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289

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171122	PROFILE SHEET	SYSTEM II	1	12/16/1982	B1
		R 1/13/2012 CREST NLR-748-23-26-1-3			
171123	MEMO	BOVERIE TO BUD MCFARLANE RE STUDY (ORIGINAL OF DOC #171109)	1	12/14/1982	B1
		R 1/13/2012 CREST NLR-748-23-26-1-3			
171124	MEMO	L. PAUL BREMER TO W. CLARK RE ATTACHED PAPERS (COPY OF DOC #171111)	1	12/13/1982	B1
		R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-26-2-2			
171125	REPORT	U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (COPY OF DOC #171112)	10	ND	B1
		R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-26-2-2			
171126	REPORT	RE VIEW FROM WASHINGTON	16	ND	B1
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TO MCFARLANE

FROM BOVERIE

DOCDATE 14 DEC 82

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BY Cv NARA DATE 1/13/82

171122

KEYWORDS: USSR

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INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: SPECIAL STUDY PAPERS ON US - USSR RELATIONS

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	- 12/28/82	Boverie spl memo to agencies		
	C 12/28/82	Mcfarlane noted		
	12/13/85	original returned - Bm		

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National Security Council
The White House

4642

Package # 91028

82 DEC 14 P 6: 31

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>I</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>AI</u>
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	<u>3</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>N</u>
Sit Room	_____	<u>12/13/85</u>	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

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RCM mtg Wed 12/15 400

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

171123

TOP SECRET/CODEWORD

December 14, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR BUD MCFARLANE

FROM: DICK BOVERIE *Dick*

RCM HAS SEEN

SUBJECT: Special Study

Attached are papers tasked at the special meeting on December 6. As requested by you and DepSecState Dam (and confirmed today with Jerry Bremer) I am distributing these to participants (you, Dam, Eagleburger, Casey, Ikle, Gorman, Murphy).

The papers include:

- Four State draft papers on U.S.-Soviet relations.
- A paper prepared for DepSecState Dam by Ambassador Nitze.
- A paper prepared for DepSecState Dam by Ambassador Rowny.
- A CIA paper entitled "Assessment of Andropov's Power."
- A CIA paper entitled "The State of the Soviet Economy in the 1980s."
- An OJCS draft paper (reviewed neither by the Joint Staff nor the JCS) entitled "Andropov's Military Programs."
- An OJCS draft paper (reviewed neither by the Joint Staff nor the JCS) entitled "The Brezhnev Era: Military Posture of the USSR."

As of this time (4:30 p.m., December 14), we have not received the OSD papers.

The next meeting is tomorrow, Wednesday, December 15, at 4:00 p.m., in the Situation Room.

Attachment

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NLR 740-23-261-3
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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December 13, 1982 11:00

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

- NLRP 718-23-26-2-2

BY ICB NARA DATE 4/8/83

Subject: U.S.-Soviet Relations

Attached are the following papers on U.S.-Soviet relations:

- A. Executive Summary
- B. The View from Moscow
- C. The View from Washington
- D. Possible Initiatives.

All of these papers should be considered as still in draft stage; work on them is continuing within the State Department.

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachments:
As stated

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NLRR 748-23-26-2-2

BY CDS DATE 4/8/83

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171125

U.S. - SOVIET RELATIONS

Executive Summary

INTRODUCTION

We considered three questions:

(1) What is the Andropov regime's view of the world situation and of how Soviet interests can be advanced?

(2) How do we see our interests, and what would we like to see the Soviets do, not do, or stop doing insofar as their conduct affects our interests?

(3) How can we affect Soviet conduct in ways that advance our interests, and counter Soviet conduct that harms our interests?

(Note: It is possible that the CIA analysis of the strength of Andropov's internal political position, which we have not yet seen, will alter the following analysis.)

THE VIEW FROM MOSCOW

In assessing its inheritance, the Soviet leadership finds major gains and assets:

- superpower status and global reach
 - a quarreling, economically shaky West
 - domestic political stability
 - an economy strong enough to support massive military outlays while keeping popular discontent within tolerable limits
- . . . as well as problems:
- instability in Eastern Europe
 - declining growth, productivity, and morale
 - Western--especially American--rearmament.

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On balance, Brezhnev's successors will be sufficiently content with these conditions--and unsure of how to effect basic change--that they will not be inclined to depart from the country's general historical course.

To be sure, they face choices between: at one extreme, economic reform, reduced military spending, and international retreat; and, at the other extreme, accelerated military growth and broad expansionism whatever the cost. But dramatic movement toward either extreme is unlikely. The leaders probably think the economy (two percent growth) can sustain roughly the current pace of military effort and foreign positions, but not much more. It would take zero growth and serious hunger to force military and international contraction, given that this would mean abandonment of Brezhnev's main achievement: status, might and reach comparable to ours.

This does not imply passive continuity. The Soviet leaders may see more sophisticated, innovative, agile, and diversified diplomacy as the best and cheapest way to undercut and pressure us, expand their influence, and perhaps cut the political costs of some of their more exposed positions abroad. They may be contemplating a mix of selective international "opportunity-seizing" and "loss-cutting," but in both cases with costs, risks and deviations kept to a minimum.

The new leadership, like the old, sees in Washington an Administration that refuses to recognize Soviet status and prerogatives as an equal superpower, even while--in their view--magnifying Soviet military advantages. They see us as having raised the costs and risks of military and international competition, even as they may doubt the Administration's ability to maintain a national consensus in support of restoring American strength, or to forge a Western consensus around Washington's outlook and policies. They doubt our willingness to respond positively to anything less than a broad Soviet retreat, which they will not contemplate.

For some in Moscow, this assessment of Washington argues for waiting for a new American administration before attempting to improve U.S. - Soviet relations. Others may believe it demands an even greater Soviet military effort--and sacrifice. However, while resource constraints do not dictate retreat, they will work against those who advocate a major bulge in military spending and aggressiveness.

On the whole, with the possible exception of arms control, it is unlikely that the Soviets see much percentage in making major concessions in hope of satisfying this Administration. They are more likely to try even harder to put us on the defensive politically and to stimulate a public and Allied backlash against our policies, though in the process they might take some steps that would partially meet our concerns.

Consistent with this, the Soviet leaders may feel that Soviet interests are best served by "out-flanking" us--that is, by orienting their foreign policy away from U.S. - Soviet relations, and by trying to come to grips with some of their problems without reference to us. This would enhance their freedom to ignore our concerns, their ability to weaken our relations with others, and their ability to pursue new initiatives. The principal exception to this pattern is likely to be START, where they must deal with us (but will also try to reach American public opinion around us).

THE VIEW FROM WASHINGTON

Our program to re-establish American ascendancy involves rearmament, world economic recovery, respect for international law and order, and the promotion of democratic values. Progress in achieving these goals affects and is affected by our competition with the Soviet Union.

- The more successful we are, the better able we are to induce more restrained Soviet conduct or, failing that, counter lack of Soviet restraint.

- The Soviets want to impede our program, mainly by dividing us from those whose cooperation we need for success.

Over the next 6 - 24 months, our chief aims toward the competition should be:

- to prevent further Soviet encroachments;
- to bring about substantive improvement in existing problems caused by the Soviets;
- to maintain control of the agenda and the terms by which problems are dealt with;
- to keep both our general Western coalition and specific problem-related coalitions intact; and
- to engage the Soviets constructively on issues where there would seem to be overlapping interests.

Because the Andropov regime will probably follow a more active and sophisticated foreign policy, oriented away from addressing problems with us and on our terms, and because they may find it easier to mollify others than to satisfy us, we need to preserve our influence over the manner in which outstanding issues are played out. Thus, while we are in a reactive posture in the general sense that only substantive improvement in Soviet conduct will bring about more positive policies toward the USSR, we may also need to take initiatives

to maintain our coalitions and to establish standards for Soviet conduct on outstanding problems that are both demanding but reasonable. We must also be true to our promise to respond positively to genuine improvement in Soviet conduct, or we will lose our capacity to influence Moscow and to keep our partners with us.

In effect, just as the Soviets may now try to out-flank us, we have to be ready to execute our own political flanking movements to ensure that the Soviets cannot escape from our agenda of concerns and our standards for responsible conduct and real progress. This means we have to consider how to use not only U.S. - Soviet relations to induce improved Soviet behavior but also our relations with other key actors, such as our European Allies, Japan, China, ASEAN, Pakistan, and others.

THE INTERSECTION OF SOVIET CONDUCT AND U.S. INTERESTS

In view of the foregoing assessment, we must anticipate our interests being affected by Soviet policies in the following specific areas:

Sino - Soviet Relations. The Soviets may be willing to make limited substantive concessions (e.g., modest withdrawal of forces from the border) in order to pressure us and give themselves more maneuvering room. We would hope that the Chinese would not accept tokenism. To the degree the Soviets are prepared to go beyond tokenism, we have an interest in trying to prevent a reduced Soviet threat against China from increasing the Soviet threat to NATO, Southwest Asia, or other U.S. interests. We also have an interest in maintaining influence over Chinese policies, e.g., toward Taiwan and Southeast Asia, which could be eroded to the degree the Soviets draw Beijing into closer relations.

Japan. The Soviets might feel they can use conciliatory actions--perhaps punctuated by threats--to try to reverse the growing Japanese inclination to support firmer East - West policies on a global basis. We can hardly regard a Soviet pull-back from the disputed islands as misconduct; but we must hope that the Japanese drive a hard bargain and not regard Soviet concessions as a reason to reverse their movement toward a more solid stance on East - West relations generally. Rapidly advancing Sino - Soviet relations could make the Japanese more susceptible to Soviet gestures.

Kampuchea. A Soviet attempt to nudge the Vietnamese toward withdrawal would fit with Moscow's interests in cooperating with Beijing, gaining respectability with ASEAN, and easing an existing problem on their terms and without reference to us. At the same time, the Soviets greatly value their relationship with Hanoi and will not want to test its limits. Our interests are served by maintaining total withdrawal and non-alignment as

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the standards. We have to guard against mere gestures designed to crack our coalition with ASEAN (and, tacitly, China). That said, we would welcome Soviet pressure on Vietnam; and we are confident that our coalition will survive as long as the Soviets and Vietnamese represent the threat that they do, notwithstanding possible moves in Kampuchea.

Afghanistan. The Soviets--possibly with a Chinese role--might show limited flexibility in order to promote their terms for settlement and satisfy the Paks and our Allies. It is also possible that they will seriously move toward extricating themselves, on their terms. As in Kampuchea, we want total withdrawal, non-alignment, and a government of the people, and we would welcome substantial partial movement toward all of these goals. Our immediate interest is in preserving our ability to influence the terms of settlement and pace of withdrawal, and in maintaining Pak support for Afghan resistance until total withdrawal is achieved.

Middle East and Persian Gulf. The Soviets will exploit lack of progress on our peace initiative, as well as our support for Israel, to recover if not expand their influence among the Arabs, if possible beyond their standard clients. Efforts to destabilize regimes are not excluded but would be quite limited. Like us, they cannot drive the Iran - Iraq war toward either a military or political conclusion. Our interests are clear: minimize Soviet influence in the Arab world and defeat any attempts to sabotage the peace process or subvert our friends.

The Horn of Africa. The Soviets are unlikely to consider engineering a draw-down of Cuban forces in this area. It is more likely that they will test us here--if they are disposed to pressure us anywhere--since their client has a military advantage and because they may doubt our willingness and ability to save Siad if pressed. Our interest over the next year or so is in stabilizing the status quo while gradually building up Sudan and Somalia.

Southern Africa. Our interest in a Namibia - Angola settlement includes but goes beyond our desire to weaken the Soviet position in this volatile and strategically important area. The Soviets are likely to be uncooperative unless convinced that they will bear the onus for failure throughout black Africa. We will not achieve our immediate goal of Soviet acquiescence if they believe we would try to portray our success as their retreat.

Central America. Our interest is in defeating subversion, advancing economic and political development, and eventually restoring tranquility on our Southern porch. The Soviets are unlikely either to escalate or to try to curb the Cubans. Our aim should be to convince the Soviets that we have a far more

compelling interest in defeating threats in Central America than they do in fueling them--and thus, that we will do what it takes to prevail in a show-down, e.g., over introduction of MIGs or Cuban combat units into Nicaragua.

Eastern Europe and Human Rights. We have an interest in evolution toward greater pluralism, national autonomy, and respect for human rights. Andropov may subtly try to exploit Romanian and Yugoslav problems, while deciding between crackdown and tolerance of controlled reform, or at least gestures in that direction, elsewhere. Our immediate aims include convincing the Soviets that the risks of pressuring the Yugoslavs are prohibitive, and that we will not exploit--indeed we will respond positively to--movement toward greater openness in Eastern Europe.

We want the Soviets to permit national reconciliation and a resumption of reform in Poland. But we also have an interest in ensuring that cosmetic concessions not undermine West European support for our stance or increase pressures on us to agree to a CDE. On such questions as Afghanistan and Kampuchea, while we want genuine progress and can't be seen to ignore it, we may need to counter Soviet efforts to work around us and defeat our coalition without conceding any substance.

Western Europe. Blocking INF deployments may well be the Andropov regime's highest foreign policy priority. To achieve this, they will work toward offering a deal which our Allies feel would justify cancellation of our deployment program--in which case we would have to accept or else witness collapse of support for deployment anyway. (See more on arms control below). The Soviets will also try, with carrots and sticks, to abort our attempt to achieve Western agreement to constrict East - West economic relations. We have an interest not only in defeating efforts to isolate us, but also in deterring and/or countering Soviet threats against our Allies should it come to that.

Arms Competition and Arms Control. We cannot exclude that the Soviets will decide that arms control progress will not be possible until there is a new U.S. administration. However, it would be far more consistent with their overall outlook, internal situation, and likely international strategy for them to become even bolder in this area. They have an interest in confronting us with choices between: on the one hand, agreements in START and INF which meet their concerns; and, on the other, collapse of our domestic consensus and Alliance consensus in support of our defense program and INF deployment, respectively. Either outcome would offer some easing of their military burden.

Focusing U.S. - Soviet relations on arms control would be consistent with their aim of taking the rest of the agenda of international problems out of our hands. We should be prepared for major concessions on their part. Our interest is in drawing them toward our goals of reductions, equality and verifiability, while keeping popular support for our negotiating efforts and force programs intact.

U.S. - Soviet Cooperation. In addition to possibilities mentioned above (notably Southern Africa), we have an interest in getting the Soviets to cooperate concretely on functional problems where we have overlapping interest and where the Soviets matter. The most obvious is non-proliferation; there is no political reason why the Andropov regime would be averse to helping tighten up international safeguards and enhance IAEA effectiveness, though it is not clear that they would view such limited U.S. - Soviet cooperation as a sign of a generally more constructive attitude on our part. In a different vein, challenging the Soviets to provide more support for economic development might produce modest but welcome results, or at least undercut their pursuit of closer "East - South" relations.

Less Likely Developments. If our overall assessment of the view from Moscow proves to be too conservative, the most likely contingencies that could affect important U.S. interests--for worse or better--include:

- Soviet directed escalation in Central America
- support for large-scale aggression against Somalia
- shipment or deployment of "offensive arms" to Cuba
- major concessions on Afghanistan, including substantial withdrawal
- major concessions in START and/or INF.

In a way, such actions would present us with more straightforward--if not easier--choices. The real dilemmas will arise when the Soviets make more limited encroachments and/or concessions. We will have a harder time gaining support for effective responses to more subtle Soviet misconduct, and conversely, preserving support for our positions when the Soviets take partial steps to satisfy others' concerns but not ours. This is exactly the sort of conduct that seems most likely.

POSSIBLE INITIATIVES

Our basic approach should continue to reflect our view that outstanding problems are the product of Soviet behavior, which must improve if the relationship is to improve. Thus, in the most fundamental sense, we are reactive. However, in the face of Soviet policies as projected above, we need to consider moves of our own to serve several purposes:

- to preempt, deter, and counter new Soviet encroachments, which they might otherwise consider to be low-risk;
- to offset Soviet efforts, to undermine international support for our overall East-West approach;
- to avoid being outflanked and losing our coalitions on specific problems;
- to induce Soviet cooperation where it is needed and achievable.

We should also be ready to deal with the less likely possibilities: either broad retreat or a burst of expansionism. But until we see signs that either may be in the works, we should focus on initiatives designed to advance our interests in the face of the more sophisticated Soviet strategy we foresee. Some of the possibilities follow:

A. Steps to head off new Soviet encroachments:

- Enhance intelligence effort regarding possible targets.
- Warn Soviets directly when specific intelligence so warrants.
- If needed, threaten to respond in kind, e.g., stepped-up US support for national liberation struggles where the Soviets have an interest in the status quo.
- Attempt to engage the Soviets in a discussion of the limits of competition in unstable areas (e.g., Central America and Eastern Europe).
- Remove temptations (e.g., helping to ease Yugoslav problems).

B. Steps to induce improved Soviet conduct:

- Discuss with Chinese how to prevent the Soviets from exploiting either party in a way that damages the other (e.g., shifting SS-20s from West to East or troops from East to West).
- Respond sympathetically to Chinese interest in US technology, consistent with our security requirements.
- Minimize Sino-American flare-ups over Taiwan, consistent with our recent understanding.
- Organize a joint initiative on Afghanistan with Pakistan, China and possibly the EC, calling for phased complete withdrawal, transition leading to safeguard of Afghan non-alignment, self-determination, return of refugees.
- Develop -- and possibly discuss with Moscow -- a plan for step-by-step progress towards reconciliation in Poland.
- Challenge the Soviets to aid LDCs.

C. Steps in the event Soviet behavior improves:

- Expand trade, within the limits, worked out in forthcoming Alliance studies.
- Make a significant effort to move toward arms control agreements.

(Note: These steps would obviously have to be graduated and refined to fit the significance and character of positive Soviet actions.)

D. The Use of "Process" and "Presence" to enhance our access and influence and to communicate how we will respond to improved Soviet behavior:

- Proceed with dialogues on non-proliferation, Southern Africa, human rights.
- Consider opening consulates in Kiev and Tashkent.
- Hold Hartman-Korniyenko substantive preparations for Shultz-Gromyko meeting.
- Plan Shultz-Gromyko meeting before next fall.

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- 10 -

We cannot and need not make any decision on a summit until we get a better fix of how Andropov views such a possibility and of whether the Soviets are prepared to make it successful, by our definition.

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Task III - "The View from Washington"

NLRR 748-23-26-3-1

BY COB NARA DATE 8/13/71 (126)

A. U.S. Interests and Soviet Behavior

Our objective in world affairs is an international environment in which our interests are secure. In its current form and with its current expansionist tendencies, the Soviet Union is the greatest obstacle and threat to such an environment. Over the past decade at least, the USSR has acted on the sense that the basic forces of history were moving in its favor, and against U.S. and Western interests and values. We and the Soviets are and will remain competitors. The question for us is not whether to compete, but how to compete. Clearly, our task is to manage relations with the Soviet Union in ways that [1] advance U.S. and Western interests and values, and [2] avoid damage to those interests and values.

In the broadest sense, our priority objective vis-a-vis the Soviet Union over the next 6-24 months is to maintain the sense of American recovery and ascendancy we have already established under this Administration. We need to show that it is the U.S., rather than the Soviet Union, which has the superior capacity to understand the issues on the international agenda and shape developments to its advantage.

Domestic economic recovery and increased military strength are necessary ingredients. Substantial restoration of American economic health and substantial American and Western rearmament will be needed if we are to demonstrate that the tide of history is running our way. At the same time, capable conduct of American foreign policy is needed to protect and support its own basis in economic recovery and in rearmament. Both are threatened if we mismanage U.S. international interests.

Our foreign policy priorities are thus designed both to provide a firm framework for our domestic and rearmament programs, and to shape the international environment -- in general and in competition with the Soviet Union -- in ways favorable to our interests. Specifically:

-- We seek increased and modernized military strength for ourselves, our Allies and our friends.

-- We seek to consolidate and strengthen our alliances and friendships with key countries.

-- We seek to resolve regional crises and tensions in cooperation with area parties, thus depriving the Soviets of entries and opportunities and building conditions for future stability.

-- We seek to promote respect for the rule of law and for internationally accepted norms of behavior, as the proper basis for relations between states and for world order.

-- Finally, we seek to advance world economic recovery and stable arrangements and rules for international economic life.

Thus, we have a broad program which extends far beyond our competition with the Soviets but promises major U.S. advances in that competition to the extent that it is successful:

-- It will demonstrate our mastery of events and trends;

-- It will demonstrate how irrelevant the Soviet Union -- dictatorial, overmilitarized, expansionist -- is to the solution of the real problems facing mankind; and

-- It will set the terms and a framework for constructive Soviet participation in world affairs if the USSR moves in that direction.

There are both dangers and opportunities in a program intended both to limit Soviet mischief-making and induce constructive Soviet participation in international transactions. Two examples illustrate this. Non-proliferation is an area where Soviet assets are so large that little progress can be made without Soviet participation but where the Soviets share many motives for constructive behavior with us. It is thus an issue where cooperation is both essential and possible. World economic relations are a contrary example. The Soviet economy is large enough and related enough to the world economy to count, but not dependent enough on outside inputs to make constructive participation come naturally. Hence, Soviet conduct in the world economy is mainly opportunistic, involving use of economic assistance to gain political advantage, without contributing in substantial ways to solutions of the financial, energy, food and other resource issues which define the global economic problem. Here a dual approach is called for: to pillory the USSR for its irresponsible passivity in the face of global economic issues and its exploitative approach to economic tensions in individual countries, and to set the terms and define standards of performance for a genuinely constructive Soviet role.

We have also developed a specific program to guide us directly vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. It focuses on three tasks:

-- To contain and over time to reverse Soviet expansionism by competing effectively on a sustained basis with the USSR in all international arenas:

--To promote, within the narrow limits available to us, the process of change in the Soviet Union in the direction of a pluralistic political and economic system; and

-- To engage the Soviet Union in negotiations to attempt to reach agreements which protect and enhance U.S. interests and which are consistent with the principle of strict reciprocity and mutual interests.

We can expect the Soviet Union to resist implementation of both the broad U.S. foreign policy program and our specific program vis-a-vis the USSR with all the considerable political and diplomatic assets at its disposal. It is too early to say exactly what steps the Andropov leadership will take to do so. There are limits -- in resources, in outlook, in the shape of issues -- to what it can do. No doubt it will be prudent. Nevertheless, it would also be prudent for us to examine the shape of an activist Andropov foreign policy going somewhat beyond the cautious limits that are most likely in order to envisage the challenges it could pose to our own foreign policies, and the adjustments that we may wish to take to meet them.

So far under this Administration, we have demonstrated that the historic tide is not running against the U.S. and the West. We have not yet succeeded in showing that it is shifting in our favor. To do so, we will need over the next 6-24 months to manage both bilateral relations and, more importantly, the key elements of the international environment skillfully and forcefully.

In order to block progress on our program, the most plausible objective for an activist Soviet foreign policy over this period is to isolate the U.S., either by making moves in which the U.S. is not involved, and/or by demanding "ready and positive" responses to moves which do not go to the heart of U.S. and Western concerns but can nevertheless be advertized as "contributions to lessening tensions." The point will be to show our Allies, friends and public opinion that we cannot control events, and that we let issues slip away from us because we are not alert or firm enough, in order to demonstrate that the Soviets rather than the Administration hold the initiative.

Regional Issues

In our direct dealings with the Soviets, we have made clear our general concern with the adventurist pattern of Soviet conduct on regional issues, and our specific concerns with regard to Poland, Afghanistan, southern Africa, Central America/the

Caribbean and Kampuchea. They have accepted discussion with us on the basis of this agenda, and in two cases -- Afghanistan and southern Africa -- we have conducted more detailed discussions at the sub-ministerial level. Nevertheless, resolution of these issues on a basis which advances our interests will not depend primarily on U.S.-Soviet bilateral discussion. Rather, it will depend on how the specific regional situations evolve, under U.S. and Soviet influence, but not U.S. or Soviet dictation. Reviewing these issues, it is natural to begin with an area where new Soviet activism met with a local response even before Brezhnev's death: the Sino-Soviet negotiating process. A Soviet policy approach designed to isolate the U.S. could well begin in Asia.

1. Improvement in Sino-Soviet Relations

The U.S. interest in Sino-Soviet relations is to retain maximum flexibility for ourselves in relations with both; to limit the degree of rapprochement before it damages regional stability or U.S. alliances and friendships in the area; and to ensure that partial solutions to area problems which may emerge from Sino-Soviet discussions do not stop short of addressing the real causes of instability we have defined.

Both for historical and geographical reasons, and because both sides have substantial interests in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere which could be jeopardized if they sought a return to their relationship of the 1950's, we believe it is unlikely that Beijing and Moscow will move quickly to any strategic realignment that would face the United States with the two-front challenges of the Cold War era. Nonetheless, however sparse the substantive achievements might be, Moscow and Beijing have already derived some diplomatic advantages from their negotiating process, and it would be imprudent to exclude results altogether.

A modest relaxation in Sino-Soviet tensions need not damage U.S. interests, provided we do not over-react in our own dealings with Beijing. However, the further the process goes, the greater the potential damage, particularly if accompanied by further strain in U.S.-China relations.

--Force Postures. Some of the global strategic benefits resulting from the Sino-Soviet confrontation could be lost if there were substantial reductions in troop levels on the borders of China. Even if Soviet troops were not redeployed westward, Western military planners would have to calculate a larger possibility that, in a war contingency, Moscow could free Soviet Far East forces for use in Europe. Moscow, in turn, would have fewer grounds to fear U.S.-China collaboration in a global confrontation.

-- Political Impact. Regionally, if China's flexibility to redeploy its own troops were increased, the concerns of our Allies and friends [perhaps most notably Taiwan] could be increased. The latter factor could make it harder to implement the August 17 U.S.-China Joint Communique, which is critical to preventing deterioration of U.S.-China relations. Moreover, improvements in Sino-Soviet relations could well increase pressures on Deng's reformist group from hardliners, who question the importance of U.S.-China relations to China's security and want an assertive policy vis-a-vis the U.S. and Taiwan, which could further reduce the counterweight to the USSR China now constitutes. A significant improvement in Sino-Soviet relations could also reduce the long-term influence on China which we seek through the large and still-growing student exchange program giving us access to future Chinese elites.

2. Japan

The U. S. interest is to keep our principal Pacific ally confident of U.S. capacity to maintain our common security interests; increasingly willing to contribute to their maintenance; willing to work with us to resolve both bilateral issues and multilateral problems, in both the political and economic areas; and supportive of Western positions in a variety of international fora. In terms of resources devoted to regional security, we have an interest in seeing the Soviets reduce their threat to Japanese security, but should recognize that Japanese concern about soviet military forces as the only plausible hypothetical threat to Japan serves to cement US-Japanese ties.

Japanese attachment to the U.S. security tie is unlikely to be called in question by any foreseeable development, and the direct Soviet blandishments to Japan which are most likely would arouse skepticism rather than responsiveness. However, there is some Japanese nervousness about the implications of the Sino-Soviet negotiating process. Our ability to collaborate with Japan in Asia as well as we do has been conditioned in large part by common approaches to China over the past decade. Substantial movement toward Sino-Soviet reconciliation could possibly lead to a renewal of differences over China policy and to charges in some Japanese political circles, right and left, that U.S. mismanagement of China policy had been among the factors responsible for such rapprochement. there would be no inclination to weaken the U.S.-Japan security treaty as a result, and this in turn should act as a brake on Japan's moving off on its own, but Japan might in these circumstances be less inclined to follow the U.S. lead with regard to Asian policies, particularly where China is a factor.

Direct Soviet blandishment could take the form of troop reductions in the Northern Territories; offers to discuss SS-20 deployments in Asia with the Japanese; or hint at a return to the defunct 1955 offer to return the two smaller of the four islands that constitute the Northern Territories. Mere Soviet overtures on the Northern Territories would have limited resonance, and would on balance be viewed with suspicion by the Japanese. An offer to discuss SS-20 deployments with Japan would suggest to the Japanese that Japan is a target to an extent the Soviets have thus far avoided. Thus, in terms of bilateral blandishments only actual return of the two islands would cause serious Japanese questioning of the tough anti-Soviet stance that comes naturally to them.

Soviet positions on the Northern Territories have been very hard for almost two decades, so that it is highly speculative to envisage Soviet offers, much less a Japanese response. Nevertheless, a combination of expressed Soviet willingness to deal on the Northern Territories and rapidly advancing Sino-Soviet reconciliation which the U.S. appeared helpless to affect could produce the kind of Japanese anxiety which would be detrimental to U.S. interests.

3. Kampuchea

As one of the Chinese "obstacles" to normalization of relations with the USSR, Kampuchea is on the agenda of Sino-Soviet talks, and the Chinese have now presented a proposal for phased total withdrawal of Vietnamese troops in that context. Our interest in both regional and U.S.-Soviet terms is in total withdrawal of Vietnamese troops, leaving an independent, non-aligned Kampuchea. But a partial withdrawal which left Kampuchea under Vietnamese control and deprived our ASEAN friends of the will and/or means of promoting their consensus conditions for regional stability, would not be in either the U.S. or Chinese interest.

In Kampuchea, the Soviets and Chinese could theoretically convince the Vietnamese to withdraw all forces in return for Chinese security assurances, termination of support for the Khmer resistance, and increased Soviet and possible Chinese aid, with a payoff in Sino-Soviet relations and in a reduction of ASEAN pressure. It might improve Moscow's image and marginally improve Soviet access to ASEAN, but might perpetuate general ASEAN wariness of China, and might well also lead to increased access for our friends and us in Indochina. A Soviet-Chinese induced partial Vietnamese withdrawal, by contrast, might only heighten ASEAN suspicions of both the Soviets and Chinese. ASEAN could react in two ways. First, it might feel obliged

simply to acquiesce. Or, it would act to maintain its control of the Kampuchea situation and pressure for total Vietnamese withdrawal. The legacy of strong U.S. support for ASEAN and the attractions to Hanoi of normalization of U.S.-SRV relations and access to Western resources, and inevitable fear in ASEAN of a Sino-Soviet-Vietnamese condominium in Southeast Asia, give our friends and us important leverage unavailable to Moscow or Peking.

4. Afghanistan

As in Kampuchea, our interest in both regional and U.S.-Soviet terms is in total withdrawal of Soviet troops and restoration of non-aligned, independent status under a government of the Afghans' choice. But, as in Kampuchea, a partial Soviet withdrawal that deprived Pakistan of the will and/or capacity to resist a Soviet troop presence in Afghanistan, led to a partial Soviet withdrawal that left the Soviets in control of Afghanistan, and was achieved without U.S. input, would not be in our interest. Again, the Chinese also would be unlikely to cooperate in a solution of this sort. But, although no concrete proposal has yet surfaced, Afghanistan figures, like Kampuchea, as one of the "obstacles" to normalization on the Sino-Soviet agenda.

Faced with a Soviet offer to reduce troop levels and perhaps reconfigure the puppet Afghan government in return for reductions in Pakistani support for the resistance, our proximate goals should be to ensure that the Pakistanis, rather than the Soviets, control the pace of Soviet reductions, and that Pakistani support for the resistance does not cease until total Soviet withdrawal is achieved.

5. Persian Gulf and the Middle East

These two regions are of course fundamental to our interests, and the Soviets possess considerable assets in the area. These are of two kinds, though the Soviets do not distinguish between them in pursuing their own purposes. They have a wide variety of covert means to influence critical situations: in Saudi Arabia, among PLO and other Arab radicals, in Iran. They are used to obstruct U.S. peace and mediation efforts, and to position the Soviets to exploit new opportunities. In terms of political and diplomatic leverage, on the other hand, Soviet assets have been seriously reduced in recent years.

In the Iran/Iraq war, they must lack confidence in their capacity to derive advantage from any possible outcome, and the Gulf states will be difficult for them to penetrate in the next 6-24 months even if the Saudis were willing. Here our objective

is to prevent the Soviets from exacerbating the current Iran/Iraq conflict, and to deny them the chance to set the terms for its solution, through our relations with third parties.

On Arab-Israeli issues, only if Syria became a pure Soviet client through some unlikely combination of reduced Saudi support and Syrian failure of nerve would the Soviets be in a position to block US-mediated forward movement. Should the current US peace initiative not succeed in producing negotiations, the Saudi reaction could include the establishment of active diplomatic relations with the Soviets; but for internal reasons and because of the strength of our position, it would not have substantial or far-reaching effects on our interests. Hence, while the Soviets can continue to play a modest blocking role in the area, their chances of reentering the mainstream of area developments in the next two years are small.

6. Ethiopia

Across from the Peninsula on the other side of the vital Red Sea oil route, the situation is threatening for U.S. interests. The regimes closest to us -- Sudan and Somalia -- are so weakened by economic crisis as to be living on borrowed time. Libyan intrigue and the overwhelmingly dominant Ethiopian military establishment could be used by the Soviets to topple Siad Barre and/or Nimeiri, thus dealing us a geopolitical reverse at little cost or risk to themselves. Our primary interest vis-a-vis the Soviets is that they refrain from doing so. Drawdown or departure of Cuban forces in Ethiopia is a secondary priority.

7. Southern Africa

Here our primary interest is that the Soviets refrain from obstructing and preventing conclusion of the Namibia/Angola settlement process underway. The U.S. is held responsible for the success of a diplomatic initiative that has been difficult from the beginning and is encountering heavy weather now. The Soviets realize it is not yet exhausted and fear it may succeed, thus undercutting their influence in the region. At the same time, they wish to avoid seeing the onus for failure placed on themselves or the Cubans, so their opposition must be low-key, and thus possibly ineffectual

Ultimately, a deal must be cut if there is to be a regional settlement, and some degree of Soviet association will be required if their Cuban surrogates are to cooperate, as they must for settlement to be achieved.

In the near term, if the Angolans and other Africans insist on Cuban troop reductions in Angola, it is not to be excluded that the Soviets and Cubans will accede in order to avoid the blame for keeping Namibia enslaved. If they do, a plausible offer would be a Cuban-free zone in southern Angola and perhaps some reductions in return for a comparable commitment from the SADF in Namibia, and perhaps a Cuban commitment to withdraw entirely "near" in time to total SADF withdrawal from Namibia. This would be damaging to our interests if it were inadequate to secure SARG cooperation on the total settlement, or if Cubans were redeployed to Mozambique.

8. Central America/the Caribbean

Our general interest is that the development process in the area go forward without outside subversion or threats to our security interests. Whatever the complexities of the Soviet-Cuban relationship, the Soviets are currently engaged in fostering outside subversion, in building up Cuban power-projection capabilities through direct military supply, and in building up Nicaraguan military strength indirectly through Cuba. While the region is peripheral to core Soviet interests, they have a strategic interest in causing trouble for us in a vital area close to the U.S. It would be in our interest for the Soviets to stop any or all of these activities.

The most urgent contingency in terms of escalatory capability [and thus of U.S.-Soviet relations overall] is introduction of jet combat aircraft and Cuban combat forces into Nicaragua. In our bilateral dialogue with the Soviets, we have said this would be unacceptable, and they have the means, within the "normalcy" of their Cuban relationship, to prevent it. Aside from this contingency, the Soviets can increase or relieve pressure on us in the region by altering the pace of military supply to Cuba. Over the longer term, this is already a problem for us, since a conflict contingency would require us to use NATO-designated forces in order to counter Cuban forces now existing; increasing them will make the problem worse.

9. Other Extra-European Areas.

Elsewhere in the world, military conflicts, economic recession or simply societal development can produce fresh opportunities for the Soviets to expand their influence to our detriment at little cost to themselves. The Falklands crisis was such a case. Economic/financial distress in the Third World -- Mexico comes to mind -- provides the raw material for a potential loss of U.S. prestige and influence that the Soviets could seek to

exploit. U.S. losses need not lead to Soviet gains, but to the extent they are exploited by the Soviets they will serve to "prove" the failure of U.S. leadership.

The Soviet Empire

Within the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe, the U.S. interest is in evolution toward greater diversity, individual freedom and national autonomy, and respect for human rights and internationally accepted norms of behavior, both between states and toward one's own citizens. In practical terms these goals are not always perfectly compatible; Romania is a case of a country whose human rights performance makes U.S. support for national autonomy [in the specific form of access to the U.S. market as an alternative to the Soviet market through MFN treatment] difficult. An active Soviet diplomacy under Andropov is capable of increasing this difficulty through moves that are both welcome and troublesome to us. Adjustments are unlikely to be fundamental, or made as "concessions" to us; but it will be hard or impossible to dismiss them either in terms of our own principles or in relations with our European Allies.

Three types of possible adjustments come to mind:

-- A) Human rights. Since state control over Soviet citizens is basic to the Soviet regime, basic changes are not in the cards, but the regime could easily make small moves in the human rights area designed to require a "positive response" in view of the importance we attach to this topic. The Soviets could release or improve treatment of more or less well-known dissidents, possibly allowing some to emigrate, under cover of a broader amnesty, in return for spy trades, or simply as gestures timed for international impact, e.g., in CSCE. Or they could make sudden moves to meet Western "balance" requirements in CSCE. Or they could make new gestures like the invitation just accepted by the ILO to observe labor conditions in the USSR.

-- B) "Normalization" in Poland. Without judging the degree of Polish initiative/Soviet tolerance of every step, the process is sure to cut both ways in terms of U.S. interests. It will alleviate suffering, and show that Western pressure in some sense "works." But it will also reflect greater regime self-confidence; it will keep most fundamental aspects of repression intact; and it will increase tensions among the Western Allies.

-- C) Economic Reform. Within the next 6-24 months, the Soviets could broaden the limits of their tolerance for economic reform in selected East European countries [though they are on balance unlikely to do so in a major way]. The motives would be

to relieve themselves of some of the economic burdens they carry; to consolidate party hegemony before developments reach the "Polish" flashpoint; and to observe [outside the Soviet Union] experiments with efforts to contain the political consequences of economic reform through greater discipline in non-economic areas, in case they also choose this path to dealing with economic dilemmas. Here too, we may have to decide how far we welcome or even support reforms undertaken to achieve such goals.

Military Security/Arms Control

The U.S. interest is to modernize our military forces and correct shifts against us in the military balance, at the lowest possible level of forces achievable through agreements that protect and enhance U.S. interests. The Soviet objective is to undercut public and political support for this effort here and among our Allies, and to defeat it. Over the next 6-24 months, the Soviet leadership under Andropov is likely to make vigorous moves to achieve that objective. Andropov will need to keep military support for his leadership, and major reductions in forces are unlikely. However, some adjustments are possible. The Soviets may consider some redeployment or even disbandment of conventional forces, and have offered to reduce intercontinental strategic forces in START. At the same time, the war fears infecting West European, Japanese and U.S. politics are genuine, so there will be a high premium on parleying modest willingness to adjust force levels downward into showcase negotiating moves designed to undercut Western rearmament. Current Soviet attacks on and veiled threats with regard to MX and INF deployment may thus be increasingly counterpointed by well-publicized negotiating "concessions" intended to paint the Administration as insincere and unwilling to negotiate, the better to isolate it. Once again, we may have to deal with offers we know are superficial or malign.

Western Europe

At the present time, we are pursuing a large number of specific objectives of very high national importance to us in Western Europe: implementation of the NATO two-track decision on INF modernization; increased West European defense spending; West European cooperation in shaping and implementing a coherent new policy for East-West economic relations; European willingness to work with us on both bilateral and multilateral trade and financial issues. Many and ultimately all of these objectives are important to the success of our broad program for managing relations with the USSR. In defensive terms, we wish to prevent the Soviets from threatening either our West European Allies or our capacity to accomplish our larger goals; more broadly,

however, we wish to move with our European Allies to shape a sounder and more stable environment for East-West relations.

The Soviets know this, and can be expected to try to make our efforts fail. They have always done so, and they will almost certainly try harder under Andropov. Their East European glacis, where Andropov has his most extensive direct foreign policy expertise, is under strain, and at a time when Western Europe must be returning to the center of Soviet preoccupations. It is conceivable that the Soviets see in East-West tendencies a historic opportunity to achieve a permanent weakening of the Western alliance system. The Western rearmament effort will be at a critical stage in 1983, when the INF deployment decision will be implemented; the Soviets must try to prevent implementation in any event, and will try to do so in a way that maximizes strains in the Alliance. Hence, it is no surprise that a European angle figures prominently in much of the action program for Soviet diplomacy sketched out above.

-- Even a program which begins in Asia can be used to show Europe that the USSR is the superpower most actively seeking political solutions to problems:

-- "Reducing tensions" on the USSR's Asian borders while threatening a retaliatory buildup in the West could be a worrying contrast for Europeans;

-- Forcing a stiff U.S. response to Cuban moves in the Caribbean would play to Soviet advantage on a sharp contrast in U.S. and European priorities; and

-- The Soviets have a small but impressive arsenal of moves -- human rights gestures and arms control "concessions" -- to fuel the lingering West European detente mystique.

Thus, in this critical area as well the USSR could present a mixture of threats and blandishments which will be hard to handle.

B. U.S. Priorities and U.S. Leverage

The U.S. has a strategic approach reflecting its real interests in world affairs at this time, and a comprehensive program for pursuing it. There is no need to adjust fundamentals. Precisely because the program is so comprehensive, however, we may need to concentrate our efforts and prioritize among the elements of the program if we are faced with new Soviet activism along the lines suggested above.

Soviet moves of this sort would in fact constitute a response to our overall policy approach, and a validation of it. Soviet military adventurism and Soviet disregard for human rights and other international commitments have after all been at the top of our agenda for U.S.-Soviet and East-West relations. Moves in Afghanistan, in Kampuchea, in Poland, in human rights would be movement in our direction. The problem would be that if the Soviets remain in control of the process of movement, such moves will stop well short of addressing our basic concerns. Our task would be to keep the Soviets moving over the border between shadow and substance, by our own efforts and together with our Allies and friends. To do so, we would need to concentrate on a limited number of priority objectives in our program.

It is premature at this point to identify such priorities. It is not even clear that the Soviets under Andropov will wish or have the capacity to proceed as projected above. But it is not premature to begin thinking about the criteria we would have to use to choose wisely the objectives on which we might concentrate.

Briefly, there are four possible criteria, and they are not mutually exclusive:

-- Strategic. Attention to this criterion would define areas of critical importance to our security interests where these interests are under significant threat. Examples would be the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea/Indian Ocean supply lanes; Central America; our military modernization program [and hence European defense spending as well as our own, and management of arms control negotiations with the Soviets]..

-- Western Values. This criterion defines areas where our own self-respect and our broader leadership credibility require sustained political and diplomatic efforts whatever the near-term strategic advantage. Examples would be human rights; respect for the rule of law and international commitments; our program for promoting democratic development; and reciprocity in bilateral relations.

-- Unity in Strength. In the U.S.-Soviet competition, we will be obliged to act unilaterally on some occasions, but in most cases our ability to determine outcomes depends on common or harmonized action with other countries. This fact defines a criterion which focusses on issues where cohesion with Allies and friends is needed either to effect a particular outcome or to maintain a reserve of cooperative inclinations for future contingencies. Examples would be Afghanistan, Kampuchea and INF deployments in Europe.

-- Initiative. Maintaining the initiative in our own hands has independent political value as an element for effectiveness everywhere. In determining priorities we would therefore need to consider issues which permit us to display mastery of events, even if they are not in areas of preeminent strategic interest to us. Southern Africa is the most salient current example.

Since we cannot yet choose priorities, it is doubly premature to identify the specific leverage at our disposal in priority situations. But, again, it is not too early to begin thinking about the kinds of leverage we would wish to bring to bear.

The key distinction here is between direct leverage on the Soviets and our capacity to shape the Soviet leadership's environment to our advantage.

The overall quality and tone of the bilateral relationship affects Soviet decisions of interest to us, and we have substantial control over it in our ability to set the style of public statements and determine the protocolary aspects of doing business. Moreover, we are in negotiation with the Soviets on a variety of arms control issues, and it may be in our interest over the next 6-24 months to engage new negotiations with the USSR on various topics, ranging from arms control [nuclear CBMs and TTBT/PNET verification] through economic issues [a maritime agreement and a new long-term grains agreement] to other bilateral topics [a new cultural agreement ensuring reciprocal cultural access to the USSR for us, new consulates in the two countries].

Nevertheless, our capacity to shape the Soviet environment indirectly will continue to provide our best leverage in this period, given the high degree of mutual mistrust and suspicion in and the current low level of direct transactions. We regularly discuss "indirect leverage" directly with the Soviets under the rubric of regional issues. In these discussions, we have the option of threatening to turn up the heat on them, or promising to turn it down, depending on Soviet conduct on a given topic, so long as we exercise it realistically and in coordination with other players on these issues.

In the main, however, we will exercise indirect leverage most productively by effecting changes in actual power configurations of interest to the Soviets. Our public posture on Soviet-related issues and our rearmament program are of course key assets here. But they are matched in importance by two others:

1. On Asian issues [Sino-Soviet relations, Kampuchea, Afghanistan, Japan], we can promote our interests and keep up pressure for genuine solutions only by strong but prudent efforts to keep our relations with China, Japan, Pakistan, Thailand and the other ASEAN states in good repair. With China, this means managing U.S.-China relations well, building the bilateral aspects of our relationship where we can and renewing our dialogue with the Chinese on strategic topics of common interest, while managing our unofficial relations with Taiwan with care. With Japan, we should give more weight in our dialogue to political/security issues that unite us, alongside trade and defense burden-sharing issues that divide us. With Pakistan, we should develop our bilateral relationship where we can; maintain our support for the Afghan national resistance and firm Pakistani insistence on total Soviet withdrawal; consult intensively on ways of advancing political solutions in Afghanistan; and not hesitate to advance them, or encourage others to do so, if common approaches are agreed. With ASEAN, we should maintain our firm support for ASEAN strategy, and continue to stress our bilateral security relationships, particularly with Thailand. In that context, our continued support for ASEAN's efforts to strengthen the Kampuchean coalition and its non-Communist elements is important. With all, we should make the point that forces reduced should be disbanded, and not redeployed against other friends of ours.

2. In southern Africa, we should maintain the considerable leverage we have by continuing to work with all interested parties for concurrent solutions in Namibi and Angola. We should consider increasing it by developing specific contingency security assurances, acceptable to the SARG, for the MPLA government, thereby preparing more specifically to tag the Cubans and Soviets with responsibility for failure if we do not succeed. Finally, we should continue working with the SARG and with Mozambique to reduce the likelihood that Cubans will be transferred to Mozambique rather than home.

3. In Europe, our multiple efforts to engineer a new post-detente consensus depend critically for success on developments in arms control negotiations, given the importance both the Soviets and the West Europeans attach to this area, and the decisive character the INF dual decision has assumed for NATO. The leverage we develop in other areas will not compensate for the loss we will sustain if we are unprepared to manage a Soviet carrots-and-sticks offensive in Europe which mixes new "proposals" or "concessions" in INF and START with heightened threats to Allies.

The dilemma new Soviet activism could pose for us recurs so often, in case after case, that it can be considered generic to the current situation. The Soviets have a running shot at preventing success of our overall program by threatening the integrity and effectiveness of U.S. policy from two sides: we will sacrifice essential support for our tough approach, our basic "leverage," if we refuse any positive response to Soviet moves, or if our response is too positive. We have it in our power, working with Allies and friends, to pursue our own objectives by making measured responses that take credit for Soviet moves where credit is due us, give credit where it is due the Soviets, and insist on further progress toward real and potentially stable solutions of the issues we have identified.