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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 12/2/2015

File Folder USSR (11/2/82-11/4/82)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 23

SKINNER

276

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
170945	MEMO	W. MARTIN TO W. CLARK RE STATUS OF GAS PIPELINE CONSTRUCTION PAR 10/11/2010 CREST NLR-748-23-13-1-7	1	11/3/1982	B1
170946	REPORT	INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND ENERGY WEEKLY (PAGE 4 ONLY) PAR 10/11/2010 CREST NLR-748-23-13-2-6	1	10/29/1982	B1
170947	CABLE	MOSCOW 13325 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-13-3-5	1	11/4/1982	B1
170948	CABLE	MOSCOW 13364 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-13-4-4	1	11/4/1982	B1
170949	REPORT	SITUATION ROOM CHECKLIST R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-13-5-3	1	11/2/1982	B1
170950	CABLE	FRANKFURT 14413 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-13-6-2	3	11/1/1982	B1
170951	MEMO	R. PIPES TO W. CLARK RE BREZHNEV'S OCT. 27 SPEECH R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-13-7-1	1	11/3/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

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B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

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File Folder USSR (11/2/82-11/4/82)

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FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

276

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
170952	MEMO	L. PAUL BREMER TO W. CLARK RE BREZHNEV'S ADDRESS R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-13-8-0	2	11/2/1982	B1
170954	MEMO	RE BREZHNEV'S OCT. 27 SPEECH R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-13-9-9	2	10/28/1982	B1
170955	REPORT	FBIS 24 R 1/13/2012 CREST NLR-748-23-13-10-7	6	10/27/1982	B3
170956	MEMO	W. CLARK TO REAGAN RE BREZHNEV'S 10/27/82 ADDRESS (DRAFT) R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-13-11-6	1	ND	B1
170958	MEMO	COPY OF MEMO IN DOC #170957 (BOB LINHARD/HORACE RUSSELL THROUGH R. BOVERIE TO W. CLARK RE PRESS GUIDANCE ON NEW SOVIET ICBM TEST) PAR 6/3/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-13-12-5	1	11/4/1982	B1
170960	ROUTING MEMO	RE ATTACHED Q&AS PAR 10/11/2010 CREST NLR-748-23-13-13-4	1	ND	B1 B3
170957	MEMO	BOB LINHARD/HORACE RUSSELL THROUGH R. BOVERIE TO W. CLARK RE PRESS GUIDANCE ON NEW SOVIET ICBM TEST (+ NSC PROFILE SHEET) PAR 6/3/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-13-12-5	2	11/4/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
170961	ROUTING MEMO	RE ATTACHED Q&AS (COPY OF DOC #170960) PAR 10/11/2010 CREST NLR-748-23-13-13-4	1	ND	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

November 2, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: HENRY NAU *HN*
SUBJECT: Grain Cartel

Your instincts on the prospects of a common export surcharge on grain sales to the Soviet Union are correct.

If it were theoretically possible to agree to an export surcharge among the major exporting governments, the effect of the surcharge would simply be to lower the price paid to exporters, not raise the world price. World price would remain the same, depressed by the excess of supply over demand in world grain markets. Revenue would be transferred from the exporter to the government of the exporting countries, but world price would be no higher.

The problem is the glut of supply over demand. Nothing can raise the world price except destroying existing stocks and cutting back on production. In a tighter world market, it might then be possible for the major exporting countries to agree to control production. But grain is unlike oil. Only 10% of total world grain production is traded (compared to 50% of total world oil production). Hence, controlling the amounts of grain traded will have a much smaller price impact than controlling the amounts of oil traded. Furthermore, grain can be produced in many more places around the world than oil can be found and produced. Thus, a grain cartel would be very short-lived, even if it could be established. It would result relatively quickly in increased production in third countries, under-cutting the original cartel.

The EC has raised the possibility of a grain export tax a number of times in the past, knowing full well it is impractical. If agriculture is included in the East-West package which Schultz is negotiating, we should focus discussion on eliminating subsidies in agricultural sales to the Soviet Union. If we cannot raise the cost of these sales above world market levels, we certainly should not lower the costs below world market levels through various subsidy schemes.

cc: Roger Robinson

~~SECRET~~

HW
2

MEMORANDUM

7684

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

170945

November 3, 1982

~~SECRET~~
INFORMATION

WFO HAS SEEN

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN *WFM*

SUBJECT: Status of Construction on the Soviet Gas Export Pipeline

The attached CIA assessment (Tab I) concludes that compressor station construction has been complicated by the U.S. embargo.

[Redacted]

25)
25)

the U.S. sanctions have created indecision in the Gas and Petroleum Pipeline Construction Ministry. Planning for compressor station construction in some cases has come to a complete halt. The sanctions are apparently forcing some difficult tradeoffs in allocation of scarce equipment between domestic and export pipelines.

Attachment
Tab I CIA Assessment

cc: Bailey
Pipes
Robinson

PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
REVIEW OF NSC EQUIT
IS REQUIRED

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLFF *CR*

BY *CN*

1/13/12

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR
CLASSIFIED BY CIA

~~SECRET~~

~~Secret~~

3

International Economic and Energy Weekly

170946

Status of Construction
on the Soviet Gas
Export Pipeline

Pipelining for the natural gas pipeline from Siberia to Western Europe appears to be generally on schedule, but compressor station construction has been complicated by the US embargo.

[Redacted]

25X1
25X1

Soviet media have asserted that the pace of pipelaying more than doubled between July and September and that by the beginning of October 700 kilometers of pipe had been laid. The photographs of the part of the route covered during September make Soviet claims concerning pipelaying appear credible. Soviet plans that call for 1,500 kilometers of pipe laid by the end of the year probably will be attained.

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

[Redacted] the US sanctions created indecision in the Gas and Petroleum Pipeline Construction Ministry. Planning for compressor station construction in some cases had come to a complete halt. [Redacted] starts on two stations along the central portion of the pipeline had been delayed because the design institutes did not know what equipment would be available. In addition, the large number of compressor stations that are being built for high-priority domestic lines may be diverting needed labor away from construction of compressor stations for the export pipeline [Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

The uncertainties surrounding further deliveries by West European firms and the ability to substitute Soviet-manufactured turbines suggest engineering plans for compressor stations may still be in abeyance. The Soviets have said they could begin deliveries using reduced compressor power pending completion of the necessary stations. If stations on the Siberian portion of the line are delayed, the Soviets also could link the section being built eastward from the Uzhgorod export terminal to a recently completed domestic pipeline that brings Urengoy gas to Kursk. This would, however, reduce the availability of gas to the domestic economy. [Redacted]

25X1

MORI/CDF

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLR-748-23-13-2-6
BY CW NARA DATE 1/3/12

~~Secret~~
29 October 1982

National Security Council
The White House

Package # 7684

8 NOV 4 P 1: 19

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>I</u>
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____
<u>MARTIN</u>	<u>2</u>	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Bill,
 I know but Judge already
 has seen this in his daily
 reports
 John

NSC/S PROFILE

SECRET

ID 8207684

5

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

RECEIVED 03 NOV 82 15

TO CLARK

FROM MARTIN

12/2/85 GAP

DOCDATE 03 NOV 82

KEYWORDS: GAS

OIL

USSR

SUBJECT: STATUS OF CONSTRUCTION RE THE SOVIET GAS EXPORT PIPELINE

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX

FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

BAILEY

PIPES

ROBINSON

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(R /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

NOV 04 1982

Clark noted

WM

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

PA (1)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

170947

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 3325
SIT139 DATE 11/04/82

DTG: 041028Z NOV 82 PSN: 048126
TOR: 308/13272

LET'S LET THE PUNDITS OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT MAKE ASSURED
STATEMENTS AND KEEP US INSTEAD IN A POSTURE OF WATCHING
OUT FOR OUR OWN INTERESTS WHILE NOT SPECULATING ON THE
INTENTIONS OF THIS CLOSED REGIME. HARTMAN

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: NODIS/CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

MOSCOW 3325

DTG: 041028Z NOV 82 PSN: 048126

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

DECLASSIFIED

748-23-13-3-5

BY COB

TE 12/2/15

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHMO #3325 3081028
O 041028Z NOV 82
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0104

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MOSCOW 13325
NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HARTMAN
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, MPOL, UR, PEPR, CH
SUBJECT: BREZHNEV SPEECH TO MILITARY COMMANDERS

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. I HAVE JUST SEEN IN THE OCTOBER 31 POST THE MURRAY
HARDER PIECE ON BREZHNEV'S SPEECH TO HIS MILITARY COMMANDERS,
WHICH IS PARTIALLY BASED ON GOVERNMENT SOURCES. I FEEL
COMPELLED TO GIVE YOU MY VIEW THAT THE U.S. WAS NOT THE ONLY,
NOR EVEN THE PRIMARY, SUBJECT OF BREZHNEV'S MESSAGE. AN
IMPORTANT CENTRAL COMMITTEE CONTACT HAS TOLD US NOT TO READ
INTO THIS MORE HOSTILE TONE ANY CHANGE OF LINE TOWARD THE
U.S. MOREOVER, I BELIEVE THAT THE INTERNAL EVIDENCE SHOWS--
AND MY BRITISH, GERMAN AND FRENCH COLLEAGUES AGREE--THAT THE
MAIN OBJECTIVE (BUT NOT THE SOLE OBJECTIVE) OF THE SPEECH
WAS TO PREPARE THE SOVIET MILITARY FOR A LIMITED DETENTE
WITH CHINA, TO DEPICT SUCH A MOVE AS CLEVER SOVIET USE OF
THE CHINA CARD AGAINST THE U.S., AND TO ENSURE THAT THE
MILITARY GETS ON BOARD. AN IMPROVEMENT IN SOVIET-CHINESE
RELATIONS WOULD, OF COURSE, HAVE AN EFFECT ON U.S.-SOVIET
RELATIONS, PARTICULARLY IF THE SOVIETS PULL SOME TROOPS
BACK FROM THE CHINESE BORDER AS PAYMENT FOR THE LIMITED
DETENTE THEY ARE SEEKING.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. ANOTHER PRIME OBJECTIVE SEEMS TO RELATE TO EDUCATING
THE MILITARY ON THE NECESSITY OF DEALING WITH CERTAIN
URGENT DOMESTIC ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND TO UNDERLINING
THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE AT THE EXPENSE OF THE MILITARY,
ALTHOUGH THEY MIGHT HAVE TO BE MORE EFFICIENT IN USING
RESOURCES.

4. THE U.S. SIDE OF THIS LECTURE SEEMS, THEREFORE, TO US
A SECONDARY ASPECT, RELATED MORE TO PROPAGANDA OBJECTIVES
AND THE NEED TO TALK TOUGH TO A MILITARY AUDIENCE THAN TO
A SEA CHANGE IN RELATIONS.

5. GIVEN THE UNCERTAINTIES, I WOULD STRONGLY URGE THAT WE
NOT REVEAL OUR IGNORANCE BY COMING DOWN HARD FOR ONE
THESIS OR ANOTHER. WE HAVE SOME ACTION-PACKED WEEKS
AHEAD WHICH MAY CLARIFY THE SITUATION. IN THE MEANTIME,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

170948
7

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 3364 DTG: 041552Z NOV 82 PSN: 048439
SIT131 DATE 11/04/82 TOR: 308/1815Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

DECLASSIFIED
NLR 78-23-13-4-4
BY KDB **DATE** 12/2/15

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHMO #3364 308155Z
O 041552Z NOV 82
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0136

INFO AMCONSUL Leningrad 9212
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0778
USMISSION USNATO 2585
AMEMBASSY LONDON 3428
AMEMBASSY PARIS 2567
AMEMBASSY BONN 3673
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5355
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4341
AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1025
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5356
AMCONSUL HONG KONG 3924
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MOSCOW 13364

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, UR, CH

SUBJECT: GLIMPSES OF SINO-SOVIET EXCHANGES

1. ~~C~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DURING CONVERSATION WITH DCM NOVEMBER 3, NEW CHINESE MINISTER-COUNSELOR HERE CONFIRMED THAT IL'ICHEV HAD RETURNED FROM BEIJING TO MOSCOW FRIDAY, OCTOBER 29 ABOARD AEROFLOT REGULAR FLIGHT. WHILE NONCOMMITTAL AS TO

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

DETAILS OF CONVERSATIONS, CHINESE COUNSELOR DID NOT DEMUR WHEN DCM SUGGESTED THAT SOVIET TROOP ADJUSTMENTS ON BORDER WOULD BE MOST LOGICAL AREA FOR FUTURE SOVIET GESTURES TO EXPAND POSSIBILITIES FOR IMPROVED TIES.

3. DURING MEETING OF WESTERN POLITICAL COUNSELORS, BRITISH REPORTED THEY HAD MANAGED TO GET INTO MFA'S FIRST FAR EASTERN DEPARTMENT FOR CONVERSATIONS WITH DEPUTY CHIEF FADEYEV. FADEYEV INDICATED THAT IL'ICHEV HAD BEEN RECEIVED BY HUANG HUA ON EVE OF DEPARTURE FROM CHINA. COMMENT: HUANG HUA MEETING MAY HAVE BEEN SOURCE OF LAST-MINUTE RUMORS THAT BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS HAD RESUMED FOLLOWING IL'ICHEV'S TRIP TO THE PROVINCES. END COMMENT.

4. WHEN BRITISH ASKED POINT BLANK WHETHER ONE OF PURPOSES OF BREZHNEV'S MEETING WITH SOVIET TOP MILITARY COMMANDERS OCTOBER 27 WAS TO BROACH WITH THEM POSSIBILITY OF ADJUSTMENTS IN USSR-PRC BORDER TROOP LEVELS, FADEYEV SMILED, LOOKED AT NOTETAKER, THEN AT CEILING, AND FINALLY REPEATED A PHRASE HE HAD USED EARLIER IN THE CONVERSATION ON AN UNRELATED SUBJECT: "NOTHING IS TO BE EXCLUDED."

5. WE NOTE IN PASSING THAT A LENINGRAD LECTURER ON OCTOBER 31 ALLUDED TO POSSIBILITY OF SOME REDEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET TROOPS AWAY FROM SOVIET BORDER (LENINGRAD 2752 NOTAL). HARTMAN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 4, 1982

TO:

~~Paula Dobriansky~~

Walt Raymond

~~Dennis Blair~~ *DBS*

IN TURN

Please initial your concurrence on the attached memo and call Francine at 4684 for pickup/xeroxing.

Pat - OBE

*just This came in just on Nov 4
from to left of Sandin Nov 13.
The response was to have addressed
a request for a human rights
group not to left sandinos*

MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CL 9
176949

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SITUATION ROOM CHECKLIST

November 2, 1982

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NL 748-73-135-3

BY LCDS

ATE 12/2/85

Letter to the President from Human Rights Organization

The chairman of the Frankfurt-based International Society for Human Rights (IGFM) has written the President urging him not to abandon his present course regarding the pipeline sanctions. The letter adds that your actions based on moral principals have "stimulated moral resistance against that dreadful totalitarian regime...European governments are lacking any such sense of responsibility -- but the people in Europe do want the withdrawal from this immoral cooperation with the Soviet government...They are tired of business as usual..."

In conclusion, the chairman writes the President to send a White House observer to its international hearing on forced labor in the USSR.

- o The hearing will take place on 18-19 November in Bonn.
- o The hearing commission will be composed of 10-12 human rights experts.
- o Thus far, seven main witnesses will appear. (C)

Frankfurt 4413, PSN 43423

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CLASSIFIED BY EMBASSY FRANKFURT
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

11-5

Roger:

Per our conversation:

1) State has been forthcoming on the large forced labor package, although there are pockets of resistance. We need to include them in this initiative. Eagleburger, for example, has chopped the package for release to the Hill.

2) I agree that Nowak would be an excellent choice; could we go so far as to say this in the letter to Gnaouck?

3) Re the letter:

---Downplay comments on the reports per se, although reference could be made to the fact that they "have drawn attention." Several people, with whom I have considerable respect, believe the report is flawed seriously and Presidential endorsement would not help the President's credibility.

4) There are certain sensitive considerations which lead me to recommend that there not be a Presidential letter, but that we let our answer to Gnaouck come in the form of a transmittal--from State--of the package on forced labor which we have sent to the Hill.

WR

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

November 4, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: CARNES LORD *CL*
ROGER ROBINSON *RR*

SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to Reinhard Gnauck

Attached at Tab A is a draft Presidential response to the letter from Dr. Reinhard Gnauck, Chairman of the International Society for Human Rights, the Frankfurt-based group that has single-handedly created the Soviet forced labor issue in Europe expressing support for our sanctions policy and inviting a White House representative to "hearings" to be held in mid-November in Bonn on the issue (Tab B).

Due to the pressure of time and in order to preserve our flexibility in handling this, the draft has not been cleared or discussed with State. The prevailing view at State on the advisability of such a response is likely to be negative, it being argued that the President will appear to be intervening to put pressure on European governments at a delicate moment in our consultations. While any response must be carefully crafted to minimize such difficulties, we feel this can be done, and that on balance a reply should be sent. As for White House representation, we feel it would not be advisable for the White House or the USG as such to be present at the meetings, but that consideration should be given to identifying an appropriate semi-official representative. The obvious candidate for this would be Michael Novak, someone who is well known in human rights circles and holds an official position at the UNHRC but is not totally identified with the USG or the current administration. If you approve, we will contact Novak to ascertain his availability. It seemed best to make no reference to any of this in the letter itself.

The letter has been cleaned with the speechwriters. Paula Dobriansky, Walt Raymond, and Dennis Blair concur. *PD*

Non concern in this form. WR (see note)

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the letter to the President at Tab I for signature.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

That you approve an approach to Michael Novak as representative to the Commission's hearings.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Memo to the President
- A Ltr to Gnauck
- B Cable of Gnauck Ltr, Bonn 7229

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Letter to Reinhard Gnauck on Soviet Forced Labor

Issue

Whether to send a response to a letter from Dr. Reinhard Gnauck, Chairman of the Frankfurt-based International Society for Human Rights, the group that has single-handedly and effectively pushed the issue of Soviet forced labor on the pipeline. Gnauck expresses support for our sanctions policy, and invites a White House representative to "hearings" to be held in Bonn in mid-November on this subject.

Discussion

Sending a letter, firm but low key in tone, to Dr. Gnauck would be an important signal of US concern over this issue and over Soviet human rights violations generally.

The letter has been cleared by the speechwriters.

RecommendationOK No

_____ That you sign the letter to Dr. Gnauck at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Ltr to Dr. Gnauck
Tab B Cable of Gnauck Ltr, Bonn 7229

Prepared by:
Carnes Lord

13

THE WHITE HOUSE

Dr. Reinhard Gnauck
Internationale Gesellschaft
für Menschenrechte
Kaiserstrasse 72
D-6000 Frankfurt a.M.
Federal Republic of Germany

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Dr. Gnauck:

I very much appreciate your recent letter concerning the hearings you intend to hold in Bonn in November on the subject of forced labor in the USSR.

The reports that have been collected and publicized by you and other private organizations concerning the role of forced labor on gas pipeline construction and other major projects in the Soviet Union have served to draw the attention of the world to a matter which should be of the utmost concern. The evidence that has accumulated to date cannot be dismissed, and raises the most serious questions regarding Soviet compliance with internationally recognized standards of human rights and labor practices. I welcome your initiative in organizing hearings on this subject, as well as any other independent investigation of the activities of the Soviet government in this area.

The United States Government, for its part, is continuing its examination of the information that has come to light, and we understand that several other governments have indicated similar intentions. The Department of State has recently transmitted to the Congress a report on the issue

of Soviet use of forced labor on pipeline projects; we will continue to make our findings available to the public wherever possible, and hope it will be of use in furthering your own work.

Sincerely,

Dr. Reinhard Gnauck
Internationale Gesellschaft
für Menschenrechte
Kaiserstrasse 72
D-6000 Frankfurt a.M.
Federal Republic of Germany

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

14

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

170950

PAGE 01 OF 03 AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 4413 DTG: 011215Z NOV 82 PSN: 043535
SIT978 AN010016 TOR: 305/1229Z

DISTRIBUTION: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB /010
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST/SENT TO PIPES FOR ACTION

ROUTINE
DE RUFHFTA #4413 3051215
R 011215Z NOV 82
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NLRR 748 23-13-6-2

BY CDB

TE 12/2/82

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INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 2212
USIA WASHDC 0084
AMEMBASSY BONN 7229

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE FRANKFURT 14413
WHITE HOUSE FOR THE PRESIDENT. STATE FOR HA AND EUR/CE.
BONN FOR EMBASSY AND USIS

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: SHUM, UR, GE

SUBJECT: SIBERIAN GAS PIPELINE: "HEARING ON FORCED
LABOR" BY INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

1. HERewith TEXT OF OCTOBER 29 LETTER RECEIVED BY THE
CONSULATE GENERAL FROM THE FRANKFURT-BASED INTERNATIONAL
SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (IGFM) FOR TRANSMISSION TO THE
PRESIDENT, CONCERNING THE SOCIETY'S HEARING ON SOVIET
FORCED LABOR TO BE HELD IN BONN ON NOVEMBER 18-19:

QUOTE

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,
ACCORDING TO THE PRESS, YOU ARE CONSIDERING A CHANGE IN
YOUR POLICY ABOUT SOVIET GAS PIPELINE SANCTIONS (OR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

15

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03 AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 4413 DTG: 011215Z NOV 82 PSN: 043535

RATHER WITHDRAWAL OF PRIVILEGES). YOUR CRITICS CLAIM WITHOUT ANY JUSTIFICATION, THAT THESE MEASURES HAVE FAILED. CERTAINLY, THE USSR HAS NOT CRUMBLLED IMMEDIATELY. BUT THE SPIRITUAL, MORAL EFFECT OF YOUR POLICY, AIMING AT A REDUCTION OF THE ECONOMIC POWER OF THAT TOTALITARIAN GOVERNMENT IS TREMENDOUS ALREADY! THIS I KNOW FROM MY MANY CONTACTS WITH CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIVISTS FROM THE USSR, POLAND, GDR AND OTHER COUNTRIES BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN. FOR THE FIRST TIME IN MANY YEARS, MILLIONS OF SUPPRESSED PEOPLE FEEL THAT SOMETHING IS DONE FOR THEM. THAT THE US, LEADING THE FREE WORLD, ACTS ON MORAL PRINCIPLES, CARES FOR THEM AND SACRIFICES SHORT-TERM ECONOMIC BENEFITS (HOW EVER QUESTIONABLE THEY MIGHT BE) IN THE HIGHER INTEREST OF FREEDOM AND HUMAN DIGNITY. THAT IS FOR MANY PEOPLE EXCITING NEWS INDEED AND HAS STIMULATED MORAL RESISTANCE AGAINST THAT DREADFUL TOTALITARIAN REGIME. YOU ARE SURELY AWARE OF THE LONG-RANGE EFFECT OF YOUR POLICY - IN THE INTEREST OF NATIONAL U.S. SECURITY AND WORLD PEACE!

UNFORTUNATELY, EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS ARE LACKING ANY SUCH SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY - BUT THE PEOPLE IN EUROPE DO WANT THE WITHDRAWAL FROM THIS IMMORAL COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT. THEY ARE TIRED OF THAT "BUSINESS AS USUAL" DESPITE THE INTERNATIONAL (AFGHANISTAN, POLAND) AND NATIONAL BEHAVIOUR (DISRESPECT FOR THE MOST ELEMENTARY HUMAN RIGHTS) OF THE MOSCOW LEADERS.

IT WOULD BE A GRAVE MISTAKE INDEED, IF YOU WOULD - ON PRESSURE FROM CERTAIN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS - ABANDON YOUR PRESENT COURSE. THE EFFECT ON THE PEOPLE WOULD BE DEMORALIZING. PLEASE CONTINUE YOUR COURSE!

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT!

HEREWITH I WOULD LIKE TO INVITE AN OBSERVER FROM THE WHITE HOUSE FOR THE QUESTIONING OF WITNESSES IN OUR INTERNATIONAL HEARING ON FORCED LABOR IN THE USSR.

THE INTERNATIONAL HEARING COMMISSION WILL BE COMPOSED OF ABOUT 10-12 OUTSTANDING EXPERTS IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

16

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03 AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 4413 DTG: 011215Z NOV 82 PSN: 043535

RIGHTS, EACH OF THEM QUALIFIED IN EVERY RESPECT TO REPRESENT THE MORAL VALUES AND ETHICAL PRINCIPLES WHICH UNITE FREE MEN. THE MEMBERS OF THE PANEL SO FAR ARE PROF. RAYMOND ARON, PHILOSOPHER, PARIS; PROF. DR. FELIX ERMACORA, FORMER UN-DELEGATE OF AUSTRIA; LUDWIG MARTIN, FORMER ATTORNEY GENERAL OF STATE AT THE GERMAN SUPREME COURT, KARLSRUHE; VICTOR SPARRE, WRITER, NORWAY. THE PANEL WILL BE CHAIRED BY ALFRED COSTE FLORET, FORMERLY STATE ATTORNEY FOR FRANCE AT THE NURENBERG TRIBUNAL 1946. THE HEARING TAKES PLACE IN BONN (STADTHALLE BAD GODESBERG) ON NOVEMBER 18/19, 1982.

WE SINCERELY HOPE YOU WILL ACCEPT THIS INVITATION AND SEND AN OBSERVER.

SO FAR WE HAVE 7 MAIN WITNESSES, 2 OF THEM WOMEN. REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL OTHER GOVERNMENTS INVOLVED, LABOR UNIONS, CHURCHES, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS WILL BE INVITED ALSO TO OBSERVE THE HEARING, LIKEWISE OF COURSE THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS, TV, RADIO.

WITH THE HIGHEST RESPECT!

YOURS SINCERELY,

REINHARD GNAUCK, M. D.

CHAIRMAN IGFM

UNQUOTE

2. ORIGINAL LETTER BEING SENT BY OFFICIAL MAIL.

BETTS

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

17

~~UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES~~
12/2/15 EDU

RECEIVED 16 NOV 82 11

TO PRESIDENT

FROM GNAUCK, REINHARD

DOCDATE 01 NOV 82

ROBINSON

04 NOV 82

LORD

04 NOV 82

KEYWORDS: USSR

HUMAN RIGHTS

SANCTIONS

SUBJECT: SOVIET PIPELINE & FORCED LABOR ISSUE

ACTION: OBE PER ROBINSON

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS

REF#

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ACTION OFFICER (S)

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COPIES TO

DISPATCH _____

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409

National Security Council The White House

RECEIVED

Package # 7446

82 NOV 4 P 2: 44

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>I</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>		
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>I</u>
John Poindexter			<u>11/9/82</u>
Staff Secretary	<u>original given to</u>		
Sit Room	<u>the President</u>		

I-Information

A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Judge,
You may want to show this
to the President.
see memo on analysis
[initials] *[initials]*

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

November 3, 1982

170951

NLRR 748-23-13-7-1

INFORMATIONBY KOB NARA DATE 12/2/05

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: RICHARD PIPES *RP*

WPC HAS SEEN

SUBJECT: Brezhnev's Speech of October 27

Brezhnev's speech has unleashed a flood of paper. The controversial question is: did he say something really new which presents a fresh threat to us, or did he merely reiterate old themes? In the two attached memoranda (Tab I, November 2; and Tab II, October 29), State reaffirms its view that the October 27 speech did not represent a new departure and does not presage a major military effort. I concur with State's evaluation on the following grounds:

- Brezhnev did not promise his military audience to increase defense spending but urged them to improve their performance.
- He stressed the improvement in Soviet-Chinese relations which most likely was meant to reassure his audience that the Soviet international situation is better than it has been for some time.
- The day after Brezhnev had delivered his speech, Chernenko, his closest collaborator and apparent choice for successor, spoke in Tiflis and downplayed the U.S. military threat.

State seems correct to me in arguing that the main thrust of Brezhnev's talk was that the Soviet armed forces must do better with what they have rather than count on more money and resources.

Attachments:

Tab I State's memorandum of November 2, 1982
 Tab II State's memorandum of October 29, 1982

cc: Dobriansky
 Myer
 Sims
 Robinson



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

7446 add-on

Washington, D.C. 20520

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170952

CONFIDENTIAL

NLR 748-13-13 8-0

BY GDJ NARA DATE 12/2/85

November 2, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Brezhnev's Address to Military Leaders: Why All the Confusion?

U.S. media analyses of Brezhnev's October 27 speech to Soviet military leaders have distorted the substance of Brezhnev's remarks. Some interpretations virtually ignore the actual content of the speech. Few show awareness of the context in which the speech was delivered.

Subsequent developments in the USSR seem to support our view that Brezhnev's speech disclosed no fundamental policy shifts and was in fact addressed primarily to Brezhnev's immediate audience, the Soviet military establishment. For example:

-- Brezhnev's speech preceded a major address to the same audience by Defense Minister Ustinov on "the state of combat and political training in the army and navy and tasks of its further perfection." The full text of Ustinov's remarks has not been published, perhaps because it was sharply critical of the military (Ustinov is reputed to be a hard-driving perfectionist). However, the initial portion, as carried on Soviet television, indicates that Brezhnev's remarks were intended to set the stage for Ustinov's critique of Soviet military preparedness.

-- The day after Brezhnev's speech, Brezhnev's protege Chernenko addressed an award ceremony in the Georgian capital of Tbilisi and was a little less harsh than his mentor in discussing the United States. In particular, Chernenko did not dwell on U.S. military preparations.

-- And, in a related development, senior members of Arbatov's USA Institute who are currently visiting Washington commented privately that Brezhnev's remarks about the U.S. were blunt because of the audience he was addressing, not because of a basic change in Moscow's thinking.

In light of these developments, we believe Brezhnev's unusually stark characterization of the U.S. military threat was in the first

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DECL: OADR

instance crafted to underscore the urgency of improving deficiencies in combat and political training in the Soviet armed forces. It did not mark a fundamental change in Moscow's current assessment of U.S. policy, though Chernenko's follow-up speech did hint at Soviet toughness in arms control negotiations and implied that Moscow would not be intimidated by any U.S. military programs. Similarly, we continue to be skeptical that Brezhnev's speech broke new ground with regard to Soviet military spending. His basic message here was that the Soviet military-industrial complex and the armed forces must do better with sizable resources they are currently provided, not that they are going to receive an even larger slice of the resource pie.


L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary



'82 OCT 28 PS 149

OCT 28 1982

170954

CONFIDENTIAL

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NLRR 7-18-23-13-9-9

BY KDB NARA DATE 12/21/85

SUBJECT: Brezhnev's October 27 Speech to Military Leaders

SUMMARY: Brezhnev broke no major substantive ground on foreign policy in his October 27 speech to Soviet military leaders. At the same time, the timing, tone, and venue of Brezhnev's remarks are indicators of the current concerns of the Soviet leadership, particularly in the areas of resource allocation and relative prospects for relations with the U.S. and China. The speech was the first time since 1972 that Brezhnev had addressed a conference of military commanders, and was apparently an effort to mend fences with the Soviet military.

DISCUSSION: There are no new policy departures in Brezhnev's October 27 speech to Soviet military leaders (copy at Tab A). Brezhnev was sharply critical of the U.S. rearmament program and American policy in virtually every region of the world. He reiterated recent Soviet overtures to China and professed to see indications of Chinese interest in "normalization" of Sino-Soviet relations, which the USSR must not ignore. Brezhnev asserted that "practical preparations" for deployment of new U.S. INF in Western Europe are moving forward. In this context, he passed up an opportunity to refer to the unilateral Soviet "moratorium" on its own INF deployments, Soviet proposals for INF reductions, and the Geneva INF negotiations with the U.S. He did not mention START. Finally, Brezhnev reiterated the commitment of the Soviet leadership to "further consolidation of the material base" of Soviet forces to enable them to cope with "growing requirements."

Although Brezhnev's formulations were largely standard fare, we think the timing and tone of his remarks on various issues and the fact that he chose to address them before an unusual convocation of military leaders may well reflect current preoccupations of the Soviet leadership. In this connection we found most interesting Brezhnev's comments on:

-- Resource Allocation: Brezhnev's reaffirmation of the priority claims of the military on the resource pie comes against the backdrop of a growing debate on resource allocation in the Soviet media. Some Soviet leaders, including Brezhnev's apparent

favorite in the succession sweepstakes, Konstantin Chernenko, have called for increased emphasis on consumer welfare in the mix of Soviet economic priorities. Other participants in the debate have argued that priority should be given to restoring cuts in the rate of investment in the Soviet Union's increasingly obsolescent non-defense industrial plant over the past two five year plans.

These calls for resource reallocation apparently provoked a recent rejoinder by Chief of the General Staff Ogarkov, who reminded Soviet leaders that only an unflagging commitment to adequate military spending could ensure against stagnation in development of new Soviet weapons systems. In his October 27 speech, Brezhnev referred briefly to the need to provide for greater consumer welfare (particularly through the food program) and increased investment in industry. However, the overall thrust of his remarks must be read as a spirited defense of the view that defense must continue to come first. It is, of course, predictable that Brezhnev would take this line in remarks tailored for a military audience. At the same time, it is perhaps indicative of the sharpness of the current debate on resource allocation that Brezhnev found it necessary to reiterate personally his commitment to the priority on defense spending associated with his leadership. He nevertheless stopped short of a specific commitment to increase the defense budget.

--Relations with the U.S. and China: The upbeat tone of Brezhnev's comments on China is particularly striking when compared with the virulence of his criticism of the U.S. While tempering his attack on Washington with a reference to the desirability of detente, Brezhnev called forthrightly for "normalization" of Sino-Soviet relations. More importantly, his assessment of Chinese intentions, while hedged and cautious, was nonetheless the most optimistic we have seen from a Soviet leader in some time. Following immediately upon the close of the first round of Sino-Soviet political level talks in Beijing, Brezhnev's comments must be read as an endorsement of the talks and an effort to give the process new impetus from the Soviet side.

Reassuring Brezhnev's Military Constituency: There was a broad hint of dissatisfaction with Brezhnev's policy line among the military in Defense Minister Ustinov's July 17 Pravda article. It acknowledged that the wisdom of Brezhnev's unilateral renunciation of first use of nuclear weapons had been questioned. The theme of questions about that policy reappeared in a Literary Gazette article on the same day Brezhnev spoke. In an apparent effort to reassure the military, Brezhnev emphasized the importance of national defense and warned against falling behind in military technology. Stressing his personal concern with military questions, Brezhnev called for higher military readiness and made a point of publicly praising Ustinov.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 29, 1982

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By CCB NARA, Date 12/2/15MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSESUBJECT: Brezhnev's October 27 Speech to
Military LeadersAttached for your use is an analysis by the
Department of Brezhnev's October 27 speech to
military leaders.A handwritten signature in red ink, appearing to read "L. Paul Bremer, III".

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: OADR

FBIS 24 (SEE 18)

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

CREIT
NLRB NUC-748-23-B-10-7

BREZHNEV 27 OCT KREMLIN ADDRESS TO ARMY OFFICERS

BY CN NARA DATE 4/13/82

TAKE 1--BREZHNEV SPEECH

LD271202 MOSCOW TASS IN ENGLISH 1152 GMT 27 OCT 82

"("KREMLIN MEETING OF MILITARY LEADERS" -- TASS HEADLINE;
QUOTATION MARKS AS RECEIVED)

"(TEXT) MOSCOW, OCTOBER 27 TASS -- A CONFERENCE OF THE COMMAND
PERSONNEL OF THE SOVIET ARMY AND NAVY WAS HELD IN THE KREMLIN TODAY.
ITS WAS ATTENDED BY COMMANDERS, MEMBERS OF MILITARY COUNCILS --
CHIEFS OF POLITICAL DEPARTMENTS AND CHIEFS OF STAFF OF MILITARY
DISTRICTS; GROUPS OF TROOPS AND FLEETS AS WELL AS LEADING OFFICIALS
OF THE CENTRAL APPARATUS OF THE DEFENSE MINISTRY.

"PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE GREETED WITH PROLONGED STORMY
APPLAUSE LEONID BREZHNEV, YURIY ANDROPOV, ANDREY GROMYKO, NIKOLAY
TIKHONOV, DMITRIY USTINOV, KONSTANTIN CHERNENKO.

"THE CONFERENCE WAS ADDRESSED BY L.I. BREZHNEV, GENERAL SECRETARY
OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE, PRESIDENT OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE
SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR, WHO WAS RECEIVED WITH STORMY
APPLAUSE.

LEONID BREZHNEV SAID:

"IT IS WITH GREAT SATISFACTION THAT I ACCEPTED THE PROPOSAL
OF DMITRIY USTINOV FOR MEETING THE COMMAND PERSONNEL OF THE ARMED
FORCES. SUCH MEETINGS ARE ALWAYS USEFUL, ESPECIALLY NOW WHEN THE
SITUATION IN THE WORLD IS VERY COMPLICATED.

"ALMOST TWO YEARS HAVE PASSED AFTER THE 26TH CONGRESS OF OUR
PARTY. THIS PERIOD WAS RICH IN MAJOR EVENTS INSIDE THE COUNTRY
AND IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA. EXPERIENCE HAS CONFIRMED
THE CORRECTNESS OF THE APPRAISALS AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE CONGRESS
AND THE FARSIGHTEDNESS OF THE DECISIONS TAKEN BY IT. OF COURSE,
THERE ALSO APPEAR NEW QUESTIONS WHICH MUST BE SOLVED WITHOUT
DELAY."

26
BIGGEST SOCIALIST STATE AT WHICH ALL THE WORLD IS LOOKING. THIS GIVES OUR FOREIGN POLICY SPECIAL MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE. THE 26TH CONGRESS OF THE CPSU DREW UP AN EXTENSIVE PROGRAMME OF STRUGGLE FOR PEACE. THIS PROGRAMME AGREES WITH THE SPIRIT OF LENIN'S BEHESTS AND HAS GAINED GENERAL RECOGNITION.

"WE ARE LIVING, CONRADES, IN A NO-SIMPLE TIME. THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION MAKES IT IMPERATIVE FOR US TO REDOUBLE OR TREBLE OUR EFFORTS IN THE STRUGGLE FOR PRESERVING PEACE, FOR REDUCING THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR WHICH IS HANGING OVER MANKIND. IN THIS STRUGGLE WE SHOULD BROADEN INTERACTION WITH ALL THOSE WHO HOLD DEAR PEACE ON EARTH, AND WE SHOULD TIRELESSLY STRENGTHEN THE DEFENCES OF OUR COUNTRY AND BE VIGILANT.

"THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE PARTY HAS POINTED OUT MORE THAN ONCE LATELY THAT THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION CONTINUES GROWING MORE COMPLICATED. THE POLITICAL CIRCLES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA HAVE LAUNCHED A POLITICAL, IDEOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC OFFENSIVE ON SOCIALISM AND HAVE RAISED THE INTENSITY OF THEIR MILITARY PREPARATIONS TO AN UNPRECEDENTED LEVEL.

"PRACTICAL PREPARATIONS ARE UNDER WAY IN EUROPE FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF AMERICAN MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN NATO COUNTRIES.

"ISRAEL'S AGGRESSION IN LEBANON SHOULD ALSO BE REGARDED AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE POLITICAL COURSE TAKEN BY THE AMERICANS. IT IS CLEAR THAT THIS IS, IN THE FINAL COUNT, THE DOING OF THE USA. THE SITUATION IN A NUMBER OF REGIONS OF AFRICA, ASIA AND CENTRAL AMERICA IS VERY COMPLICATED. THE REASON IS THE SAME: ATTEMPTS TO IMPOSE AMERICAN DIKTAT ON THEM."

"THE MASSES OF PEOPLE ON ALL CONTINENTS ANGRILY PROTEST AGAINST WASHINGTON'S AGGRESSIVE POLICY WHICH IS THREATENING TO PUSH THE WORLD INTO THE FLAMES OF A NUCLEAR WAR. THE ADVENTURISM, RUDENESS AND UNDISGUISED EGOTISM OF THIS POLICY AROUSE GROWING INDIGNATION IN MANY COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THOSE ALLIED WITH THE USA.

"IN THIS SITUATION IT IS VERY IMPORTANT, OF COURSE, HOW OUR RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES WILL SHAPE UP. OF NO SMALL IMPORTANCE ARE RELATIONS WITH CHINA. WE SINCERELY WANT A NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH THAT COUNTRY AND ARE DOING EVERYTHING IN OUR POWER TOWARD THIS END. IN BEIJING, THEY ALSO SAY NOW THAT NORMALISATION IS DESIRABLE. NO RADICAL CHANGES IN THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ARE TO BE SEEN SO FAR. BUT THE NEW THINGS WHICH APPEAR MUST NOT BE IGNORED BY US."

"THE LINE OF THE USA AND THOSE WHO FOLLOW IT -- A LINE FOR DEEPENING TENSION AND AGGRAVATING THE SITUATION TO A MAXIMUM. THEY ARE DREAMING OF ISOLATING POLITICAL AND WEAKENING ECONOMICALLY THE USSR AND ITS FRIENDS. THEY HAVE UNFOLDED AN UNPRECEDENTED ARMS RACE, ESPECIALLY A NUCLEAR ARMS RACE, AND ARE TRYING TO ATTAIN MILITARY SUPERIORITY. HAVING STEPPED ON THIS ROAD, IMPERIALISM IS IRRESPONSIBLY PLAYING WITH THE DESTINIES OF THE PEOPLES.

"OUR LINE IS A LINE FOR DETENTE AND STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. WE SHALL NOT ABANDON IT AND SHALL STEP UP OUR EFFORTS AND RETAIN THE INITIATIVE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS."

"AS YOU UNDERSTAND, IT IS NOT ONLY WORDS THAT ARE NEEDED IN POLITICS. A POLICY IS ONLY EFFECTIVE WHEN IT RELIES ON THE REAL ECONOMIC AND MILITARY STRENGTH OF A STATE, ON THE UNLIMITED SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE, ON STRONG FRIENDSHIP AND FIGHTING UNION WITH THE ALLIES AND FRIENDS. WE HAVE ALL THIS, AND WE ARE WORKING TIRELESSLY IN THIS DIRECTION.

"NOW ON INTERNAL TASKS, OUR HOMELAND IS APPROACHING THE 60TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE USSR IN THE FLOWER OF ITS STRENGTH.

"THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS MADE BY THE COUNTRY IS APPARENT. OUR INDUSTRY IS WORKING AT A GOOD RHYTHM. IT CAN PRODUCE EVERYTHING NECESSARY BY RELYING ALMOST ENTIRELY ON OUR OWN RESOURCES OF RAW AND OTHER MATERIALS.

"OF COURSE, NOT EVERYTHING GOES SMOOTHLY. THERE ARE DIFFICULTIES AND SHORTCOMINGS. HEAL, FUEL AND TRANSPORT CONTINUE TO BE THE BOTTLENECKS. OUR ECONOMIC EXECUTIVES ARE STILL TO DO A GREAT DEAL TO REMOVE THE SHORTCOMINGS. THE SITUATION IN CAPITAL CONSTRUCTION IS IMPROVING SLOWLY ALTHOUGH THE MEASURES TAKEN LATELY ARE ALREADY PRODUCING RESULTS."

"A GREAT DEAL OF WORK IS BEING DONE IN AGRICULTURE IN ORDER TO ELIMINATE IN THE FUTURE THE NEED FOR GRAIN PURCHASES ABROAD AND FULLY MEET THE POPULATION'S GROWING DEMAND. WE ATTACH EXCEPTIONAL IMPORTANCE TO THE FOOD PROGRAMME ADOPTED AT THE MAY PLENUM OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE.

"CONRADES, DMITRIY USTINOV CONSTANTLY REPORTS TO ME ABOUT THE STATE OF OUR ARMED FORCES. AS TO ME, I ALSO CONSTANTLY HANDLE MATTERS OF CONSOLIDATING THE ARMY AND NAVY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF MY OFFICIAL DUTY, SO TO SAY, AND KNOW ABOUT THE STATE OF AFFAIRS.

"YOU WORK HARD. THE YEAR'S RESULTS CONFIRM THAT THERE ARE UNDENIABLE SUCCESSES IN THE COMBAT READINESS AND TRAINING OF THE ARMED FORCES. BIG OPERATIONAL, TECHNICAL AND ORGANISATIONAL MEASURES WERE CARRIED OUT, ADDING TO THE MIGHT OF THE ARMY AND NAVY. I NOTE WITH SATISFACTION THE POSITIVE RESULTS OF THE LARGE-SCALE EXERCISES CONDUCTED IN RECENT YEARS, WHICH HELPED DRAW IMPORTANT CONCLUSIONS FOR THE FUTURE.

"OUR PEOPLE LOVE THEIR ARMED FORCES AND ARE CONFIDENT BY THEIR CONSTANT READINESS TO DEFEND THEIR SOCIALIST MOTHERLAND. THEY VALUE COURAGE AND SELFLESSNESS IN FULFILLING THEIR SOLDIERLY DUTY.

"EVERYONE SEES THAT THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES ARE A POWERFUL FACTOR OF PEACE AND SECURITY, A RELIABLE MEANS OF CURBING AGGRESSIVE FORCES, AND THE PEOPLE SPARE NOTHING TO KEEP THEM ALWAYS UP TO THE MARK. WE EQUIP THE ARMED FORCES WITH MOST ADVANCED WEAPONS AND MILITARY HARDWARE. THE PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE ADOPTS MEASURES TO MEET ALL YOUR NEEDS, AND THE ARMED FORCES SHOULD ALWAYS BE WORTHY OF THIS CONCERN."

(TEXT) "THE TIME NOW IS SUCH THAT THE LEVEL OF COMBAT READINESS OF THE ARMY AND NAVY SHOULD BE EVEN HIGHER. IT IS NECESSARY TO PERFECT COMBAT READINESS IN A CONSTANT AND EXTREMELY RESPONSIBLE WAY, PROCEEDING FROM THE GROWING REQUIREMENTS. THEN NO FORTUITY WILL TAKE US UNAWARES.

"IT IS NECESSARY TO BE ABLE TO OPERATE WITH DUE ACCOUNT FOR THE LATEST ACHIEVEMENTS OF SCIENCE AND ART OF WAR. IT IS IMPORTANT TO STRIVE FOR POSITIVE RESULTS IN MILITARY TRAINING. SPECIAL ATTENTION IN THIS SHOULD BE GIVEN TO COMMANDING OF THE TROOPS.

"IT IS OF EXCEPTIONAL IMPORTANCE TO WIELD WEAPONS IN A MASTERLY WAY, TO BE ABLE TO USE IN FULL THEIR COMBT POSSIBILITIES.

"THE SOVIET ARMY SHOULD BE UP TO THE NAZR IN ALL RESPECTS: EQUIPMENT, STRUCTURE AND METHODS OF TRAINING. IT SHOULD CORRESPOND TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE PRESENT TIME, AND YOU, COMRADES, ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THAT.

"FURTHER CONSOLIDATION OF THE MATERIAL BASE OF THE ARMED-- FORCES SHOULD BE MENTIONED SEPARATELY. COMPETITION IN MILITARY TECHNOLOGY HAS SHARPLY INTENSIFIED, OFTEN ACQUIRING A FUNDAMENTALLY NEW CHARACTER. LAG IN THIS COMPETITION IS INADMISSIBLE.

"WE EXPECT THAT OUR SCIENTISTS, DESIGNERS, ENGINEERS AND TECHNICIANS WILL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO RESOLVE SUCCESSFULLY ALL TASKS CONNECTED WITH THIS."

"NATURALLY, PARTY AND POLITICAL WORK TO EDUCATE THE PERSONNEL SHOULD BE INTENSIFIED. HIGH MORALE HAS ALWAYS BEEN THE MOST POWERFUL WEAPON OF OUR ARMY. THIS HOLDS TRUE TODAY EVEN TO A GREATER EXTENT.

CARE FOR THE SOLDIER AND OFFICER, FOR THE CONDITIONS OF THE TROOPS HAS ALWAYS BEEN AND REMAINS IN THE FOCUS OF ATTENTION OF OUR PARTY AND THE SOVIET STATE. AND YOU SHOULD REGARD THIS TASK IN THE FUTURE AS ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL ONES.

THE PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE IS SURE, COMRADES, THAT THE TASKS FACING OUR ARMED FORCES WILL BE SUCCESSFULLY RESOLVED. THIS IS GUARANTEED BY THE HARDENED, HIGHLY CONSCIENTIOUS, AND SELFLESSLY DEVOTED TO MOTHERLAND COMMANDING AND POLITICAL CADRES OF THE ARMY AND NAVY; HIGH SKILL AND RICH EXPERIENCE OF THE MEMBERS OF THE COLLEGIUM OF THE USSR DEFENCE MINISTRY; PRECISE WORK OF THE ENTIRE MINISTRY; WHOLE HELM IS IN THE RELIABLE HANDS OF THE LOYAL SON OF THE LENINIST PARTY; MEMBER OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE; OUR COMRADE-IN-ARMS MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION; DMITRIY USTINOV.

COMRADES,

GREAT WORK, NEW EXERCISES AND MARCHES ARE AHEAD OF ALL OF YOU. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THEY WILL BECOME ANOTHER CONSIDERABLE STEP IN THE TRAINING OF THE ARMED FORCES. I EXPRESS CONFIDENCE ON BEHALF OF THE PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND ON MY PERSONAL BEHALF THAT YOU WILL SUCCESSFULLY COPE WITH THE TASKS ADVANCED BEFORE YOU. IN THIS YOU ARE GUARANTEED CONSTANT SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE.

LET ME WISH YOU NEW SUCCESSES IN YOUR IMPORTANT WORK."

LEONID BREZHNEV'S SPEECH WAS HEARD WITH IMMENSE ATTENTION BY ALL THOSE PRESENT AND WAS REPEATEDLY PUNCTUATED WITH STORMY APPLAUSE.

MEMBER OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE, DEFENSE MINISTRY, MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION DMITRIY USTINOV MADE A REPORT ON THE STATE OF COMBAT AND POLITICAL TRAINING IN THE ARMY AND NAVY AND TASKS OF ITS FURTHER PERFECTION.

401

National Security Council
The White House

Package # 7446

32 OCT 28 P 6: 23

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	<u>1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<u>A</u>
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____
<u>Dick Morris</u>	<u>2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	_____
I-Information	A-Action	R-Retain	D-Dispatch
			N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

*Dick Pipes,
I believe you are preparing
a new package incorporating
state input. Jol*

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~
INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON **DECLASSIFIED**

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

748-23-13-11-6

120956

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARKE BY KOB NARA DATE 12/2/15

SUBJECT: Brezhnev's address of October 27, 1982

Issue

On October 27, Brezhnev addressed an unusually complete assembly of top Soviet military personnel.

Discussion

Brezhnev's speech had some unusual characteristics.

- It was (by Brezhnev's own admission) delivered at the invitation of the Minister of Defense, which suggests (a suggestion reinforced by the contents of the speech) that it was intended at least in part as a pep-talk.
- Brezhnev depicted the United States as launching "a political, ideological, and economic offensive against socialism" and undertaking an "unprecedented" military buildup.
- He stressed that relations with China were improving and drew a striking connection between that and the Soviet Union's improved global situation (until now the Soviet leadership has avoided referring to the Sino-Soviet relationship as having an affect on the Soviet Union's international position.)
- He emphasized the need to improve the economic strength of the Soviet state and "relying almost entirely on Soviet sources of raw and other materials".
- He assured the audience that "all its needs" will be met, and singled out for attention military technology, some of it of a "fundamentally new character", as a top priority.

The impression one gains is that Brezhnev and Ustinov are worried about the morale of the armed forces caused by the drubbing Soviet equipment took in Lebanon at the hands of the Israelis and by the U.S. defense programs. Brezhnev's speech was defensive. It was meant to reassure the top brass that (a) they will get all they need, including the newest technology and (b) that improved relations with China are in the offing, easing the strategic burden of the Soviet armed forces.

The speech may be merely a pep talk or it may presage a major new defense spurt: we will know more in the months to come.

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DECLAS: OADR

Prepared by Richard Pipes

WHSR
ROUTE SLIP

Time Stamp

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STAFF	C/O
Clark	C
McFarlane	C
Poindexter	C
Merchant	
NSC S/S	C

82 OCT 2 AM 12

WHITE HOUSE
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11/2

*Dick Pipes,
Please incorporate
this in paper you
are working.*

C : Copy

O : Original

J

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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S/S # 8233540

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82 OCT 2 11:12
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MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL No. Pages 2
FROM: Clay McManaway S/S 23126 UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE 12/2/87 CDB
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Bremer/Clark: Brezhnev's Address to Military
Leaders: Why All the Confusion?

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
<u>NSC</u>	<u>MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK</u>	<u>456-2255</u>	

FOR: CLEARANCE INFORMATION PER REQUEST COMMENT

REMARKS: Advance copy LDXed. Original to follow via courier.

S/S Officer: Clay McManaway
cdj

NSC/S PROFILE

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ID 8207446

TO CLARK

FROM PIPES

UNCLASSIFIED UPON
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES
12/2/85 CAB

RECEIVED 28 OCT 82 18

DOCDATE 28 OCT 82

BREMER

29 OCT 82

BREMER

02 NOV 82

KEYWORDS: USSR

CHINA P R

BREZHNEV, LEONID I

ECONOMICS

SPEECHES

SUBJECT: ANALYSIS OF BREZHNEV SPEECH 27 OCT

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR INFO

DUE: 01 NOV 82 STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS *** STATE ANALYSIS RECD VIA LDX

REF# 8233233 LOG 8207505 NSCIFID (R /)

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<i>Clark</i>	<i>IX 11/3</i>	<i>for information</i>		<i>DO, My BS, Ro</i>
<i>Pres</i>	<i>IP NOV 09 1982</i>	<i>for info via PDB</i>		
	<i>NOV 09 1982</i>	<i>Pres noted</i>		<i>RP</i>

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE *PA (C)*

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172958 37

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

November 4, 1982

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR748-23-13-12-5

BY 603 NARA DATE 6/3/82

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

THROUGH: RICHARD BOVERIE


FROM: BOB LINHARD ⁶⁷ / HORACE RUSSELL

SUBJECT: Press Guidance on New Soviet ICBM Test

We had planned to stress the new Soviet ICBM test to Congress during the series of briefings provided next week. We anticipated that this would result in a leak by some member of Congress of this information, and that we would then be prepared to comment on that leak. Unfortunately, someone jumped the tracks and provided the information needed for Getler and Pincus to write the article at TAB B which appeared in the Nov 4 Post.

To ensure that this acceleration of events is handled correctly, we have developed the series of Qs & As at TAB A and are circulating them for comment immediately.

Overall, the Post article goes in the direction that we had desired.



25x1

- It comes at a time when we are still struggling with how best to treat encryption in INF, in START (where the current U.S. position is to permit no encryption at all), and in current U.S. practice (where encryption is a possibility in the testing of both Pershing II and M-X) and a necessity in certain BMD-related tests).
- It quickly leads one again into a public debate of the U.S. interim restraint policy.

The Qs & As are framed to limit damage where necessary and to channel the discussion of this material in the most positive directions.

We will have agency comments and coordination by early Monday and then make the material generally available for use by Administration spokesmen. We will also bring in Bob Sims as early as possible.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

170960

URGENT 39

PLEASE LDX TO THE FOLLOWING:

25X1

LTC JOHN DOUGLASS	OSD/USDRE	Pentagon	Room 3E1006	69-711
Dr. RON LEHMAN	OSD/ISP	Pentagon	Room 4C762	69-133
Dr. MARV ATKINS	OSD/USDRE	Pentagon	Room 3E1225X1	169-749
Col. FRANK WRIGHT	JCS/J-5	Pentagon	Room 2D990	69-545
[Redacted]	CIA	CIA	Room 6F20	[Redacted]
[Redacted]	CIA	CIA	Room 6F20	[Redacted]
[Redacted]	DIA	Pentagon	Room 2C283	69-502
LTC JOHN GORDON	STATE	New State	Room 7317	63-286
Dr. JIM TIMBIE	ACDA	State	Room 5933	63-274

FROM: COL BOB LINHARD NSC STAFF OEOB Room 386 Ext 395-5865

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED PAGES: 4

COMMENT:

Attached are suggested Qs&As intended to serve as the basis for press guidance to Admin spokesmen on the recent articles discussing the Soviet test on Oct 26.

Please provide comments to me on these soonest on Monday morning. We will recirculate a coordinated version - hopefully by 10:30 am on Monday.

I have shot-gunned these drafts to a number of individuals in OSD and in the intelligence community in order to save us some time on Monday. Could the intelligence community and OSD please internally coordinate and provide a single input on the material provided.

PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY REVIEW OF NSC EQUITY IS REQUIRED

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SECRET

LN NARA DATE 1/13/12

URGENT

New Soviet Missile Test

Q: Can you confirm reports that the Soviets have begun testing of a new solid propellant missile?

A: The Soviet Union did inform the United States that it had tested a "light intercontinental ballistic missile of a new type" on October 26, 1982. The use of the term "light" simply indicates that they claim the new missile is smaller than heavy ICBMs like the Soviet SS-18 missile. For comparison, using the same terminology, the US Peacekeeper missile is a "light" ICBM.

It is interesting that the Soviets have publicly criticized the President's decision to deploy the Peacekeeper missile, a missile which we have yet to flight-test and a missile whose purpose and characteristics we have openly explained, while in contrast, the Soviets have failed to openly mention that they already have their next generation ICBM in flight-testing, that this testing began prior to the President's reaching his decision on the Peacekeeper, and that they have yet to provide any information on the purpose and the capabilities of their new missile.

Finally, it is also interesting to note that while suggesting that it is the US who is racing to improve its arms, this is just one more indication that the continued momentum of the Soviet nuclear program has not slackened in the least. It is this continued momentum which drives the adverse trends in the strategic balance cited in the President's most recent speech and which is one of the key elements in the rationale for his deciding to deploy the Peacekeeper.

DRAFT

Q: Why did the US not reveal this to the American public prior to this time?

A: The US government wanted to provide to the Soviets every opportunity to be forthcoming with respect to this test. At the same time, we wanted to avoid the characterization of this real and significant fact as merely one more intelligence revelation aimed at enhancing the likelihood of approval of US defense programs in general and the Peacekeeper in particular. Congress was notified immediately after the event. We did intend to make this information public at an appropriate time if the Soviets were not forthcoming.

Q: Can you confirm reports that the Soviet test of their new ICBM failed?

A: The Soviets did inform us of the test but have provided no descriptions of the results of the test or anything more than the most superficial description of the missile tested. I can't go much further than that at this time.

Q: Can you tell us anything about the size ^{or} of the capabilities of the new Soviet ICBM?

A: Of course, US intelligence sources and methods must be protected -- but I can say that they have told us that this is a new, "light" ICBM. The use of the term "light" by the Soviets simply indicates that they claim the new missile is smaller than their "heavy" ICBMs like the SS-18 missile. For comparison, using the same terminology, the US Peacekeeper missile is a "light" ICBM. While we have patiently and openly described both the purpose and the capabilities of the Peacekeeper, the Soviets have provided no information describing the capabilities or purpose of their new ICBM.

Q: Does this new Soviet test violate SALT?

A: The SALT II agreement provided for the testing of one new ICBM by both sides. The Soviets have told us that this is their one new ICBM permitted by the unratified SALT II agreement. We are continuing to study the data on this test prior to making a determination as to whether any other aspect of this test undercuts existing arms control agreements.

Q: Can you confirm reports that Soviets coded the electronic signals coming from the missile -- and if so, would this not be a violation of SALT?

A: The answer involves special sensitivities. To answer your question I would have to draw upon classified US intelligence and in doing so run the risk of damaging the effectiveness of critical US intelligence sources and methods. This I cannot and will not do.

Q: Would encryption violate SALT?

A: Encryption which impedes our capability to monitor ~~using~~ ^{USING NATIONAL TECHNICAL} ~~national technical means~~ the performance of ballistic missiles and ^{MEANS} thus verify specific provisions of the agreements would be a violation.

Q: Can you confirm that the new missile uses solid propellant?

A: The Soviets have not given us any information about the nature of the propellant -- or for that manner, any information about the missile, other than it is a new "light" ICBM -- however, we have been anticipating that the Soviets would have new, solid propellant missiles available for testing.

DRAFT

Q: What are the advantages of using solid fuel -- and is this a significant increase in capability for the Soviets?

A: In the past, the Soviets have continued to rely more heavily on liquid fuels than did we. Today, the only US ICBM that employs liquid fuels as its primary propellant is the TITAN II, and as the President has announced, we are phasing those out of our inventory. Solid fuels are easier to handle, safer, and provide more reliable performance.

Q: You said (some claim) this is a new generation of Soviet ICBMs. How do you reach that conclusion?

A: The first generation of Soviet ICBMs was deployed in the early 1960s. This led in the late 1960s to the deployment of the SS-9 and SS-11 families of missiles. In the 1970s they improved their ICBM force with the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 ICBMs. The new missile tested will be of a yet newer generation.

It is of note that during this period ^{WHILE MAKING SOME IMPROVEMENTS} the US started and stayed with the TITAN II and the MINUTEMAN family of missiles.

Q: Could this be a new solid mobile ICBM like the SS-16?

A: The Soviets have not provided any information beyond the fact that it is a new "light" ICBM. It could therefore be anything from a MINUTEMAN-sized to an ^{PEACEKEEPER} ~~M-X~~-sized missile. We have no information from the Soviets on how they plan to deploy this new missile.

DRAFT

11/30

11/30

Failed in First Flight. U.S. Officials Say

By Michael Getler
and Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writers

A new Soviet intercontinental-range ballistic missile, or ICBM, failed its first flight test about six weeks ago, according to U.S. officials.

Officials say the missile was launched from the Russian missile test center at Plesetsk on Oct. 26. Indications here are that the missile's first-stage rocket motor failed and the flight ended quickly.

Despite the failure, U.S. analysts believe the start of the flight test program is significant because the new weapon uses solid, rather than liquid, fuel for its rocket motors.

The solid fuel makes such weapons easier for ground crews to handle. More important, it makes the missiles themselves more reliable and thus would give Soviet commanders a higher percentage than before of missiles that are always ready to fire. Solid-fuel missiles are also said to be easier to protect in underground silos against the blast of attacking enemy missiles.

Virtually the entire Soviet ICBM arsenal of about 1,398 land-based missiles is now composed of liquid-fueled weapons, including all of Moscow's latest and most menacing weapons.

All 1,000 U.S. land-based Minutemen ICBMs, on the other hand, are solid-fueled. The only liquid-fueled U.S. missiles are 51 aging Titan II missiles that are now being withdrawn from service, in part because of recent accidents.

The Soviet test came as no surprise. Moscow has had several new missiles in development. But the start of the new flight-test program, analysts here believe, indicates that Moscow will probably begin modernizing its existing force of SS17 and perhaps SS19 missiles with a solid-fueled version.

Under the second strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT II) signed by presidents Jimmy Carter and Leonid I. Brezhnev in 1979, each side "may flight test and deploy one new type of light ICBM." Although

the United States never ratified that agreement, the Reagan administration is abiding by it.

Sources here say that, in accordance with SALT II, Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin informed the State Department of the missile test shortly after it took place and reportedly described it as the one new missile that Moscow is allowed under the SALT II provisions.

The new Soviet test could figure in the developing debate on Capitol Hill over the administration's proposed MX missile program.


The Soviets have 150 SS17 missiles, each of which carries four individual nuclear warheads. There are 300 SS19s, each carrying six warheads. The SS19s, along with the still-larger SS18s, are considered among the most threatening to the U.S. land-based missile force.

Under SALT II, both the SS17 and SS19 are classified as "light" missiles, the classification that Moscow can modernize with one new missile. It is a classification that many American critics of SALT II believe does not properly describe the striking power of the Soviet weapons. Officials here are privately describing the new missile's size as medium to heavy. Because the test failed so quickly, it is not known how many warheads the new missile carried.

Sources say the Soviets coded the electronic signals coming from the missile, which also diminishes the information U.S. monitoring devices can gather.

The Russians have had trouble developing solid-fueled missiles for some time and may still be having trouble. The only other solid-fueled ICBMs in the Soviet arsenal are about 60 smaller SS13 missiles deployed in the late 1960s. This was Moscow's first effort at solid-fueled, long-range missiles, and western experts never rated the SS13 highly. Another smaller, solid-fuel missile, the SS16, was tested in 1975 but never deployed.

Since then, however, Moscow has used solid fuel in its SS20 intermediate-range missiles meant for use against Western Europe and China.



United Press International
posed MX missile silo after it withstood an effect of a Soviet 25-megaton warhead.

Air Force "has a chance of achieving" the hardness level it is seeking; but its experts "don't have a design yet," and achieving one "will be costly."

Townes, in his letter, raised the prospect of "delays in full deployment" of the MX missile brought on by problems in achieving hardness levels required and by "cost overruns." Thus, he said, it may be "particularly difficult" to deploy the first MX missiles in the Dense Pack plan by the 1986 target date.

Under his analysis, Townes said, the Soviets' costs and technical difficulties in designing and deploying a nuclear warhead to defeat Dense Pack would be less than those facing the Pentagon in designing and building the basing system.

He called the Air Force "scenario"—in which the Russians will not be able to come up with a new warhead to defeat the Dense Pack system until 1990 or 1991—"at best quite uncertain and maybe unlikely."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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INFORMATION

DEC 11 1982
November 4, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: WILLIAM P. CLARK

BY CCD NARA DATE 12/2/15

THROUGH: RICHARD BOVERIE


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TO CLARK

FROM LINHARD

DOCDATE 04 NOV 82

RUSSELL

04 NOV 82

BOVERIE

04 NOV 82

KEYWORDS: ICBM

NUCLEAR TESTING

USSR

MEDIA

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-23-13-12-5

SUBJECT: PRESS GUIDANCE ON NEW SOVIET ICBM TEST

BY KDB

DATE 12/2/15

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

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FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

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CLARK

COMMENTS

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PLEASE LDX TO THE FOLLOWING:

LTC JOHN DOUGLASS	OSD/USDRE	Pentagon	Room 3E1006	69-71282
Dr. RON LEHMAN	OSD/ISP	Pentagon	Room 4C762	69-13345
Dr. MARV ATKINS	OSD/USDRE	Pentagon	Room 3E129	69-74910
Col. FRANK WRIGHT	JCS/J-5	Pentagon	Room 2D990	69-54533
[Redacted]	CIA	CIA	25X1 Room 6F20	[Redacted]
[Redacted]	CIA	CIA	Room 6F20	[Redacted]
[Redacted]	DIA	Pentagon	Room 2C283	69-5025X
LTC JOHN GORDON	STATE	New State	Room 7317	63-28688
Dr. JIM TIMBIE	ACDA	State	Room 5933	63-27466

FROM: COL BOB LINHARD NSC STAFF OEOB Room 386 Ext 395-5865

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED PAGES: 4

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART (RELEASABLE)
 BY CRJ
 DATE 1/13/12

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DRAFT

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
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DRAFT

NEW SOVIET MISSILE Failed in First Flight, U.S. Officials Say

53



United Press International
Proposed MX missile silo after it withstood an effect of a Soviet 25-megaton warhead.

By Michael Getler
and Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writers

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Sources here say that, in accordance with SALT II, Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin informed the State Department of the missile test shortly after it took place and reportedly described it as the one new missile that Moscow is allowed under the SALT II provisions.

The new Soviet test could figure in the developing debate on Capitol Hill over the administration's proposed MX missile program.

The Soviets have 150 SS17 missiles, each of which carries four individual nuclear warheads. There are 300 SS19s, each carrying six warheads. The SS19s, along with the still-larger SS18s, are considered among the most threatening to the U.S. land-based missile force.

Under SALT II, both the SS17 and SS19 are classified as "light" missiles, the classification that Moscow can modernize with one new missile. It is a classification that many American critics of SALT II believe does not properly describe the striking power of the Soviet weapons. Officials here are privately describing the new missile's size as medium to heavy. Because the test failed so quickly, it is not known how many warheads the new missile carried.

Sources say the Soviets coded the electronic signals coming from the missile, which also diminishes the information U.S. monitoring devices can gather.

The Russians have had trouble developing solid-fueled missiles for some time and may still be having trouble. The only other solid-fueled ICBMs in the Soviet arsenal are about 60 smaller SS13 missiles deployed in the late 1960s. This was Moscow's first effort at solid-fueled, long-range missiles, and western experts never rated the SS13 highly. Another smaller, solid-fuel missile, the SS16, was tested in 1975 but never deployed.

Since then, however, Moscow has used solid fuel in its SS20 intermediate-range missiles meant for use against Western Europe and China.

Air Force "has a chance of achieving" the hardness level it is seeking; but its experts "don't have a design yet," and achieving one "will be costly."

Townes, in his letter, raised the prospect of "delays in full deployment" of the MX missile brought on by problems in achieving hardness levels required and by "cost overruns." Thus, he said, it may be "particularly difficult" to deploy the first MX missiles in the Dense Pack plan by the 1986 target date.

Under his analysis, Townes said, the Soviets' costs and technical difficulties in designing and deploying a nuclear warhead to defeat Dense Pack would be less than those facing the Pentagon in designing and building the basing system.

He called the Air Force "scenario"—in which the Russians will not be able to come up with a new warhead to defeat the Dense Pack system until 1990 or 1991—"at best quite uncertain and maybe unlikely."

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