE RETROGRESSION IN SINO-US RELATIONS THAT COULD OCCUR FOLLOWING THE SALE TO TAIWAN OF "ADVANCED WEAPONS."

7. DENG XIAPING IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH FORMER PRESIDENT FORD LAST MARCH INDICATED HIS DESIRE THAT ANY FUTURE ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN BE PUT OFF UNTIL NEXT YEAR. APPARENTLY DENG HAD IN MIND THE 12TH PARTY CONGRESS WHICH IS EXPECTED TO CONVENE IN EARLY 1982. DENG HAS RECENTLY STRESSED TO RECENT VISITORS THAT HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES COULD BE THROWN OUT OF OFFICE IF THEY DID NOT HANDLE THE TAIWAN QUESTION WELL. ZHANG MAY THUS ALSO PROBE FOR FURTHER CLARIFICATION OF THE TIMING OF THE NEXT US ARMS SALES PACKAGE TO TAIWAN.

8. MULTILATERAL - ISRAEL
ZHANG WILL VERY LIKELY EXPRESS CHINESE CONCERN THAT ISRAELI ACTIONS ARE UNDERMINING THE CHANCES FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST, OPENING UP OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE SOVIETS, AND THREATENING SADAT'S DOMESTIC POSITION. PRC POLICY ON THE MIDDLE EAST INCLUDES RECOGNITION OF BOTH THE "NATIONAL RIGHTS" OF THE PALESTINIANS, INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO A HOMELAND, AND OF THE SECURITY AND RIGHT TO EXISTENCE OF ALL COUNTRIES IN THE REGION, INCLUDING ISRAEL. THE CHINESE HAVE INDICATED THAT IN THEIR VIEW THE CAMP DAVID TALKS MAY HAVE SERVED THEIR PURPOSE, AND THEY HAVE IN A LOW-KEY WAY INDICATED SUPPORT FOR AN EUROPEAN INITIATIVE ON THE MID-EAST AND HAVE WELCOMED THE RECENT SAUDI PEACE PLAN. ZHANG WILL WANT TO HEAR THE SECRETARY'S ASSESSMENT OF THE MID-EAST IN LIGHT OF BEGIN'S RECENT TALKS IN WASHINGTON.

BT

#0135

NNNN

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE367
STU9033
OO RUEHC
DE RUMJPG #0135/03 2600959
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 170858Z SEP 81
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5500
INFO RUEHCR/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 3250
RUEHCR/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 2753
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 8272
RUMJDH/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 8824
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1342

BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 3 OF 3 BEIJING 10135

EXDIS

9. ON THE NAMIBIAN ISSUE, THE CHINESE ARE LIKEWISE CONCERNED THAT SOUTH AFRICAN ACTIONS AND US POLICY IN THE AREA THREATEN TO PUSH MODERATE AFRICAN COUNTRIES INTO THE MILITANT CAMP. THE CHINESE FEEL THAT THEY MUST PROTECT THEIR THIRD WORLD CREDENTIALS AND HAVE CRITICIZED US POLICY ON NAMIBIA, ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE BEEN CAREFUL NOT TO ACCUSE THE US OF MALICIOUS MOTIVES. ZHANG WILL STRESS THAT ANY EFFORT TO CHANGE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 435 WOULD, IN THE CHINESE VIEW, BE UNWISE. ZHANG WILL BE INTERESTED IN ANY DETAILS THE SECRETARY CAN PROVIDE ON US STRATEGY AND EXPECTATIONS REGARDING IMPLEMENTATION OF 435.

10. ALTHOUGH BASICALLY IN AGREEMENT WITH THE CHINESE ON STRATEGIC ISSUES REGARDING THE KAMPUCHEAN ISSUE, WE CONTINUE TO HAVE TACTICAL DIFFERENCES. ZHANG IS LIKELY TO TAKE A HARD LINE AGAINST THE IDEA, WHICH WE SUPPORT, OF PARTICIPATION OF NON-DK KHMER AT THE UPCOMING UNGA. THE SECRETARY MAY WISH TO URGE MORE POLITICAL FLEXIBILITY ON THE PART OF THE PRC AND TO SUGGEST THAT THE CHINESE PRESS THE DK TO FOLLOW UP ON THE SINGAPORE MEETING.

11. ON SOUTH ASIAN ISSUES, THERE ARE FEW TACTICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OURSELVES AND THE CHINESE, AND OUR STRATEGIC APPROACHES REMAIN ON PARALLEL PATHS. THE CHINESE APPRECIATE THE POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ADVANTAGES OF POLITICAL INITIATIVES

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

SUCH AS THE EEC PROPOSAL, BUT THEY ARE NERVOUS THAT THESE MAY LEAD INADVERTENTLY TO CREEPING RECOGNITION OF THE KARMAL GOVERNMENT. SO FAR, THEY SEEM TO BE CONFIDENT OF PAKISTAN'S ADHERENCE TO ITS BASIC PRINCIPLES FOR SETTLEMENT. THE PRC HAS WELCOMED THE US IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN AND THE RECENT US-PAK ARMS SALES AGREEMENT. ZHANG WILL VERY LIKELY STRESS THE IMPORTANCE FOR PAKISTAN OF EARLY DELIVERY OF THE PROMISED F-16 AIRCRAFT. THE CHINESE HAVE BEEN ATTEMPTING TO IMPROVE THEIR RELATIONS WITH INDIA IN ORDER TO MINIMIZE INDIA'S REACTION TO THE US-PAKISTAN ARMS AGREEMENT AND LOOSEN INDIAN TIES WITH MOSCOW. SINO-INDIAN BORDER NEGOTIATIONS ARE SCHEDULED TO BEGIN IN NOVEMBER.

12. THE CHINESE HAVE QUERIED US ON RECENT STATEMENTS BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY AFFIRMING US INTENTIONS TO CONTINUE A DIALOGUE WITH THE USSR. ZHANG WILL BE MOST INTERESTED IN A BRIEFING BY THE SECRETARY ON HIS FORTHCOMING TALKS WITH GROMYKO AND ON EXPECTATIONS ON FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS.

13. THE MFA EARLIER PROPOSED DETAILED CONSULTATIONS WITH THE US ON THE CANCUN SUMMIT. ALTHOUGH THE CHINESE DID NOT PROPOSE THIS SUBJECT FOR THE TALKS IN NEW YORK, ZHANG MAY POSSIBLY RAISE IT.

FREEMAN

BT

#0135

NNNN

60151 9

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 202

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/30/81//273

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE358
STU5038
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHDT #2997 2640123
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 210122Z SEP 81 ZFF-6
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6095
INFO RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTD 10002

NODIS

E.O. 12065: XDS-2 9-20-01 (HOLDRIDGE, JOHN H)
TAGS: DVIP (HAIG, ALEXANDER M), PFOR, CH, US
SUBJECT: (S) ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLDRIDGE'S MEETING WITH
ZHANG WENJIN, SEPT. 20, 1981; TAIWAN ARMS SALES
REF: BEIJING 9722

1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. IN A SEPT 20 PREPARATORY MEETING WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLDRIDGE PRIOR TO HIS BILATERAL WITH SECRETARY HAIG SCHEDULED FOR SEPT. 22, CHINESE VICE FOREIGN MINISTER ZHANG WENJIN MADE CLEAR THAT US ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN WILL BE THE KEY TOPIC OF HIS DISCUSSION WITH THE SECRETARY.
3. WHILE HE WAS BY NO MEANS STRIDENT IN HIS PRESENTATION, ZHANG MADE IT PLAIN THAT TAIWAN ARMS SALES ARE "THE CRUCIAL ISSUE" BETWEEN THE US AND CHINA -- ONE WHICH "CASTS A SHADOW" OVER ALL POSITIVE ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP. HE INDICATED THAT IF IT WERE NOT HANDLED PROPERLY, IT COULD LEAD TO RETROGRESSION IN US-CHINA RELATIONS AND ADVERSELY AFFECT THE STRATEGIC UNDERSTANDING THE TWO COUNTRIES HAVE ACHIEVED. HE STRESSED THAT THIS WILL BE THE PRINCIPAL SUBJECT FOR THE PRESIDENT AND PREMIER ZHAO IN THEIR BILATERAL AT CANCUN AND ALSO IN FOREIGN MINISTER HUANG HUA'S SUBSEQUENT VISIT TO WASHINGTON.
4. ZHANG SAID THAT HIS RECENT DEMARCHE TO CHARGE FREEMAN IN BEIJING (REFTEL) EXPRESSED THE CHINESE POSITION ON TAIWAN ARMS SALES CLEARLY. HE ADDED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO HEAR SECRETARY HAIG'S RESPONSE TO THAT DEMARCHE WHEN THE TWO MEET.
5. CITING RECENT REMARKS BY VICE CHAIRMAN DENG TO FORMER PRESIDENT CARTER, ZHANG SAID, IN EFFECT, THAT THERE IS A LIMIT BEYOND WHICH THE PRC CANNOT TOLERATE US ARMS

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M386/1 *60151

BY KML NARA DATE 10/18/13

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

SALES TO TAIWAN, JUST AS THE PRC RECOGNIZES THAT THERE IS A LIMIT TO HOW FAR THE US WILL GO IN RESTRAINING ITS ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN.

6. IN RESPONSE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLDRIDGE RECALLED THE POSITION SECRETARY HAIG HAD TAKEN IN HIS TALKS WITH VICE CHAIRMAN DENG XIAOPING AND FOREIGN MINISTER HUANG IN JUNE AND STATED THAT THIS POSITION REMAINS IN EFFECT. "YOU MEAN," ZHANG RESPONDED, "THAT NOTHING HAS HAPPENED YET." HE ADDED THAT US REASSURANCES THAT PRC SENSITIVITIES ON THE TAIWAN ARMS ISSUE WILL BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT "SOUND NICE," BUT THE CHINESE WOULD LIKE TO HEAR MORE SPECIFICS ON US INTENTIONS IN THIS AREA THAN THEY HAVE HEARD TO DATE.

7. ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLDRIDGE NOTED THE EXISTENCE OF SENSITIVITIES ON THIS ISSUE ON BOTH SIDES, AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT CHINESE SIDE WOULD TAKE OURS INTO CONSIDERATION AS WELL AS THEIR OWN. HAIG

BT

#2997

NNNN

TO ALLEN

FROM LILLEY

DOCDATE 21 SEP 81

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
VISIT

ARMS SALES

WENJIN, ZHANG
HAIG, A

SUBJECT: HAIG MTG W/ FOMIN WENJIN ON 22 SEP

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 21 SEP 81 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

ALLEN

GREGG

BAILEY

TYSON

SCHWEITZER

KIMMITT

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(M /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	<i>C 9/22</i>	<i>lvA apwd recon</i>		<i>ll ✓</i>

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

PA

(C)

dom

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

(b)(2) of the
on (b)(4) of the
cy (b)(6) of the
ces (b)(7) of the
al institutions (b)
wells (b)(9) of

Withdrawer

RB 1/5/2009

W

File Folder

CHINA, PRC SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1981

FOIA

F02-025/1

COHEN, WARREN

Box Number

6

7

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i>	<i>No of pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restrictions</i>
60153	MEMO LILLEY TO ALLEN [W/NOTATIONS]	2	9/21/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

60152 5563 14

EOB638

~~SECRET~~

*****E COPY

IN-

OP IMMED
STU5038
DE RUEHDT #2997 2640123
O 210122Z SEP 81 ZFF-6
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN NEW YORK

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6095

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M386/1 #60152

BY KML NARA DATE 10/18/13

~~SECRET~~ SECTO 10002

NODIS

E.O. 12065: XDS-2 9-20-01 (HOLDRIDGE, JOHN H)
TAGS: OVIP (HAIG, ALEXANDER M), PFOR, CH, US
SUBJECT: (S) ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLDRIDGE'S MEETING WITH
ZHANG WENJIN, SEPT. 20, 1981: TAIWAN ARMS SALES
REF: BEIJING 9722

1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. IN A SEPT 20 PREPARATORY MEETING WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLDRIDGE PRIOR TO HIS BILATERAL WITH SECRETARY HAIG SCHEDULED FOR SEPT. 22, CHINESE VICE FOREIGN MINISTER ZHANG WENJIN MADE CLEAR THAT US ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN WILL BE THE KEY TOPIC OF HIS DISCUSSION WITH THE SECRETARY.

3. WHILE HE WAS BY NO MEANS STRIDENT IN HIS PRESENTATION, ZHANG MADE IT PLAIN THAT TAIWAN ARMS SALES ARE "THE CRUCIAL ISSUE" BETWEEN THE US AND CHINA -- ONE WHICH "CASTS A SHADOW" OVER ALL POSITIVE ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP. HE INDICATED THAT IF IT WERE NOT HANDLED PROPERLY, IT COULD LEAD TO RETROGRESSION IN US-CHINA RELATIONS AND ADVERSELY AFFECT THE STRATEGIC UNDERSTANDING THE TWO COUNTRIES HAVE ACHIEVED. HE STRESSED THAT THIS WILL BE THE PRINCIPAL SUBJECT FOR THE PRESIDENT AND PREMIER ZHAO IN THEIR BILATERAL AT CANCUN AND ALSO IN FOREIGN MINISTER HUANG HUA'S SUBSEQUENT VISIT TO WASHINGTON.

4. ZHANG SAID THAT HIS RECENT DEMARCHE TO CHARGE FREEMAN IN BEIJING (REFTEL) EXPRESSED THE CHINESE POSITION ON TAIWAN ARMS SALES CLEARLY. HE ADDED THAT HE WOULD LIKE

SIT: RVA NAN COL JP VP
EOB: LILY, KIMM, SCHW
WHSR COMMENTS: C H E C K L I S T

PAGE 01

USDEL SECRETARY IN 2997

DTG: 210122Z SEP 81
TOR: 264/0308Z

PSN: 055245
CSN: HCE358

~~SECRET~~

*****E COPY

~~SECRET~~

*****E COPY

TO HEAR SECRETARY HAIG'S RESPONSE TO THAT DEMARCHE WHEN THE TWO MEET.

5. CITING RECENT REMARKS BY VICE CHAIRMAN DENG TO FORMER PRESIDENT CARTER, ZHANG SAID, IN EFFECT, THAT THERE IS A LIMIT BEYOND WHICH THE PRC CANNOT TOLERATE US ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN, JUST AS THE PRC RECOGNIZES THAT THERE IS A LIMIT TO HOW FAR THE US WILL GO IN RESTRAINING ITS ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN.

6. IN RESPONSE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLDRIDGE RECALLED THE POSITION SECRETARY HAIG HAD TAKEN IN HIS TALKS WITH VICE CHAIRMAN DENG XIAOPING AND FOREIGN MINISTER HUANG IN JUNE AND STATED THAT THIS POSITION REMAINS IN EFFECT. "YOU MEAN," ZHANG RESPONDED, "THAT NOTHING HAS HAPPENED YET." HE ADDED THAT US REASSURANCES THAT PRC SENSITIVITIES ON THE TAIWAN ARMS ISSUE WILL BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT "SOUND NICE," BUT THE CHINESE WOULD LIKE TO HEAR MORE SPECIFICS ON US INTENTIONS IN THIS AREA THAN THEY HAVE HEARD TO DATE.

7. ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLDRIDGE NOTED THE EXISTENCE OF SENSITIVITIES ON THIS ISSUE ON BOTH SIDES, AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT CHINESE SIDE WOULD TAKE OURS INTO CONSIDERATION AS WELL AS THEIR OWN. HAIG
BT

~~SECRET~~

*****E COPY

5563

RECEIVED

81 SEP 21 P 1: 51

JANET COLSON

[Signature]

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

[Signature] 21

IRENE DERUS

[Signature] 22/0725

JANET COLSON

[Signature]

BUD NANCE

PETER

CY TO VP

SHOW CC

CY TO MEESE

SHOW CC

CY TO BAKER

SHOW CC

CY TO DEAVER

SHOW CC

CY TO BRADY

SHOW CC

Comments:

PAGE 1 - 131

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/30/81//273

SITUATION: CHECK
 SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE130
 UTS9303
 OO RUEHC
 DE RUEHDT #3034/01 2661247
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 231240Z SEP 81 ZFF-6
 FM USDEL SECRETARY IN NEW YORK
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6101
 INFO RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE
 RUMJDH/AMCONSUL HONG KONG IMMEDIATE
 RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI IMMEDIATE

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 SECTO 10006
 E.O. 12065: XGDS-2 9/21/01 (HOLDRIDGE, JOHN H)
 TAGS: OVIP (HAIG, ALEXANDER M), PFOR, CH, US
 SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLDRIDGE'S MEETING
 WITH ZHANG WENJIN, SEPT. 20, 1981
 REF: BEIJING 9722

1. ~~(SECRET)~~ ENTIRE TEXT
2. SUMMARY. IN A ONE-HOUR DISCUSSION WITH CHINESE VICE FOREIGN MINISTER ZHANG WENJIN AT THE CHINESE MISSION TO THE UN, PREPARING FOR SECRETARY HAIG'S BILATERAL WITH ZHANG THIS WEEK, ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLDRIDGE AND ZHANG DISCUSSED A VARIETY OF INTERNATIONAL AND BILATERAL ISSUES. ON KAMPUCHEA, HOLDRIDGE URGED THE CHINESE TO PROMOTE DK FLEXIBILITY IN APPROACHING THE WORK OF COALITION BUILDING WITH SON SANN AND PRINCE SIHANDUK, REGARDING NORTH SOUTH ISSUES, ZHANG EXTENDED AN INVITATION TO UNDER SECRETARY RASHISH FOR CONSULTATIONS IN BEIJING PRIOR TO CANCUN. ON INDIA, ZHANG SAID BOTH BEIJING AND DELHI WANT TO IMPROVE RELATIONS AND ADDRESS BORDER ISSUES, THOUGH HE SEEMED MORE CONFIDENT OF HIS OWN SIDE'S WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE. ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLDRIDGE EXPLAINED THE RATIONALE BEHIND US POSITIONS ON NAMIBIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST.
3. IN RESPONSE TO HOLDRIDGE'S URGING THAT THE CHINESE PAY THEIR UN PEACEKEEPING ASSESSMENT AND AVOID AN ARREARAGES PROBLEM, ZHANG INDICATED AN INTENTION TO BE "FLEXIBLE" AND RESOLVE THE PROBLEM. HE ALSO INDICATED UNDERSTANDING OF THE US POSITION ON PUERTO RICO. ON VARIOUS HOUSEKEEPING ISSUES, THE TWO SIDES HAD A FRUITFUL EXCHANGE. END SUMMARY.
4. FOLLOWING ARE HIGHLIGHTS OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLDRIDGE'S ONE HOUR MEETING WITH CHINESE VICE FOREIGN

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M386/1 #60154

BY KML NARA DATE 10/18/13

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MINISTER ZHANG WENJIN AT THE PRC MISSION TO THE UN ON SEPTEMBER 20, 1981, IN PREPARATION FOR THE SECRETARY'S BILATERAL WITH ZHANG SCHEDULED FOR SEPTEMBER 22. PARTICIPATING IN THE MEETING ON THE US SIDE WERE AMBASSADOR HOLDRIDGE, EA/C COUNTRY DIRECTOR ROPE, AND VIVIAN CHANG, INTERPRETER. ZHANG WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR LING QUING, PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE AT UN, JI CHAOZHU, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF BUREAU OF US AND OCEANIAN AFFAIRS, FOREIGN MINISTRY, BEIJING, MR. YANG (INTERPRETER), AND MADAME HAN HU.

5. KAMPUCHEA. AMBASSADOR HOLDRIDGE STRESSED THE NEED FOR FLEXIBILITY ON THE PART OF THE DK IN APPROACHING COALITION-BUILDING WORK WITH THE FORCES OF SON SANN AND PRINCE SIHANOUK. HE ADDED THAT WHILE THE KAMPUCHEAN CREDENTIALS VOTE WENT WELL THIS YEAR, THERE MAY WELL BE EROSION NEXT YEAR IF AN ACCEPTABLE AMALGAM OF FORCES IS NOT BROUGHT INTO BEING.

6. POINTING OUT THAT, PARTICULARLY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, HANOI IS ABLE TO PLAY ON FEARS OF CHINESE BACKING FOR THE DK, HOLDRIDGE SAID THAT WE MUST DEFUSE VIETNAM'S ABILITY TO EXPLOIT ASEAN ANXIETIES. THE BEST WAY TO DO SO IS TO PROMOTE THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COALITION, FOR WHICH A FLEXIBLE DK APPROACH IS REQUIRED. THE US UNDERSTANDS THAT THE DK IS STICKING TO ITS FIVE POINTS. WE WOULD HOPE THE DK WOULD BE MORE FLEXIBLE.

7. ZHANG AGREED THAT COALITION FORMATION IS NEEDED "SO THAT THE STRENGTH OF ANTI-VIETNAMESE RESISTANCE CAN BE FULLY DEVELOPED." THE QUESTION IS, HE SAID, HOW TO DO IT? FROM THE CHINESE VIEWPOINT THE DK'S FIVE POINTS WERE QUITE MODERATE. ALTHOUGH THE POLITICAL FORCE WHICH WOULD BE EMBODIED BY A COALITION IS IMPORTANT, ZHANG ADDED, IN CHINESE EYES THE MAJOR QUESTION IS WHO HAS THE MILITARY FORCE. WITHOUT MILITARY FORCE, THE VIETNAMESE WILL BE THE WINNERS.

8. AS FOR THE PERCEPTION THAT CHINA IS BEHIND THE DK IN ORDER TO EXTEND ITS INFLUENCE INTO SOUTHEAST ASIA, ZHANG INSISTED THIS WAS UNFOUNDED AND ARGUED THAT, ULTIMATELY, THE SOUTHEAST ASIANS WILL COME TO REALIZE IT. AT THE SAME TIME, HE ADDED, "IT MUST BE RECOGNIZED THAT ONLY CHINA IS HELPING THE KAMPUCHEAN RESISTANCE FORCES." "IF YOU CAN HELP THE DK, GOOD. IF YOU CAN HELP SON SANN BECOME A TIGER, FINE. IF YOU CAN HELP PRINCE SIHANOUK, THAT IS ALSO FINE."

9. REGARDING SON SANN, ZHANG SAID, "I CAN'T UNDERSTAND HIM. HE WANTS ALL THE POWER. HE RECOGNIZES SIHANOUK ONLY AS AN INDIVIDUAL, AND WITH THE DK HE HAS A HIGH

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

PRICE--HE WANTS TO DOMINATE THE GOVERNMENT. WE MUST NOT DEMORALIZE THE DK BY TALKING ABOUT DISARMING TROOPS OR GETTING RID OF LEADERS."

10. HOLDRIDGE RESPONDED THAT THE US DOES NOT DENY THAT MILITARY FORCE IS IMPORTANT, BUT HE REITERATED THAT STRONG CONSIDERATION MUST BE GIVEN TO THE POLITICAL FACTOR. THE DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE CONCLUDED WITH

BT

#3034

NNNN

SITUATION: CHECK
 SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE133
 STU2090
 DD RUEHC
 DE RUEHDT #3034/02 2661249
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 231575Z SEP 81 ZFF-6
 FM USDEL SECRETARY IN NEW YORK
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6102
 INFO RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE
 RUMJDH/AMCONSUL HONG KONG IMMEDIATE
 RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI IMMEDIATE
 BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 SECTO 10006

AGREEMENT THAT PROGRESS TOWARD A DURABLE COALITION IS NEEDED AND THAT ANYTHING SHORT OF THAT--E.G., A HASTILY FORMED UNION WHICH LATER WOULD BREAK APART--IS WORSE THAN THE CURRENT SITUATION.

11. NORTH SOUTH ISSUES. NOTING THAT THE CHINESE SIDE IS ANXIOUS TO DISCUSS THIS SUBJECT IN DETAIL WITH THE US PRIOR TO CANCUN, ZHANG SAID AN INVITATION HAS BEEN ISSUED THROUGH EMBASSY BEIJING TO UNDER SECRETARY RASHISH FOR PRE-SUMMIT CONSULTATIONS IN BEIJING. HOLDRIDGE RESPONDED THAT HE WOULD PASS ON THE INVITATION BUT THAT UNDER SECRETARY RASHISH IS VERY INVOLVED IN PREPARATIONS, AND OUR INVITATION HAD ALREADY BEEN ISSUED FOR A CHINESE TEAM TO COME TO WASHINGTON. ACKNOWLEDGING THIS, ZHANG STRESSED THAT FOR CHINA THESE ISSUES ARE VERY NEW AND THE FOREIGN MINISTRY STAFF IS SMALL. THE LEADER ON THE CHINESE SIDE, MOFA VICE FOREIGN MINISTER PU SHOUCANG, WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO COME TO WASHINGTON AND THEY HOPED UNDER SECRETARY RASHISH COULD COME SO THAT THE FULL STAFF ON THE CHINESE SIDE COULD BE INVOLVED. AMBASSADOR HOLDRIDGE SAID WE WOULD GIVE THE INVITATION CAREFUL CONSIDERATION.

12. OTHER INTERNATIONAL. ZHANG SAID THE CHINESE HAD THOUGHT EARLIER THAT BORDER TALKS WITH INDIA MIGHT BEGIN IN SEPTEMBER OR EARLY OCTOBER BUT THE INDIANS THEN SOUGHT POSTPONEMENT UNTIL AFTER CANCUN, SO THERE WOULD BE MORE TO DISCUSS. "ANYWAY," ZHANG SAID, "IT IS AGREED TO HAVE TALKS." HE SAID BOTH SIDES DESIRE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS, THOUGH THE INDIANS HAVE SAID THAT RELATIONS CANNOT BE FULLY IMPROVED UNTIL THE BOUNDARY ISSUE IS SOLVED. "INDIA," HE ADDED, "HAS ALWAYS WANTED A HIGH PRICE. ON OUR SIDE, WE ARE PREPARED TO COMPROMISE. IF

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

THE INDIANS ARE WILLING, WE CAN MAKE PROGRESS," ZHANG SEEMED QUITE STRAIGHTFORWARD ABOUT THIS, BUT SEEMED TO WONDER WHETHER DELHI HAD THE WILL TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THE ISSUE. IN ANY EVENT, HE SAID, IT IS A COMPLICATED QUESTION WHICH CANNOT BE SOLVED OVER NIGHT.

13. REFERRING TO WORLD ISSUES HE WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS WITH THE SECRETARY, ZHANG MENTIONED UPCOMING US-SOVIET TALKS, NAMIBIA, AND THE MIDDLE EAST. ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLDRIDGE NOTED THAT THE SECRETARY WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THESE SUBJECTS. REGARDING SOUTHERN AFRICA, HOLDRIDGE SAID OUR POLICY IS NOT TO BACK SOUTH AFRICA. WE OF COURSE OPPOSE APARTHEID. OUR AIM IS TO TAKE ACTIONS WHICH WILL CREATE CONDITIONS IN WHICH THE SOUTH AFRICANS CAN FEEL THEY ARE NOT NEGOTIATING AT THE END OF A GUN. THE SAME IS TRUE OF US POLICIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WE SEEK TO MAINTAIN INFLUENCE WITH ALL CONCERNED, SO THAT WE CAN PROMOTE A SETTLEMENT. IF WAR BREAKS OUT IN THE MIDDLE EAST, HE ADDED, THE SOVIETS WILL BE THE FIRST TO BENEFIT.

14. ZHANG REPLIED THAT CHINA FEELS IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE US TO MAINTAIN THE CONFIDENCE OF THE AFRICAN FRONT LINE STATES AND THE ARABS. ON NAMIBIA, HE SAID THAT, WHILE CHINA TOO OPPOSES APARTHEID, "NO ONE IS GOING AFTER SOUTH AFRICA." THE ISSUE IS NAMIBIA, WHICH SHOULD BECOME INDEPENDENT. THERE IS AN URGENCY ABOUT THE SITUATION, HE ADDED. "IT SHOULD NOT GO ON TOO LONG."

15. UN ARREARAGES. AMBASSADOR HOLDRIDGE NOTED THAT CHINA'S REFUSAL TO PAY ITS ASSESSMENT FOR UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS HAS CREATED \$56 MILLION OF PRC ARREARAGES AND THAT A PAYMENT OF AT LEAST \$30 MILLION IS NEEDED TO HEAD OFF POSSIBLE INVOCATION OF ARTICLE 19 SANCTIONS, WHICH COULD COME AS EARLY AS JANUARY OF NEXT YEAR. HE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT CHINA WOULD REVIEW ITS PAYMENTS FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND DECIDED TO CONTRIBUTE. HE ADDED THAT IN DECIDING ITS POSITIONS ON ARREARAGES ISSUES THE US COULD NOT HOLD FIRM WITH OTHER COUNTRIES AND MAKE AN EXCEPTION FOR CHINA.

16. ZHANG RESPONDED THAT CHINA FELT THAT "PEACEKEEPING" WORK HAD BEEN MUCH MISUED, FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE CONGO. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT IN CHINESE EYES THERE HAS BEEN AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE SITUATION AND THAT CHINA IS THEREFORE GIVING CONSIDERATION TO CHANGING ITS POSITION. "WE HAVE TALKED TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL ABOUT THIS," HE SAID, "AND HE WILL TAKE A MORE FLEXIBLE ATTITUDE." PRESUMABLY THIS SIGNIFIES AN INTENTION TO CONTRIBUTE AND REDRESS THE ARREARAGES PROBLEM BEFORE

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

ARTICLE 19 SANCTIONS BECOME AN IMMINENT POSSIBILITY.
17. PUERTO RICO. AMBASSADOR HOLDRIDGE EXPRESSED HOPE
THAT CHINA WOULD SUPPORT US IN OUR EFFORTS TO PREVENT
INSCRIPTION OF PUERTO RICO ON THE AGENDA FOR 1982.
ZHANG REPLIED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT KNOWS THE US POSITION
AND KNOWS THE CUBANS HAVE BEEN TRYING TO EXPLOIT THE
ISSUE. CHINA HAS ADJUSTED ITS STAND ACCORDINGLY, HE
SAID. HE ADDED THAT, "WE WILL BE MORE MODERATE AND WILL
NOT STAND IN YOUR WAY." IT WAS NOT CLEAR, HOWEVER, IF
THIS MEANT A NEGATIVE CHINESE VOTE ON THE INSCRIPTION
BT
#3034
NNNN

PAGE 1 - 126

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/30/81//273

SITUATION: CHECK
 SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE134
 STU2094
 DD RUEHC
 DE RUEHDT #3034/03 2661252
 ZNY SSSSS
 O 231575Z SEP 81 ZFF-6
 FM USDEL SECRETARY IN NEW YORK
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6103
 INFO RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE
 RUMJDH/AMCONSUL HONG KONG IMMEDIATE
 RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI IMMEDIATE
 BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 SECTO 10006

QUESTION WOULD BE FORTHCOMING.

18. BILATERAL ISSUES - CONSULATES. AMBASSADOR HOLDRIDGE NOTED THAT WE CONTINUE TO NEED FOREIGN MINISTRY HELP ON HOUSING AND OFFICE SPACE IN CHINA. HE TOLD ZHANG THAT IN BEIJING, WE STILL HAVE PERSONNEL LIVING IN HOTELS; IN GUANGZHOU, WE NEED FOREIGN MINISTRY ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING APPROVAL FROM LOCAL AUTHORITIES FOR US CONSULATE PERSONNEL TO BE HOUSED IN A JOINT-VENTURE HOTEL PROJECT TO BE UNDERTAKEN THERE (WINSTON KO'S KUANG CHUAN HOTEL); AND IN SHENYANG, THE FACILITIES SHOWN TO US ARE TOO FAR REMOVED FROM THE TOWN CENTER--WE WILL NEED FOREIGN MINISTRY HELP WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES TO GET US A MORE CONVENIENT LOCATION.

19. ZHANG RESPONDED THAT THE U.S. IS BETTER HOUSED THAN SOME OTHER EMBASSIES IN BEIJING, BUT HE NONETHELESS UNDERSTANDS AND SYMPATHIZES WITH THE PROBLEMS FACED. FOR GUANGZHOU THE REPLY WAS GIVEN BY JI WHO SAID THAT THE CONSULAR DEPARTMENT OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY IS PREPARED TO GIVE ASSISTANCE. ON SHENYANG, ZHANG LISTENED AND APPEARED TO UNDERSTAND, THOUGH HE SIMPLY REPLIED, "WE WILL TAKE NOTE OF THIS."

20. STUDENT ACCESS. AMBASSADOR HOLDRIDGE RAISED THE PROBLEM OF NON-RECIPROCITY IN SCHOLAR EXCHANGES, NOT IN TERMS OF THE NUMBER OF STUDENTS, WHERE THE CHINESE FAR EXCEED THE US, BUT IN THE LACK OF ACCESS TO SOCIAL RESEARCH EXPERIENCED BY SOME US SCHOLARS IN CHINA. ZHANG QUICKLY RESPONDED THAT AMERICAN SCHOLARS ARE GIVEN MORE ACCESS IN CHINA THAN CHINESE SCHOLARS THEMSELVES ENJOY. "OUR OWN CHILDREN," HE SAID, "HAVE A PROBLEM." HE ADDED THAT THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION HAS BEEN INFORMED OF THE MATTER SINCE AMBASSADOR HOLDRIDGE LAST

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

RAISED IT, AND SOME PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE. JI INTERJECTED THAT THE PROBLEMS OF TWO US SCHOLARS WHO HAD EARLIER BEEN DENIED ACCESS (MYRON COHEN AND CHRISTINE WONG) ARE NOW BEING RESOLVED.

21. JI BROUGHT UP THE QUESTION OF CHINESE EXCHANGE STUDENTS WHO "HAVE NOT YET BEEN TAKEN CARE OF." THIS INVOLVES SOME 50 STUDENTS FROM 1979 AND 500 FROM 1980. HOLDRIDGE PROMISED TO LOOK INTO THE PROBLEM.

22. SECURITY OF CHINESE DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS AND PERSONNEL. ZHANG REITERATED PAST PRC CONCERNS OVER INCIDENTS OF MUGGINGS (AND EVEN DEATH BY BOMBING IN ONE INSTANCE) OF CHINESE PERSONNEL IN THE UNITED STATES. THE SITUATION IN SAN FRANCISCO FOR THE CHINESE CONSULATE GENERAL THERE HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY BAD. IN RESPONSE, AMBASSADOR HOLDRIDGE INFORMED ZHANG OF A RECENT LETTER THE DEPARTMENT HAD RECEIVED FROM MAYOR FEINSTEIN ASSURING THAT FULL, FIXED-POST SECURITY WILL BE PROVIDED TO THE CONSULATE GENERAL IN SAN FRANCISCO AND DETAILING OTHER SECURITY MEASURES BEING TAKEN BY THE SAN FRANCISCO POLICE. ON THE MARGINS, EA/C DIRECTOR ROPE ALSO PASSED ON TO JI ASSURANCES THAT THE DEPARTMENT HAS BEEN CLOSELY MONITORING ALL INCIDENTS DIRECTED AT CHINESE IN THE US, AND IS TAKING APPROPRIATE ACTION. ZHANG (AND JI) EXPRESSED APPRECIATION.

HAIG

BT

#3034

NNNN

HCE713
STU0144
DD RUEHC
DE RUEHDT #3119/01 2700417
ZNY SSSSS ZZH

O 270414Z SEP 81 ZFF-6
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6139
INFO RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING
BT

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M386/1 # 60155

BY KML NARA DATE 10/18/13

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 SECTO 10024

NOBIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 09/15/01 (HAIG, ALEXANDER M)
TAGS: OVIP (HAIG, ALEXANDER M), PEPR, PRC
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH CHINESE VICE FOREIGN
MINISTER ZHANG WENJIN: UN PLAZA 9/22/81

REF: SECTO 10006

1. (X - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. SUMMARY: IN A CORDIAL ONE HOUR AND FIFTEEN MEETING SEPTEMBER 22, THE SECRETARY AND CHINESE VICE FOREIGN MINISTER ZHANG WENJIN DISCUSSED CURRENT WORLD ISSUES AND THE UPCOMING OPPORTUNITIES TO DEVELOP OUR BILATERAL DIALOGUE. ZHANG WELCOMED THE IMPORTANT MEETINGS SOON TO TAKE PLACE AT CANCUN AND THE ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL DISCUSSIONS WHICH WOULD BE HELD AT THE CABINET LEVEL. FURTHER FOREIGN AFFAIRS DISCUSSIONS WERE ALSO ANTICIPATED DURING HUANG HUA'S OCTOBER VISIT TO WASHINGTON.
3. ON NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES THE CHINESE APPROVED OF FURTHER CONSULTATIONS AND URGED A GREATER U.S. ATTENTION TO THE IMPACT OF THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE IN THE CONTEXT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THE SECRETARY ASKED THE CHINESE TO KEEP UP THE PRESSURE ON THE DK TO MAKE COALITION BUILDING EFFECTIVE AND STRESSED THAT HIS TALKS WITH GROMYKO WOULD BE FIRM AND INSISTENT UPON THE NEED FOR RECIPROCITY.
4. THE SECRETARY BRIEFED ZHANG ON HIS TALKS WITH POLAND'S FOREIGN MINISTER AND ON U.S. CONCERN THAT THE INTERNAL SITUATION THERE COULD COME UNRAVELED. HE DISCUSSED THE RECENT VISIT OF ISRAELI PM BEGIN AND POINTED OUT HOW HE SAW THE SITUATION IMPROVING VIS-A-VIS OUR DIALOGUE WITH SOUTH AFRICA ON THE NAMIBIA ISSUE.
END SUMMARY.
5. FOLLOWING ARE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE SECRETARY'S BILATERAL MEETING WITH CHINESE VICE FOREIGN MINISTER ZHANG WENJIN ON FEBRUARY 22 IN NEW YORK. IN ADDITION TO THE

ZFF(6)

RECALLED/

0000

007234

CSN:HCE 0713

1

271/13:24Z

270414Z SEP 81

SECRETARY ON THE U.S. SIDE WERE UNDER SECRETARY STOESEL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLDRIDGE, EA/C COUNTRY DIRECTOR ROPE AND VIVIAN CHANG (INTERPRETER). THE CHINESE SIDE INCLUDED ZHANG, AMBASSADOR TO THE UN LING QING, AMBASSADOR TO THE US CHAI ZEMIN; AMBASSADOR LIANG YU-FAN, DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF PRC TO THE UN; JI CHAOZHU, MOFA, BEIJING; GE QIYN, MOFA BEIJING, AND TWO INTERPRETERS/NOTETAKERS.

6. BILATERAL. ZHANG STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF UPCOMING MEETINGS BETWEEN PRC AND U.S. LEADERS -- CANCUN, WHEN THE PRESIDENT WOULD MEET PREMIER ZHAO ZIYANG; VICE PREMIER FANG YI'S SCHEDULED VISIT IN MID-OCTOBER FOR THE MEETING OF THE U.S.-CHINA JOINT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMISSION; VICE PREMIER HUANG HUA'S SCHEDULED VISIT TO WASHINGTON IN LATE OCTOBER AFTER CANCUN; AND SECRETARY REGAN'S VISIT TO CHINA IN NOVEMBER FOR THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMISSION MEETING. THESE MEETINGS, ZHANG SAID, WOULD PROVIDE AN IMPORTANT FLOW OF DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND CHINA. HE NOTED WITH SATISFACTION THE RECENT VISITS TO CHINA OF CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER AND ICA DIRECTOR WICK. HE WAS ALSO PLEASED BY HIS TALK WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLDRIDGE (REFTEL) ON SEPTEMBER 20, IN WHICH A GOOD NUMBER OF BILATERAL MATTERS HAD BEEN COVERED. ZHANG SAID THAT CHINA VERY MUCH VALUED ITS RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES FOR BOTH INTERNATIONAL AND BILATERAL REASONS. CHINA, HE SAID, DOES NOT MERELY WANT TO IMPROVE RELATIONS; IT WOULD LIKE TO "ESCALATE" THEM. THE SECRETARY AGREED ON THE GREAT IMPORTANCE OF EXCHANGES BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. HE NOTED THAT ALL OF THE TOP LEADERSHIP IN U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS WOULD BE INVOLVED IN THE VARIOUS VISITS ZHANG HAD MENTIONED, PARTICULARLY DURING THE LATE OCTOBER VISIT TO WASHINGTON OF VICE PREMIER/FOREIGN MINISTER HUANG HUA.

7. NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES. THE SECRETARY AND ZHANG AGREED ON THE VITAL IMPORTANCE OF MANAGING NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS WELL. THE SECRETARY STRESSED THAT THE U.S. WANTS TO DEVELOP GOOD RELATIONS WITH ALL DEVELOPING COUNTRIES -- NOT JUST WITH ONE GROUP OR ANOTHER, BUT WITH ALL. ZHANG APPLAUDED THIS. HE URGED THAT THE U.S. TAKE A POSITIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE ASPIRATIONS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND HAVE AN EARLY START TO IMPROVE NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS. HE AGREED WITH THE SECRETARY THAT NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS ARE IMPORTANT NOT ONLY IN THEMSELVES BUT ALSO IN AN EAST-WEST CONTEXT.

8. ZHANG SAID THAT FOR CHINA, THE ISSUES TO BE DISCUSSED AT CANCUN ARE NEW, AND THE STAFF WHICH ADDRESSES THEM IN BEIJING IS SMALL. FOR THIS REASON, HE HOPED THAT UNDER SECRETARY RASHISH OR SOME OTHER HIGH-LEVEL U.S. OFFICIAL WOULD LEAD A TEAM TO BEIJING FOR PRE-SUMMIT CONSULTATIONS. IN THIS WAY, THE FULL STAFF ON THE

007234
CSN:HCE 0713

2

271/13:24Z

270414Z SEP 81

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

27

CHINESE SIDE COULD BE INVOLVED. THE SECRETARY RESPONDED

BT
#3119
NNNN

007234

CSN:HCE 0713

3

3

271/13:24Z

270414Z SEP 81

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

28

HCE714
 STU0145
 DD RUEHC
 DE RUEHDT #3119/02 2700419
 ZNY SSSSS ZZH
 O 270414Z SEP 81 ZFF-6
 FM USDEL SECRETARY IN NEW YORK
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6140
 INFO RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING
 BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 SECTO 10024

NODIS
 THAT UNDER SECRETARY RASHISH IS VERY BUSY, AS ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLDRIDGE HAD INDICATED EARLIER (REFTEL), BUT WE WOULD WELCOME CHINESE ADVICE AND SUPPORT AND WOULD SEND A WELL-QUALIFIED TEAM TO BEIJING FOR PRE-CANCUN CONSULTATIONS. AT ZHANG'S INVITATION, THE SECRETARY THEN PROCEEDED TO GIVE HIS VIEWS ON A VARIETY OF ISSUES:
 KAMPUCHEA, U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, POLAND, AND U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTHERN AFRICA.
 9. KAMPUCHEA. THE SECRETARY EXPRESSED SATISFACTION THAT CHINA AND ASEAN HAVE IMPROVED THEIR DIALOGUE ON THIS ISSUE, NOTING THAT, WHILE HE KNEW THEY HAD HAD THEIR DIFFERENCES, FROM A STRATEGIC POINT OF VIEW IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THESE DIFFERENCES BE RESOLVED. HE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT CHINA WOULD PUSH THE DK TO BE FLEXIBLE IN ITS APPROACH TO COALITION-BUILDING SO THAT A VIABLE, INTERNATIONALLY RESPECTABLE ENTITY COULD BE CREATED IN KAMPUCHEA. THIS WAS IMPORTANT, SINCE IT WAS NOT ONLY THE SOVIETS WHO, IN THEIR PROPAGANDA EXPLOIT THE BAD IMAGE OF THE DK, BUT ALSO THE WEST EUROPEANS AND OTHERS WHO HARBOR LEGITIMATE CONCERNS ABOUT THE DK BASED ON THE PAST EXCESSES OF POL POT.
 10. TURNING TO HIS UPCOMING TALKS WITH GROMYKO, THE SECRETARY SAID, BASED ON THE MORNING'S SPEECH BY THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER, HE WOULD NOT EXPECT A LOVE FEST. HE WOULD SEEK TO IMPRESS ON GROMYKO THAT THE CHANGE IN U.S. POLICY IS REAL AND PERMANENT, THAT IT WOULD INVOLVE A STRONG DEMAND FOR RECIPROCITY AND THAT IT IS BACKED BY A FIRM COMMITMENT TO INCREASED DEFENSE SPENDING. IF THERE WERE EQUITABLE REDUCTIONS THAT COULD BE REACHED ON BOTH SIDES, THEN ARMS CONTROL COULD MEAN A DECREASE IN DEFENSE BURDENS. IN ANY CASE, IT WAS IMPORTANT IN THE AREA OF MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES THAT THE EUROPEANS PERCEIVE

SIT:
 EOR: LILY
 WHSR COMMENTS:

ZFF(6)

RECALLED/

0000

007238

CSN:HCE 0714

1

271/13:26Z

270414Z SEP 81

~~SECRET~~

THE UNITED STATES AS MAKING A REAL EFFORT. OVERALL, THE MESSAGE TO GROMYKO WOULD BE THAT OUR WILL IS FIRM AND WE WILL NOT DEPART FROM OUR PRESENT COURSE.

11. ON POLAND, THE SECRETARY RECOUNTED HIS DISCUSSION WITH FOREIGN MINISTER CZYREK, NOTING THAT HE CONSIDERED THE SITUATION NOW VERY SERIOUS. THERE WERE THREE CONDITIONS WHICH WOULD LIKELY PROVE TO BE THE LIMITS OF SOVIET TOLERANCE. ONE, A FUNDAMENTAL CHALLENGE TO THE POLISH PARTY, HAD ALREADY HAPPENED. TWO, AN EFFORT TO EXPAND THE MOVEMENT IN POLAND OUTSIDE ITS BORDERS, HAD ALSO HAPPENED. THE THIRD, A BREAKDOWN OF INTERNAL LAW AND ORDER, HAD NOT HAPPENED. THE DANGER WAS THAT THE NEXT SESSION OF SOLIDARITY COULD LEAD TO AN INTERNAL CRACKDOWN, WHICH MIGHT LEAD TO VIOLENCE, WHICH IN TURN COULD LEAD TO SOVIET INTERVENTION. THE SITUATION SHOULD BE CONSIDERED EXTREMELY SERIOUS.

12. IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT EXCELLENT PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE ON RESUMING THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS. THEY WOULD START SOON IN CAIRO AT THE AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL, WITH THE U.S. A FULL PARTNER. BOTH SIDES WOULD BE UNDER PRESSURE TO GET RESULTS OVER THE NEXT THREE TO FOUR MONTHS BEFORE THE DATE ARRIVES FOR THE RETURN OF THE SINAI TO EGYPT AND THE U.S. HAD REASONS TO BE OPTIMISTIC. THE REAL DANGER IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS THE LEBANON SITUATION.

13. ON NAMIBIA, THE SECRETARY STRESSED THE MOVEMENT WHICH HAD BEEN ACHIEVED WITH SOUTH AFRICA OVER THE PAST FOUR MONTHS, TO THE POINT OF SOUTH AFRICAN ACCEPTANCE OF RESOLUTION 435, ITS AGREEMENT TO CONSIDER ONLY A SET OF PRINCIPLES RATHER THAN CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES, AND ITS ACCEPTANCE OF THE IDEA OF A UN FORCE IN NAMIBIA, TO WHICH THEY WERE PREVIOUSLY VIOLENTLY OPPOSED. THE SECRETARY NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT AS THE SOUTH AFRICANS HAVE BECOME MORE FLEXIBLE THEY HAVE BECOME MORE ADAMANT ABOUT THE PRESENCE OF CUBANS IN ANGOLA. THIS WAS SOMETHING THAT CONCERNED THE US GREATLY TOO. MUCH COULD HAPPEN IN ANGOLA FOR THE BETTER, SUCH AS WESTERN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND AID FOR DEVELOPING A POTENTIALLY RICH COUNTRY, IF AND WHEN THE CUBANS WERE OUT. ZHANG STATED THE CHINESE VIEW THAT THE SOONER NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE IS ACHIEVED THE SOONER CUBA WILL GET OUT. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT IN OUR VIEW, SIMULTANEOUS SETTLEMENTS ON BOTH SCORES WAS THE ONLY APPROACH LIKELY TO SUCCEED.

14. ZHANG THANKED THE SECRETARY FOR HIS PRESENTATION AND REITERATED THAT "WE VALUE OUR RELATIONSHIP."

HAIG

BT

#3119

NNNN

007238

CSN:HCE 0714

2

2

271/13:26Z

270414Z SEP 81

PAGE 1 - 417

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 10/14/81//287

SITUATION: CHECK
 SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE680
 OO RUEHC RUMJPG
 DE RUEHC #2240 2732243
 ZNY SSSSS ZZH
 O 302218Z SEP 81 ZFF4
 FM SECSTATE WASHDC
 TO AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 6356
 BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 262240

NODIS

FROM THE SECRETARY FOR THE AMBASSADOR
 E.O. 12065: RDS-1 9/30/01 (HAIG, ALEXANDER M., JR.)

TAGS:OVIP (HAIG, ALEXANDER M.), PARM. PEPR, UR, US, CH, CU
 SUBJECT:MY SECOND MEETING WITH GROMYKO, SEPTEMBER 28

1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. YOU SHOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FOR FOREIGN MINISTER HUANG HUA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
3. DEAR MR. FOREIGN MINISTER:
4. IN KEEPING WITH OUR PRACTICE OF CONSULTATIONS ON MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST, I WOULD LIKE TO GIVE YOU AN ACCOUNT OF MY SECOND MEETING WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREY A. GROMYKO, SEPTEMBER 28.
5. THE SECOND MEETING LASTED FIVE HOURS. IN A FIRST PRIVATE SESSION LASTING FOUR-AND-A-HALF HOURS, THE DISCUSSION WAS KEPT ALMOST WHOLLY TO INTERNATIONAL ISSUES. A SHORT PLENARY SESSION FOLLOWED, INVOLVED BILATERAL TOPICS.
6. IN THE DISCUSSION OF INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, WE CONTINUED THE EXCHANGE OF POINTS OF VIEW BEGUN SEPTEMBER 23 WITH REGARD TO BOTH GENERAL OUTLOOK AND SPECIFIC PROBLEM AREAS.

OUR POINT OF VIEW, AS YOU KNOW, IS THAT THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS FRIENDS AND ALLIES HAVE INCREASINGLY RESORTED TO THE THREAT AND USE OF FORCE TO GAIN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, AND THAT THIS IS A DANGEROUS APPROACH WHICH MUST BE ABANDONED IF THE SOVIET UNION TRULY DESIRES CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES. FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO, BOTH IN DISCUSSIONS OF GENERAL PHILOSOPHY, -AND ON SPECIFICS, WAS UNBENDING. THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M386/1 #60156
 BY KML NARA DATE 10/18/13

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

THEREFORE DID NOT NARROW. -- --

7. WE TALKED ABOUT MANY OF THE SAME PROBLEM AREAS WE DISCUSSED SEPTEMBER 23, BUT IN MORE DETAIL. I GAVE A FULLER EXPLANATION OF OUR CONCERNS ABOUT CUBAN ACTIVITIES, FOR WHICH THE SOVIET UNION CANNOT ESCAPE RESPONSIBILITY. I WAS INTERESTED TO NOTE THAT FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO DID NOT REJECT DISCUSSION OF THIS TOPIC, ALTHOUGH HE WAS INFLEXIBLE CONCERNING SUBSTANCE. -

8. WE ALSO DISCUSSED SOME NEW AREAS. IN THIS MEETING, FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO GAVE THE FULL PRESENTATION OF THE SOVIET POINT OF VIEW ON THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA - WHICH WAS MISSING FROM OUR FIRST MEETING. HIS ARGUMENTS WERE ENTIRELY FAMILIAR; SO WAS MY RESPONSE. INTERESTINGLY, HE DID NOT RAISE THE MIDDLE EAST, EXCEPT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PERSIAN GULF.

9. WE ALSO TALKED AT LENGTH ABOUT ARMS CONTROL. ON SALT II I TOLD GROMYKO THE TREATY WAS DEAD AND THAT WE WOULD NOT BE RUSHED INTO NEW NEGOTIATIONS. AS YOU KNOW, WE HAD-ALREADY-AGREED IN THE FIRST MEETING TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS ON WHAT THE UNITED STATES CALLS THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES ON NOVEMBER 30 IN GENEVA. OUR REVIEW OF THE ISSUES AND OUR - - - CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES HAVE REACHED THE POINT WHERE IT IS PRACTICABLE TO BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS, AND OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES HAVE WELCOMED THE ANNOUNCEMENT.

10. THE TONE OF THE DISCUSSION IN BOTH MEETINGS WAS FRANK AND BUSINESSLIKE, AND THE APPROACH SOBER ON BOTH SIDES. WE AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO CONTINUE DISCUSSION AT - THE LEVEL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS, AND TO HOLD A FURTHER MEETING FOR THIS PURPOSE IN GENEVA IN EARLY 1982.

11. SALUTARY CLOSE. ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR. END TEXT. HAIG
BT
#2240
NNNN

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE536
UTS3685
PP RUEHC
DE RUMJPG #0995/01 2800745
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 070648Z OCT 81
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6083
INFO RUHQHQA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
RUMJDH/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 9065
ZEN/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU (POUCH)
ZEN/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI (POUCH)
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 4 BEIJING 10995

EXDIS

DEPT PASS SECDEF

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 - 10/7/01 (HUMMEL, ARTHUR W. JR.) DR-M

TAGS: MPDL, MASS, MMOL, PCAT, ESTC, CH, US, UR, XX

SUBJ: POLITICO-MILITARY DIMENSION OF US-CHINA RELATIONS

1. ~~1~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY. THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE ANALYZES US NATIONAL INTERESTS IN STRATEGIC COOPERATION WITH CHINA. WE HAVE AN INTEREST IN SUSTAINING CURRENT SOVIET MILITARY ATTENTION TO CHINA AND SOVIET CONCERN OVER THE PROSPECTS OF CONCERTED SINO-AMERICAN ACTIONS IN REACTION TO SOVIET MOVES. THE COMMUNITY OF STRATEGIC INTERESTS BETWEEN THE US AND CHINA IS, HOWEVER, BASICALLY LIMITED TO MAINTENANCE OF THE GLOBAL BALANCE OF POWER AGAINST THE SOVIET CHALLENGE, AND INDEPENDENT BUT PARALLEL ACTIONS TO COUNTER SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF SOVIET ADVENTURISM. IN THIS SENSE, THE U.S.-CHINA RELATIONSHIP CONSTITUTES AN INCIPIENT ENTENTE, BUT IS NOT AND WILL NOT BECOME AN ALLIANCE. CHINA WILL MAINTAIN A NATIONAL POLICY OF SELF-SUFFICIENCY. ITS MILITARY CAPABILITIES VIS-A-VIS ITS NON-SOVIET NEIGHBORS ARE LIKELY TO GROW, BUT FOR A COMPLEX OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL REASONS IT IS UNLIKELY IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE THAT THE PRC WILL HARBOR AGGRESSIVE INTENTIONS IN EAST ASIA. EVEN IN AREAS OF STRONG DISAGREEMENT, SUCH AS KOREA AND TAIWAN, OUR GROWING STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP CAN CONTINUE TO INFLUENCE BEIJING'S POLICIES IN DIRECTIONS FAVORABLE TO OUR INTERESTS. WITH THIS AS BACKGROUND, THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M386/1 #60157

BY KML NARA DATE 10/18/13

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

QUESTIONS ARISE RELATING TO US NATIONAL INTERESTS, WHAT CAN AND SHOULD BE DONE BY THE US IN TERMS OF EXCHANGES, TRAINING AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS TO HELP RETARD THE STEADY EROSION OF CHINA'S MILITARY CAPABILITIES RELATIVE TO THE USSR? HOW CAN THE US AND CHINA COOPERATE TO EXCLUDE OR CURTAIL SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE THIRD WORLD? HOW CAN WE COOPERATE IN THE EVENT OF AGGRESSION AGAINST NATIONS WHOSE SECURITY WE HAVE COME TO GUARANTEE THRU SEPARATE BUT PARALLEL COMMITMENTS? WHAT, IF ANY, LOGISTICAL SUPPORT ROLE COULD CHINA PROVIDE TO US FORCES IN THE EVENT OF THEIR ENGAGEMENT IN A PERSIAN GULF OR SOUTHWEST ASIAN CRISIS?

FINALLY, HOW CAN WE FORGE THE FRIENDLY AND MUTUALLY ADVANTAGEOUS RELATIONS WITH THE HIGH BACKWARD AND TRADITIONAL XENOPHOBIC PLA THAT WE MUST HAVE IF WE ARE TO BE ABLE FULLY TO EXPLORE THESE QUESTIONS IN THE COMING YEARS?

END SUMMARY.

3. INTRODUCTION.

A. BARRING A SERIOUS FALLING OUT OVER TAIWAN, THE US AND CHINA MAY BE ENGAGED OVER THE COMING YEAR IN AN UNPRECEDENTEDLY INTENSE DIALOGUE ON THE POLITICO-MILITARY ASPECTS OF OUR RELATIONSHIP.

B. THE PRESIDENT WILL MEET PREMIER ZHAO ZIYANG AT CANCUN, AND AGAIN NEXT YEAR IN WASHINGTON. VICE PREMIER/FOREIGN MINISTER HUANG HUA WILL BE IN WASHINGTON AT THE END OF THIS MONTH. VICE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF GENERAL LIU HUAQING HAS ACCEPTED AN INVITATION TO REVISIT THE US. THE CHINESE HAVE INVITED SECRETARY WEINBERGER, JCS CHAIRMAN GENERAL JONES AND CINCPAC ADMIRAL LONG TO VISIT CHINA, AND ALL HAVE ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE. DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES AT THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OR DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE LEVEL WILL BE INITIATED, MANY OF THEM ADDRESSING REGIONAL POLITICAL-MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS. MEANWHILE, BOTH SIDES HOPE TO BROADEN AND INTENSIFY MILITARY EXCHANGES AT LOWER LEVELS.

C. CHINESE INTERESTS AND MOTIVATIONS IN EXPANDED STRATEGIC COOPERATION WITH THE US HAVE BEEN ANALYZED FREQUENTLY AND AT LENGTH. SO HAVE THIRD PARTY INTERESTS CONSTRAINING THEIR DEVELOPMENT. IT IS TIME FOR US TO DEFINE US STRATEGIC INTERESTS MORE CLEARLY.

4. PREMISES. WE START FROM CERTAIN PREMISES:

A. CHINA CURRENTLY TIES DOWN 25-30 PERCENT OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES AND DRAWS OFF AN EVEN HIGHER

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

PROPORTION OF SOVIET MILITARY EXPENDITURES. IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO SEE AT LEAST THIS LEVEL OF SOVIET ATTENTION TO CHINA MAINTAINED.

B. UNCERTAINTY OVER CHINESE REACTION AND OVER THE EXTENT TO WHICH CHINA WOULD ACT IN CONCERT WITH THE US AND OUR ALLIES ARE AN IMPORTANT DETERRENT TO SOVIET AGGRESSION IN WEST ASIA, THE MIDDLE EAST AND EUROPE. IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO MAKE EVIDENT THE POTENTIAL FOR SUCH CONCERTED ACTION AS A DETERRENT TO SOVIET ACTIONS.

C. THE POSSIBILITY THAT SOVIET ACTIONS DIRECTED AT INTERESTS HELD IN COMMON BY CHINA AND THE WEST WOULD FURTHER CEMENT SINO-WESTERN STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT IS AN IMPORTANT DETERRENT BOTH TO SOVIET ADVENTURISM IN THE THIRD WORLD AND ALSO TO PROVOCATIVE SOVIET ACTIONS IN GENERAL, E.G., INTERVENTION IN POLAND. IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO PRESERVE SUFFICIENT HARMONY IN US-CHINA RELATIONS TO MAKE THIS POSSIBILITY CONTINUE TO SEEM REALISTIC TO THE SOVIETS. AT THE SAME TIME, THE MORE WE DEMONSTRATE AND ASSERT THAT OUR MILITARY

BT

#0995

NNNN

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE538
UTS3757
PP RUEHC
DE RUMJPG #0995/02 2800800
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 070648Z OCT 81
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6084
INFO RUHQHQA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
RUMJDH/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 9066
ZEN/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU (POUCH)
ZEN/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI (POUCH)
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 4 BEIJING 10995

EXDIS

DEPT PASS SECDEF

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

SALES AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS TO THE CHINESE ARE BASED STRICTLY UPON CHINA'S DEFENSE NEEDS, THE MORE LIKELY THE SOVIETS ARE EVENTUALLY TO ACCEPT THIS AS AN INEVITABLE, IF UNWELCOMED, REALITY.

D. NEITHER FORMAL NOR INFORMAL MUTUAL SECURITY COMMITMENTS, HOWEVER, ARE LIKELY TO BE PART OF THE US-CHINA DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. CHINA AND THE US SHARE A WIDE RANGE OF COMMON STRATEGIC INTERESTS DIRECTED AGAINST SOVIET EXPANSIONISM, BUT NEITHER IS INTERESTED IN ASSUMING ANY DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SECURITY OF THE OTHER. DIFFERENCES IN OUR SOCIAL SYSTEMS AND IDEOLOGIES WILL CONTINUE TO CONSTRAIN THE DEGREE OF WARMTH IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS AND TO VARY THE INTENSITY OF OUR RELATIONS WITH SPECIFIC THIRD COUNTRIES. IN ADDITION, CHINA IS A DEVELOPING AS WELL AS A SOCIALIST COUNTRY AND THIS PROVIDES IT A DIFFERENT OUTLOOK FROM THAT OF THE US IN MANY IMPORTANT MULTILATERAL ISSUES. THE US AND CHINA THEREFORE WILL NOT BECOME "ALLIES," HOWEVER STRONG OUR STRATEGIC "ALIGNMENT" OR "CONSENSUS" MAY BECOME.

E. THE COMMUNITY OF INTERESTS BETWEEN THE US AND CHINA IS THUS LIMITED TO A SHARED CONCERN OVER THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ROLES WE EACH PLAY IN MAINTAINANCE OF THE GLOBAL BALANCE OF POWER, AND TO THE POSSIBILITY OF CONCERTED -- BUT INDEPENDENT AND PARALLEL -- ACTION IN DEFENSE OF THE INDEPENDENCE AND STRATEGIC

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

NEUTRALITY OF THIRD COUNTRIES AND AREAS. IN THIS SENSE, US-CHINA RELATIONS CONSTITUTE AN INCIPIENT "ENTENTE" -- A SET OF INFORMAL UNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT WHAT EACH OF US WILL DO IN DEFENSE OF THIRD COUNTRIES AND AREAS, IN THE CONTEXT OF CONTINUED MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF BILATERAL AND INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES.

F. CHINA WILL MAINTAIN A NATIONAL POLICY OF SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN ITS DEFENSE IN TERMS OF FORCES AND EQUIPMENT. AS SHOWN BY ITS RECENT SATELLITE LAUNCH AND ICBM TEST LAST YEAR, CHINESE MILITARY CAPABILITIES VIS-A-VIS ITS NON-SOVIET NEIGHBORS ARE LIKELY TO GROW OVER THE NEXT TWO DECADES. ALTHOUGH MANY OF ITS NEIGHBORS ARE ONE TO TWO DECADES IN ADVANCE OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY IN EQUIPMENT AND DOCTRINE, CHINA'S OVERWHELMING SIZE WILL CONTINUE TO GENERATE FEAR AMONG OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION. ON THE OTHER HAND, GIVEN CHINA'S PREOCCUPATION WITH DEVELOPMENT, ITS GLOBAL CONCERNS, AND THE INTERESTS OF THE US, JAPAN AND OTHERS IN THE REGION, THE PRC IS UNLIKELY TO HARBOR -- OR TO BE ABLE TO AFFORD -- EXPANSIONIST INTENTIONS FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

G. EVEN IN AREAS OF STRONG DISAGREEMENT SUCH AS KOREA AND TAIWAN, OUR GROWING STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA CONTINUES SIGNIFICANTLY TO MODERATE CHINESE POLICIES. IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO SUSTAIN A RELATIONSHIP THAT CAN FURTHER REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF CONFLICT IN THESE AREAS, IN WHICH THE US WOULD BE INVOLVED.

5. THE AGENDA. WITH THIS AS BACKGROUND, WE BELIEVE THE COMING YEARS IN US-CHINA RELATIONS SHOULD BE TAKEN UP IN AMERICAN EXPLORATION OF THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC QUESTIONS RELATING TO US NATIONAL INTERESTS.

A. WHAT SHOULD WE DO ABOUT CHINA'S SLOW DECLINE AS A COUNTERWEIGHT TO SOVIET POWER?

(1) THERE IS AN ENORMOUS -- AND GROWING -- QUALITATIVE GAP IN MILITARY CAPABILITIES ALONG THE SINO-SOVIET FRONTIER. THE SOVIETS ARE AGGRESSIVELY DEPLOYED UP AGAINST THE CHINESE BORDER, WHILE THE CHINESE ARE DRAWN BACK FOR DEFENSE IN DEPTH. THE SOVIETS ARE STEADILY BUILDING UP THEIR INFRASTRUCTURE AND INTRODUCING NEW SYSTEMS. THE CHINESE REMAIN MIRED IN THE TECHNOLOGY OF THE 1950'S OR EARLY 1960'S AND WEDDED TO THE OUTMODED AND INEFFECTUAL DOCTRINES OF "PEOPLE'S WAR." SHOULD THE RELATIVE DECLINE IN CHINESE CAPABILITIES VIS-A-VIS SOVIETS CONTINUE THROUGH THIS DECADE AND BEYOND, CHINA WILL BE IN TIME BECOME A

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

DIMINISHED FACTOR IN MOSCOW'S PLANNING AGAINST ITS
IRAN-PAKISTAN AND NATO FRONTS.

(2) GIVEN THE MAGNITUDE OF CHINA'S MILITARY
MODERNIZATION NEEDS, THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY -- EVEN IF
WE WISHED TO GO ALL OUT -- OF A QUICK FIX TO CHINA'S
INCREASING VULNERABILITY. CHINA'S LIMITED CAPACITY TO
ABSORB NEW TECHNOLOGY, ITS UNWILLINGNESS AGAIN TO BECOME
DEPENDENT ON FOREIGN SOURCES OF WEAPONRY FOR ITS
DEFENSE, FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS ON BOTH CHINA AND THE US,
THE WEAKENED CONDITION OF OUR OWN MILITARY PRODUCTION
CAPACITY, AND OUR CONCERN WITH THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES
IN THE REGION AND IN SOVIET CALCULATIONS, ALL PRECLUDE
SUCH AN APPROACH.

(3) REALISTICALLY, THEN, THE QUESTION BEFORE US IS
WHAT CAN AND SHOULD BE DONE BY THE UNITED STATES -- IN
TERMS OF EXCHANGES, TRAINING AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS --
TO HELP RETARD THE STEADY EROSION OF CHINA'S MILITARY
CAPABILITIES RELATIVE TO THE USSR, WHILE TAKING INTO
ACCOUNT THE CONCERNS OF CHINA'S OTHER NEIGHBORS. DOES
IT MAKE SENSE IN TERMS OF US INTERESTS TO FOLLOW
POLICIES THAT RESTRICT TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS TO CHINA
IN PRACTICE TO LEVELS BELOW THOSE APPLIED TO COUNTRIES
LIKE YUGOSLAVIA OR INDIA? SHOULD CHINA -- UNLIKE
THOSE COUNTRIES -- REMAIN SUBJECT TO COCOM CONTROLS?

BT

#0995

NNNN

PAGE 1 - 262

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 10/14/81//287

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE543
STU2667
PP RUEHC
DE RUMJPT #0995/03 2800827
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 070648Z OCT 81
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6085
INFO RUHQHQA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
RUMJDH/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 9067
ZEN/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU (POUCH)
ZEN/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI (POUCH)
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 3 OF 4 BEIJING 10995

EXDIS

DEPT PASS SECDEF

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

B. HOW CAN THE US AND CHINA COOPERATE TO EXCLUDE OR CURTAIL SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE THIRD WORLD? (1) IN SOMALIA AND EGYPT (AND TO A LIMITED EXTENT ELSEWHERE), THE US AND CHINA HAVE DEVELOPED COMPLEMENTARY ARMS SALES POLICIES. THE CHINESE REPAIR AND REPLACE OLD SOVIET EQUIPMENT, WHILE WE SUPPLY MORE ADVANCED WEAPONRY. OUR RESPECTIVE EFFORTS SUPPLANT FORMER SOVIET ARRANGEMENTS WITH THOSE COUNTRIES, DEPRIVING THEM OF AN INCENTIVE TO RETURN TO MOSCOW'S EMBRACE.

(2) THIS HAS OCCURED NATURALLY, WITH VIRTUALLY NO COORDINATION OR DISCUSSION BETWEEN US. AS CHINA'S ARMS EXPORT CAPACITY EXPANDS (AS IT HAS BEGUN RAPIDLY TO DO), THERE WILL BE GREATER OPPORTUNITIES TO COORDINATE OUR APPROACHES, AS WELL AS GREATER POSSIBILITIES THAT WE MAY ON SOME OCCASIONS BE AT CROSS-PURPOSES. CAN WE ENHANCE OUR EFFECTIVENESS -- WHERE OUR ARMS TRANSFER POLICIES ALREADY COMPLEMENT EACH OTHER -- THROUGH BETTER CONSULTATION? CAN WE INFORMALLY COORDINATE OUR ARMS SALES POLICIES TO REDUCE SOVIET OPPORTUNITIES IN COUNTRIES WHERE THEY ARE NOW SEEKING THROUGH ARMS SALES TO GAIN NEW STRATEGIC Footholds, E.G., IN MADAGASCAR, NORTH YEMEN, AND EVEN PERU? CAN WE JOIN OUR RESPECTIVE CAPABILITIES TO PRY THE SOVIETS OUT OF AREAS WHERE THEY ARE ENTRENCHED, SUCH AS ANGOLA, SOUTH YEMEN, MOZAMBIQUE?

C. HOW DO WE AVOID TRIPPING OVER EACH OTHER IN THE

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

EVENT OF AGGRESSION AGAINST NATIONS WHOSE SECURITY WE HAVE COME TO GUARANTEE THROUGH SEPARATE BUT PARALLEL COMMITMENTS?

(1) THAILAND'S INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY ARE NOW SECURED BOTH BY US COMMITMENTS UNDER THE MANILA PACT AND BY CHINESE ASSURANCES TO BANGKOK OF ACTION AGAINST VIETNAM SHOULD HANOI LAUNCH A MAJOR ATTACK ACROSS THE KAMPUCHEAN BORDER. THE US AND CHINA HAVE -- IN A MUCH LESS CLEARCUT AND TOTALLY UNCOORDINATED WAY -- ASSUMED A SIMILAR ROLE AS "CO-GUARANTORS" OF PAKISTAN'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND SECURITY AGAINST SOVIET ATTACK. NEITHER CHINA NOR THE US -- STILL LESS THAILAND OR PAKISTAN -- WOULD WISH TO FORMALIZE THESE ARRANGEMENTS. THE OBVIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR OUR RESPECTIVE RELATIONS WITH THE OTHER ASEAN STATES AND INDIA PRECLUDE THIS. NEVERTHELESS, "CO-GUARANTEESHIP" IS AN OBJECTIVE FACT.

(2) WHAT CAN WE -- WHAT SHOULD WE -- DO, SHORT OF FORMAL ARRANGEMENTS AND JOINT PLANNING, TO ENSURE THAT WE CAN COMMUNICATE ADEQUATELY WITH THE CHINESE MILITARY IN A CRISIS? WHAT MINIMAL DEFINITION OF A REALISTIC DIVISION OF ROLES CAN WE DEVELOP? WITHOUT SUCH MEANS OF COMMUNICATION AND UNDERSTANDINGS, WE RISK CONFUSION AT BEST, AND, AT WORST, ACTION AT CROSS PURPOSES.

D. WHAT, IF ANY, LOGISTICAL SUPPORT ROLE COULD CHINA PROVIDE TO US FORCES IN THE EVENT OF THEIR ENGAGEMENT IN A PERSIAN GULF OR SOUTHWEST ASIAN CRISIS?

(1) CURRENT LINES OF COMMUNICATION AND SUPPORT FOR THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE (RDF) IN THE NORTHERN INDIAN OCEAN-PERSIAN GULF REGION ARE EITHER ALMOST UNMANAGEABLY LONG AND SLOW OR OF QUESTIONABLE REALIABILITY. THEY EXTEND AROUND AFRICA OR VIA THE STRAITS OF MALACCA BY SEA; VIA SOUTHEAST ASIA OR NORTHERN AUSTRALIA BY AIR; OR BY SEA AND AIR THROUGH WESTERN EUROPE, THE MEDITERRANEAN, AND NORTH AFRICA. THE LATTER ROUTE, WHICH IS THE SHORTEST, PRESENTS FORMIDABLE PROBLEMS OF COORDINATION WITH ALLIES WHO HAVE BEEN RELUCTANT TO COOPERATE IN THE PAST, AND REQUIRES TRANSIT OF AREAS HEAVILY PATROLLED BY THE SOVIETS, THEIR PROXIES OR THIRD WORLD ALLIES. THESE PROBLEMS MAGNIFY THE DIFFICULTY OF CONTAINING ANY CONFLICT IN SOUTHWEST ASIA.

(2) TRANSIT BY AIR ACROSS CHINA AND PAKISTAN OFFERS AN ALTERNATIVE, THOUGH NOT A SUBSTITUTE, FOR THESE COMMUNICATION LINES. THE CHINESE MIGHT WELL AGREE THAT, IN CERTAIN CONTINGENCIES IN WHICH OUR COMMON INTERESTS

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

WERE ENGAGED (E.G., A SOVIET STRIKE THROUGH IRAN AT THE PERSIAN GULF, OR AT PAKISTAN), THEY WOULD FACILITATE OVERFLIGHTS AND STOPS IN CHINESE AIRFIELDS (IN SICHUAN OR ELSEWHERE) FOR REFUELING AND OTHER SUPPORT. SUCH A TRANS-CHINA AIR ROUTE WOULD BE ATTRACTIVE IN A CRISIS; IT WOULD TRANSIT SECURE, FRIENDLY AREAS AND CUT 20 PERCENT OR MORE OFF THE FLIGHT TIME ALONG MORE SOUTHERNLY ROUTINGS FROM HAWAII AND THE US WEST COAST.

(3) NO US BASES OR OTHER PERMANENT FACILITIES WOULD BE REQUIRED. THE CHINESE WOULD NOT ACCEPT THEM IN ANY EVENT. BUT IT MAY PROVE WORTHWHILE TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF SURVEYING CHINESE AIRFIELDS AND ASSURING THEY HAVE THE MINIMUM (COMPATIBLE) EQUIPMENT AND POL NECESSARY TO SUPPORT FLIGHTS IN CERTAIN SPECIFIED CONTINGENCIES.

6. CONCLUSIONS.

A. DOUBTLESS OTHER OPPORTUNITIES FOR COOPERATION WILL BECOME APPARENT AS THE US AND CHINA DRAW CLOSER -- E.G., A POSSIBLE US-CHINA-JAPAN EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON SOVIET FLEET AND AIR MOVEMENTS IN THE EAST AND SOUTH CHINA SEAS. WHETHER ANY OR ALL OF THESE OPPORTUNITIES ARE EXPLORED WILL DEPEND, OF COURSE, ON THE WAY THEY FIT INTO US GLOBAL STRATEGY, ON HOW WE GAUGE THE REACTIONS AND WEIGH THE CONTRADICTIONARY INTERESTS OF THIRD PARTIES, ON THE WILLINGNESS OF THIRD COUNTRIES TO COOPERATE, AND ON SUCCESSFUL MANAGEMENT OF FURTHER IMPROVEMENT IN US-CHINA RELATIONS.

BT

#0995

NNNN

PAGE 1 - 260

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 10/14/81//287

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE544
STU2724
PP RUEHC
DE RUMJPG #0995/04 2800843
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 070648Z OCT 81
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6086
INFO RUHQHQA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
RUMJDH/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 9068
ZEN/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU (POUCH)
ZEN/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI (POUCH)
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 4 OF 4 BEIJING 10995

EXDIS

DEPT PASS SECDEF

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

B. IN THAT LAST REGARD, QUITE ASIDE FROM THE CRUCIAL QUESTION OF HOW WELL WE ARE ABLE TO MUTE OR TRANSCEND OUR DIFFERENCES OVER TAIWAN, WE FACE A FORMIDABLE CHALLENGE: HOW TO FORGE FRIENDLY AND MUTUALLY ADVANTAGEDUS RELATIONS WITH THE HUGE, BACKWARD AND TRADITIONALLY XENOPHOBIC PLA. AS WE HAVE SAID ELSEWHERE, THE PLA LURKS JUST OFF THE STAGE OF CHINESE POLITICS, ALMOST AUDIBLY MUTTERING ITS DISCONTENT WITH CERTAIN CURRENT CHINESE POLICIES. THOSE POLICIES ARE SYMBOLIZED BY CHINA'S OPENING TO THE WEST AND -- MOST OF ALL -- BY ITS NEW FRIENDSHIP WITH THE US. AS THE POSSIBLE AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE WE HAVE OUTLINED ABOVE SUGGESTS, HOWEVER, OUR INTERESTS IN THE PLA MAY GO WELL BEYOND HELPING IT TO DEVELOP A STAKE IN OUTWARD LOOKING POLICIES OR IN MODERNIZING ITS PRIMITIVE EQUIPMENT AND DOCTRINE. THOSE INTERESTS ARE, HOWEVER, REAL, AND SUGGEST A NEED TO MOVE FORWARD WITH TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS WHICH WILL ENHANCE THE PLA'S SHORT TERM DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION, WITHINT THE STRATEGY OF PEOPLE'S WAR. IN THE LONGER TERM MUCH MORE IS NEEDED. FIRST, WE MUST CHANGE THE PLA PERCEPTION OF THEIR REQUIREMENT FOR A MORE USEFUL MILITARY STRATEGY. IN SUCH A TRADITIONALIST ORGANIZATION THIS MUST BE DONE THROUGH MILITARY TRAINING AND EDUCATION.

C. WE HAVE MADE A START IN BREAKING DOWN THE BARRIERS BETWEEN THE US ARMED SERVICES AND THE PLA

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

FORMED BY FIFTY YEARS OF MUTUAL ISOLATION AND ANTI-PATHY. THE SERIES OF HIGH LEVEL EXCHANGES BETWEEN OUR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND THE CHINESE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE HAVE GONE WELL, THOUGH THEY ARE STALLED AT PRESENT. WE NEED NOW TO MOVE AGGRESSIVELY TO DEVELOP DEEPER MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING THROUGH GREATLY STEPPED-UP MILITARY EXCHANGES AT LOWER AND LESS VISIBLE LEVELS. WE SHOULD NOT WAIT FOR THE CHINESE TO PROPOSE SUCH EXCHANGES. THE PLA LEADERSHIP IS ARTHRITIC AND UNIMAGINATIVE; THEIR BUREAUCRACY IS OSSIFIED. THEY CAN BE EXPECTED TO BE BACKWARD IN COMING FORWARD WITH NEW IDEAS. WE SHOULD NOT BE HESITANT TO PROPOSE A WIDE RANGE OF MILITARY EXCHANGES THAT WE BELIEVE WILL ULTIMATELY SERVE OUR OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS.

D. THERE IS, QUITE FRANKLY, ANOTHER REASON FOR OUR DOING SO NOW. IN CHINESE EYES, AT LEAST, "A SHADOW" -- THE TAIWAN ISSUE -- "LIES OVER US-CHINA RELATIONS." SHOULD THE WORST OCCUR, AND OUR RELATIONS WITH CHINA GO INTO ECLIPSE, LOWER LEVEL EXCHANGES -- LESS VISIBLE BY THEIR VERY NATURE -- MAY BE ABLE TO CONTINUE EVEN AS HIGH-LEVEL EXCHANGES FALTER OR HALT. WE WOULD THUS BE ABLE TO CONTINUE MILITARY CONTACTS. THAT COULD BE IMPORTANT TO PRESERVE THE STRATEGIC CREDIBILITY OF THE US-CHINA CONNECTION, AND IT COULD ULTIMATELY FACILITATE EXPANDED COOPERATION ONCE THE SHADOW HAS PASSED.

HUMMEL

BT

#0995

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

rw 1/5/09

RECEIVED 09 OCT 81 15

TO LENZ

FROM LILLEY

DOCDATE 07 OCT 81

LENZ

08 OCT 81

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R

HAIG, A

HUANG HUA

DENG XIAOPING

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR RECORDS OF BILATERALS BTW SECSTATE & CHINESE FOR PRES
UPCOMING BILATERALS IN OCT

ACTION: LENZ SGD MEMO DUE: STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

NONE

ALLEN

PIPES

SCHWEITZER

BAILEY

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (D / D)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

60158
5929

44

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

any
dispatched
10/08
don

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 8, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER III
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Records of Bilateral Talks With Chinese
Ref: NSC #3996, dated 1 July 1981 (e)

To prepare the President and the National Security Council Staff for the upcoming bilateral talks in October with the Chinese Premier at Cancun and the Foreign Minister in Washington, we request access to the transcripts of the following meetings:

-- Secretary Haig's second talk with Huang Hua in Peking in June 1981, and his talk with Deng Xiaoping as requested in referenced memorandum.

-- The Secretary's talk with Huang Hua in Cancun.

-- The Secretary's and Assistant Secretary Holdridge's talks with Zhang Wenjin, Vice Foreign Minister, in New York City in September 1981. These would be the bilateral portions of these meeting. (e)

These requests have already been made of the East Asia Bureau at State which has referred us to you. (U)

Kathy Jen

Allen J. Lenz
Staff Director

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M386/1 #60158

BY KML NARA DATE 10/18/13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on 10/7/87

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

60159

45

MEMORANDUM

5929

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 7, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ALLEN LENZ

FROM: JIM LILLEY *pl*

SUBJECT: Records of Secretary Haig's Bilateral
Talks With Chinese (U)

Please send the attached memorandum (Tab I) to State.
This is to get down on the record their withholding of
key memos from us. *(e)*

RECOMMENDATION:

That you send Tab I to State Department.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab I Lenz memo to Bremer

cc: Richard Allen
Richard Pipes
Bob Schweitzer
Norman Bailey

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M386/1 #60159

BY KML NARA DATE 10/18/13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on 10/7/81

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*****CONFIDENTIAL*****

HCE830
STU5033
PP RUEHC
DE RUMJPG #1022/01 2810350
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 080037Z OCT 81
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6101
INFO RUEHCR/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 2871
RUEHCR/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 3384
RUMJDH/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 9074
BT

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M386/1 # 60160

BY KML NARA DATE 10/18/13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIJING 11022

DEPT PASS TREASURY
E.O. 12065: GDS 10/7/87 (BROWN, DAVID G.) DR-E
TAGS: EEWT, CH, US
SUBJ: US-CHINA JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE (JEC)
REF: STATE 262342

1. SUMMARY: PER INSTRUCTIONS REFTEL, ECONCOUNS DESCRIBED U.S. THOUGHTS CONCERNING JEC TO MFA U.S. AFFAIRS DIRECTOR ZHANG WENPU OCTOBER 6. ZHANG SAID INFO VERY HELPFUL AND PROMISED TO BE BACK IN TOUCH WITH COORDINATED CHINESE COMMENTS ASAP. HE FORESAW NO PROBLEMS WITH TIMING OR FORMAT. HIS ONLY SUSTANTIVE QUESTION MARK PREDICTABLY CONCERNED INFORMATION EXCHANGE PROPOSAL. EMBASSY RESPONSES TO SUBSTANTIVE QUESTIONS RAISED REFTELS AND SUGGESTIONS ON SUBSTANTIVE TOPICS ARE GIVEN BELOW. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS ARE SUBJECT OF SEPTEL. EMBASSY SUGGESTS THAT TEXT OF A DRAFT JOINT STATEMENT FOR PRESS BE PREPARED FOR EARLY DISCUSSION WITH CHINESE. END SUMMARY.

2. SCHEDULE: ECONCOUNS GAVE ZHANG INFORMATION ON SECRETARY REGAN'S TENTATIVE TRAVEL PLANS, U.S. DELEGATION LIST AND PROPOSED FORMAT FOR A TWO-DAY JEC SESSION. ZHANG BELIEVES THAT PROPOSED TIMING WILL NOTR PRESENT ANY DIFFICULTIES FOR VICE PREMIER BO YIBO OR OTHER CHINESE PARTICIPANTS AND PROMISED TO CONFIRM THIS FORMALLY ASAP. ZHANG SAID HE WOULD CIRCULATE PROPOSED FORMAT (ALONG WITH INFORMATION ON ILLUSTRATIVE TOPICS FOR WORKING GROUPS) AND PROVIDE A COORDINATED RESPONSE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE (ABOUT 10 DAYS). ZHANG'S ONLY COMMENT ON FORMAT WAS THAT A TWO-DAY MEETING WOULD REQUIRE VERY TIGHT SCHEDULING.

3. JOINT STATEMENT FOR PRESS: ECONCOUNS DREW ZHANG'S

SIT: JP COL
EOB: GREG, LILY, PIPE
WHSR COMMENTS:

RECALLED/

019738

CSN:HCE 0830

1

281/04:30Z

0000

080037Z OCT 81

*****CONFIDENTIAL*****

~~*****CONFIDENTIAL*****~~

ATTENTION TO IDEA OF A JOINT STATEMENT FOR PRESS AT END OF MEETING, EXPLAINING THAT SUCH A STATEMENT WOULD HELP PUT U.S.- CHINESE ECONOMIC RELATIONS AND JEC SESSION IN PROPER PERSPECTIVE. ZHANG SAID HE WOULD RESERVE COMMENTS UNTIL HE HAD CONSULTED OTHERS. ALTHOUGH WE DID NOT DISCUSS CONTENTS WITH ZHANG, EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT SUCH A JOINT STATEMENT COULD HIGHLIGHT CONTINUED GROWTH AND DIVERSIFICATION OF U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC RELATIONS, NOTE THE IMPORTANCE ECONOMIC TIES HAVE ASSUMED IN OUR OVERALL RELATIONS, STRESS ROLE OF JEC IN ENSURING THE SMOOTH DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC RELATIONS AFTER THE INITIAL CREATIVE PERIOD IN WHICH BASIC FRAMEWORK WAS ESTABLISHED, NOTE SPECIFIC ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF SESSION AND DESCRIBE PROSPECT FOR DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP. IN ORDER TO PUT OUR EARLY IMPRINT ON JOINT STATEMENT, EMBASSY SUGGESTS THAT A DRAFT BE PREPARED AND SENT TO EMBASSY FOR EARLY DISCUSSION WITH CHINESE.

4. WORKING GROUPS: ZHANG ASKED A FEW FACTUAL QUESTIONS ABOUT OUR ILLUSTRATIVE LIST OF WORKING GROUP TOPICS AND NOTED THAT PROSPECTS FOR EXCHANGING NOTES ON MARITIME AND CIVAIR TAX EXEMPTIONS DEPEND UPON RECENT TAX DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON ON WHICH HE HAD NOT YET RECEIVED REPORT. ECONCOUNS DESCRIBED U.S. APPROACH TO INFORMATION EXCHANGE PER PARA 7 REFTEL, (STATE 266405 ARRIVED AFTER MEETING.) ZHANG EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS INFO EXCHANGE FURTHER BUT COMMENTED THAT WHEN ISSUE HAD ARISEN A YEAR OR TWO AGO, IT HAD BEEN DECIDED THAT TIME WAS NOT THEN RIPE FOR DRAWING UP A WRITTEN UNDERSTANDING. HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER SITUATION HAD CHANGED. (EMBASSY DOES NOT HAVE BACKGROUND ON EARLIER DISCUSSION ZHANG REFERRED TO AND WOULD APPRECIATE ANY BACKGROUND DEPARTMENT CAN PROVIDE.) ECONCOUNS PLANS TO PRESENT VIEWS CONTAINED IN STATE 266405 TO ZHANG THIS WEEK.

BT
 #1022
 NNNN

019738
 CSN:HCE 0830 2 2 281/04:30Z 080037Z OCT 81

~~*****CONFIDENTIAL*****~~

*****CONFIDENTIAL*****

HCE836
STU5100
PP RUEHC
DE RUMJPG #1022/02 2810405
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 080037Z OCT 81
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6102
INFO RUEHCR/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 2872
RUEHCR/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 3385
RUMJDH/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 9075
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIJING 11022

5. SECRETARY REGAN'S CALLS: ECONCOUNS NOTED THAT SECRETARY REGAN WOULD LIKE TO MAKE CALLS ON GOVERNMENT LEADERS DURING TWO HALF DAYS WHEN WORKING GROUPS WILL BE MEETING BUT DID NOT PRESENT SPECIFIC REQUESTS. EMBASSY BELIEVES IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO ARRANGE ONE APPOINTMENT WITH A SENIOR GOVERNMENT LEADER DURING EACH OF THE TWO HALF DAYS DEVOTED TO WORKING GROUPS. IT SHOULD ALSO BE POSSIBLE TO SCHEDULE MEETINGS WITH FINANCIAL/BANKING OFFICIALS AROUND THESE TWO MAJOR APPOINTMENTS. EMBASSY RECOMMENDS THAT SECRETARY REGAN REQUEST APPOINTMENTS WITH PREMIER ZHAO AND VICE PREMIER CHEN YUN AS WELL AS WITH BANKING/FINANCIAL OFFICIALS (WANG BINGQIAN - MOF, LI BOAHUA - PBOC AND BU MING - BOC). (THIS ASSUMES SECRETARY REGAN WILL HAVE OTHER OPPORTUNITIES FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH BO YIBO, FOR INSTANCE ON MONDAY, BEFORE FIRST PLENARY SESSION.) EMBASSY WOULD NOTE THAT, IF TIME PERMITTED, SECRETARY REGAN WOULD ALSO LIKE TO MEET WITH VICE PREMIERS WAN LI AND/OR YAO YILIN.

6. SUBSTANTIVE SUGGESTIONS:

A) TRADE WORKING GROUP: EMBASSY WILL BE PROVIDING SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS ON BUSINESS FACILITATION ISSUES SHORTLY IN RESPONSE TO USDOC 19782. IN ADDITION, EMBASSY RECOMMENDS THAT U.S. DELEGATION RAISE DRAFT PRC PATENT LAW. AS WASHINGTON IS AWARE, U.S. TRADERS HAVE AWAITED DRAFT LAW FOR SOMETIME AND SEVERAL U.S. AGRICULTURAL CHEMICAL AND PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES HAVE DIFFICULTIES WITH CERTAIN ASPECTS OF DRAFT. EMBASSY SUGGESTS THAT U.S. DELEGATION SHOULD INQUIRE ABOUT STATUS OF DRAFT LAW, DESCRIBE THE CONCERNS SOME U.S. EXPORTERS HAVE AND URGE THE CHINESE TO TAKE THESE U.S. VIEWS INTO ACCOUNT IN DRAFT LAW. WE MIGHT ALSO MAKE SIMILAR INQUIRIES ABOUT STATUS OF DRAFT COPYRIGHT LAW.

RECALLED/

019764

CSN:HCE 0836

1

281/05:09Z

0000

080037Z OCT 81

*****CONFIDENTIAL*****

~~*****CONFIDENTIAL*****~~

B) MARITIME ISSUES: ALTHOUGH OTHER CONSULTATIVE MECHANISMS UNDER ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS SEEM TO BE WORKING PRODUCTIVELY, RECENT INTIAL MARITIME CONSULTATIONS (SEE STATE 256346) REVEALED BUT DID NOT RESOLVE SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES ON MARITIME ISSUES. EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT MARITIME CONSULTATIONS COULD BE GIVEN USEFUL MOMENTUM BY BRIEFLY DISCUSSING MARITIME AGREEMENT AT JEC, POSSIBLY IN PLENARY, IN THE CONTEXT OF A GENERALLY POSITIVE REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE THREE ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS SIGNED AT FIRST JEC. DETAILED DISCUSSIONS SHOULD OF COURSE REMAIN IN EXISTING MARITIME AGREEMENT CHANNELS.

C. FINANCE AND INVESTMENT WORKING GROUP: EMBASSY BELIEVES U.S. SIDE SHOULD USE OCCASION TO INQUIRE ABOUT CHINESE VIEWS ON DEBT FINANCING, SPECIFICALLY THE RELATIVE ROLES OF WORLD BANK, EXPORT CREDITS, COMMERCIAL CREDITS AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE DENOMINATED DEBT INSTRUMENTS (SUCH AS PROVINCIAL BANKS IN HONG KONG).

7. CONTROL OFFICER FOR JEC WILL BE ECONCOUNS DAVID BROWN (OFFICE TEL: 522-033 X 230, HOME TEL: 522-267).

HUMMEL

BT
#1022
NNNN

019764
CSN:HCE 0836

2

2

281/05:09Z

080037Z OCT 81

~~*****CONFIDENTIAL*****~~

PAGE 1 - 220

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 10/14/81//287

SITUATION: CHECK
 SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE839

OO RUEHC RUMJPG RUFHOL RUDKEBQ RUEHLD

DE RUEHC #8842 2810416

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

O 080306Z OCT 81

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 6560

RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 1600

RUDKEBQ/AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE 6304

RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 4430

BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 268842

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 10/7/89 (BORRIGHT, JOHN P.) DES/NTS

TAGS: MNUC, TECH, CH, SZ, ENRG

SUBJECT: CHINESE SALE OF ENRICHED URANIUM TO SOUTH AFRICA

1. (X) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. EMBASSY BEIJING IS REQUESTED TO IMMEDIATELY MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS TO APPROPRIATE HIGH LEVEL CHINESE OFFICIALS:

-- THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS STRONG REASON TO BELIEVE THAT OVER 30 TONS OF CHINESE LOW ENRICHED URANIUM WILL SOON BE SENT BY SHIP FROM SHANGHAI TO SOUTH AFRICA, PROBABLY DURBAN.

-- AS WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY INFORMED YOU, THE SWISS FIRM ORDA, THE INTERMEDIARY FOR SOUTH AFRICA IN THIS MATTER, IS ARRANGING FOR DELIVERY OF THIS MATERIAL TO SOUTH AFRICA. ORDA HAS ALREADY RECEIVED PARTIAL PAYMENT BY SOUTH AFRICA.

-- PRC OFFICIALS HAVE INFORMED US THAT PRC DOES NOT TRADE WITH SOUTH AFRICA. WE FURTHER NOTE PRC STATEMENTS AND THAT CHINA OPPOSED THE ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY SOUTH AFRICA AND THAT CHINA WILL NOT ASSIST OTHER NATIONS TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES. PERMITTING THIS EXPORT WOULD BE CLEARLY INCONSISTENT WITH THESE CHINESE STATEMENTS.

-- AS WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY INFORMED YOU, GOVERNMENT TO

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M386/1 #60161

BY KML NARA DATE 10/18/13

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

GOVERNMENT ASSURANCES ARE REQUIRED BY THE US AND OTHER NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS AS A CONDITION OF EXPORT. IN PARTICULAR AS YOU KNOW, THE FIRM ORDA HAS ALREADY VIOLATED ITS ASSURANCES IN THE MATTER OF SHIPPING CHINESE HEAVY WATER TO ARGENTINA THROUGH FRANCE.

-- AS YOU KNOW, OUR CONCERN IS SHARED BY SEVERAL EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS. IF THIS TRANSACTION TAKES PLACE, THE US BELIEVES THAT THE INTERNATIONAL REACTION IN EUROPE, BLACK AFRICA, AND OTHER PARTS OF THE THIRD WOLRD WOULD BE VERY DAMAGING TO BOTH CHINESE AND US INTERESTS.

-- WE HOPE THAT IMMEDIATE ACTION WILL BE TAKEN TO PREVENT THIS TRANSACTION.

3. EMBASSIES BERN AND LONDON SHOULD DRAW ON PARAGRAPH 2 TO INFORM APPROPRIATE GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES OF US DEMARCHE.

4. EMBASSY BONN SHOULD DRAW ON PARA 2 TO INFORM FRG OFFICIALS OF US DEMARCHE. IN ADDITION EMBASSY SHOULD CONVEY THE FOLLOWING TO FRG OFFICIALS:

-- WE BELIEVE THAT THE GERMAN FIRM INTERNATIONAL SPEDITION GMBH TRANSSERVICE IS ARRANGING FOR THE SHIPPING OF THE CHINESE ORIGIN LOW ENRICHED URANIUM TO SOUTH AFRICA. WE BELIEVE THAT THE SHIPMENT OR SHIPMENTS ARE PLANNED FOR OCTOBER.

-- WOULD GERMAN RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE WITH SOUTH AFRICA APPLY TO THIS FIRM?

-- ARE THERE ACTIONS THAT THE FRG GOVERNMENT CAN TAKE TO DISSUADE TRANSSERVICE FROM ARRANGING THIS SHIPMENT? HAIG

BT
#8842
NNNN