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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

File Folder USSR (12/8/82-12/13/82)

KDB 12/8/2015

Box Number 23

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

285

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171088	CABLE	MOSCOW 14805 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-22-1-7	3	12/8/1982	B1
171089	MEMO	F. WETTERING THROUGH D. PIPES TO W. CLARK RE CROCKER'S MEETING WITH SOVIETS	1	12/10/1982	B1
171090	CABLE	MOSCOW 14805 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-22-3-5	5	12/8/1982	B1
171101	CABLE	RE USSR	3	11/9/1982	B1
171091	MEMO	WETTERING TO CLARK RE STATE MEMO ON US/USSR MEETING ON AFRICA R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-22-4-4	1	11/30/1982	B1
171100	CABLE	031957Z DEC 82	1	12/3/1982	B1
171092	REPORT	RE SOVIET ELITES	14	12/1/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
171093	MEMO	CLARK TO REAGAN RE REPORT R 1/13/2012 CREST NLR-748-23-22-6-2	1	12/28/1982	B1
171094	MEMO	W. CASEY TO PRESIDENT ET AL. RE ATTACHED MEMO PAR 1/13/2012 CREST NLR-748-23-22-7-1	1	11/29/1982	B1
171096	MEMO	TO PRESIDENT ET AL. RE SOVIET POLITICAL SUCCESSION PAR 10/8/2010 CREST NLR-748-23-22-8-0	1	4/22/1982	B1
171098	MEMO	RE ANDROPOV R 1/13/2012 CREST NLR-748-23-22-9-9	7	11/20/1982	B1
171095	MEMO	TO PRESIDENT ET AL. RE SOVIET POLITICAL SUCCESSION (COPY DOC #171096) PAR 10/8/2010 CREST NLR-748-23-22-8-0	1	4/22/1982	B1
171099	MEMO	RE ANDROPOV (SAME AS DOC #171098) R 1/13/2012 CREST NLR-748-23-22-9-9	7	11/20/1982	B1
171097	PROFILE SHEET	NSC/S R 1/13/2012 CREST NLR-748-23-22-9-9	1	12/14/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

171088

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 4805 63084 DTG: 081120Z DEC 82 PSN: 028557
SIT302 DATE 01/04/83 TOR: 342/1341Z

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O 081120Z DEC 82
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR 748-03-22-1-7
BY 26 /CDS NARA DATE 12/8/82

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1218

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 14805
NODIS

DEPARTMENT PASS TO SECRETARY FROM CROCKER
AF FOR WISNER

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: US, UR, PEPR, XJ

SUBJECT: DISCUSSIONS WITH SOVIETS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

1. ~~1~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: MY DECEMBER 7 MOSCOW TALKS WITH THE SOVIETS REVEALED THEM TO BE STILL IN POSITION ONLY TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION ON POSITIONS WITH US, DESPITE SUGGESTIONS THEY HAVE MADE IN TALKS AT MINISTERIAL AND WORKING LEVEL OVER PAST YEAR THAT THEY DESIRE TO PLAY SOME ACTUAL PART IN THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN NEGOTIATIONS. ALTHOUGH THERE WAS PREDICTABLE SKIRMISHING ON SOME OF THE PERENNIAL THEMES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS - LINKAGE, U.S. AS THE STALKING HORSE FOR SOUTH AFRICAN POSITIONS AND AGGRESSION, CG NON-UNITY, ETC. - THE QUESTION OF CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL CLEARLY EMERGED AS THE CENTRAL ISSUE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AS THEY STAND NOW AND WAS DISCUSSED AT SOME LENGTH. THE SOVIETS PROBED OUR ATTITUDE TOWARD THE CONCEPT OF SOME CUBAN WITHDRAWAL AS THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEVEL IN NAMIBIA IS REDUCED TOWARD 1,500, WHICH SHOWED THEY ARE THINKING AHEAD, ARE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FAMILIAR WITH EVOLVING MPLA POSITIONS, AND DO NOT RULE OUT A REDUCTION OF THE CUBAN TROOP PRESENCE IN ANGOLA IN PHASE III. THEY ACCUSED US OF HAVING HARDENED OUR POSITION SINCE THE SEPTEMBER 21 GENEVA TALKS, BASED ON OUR SPECIFIC IDENTIFICATION OF THE NEED FOR A TIMETABLE ON WITHDRAWAL WITH NUMBERS AND DATES TO MOVE FORWARD, A FALSE CLAIM THAT I KNOCKED DOWN BUT THAT WE WILL NEED TO PREEMPT IN BRIEFING THE CG, THE FLS, AND OTHER PARTIES ON THE TALKS. I MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE DID NOT COME TO MOSCOW TO ASK FOR THEIR HELP BUT DID OPEN THE DOOR A CRACK AT SEVERAL POINTS IF THEY HAD WISHED TO BID ON A ROLE. THEY DID NOT AND THUS THIS THIRD ROUND OF DETAILED TALKS CONSISTED BASICALLY OF ANOTHER INFORMATIONAL EXCHANGE OF POSITIONS. NO MENTION WAS MADE OF FURTHER DISCUSSIONS. END SUMMARY.

3. I SET OUR TONE FOR THIS SESSION BY PLACING THESE TALKS IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR CONTINUING DISCUSSIONS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA, EXPRESSING OUR HOPE THAT THEY WOULD BE POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE, AND CALLING THEM AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THE OVERALL U.S./SOVIET DIALOGUE INVOLVING ARMS CONTROL, REGIONAL ISSUES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND BILATERAL ISSUES. I NOTED OUR COOPERATION IN THE RECENT PRISONER EXCHANGE AND SUGGESTED WE EXPLORE WHETHER IT WAS POSSIBLE TO AVOID WORKING AT CROSS PURPOSES WITH EACH OTHER ON THE LARGER ISSUES OF THE REGION, CITING THE PRESIDENT'S POINT THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL FIND A READY PARTNER IN THE U.S. IF IT IS PREPARED TO ACT POSITIVELY AND CONSTRUCTIVELY.

4. DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER IL'ICHEV, AN OLDER, STALIN-VINTAGE NEGOTIATOR WHO IS THE SOVIETS' CHINA INTERLOCUTOR, OPERATED IN THE SAME MODE AS HE HAD IN THE SEPTEMBER 21 TALKS IN GENEVA, PRESENTING THE SOVIETS' "PRINCIPLED", LEGALISTIC, UN-FOCUSSED POSITIONS ON THE ISSUES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. UNSCR 435 AND OTHER UN RESOLUTIONS WERE THE ONLY ROAD TO NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE; LINKAGE TO CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL WAS NOT IN ANY UN RESOLUTION; THEREFORE, OUR APPROACH WAS UNLAWFUL AND WAS "REJECTED" BY THE AFRICANS. IN PARTICULAR, SOVIETS MADE POINT THAT THESE TALKS WITH US WERE,

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

IN PART, A FUNCTION OF COMMON UNSC PERMANENT MEMBERSHIP AND THAT IN THAT RESPECT, THEY WOULD NOT DEAL BEHIND BACKS OF THE AFRICANS. IT IS THE SOVIET POSITION RATHER THAN OURS WHICH REFLECTS CORRECTLY THE WISHES OF THE AFRICAN STATES.

5. I MADE IT CLEAR THAT LINKAGE WAS NOT A THEOLOGY WE WERE SEEKING TO ESTABLISH, BUT RATHER REFLECTED OUR PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO RESOLVING THE PROBLEMS OF THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGION. I NOTED THAT WE HAD BEEN NEGOTIATING INTENSIVELY AND FLEXIBLY WITH THE MPLA ON CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL FOR A YEAR NOW AND, I BELIEVE, SURPRISED THEM BY OBSERVING THAT THE TWO KEY ACTORS IN THE QUESTION, SOUTH AFRICA AND ANGOLA, WERE MEETING THIS VERY DAY TO DISCUSS MATTERS DIRECTLY.

6. I SOUGHT TO BLAST IL'ICHEV OUT OF HIS RECITATION OF FAMILIAR POSITIONS IN MY UPDATE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BY PRESENTING ALTERNATIVE PICTURES OF THE REGION, WITH

MOSCOW 4805 63084 DTG: 081120Z DEC 82 PSN: 028557

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 4805 63084 DTG: 081120Z DEC 82 PSN: 028611
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O 081120Z DEC 82
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1219

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 14805
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DEPARTMENT PASS TO SECRETARY FROM CROCKER
AF FOR WISNER

OR WITHOUT OUR SETTLEMENT, SUGGESTING THAT THERE COULD BE SOMETHING FOR EVERYONE IN A SETTLEMENT AND THAT THE PICTURE WITHOUT IT WAS BLEAK, WITH THE PROBABILITY OF ACCENTUATED VIOLENCE AND HIGHER COSTS FOR EVERYONE, INCLUDING THE SOVIET UNION AND CUBA AS WELL AS SWAPO AND THE MPLA. I ALSO CLARIFIED THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS IMPLICIT IN THE PARALLEL WITHDRAWAL OF SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES FROM ANGOLA AND THEN NAMIBIA UNDER UNSCR 435 AND THE TIME FRAME FOR PARALLEL CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA, TO MAKE CLEAR THE REASONABLENESS OF OUR POSITION AND TO BE SURE THAT THE SOVIETS KNEW WHAT WE WERE ASKING FOR. THIS LED TO A RATHER THOROUGH AIRING OF THE CUBAN TROOP ISSUE, BUT NO AGREEMENT. AT LUNCH, IL'ICHEV PROBED THE POSSIBILITY OF RELATING CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL TO THE UNSC RES. 435 IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE WHICH PERMITS SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES AT THE 1,500 LEVEL UP TO THE ELECTION. LATER HE PRAISED THE MPLA IDEA OF "SOME" CUBAN WITHDRAWAL ONCE THE SADF WITHDRAWAL IS UNDERWAY AS "BUSINESSLIKE AND SERIOUS." I AGREED THAT THE MPLA POSITION HAD EVOLVED IN PRINCIPLE, BUT MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT WAS NOT GOOD ENOUGH, LACKING THE NECESSARY PRECISION ON DATES AND NUMBERS.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

7. AGAINST A BACKGROUND OF REFERENCES TO PAST SOVIET HINTS AT VARIOUS LEVELS THAT THEY WISHED A ROLE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, AT DIFFERENT TIMES IN THE TALKS I OPENED THE DOOR A CRACK IF THEY WISHED TO BID BY REFERENCES TO (A) THE SUCCESSFUL PRISONER EXCHANGE AS A MICROCOSM, (B) A POSSIBLE "COOLING-OFF" PERIOD IN THE REGION, AND (C) REFERENCE TO THE UN IMPLEMENTING RESOLUTION. AS THE TALKS WERE DRAWING TO A CLOSE, I REMARKED TO IL'ICHEV THAT THE ONLY ROLE WE SAW THE SOVIETS PLAYING AT THIS POINT WAS ONE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DIPLOMATIC REJECTION OF THE ONE EFFORT UNDERWAY TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEMS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA. WE HAD CERTAINLY NOT COME TO MOSCOW ASKING HELP BUT, AGAINST THEIR REFERENCES FOR A YEAR NOW TO A ROLE FOR THEMSELVES, WE WOULD APPRECIATE SOME CLARIFICATION. AT THIS POINT, WE COULD ONLY CONCLUDE THAT SOUTHERN

AFRICA WAS NOT AN AREA WHERE THE U.S. AND USSR COULD PURSUE POSSIBILITIES OF COOPERATION WITH POTENTIAL FOR GENERAL IMPROVEMENT OF BILATERAL RELATIONS.

8. IL'ICHEV RESPONDED BY ACCUSING US OF HAVING HARDENED OUR POSITION SINCE GENEVA IN NOW INSISTING ON A TIME-TABLE FOR CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL, THE EXACT POINT WHERE THE TWO COUNTRIES' POSITIONS MOST SHARPLY DIVERGE. HE RECITED THE LITANY THAT TIMETABLES ARE FOR LUANDA AND HAVANA TO DECIDE AS A "BILATERAL MATTER." I COUNTERED THAT OUR POSITION ON CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL NOW WAS THE SAME AS IT WAS 18 MONTHS AGO. A TIMETABLE FOR THE CUBANS WAS NOW THE FOCUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS SINCE ALL OTHER ISSUES HAD BEEN RESOLVED. IL'ICHEV ASKED WHAT THE USE OF THAT WAS SINCE WE WERE "BLOCKED" ON CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL. I RESPONDED, "WE WILL SEE."

9. COMMENT: IF THE SOVIETS DO HAVE ANY INTENTION OF PLAYING A ROLE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS BEYOND OBSTRUCTING ANGOLAN AGREEMENT TO CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL, IT WAS CLEAR THAT IL'ICHEV HAD NO BRIEF TO BID ON IT AT THIS TIME. I SUGGESTED NO ROLE FOR THEM NOR ASKED THEM FOR HELP, BUT DID PROVIDE THEM SEVERAL OPENINGS IF THEY WISHED TO PURSUE THIS ISSUE AS AN AREA FOR SPECIFIC OR MORE GENERAL COOPERATION. I MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE FORM OF THAT WOULD BE TO ENCOURAGE THE ANGOLANS TO COME FORWARD WITH A SPECIFIC TIMETABLE FOR CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL. FAILING A CLEAR BID ON THEIR PART, THEY

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PRESUMABLY WANTED THE MEETING IN ORDER TO CONTINUE THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND TO BE SEEN TALKING TO US IN GENERAL AND ON THIS ISSUE. IN THE MEANTIME, THEIR LINE OF ATTACK IN THE DISCUSSIONS MADE IT CLEAR WHERE WE MUST DEFEND OURSELVES IN THE ONGOING BATTLE TO MAINTAIN CG UNITY AND AFRICAN FRONT LINE AND OTHER SUPPORT FOR OUR EFFORT, IN THE UN AND ELSEWHERE. THE SUBJECT OF FUTURE TALKS WAS NOT RAISED.

10. IT IS CLEAR THEY WISH TO RETAIN A STRONG RECORD OF PURITY WITH THE AFRICANS ON LINKAGE AND WILL PLAY THEIR LINE, PLUS DISTORTIONS OF OURS, BACK THROUGH THEIR CHANNELS. IT IS ALSO CLEAR THEY ARE MONITORING THE MPLA'S POSITIONS AND MAKING THEIR OWN ASSESSMENT OF WHAT MIGHT BE NEGOTIABLE WITH US WHILE MAINTAINING THE STRONG POSTURE OF DENYING THE LEGITIMACY OF OUR

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 14805
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DEPARTMENT PASS TO SECRETARY FROM CROCKER
AF FOR WISNER
WHOLE EFFORT. THIS MEANS THEY RETAIN ALL THEIR OPTIONS.
HARTMAN

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National Security Council
The White House

460

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Package #

8 DEC 10 P 6: 43

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	1	<i>[initials]</i>	A
Bud McFarlane	2	<i>[initials]</i>	
Jacque Hill	3	<i>[initials]</i>	
Judge Clark	4	<i>[initials]</i>	A
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary	5		
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Get Clark to come over - he suggested it

add Bud

BUD WILL BE OUT OF THE OFC.

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	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>

171089 MEMO

1 12/10/1982 B1

F. WETTERING THROUGH D. PIPES TO W. CLARK
RE CROCKER'S MEETING WITH SOVIETS

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 14805

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NLRR 748-23-22-3-5

BY CDJ NARA DATE 12/8/15

NODIS
DEPARTMENT PASS TO SECRETARY FROM CROCKER
AF FOR WISNER
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: US, UR, PEPR, XJ
SUBJECT: DISCUSSIONS WITH SOVIETS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA

1. (~~S~~ ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: MY DECEMBER 7 MOSCOW TALKS WITH THE SOVIETS REVEALED THEM TO BE STILL IN POSITION ONLY TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION ON POSITIONS WITH US, DESPITE SUGGESTIONS THEY HAVE MADE IN TALKS AT MINISTERIAL AND WORKING LEVEL OVER PAST YEAR THAT THEY DESIRE TO PLAY SOME ACTUAL PART IN THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN NEGOTIATIONS. ALTHOUGH THERE WAS PREDICTABLE SKIRMISHING ON SOME OF THE PERENNIAL THEMES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS - LINKAGE, U. S. AS THE STALKING HORSE FOR SOUTH AFRICAN POSITIONS AND AGGRESSION, CG NON-UNITY, ETC. - THE QUESTION OF CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL CLEARLY EMERGED AS THE CENTRAL ISSUE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AS THEY STAND NOW AND WAS DISCUSSED AT SOME LENGTH. THE SOVIETS PROBED OUR ATTITUDE TOWARD THE CONCEPT OF SOME CUBAN WITHDRAWAL AS THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEVEL IN NAMIBIA IS REDUCED TOWARD 1,500, WHICH SHOWED THEY ARE THINKING AHEAD, ARE FAMILIAR WITH EVOLVING MPLA POSITIONS, AND DO NOT RULE OUT A REDUCTION OF THE CUBAN TROOP PRESENCE IN ANGOLA IN PHASE III. THEY ACCUSED US OF HAVING HARDENED OUR POSITION SINCE THE SEPTEMBER 21 GENEVA TALKS, BASED ON OUR SPECIFIC IDENTIFICATION OF THE NEED FOR A TIMETABLE ON WITHDRAWAL WITH NUMBERS AND DATES TO MOVE FORWARD, A FALSE CLAIM THAT I KNOCKED DOWN BUT THAT WE WILL NEED TO PREEMPT IN BRIEFING THE CG, THE FLS, AND OTHER PARTIES ON THE TALKS. I MADE IT CLEAR THAT WE DID NOT COME TO MOSCOW TO ASK FOR THEIR HELP BUT DID OPEN THE DOOR A CRACK AT SEVERAL POINTS IF THEY HAD WISHED TO BID ON A ROLE. THEY DID NOT AND THUS THIS THIRD ROUND OF DETAILED TALKS CONSISTED BASICALLY OF ANOTHER INFORMATIONAL EXCHANGE OF POSITIONS. NO MENTION WAS MADE OF FURTHER DISCUSSIONS. END SUMMARY.

3. I SET OUR TONE FOR THIS SESSION BY PLACING THESE TALKS IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR CONTINUING DISCUSSIONS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA, EXPRESSING OUR HOPE THAT THEY WOULD BE POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE, AND CALLING THEM AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THE OVERALL U. S. /SOVIET

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 4805

DTG: 081120Z DEC 82 PSN: 028557

DIALOGUE INVOLVING ARMS CONTROL, REGIONAL ISSUES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND BILATERAL ISSUES. I NOTED OUR COOPERATION IN THE RECENT PRISONER EXCHANGE AND SUGGESTED WE EXPLORE WHETHER IT WAS POSSIBLE TO AVOID WORKING AT CROSS PURPOSES WITH EACH OTHER ON THE LARGER ISSUES OF THE REGION, CITING THE PRESIDENT'S POINT THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL FIND A READY PARTNER IN THE U.S. IF IT IS PREPARED TO ACT POSITIVELY AND CONSTRUCTIVELY.

4. DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER IL'ICHEV, AN OLDER, STALIN-VINTAGE NEGOTIATOR WHO IS THE SOVIETS' CHINA INTERLOCUTOR, OPERATED IN THE SAME MODE AS HE HAD IN THE SEPTEMBER 21 TALKS IN GENEVA, PRESENTING THE SOVIETS' "PRINCIPLED", LEGALISTIC, UN-FOCUSSED POSITIONS ON THE ISSUES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. UNSCR 435 AND OTHER UN RESOLUTIONS WERE THE ONLY ROAD TO NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE; LINKAGE TO CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL WAS NOT IN ANY UN RESOLUTION; THEREFORE, OUR APPROACH WAS UNLAWFUL AND WAS "REJECTED" BY THE AFRICANS. IN PARTICULAR, SOVIETS MADE POINT THAT THESE TALKS WITH US WERE, IN PART, A FUNCTION OF COMMON UNSC PERMANENT MEMBERSHIP AND THAT IN THAT RESPECT, THEY WOULD NOT DEAL BEHIND BACKS OF THE AFRICANS. IT IS THE SOVIET POSITION RATHER THAN OURS WHICH REFLECTS CORRECTLY THE WISHES OF THE AFRICAN STATES.

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 14805

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DEPARTMENT PASS TO SECRETARY FROM CROCKER
AF FOR WISNER

OR WITHOUT OUR SETTLEMENT, SUGGESTING THAT THERE COULD BE SOMETHING FOR EVERYONE IN A SETTLEMENT AND THAT THE PICTURE WITHOUT IT WAS BLEAK, WITH THE PROBABILITY OF ACCENTUATED VIOLENCE AND HIGHER COSTS FOR EVERYONE, INCLUDING THE SOVIET UNION AND CUBA AS WELL AS SWAPO AND THE MPLA. I ALSO CLARIFIED THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS IMPLICIT IN THE PARALLEL WITHDRAWAL OF SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES FROM ANGOLA AND THEN NAMIBIA UNDER UNSCR 435 AND THE TIME FRAME FOR PARALLEL CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA, TO MAKE CLEAR THE REASONABLENESS OF OUR POSITION AND TO BE SURE THAT THE SOVIETS KNEW WHAT WE WERE ASKING FOR. THIS LED TO A RATHER THOROUGH AIRING OF THE CUBAN TROOP ISSUE, BUT NO AGREEMENT. AT LUNCH, IL'ICHEV PROBED THE POSSIBILITY OF RELATING CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL TO THE UNSC RES. 435 IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE WHICH PERMITS SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES AT THE 1,500 LEVEL UP TO THE ELECTION. LATER HE PRAISED THE MPLA IDEA OF "SOME" CUBAN WITHDRAWAL ONCE THE SADF WITHDRAWAL IS UNDERWAY AS "BUSINESSLIKE AND SERIOUS." I AGREED THAT THE MPLA POSITION HAD EVOLVED IN PRINCIPLE, BUT MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT WAS NOT GOOD ENOUGH, LACKING THE NECESSARY PRECISION ON DATES AND NUMBERS.

7. AGAINST A BACKGROUND OF REFERENCES TO PAST SOVIET HINTS AT VARIOUS LEVELS THAT THEY WISHED A ROLE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, AT DIFFERENT TIMES IN THE TALKS I OPENED THE DOOR A CRACK IF THEY WISHED TO BID BY REFERENCES TO (A) THE SUCCESSFUL PRISONER EXCHANGE AS A MICROCOSM, (B) A POSSIBLE "COOLING-OFF" PERIOD IN THE REGION, AND (C) REFERENCE TO THE UN IMPLEMENTING RESOLUTION. AS THE TALKS WERE DRAWING TO A CLOSE, I REMARKED TO IL'ICHEV THAT THE ONLY ROLE WE SAW THE SOVIETS PLAYING AT THIS POINT WAS ONE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DIPLOMATIC REJECTION OF THE ONE EFFORT UNDERWAY TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEMS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA. WE HAD CERTAINLY NOT COME TO MOSCOW ASKING HELP BUT, AGAINST THEIR REFERENCES FOR A YEAR NOW TO A ROLE FOR THEMSELVES, WE WOULD APPRECIATE SOME CLARIFICATION. AT THIS POINT, WE COULD ONLY CONCLUDE THAT SOUTHERN AFRICA WAS NOT AN AREA WHERE THE U.S. AND USSR COULD PURSUE POSSIBILITIES OF COOPERATION WITH POTENTIAL FOR GENERAL IMPROVEMENT OF BILATERAL RELATIONS.

8. IL'ICHEV RESPONDED BY ACCUSING US OF HAVING HARDENED OUR POSITION SINCE GENEVA IN NOW INSISTING ON A TIME-

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 4805

DTG: 081120Z DEC 82 PSN: 028611

TABLE FOR CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL, THE EXACT POINT WHERE THE TWO COUNTRIES' POSITIONS MOST SHARPLY DIVERGE. HE RECITED THE LITANY THAT TIMETABLES ARE FOR LUANDA AND HAVANA TO DECIDE AS A "BILATERAL MATTER." I COUNTERED THAT OUR POSITION ON CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL NOW WAS THE SAME AS IT WAS 18 MONTHS AGO. A TIMETABLE FOR THE CUBANS WAS NOW THE FOCUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS SINCE ALL OTHER ISSUES HAD BEEN RESOLVED. IL'ICHEV ASKED WHAT THE USE OF THAT WAS SINCE WE WERE "BLOCKED" ON CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL. I RESPONDED, "WE WILL SEE."

9. COMMENT: IF THE SOVIETS DO HAVE ANY INTENTION OF PLAYING A ROLE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS BEYOND OBSTRUCTING ANGOLAN AGREEMENT TO CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL, IT WAS CLEAR THAT IL'ICHEV HAD NO BRIEF TO BID ON IT AT THIS TIME. I SUGGESTED NO ROLE FOR THEM NOR ASKED THEM FOR HELP, BUT DID PROVIDE THEM SEVERAL OPENINGS IF THEY WISHED TO PURSUE THIS ISSUE AS AN AREA FOR SPECIFIC OR MORE GENERAL COOPERATION. I MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE FORM OF THAT WOULD BE TO ENCOURAGE THE ANGOLANS TO COME FORWARD WITH A SPECIFIC TIMETABLE FOR CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL. FAILING A CLEAR BID ON THEIR PART, THEY PRESUMABLY WANTED THE MEETING IN ORDER TO CONTINUE THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND TO BE SEEN TALKING TO US IN GENERAL AND ON THIS ISSUE. IN THE MEANTIME, THEIR LINE OF ATTACK IN THE DISCUSSIONS MADE IT CLEAR WHERE WE MUST DEFEND OURSELVES IN THE ONGOING BATTLE TO MAINTAIN CG UNITY AND AFRICAN FRONT LINE AND OTHER SUPPORT FOR OUR EFFORT, IN THE UN AND ELSEWHERE. THE SUBJECT OF FUTURE TALKS WAS NOT RAISED.

10. IT IS CLEAR THEY WISH TO RETAIN A STRONG RECORD OF PURITY WITH THE AFRICANS ON LINKAGE AND WILL PLAY THEIR LINE, PLUS DISTORTIONS OF OURS, BACK THROUGH THEIR CHANNELS. IT IS ALSO CLEAR THEY ARE MONITORING THE MPLA'S POSITIONS AND MAKING THEIR OWN ASSESSMENT OF WHAT MIGHT BE NEGOTIABLE WITH US WHILE MAINTAINING THE STRONG POSTURE OF DENYING THE LEGITIMACY OF OUR BT

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DEPARTMENT PASS TO SECRETARY FROM CROCKER
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WHOLE EFFORT. THIS MEANS THEY RETAIN ALL THEIR OPTIONS.
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	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>
171101	CABLE	3	11/9/1982	B1
	RE USSR			

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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171100	CABLE	1	12/3/1982	B1
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171091	MEMO WETTERING TO CLARK RE STATE MEMO ON US/USSR MEETING ON AFRICA	1	11/30/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Please review for your agency's equities and obtain any necessary concurrences.

~~SECRET~~ *Wetterling*

HW
14

MEMORANDUM

SYSTEM II
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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~~DECLASSIFIED~~

November 30, 1982

NLRR 748-23-22-44

WPC HAS SEEN

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INFORMATION BY GD NARA DATE 12/8/15

176091

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: FRED WETTERING *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: State Memo on US/USSR Meeting on Africa

On November 27 State forwarded a Bremer-Clark memo advising you that the third in a series of meetings between us and the Soviets on Africa is scheduled for December 7 in Moscow. Chet Crocker will meet with Deputy Foreign Minister Ilichev. *(S)*

This was an idea of former Secretary Haig which I thought then and continue to think disingenious. The original idea was to level with the Soviets as to what we are trying to do in Angola and Namibia and ask them to support our efforts or at least not oppose them. Since there is no conceivable reason for the Soviets or the Cubans to do so, they have naturally ignored this and made some efforts to block our attempts to get the Cubans out of Angola. *(S)*

State has now seized upon the installation of a new Soviet leadership as the new rationale for continuing these talks. From my non-Soviet expert position, it strikes me that the Soviets should regard this overture as either naive in the extreme or else malicious insofar as we are rubbing their noses in a possible Soviet reverse in Africa. Nonetheless, I appreciate that once such a round of talks begins it is difficult to end without sending the wrong signals. The NSC Staff was not consulted when these began last year, this meeting has already been scheduled with Moscow, and I would not argue that it be cancelled at this point. I do believe you should ask Secretary Shultz or Bud ask Deputy Secretary Dam as to the value of further such meetings once (if) we hear the results of this one. *(S)*

we should look for immediate need out

The following is Dick Pipes' comment: I think this proposal is almost as promising as the abortive Afghanistan negotiations - let them come to us. *(S)*

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15

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RECEIVED 10 DEC 82 18

TO CLARK

FROM WETTERING

DOCDATE 10 DEC 82

PIPES

10 DEC 82

KEYWORDS: SOUTH AFRICA

NAM

CROCKER, C

USSR

ANGOLA

ILICHEV

CUBA

SUBJECT: CROCKER MTG W/ SOVIET DEPUTY FOMIN RE SOUTHERN AFRICAN INITIATIVE

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 13 DEC 82 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF#

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ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

	2	DEC 1 6 1982	Clark approved w/ comment	
wetting	5	12/16	Any further action	
	C12/17		No further action req'd for Wetting	

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171092	REPORT RE SOVIET ELITES	14	12/1/1982	B1

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National Security Council
The White House

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Package # 8505-29

82 DEC 13 P 6: 03

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>[initials]</u>		
Judge Clark	<u>[initials]</u>		<u>[initials]</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			
<u>PIPES</u>	<u>3</u>		<u>A</u>

I-Information A-Action B-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Dick,
 Please expand your cover
 memos. President probably won't
 have time to read Gates memos.
John

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	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>
171093	MEMO	1	12/28/1982	B1
	CLARK TO REAGAN RE REPORT			

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Please review for your agency's equities and obtain any necessary concurrences.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

December 28, 1982

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: "Andropov: His Power and Program"

171093 30
DECLASSIFIED
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NLR/NCR-746-23-22-6-2
BY CV NARA DATE 1/13/12

Bill Casey forwarded you an insightful CIA report (Tab A) entitled, "Andropov: His Power and Program." The primary findings include:

1. The precedent of an extended period for a new Soviet leader to consolidate power does not apply. Andropov is a "leader who has come to power with firm support in the Politburo at the outset, and who has a mandate to act in both domestic and foreign affairs." He is supported by the military, the security apparatus and powerful conservative elements of the Party.

2. Given Andropov's promotion and apparently unchallenged accession to power, he will move promptly to address and tackle domestic and foreign issues/problems, displaying initiative and resolve where necessary. His domestic agenda might include: continuing a "vigilance" campaign to restore discipline, waging a major anti-corruption campaign, seeking additional resources for both the military and the KGB, generating limited experimentation and economic reform, and promoting greater realism in planning and recognition of problems. Andropov's foreign policy agenda might entail:

- Curbing U.S. strategic modernization, preventing the INF deployment and deepening the rift between the U.S. and Western Europe.
- Permitting some flexibility toward East European efforts to cope with economic problems, but only within the context of close ties to the USSR and firm party control.
- Securing a pseudo-neutral government in Kabul which would allow Moscow to achieve some sort of regional settlement and withdraw some forces.
- Vigorously pursuing policies intended to improve Sino-Soviet relations.

The report concludes that the Soviet Union is likely to pose an even greater threat to U.S. security as we are faced with a more active, intelligent, adroit adversary -- Andropov.

Prepared by: Paula Dobriansky

Attachment:

Tab A Casey memo of Nov 29 and DDI 0503-82, Nov 20

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31

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

December 20, 1982

DECLASSIFIED

White House Co. s, August 28, 1997
By EDJ NARA, Date 12/8/15

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY *PD*

WPC HAS SEEN

SUBJECT: Andropov: His Power and Program

At Tab A is a report on Andropov forwarded to the President by William Casey. At Tab I is a transmitting memorandum which summarizes the key points of the report.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Willliam Casey's Memorandum of Nov 29 with Report DDI 9593-82, dated November 30

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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December 13, 1982

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White House Gu

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By

COB

NARA, Date

17/8/15

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: RICHARD PIPES *RP*

SUBJECT: Andropov: His Power and Program

The President may be interested in seeing the report at Tab A forwarded by William Casey on Andropov. A transmitting memorandum is at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That the memorandum at Tab I be forwarded to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A William Casey's memorandum (dated Nov 29) to DDI 9593-82, dated Nov 20, 1982

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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White House Cl
By WCS NASA, August 23, 1997
12/8/95

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Andropov: His Power and Program

You may be interested in seeing the CIA report forwarded by Bill Casey at Tab A. The report is titled: "Andropov: His Power and Program."

Tab A Bill Casey's memorandum (Nov 29) and report
DDI 9593-82 (Nov 20)

Prepared by:
Richard Pipes

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

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82 DEC 2 P 3: 11

171094

29 November 1982


MEMORANDUM FOR: ✓ The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

SUBJECT: Andropov: His Power and Program

1. Here is a memorandum on how we now see the thrust and scope of Andropov's program. It was prepared by Bob Gates, our Deputy Director for Intelligence, who has maintained a realistic view of Soviet purposes. He did two stints at the NSC, one with Kissinger and one with Brzezinski, and two stints at CIA as National Intelligence Officer for Soviet Affairs. You may recall that this experience was put to good use last year in analyzing Brezhnev's correspondence with you and recommending responses.

2. One added feature which has struck me is the emerging picture of Ustinov as giving Andropov crucial support. When you put together Ustinov's 30-odd years in command of defense industries and then defense and Andropov's 15 years at the KGB, you get an awesome concentration of institutional power. To brag a little, I attach a note in which we called this six months before the event.

William J. Casey



Attachments

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171096 MEMO

1 4/22/1982 B1

TO PRESIDENT ET AL. RE SOVIET POLITICAL
SUCCESSION

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

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77096

22 April 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President
 The Vice President
 Secretary of State
 Secretary of Defense
 Counsellor to the President
 Chief of Staff to the President
 Deputy Chief of Staff to the President
 Assistant to the President for
 National Security Affairs

SUBJECT: Soviet Political Succession: Institutions,
 People and Policies

1. With Suslov's death, Kirilenko fading away, and the inception of the Chernenko boom, I tasked our Soviet analysts to evaluate the prospects for the Soviet succession.
2. In recent weeks Chernenko appears to have peaked too soon, with Andropov emerging as the present favorite. Ustinov has the military clout and seems to be lining up with Andropov, but may be positioning himself for partnership or even competition. Under pressure, forced to stick our necks out on a dark horse, we pick Grishin, the 67 year old Moscow party boss and fourth youngest member of the Politburo, and Gorbachev, at 51 the youngest Politburo member, who is Party Secretary for Agriculture, a post which Khrushchev held on his way to the top. Brezhnev also was deeply involved in agricultural matters on his way up.
3. If I had to bet money, I'd take Andropov on the nose and Gorbachev across the board.
4. This paper analyzes the influence of various Soviet institutions, the policy issues which might be influential in the outcome, and the policy implications of possible resolutions.

WJ Casey
 William J. Casey

Attachment

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171098	MEMO RE ANDROPOV	7	11/20/1982	B1

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171098

DDI #9593-82
20 November 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT : Andropov: His Power and Program

1. The emerging conventional wisdom seems to be that the USSR will now enter a period of collegial rule in which continuity will be stressed and the new leaders will hold back from significant policy changes for the near to medium term. In this view, Andropov will be preoccupied with internal matters such as improving the economy and any new initiatives that do appear will likely focus on domestic affairs rather than foreign policy. The immediate post-Khrushchev period is cited as precedent for what will happen.

2. I believe that analysis is based on a misreading of the events of recent days, Andropov's character, and history. In 1953, a number of new initiatives followed the death of Stalin (and preceded Khrushchev's consolidation of power) -- a purge of the KGB, an end to the intra-party terror, the Virgin Lands program, a decision to end the Korean War, and a mending of relations with the Yugoslavs. In 1964, the new leaders swept aside a number of major changes Khrushchev had made in the party organization, sharply raised investment in agriculture, began the heavy military buildup on the Sino-Soviet border, and actively began to support North Vietnam's effort to take over the South.

3. Andropov comes to power at a time when there is a widely perceived need for renewal in the USSR -- to get the economy moving again, to get rid of corruption, to restore discipline, to reassert the idealism of the Revolution and relatedly to reaffirm Russia's missionary/evangelical role at home and abroad. Perversely, this often takes the shape of nostalgia for Stalin. It is his forcefulness, toughness, decisiveness and ability to move the country that the Party seeks in Andropov -- believing they can have all that without the old dictator's less welcome attributes (such as a tendency to shoot his colleagues).

4. The Soviet leadership appears to have decided last spring that Andropov was the man to lead the USSR out of its political and economic doldrums after Brezhnev's death. He was moved from the KGB back to the Central Committee Secretariat, a more appropriate and

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acceptable launching point. I believe that since then he has steadily consolidated his power and begun, with his colleagues, to develop new initiatives and implement certain of them -- even before assuming power. As the Soviets say, "it is not by accident" that in the last several months we have seen both a new internal crackdown in the Soviet Union and also a major new initiative in foreign policy -- the effort to improve relations between the Soviet Union and China. There also are indications that the military has been asking for additional resources. In my judgment, Andropov has been behind the first two of these initiatives and supported the third.

5. In brief, I believe the precedent of an extended period for the new leader to consolidate power -- as with Brezhnev after the overthrow of Khrushchev -- does not apply this time around. This view is supported by Andropov's prompt appointment; his clear authoritative nature during events surrounding Brezhnev's funeral; his role and "presence" in meetings with the principal foreign visitors; the quick promotion of an old KGB colleague to the Politburo; and his speeches at the Central Committee Plenum and Supreme Soviet. This time we have a leader who has come to power with firm support in the Politburo at the outset, has a mandate to act in both domestic and foreign affairs, and will do so.

6. The nature of this succession and the character of Andropov himself argue strongly that he will move promptly and broadly to tackle many of Russia's problems. For the first time in Soviet history, there has been a smooth succession where the new leader has assumed power in an orderly way and probably with greater leeway to make decisions than enjoyed by his predecessor. Indeed, Andropov has been chosen because he is a man who can make decisions and hopefully can end the long period of drift, especially in internal affairs. He is on close terms with the powerful conservative elements in the Soviet hierarchy and is a man who can act with both intelligence and imagination on a long list of pressing foreign and domestic issues. What we are likely to see with Andropov is preservation of the forms of "collegiality" but the absence of its paralyzing effect on decisionmaking. All of the senior policymakers who might block Andropov are dead or out of power; those who remain, such as Ustinov and Gromyko, are closely allied with him; his presumed rival, Chernenko, appears (for now, at least) to have been co-opted.

7. Given Andropov's prompt and apparently unchallenged accession to power, his personality and past history, and the problems that face him, what might Andropov's agenda resemble for the coming period? On the basis of both 1953 and 1964, historical experience would suggest that a number of changes or initiatives can be expected:

Internal Affairs

- A continuation of the "vigilance" campaign and internal crackdown to restore discipline; to give the impression

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of a strong hand at the top again, to forestall any impression of internal relaxation as a result of the succession, to keep the country well under control so that other initiatives or reforms do not lead to unrealistic expectations or spontaneous popular action, and to secure the home front for perhaps severe measures to revive the economy.

- 2 A major anti-corruption campaign by a man who is said to have a reputation for being relatively "clean" among Soviet leaders. The promotion of Aliyev to the Politburo further suggests action in this area. It is plain that many of the present political problems in Poland and Romania grow out of popular awareness and resentment of the corruption of senior party officials. While Andropov would have to proceed carefully with this, the KGB's role in exposing the corruption of Brezhnev's family early in the year is indicative of his willingness to use this issue both politically and for larger ends. With his KGB background, he would know against whom to strike. There might even be a return of an occasional show trial specifically for corruption, although Andropov would choose the targets with care to insulate his strongest supporters.

- It seems logical and likely that Andropov would press for additional resources for both the military and the KGB. These are important constituencies for him and for his principal supporters in the leadership. While there might be some reallocation of priorities within the military, overall greater resources to respond to the perceived increased threat from the US are in the cards, in my view.

- On the economy, while specific policies are difficult to forecast at this point, we should expect "reform" and perhaps some limited experimentation. The focus on internal discipline, anti-corruption and vigilance -- in essence, the maintenance of strict internal controls -- must go hand in hand with any effort to undertake economic reform or experiments, witness the Polish experience. While a more detailed analysis of economic options available to the new leadership will take more time, the essential message is that we should anticipate change in this area and it seems likely to involve (1) greater trade with the West, (2) more problems for us in the area of technology transfer, and (3) more difficulty with our Western and Japanese allies over the issue of trade with the East. The idea of Andropov's willingness to consider reform in the Soviet economy is suggested by stories that he has been the protector of Hungarian economic reform and is willing to consider such new approaches -- although Hungary is obviously a much smaller country and the costs of failure are not as high (always a disincentive to agricultural reform in Russia).

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- In the Party itself, I expect to see Andropov move to improve the competence of senior officials generally while ensuring that the new men are sympathetic to his objectives and politically supportive. He already is placing his own people in openings on the Politburo, Secretariat, and elsewhere in the hierarchy.
- More generally, Andropov's advocacy at the Supreme Soviet of greater realism in planning and recognition of problems, and the call of an important Soviet newspaper editorial last week for a major revamping of the Soviet bureaucracy, both suggest that significant changes are in store internally.

Foreign Policy

- US: Andropov seems likely to pursue a policy directed at achieving simultaneously some visible reduction in tensions with the United States, curbing new US arms programs, preventing the deployment of INF, and dividing the US from its European allies. A conciliatory approach to the United States and effective use of peace-oriented propaganda and "active measures" are to be expected. The Soviets will try to reinforce notions already current in the West of the need for forthcoming gestures to the new Soviet leader and the need to take advantage of this "new beginning." While the European decision on INF remains uncertain it would seem most unlikely for the Soviets to abandon the Geneva talks. Rather, we should be prepared for imaginative Soviet initiatives both in negotiations and in public in the next few months to throw the US on the defensive and increase divisions between the Europeans and ourselves. Should INF deployment actually begin, the Soviets could then walk out in Geneva and blame failure on the US. They would subsequently strive to prevent full deployment by playing on European fears and purported US intransigence.

The Soviets have seen a steady deterioration in US-Soviet relations for seven years under three US administrations. I believe they have concluded that the moment for establishing a more benign relationship on their terms has passed. Arms control negotiations and other forms of cooperation with the US government are likely considered to hold out little prospect of success for years to come. Thus, Andropov probably will focus Soviet policy on isolating the US and trying, through all instruments available to him, to build opposition to US military modernization and to US policies toward the USSR generally, both in the US and abroad.

- East-West Trade: Andropov likely will continue efforts to tie East and West Europe to the USSR through economic.

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"cooperation" and trade. The Soviets already are aware of the leverage they hold because of the value of East-West trade to the West and the jobs said to depend upon it. Trade thus has both economic and political benefits for them. Andropov presumably will strive to maximize these benefits and seek a corollary benefit in the strains such increased dealings will bring between the US and its allies. After removal by the US of sanctions imposed after Afghanistan and after Poland, this instrument of US policy will have little credibility in the future in Soviet eyes. Indeed, Andropov will see the US as little more than an annoyance in the area of trade and technology transfer, unable to impose discipline inside the US, much less in Europe and Japan.

- Eastern Europe: Andropov reportedly has evinced considerable hostility to the Yugoslavs, Romanians and Czechs in the past -- implying little tolerance for deviation from loyalty to Moscow and political orthodoxy. Almost as proof, his meeting with the Yugoslavs after the Brezhnev funeral was "harsh" and he pointedly snubbed Ceausescu. On the other hand, he is said to be close to Kadar of Hungary and a protector of Hungarian economic reforms. This and other information suggests some flexibility toward East European efforts to cope with economic problems but only within the context of close ties to the USSR and firm party control. As in the USSR, Andropov could well urge his East European colleagues to impose stricter discipline at home -- accompanied by a campaign to root out obvious and damaging corruption in high places, perhaps by making examples of some officials.

- Afghanistan: Afghanistan seems to be a candidate for a new Soviet initiative to try to diminish in some measure both the insurgency there and their military role. It continues to be an embarrassment for them in Islamic countries as well as in the West, it does impose a certain military cost in both materiel and casualties, and it is an obstacle to any significant reconciliation with the Chinese. Some new initiative combining a new government with some greater legitimacy in Afghanistan (although still under Soviet control) coupled with strong pressure on Pakistan to abandon its supporting role for the insurgents could conceivably meet with some success if orchestrated well by the Soviets. It could involve a government in Kabul with a figleaf image of neutrality and a diminution of support for the insurgents that would allow the Soviets to withdraw at least some of their forces.

- Middle East: The short term options are not bright, but the Soviets are prepared to be patient. Egypt and Iran are the big prizes and Andropov will pursue overt and covert policies designed to take advantage of any instability in either country.

- Kampuchea: Kampuchea is another area where the Soviets could make some concessions to the Chinese for larger ends. Never before have the Soviets shown any particular sensitivity to Hanoi's concerns. While Vietnam might not abandon its campaign in Kampuchea under Soviet pressure, the Soviets still could claim to the Chinese that they were no longer supporting Vietnam's effort and were amenable to new political arrangements that could be worked out. This might involve some sort of face saving settlements that would not represent a defeat for Vietnam but would get most of their troops out of the country.

- Third World: In the Third World, I believe we can expect not only a continuation of the direct and indirect destabilization activities the Soviets have had underway in recent years but perhaps an increase in that activity. In many ways Soviet policy in the Third World is likely to be indicative of a more assertive Soviet role abroad generally, although as our papers on Andropov have made clear, he prefers to win by strategem and maneuver rather than resort to force -- although he will use force if maneuvering fails and the risks are deemed acceptable.


- China: As I have suggested in several places above, I believe Andropov is playing a key role in the new initiative to try and patch things up with China. At some point, this will involve tough decisions for the Soviets because any real reconciliation with China will require acceding to Chinese preconditions relating to Afghanistan, Kampuchea or Soviet deployments along the Chinese border. The latter is probably the easiest area for the Soviets to be responsive. Andropov's pointed conversation with Foreign Minister Huang Hua after Brezhnev's funeral, the meeting between Huang Hua and Gromyko the next day and Chinese willingness to send Huang Hua is indicative of both powers intent to pursue an improved relationship at minimum and to improve their mutual positions with respect to the US.

8. In sum, the US faces a new and, in many ways, far more intelligent and skillful adversary than we confronted in Khrushchev or Brezhnev -- and a man who is a "doer". He is familiar with the world and a realist. My money says we will face a much greater challenge from the USSR under his leadership. While the specifics of his program are difficult to construct, we should be prepared for significant new Soviet initiatives in both internal and foreign policy. A leadership has come to power during the last two weeks in the Soviet Union with greater power and more unity at the highest level than after either the succession in 1953 or 1964. It has come to power with considerable work to do and Andropov is not a man who will delay in setting

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in motion initiatives to address a number of issues and problems. The effort to repair relations with China -- long thought out of the question by most analysts in the West -- is indicative of the kind of flexibility, pragmatism and boldness we can expect from this new leader. His talks with the Yugoslavs and Finns are indicative of his willingness to play hard ball.



Robert M. Gates

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are Classified SECRET]

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171095 MEMO

1 4/22/1982 B1

TO PRESIDENT ET AL. RE SOVIET POLITICAL
SUCCESSION (COPY DOC #171096)

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

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171095

22 April 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President
 The Vice President
 Secretary of State
 Secretary of Defense
 Counsellor to the President
 Chief of Staff to the President
 Deputy Chief of Staff to the President
 Assistant to the President for
 National Security Affairs

SUBJECT: Soviet Political Succession: Institutions,
 People and Policies

1. With Suslov's death, Kirilenko fading away, and the inception of the Chernenko boom, I tasked our Soviet analysts to evaluate the prospects for the Soviet succession.

2. In recent weeks Chernenko appears to have peaked too soon, with Andropov emerging as the present favorite. Ustinov has the military clout and seems to be lining up with Andropov, but may be positioning himself for partnership or even competition. Under pressure, forced to stick our necks out on a dark horse, we pick Grishin, the 67 year old Moscow party boss and fourth youngest member of the Politburo, and Gorbachev, at 51 the youngest Politburo member, who is Party Secretary for Agriculture, a post which Khrushchev held on his way to the top. Brezhnev also was deeply involved in agricultural matters on his way up.

3. If I had to bet money, I'd take Andropov on the nose and Gorbachev across the board.

4. This paper analyzes the influence of various Soviet institutions, the policy issues which might be influential in the outcome, and the policy implications of possible resolutions.

WJ Casey
 William J. Casey

Attachment

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171099	MEMO RE ANDROPOV (SAME AS DOC #171098)	7	11/20/1982	B1

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NLRN NLR 748-232299

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BY CN NARA DATE 1/13/12

DDI #9593-82
20 November 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT : Andropov: His Power and Program

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2. I believe that analysis is based on a misreading of the events of recent days, Andropov's character, and history. In 1953, a number of new initiatives followed the death of Stalin (and preceded Khrushchev's consolidation of power) -- a purge of the KGB, an end to the intra-party terror, the Virgin Lands program, a decision to end the Korean War, and a mending of relations with the Yugoslavs. In 1964, the new leaders swept aside a number of major changes Khrushchev had made in the party organization, sharply raised investment in agriculture, began the heavy military buildup on the Sino-Soviet border, and actively began to support North Vietnam's effort to take over the South.

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acceptable launching point. I believe that since then he has steadily consolidated his power and begun, with his colleagues, to develop new initiatives and implement certain of them -- even before assuming power. As the Soviets say, "it is not by accident" that in the last several months we have seen both a new internal crackdown in the Soviet Union and also a major new initiative in foreign policy -- the effort to improve relations between the Soviet Union and China. There also are indications that the military has been asking for additional resources. In my judgment, Andropov has been behind the first two of these initiatives and supported the third.

5. In brief, I believe the precedent of an extended period for the new leader to consolidate power -- as with Brezhnev after the overthrow of Khrushchev -- does not apply this time around. This view is supported by Andropov's prompt appointment; his clear authoritativeness during events surrounding Brezhnev's funeral; his role and "presence" in meetings with the principal foreign visitors; the quick promotion of an old KGB colleague to the Politburo; and his speeches at the Central Committee Plenum and Supreme Soviet. This time we have a leader who has come to power with firm support in the Politburo at the outset, has a mandate to act in both domestic and foreign affairs, and will do so.

6. The nature of this succession and the character of Andropov himself argue strongly that he will move promptly and broadly to tackle many of Russia's problems. For the first time in Soviet history, there has been a smooth succession where the new leader has assumed power in an orderly way and probably with greater leeway to make decisions than enjoyed by his predecessor. Indeed, Andropov has been chosen because he is a man who can make decisions and hopefully can end the long period of drift, especially in internal affairs. He is on close terms with the powerful conservative elements in the Soviet hierarchy and is a man who can act with both intelligence and imagination on a long list of pressing foreign and domestic issues. What we are likely to see with Andropov is preservation of the forms of "collegiality" but the absence of its paralyzing effect on decisionmaking. All of the senior policymakers who might block Andropov are dead or out of power; those who remain, such as Ustinov and Gromyko, are closely allied with him; his presumed rival, Chernenko, appears (for now, at least) to have been co-opted.

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-- A continuation of the "vigilance" campaign and internal crackdown to restore discipline; to give the impression

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- A major anti-corruption campaign by a man who is said to have a reputation for being relatively "clean" among Soviet leaders. The promotion of Aliyev to the Politburo further suggests action in this area. It is plain that many of the present political problems in Poland and Romania grow out of popular awareness and resentment of the corruption of senior party officials. While Andropov would have to proceed carefully with this, the KGB's role in exposing the corruption of Brezhnev's family early in the year is indicative of his willingness to use this issue both politically and for larger ends. With his KGB background, he would know against whom to strike. There might even be a return of an occasional show trial specifically for corruption, although Andropov would choose the targets with care to insulate his strongest supporters.

- It seems logical and likely that Andropov would press for additional resources for both the military and the KGB. These are important constituencies for him and for his principal supporters in the leadership. While there might be some reallocation of priorities within the military, overall greater resources to respond to the perceived increased threat from the US are in the cards, in my view.

- On the economy, while specific policies are difficult to forecast at this point, we should expect "reform" and perhaps some limited experimentation. The focus on internal discipline, anti-corruption and vigilance -- in essence, the maintenance of strict internal controls -- must go hand in hand with any effort to undertake economic reform or experiments, witness the Polish experience. While a more detailed analysis of economic options available to the new leadership will take more time, the essential message is that we should anticipate change in this area and it seems likely to involve (1) greater trade with the West, (2) more problems for us in the area of technology transfer, and (3) more difficulty with our Western and Japanese allies over the issue of trade with the East. The idea of Andropov's willingness to consider reform in the Soviet economy is suggested by stories that he has been the protector of Hungarian economic reform and is willing to consider such new approaches -- although Hungary is obviously a much smaller country and the costs of failure are not as high (always a disincentive to agricultural reform in Russia).

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- More generally, Andropov's advocacy at the Supreme Soviet of greater realism in planning and recognition of problems, and the call of an important Soviet newspaper editorial last week for a major revamping of the Soviet bureaucracy, both suggest that significant changes are in store internally.

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- East-West Trade: Andropov likely will continue efforts to tie East and West Europe to the USSR through economic

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- Afghanistan: Afghanistan seems to be a candidate for a new Soviet initiative to try to diminish in some measure both the insurgency there and their military role. It continues to be an embarrassment for them in Islamic countries as well as in the West, it does impose a certain military cost in both materiel and casualties, and it is an obstacle to any significant reconciliation with the Chinese. Some new initiative combining a new government with some greater legitimacy in Afghanistan (although still under Soviet control) coupled with strong pressure on Pakistan to abandon its supporting role for the insurgents could conceivably meet with some success if orchestrated well by the Soviets. It could involve a government in Kabul with a figleaf image of neutrality and a diminution of support for the insurgents that would allow the Soviets to withdraw at least some of their forces.

- Middle East: The short term options are not bright, but the Soviets are prepared to be patient. Egypt and Iran are the big prizes and Andropov will pursue overt and covert policies designed to take advantage of any instability in either country.

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
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- Third World: In the Third World, I believe we can expect not only a continuation of the direct and indirect destabilization activities the Soviets have had underway in recent years but perhaps an increase in that activity. In many ways Soviet policy in the Third World is likely to be indicative of a more assertive Soviet role abroad generally, although as our papers on Andropov have made clear, he prefers to win by strategem and maneuver rather than resort to force -- although he will use force if maneuvering fails and the risks are deemed acceptable.

- China: As I have suggested in several places above, I believe Andropov is playing a key role in the new initiative to try and patch things up with China. At some point, this will involve tough decisions for the Soviets because any real reconciliation with China will require acceding to Chinese preconditions relating to Afghanistan, Kampuchea or Soviet deployments along the Chinese border. The latter is probably the easiest area for the Soviets to be responsive. Andropov's pointed conversation with Foreign Minister Huang Hua after Brezhnev's funeral, the meeting between Huang Hua and Gromyko the next day and Chinese willingness to send Huang Hua is indicative of both powers intent to pursue an improved relationship at minimum and to improve their mutual positions with respect to the US.

8. In sum, the US faces a new and, in many ways, far more intelligent and skillful adversary than we confronted in Khrushchev or Brezhnev -- and a man who is a "doer". He is familiar with the world and a realist. My money says we will face a much greater challenge from the USSR under his leadership. While the specifics of his program are difficult to construct, we should be prepared for significant new Soviet initiatives in both internal and foreign policy. A leadership has come to power during the last two weeks in the Soviet Union with greater power and more unity at the highest level than after either the succession in 1953 or 1964. It has come to power with considerable work to do and Andropov is not a man who will delay in setting

in motion initiatives to address a number of issues and problems. The effort to repair relations with China -- long thought out of the question by most analysts in the West -- is indicative of the kind of flexibility, pragmatism and boldness we can expect from this new leader. His talks with the Yugoslavs and Finns are indicative of his willingness to play hard ball.


Robert M. Gates

[All Portions of this Memo
are Classified SECRET]

DDI #9593-82
20 November 1982

National Security Council
The White House

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Package # 8505
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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>[initials]</u>		
Judge Clark	<u>[initials]</u>		<u>[initials]</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			
<u>Pipes</u>	<u>3</u>		<u>A</u>

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COMMENTS

Dick,
Please expand your cover
memo. President probably won't
have time to read Gates memo.
John

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ANDROPOV

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ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR INFO

DUE: 14 DEC 82 STATUS X FILES

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