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NLETT 148-23-271-2

BY CCDB NARA DATE 17/9/15 Task IV. US Policy: Possible Actions/Initiatives 171129

NSSD 11-82 and NSDD establish the framework for U.S. policy towards the Soviet Union over the next 5-10 years. The question this section addresses is what we can do concretely over the next 6-24 months to implement the longer-term policies established in the NSSD and NSDD.

The preceding three sections of this paper set out our best estimate of the context for the next two years. There are important uncertainties both about Soviet conduct and other key variables (global economy, crisis spots, US domestic consensus, etc.). However, in order to determine US policy now, we need to proceed on certain explicit assumptions -- being prepared to adjust as required by subsequent developments.

We believe the most prudent assumption is that the Soviet Union will pursue a somewhat more active diplomacy, and continue its opportunistic course in regions of instability (as opposed to an immobilized, inward-looking Soviet leadership). The probability of really radical changes in the substance of Soviet policies across the board is not high. But they are likely to be more active on the margins across a fairly broad front. By proceeding on this assumption, we can prevent being put on the defensive or caught off guard.

But we face this dilemma. Our approach has been -- and should remain -- that outstanding problems relate to Soviet behavior and they need to change. This could put us in a largely reactive mode. At the same time, in the face of a more activist Soviet approach, American policies over the next 6-24 months must be geared to meet these four concerns:

1. To preempt, counter new Soviet threats against Allies and friends (in Europe re INF) or new encroachments (Somalia, Central America).
2. To offset Soviet efforts to undermine support for our overall stance on East-West relation -- peace offensives vis-a-vis China, Japan, Europe.

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3. To avoid losing the initiative or becoming irrelevant on specific outstanding problems because the Soviets make deals without reference to us, i.e. Afghanistan, Kampuchea, perhaps Poland (this is not to say that any change of Soviet behavior in which we are not involved must be bad. It is to say that certain situations which the Soviet Union and its allies created (Afghanistan, Kampuchea, etc.) are unlikely to be settled on optimal terms without the participation and weight of the United States).
4. To induce Soviet acquiescence or active cooperation in areas where this is needed, i.e. southern Africa, non-proliferation, other arms control.

The strategy of American activism, momentum, and strength which this requires does not define the content of our policy in each area. For example, we do not need to rush into a summit just to demonstrate activism. Nor should we change policies for the sake of doing something. Clearly our approach will depend in part on the situation in each area, i.e. whether in INF the Soviets make an effective presentational or substantive move determines in part whether we need to take steps in Geneva to assure that our deployments move ahead. But it does mean moving now to get the initiative in our hands in areas where there is already evidence of Soviet movement -- China, Kampuchea, Afghanistan. In general it means being acutely conscious that the Soviets have opportunities and the power to move in directions both unfavorable and favorable to the United States.

The most important determinants of the success of our policy towards the Soviet Union over the next two years will be external to the direct bilateral relationship. The major determinants will be our ability: to sustain major defense increases and restore economic growth; to keep the cohesion of our alliances; and to help shape regional situations like the Middle East where the US-Soviet relationship is of tertiary importance. But there will be an important role for action and initiative in the US-Soviet relationship as well. We will need disincentives and incentives, a willingness to penalize misconduct and to stimulate positive steps. This will require discipline and sophistication -- the ability to take limited steps while keeping from another large swing in atmospherics.

What can U.S. policy realistically be designed to achieve vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in this limited period of time.

- o First, we need to avoid another major Soviet victory at our expense and/or major new instance of Soviet misconduct (of which there was one nearly every year from 1975 to 1980), whether negative like preventing INF deployment or expansive like a Soviet-backed insurgent takeover of El Salvador.
- o Second, we need to stimulate reassessment in Moscow about the costs of using their normal policy tools vs. the benefits of a more responsible approach to international problems, i.e. that national liberation struggles are now a two-way street -- witness Afghanistan, Kampuchea, Angola, Nicaragua -- and that Soviet influence/prestige could be enhanced through participation in negotiated/peaceful solutions in places like southern Africa.

The bottom line is that in two years the Soviet Union is likely to present much the same challenge it does today no matter what policy the U.S. pursues. We will not get a broad Soviet retreat or an abandonment of their long-term view of history. But we can try to compel a pause, while we rearm, to sustain serious pressure at points where ultimately reversals are possible, and to test Moscow to determine whether and where it is prepared to engage in more constructive pursuits. Thus we need U.S. moves which are both politically effective and serious enough to engage the Soviet Union.

How should we accomplish these objectives. The following sets out under four categories a fairly rich menu of actions and initiatives. Taken together, they constitute a broad program for US actions over the next 6-24 months to deal with greater Soviet activism -- whether of the new pressure, peace offensive, or positive substantive movement variety.

A. What steps should we take to head off new instances of Soviet misconduct? Warnings? Preemptive action?

We need to be prepared for a somewhat more formidable Soviet challenge, particularly in the areas of covert action and military adventures, given Andropov's background and growing Soviet military projection capabilities. These could range from support for terrorism (PLO), to increased support for guerillas (El Salvador), to political/military moves (raising the fear-level in Europe, Cuban troops into Nicaragua penetration into Pakestan), to full scale invasions (a move into Somalia, Iran).

What should the U.S. do to head off these possibilities. Clearly each potential situation deserves detailed individual consideration which this paper cannot provide. But we can take steps in five areas:

1. Prediction. As the to-date success of our effort to persuade the Soviets to keep MIGs out of Nicaragua demonstrates, we need the best possible intelligence collection and assessment efforts in areas where the Soviets might move. Unless we know in advance, we will be unable to warn against them or take a counter-move. We would face a fait d'accompli, or a much more difficult and dangerous effort to reverse the Soviet/proxy action. Specifically, we recommend that intelligence community tasking set a high priority on monitoring potential areas for Soviet moves over the next 6-24 months.
2. Warnings. With advance knowledge, we can and should issue warnings to the Soviets. We should do so in future areas where intelligence raises serious concerns.
3. Reciprocity. The reason words had an effect in the Nicaragua case is that the Soviets judged that this Administration had the will and capability to back them up and/or to reciprocate in other areas. This is one of several important reasons for us to sustain our own programs to help national liberation struggles in certain countries, and keep in good repair the relations with other countries we need to do that. We also should be prepared to increase these programs inter alia if the Soviets increase their threat in situations of importance to us and to indicate to Soviets that we will.
4. Preemption/Reaction. We need to continue developing our military capabilities for preemption/reaction, notably the RDJTF. And we should encourage Allied capabilities, i.e. in French in Djibouti.
5. Dialogue. One idea which needs further development is the possibility of a dialogue with the Soviet Union about the use of force versus peaceful settlement in areas of instability. We are now in a stronger position to discuss this than in the 1970s because we are hurting the Soviets and their clients in various areas, even as they continue to hurt us. Clearly we do not want another set of principles which the Soviets proceed to ignore. Nor at the other extreme can we engage in specific trade-offs or discussions of spheres of influence, i.e. abandoning Afghanistan if they get out of Nicaragua. One positive thing we have established these past two years is that what happens

in Poland -- a Warsaw Pact country -- is a matter of serious international concern. We should continue to extend our droit de regard to the old "Soviet sphere" and that is another reason to resist its extension -- to Afghanistan. But there might be some area for useful thought and potential exchanges in between. The discussion could be over "means" -- acknowledging that we each believe in political/societal change but in different directions, that we are and will remain essentially competitors, and that the central question is whether support for armed liberation struggles, etc. isn't becoming too dangerous for both sides in the nuclear era, i.e. to use a head-clearing example, if an insurrection starts in Mexico and the Soviets arm it, would the United States respond by arming underground worker movements in Poland. We could for example make clear that there is a general relationship between the growth, necessity for and level of our programs in these areas and Soviet use of covert action and military force. This is a subject Andropov and Ustinov are particularly well equipped to address either through others or in any direct meetings with us. This perhaps could be done in dialogue between non-governmental people. It probably should not lead to any specific agreements but might result in some reciprocal and understood demonstrations of will on both sides.

6. Removing the Temptation. In a broader sense, one of the key element is to prevent the source of temptation from becoming so attractive that the Soviets intervene. The Middle East and Southwest Asia is the best example. Yugoslavia is another good one. US policy must place high priority on helping to ease Yugoslav economic problems to prevent Soviet meddling or worse. This applies in a number of other areas. Security assistance is particularly critical to friends who are potential targets of Soviet-sponsored pressure. We should work with the environment to make it less receptive to Soviet use.
7. Individual Game-Plans. Finally, as we develop individual policies for areas which Task II has identified as most likely for Soviet action, i.e. raising the fear level in Europe, Cuban troops into Nicaragua, further Soviet moves in the Horn of Africa and the Gulf we need to keep this potential for greater Soviet activism in mind. These papers should develop strategies which incorporate all of the elements listed above (warnings, reciprocity, preemption, etc.), plus

the traditional diplomatic use of Allies, the U.N., etc. As we deal with individual problem areas around the world, we must not assume that the new Soviet leadership is so preoccupied at home that it cannot cause us new troubles.

B. What steps should we take to induce both general and specific improvement in Soviet conduct? What leverage can we apply? What initiatives can we take?

1. Under the category of sustaining leverage and/or turning up the heat, there are these key areas for action:

- o East-West economic policy. As the NSSD points out, one key to our success in dealing with the Soviets and bringing about long-term change in the Soviet system is a united, firm Western approach to economic relations with the Soviets. We need to finish the first phase of the Western effort to define such a policy by the Williamsburg summit, i.e. six months from now. It will take additional time to have specific agreement and teeth for each component: credits, COCOM, energy, etc. What this means for our overall approach to US-Soviet relations in the 6-24 month period of this paper is that we can move in the right direction, but slowly and with some predictable bumps. We need to take this into account as we examine other areas of the US-Soviet relationship, i.e., our economic leverage will be growing but still limited and fragile. We need to avoid moves which could ease pressure on the Allies for a tougher economic policy, i.e., overly positive atmospherics. Equally important we need to sustain Allied consensus, not pushing them on specific near-term problems so hard that we kill the overall exercise.
- o US-China relations. We need to provide sufficient content to the US-China relationship to sustain this key factor in our relations vis-a-vis the Soviets. To accomplish this, we will need to proceed calmly to develop US-China relations on their own merits, in a manner that will avoid giving either the Chinese or the Soviets the impression that they can manipulate us.

The series of high level US-China exchanges already planned for 1983 will be key to advancing the relationship. The aim of the Secretary's February trip to China -- the first in the series --

will be to restore an atmosphere of trust and confidence. We have already made clear to the Chinese, and have received positive responses from them, that we expect the visit to include detailed exchanges of view in areas of common interest, regionally and globally.

In the Soviet context, we need to focus more closely on ensuring that any agreement the Chinese reach with the Soviets accords with our own interests. As the US-Chinese dialogue resumes, we should seek to engage the Chinese in discussions on how to prevent the Soviets from taking advantage of any reduction in Sino-Soviet tensions in a way that would be damaging to either of our interests. For example, any Sino-Soviet agreement to reduce troop levels along the border which allowed the Soviets to redeploy southwest (e.g., Afghanistan) would be damaging to both US and Chinese interests. It is also in both of our interests to avoid increasing the burden on NATO forces. Therefore, in our dialogue with the Chinese, we should encourage them to seek genuine demobilization, rather than redeployment. We should also maintain close dialogue on Afghanistan; and, on Kampuchea, we need to keep the US-China-ASEAN consultative process intact.

Improvement in US-China relations will require not only restoring high-level rapport but also managing problem areas, and reduces Beijing's incentives for expanding relations with Moscow. We need to define our long term national security interest with China carefully, weighing export control needs against our interest in strengthening China against Moscow. We must bear in mind also China's strong sensitivity to discriminatory treatment and need for help in its modernization.

US-China defense relations offer a means to reinforce the bilateral relationship and nurture its potential vis-a-vis the USSR. Proceeding too aggressively could backfire however, furthering both Beijing's and Moscow's suspicions that we see China solely as an anti-Soviet weapon. The ball is in Beijing's court on arms sales; we can leave it there while nonetheless pursuing a visit by Secretary Weinberger, which the Chinese have indicated they would welcome.

We must handle unofficial relations with Taiwan carefully, enhancing their substance while avoiding missteps that inflame relations with Beijing and give friends and allies the impression that we are mismanaging this key area.

- o The Middle East. Here it is important that we conduct ourselves in ways which deny the Soviets opportunities for advances. We should show sufficient forward movement -- evacuation of foreign forces from Lebanon and a beginning to broadened autonomy talks -- for us to maintain the support of moderate Arabs and deter the extremists from becoming instruments of the Soviets. We should, of course, continue to deny the Soviets a role in either the resolution of the Lebanon problem or the peace process. While planning for success regarding Lebanon and Middle East peace, we should also foresee the problems which might be caused by failure. In doing so, we should recognize that if we play our hand correctly, even in failure we should be able to prevent significant Soviet gains in the Middle East.
 - o Other areas for sustaining leverage and/or turning up the heat include those touched upon briefly in "A" above: programs directed at Afghanistan, Kampuchea, Nicaragua, southern Africa, the Horn of Africa, etc.
2. These same areas provide possibilities for constructive initiatives or measures in concert with key regional countries. We set forth proposals so that we cannot be undercut by Soviet initiatives, but also that can serve as the basis for genuinely useful negotiations if the Soviets are interested.
- o Afghanistan. A joint initiative on Afghanistan with Pakistan, China and possibly the EC in the next few months could have multiple benefits: it would be an early way to test the possibilities for positive movement with the Andropov regime, and make somewhat more difficult a further toughening of the Soviet position, i.e. raising troop levels, attacks on Pakistan; it would keep the U.S. in the mainstream of this key issue, where there is some danger of separate Pakistani and/or Chinese deals with the Soviets on less than optimal terms; if done carefully and in full consultation with the Pakistanis and Chinese, it would provide some additional content for our relations with these countries at a time when this is needed;

here and abroad it would show the U.S. as active diplomatically with a positive program vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Launching a joint initiative will require considerable effort and may not succeed. But we should attempt to do so as soon as possible -- ideally prior to the Secretary's trip to Beijing. We envisage a package of four substantive elements: phased, complete withdrawals of Soviet forces; transitional leading to permanent safeguards of Afghanistan as a non-aligned state which is not threatening to its neighbors; self-determination through electoral or traditional means; arrangements for return of refugees.

- o Southern Africa. As our southern Africa effort moves toward critical choices in the next 3-6 months, it is predictable that Moscow will pursue a two-track approach of (a) publicly berating us for the Angola-Namibia linkage and stirring up African dismay and allied nervousness over the possibility of a breakdown, while (b) making careful behind-the-scenes calculation of how we are doing and what degree of compromise will be needed. Moscow will formally reject linkage while indirectly participating, via its influence with Luanda and Havana, in a de facto negotiation.

In these circumstances, it is essential that the US game plan include potential moves to maximize pressures/incentives on the MPLA to deal and to strip away arguments that could shift the onus for failure to us. One element of our approach should be continued exchanges at sub-Ministerial level which give us useful opportunities to probe Soviet intentions and test Soviet flexibility. Another is continued development, with our CG allies, of proposals which give the MPLA (and indirectly Moscow) something concrete it must react to. Maintenance of CG cohesion is central, and the French involvement in developing proposals, scenarios and security assurances should enable us to keep the initiative and disarm Soviet divisive maneuvers. Assurances for the MPLA--put forward to obtain an adequate bid on Cuban withdrawal and to demonstrate our reasonableness and good faith--range from SAG commitments to us, to international undertakings in the UNSC context including, perhaps, outside observers, to bilateral help in the security field from the French or Portuguese. We can best maintain the high ground by means of SAG cooperation

in a "peace offensive" that reduces conflict in southern Angola and--at an appropriate moment--considering recognition of the MPLA which would strip away the argument that our purpose was its overthrow.

We should recognize that it is highly unlikely that Moscow will come down off its "principled" position on linkage until the pieces of a package are in place--both to protect itself from the charge of selling out its clients and to maximize pressures on us. A consistent record of reasonableness--shared with both the MPLA and Moscow--and a firm reiteration that we cannot be shifted on the Cubans--will give us the best chance to track Soviet moves and shape the final outlines of a settlement on our terms. It will also give us the basis for a solid public presentation of who caused failure if the process (or the MPLA) falls short. Proceeding thus will enable us to point out that despite its principled position the Soviets were (already are) prepared to consider parallel withdrawal in Phase III. We will need to push the South Africans to gain more high ground if this becomes necessary.

- o The Horn. Via our military assistance to Somalia and periodic exercises, we must create the impression in Addis Ababa and Moscow that further aggression against Somalia runs real dangers, including greater U.S. involvement. Economic pressure, both direct and indirect, must be maintained on Ethiopia to curb its adventurism. We should consider how we might facilitate a negotiated decrease in border tension.
- o Poland. We should do a separate paper on the Polish-Soviet connection. Can we encourage further progress towards reconciliation in Poland by taking the same step-by-step/dosage approach to removing the Poland-related sanctions in effect against the Soviet Union? Do we want to approach the Soviets to discuss the course we would like to see in Poland over the next 6-24 months and how it would affect our relations (this issue was not addressed in the President's Dec. 10th remarks). Clearly all of this requires close consultations with the Allies.

- o Cuban Proxy Problem. This is another possible area for initiative which requires careful and more detailed consideration than this paper can give. For example, we could consider making an offer to normalize relations with Havana if they withdrew their forces from Angola and Ethiopia, and ended their destabilizing activities in the Western Hemisphere. If the Cubans and Soviets refused to accept the proposal, it would paint them as the intransigent party; if they accepted, it would constitute a major geopolitical triumph for U.S. policy. To give this project some teeth, we could try simultaneously to sustain pressure on Cuban forces/presence in these areas and in Cuba itself (at the same time, we must recognize the complexity/difficulty of carrying this out).

In considering the foregoing we should keep in mind these factors. There are areas where we could consider discussing with the USSR the desirability of reduction of withdrawal of Cuban forces (e.g., Africa, the Middle East). In Central America, while we would not wish to begin a dialogue with the Soviets, we need to warn them of the risks that arms supplies to the area can cause. Most important we need to make them continually aware of the unacceptability of the introduction of Cuban combat forces in this region.

We need to bear in mind that (a) the direct role of the USSR in the Western Hemisphere is relatively small; (b) its control over Cuban actions in this region is rather in the nature of a veto on certain possible Cuban initiatives than it is any blanket directive authority; (c) the Cuban proxy has strong interests of its own, particularly in Latin America, most of which are starkly antithetical to US interests; (d) the capacity of the United States to change the aggressive course of the Cuban-proxy are limited in nature; (e) in the Western Hemisphere the actions of third countries and their reaction to U.S. or Cuban activities will be at least as significant as the Soviet reaction.

This means that we may wish to persuade the Soviets to take specific steps of self-restraint or restraint of the Cubans but that no general dialogue on this region is desirable.

C. What should we be prepared to do in the bilateral relationship if Soviet behavior improves?

Defining an improvement in Soviet behavior is more difficult than demonstrating the reverse. In the midst of what will continue to be a basically adversarial relationship, with far more points of friction than agreement, what constitutes a significant enough improvement to warrant a U.S. move? In terms of human rights, does release of some prominent dissidents in the midst of general repression call for something from the U.S.? Does the absence of a new aggression each year, an improvement over the past decade, mean we should reward this behavior or should we continue to require progress on existing aggressions? And how much progress on these continuing problems warrants what level of response in either the direction of the overall relationship or specific areas of it?

There are no easy, abstract answers. To some extent we will need to deal with issues in their own regional and functional context, keeping in mind our overall policy of linkage and the realistic tone we want to sustain in the relationship. But perhaps we can view the next 6-24 months in terms of three general situations: no movement on the Soviets' side except presentational insincerity; some minor moves; or a fairly significant move(s) either in terms of political impact or actual major substantive changes. The following assumes the Soviets take no major new negative action which overshadows their neutral or positive moves.

We see three basic alternatives for U.S. policy towards the bilateral relationship (as opposed to Sections A and B above which ranged more broadly -- most of the actions/initiatives set forth in those sections should be done on their own merits regardless of improvement or lack thereof in Soviet conduct).

1. Maintain the Status Quo, including its Presentational Aspects: Reiterate the basic policy we have articulated since the outset of this Administration; reaffirm that we are prepared to work for better relations on the basis of mutual restraint and reciprocity, but undertake no bilateral initiatives, gestures or signals of increased U.S. flexibility on the substance of the major issues; continue to emphasize the need for changes in Soviet conduct as the precondition for improved US-Soviet relations, while pursuing an active dialogue with Moscow on the full range of issues in order to demonstrate U.S. willingness to find constructive solutions.

2. Status Quo Plus Small Steps: While reiterating our basic policy, make minor changes to our existing positions in order to reinforce minor Soviet moves and the "two tracks" we wish to pursue vis-a-vis the Soviets: building our strength, and engaging in serious efforts to improve relations on that basis. The purpose would be to reinforce any small evidence of movement and to test the intentions and flexibility of the new leadership -- without offering significant moves on the main arms control and other bilateral. US steps could include negotiation of a new long-term agreement on grains, reestablishment of government-to-government contacts on trade through the Joint Economic Commission, or minor steps forward in arms control, such as greater flexibility in Madrid on CSCE/CDE issues.

3. Bilateral Activism: Within the framework of our existing approach, announce U.S. initiatives in arms control or other bilateral areas, and perhaps even agree to an early summit as well; the purpose would be to demonstrate forcefully to the U.S. public and our Allies that we are prepared for a substantial improvement in US-Soviet relations, and to encourage further positive Soviet actions. This paper cannot and should not get into the details of possible initiatives. We just note the centrality of arms control -- particularly START and INF. In addition, if there are really substantive as opposed to political major moves in Soviet positions, we could consider other areas for U.S. moves. For example there is some room for expanded trade once we have clearly demarcated the boundaries, i.e. when we have Allied agreement on COCOM, credits, energy, etc. This would be related to confidential talks and significant steps on human rights.

In keeping with our overall approach, moves under all three options would be so designed as to yield nothing of substance unless the Soviets reciprocated.

In weighing the choice among these alternatives, we must keep in mind what the Soviet Union's main objectives are likely to be in East-West relations over the coming months: particularly, undermining the U.S. consensus in support of increased defense spending; and undercutting the cohesion of the Alliance -- derailing INF deployments in particular. To counter Soviet efforts toward these ends, we need a policy which holds firm to the principled positions we have taken on the major issues, but which at the same time convincingly portrays us as sincerely prepared to work for improved

relations. Such a policy would, at a minimum, help to defuse the Soviet "peace offensive". If a more stable and constructive relationship were to result, all the better.

The first approach would be the course to follow if the Andropov leadership were simply to maintain the foreign policy line established under Brezhnev, and avoid any substantive or presentational departures. Absent major Soviet initiatives or a stepped-up rhetorical campaign, we could successfully fend off pressures to alter our policy, and keep the pressure on Moscow to make the first move.

The third approach would be the appropriate course of action if the Andropov regime were to take the offensive either on the substance of the issues, or successfully on the atmospherics. Even if there were little Soviet flexibility behind the intensified rhetoric, it would be a mistake to yield the initiative we have seized in US-Soviet relations by simply standing pat, and we would have to develop our own program aggressively to keep the high ground. At the same time, a more activist policy would not imply a shift in our basic policy toward the USSR; we would still demand changes in Soviet behavior as the prerequisite to changes in our own positions.

The second approach is the course that many commentators are pressing for, but would have some important drawbacks. It might be seen as unjustifiably forthcoming in the face of only minor moves by a still largely unimaginative Soviet leadership. A strategy of small steps could risk overly stimulating public and Allied expectations of a "new dawn" in US-Soviet relations, yet the gestures themselves would not go far enough either to pressure the Soviets necessarily to move on to major moves or to position us as the clearly more forthcoming party in the relationship. They could also undermine domestic support for our defense buildup.

The Allied dimension is particularly important as we consider our choices. A major Soviet objective is and will remain to influence West European public opinion in the direction of opposition to U.S. policies. Sustaining Allied unity on East-West trade and defense policies will be even more difficult during the Soviet transition, when many of our Allies will be especially eager to let bygones be bygones and seek a new rapport with the Andropov regime. Thus it is vital that we coordinate closely with the Allies, including the Japanese, as we weigh the choice between a cautious and a more activist approach. Above all we should try to restrain the Allies from striking out on their own in new directions.

We also need to take into account how our policy toward Moscow will affect our relations with the Chinese. While the

basic direction of our Soviet policy will be determined by factors intrinsic to the US-Soviet relationship, we may want to consider the Chinese angle in deciding, for example, how we handle the different regional issues.

D. How can we use "process and presence" to communicate how we will respond to improved Soviet behavior, alter Soviet incentives and disincentives, and enhance our influence on and in the Soviet Union.

Assuming no new Soviet act of aggression, we need to consider how to strengthen our communication with and presence in the Soviet Union. There are three categories of "process and presence."

1. Dialogue on specific issues. We need to go ahead with our talks on non-proliferation, southern Africa, human rights and to get on with some new areas, i.e. TTBT, nuclear CBMs and perhaps CW.
2. Enhanced presence and the means to get to the Soviet population are key to enhanced influence. We need to look seriously at consulates in Kiev and Tashkent to give some meaning to our more active nationalities policy -- the Ukraine and Central Asia are at the heart of the Soviet empire question. We also should review how to gain both greater presence and greater reciprocity through exchanges and particularly exhibits, next to the radios the most powerful tool we have had to influence Soviet citizens and now absent from our arsenal because we unilaterally decided not to proceed with a new cultural agreement. The strengthening of the radios themselves must proceed in accordance with approved Presidential guidance. And finally, our overall ideological/political action offensive must move ahead.
3. Higher-level meetings are important to getting across our message and determining how far the Soviets are prepared to go.

We envision a three stage process over the first six months of 1983.

- a. Meetings between Hartman and Korniyenko/Gromyko in Moscow, and with Dobrynin here in Washington. One objective would be to determine whether and when another meeting between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko makes sense.

- b. Another Shultz-Gromyko meeting could make sense before the regular one at the fall UNGA. It in turn could determine whether or not there is reason for a summit.
- c. Finally, therefore, there is the issue of summitry. We devote considerable attention to it because it could be so important both in terms of substance and holding U.S. public and Allied support for our policies. It cuts in a variety of directions.

Almost irrespective of the course we ultimately pursue, in coming months we should review the question of a summit. Contributing to the need for this review will be the likely series of pilgrimages to Moscow by West European leaders to "establish a dialogue" with Andropov; there might even be a Sino-Soviet summit meeting if present trends continue. The President may want to avoid being the last Western leader to meet with Andropov, but there are many risks that have to be taken into account as we consider whether and how to handle the summit issue.

Even if the Andropov leadership pursues a cautious, uncreative foreign policy, a summit in the near term might have some advantages, both substantive and political: demonstrating to Western publics that we and the Russians are actually talking to one another; giving impetus to the dialogue on arms control and regional issues; securing at least symbolic Soviet concessions on human rights. At the same time, we are all familiar with the drawbacks: a summit would suggest that US-Soviet relations were better than is in fact the case, and would stimulate unilateral European initiatives toward Moscow. (To some extent, the latter may be taking place already: Gromyko has been invited to Bonn early next year, and Helmut Kohl -- who has endorsed the idea of a Reagan-Andropov meeting in a Bundestag speech -- is likely himself to go to Moscow after the FRG elections).

Nevertheless, and in particular if we are faced with a more dynamic Soviet foreign policy, proposing an early summit could be an important element of the more aggressive U.S. policy that would be required to keep Moscow on the defensive. In tandem with the regional and arms control initiatives of the kind suggested above, agreeing to meet at the summit would make it clear that the U.S. was prepared to be flexible, and that it was in the Soviets' hands to determine which way the relationship would evolve. It could thus assist us tactically in realizing some of our strategic objectives.

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At the same time, we recognize that the results of an early summit meeting are likely to be meager at best, certainly nothing more than minor agreements such as on confidence-building measures, if that. Moreover, there is a risk that an early summit could be a bitter encounter, with Soviet intransigence leading to pressure for more confrontational U.S. policies.

We could try to avoid these pitfalls by lowering our own and the public's expectations with regard to a summit but that would be no easy task. We should try to move our public line away from emphasis on the need for "positive results" to the theme that a summit should be "carefully prepared". Such an approach would attempt to demystify the whole summit question, and seek to minimize the danger that the lack of concrete results would be interpreted as a "crisis" in the US-Soviet relationship. Another possible way to make them lower key and more routine would be to establish the principle of annual summits -- this clearly requires consideration. But altering public expectations will be very difficult no matter what we do. Another question we would need to answer is whether we could control the pressure for substantive results once summit preparations were in train. (One means of lowering expectations would be to arrange a summit on the margins of some other event, e.g., an Andropov visit to the UNGA. Such a summit could be more of a "get-acquainted" session, but it is difficult to predict whether the opportunity for such a chance encounter will occur in the coming year).

The timing of a summit would be as critical a question as whether to have a summit. Seeking a summit within the next six months could be interpreted in Moscow as an attempt to meddle in succession politics, and at home as a deviation from the basic policy course we have established these past two years. On the other hand, if a large number of our Allies seek early meetings with Andropov, this could argue for an early US-Soviet summit, perhaps in late spring, after the Williamsburg Summit (a spring meeting could give INF a needed boost at a time when public opposition to deployments will be reaching a crescendo). Moreover, if the President visits Beijing, it might be prudent to consider a meeting with Andropov in roughly the same time frame, in view of our own difficulties with Beijing and the nascent Sino-Soviet rapprochement.

No decisions on a summit are needed at the present time. Until we have a better fix on Andropov's policies, and until we can better judge whether a summit would be beneficial, we should avoid discussing it with anyone.

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