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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 11/24/2015

File Folder USSR (9/14/82-9/20/82)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 23

SKINNER

269

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
170740	CABLE	MOSCOW 11040 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-6-1-5	2	9/14/1982	B1
170741	MEMO	R. PIPES TO W. CLARK RE FORMER CANADIAN AMBASSADOR'S ASSESSMENT R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-6-2-4	1	9/14/1982	B1
170742	MEMO	L. PAUL BREMER TO W. CLARK RE ATTACHED REPORT R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-6-3-3	1	9/10/1982	B1
170743	REPORT	RE SOVIET UNION R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-6-3-3	13	ND	B1
170744	MEMO	R. PIPES TO W. CLARK RE REMARKS ABOUT SOVIET SUCCESSION R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-6-4-2	1	9/14/1982	B1
170745	CABLE	SAME CABLE TEXT AS DOC #170740 (MOSCOW 11040) R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-6-5-1	2	9/14/1982	B1
170746	MEMO	W. MARTIN TO W. CLARK RE SIBERIAN GAS R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-6-6-0	2	9/16/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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269

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
170747	MEMCON	RE INTERVIEW PAR 10/8/2010 CREST NLR-748-23-6-7-9	2	9/19/1982	B1 B3
170866	MEMO	N. BAILEY TO W. CLARK RE SOVIET FOOD EMBARGO (+ ATTACHED NOTE)	2	9/20/1982	B1
170868	MEMO	CLARK TO PRESIDENT RE FOOD EMBARGO (DRAFT)	1	ND	B1
170867	MEMO	BAILEY TO CLARK RE FOOD EMBARGO	1	9/9/1982	B1
170869	MEMO	R. ROBINSON TO CLARK RE FOOD EMBARGO R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-6-11-4	1	9/20/1982	B1
170870	MEMO	W. CLARK TO SEC. OF STATE RE MEETING WITH GROMYKO R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-23-6-12-3	1	ND	B1
170871	MEMO	W. STEARMAN TO W. CLARK RE U.S. POSITION ON SUMMITRY FOR MEETING WITH GROMYKO	1	9/20/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Box Number 23

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269

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
170872	MEMO	W. CLARK TO SECRETARY OF STATE RE U.S. POSITION ON SUMMITRY FOR MEETING WITH GROMYKO (DRAFT)	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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MW
f

MEMORANDUM

6325

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 14, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: NORMAN A. BAILEY *MB*

SUBJECT: Rationale for the December 1981 Sanctions

I have been struck recently by the extent to which the reason why sanctions were imposed on Poland and the Soviet Union following the imposition of martial law on December 13, 1982 has been forgotten in all the subsequent debate and confusion.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the attached memo to Department heads (Tab I).

OK _____ No OBE'd

RP Richard Pipes, Paula *PD* Dobriansky, Roger *RR* Robinson, Dennis *JES* Blair and Carnes Lord concur.
CL

- cc: Robert Sims
- Henry Nau
- Bill Stearman
- Dick Boverie
- Walt Raymond

Attachment
Tab I Memo to Department heads

THE WHITE HOUSE

6325

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE

SUBJECT: Polish/Soviet Sanctions

In the course of the controversies that have developed following the imposition of sanctions on Poland and the Soviet Union as a result of the imposition of martial law in Poland on December 13, 1981, the reason for the imposition of those sanctions has tended to get lost or at least obscured.

The gradual liberalization of and the growth of pluralism in the Eastern European countries poses a grave threat to the expansion of the military and political power of the Soviet Union. It is for this reason that the U.S. Government has consistently supported internal liberalization in Hungary, relative foreign policy independence in Romania and the development of independent power bases in Poland (the Church and Solidarity).

The sanctions were designed to demonstrate to the Polish government and to the Soviet Union that they cannot with impunity crush these manifestations of pluralism in their sphere of influence. This is why the sanctions were imposed as a result of the events in Poland, why they were chosen to have maximum effect, why efforts to aid the Polish people as opposed to their government continue, and why the sanctions will be lifted if pre-December pluralism is restored in that country.

Incidentally, that is also why the Polish people support our sanctions.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

William P. Clark

National Security Council
The White House

344

Package # 6325 3

82 S 6 P 5. 54

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>M</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>g</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

RECEIVED 16 SEP 82 17

TO CLARK FROM BAILEY

DOCDATE 14 SEP 82

KEYWORDS: SANCTIONS POLAND
USSR

SUBJECT: RATIONALE FOR DEC 81 SANCTIONS VIS A VIS POLAND & USSR

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE DUE: 18 SEP 82 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
CLARK		SIMS
		NAU
		STEARMAN
		BOVERIE
		RAYMOND

COMMENTS

REF#	LOG	NSCIFID	(N /)
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ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
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SEP 27 1982

OBE per Clark

WB

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE *PA* (C)

SF

CONFIDENTIAL

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

5

170740

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 1040
SIT103 DATE 09/17/82

DTG: 141536Z SEP 82 PSM #31209
TOR: 257/1721Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT PIPE EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: NODIS/CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

ROUTINE
DE RUEHMO #1040 2571536
R 141536Z SEP 82
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8512

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR 748-23-6-1-5
BY GDB NARA DATE 11/24/85

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ MOSCOW 11040
NODIS

FOR SECRETARY ONLY; PLEASE PASS TO JUDGE CLARK, NSC
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, PGOV, PINT, UR
SUBJ: SPECULATION ON SOVIET LEADERSHIP CHANGES
REF: MOSCOW 5166

1. ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. I CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT, WHEN SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON SENSITIVE SUBJECTS, THEY OUGHT TO HAVE A PURPOSE IN MIND. I FAIL TO SEE THE PURPOSE IN DICK PIPES' PUBLIC DISCUSSIONS OF POSSIBLE SOVIET LEADERSHIP CHANGES AND THE PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CONTESTANTS IN THE JOCKEYING FOR POSITION IN THE SOVIET POLITBURO. (HE WAS JUST QUOTED BY AP AS CALLING ANDROPOV THE LEADING CONTENDER TO SUCCEED BREZHNEV AND AS ACCUSING ANDROPOV OF SPREADING FALSE RUMORS THAT HE IS A LIBERAL.) THIS SORT OF PUBLIC DISCUSSION, NOT BY SOMEONE IN ACADEMIA, BUT RATHER BY SOMEONE CLOSE TO THE PRESIDENT, SHOULD BE STOPPED. IT GAINS US ABSOLUTELY NOTHING AND SIMPLY DEEPENS SOVIET SUSPICIONS THAT WE ARE TRYING TO MANIPULATE THEIR SUCCESSION AND THAT WE HAVE NO WISH FOR SERIOUS DIALOGUE WITH THEM.
HARTMAN

END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

6

PAGE 01
SIT160

MOSCOW 1040
DATE 09/17/82

DTG: 141536Z SEP 82 PSN: 031209
TOR: 257/1721Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT PIPE EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: NODIS/CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

ROUTINE
DE RUEHMO #1040 2571536
R 141536Z SEP 82
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8512

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ MOSCOW 11040
NODIS
FOR SECRETARY ONLY; PLEASE PASS TO JUDGE CLARK, NSC
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, PGOV, PINT, UR
SUBJ: SPECULATION ON SOVIET LEADERSHIP CHANGES
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HARTMAN

END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

National Security Council
The White House


340

Package #

63957

82 S P 14 P 6: 17

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	1	<i>[Signature]</i>	
Bud McFarlane	2	<i>[Signature]</i>	
Jacque Hill	3	<i>[Signature]</i>	
Judge Clark	4	<i>[Signature]</i>	I
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			



I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 14, 1982

170741

INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

NLR 74823-624

FROM:

RICHARD PIPES ^N

BY GDB NARA DATE 11/24/85

SUBJECT:

Former Canadian Ambassador's Assessment of
Developments in the USSR

Former Canadian Ambassador to Moscow, Robert Ford, has prepared a brief paper (Tab I) summarizing his views on the current situation in the USSR and recommending a broad set of policies for the West. The gist of his analysis and recommendations is as follows:

- The Soviet Union is in deep trouble but it is unlikely that Brezhnev's successors will undertake major innovations: most likely they will continue present policies with minor variations.
- The Soviet military buildup is likely to be increased under the succession leadership, the role of the military will grow, and Russian nationalism will be on the rise.
- A Western policy of outright hostility to the USSR may, in the long run, weaken the system but in the short run it will strengthen anti-Western tendencies and hence is undesirable.
- The best policy would be to persuade the Soviet leadership that the United States does not desire the breakdown of the regime and the dissolution of its empire: this policy alone stands a chance of convincing Moscow to cut down its military expenditures and turn to its domestic problems.
- The greatest danger lies in the next five-six years: if the West "does not do something suicidal" at the end of this period, the correlation of forces will shift in our favor.

Attachment:

Tab I Paper by former Canadian Ambassador to the USSR

cc: Norman Bailey
Paula Dobriansky
Henry Nau
Roger Robinson

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

6395

8227236

9



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 10, 1982

82 SEP 10 P11:13

170742

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM CLARK

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

THE WHITE HOUSE

NLRR 148-23-6-3-3

BY /C03 NARA DATE 11/24/15

Subject: Views of Robert Ford, former Canadian Ambassador to the Soviet Union.

Attached is a paper prepared by Robert Ford, former Canadian Ambassador to the Soviet Union, that the Secretary thought you would find interesting.

L. Paul Bremer III
L. Paul Bremer III
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated above

~~SECRET~~
DECL: QADR

10

170743

DECLASSIFIED

ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION

NLRR 148-23-63-3

BY CDB NARA DATE 11/24/05

A paper by R.A.D. Ford, Special Adviser on East-West Relations to the Department of External Affairs

The way in which the USSR develops in the next few years will be deeply affected by foreign affairs and above all relations with the United States. They must therefore be examined together.

It is obvious that the USSR is in deep trouble in the economy, agriculture, Eastern Europe, relations with the West, Afghanistan. All of these problems will be accentuated after the departure of Brezhnev since it is almost certain that power will once again have to devolve on a troika and be even more dispersed among the leading members of the hierarchy, making it harder for difficult decisions to be taken.

It would be a mistake to talk in terms of divisions between a hard-line and a soft-line but there are certainly differences of opinion about policy, which can be summed up in the following three trends:

- (I) Because of the immobilism of the last years of Brezhnevism and the innate caution of the leading Soviets there will be a strong tendency to follow present policies with perhaps minor variations.

This means no major innovation in foreign or international affairs, with a continuing effort both to strengthen the armed forces; and to maintain a measure of good relations with the West without making any substantial concessions.

(II) The leadership is fully aware of the deepening economic crisis and the desirability of trying to increase economic growth and improve the production and quality of consumer goods and the standard of living, but there is certainly no consensus about how to go about it. The three main options opened to them are: economic reform; an effort to return to détente as a means of providing capital and technology which would make it unnecessary to indulge in their risky business of economic reform; a serious effort to reach an agreement with the U.S. on arms control and reductions as the only means of reducing the proportion of GNP devoted to the military. The leadership faces the difficulty, as outlined later, of finding a way to implement any of these policies without running into massive resistance from the military, from the orthodox party bosses and from the hardliner nationalists. Finding a solution will depend very much on circumstances and the emergence of a strong leader.

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(III) Others will argue that détente was a mirage, that there can be no accommodation with the West, that deterrence (in the Soviet sense) must depend on adequate Soviet military strength, and that therefore the share of the GNP absorbed by the military and the military industries must be increased.

I think that the inclination of the Soviets would be for (I). It coincides with their conservative style and requires the least amount of initiative, but circumstances may not permit the continuation of the present policies of improvisation. Strained relations with the West, which may easily get worse, over Poland for example, and a perceived threat to their economic and their political system may force them to take decisions they would otherwise prefer to avoid.

A determined effort to return to détente would require a strong man with a solid political base and army support, neither of which conditions seem very likely, and in any event would quickly run into the obstacle of Afghanistan and/or Poland since it seems improbable that very much progress could be made in restoring East-West relations without as a minimum some concessions on the Soviet side on these issues, and in both areas the security problem looms large in Soviet eyes, and therefore involves the military.

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As regards economic reforms, it would take a very strong leader to introduce measures which most of the Soviet hierarchy, and all the little communist bosses around the country would consider dangerous innovations affecting their power and also liable to lead to demands for political reforms as well, and which would also infect the East-European empire.

What I think most likely is a combination of (I) and (III). The Soviets' preference is for continuity, but the situation will probably facilitate an increase in the role of influence of the military accompanied by a growth of great Russian nationalism. The role of the military could also be enhanced because of the power struggle and the reluctance of any of the contenders to advocate policies opposed by the military.

No matter what path the succession leaders choose, there are a few hard facts with which they will have to live. The first is the continuing, if not increasing share, of the GNP which will have to go to the military. The second is the inability of the country to feed itself adequately under the present system. The third is the awe-inspiring inefficiency in most branches of the economy, particularly consumer-goods and their poor quality, the devastatingly low standard of living.

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The military-industrial complex is the one exception to the rule because it is the only branch of the economy where the users can and do insist on quality. The fourth fact is the low morale reflected in the high death rate and very low birth rate among the Russian population who are gradually seeing their numerical superiority whittled away.

There is no answer to these and the innumerable other economic and human problems. But in spite of a crying need for economic and administration reform, I think it highly unlikely that anything more than mere tinkering with the system can take place. Therefore, the attraction the Soviet system seems to exert on so many people, particularly in the Third World, and in spite of its manifold and repugnant drawbacks, ought to decline. Since at the same time the regime will clearly have to maintain and tighten its control, and human rights will be even less observed in future than in this poor present.

How can we influence Soviet developments?

While there is a limit on the extent to which the West can affect the policies of a succession government in the USSR, we should not underestimate what can be done - for better or for worse. Let us assume, first, a Western policy of declared hostility with the aim (specific or not) of achieving clear

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military superiority, of weakening the economy and of hastening the eventual collapse of the Soviet system.

The result of such a policy, and it need only be perceived on the Soviet side, would be:

- (I) A strengthening of the position of those Soviets who argue that the West is unalterably opposed and that détente is a fraud and a delusion; an increase in great Russian nationalism and anti-americanism.
- (II) A determination, agreed by both the military and civilians, that the USSR must never be in a position of military inferiority no matter what the economic cost; and, inevitably, a considerable increase in the influence of the military.
- (III) The rejection of any idea of economic reform; a tightening of belts; an even greater reliance on internal discipline; repression against Jews, troublesome minorities, religious, nationalist and political dissidents; and a tighter grip on the East-European empire.

...../7

(IV) No direct challenge to the USA; but a greater tendency to take risks in order to exploit weak points in the Third World and to utilize politically the Soviet military force.

A western policy of outright hostility might work in the long run, by weakening the Soviet system at its most vulnerable point, therefore accentuating the problem of survival for the political system and the leadership. But it will not work in the short run as the Soviets are capable of sacrifices they think necessary to survive, and danger lies precisely in the short run because it is in this period that the West will be in a real or conceived position of military inferiority.

This kind of policy could therefore have a negative effect on Soviet developments. It is less likely that we can do very much to encourage developments which we would consider advantageous to the West. The most obvious alternative policy would be a determined effort on the part of all NATO countries to improve economic and political relations with the USSR. There are major obstacles of which the first is the impasse over Afghanistan and Poland. The second is the need to reestablish military parity before negotiating in depth with the Soviets. The third is the danger, in a period of economic recession, of giving away too much for illusory gains. The exception is arms reduction and control, an area in which Soviet civilian

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leaders might feel there was a possibility of cutting back military expenses and military influence.

To be even moderately successful, such a policy would have to be coordinated with our European allies. The main element in détente is, of course, US-USSR relations but if an improvement in relations between Moscow and Washington took place strictly in a bilateral context, there would be an alarmed European reaction, and even more troublesome would be an attempt by the Europeans to go it alone.

I am skeptical that at this time we could gain very much from an obvious effort to reverse the process of the last few years, even if it were politically possible. Nor do I think it would have a great enough effect internally; that is by promoting a moderate line in Moscow, to justify the risks we would run.

A third option, which I personally prefer, is a kind of western attentism accompanied by an effort not to make things worse and by a self-restraining ordinance which will admittedly be difficult because of the very different nature of our systems. It would be unwise to seek a better relationship before we are strong enough (and I do think it was necessary for the U.S.A. to demonstrate its strength and its will) and before the Soviets are ready for it. Any precipitate offer or move on the part of the West would be suspect in Soviet eyes.

The one conjuncture which I think might make the Soviets ready to be less truculent would be a double realization by them that the civilian economy was continuing badly to decline; and that the U.S.

was not seeking the downfall of the Soviet regime and the breakup of its empire. This seems to me the only combination which would convince the Soviets that they could and should endeavour to reduce the military slice of the GNP, and if this is not done, there seems no way in which the standard of living, already disastrously low, will not further deteriorate.

The question can legitimately be raised whether on the other hand the Soviets themselves are seeking military superiority. I think the difficulty in considering the question of the military balance stems from a widely differing approach to the subject. The West tends to look at the military balance in strictly military terms and often restricted to one area, i.e. intermediate range nuclear weapons, or conventional forces in Central Europe. But the Soviets, fully cognizant of their economic weaknesses, of the threat from China, of the unreliability of their East European allies, look at the strategic balance taking all factors into consideration, and their conclusions are invariably that, at the very best, there is no more than an approximate balance in correlation of forces.

The exasperating factor in dealing with the Soviets is that they seem to see no contradiction in proclaiming a political philosophy which assumes the inevitable downfall of the capitalist states, while objecting if we foretell collapse of communism. The difference is that Marxism-Leninism, while useful and necessary

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to keep the party in power, and occasionally as an adjunct to foreign policy, is not the basis on which realistic policies are formulated. They do not follow a strategy aimed at the destruction of capitalism in the U.S.A., for example, and are therefore alarmed when they sense that their destruction might be the aim of the U.S. (they are realistic about distinguishing between what they consider politically necessary anti-Soviet declarations and practical measures).

In a secondary way, I think it important that an effort be made to avoid unnecessarily humiliating them. They are extremely sensitive and insecure about their place in the world. A lot can be gained by giving them at least the appearance of political parity with the U.S. Real parity is a long, long way off.

I have no illusions about the Soviets and my expectations from détente in the past and whatever might develop in the future are low-key and realistic. The Soviets are not going to alter their fundamental view of the world, and they will be unable to resist small victories at our expense if the opportunity presents itself, and no matter what the state of our relations.

But I think the Soviets may be reaching one of the periodic water-sheds in their history, when they feel the time has come to pause and consolidate their gains. After the immobilism of the present, there may come a recognition that they have pushed their people too far, too hard; that their hold on Eastern Europe is

CONFIDENTIAL

becoming more difficult and more expensive; and that the confrontation with the U.S. has become counter-productive and even dangerous, and could create more military, technological and economic problems than they would like to envisage. Their experience and ideology justify the occasional pause. Brezhnev would find it difficult. His successors might find it easier. The problem for them will be to find a way to make concessions necessary to ease tensions.

No matter which policy direction is taken, the new leaders are likely to be just as tough and difficult as Brezhnev and company, perhaps even more so until they consolidate their position or until some exceptional man comes to the fore. I do not see one on the horizon but then Kruschchev looked an unlikely candidate to be a reformist leader, and Sadat beside Nasser appeared a cypher. The Russians always prepare surprises for us.

The next few years are going to be particularly difficult in East-West relations because of the concatenation of a number of circumstances.

- (i) The assumptions on which the peace of Europe rested since World War II are beginning to wear thin. These are the division of the Continent into two areas in which each sides' mandate held sway,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

which will be increasingly questioned; and the doctrine of approximate nuclear balance which is losing some of its validity in light of the new technology.

- (ii) An American Administration which has decided to try to restore military power and the political will of the West and to challenge the USSR more directly than has been done in the past.
- (iii) Problems in the economies of Western industrialized nations creating strains in the Western alliance.
- (iv) New players on the scene, particularly China and Japan, and new problems in inflammable areas such as the Gulf and the Middle-East, complicating the East-West struggle and globalising it.
- (v) Finally, all of this will coincide with a transfer of power in Moscow and the accentuation of economic problems inside the USSR.

Within five years to a decade, the famous correlation of forces of which the Soviets are so fond of talking will begin strongly to shift in our favour, provided the West does not do something suicidal. But we have to get through the coming 5-6 years which will be dangerous because of the above combination of circumstances and because of the real or perceived Soviet military superiority.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

It seems logical in that period to avoid letting the Soviets exploit their only really valid card. Perhaps we should reexamine the only indisputably advantageous element in agreements worked out in the seventies-crisis limitation between the super-powers and try to revive it in a realistic and unemotional way accepting that relations are confrontational but controllable.

The Soviets are obsessed with the U.S. It is the only power that really counts for them. While they would like ideally a relationship of parity which is probably unrealistic and unattainable given their ideological motivation, I do not believe they would be adverse to something more limited and more closely related to the actual situation.

170744

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 14, 1982

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: RICHARD PIPES *RP*

WPC HAS SEEN

SUBJECT: My Remarks About Soviet Succession

DECLASSIFIED

NLR 748-236-4-2
BY LENS NARA DATE 11/24/05

Ambassador Hartman in the attached cable (Tab I) rightly argues that senior officials should not make "public" statements about Soviet succession. The point is, however, that such remarks as I made were not made at a public forum. I had been invited to address the National Interreligious Council on Soviet Jewry at a private meeting held at the Department of State yesterday. There were to be no correspondents present. In the course of questions and answers about Soviet Jewry's future I gave my impressions of Andropov. It is an outrage that the organization in question (or the State Department) should be so careless as to ask a "senior official" to address a private group without informing him that journalists are present and that his remarks will be made public.

At the same time, with due respect, I must take issue with Ambassador Hartman's statement that remarks by U.S. officials about Soviet leaders "deepen Soviet suspicions ... that we have no wish for serious dialogue with them". Hardly a week passes when Soviet foreign policy experts like Arbatov, Falin, or Zagladin don't write or broadcast statements about President Reagan and his political rivals, assessing their political attitudes and electoral chances. No one seems to think that this affects their ability to negotiate with us. Why the double standard? Why must we display a degree of self-restraint in expressing opinions that is not expected of them?

Attachment:

Tab I Moscow cable 11040, September 14

cc: Bob Sims

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET~~

UPON RE
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE
11 " " 24/25 (COT)

23
ID 8206395

RECEIVED 11 SEP 82 10

TO CLARK

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 10 SEP 82

KEYWORDS: USSR EAST WEST ECONOMICS FORD, R A D
CANADA

SUBJECT: FORMER CANADIAN AMB ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN USSR

ACTION: ANY ACTION NECESSARY DUE: 14 SEP 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

PIPES

DOBRIANSKY

ROBINSON

MYER

NAU

BAILEY

MCGAFFIGAN

BLAIR

COMMENTS

REF# 8227236

LOG

NSCIFID

(N /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

Clark

1X 9/14

for information

C 10/5 noted by Clark

-

RP, DO, RO, HN, ME

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

PA (C) PH

National Security Council
The White House

346

Package # 6312

27

82 4 P 5 . 10

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>		
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>[Checkmark]</u>	<u>I</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information

A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

NSC/S- PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

248
ID F205312

TO CLARK

FROM PIPES

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFICATION(S)
11/24/15 EDS

RECEIVED 14 SEP 82 19

DOCDATE 14 SEP 82

KEYWORDS: USSR

SPEECHES

SUBJECT: PIPES REMARKS RE SOVIET SUCCESSION

.....
ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

.....
FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

SIMS

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(N /)

.....
ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

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DUE

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C SEP 1 5 1982

Clark noted

RPV

DISPATCH _____

W/ATTCH FILE

(PA) (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

25

170745

PAGE 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 1040
SIT368 AN000150

DTG: 141536Z SEP 82 PSN: 031209
TOR: 257/1721Z

NODIS

DISTRIBUTION: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB PIPE /011
WHSR COMMENT: NODIS/CHECKLIST

NODIS

ROUTINE
UTS8883
DE RUEHMO #1040 2571536
R 141536Z SEP 82
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8512

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR 748-23-6-5-1
BY CCD NARA DATE 11/24/15

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ MOSCOW 11040

NODIS

NODIS
FOR SECRETARY ONLY; PLEASE PASS TO JUDGE CLARK, NSC
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, PGOV, PINT, UR
SUBJ: SPECULATION ON SOVIET LEADERSHIP CHANGES
REF: MOSCOW 5166

NODIS

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. I CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT, WHEN SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON SENSITIVE SUBJECTS, THEY OUGHT TO HAVE A PURPOSE IN MIND. I FAIL TO SEE THE PURPOSE IN DICK PIPES' PUBLIC DISCUSSIONS OF POSSIBLE SOVIET LEADERSHIP CHANGES AND THE PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CONTESTANTS IN THE JOCKEYING FOR POSITION IN THE SOVIET POLITBURO. (HE WAS JUST QUOTED BY AP AS CALLING ANDROPOV THE LEADING CONTENDER TO SUCCEED BREZHNEV AND AS ACCUSING ANDROPOV OF SPREADING FALSE RUMORS THAT HE IS A LIBERAL.) THIS SORT OF PUBLIC DISCUSSION, NOT BY SOMEONE IN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

26

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 1040

DTG: 141536Z SEP 82 PSN: 031209

NODDIS

ACADEMIA, BUT RATHER BY SOMEONE CLOSE TO THE PRESIDENT,
SHOULD BE STOPPED. IT GAINS US ABSOLUTELY NOTHING
AND SIMPLY DEEPENS SOVIET SUSPICIONS THAT WE ARE
TRYING TO MANIPULATE THEIR SUCCESSION AND THAT WE HAVE
NO WISH FOR SERIOUS DIALOGUE WITH THEM.

HARTMAN

BT

NODDIS

NODDIS

NODDIS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

National Security Council
The White House

344

Package # 6455

RED
TAG

82 JUN 10 P 3. 58

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	1	<i>[initials]</i>	
Bud McFarlane	2	m	
Jacque Hill	3		
Judge Clark	4	<i>[checkmark]</i>	I
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information

A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Let's check it in
over

NSC/S PROFILE

SECRET

ID 8206455

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
6/24/15 EDB

RECEIVED 16 SEP 82 15

TO CLARK

FROM MARTIN

DOC DATE 16 SEP 82

KEYWORDS : GAS NORWAY
USSR

SUBJECT: SIBERIAN GAS VERSUS NORWEGIAN GAS

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION DUE: STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO
CLARK NAU
BLAIR
PIPES

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (C /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	C SEP 27 1982	Clark noted		WM

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE ~~SECRET~~ (C) *PA*

~~SECRET~~

6455

MW
25

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

170746

September 16, 1982

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

INFORMATION

NLRR 748-23-66-0

BY 1608 NARA DATE 11/24/15

WPC HAS SEEN

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN WFM

SUBJECT: Siberian Gas Versus Norway's 31/2

As a follow-up to the Robinson memo of 9/9 on the impact of a second strand, the most significant alternative to more Soviet gas is the Troll field (also known as 31/2) in Norway. This is a massive field and could produce between 30 and 40 bcm (compared to the first strand of the Soviet pipeline of 30 bcm). There are some technical problems, but the Norwegians have assured us that they will develop this field if they can find buyers and secure a sufficient wedge of the future European gas market. In this case, it is all or nothing. Unless a market can eventually be found for some 30 bcm, 31/2 will remain undeveloped.

The catch is that the Soviets can satisfy small blocks of incremental demand. This is comforting to consumers who generally now see relatively low demand ahead and who do not want to invest in fields which might not be needed. Ambassador Galbraith points out that the Soviets might indeed be able to organize a type of spot market for gas.

This is in the realm of technical possibilities. The Soviets, by using the first strand plus surplus of existing pipeline capacity, can effectively capture enough of a market to make development of Troll, as well as any other large scale projects, like Nigerian Bonny LNG, uneconomic ventures. If pushed, they could further cut back on Eastern Europe and domestic gas use, although this would be at substantial internal costs.

In the mid-1980's Soviets would push for a second strand, but at this point in time, they really do not need it to capture most of the 1980-90's European market.

In light of this, the gas dependency element of our negotiations with the Europeans should be twofold: that they will not buy any additional gas beyond current contracts and that they take steps to preserve the market share for other large scale alternatives with particular attention focused on Norway's 31/2 block.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

If we ask them only to avoid a second strand, they may begrudgingly agree on the surface, but in fact realize that this costs them very little.

This new evidence once again supports our original stance in July 1981 to try to stop the first line of the pipeline. It also clearly identifies why we must now receive assurances from Europe that first strand deliveries be held at minimal levels.

Norman Bailey^{NS} and Roger Robinson^{Rub} concur.

cc: Henry Nau
Dennis Blair
Dick Pipes

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

19 September 1982

29
170747

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted]

25X1

[redacted]

25X1

2. [redacted] Gromyko has been the Soviet regime's principal on foreign relations for 25 years and a major political leader since joining the CPSU Politburo 12 years ago. He said the U.S.-Soviet relationship is considered crucial to the regime and to Gromyko personally because it is his specialty professionally. Gromyko's philosophy is that virtually everything depends on the state of relations with the U.S. [redacted]

3. The importance of U.S.-Soviet relations has meant that Gromyko has sought personal contact early on with every U.S. Secretary of State. [redacted] In contrast with other foreign affairs counterparts, Gromyko wants to know the U.S. Secretary personally, to get his own feel of the individual, rather than relying on the impressions of other Soviet Foreign Ministry representatives. If Gromyko requests such a meeting with the U.S., one can assume it has the support of the highest political level in the USSR, the approval of Secretary General Leonid ((Brezhnev)) and the Politburo probably was, in fact, automatic.

All Portions SECRET

[redacted]

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AND METHODS INVOLVED

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BY CW NARA DATE 11/3/12

~~SECRET~~

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

~~SECRET~~

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30

4. Gromyko's request for an initial meeting with the U.S. Secretary indicates that he seeks a positive discussion, not confrontation, [redacted]. This probably is considered vital by Gromyko and the Soviet leadership in view of the state of relations between the two countries presently. He will want to try to establish a common understanding and working relationship with the Secretary, regarded as the second highest U.S. official by the Soviets, since the prospects for summit-level interaction are not encouraging. Gromyko's goal will be to revive the practice of regular meetings between the two foreign affairs principals and increased bilateral consultations on international problems.

25X1

5. [redacted] Gromyko to emphasize the need for improved relations with the U.S. Secretary. He might begin by accenting the positive, such as Lebanon and the arms control talks, suggesting that the two sides are more in agreement basically in seeking peace in the Middle East and in weapons reductions. Gromyko can be expected to be friendly, pragmatic, and apparently somewhat flexible on issues which he wishes to discuss. He will not interject ideological views unless issues are raised which he does not wish to discuss, like Afghanistan, but he will expect the U.S. Secretary to do so, and forcefully.

25X1

6. [redacted] Gromyko probably will raise such contentious issues as the U.S. trade embargo because of the importance of Western, especially U.S., trade to the USSR. [redacted] the unusual emphasis given to the economy in the Soviet press over the past two year highlights the urgency of this problem. In connection with the embargo, Gromyko might well raise the question of Poland [redacted]. [redacted] He thought that the Soviet Foreign Minister might mention China, in terms of possible U.S. arms sales to that country, but he probably will not seek to discuss Cuba or Latin America.

25X1

[redacted]

25X1

[redacted]

25X1

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FOIA

F03-002/5

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
170866	MEMO N. BAILEY TO W. CLARK RE SOVIET FOOD EMBARGO (+ ATTACHED NOTE)	2	9/20/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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National Security Council
The White House

348

Package # 6281

82 SEP 20 P 5: 18

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>M</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>		<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
170868	MEMO CLARK TO PRESIDENT RE FOOD EMBARGO (DRAFT)	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
170867	MEMO BAILEY TO CLARK RE FOOD EMBARGO	1	9/9/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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36

MEMORANDUM

6281

170869

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 20, 1982

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-23-6-11-4

INFORMATION

BY KDB NARA DATE 12/4/15

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: ROGER W. ROBINSON *RWR*

SUBJECT: Soviet Food Embargo

As Norman Bailey's memo indicates, this is primarily a public affairs tactic designed to diffuse the empty argument used by the Europeans and others concerning the "inconsistency" of U.S. grain sales to the USSR while restricting the sale of oil and gas related equipment. I view this "call-their-bluff" opportunity in the context of a point which could be raised in a future Presidential speech. He could offer this hypothetical invitation for other supplier countries to halt their grain sales to the USSR if we were to do the same, thus alerting these countries to our impatience with this empty argument and putting them on notice that the U.S. may come forward with an "official" invitation for a total food embargo if they persist. This two step approach may be more helpful if we are to avoid unnecessary panic or confusion among U.S. farmers or leave ourselves open to increased charges of "economic warfare" against the Soviet Union.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
FROM BAILEY *4/24/15 EOB*

RECEIVED 09 SEP 82 16

TO CLARK

DOCDATE 09 SEP 82

BAILEY

20 SEP 82

KEYWORDS: SANCTIONS

FOOD

USSR

CANADA

ARGENTINA

AUSTRALIA

SUBJECT: FOOD EMBARGO ON THE SOVIET UNION

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 21 SEP 82 STATUS X

FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

ROBINSON

PIPES

STEARMAN

DOBRIANSKY

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(R / H)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

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<i>Clark</i>	<i>X gfw</i>	<i>sent to Treas. for decision 2/24</i>		<i>DB, SA, FE, SB, HA</i>
	<i>C</i>	<i>SEP 27 1982</i>	<i>Clark disapproved</i>	<i>NB Same</i>

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

(C) *RH*

NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
11/24/15 EDD

38
ID 8290739

RECEIVED 20 SEP 82 11

TO CLARK

FROM PIPES

DOCDATE 20 SEP 82

KEYWORDS: USSR

SHULTZ, G

GROMYKO, ANDREI A

SUBJECT: SHULTZ MTG W/ FOMIN GROMYKO IN NEW YORK

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE

DUE:

STATUS X

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(B / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

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C SEP 23 1982 Clark disapproved

RB

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

8 7

National Security Council
The White House

Package # 90739 ³⁹

09 S 20 All: 31

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information **A-Action** R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Judge,
 Recommended you use NSC meeting
 on Friday at 11:00 for a meeting
 with President and George to discuss
 his participation in UNGA and Groupko
 meetings. John

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

September 20, 1982

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1987

By ICOB NARA, Date 11/24/15

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: RICHARD PIPES *RP*

SUBJECT: Shultz Meeting with Gromyko

In accord with your request, I attach a memorandum from you to Secretary Shultz (Tab I) concerning his forthcoming meeting with Andrei Gromyko in New York. ~~(S)~~

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum to Secretary Shultz at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove ✓

Judge will handle verbally.

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum to Secretary of State Shultz

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLR 74823612-3

SYSTEM II
90739

41

~~SECRET~~

BY 1078

ADATE 12/1/18

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SENSITIVE

170870

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Your Forthcoming Meeting with Gromyko

Your predecessor, Alexander Haig, held three substantive meetings with Gromyko, which followed a certain pattern. Essentially, Gromyko did not appear interested in reaching compromises on outstanding issues but in establishing in the mind of the Reagan Administration the conviction that Moscow cannot be compelled to concede under pressure. He thus reiterated time and again Moscow's well-known positions on arms control and regional problems, whether Afghanistan or Nicaragua or Namibia (Poland he refused to discuss altogether). His tone was a mixture of condescension and sarcasm. (S)

Another factor behind this uncompromising stand may be the internal Soviet situation. There is, at present, something like an inter-regnum in Moscow. The bureaucrats of the International Department (Central Committee) are unwilling to commit themselves, because they cannot know who will emerge on top from the power struggle and which "line" -- hard or conciliatory toward the West -- will triumph. As a result, they play safe by restating established positions. It is unlikely that serious conversations with Moscow can begin until Brezhnev retires or dies and a new group takes over. (S)

Inasmuch as you are to the Soviet leadership a relatively unknown quantity it is possible that Gromyko will be more willing to listen than to talk, so as to size you up. It is worth considering, however, how much merit there is in a prolonged session with Gromyko if the first few hours do not indicate any willingness on his part to assume a more realistic stance. You may wish to consider setting up an initial agenda that will be limited in time and scope, and expanded if and when the content and tone of the talks warrant it. (S)

Gromyko is likely to raise with you once again the issue of a Reagan-Brezhnev "summit". It is difficult to see how such a meeting could serve our interests at a time when Moscow shows no willingness whatever to compromise on outstanding differences with us or to entertain new initiatives. Its main purpose would be to enhance Moscow's low current international status and show the world that, his harsh anti-Soviet rhetoric notwithstanding, President Reagan has come to acknowledge the "realities" of the global correlation of forces. In other words, a summit at this time would serve exclusively Moscow's propaganda purposes. (S)

William P. Clark

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

SENSITIVE

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S) RECEIVED 20 SEP 82 18

TO CLARK

FROM STEARMAN *11/24/85 COB*

DOCDATE 20 SEP 82 *42*

KEYWORDS: USSR

SUMMIT

GROMYKO, ANDREI A

SHULTZ, G

SUBJECT: US POSITION ON SUMMITRY FOR SHULTZ MTG W/ FOMIN GROMYKO IN NEW YORK

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE

DUE:

STATUS X

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(B / *B*)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	<i>C</i> SEP 27 1982	<i>Clark disapproved</i>		<i>STV</i>

DISPATCH _____

W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

National Security Council
The White House

349

Package #

90745

RED

JAG

43

02 20 8:53

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	1	J	
Bud McFarlane	2	M	
Jacque Hill	3	J	
Judge Clark	4		A
John Poindexter	5	J	
Staff Secretary	6		N
Sit Room			

SEP 27 1982

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
170871	MEMO W. STEARMAN TO W. CLARK RE U.S. POSITION ON SUMMITRY FOR MEETING WITH GROMYKO	1	9/20/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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170872	MEMO W. CLARK TO SECRETARY OF STATE RE U.S. POSITION ON SUMMITRY FOR MEETING WITH GROMYKO (DRAFT)	1	ND	B1

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