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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

**Withdrawer**

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**File Folder** USSR (10/9/82-10/18/82)

**FOIA**

F03-002/5

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272

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
170905	MEMO	L. PAUL BREMER TO W. CLARK RE SOVIET FORCED LABOR	2	10/9/1982	B1
	<i>R</i>	<b>4/8/2013</b>	<b>CREST NLR-748-23-9-1-2</b>		
170906	CABLE	STATE 269372	3	9/23/1982	B1
	<i>R</i>	<b>4/8/2013</b>	<b>CREST NLR-748-23-9-2-1</b>		
170907	CABLE	MOSCOW 12186	1	10/10/1982	B1
	<i>R</i>	<b>4/8/2013</b>	<b>CREST NLR-748-23-9-3-0</b>		
170908	MEMO	W. CASEY TO PRESIDENT ET AL. RE ANDROPOV	1	10/12/1982	B1
	<i>R</i>	<b>1/13/2012</b>	<b>CREST NLR-748-23-9-4-9</b>		
170909	REPORT	RE ANDROPOV	42	9/1/1982	B1 B3
170910	REPORT	RE SOVIET MISSILES	3	10/13/1982	B1
	<i>PAR</i>	<b>4/8/2013</b>	<b>CREST NLR-748-23-9-6-7</b>		
170911	CABLE	RE USSR	4	10/18/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
170912	CABLE	RE USSR	2	10/18/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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— 12/3 1  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Van Eran

Pls ensure that I  
am the ACTION

OFFICER on Soviet

Free Labor (→  
well → Yellow Rain)

I do the work +  
attend the mtg.

WR



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DECLASSIFIED

Washington, D.C. 20520

1- 1748-23-9-1-2

October 9, 1982

BY LODS NARA DATE 12/2/15

170905

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK<sup>2</sup> ? 19 05 6  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Soviet Forced Labor

WHITE HOUSE  
SECRET

We have been developing a strategy to sharpen the issue of forced labor in the Soviet Union--particularly that of political prisoners-- before world public opinion and to discover as much information as we can on the issue. The steps taken thus far and those suggested here have been developed in a number of informal interagency meetings which have included NSC staff members, representatives of the intelligence community and officials of the Department of Labor.

As you are aware, the Department issued an official statement on this issue on September 22 (TAB 1). This put on the public record USG concern over the issue and our belief that the international community has a responsibility to investigate the charges which have been made. Our statement focussed on Soviet forced labor as a human rights issue--particularly in regard to the use of political prisoners--and treated the pipeline project as one facet of the broader issue. There are some 4-5 million prisoners in the Soviet Union and a well documented practice of subjecting them to forced labor. We believe this approach is most likely to bring a positive international response, particularly given the state of evidence concerning the pipeline itself. Our statement also included reference to the growing use, under apparently questionable circumstances, of Vietnamese laborers in the USSR.

We have also sent instructions to US posts worldwide (Tab 2) conveying USG interest in the issue, providing information obtained from private sources as well as the text of our 9/22 statement and asking our Embassies in Western and other friendly countries to pursue the issue with host governments and selected media representatives.

By a vote of 80-1 on September 24, the Senate passed a resolution (TAB 3) asking the Administration to submit within 30 days an interim report on how we are pursuing the issue of forced labor on the pipeline project and to submit by January a full report. We are working now to meet the 30-day deadline, and we will make use of the Senate action as a useful vehicle for keeping the issue alive. Our proposed approach in responding to the Senate will be to provide under an appropriate covering statement a packet consisting of:

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-


--A summary of USG actions, including our 9/22 statement, and information and testimony received from private sources;

--A paper giving the history of the Soviet forced labor issue in the ILO, including the recent ICFTU approach to the ILO;

--A description of actions taken by other governments, as well as private human rights groups.

There are several additional tracks on which we will pursue this issue. First, with discretion, we will encourage--in coordination with the AFL-CIO--action on the issue by the ICFTU, ILO and other international labor bodies. Second, we will try to arrange a meeting within the next month with the President's Committee on the ILO (which includes representatives of organized labor and business), and possibly use such a meeting as the occasion for a follow-up statement on the issue. Third, since the use of forced labor as a punishment for exercising basic human rights is also a violation of Soviet commitments in CSCE, we are providing all of our materials on the issue to Ambassador Kampelman so that he can continue to pursue at the Madrid Review Conference these and other Soviet labor violations.

Finally, we will explore the possibilities of raising this in the UN context, and we will do what we can (discreetly) to be helpful to the International Society for Human Rights in Frankfurt, Germany, which has announced that it will hold its own hearings on the issue in November.

  
D. Paul Bremer, III  
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

- TAB 1 - DOS Statement on Forced Labor of 9/22/82
- TAB 2 - DOS Cable on Forced Labor
- TAB 3 - Senate Resolution

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESS STATEMENTForced Labor in USSR

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We have received a growing number of reports that the USSR has used a large number of prisoners -- including thousands of political prisoners -- to work on massive labor projects. According to at least one such report, for example, at least 100,000 such forced laborers are being used on the heavy infrastructure work of clearing swamps, cutting timber and building access roads for the Yamal gas pipeline. These forced laborers reportedly include religious dissidents and other prisoners of conscience.

These reports have come from a wide variety of individuals and organizations, in Europe, Asia and the US. The sources include human rights organizations; labor organizations; laborers who have managed to emigrate from the Soviet Union after working under these conditions; and letters reaching Asia and the West from the USSR.

We are not claiming to have evidence resembling a "smoking gun." Given the closed nature of Soviet society and the official control of the Soviet media, moreover, there may never be a "smoking gun." But the information being released by this wide range of knowledgeable individuals and organizations spanning three continents, some with first hand experience of these labor conditions, goes into considerable detail and deserves serious examination.

Reliable estimates place the total number of forced laborers in the Soviet Union today at approximately 4 million. Further, it is well established that the Soviet Union has a history of using forced labor on a mass scale -- including political prisoners -- on major projects, particularly in Siberia -- where the official press has acknowledged that it is difficult to persuade Soviet workers to go there voluntarily. To cite only two examples, some 250,000 forced laborers are believed to have perished during the 1930's while working on the construction of the Bielomorsk Canal. And in the 1970's thousands of forced laborers were reported to be building the Baikal-Amur railway extension in Southeastern Siberia.

As regards foreign laborers, the official Soviet media itself has admitted that several thousand Vietnamese and other Southeast Asian laborers have been imported into the USSR and has intimated that many thousands more are likely to be imported in the near future. Information on the nature of this program is fragmentary. We do not know whether or not the Vietnamese laborers are working on the Siberian pipeline. But

we are very concerned about indications that Vietnamese may be coerced into working in the USSR and Eastern Europe and that a portion of the salary paid to them might be deducted to offset Vietnam's debts to the host country. In addition, we have received reports that the Soviet authorities are placing limitations on the ability of these workers to communicate with their families and friends outside the USSR. We believe it is important that international attention be given to this situation, given the obvious possibility of exploitation of these workers.

The Soviet Government could contribute to establishing the truth about these very serious charges by permitting an objective examination of labor conditions on its various Siberian projects, and the conditions in which Soviet political prisoners live and work. We would welcome such an independent international investigation, but the prospects for obtaining this are probably not bright. For example, charges of use of forced labor have been made in the past against the USSR in the International Labor Organization (ILO). However, the Soviet authorities have consistently refused to allow an ILO mission to visit the USSR to investigate these charges.

Because of the seriousness of these charges, and the massive human rights violations which they imply, we believe the international community has a responsibility to investigate them. The USG, for its part, is thoroughly examining the information being brought to bear on this issue, and we understand that several other governments have indicated similar intentions. As our examination proceeds, we will -- wherever possible -- make our findings available to the public. We hope that other governments and private organizations will do the same.



Department of State

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

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S/IL: JWARNACK S/P: SRANDOLPH  
P: RNECKLINGER S/S: CEMCHANAV  
EUR/SOV: TSIMONS

*OP: ISSUES: USSR*  
*IP Soviet Forced Labor*

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 269372

INFORM CONSULS: ALSO FOR PAOS

E.O. 12356: DECL. 9/28/92  
;AGS: SHUM, PINS, UR  
SUBJECT: ISSUE OF FORCED LABOR AND THE SOVIET GAS PIPELINE

1. (C) SINCE MID-SUMMER, THE ISSUE OF FORCED LABOR, INCLUDING POLITICAL PRISONERS, ON THE USSR-EUROPE GAS PIPELINE AND OTHER MAJOR PROJECTS IN THE USSR HAS APPEARED IN WEST EUROPEAN AND OTHER MEDIA. MOST REPORTS HAVE EMANATED FROM THE FRANKFURT-BASED INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. NONE OF THESE REPORTS HAVE BEEN CONFIRMED. FRENCH AND FRG GOVERNMENTS HAVE PUBLICLY STATED THAT THEIR EMBASSIES IN MOSCOW HAVE BEEN ASKED TO INVESTIGATE THESE ALLEGATIONS. THE U.S. EMBASSY HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO DO THE SAME. THE LIKELIHOOD OF OUR DISCOVERING DIRECT EVIDENCE OF THE USE OF FORCED LABOR ON PIPELINE CONSTRUCTION IS REMOTE, CONSIDERING RESTRICTIONS PLACED ON EMBASSY TRAVEL AND SOVIET DESIRE TO COUNTER THESE CHARGES, BUT IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ACTIVELY SEEK TO DISCOVER THE FACTS, AND THAT THE ISSUE REMAIN ALIVE.

2. (C) GIVEN THE TRADITIONAL SOVIET USE OF FORCED LABOR ON MAJOR PROJECTS IN REMOTE AREAS REQUIRING CONSIDERABLE MANUAL INPUT, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT PRISON LABOR IS BEING USED, OR THAT IT WAS USED IN THE PRELIMINARY STAGES. WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER POLITICAL PRISONERS WERE USED. WHILE THIS ISSUE IS OF EQUAL CONCERN TO EUROPEANS AND AMERICANS, WE SHOULD AVOID GIVING IT A "MADE IN USA LABEL." U.S. OFFICIALS SHOULD ATTEMPT TO DEVELOP IT CAREFULLY, FOCUSING APPROPRIATE ATTENTION NOT ONLY ON THE QUESTION OF FORCED LABOR ON THE PIPELINE PROJECT, BUT ALSO ON THE BROADER HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE REPRESENTED BY THE APPROXIMATELY FOUR MILLION SOVIET PRISONERS UNDERGOING SOME FORM OF INVOLUNTARY LABOR.

3. (C) PARA 5 CONTAINS EXCERPTS FROM DOCUMENTATION RELEASED IN MID-AUGUST BY THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. WHILE IT IS IMPRACTICABLE TO VERIFY THE DETAILED ASSERTIONS, SOME OF WHICH APPEAR TO BE EXAGGERATED, WE BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE WORTHY OF ATTENTION.

4. (C) ACTION REQUESTED.

ALL POSTS IN WESTERN EUROPE AND OTHER POSTS WHERE, IN YOUR JUDGMENT, YOU ARE LIKELY TO RECEIVE A FAIR HEARING, SHOULD EXPRESS IN APPROPRIATE CONVERSATIONS WITH HOST GOVERNMENT, PRIVATE SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING UNIONS, AND MEDIA: A. OUR CONCERN OVER THIS HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE; B. OUR BELIEF THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS A RESPONSIBILITY TO INVESTIGATE THESE CHARGES. YOU MAY MAKE AVAILABLE TO THEM TESTIMONY IN PARA 5 BELOW, POINTING OUT ITS ORIGIN, AND EXPRESS OUR WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE ANY FURTHER INFORMATION WE ARE ABLE TO UNCOVER ON THIS ISSUE. YOU SHOULD INDICATE THAT WE WOULD WELCOME ADDITIONAL INFORMATION THEY MAY HAVE.

5. (U) "SELECTED TESTIMONY FROM THE SOVIET UNION" WRITTEN ACCOUNT BY MRS. A.P. FROM MOSCOW, JULY 1982

MY UNCLE IS AN OFFICER IN THE SOVIET ARMY AND SERVES IN THE NORTH IN THE KANTY-MANSSIYSKIY AUTONOMOUS REGION.

AT THE END OF LAST YEAR, MY UNCLE ARRIVED UNEXPECTEDLY IN MOSCOW SAYING THAT HE HAD BEEN DISMISSED FROM THE ARMY FOR HEALTH REASONS. IN THE COURSE OF OUR CONVERSATIONS I LEARNED THE FOLLOWING:

IT WAS TRUE THAT MY UNCLE HAD PARTICIPATED AS A CONSTRUCTION ENGINEER IN VARIOUS PROJECTS FROM THE NEW PORT ON THE YAMAL PENINSULA TO PERM IN THE URALS. THE OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS HAD BEEN TOLD QUITE OPENLY THAT THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE GAS PIPELINE FROM SIBERIA TO WESTERN EUROPE WOULD GREATLY CONTRIBUTE TO STRENGTHENING THE DEFENSE OF THE NORTHERN U.S.S.R. FOR ONE THING, IT INCREASES THE INFLUX OF WORKERS TO THE NORTH AND SECONDLY, THE GAS PIPELINE WILL FACILITATE THE SUPPLY OF FUEL TO THE VARIOUS MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN THE NORTH. IN THIS AREA WE NEED NOT BUILD ANYTHING OURSELVES ANYMORE -- ALL PREPARATORY WORK IS COMPLETED BY PRISONERS, AND ONLY AFTER THAT, VOLUNTEER LABOR BRIGADES ARRIVE ON THE SCENE.

TELEPHONE REPORT BY MR. P.S. FROM MOSCOW, JULY 1982

"I WAS FIRED FROM THE MOSCOW MINING INSTITUTE BECAUSE I HAD CRITICIZED THE REGIME, AND NOW NO ONE IN TOWN WILL HIRE ME.

THE KGB TOLD ME: "YOU CAN VOLUNTEER NOW TO WORK ON THE GAS PIPELINE, BEFORE WE SEND YOU THERE BY FORCE. AT THIS POINT, YOU STILL HAVE THE CHANCE TO WORK THERE AS A VOLUNTEER."

SO I WENT TO TYUMEN, WHERE I WAS ORDERED BY CONSTRUCTION HEADQUARTERS TO REPORT TO THE URENGOY DISTRIBUTING STATION AS AN ELECTRICIAN. I WORKED IN URENGOY, A DIRTY SMALL TOWN OF HASTILY PUT UP PRIMITIVE SHACKS, FOR A YEAR, SHARING WITH THREE OTHER WORKERS A SMALL ROOM IN A DORMITORY.

ON THE VERY FIRST DAY I WAS TOLD THAT THERE WERE ALSO PRISONERS WORKING AT THIS SITE, AND THAT I WAS NOT TO SPEAK WITH THEM OR TELL ANYONE ABOUT THEM IF I DID NOT WANT TO BE LOCKED UP WITH THEM.

FOR ELEVEN MONTHS I WAS ABLE TO OBSERVE HOW EARLY AND UNFAIRLY THE PRISONERS AND DEPORTEES WERE BEING TREATED. THEY WERE SUPERVISED BY THE VOLUNTEERS WHO, OF COURSE, ONLY DID THE EASIER JOBS. THE DANGEROUS JOBS WERE DONE ONLY BY PRISONERS; SOMETIMES THEY WERE PROMISED THAT THEY WOULD BE RELEASED EARLY.

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DURING THE ELEVEN MONTHS, I WITNESSED NUMEROUS FATAL ACCIDENTS CAUSED BY EXPLODING GAS AND GAS POISONING. DURING THE SUMMER, CONCRETE WAS DELIVERED BY OPEN TRUCKS; EN ROUTE IT HAD HARDENED TO THE POINT WHERE THE PRISONERS HAD TO WACK IT OUT BIT BY BIT SO THAT THEIR HANDS STARTED BLEEDING.

THE HEAVY EQUIPMENT ARRIVING FROM ABROAD ALSO HAD TO BE UNLOADED AND TRANSPORTED MANUALLY BY THE PRISONERS. AGAIN AND AGAIN, THERE WERE ACCIDENTS DURING THE TEST RUNS; BECAUSE OF MISTAKES IN THE OPERATION OF THE EQUIPMENT, IT KEPT BREAKING DOWN AND THE PRISONERS HAD TO MOVE THE HEAVY PIPES AGAIN AND AGAIN, WITHOUT PROPER MECHANICAL AIDS; OFTEN THE ROPES, WHICH WERE NOT STRONG ENOUGH, WOULD BREAK, CAUSING MORE LIVES TO BE LOST. I TRIED SEVERAL TIMES TO LODGE A COMPLAINT ABOUT THIS WITH THE TRADE

UNIONS, BUT I WAS TOLD: "YOU DON'T HAVE TO FEEL SORRY FOR THESE PEOPLE, THEY SHOULD HAVE BEEN KILLED LONG AGO. THEY SHOULD BE GLAD TO BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO REFORM."

THE PRISON CAMP WAS NOT LOCATED IN URENGOY BUT TWO KILOMETERS AWAY, IN THE TAIGA, SO THAT THE PEOPLE IN THE CITY HAD NO IDEA THAT IT WAS THERE. BUT I HAD OCCASION TO TALK TO THE SOLDIERS ASSIGNED TO THE CAMP, AND THEY NOT ONLY TOLD ME OF THE HIGH MORTALITY RATE AMONG THE PRISONERS, BUT ALSO OF THE FREQUENT SUICIDES COMMITTED BY DESPAIRING YOUNG SOLDIERS WHO COULDN'T TAKE ALL THAT MISERY ANYMORE AND KILLED THEMSELVES WITH THEIR OWN WEAPONS IN THEIR WATCH TOWERS.

THE SADDEST SIGHT WERE THE MANY FEMALE PRISONERS WHO HAD TO DO THE SAME WORK AS THE MEN AT THE CONSTRUCTION SITES. COMPLETELY FILTHY OR SOAKING WET THEY RETURNED TO THEIR HUTS IN THE EVENING; THEY WEREN'T ABLE TO CHANGE OR WASH THEIR CLOTHES.

DURING THE WINTER, THE MVD GUARDS WOULD BE STANDING AROUND A FIRE IN HEAVY SHEEPSKIN COATS, WARMING THEIR HANDS, WHILE THE PRISONERS HAD TO WORK IN THE COLD, DRESSED IN THIN WORK PANTS AND SHORT COATS WITH HARDLY ANY LINING."

TELEPHONE REPORT BY MR. I.P. FROM TYUMEN, JUNE 1982

ON JUNE 15, 1982, MR. I.P. TELEPHONED AN ACQUAINTANCE IN THE WEST WITH THE FOLLOWING REPORT:

"WHILE I WAS STILL AT THE CAMP, I HEARD OF THE POSSIBILITY OF WORK ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE GAS PIPELINE FOR EUROPE.

BECAUSE OF THE DIFFICULT LIVING AND WORKING CONDITIONS IN THE CAMPS, MANY PRISONERS ARE WILLING TO EXCHANGE LIFE IN A CAMP FOR THE LIFE OF FORCED LABORERS, WHO WORK UNDER MINIMUM SECURITY CONDITIONS.

THUS I VOLUNTEERED AND, ALONG WITH APPROXIMATELY 50 MINIMUM-SECURITY PRISONERS FROM VARIOUS CAMPS, WAS TAKEN TO THE FACILITY FOR PRISONERS IN TRANSIT IN TYUMEN, WHERE WE REMAINED FOR TEN DAYS, UNTIL THE MILITIA AND THE MVD HAD DECIDED WHERE TO PUT US. WITH SEVERAL OTHERS I WAS ASSIGNED TO "SPECIAL WORKFORCE NO. 7" IN KIRPICHNY, A SMALL PLACE NEAR TYUMEN, WHERE I REPORTED TO THE COMMANDANT FOR MINIMUM-SECURITY PRISONERS AND DEPORTEES.

ALONG WITH FOUR OTHERS, I WAS HOUSED IN AN EMPTY FREIGHT CAR WHICH HAD BARELY ENOUGH ROOM FOR FOUR COTS. WE HAD

ELECTRICITY, BUT NO WATER. OTHERS LIVED IN HUTS WHICH DATED BACK TO THE CAMPS BUILT UNDER STALIN, OR IN HASTILY ERECTED DORMITORIES, TWO-STOREY BUILDINGS WITHOUT ANY

AMENITIES.

THESE SETTLEMENTS RARELY HAVE A NAME; IN MOST CASES THEY ARE REGISTERED UNDER "SPECIAL WORKFORCE NO. ..." ALONG WITH THE DESIGNATION OF THE CAMP ADMINISTRATION FOR THE REGION IN QUESTION.

ARRIVING MINIMUM-SECURITY PRISONERS MUST IMMEDIATELY BEGIN WORK ON THE TASKS ASSIGNED TO THEM BY THE COMMANDANT.

IN ADDITION TO THE MINIMUM-SECURITY PRISONERS, THE WORKFORCE INCLUDES DEPORTEES AND PEOPLE SENTENCED FOR "PARASITISM"; IN KIRPICHNY, THEIR NUMBERS TOTALED APPROXIMATELY 6,000.

FOR THE MOST PART, THE WORK INVOLVED PREPARATION OF GLASS WOOL, WRAPPING OF PIPES, EXCAVATION, MOUNTING OF INSTRUMENTS AND PIPE SUPPORTS, LAYING OF ELECTRIC AND TELEPHONE CABLES, AND VARIOUS CHORES IN THE PETROCHEMICAL FIELD.

SOME CONSTRUCTION AREAS, WHERE THE WORK INVOLVED PERMA-FROST, REMOVAL OF GROUND WATER AND BLASTING OF ROCKS ARE SURROUNDED BY WOODEN FENCES AND BARBED WIRE AND GUARDED BY ARMED SOLDIERS AND GUARD-DOGS. THIS IS WHERE THE PRISONERS FROM CAMP NO. 34/2 ARE TAKEN BY CLOSED CARS EACH DAY. THEY KEEP MOVING FROM ONE SITE TO THE NEXT ALONG THE ROUTE WHERE THE GAS PIPELINE IS TO BE LAID.

THE FOOD IS POOR, THERE IS NO MEDICAL CARE WHATSOEVER, THE HUTS AND FREIGHT CARS ARE COLD, DRUNKENNESS IS COMMON AMONG THE WORKERS. IT ALSO HAPPENS THAT MINIMUM-SECURITY PRISONERS ARE SENTENCED AGAIN, SENT BACK TO THE PRISON CAMPS, AND HAVE TO WORK BEHIND BARBED-WIRE FROM THEN ON.

AT THE PRESENT TIME, THE TYUMENLAG COMPLEX CONSISTS OF FOURTEEN CAMPS, LOCATED IN MIZHNAYA TAVDA, USSETSK, YALUTDROVSK, ZAVODUKOVSK IMPIM, MALITSA, TOBOLSK (2) AND TYUMEN (2).

THE HARDEST JOBS SUCH AS EXCAVATION OF TRENCHES, LAYING OF RAILROAD TRACKS, MIXING OF CONCRETE, AND CONSTRUCTION OF RAILINGS FOR SCAFFOLDING ARE DONE NOT ONLY BY MEN, BUT ALSO BY DEPORTED WOMEN AND MINORS FROM REFORMATORIES.

AT THE PRESENT TIME, MORE THAN 100,000 FORCED LABORERS ARE ASSIGNED TO THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE GAS PIPELINE FOR

EUROPE IN VARIOUS CAPACITIES. THEIR WORK INCLUDES MANUFACTURE OF WORK CLOTHES--THIS IS DONE BY FEMALE PRISONERS OR INMATES OF PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITALS. NEVERTHELESS, THERE IS A SHORTAGE OF WORK CLOTHES; FOR INSTANCE, PROTECTIVE GLOVES ARE ISSUED ONLY EVERY SIX MONTHS. THE WORKERS WRAP RAGS AROUND THEIR HANDS, BUT INJURIES AND ECZEMA ARE A FREQUENT OCCURRENCE AMONG THE WORKERS HANDLING BARBED WIRE, CONCRETE, GLASS WOOL, OR ASBESTOS. ACCIDENTS ARE THE ORDER OF THE DAY, BUT WHEN PEOPLE CALL THE EMERGENCY STATION THE MEDICS WANT TO KNOW FIRST WHETHER THE INJURED PERSON IS A VOLUNTEER OR A ZEK (THAT IS WHAT THEY CALL THE CAMP POPULATION, I.E., MINIMUM-SECURITY PRISONERS AND DEPORTEES). IF THE INJURED PERSON IS A ZEK, THE MEDICS USUALLY TAKE THEIR TIME ARRIVING."

C POSTS SHOULD ALSO DRAW UPDN, AND MAKE AVAILABLE TO APPROPRIATE HOST GOVERNMENTS, DEPARTMENT'S STATEMENT OF 9/22/82 ON FORCED LABOR ISSUE. TEXT FOLLOWS:

7. U: PRESS STATEMENT

FORCED LABOR IN USSR

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# Department of State

OUTGOING  
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U, WE HAVE RECEIVED A GROWING NUMBER OF REPORTS THAT THE USSR HAS USED A LARGE NUMBER OF PRISONERS -- INCLUDING THOUSANDS OF POLITICAL PRISONERS -- TO WORK ON MASSIVE LABOR PROJECTS. ACCORDING TO AT LEAST ONE SUCH REPORT, FOR EXAMPLE, AT LEAST 100,000 SUCH FORCED LABORERS ARE BEING USED ON THE HEAVY INFRASTRUCTURE WORK OF CLEARING SWAMPS, CUTTING TIMBER AND BUILDING ACCESS ROADS FOR THE BAMAL GAS PIPELINE. THESE FORCED LABORERS REPORTEDLY INCLUDE RELIGIOUS DISSIDENTS AND OTHER PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE.

U THESE REPORTS HAVE COME FROM A WIDE VARIETY OF INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS, IN EUROPE, ASIA AND THE U.S. THE SOURCES INCLUDE HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS; LABOR ORGANIZATIONS; LABORERS WHO HAVE MANAGED TO EMIGRATE FROM THE SOVIET UNION AFTER WORKING UNDER THESE CONDITIONS; AND LETTERS REACHING ASIA AND THE WEST FROM THE USSR.

U, WE ARE NOT CLAIMING TO HAVE EVIDENCE RESEMBLING A "SMOKING GUN." GIVEN THE CLOSED NATURE OF SOVIET SOCIETY AND THE OFFICIAL CONTROL OF THE SOVIET MEDIA, MOREOVER, THERE MAY NEVER BE A "SMOKING GUN." BUT THE INFORMATION BEING RELEASED BY THIS WIDE RANGE OF KNOWLEDGEABLE INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS SPANNING THREE CONTINENTS, SOME WITH FIRST HAND EXPERIENCE OF THESE LABOR CONDITIONS, GOES INTO CONSIDERABLE DETAIL AND DESERVES SERIOUS EXAMINATION.

U, RELIABLE ESTIMATES PLACE THE TOTAL NUMBER OF FORCED LABORERS IN THE SOVIET UNION TODAY AT APPROXIMATELY FOUR MILLION. FURTHER, IT IS WELL ESTABLISHED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS A HISTORY OF USING FORCED LABOR ON A MASS SCALE -- INCLUDING POLITICAL PRISONERS -- ON MAJOR PROJECTS, PARTICULARLY IN SIBERIA -- WHERE THE OFFICIAL PRESS HAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT IT IS DIFFICULT TO PERSUADE SOVIET WORKERS TO GO THERE VOLUNTARILY. TO CITE ONLY TWO

EXAMPLES, SOME 250,000 FORCED LABORERS ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE PERISHED DURING THE 1930'S WHILE WORKING ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE BIELOMORSK CANAL. AND IN THE 1970'S THOUSANDS OF FORCED LABORERS WERE REPORTED TO BE BUILDING THE BAMAL-AMUR RAILWAY EXTENSION IN SOUTHEASTERN SIBERIA.

C, AS REGARDS FOREIGN LABORERS, THE OFFICIAL SOVIET MEDIA ITSELF HAS ADMITTED THAT SEVERAL THOUSAND VIETNAMESE AND OTHER SOUTHEAST ASIAN LABORERS HAVE BEEN IMPORTED INTO THE USSR AND HAS INTIMATED THAT MANY THOUSANDS MORE ARE LIKELY TO BE IMPORTED IN THE NEAR FUTURE. INFORMATION ON THE NATURE OF THIS PROGRAM IS FRAGMENTARY. WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER OR NOT THE VIETNAMESE LABORERS ARE WORKING ON THE SIBERIAN PIPELINE. BUT WE ARE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT INDICATIONS THAT VIETNAMESE MAY BE COERCED INTO WORKING IN THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE AND THAT A PORTION OF THE SALARY PAID TO THEM MIGHT BE DEDUCTED TO OFFSET VIETNAM'S DEBTS TO THE HOST COUNTRY. IN ADDITION, WE HAVE RECEIVED REPORTS THAT THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES ARE PLACING LIMITATIONS ON THE ABILITY OF THESE WORKERS TO COMMUNICATE WITH THEIR FAMILIES AND FRIENDS OUTSIDE THE USSR. WE BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT THAT INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION BE GIVEN TO THIS SITUATION, GIVEN THE OBVIOUS POSSIBILITY OF EXPLOITATION OF THESE WORKERS.

U, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT COULD CONTRIBUTE TO ESTABLISHING THE TRUTH ABOUT THESE VERY SERIOUS CHARGES BY PERMITTING AN OBJECTIVE EXAMINATION OF LABOR CONDITIONS ON ITS VARIOUS SIBERIAN PROJECTS AND THE CONDITIONS IN WHICH SOVIET POLITICAL PRISONERS LIVE AND WORK. WE WOULD WELCOME SUCH AN INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL INVESTIGATION, BUT THE PROSPECTS FOR OBTAINING THIS ARE PROBABLY NOT BRIGHT. FOR EXAMPLE, CHARGES OF USE OF FORCED LABOR HAVE BEEN MADE IN THE PAST AGAINST THE USSR IN THE

INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (ILO). HOWEVER, THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES HAVE CONSISTENTLY REFUSED TO ALLOW AN ILO MISSION TO VISIT THE USSR TO INVESTIGATE THESE CHARGES.

U, BECAUSE OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF THESE CHARGES, AND THE MASSIVE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS WHICH THEY IMPLY, WE BELIEVE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS A RESPONSIBILITY TO INVESTIGATE THEM. THE USG, FOR ITS PART, IS THOROUGHLY EXAMINING THE INFORMATION BEING BROUGHT TO BEAR ON THIS ISSUE, AND WE UNDERSTAND THAT SEVERAL OTHER GOVERNMENTS HAVE INDICATED SIMILAR INTENTIONS. AS OUR EXAMINATION PROCEEDS, WE WILL -- WHEREVER POSSIBLE -- MAKE OUR FINDINGS AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC. WE HOPE THAT OTHER GOVERNMENTS AND PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS WILL DO THE SAME. SHULTZ

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

97TH CONGRESS  
2D SESSION

# S. RES. 449

Expressing the sense of the Senate with respect to human rights violations in connection with the construction of the trans-Siberian pipeline.

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IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

AUGUST 17, 1982

Mr. ARMSTRONG submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

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## RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the Senate with respect to human rights violations in connection with the construction of the trans-Siberian pipeline.

Whereas the Soviet Union is proceeding with its plan to build the trans-Siberian pipeline, known as the Yamal pipeline;

Whereas there is Senate testimony that massive use of forced labor may be used by the Soviet Union to complete its construction;

Whereas there are first-hand dissident reports that there are four to seventeen million Soviet citizens now being held in some two thousand work camps in the Soviet Union and that there are persistent published reports of agreements to deport forcibly up to a half-million laborers from Vietnam to Soviet Union concentration camps in direct violation of international agreements;

Whereas the Vietnamese Government under the 1973 Paris Peace Agreements which were signed by former Secretary of State Rogers and North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh guaranteed freedom of residence and freedom of work;

Whereas there is concern that political prisoners from Poland and other Soviet satellite countries may also be forced to work on the Yamal pipeline;

Whereas there have been estimates by Soviet dissidents of enormous loss of lives of workers forced to do the heavy, dirty, dangerous work in Soviet labor camps under subhuman conditions;

Whereas if allegations of forced labor prove to be true, the participation of the West in furnishing either technology or financing to make the construction of the pipeline possible is tantamount to unwitting collaboration by the West in one of the most massive abuses of human rights in history;

Whereas the United States stands, as it has always stood, in the forefront of the struggle for freedom and dignity of every human being: Now, therefore, be it

1       *Resolved*, That it is the sense of the Senate that—

2               (1) the Secretary of State should—

3                       (A) investigate the extent to which forced

4               labor will be employed and human rights violated

5               in the construction of the trans-Siberian pipeline

6               and to cooperate with other Western nations

7               which also seek to investigate such violations; and

1 (B) report back to the Congress within thirty  
2 days with his preliminary findings and with a final  
3 report by January 1, 1983;

4 (2) the heads of the appropriate Federal agencies  
5 should take the steps necessary to assure that the  
6 United States is abiding by existing treaties respecting  
7 the importation of goods produced with slave labor.

○

RECEIVED 12 OCT 82 09

TO CLARK

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 09 OCT 82

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES  
12/2/15 GAB

KEYWORDS: HUMAN RIGHTS                      USSR  
                  CONGRESSIONAL                      MEDIA  
                  CSCE

SUBJECT: STRATEGY TO SHARPEN ISSUE OF FORCED LABOR IN SOVIET UNION

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ACTION:    PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK                      DUE: 14 OCT 82 STATUS S    FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

~~LORD~~

PIPES

DOBRIANSKY

MYER

RAYMOND

BLAIR

SOMMER

KIMMITT

KRAEMER

ROBINSON

SIMS

COMMENTS

REF# 8230804

LOG 8206096

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( C / )

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ACTION OFFICER (S)    ASSIGNED                      ACTION REQUIRED                      DUE                      COPIES TO

*This issue has been thoroughly handled in a series of inter-agency meetings. No further action required - W. Raymond*

*W*

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

*PA* *4c*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

B

170907

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 2186  
SIT819 DATE 10/14/82

DTG: 101330Z OCT 82 PSN: 011292  
TOR: 283/1346Z

AT THIS POINT, BUT HIS EMPHASIS ON THE LEGAL AS WELL AS THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE ISSUE INDICATES THAT THE SOVIETS ARE BY NO MEANS A LOST CAUSE.  
ZIMMERMANN

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NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ MOSCOW 12186  
E.O. 12956: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: UNGA, PORG, IS, XF  
SUBJECT: 37TH UNGA: REPORTED ARAB MOVE TO CHALLENGE  
- ISRAEL'S CREDENTIALS  
REF: STATE 285990

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**NLRR 748-28-4-3-0**  
**BY 10713 NARA DATE 12/2/05**

1. ~~10~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. IN RESPONSE TO DEPARTMENT'S INSTRUCTIONS (REFTEL), CHARGE CALLED ON MFA INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DEPARTMENT ACTING CHIEF STASHEVSKIY ON OCTOBER 10 TO CONVEY USG'S STRONG OBJECTION TO REPORTED ARAB EFFORTS TO EXPEL ISRAEL FROM THE 37TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY. CHARGE STRESSED THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN HIS PRESENTATION: (1) SPECIFIC U.S. REACTIONS TO EXPULSION; (2) THE ILLEGALITY OF THE MOVE; AND (3) OUR OPPOSITION TO A POSTPONEMENT OF CONSIDERATION OF THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE REPORT. HE THEN EMPHASIZED THAT, WHILE WE AND THE SOVIETS DIFFER IN OUR APPROACH TO ISRAEL, THE QUESTION OF CREDENTIALS IS AN ISSUE OF PRINCIPLE AND A TEST OF SOVIET SUPPORT FOR THE UN AND FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM. CHARGE ADDED, SPEAKING PERSONALLY, THAT EXPULSION OF ISRAEL FROM THE UNGA WOULD LEAD TO AN ENORMOUS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

POPULAR OUTCRY IN THE U.S. AGAINST THE UN AND AGAINST U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE UN, AND WOULD CERTAINLY AFFECT U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS IF THE SOVIETS SUPPORTED EXPULSION.

3. STASHEVSKIY RESPONDED BY READING A LIST OF ISRAEL'S "SYSTEMATIC VIOLATIONS OF THE UN CHARTER" IN A MANNER WHICH SEEMED INTENDED MAINLY TO PUT THE SOVIET VIEW OF ISRAEL'S ACTIONS ON THE RECORD. HE THEN READ ARTICLE 6 OF THE UN CHARTER WHICH EXPLICITLY REQUIRES A SECURITY COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION FOR EXPULSION OF A MEMBER STATE. WHEN THE CHARGE ASKED WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION SHARES THE U.S. VIEW THAT THE ARAB EFFORT IS ILLEGAL, STASHEVSKIY HINTED AGREEMENT BY REREADING ARTICLE 6. HE REFUSED TO BE DRAWN ON HOW THE SOVIETS WOULD REACT TO AN ARAB EXPULSION EFFORT, SAYING THAT IT WAS ONLY HYPOTHETICAL

CONFIDENTIAL



~~SECRET~~

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

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170908

12 October 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President  
The Vice President  
Secretary of State  
Secretary of Defense  
Counsellor to the President  
Chief of Staff to the President  
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT : Yuriy Andropov

1. Yuriy Andropov presently seems to be the front runner to succeed Brezhnev. While we have no idea how long Brezhnev may live or retain his present position, his demise could come at any time. Accordingly, we have prepared a comprehensive assessment of Andropov that examines his personality, policy views, political alliances and style.

2. I believe it is worth your time to read this study and gain some appreciation of what manner of man may succeed Brezhnev. I found two aspects of the study particularly interesting. First, I was struck by Andropov's decades-long preparation to assume the leadership position, and the unique strengths he would bring to the top spot. Second, I was impressed to learn the extent of his political alliances and how long they have been forming. For example, he is an old friend and ally of Defense Minister Ustinov, Foreign Minister Gromyko and, ironically, Kirilenko -- one of those he is perceived to have edged out in the succession race. He was also close to Suslov -- the long time conservative kingmaker -- before the latter's death last January, and he also has longstanding ties to Brezhnev.

3. In sum, I think you will find this a most interesting biography with a wealth of anecdotal information that offers insights into a man we may be dealing with in the not too distant future.

  
William J. Casey

Director of Central Intelligence

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REF  
NLR/NLZ-748-23-7-4-9

BY CW NARA DATE 1/13/12

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170909	REPORT  RE ANDROPOV	42	9/1/1982	B1  B3

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
170910

13 October 1982

**DIA REVIEWED 30 May 2008 SANITIZED FOR RELEASE IN PART**

The Soviets are upgrading their antiballistic missile (ABM) deployments at Moscow and are actively engaged in ABM research and development programs. The available evidence does not indicate with any certainty whether or not the Soviets are making preparations for ABM deployments beyond the limits of the ABM Treaty--100 ABM launchers at Moscow--but it does show that are steadily improving their ability to exercise options for deployment of widespread ballistic missile defenses in the 1980s. If the Treaty were abrogated by either the United States or the USSR, we believe the Soviets would undertake rapidly paced ABM deployments to strengthen their defenses at Moscow and cover key targets in the western USSR, and to extend protection to key targets east of the Urals. Such widespread defenses could be in place by the late 1980s or early 1990s.

Since the negotiation of the ABM Treaty in 1972, most of the trends in strategic forces have been favorable to the USSR. The Soviets probably consider that they are much better able to prosecute a nuclear war than they were in 1972. To reduce damage to the USSR in accordance with their doctrine and strategy for nuclear war, the Soviets are continuing to improve the counterforce capabilities and survivability of their offensive forces, to strengthen their air defenses and antisubmarine warfare forces, and to expand their passive defenses. In this context, we believe that a Soviet assessment of the correlation of strategic forces would indicate that the continuing vulnerability of the USSR to ballistic missile attack is an obvious deficiency which they would want to overcome. (C)



25x1

Another view holds that the Soviets' criteria for judging the performance of ballistic missile defenses considers effectiveness in the total context of their overall damage limiting goals as part of their plan to fight and win a nuclear war. The holder of this view concludes that, while not providing a leak-proof defense, a widespread ABM deployment using present technology and systems under development, possibly augmented by SAMs performing in an ABM role, could satisfy the requirements of Soviet military strategy for limiting damage to critical targets in the USSR.\*

\*DIA

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If the capabilities of a new advanced surface-to-air missile system, the SA-X-12, are realized, its potential contribution to ballistic missile defenses would be of growing concern as it becomes widely deployed in the USSR and Eastern Europe in the mid-to-late 1980s. While we do not believe the SA-5 and SA-10 surface-to-air missile systems are suitable for ABM use as currently configured, the Soviets could probably conduct an overt upgrade that would give them a potentially important supplement to an ABM defense. There is an alternative view that the SA-5 and SA-10 without any upgrading may be capable of operating in an ABM role, and that upgrading, if required, could be performed without much chance of being detected.\*

A decision by the Soviets on whether to deploy a widespread ABM system would be based primarily on the answer to the crucial question of whether the USSR will face a sufficiently threatening strategic situation in the late 1980s and beyond, for which an expanded ABM defense would make a significant difference. If the answer is yes then they would probably make the commitments necessary to deploy such defenses despite the economic and political costs. Since the answer probably will not be clearcut, other important factors would bias their decision toward nondeployment:

- The USSR's two track approach--arms control and a military build-up--to further its strategic goals has achieved limits on US delivery vehicles and constrained US defenses, while permitting expansion of Soviet offensive forces. There are no indications that the USSR is becoming dissatisfied with it.
- Under the Treaty the USSR has ABM defenses to protect critical targets in the Moscow area while the United States has no similar capability.
- The Soviets apparently see the Treaty as having slowed US ABM research and development, while they moved ahead with their own.

On balance, we believe there is a fairly low, but nevertheless significant chance (about 10-30 percent) that the Soviets will abrogate the Treaty and deploy ABMs in excess of Treaty limits in the 1980s. We believe the Soviets would weigh the military advantages of the defenses they could deploy as being outweighed by the disadvantages cited above, especially, of energizing the United States and perhaps its Allies into a rapid and sustained growth in overall military capabilities, both conventional and nuclear, that could lead to a reversal in the 1990s of Soviet advantages gained in the 1970s and 1980s. (S)

An alternative view is that the preceding judgments do not give adequate consideration to some of the most significant factors that would motivate Soviet attitude on deployment of a widespread ABM defense.

- This view stresses that Soviet doctrinal requirements for damage-

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limiting capability have always provided the motivation to deploy ABMs both at Moscow and elsewhere. Now, as a result of advances by the USSR in ABM technology, the USSR's counterforce advantage over the US and US plans to deploy survivable and hard-target-capable ballistic missiles, the Soviets may no longer deem it necessary to restrain themselves from further ABM deployment. They have taken essentially all the steps necessary to prepare for a decision to deploy in the near term and have demonstrated confidence in their current ABM technology by deploying the new ABM system at Moscow.

--The strategic advantage that could accrue to the USSR as a result of widespread ABM deployments may be judged by them as having long-term advantages, both military and political both in bilateral relations with the United States and in multilateral relations with Europe.

--The holder of the view believes that the main text underestimates the probability of Soviet abrogation or withdrawal from the Treaty.\*

Another alternative view notes that Soviet benefits from the Treaty, under current and projected conditions, far outweigh the potential gains from abrogation. As a result, the likelihood of abrogation is considered to be low (10-percent chance or less) in the 1980s unless current conditions change substantially. This view cautions, however, that the Soviets have a motivation to deploy a widespread ABM system to fill the serious gap in their defenses, and have the capability to complete such a deployment in only a few years.\*\*

25x1

\*DIA

\*\*ACSI, Army

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