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Collection Name SITUATION SUPPORT STAFF, WHITE HOUSE: RECORDS

Withdrawer

MJD 9/12/2007

File Folder IN-HIS (INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY) 4-12: RUMSFELD
MISSIONS 11/28/1983-03/28/1984

FOIA

M10-370/1

Box Number 92468

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
42079	CHRONOLOGY	RE RUMSFELD MISSIONS PAR 6/26/2013 M370/1	28	ND	B1

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CODEWORD

CMFCHRON:
 CHRONOLOGY OF CMF ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT
 OF AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD

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28 NOV 1983

- 0715 Beal confers with McFarlane and Poindexter about the CMF providing intelligence/analytical support for the December Middle East trip by AMB Rumsfeld.
- 0730 Beal confers with Teicher on any ideas that Teicher may have for CMF support during the Rumsfeld trip and sets up a meeting later for Teicher and CMF staff.
- 1300 Beal informs CMF staff meeting that we will be giving special support to AMB Rumsfeld on his December trip to the Middle East.

29 NOV 1983

- 1430 Meeting with Howard Teicher in his office to discuss our role in the Rumsfeld mission. Attending the meeting were Teicher, Lucas, Colestock, Rothe, and Wood. It was agreed that the CMF staff will provide Teischer with two "dry run" reports on 1 and 2 December, in an effort to work out the bugs. Teicher agreed to provide CMF staff with NSDD 99 and other pertinent documents.
- 1645 Lucas, Beal and Colestock meet with Dur in Room 208 for further discussions on the Rumsfeld mission.

COMMENT: CMF is to provide more information, rather than less, and emphasize intelligence and analysis, rather than public reporting. We should view this as a first effort of support of this type, rather than an effort that is a finished product (Teicher's view). Teicher feels we may have plenty of opportunity to refine our efforts; Rumsfeld is expected to return to the Middle East in early 1984. Our main analytical function is to be the editors or gatekeepers to select out what information is to be forwarded to the party. If we feel we have some insight that needs to be presented, however, we should feel free to do so.

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 BY *rw* NARA DATE 6/26/13

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30 NOV 1983

- 1000 Colestock sends an AI message to Lucas and Rothe outlining our upcoming and ongoing requirements to be fulfilled by the CIA.
- 1300 Colestock and Rothe give a brief update at the Planning staff meeting.
- 1500 Colestock goes to DIA to get ideas and information on how to prepare cables to be sent from CMF to the Rumsfeld mission. Rothe experiments with the data management procedures to scan cables in GESCAN, move them to the RUMSFELD environment, edit them, and prepare them for transmission. All procedures executed well and an initial model for transmission was prepared.

1 DEC 1983

- 0800 Colestock attempts to replicate Rothe's experiment from 30 November and encounters difficulties.
- 0900 Rothe attempts to replicate yesterday's efforts and encounters the same difficulties that Colestock did. Rothe and Colestock confer with Jones and then LaFlamme in an effort to solve the problem.
- 1000 Lucas talks with CIA regarding the support we need to fulfill our task. The response is positive, but technical details must be resolved. LaFlamme, Kidd and Larson work on the data management problems.
- 1015 Colestock, Lucas and Rothe confer on support needs from CMF staff and other agencies. Lucas requests a written report on our needs. Colestock and Rothe are preparing.
- 1045 Rothe goes to Teicher's office in an effort to get NSDDs 99 and 111. Teicher was not in.
- 1200 Rothe completes memorandum to Lucas. This memorandum is MEMO1 in DTP in the RUMSFELD environment. It was delivered to Lucas at 1400 and Lucas requested that a copy be given to Beal. The copy to Beal was delivered at 1600.
- 1400 All problems with the SEND program have been corrected, and we are now operational.
- 1745 Rothe and Colestock complete first effort at composing a message that is ready for transmission. The model is named RUMSFELD in the RUMSFELD environment's DTP. Documentation for this process is in the same place with the name NOTES.

2 DEC 1983

- 0930 Rothe confers with VanHorn and Crowley regarding admin and technical support. The admin schedule has been distributed and is also located in ADMIN.

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- 0945 Colestock completes first draft of sample message; information cut off was 1800 EST on 1 December 1983.
- 1130 Colestock, Lucas and Rothe confer on administrative matters.
- 1430 Colestock, Lucas, and Rothe meet with Teicher in Teicher's office. Technical and administrative matters were discussed and the sample message was given to Teicher for his review. His initial comment was that it was excellent and that he wanted to keep the copy to show Rumsfeld.
- 1530 Colestock completes a memo(MEMO2) for Beal to Poindexter outlining what we plan to do during the Rumsfeld mission.
- 1600 Lucas meets with Rubio to confer on a variety of matters including exactly what it is we will be doing.
- 1700 Beal approves of Colestock's memo(MEMO2) and wants it sent with the example message to Poindexter.
- 1730 The memo(MEMO2) to Poindexter is finished(by Terry) and delivered to Beal to submit to Poindexter. This was done some time after the Friday NSC staff meeting.

5 DEC 1983

- 1145 Rothe confers with Cox on the CMF's capability to locate all cables directed specifically to Rumsfeld. We need to know this so we don't duplicate any message traffic. Although possible, the process is not efficient for our purposes.
- 1200 Colestock confers with Cox to continue discussing the problem of locating all messages directed specifically to Rumsfeld. Because of the way the data are managed(stripping off all passing information for GESCAN but keeping it in the message copy file and documenting it in the message log), it is very difficult to know just who is supposed to receive what messages; it is possible, but cumbersome.
- 1530 Colestock, Lucas, Rothe, Smalls, Williams, Wood and VanHorn confer in Room 208 to clarify the next few days. Smalls is in charge of the communications along with admin support from VanHorn. Beginning tomorrow morning(6 Dec), Williams will collect information and have it ready by 0700 hours; Wood will arrive and prepare the morning Lebanon report; Colestock and Rothe will arrive and work on the 1500 Lebanon and Rothe is in charge of the Rumsfeld report from now until 10 Dec. The Lebanon reports will serve as the foundation for the Rumsfeld report.

6 DEC 1983

- 1500 Lucas receives some material from DeGraffenreid to be placed in the DEC06 message. This material was distilled by Wood and is ready for entry.

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- 1545 Rothe delivers to Teicher the DEC05 message, which will not be sent electronically, but was hand-carried. At the same time Teicher delivered to Rothe NSDD 99 and NSDD 111 and the agenda for the mission.
- 1630 Lucas spoke with [REDACTED] at CIA concerning the CIA's [REDACTED] support of the mission. [REDACTED] asked whether CIA should [REDACTED] and Lucas responded yes.
- 1905 DEC06 was finished and proofed one last time. Participating in the preparation were Britton, Colestock, Rothe, Williams and Wood. Lucas led.
- 1910 Lucas speaks with the WHSR Director Rubio on the release of [REDACTED] messages and Rubio responded that this is back channel from McFarlane to Rumsfeld and WH has authority to release anything and everything. Rubio will place a hard copy of the report in McFarlane's and Poindexter's mail.
- 1913 Britton executes message transmission, i.e., he hit the carriage return.
- 1926 Rubio called and asked for a title for the message, Colestock replied the title should be Rumsfeld Report with the date.
- 1945 Lucas called the WHSR, spoke with a senior officer and inquired if the message had been received in London. the response was that the message had been received at 1930 local(Washington) time.

7 DEC 1983

- 1300 Rothe gave a brief review of the message activities during the staff meeting. Very simply, everything had gone very well in the first full day of the effort, but Lucas emphasized that we have encountered some sensitivities.
- 1500 Rothe checked with Jim in Degraffenreid's office to see if they had anything they wanted included in today's message, but they had nothing at the time.
- 1515 Problems with DTP encountered and reported to Jones.
- 1545 Jones repaired DTP(for the time being or forever is unknown).
- 1715 Rothe checked with Degraffenreid's office--no items.
- 1815 Degraffenreid called CMF, spoke with Rothe and mentioned that he had something for today's message. Rothe got it from DeGraffenreid and it was entered as the last item on today's message.
- 1850 Britton completed entry and made a paper copy for Beal.
- 1855 Message was sent from CMF. Participating in the preparation of today's message were Britton, rothe, Williams and Wood.

8 DEC 1983

- 1015 Rothe retrieves CIA cable traffic for Rumsfeld and places

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- it in the RUMSFELD environment(DTP) under the name CIA07, for CIA message of Dec 07.
- 1330 To eliminate confusion over whether we should include our "gist" of the INR morning summary(due to not knowing if State is sending the same information to Rumsfeld), we have elected to enter and if we find out later that it is a duplicate to delete from message but to keep in a file named ADDINFO, meaning additional information that we did not send. Beal made the decision in conference with Wood.
- 1500 Lucas returned from a meeting with Rubio. Agreement was reconfirmed on who has what role in the preparation of the message and Rubio was very agreeable(we prepare but if they want to put anything in, they can). Also, Lucas saw the message as it is sent to Rumsfeld and also as it appears in the President's daily briefing book. The message is addressed to Rumsfeld and signed by McFarlane.
- 1800 Rothe and Walls discuss the fact that something is "funny" with GESCAN when running in the PROFILE mode. For example, the individual query will stop accumulating hits but will indicate that it is still active, when the directory is viewed. This warrants further discussion.
- 1803 Message is sent. Participating in the preparation were Rothe, VanHorn, Williams and Wood.

COMMENT: Rothe has a "feeling" that although we are producing a message that is being well received, we are not managing the information as well as we could. Managing means getting a complete take and producing what we have as fast as we possibly could. This is designed primarily as a note for further reflection when time is available.

9 DEC 1983

- 1000 Crowley and then Walls aid Rothe in setting up a GETEMPS file named ENVOY that will contain, ideally, all cables that we believe pertain to the mission, although all of them may not be included in the message itself.
- 1115 Rothe uncovers a cable saying that Rumsfeld will be in Jordan over the weekend. GESCANs are adjusted to account for that schedule change.
- 1130 The ENVOY database is now active and contains all cables that are pertinent to the Rumsfeld mission.
- 1330 Rothe receives from someone(Lucas?) a hardcopy of a cable from the Rumsfeld mission(DTG 090648Z) containing the following:"Your daily intelligence summary is first rate and fits our needs exceedingly well. Thanks." That's one for the A-TEAM!!!!
- 1545 Rothe checked with Dur a second time to see if had anything. He was not in and has not called; assumed that

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he had nothing to report. Rothe also checked with Radzinski (in DeGraffenreid's office) and he too had nothing.

1715 Not much cable traffic is coming in.

COMMENT: The plan for this weekend is to have the Rumsfeld group come in at 1000 hours on both Saturday and Sunday and leave by no later than 1400. This may result in a slightly less polished product, but the group has ten more days to go and we want to be able to maintain freshness and accuracy as much as possible over the remainder of the mission.

1800 Message is sent. Participating in the preparation were Britton, Rothe, Williams and Wood.

2100 WHSR called Lucas saying they had received only the "header" to the message and not the entire message. Lucas had them call Rothe.

2115 WHSR called Rothe and told him the difficulty. Rothe called Crowley for advice and VanHorn for action. Rothe and VanHorn agreed to meet at CMF ASAP.

2135 Rothe arrived at CMF; VanHorn was already here and says he has corrected the problem. The message transmission was verified with the WHSR. Rothe and VanHorn telephoned Lucas and reported that the message had been received by the WHSR in its entirety.

2145 Rothe and VanHorn depart.

COMMENT: As near as we (VanHorn) can tell, the CMF staff prepared and executed the transmission correctly, nevertheless something went wrong. We will make a request for the systems people to investigate. Two questions remain: precisely what did go wrong and why did it take the WHSR three(3) hours to discover that the message in its entirety was not received?

10 DEC 1983

1020 All members of the Saturday team have arrived, despite some severe parking problems.

1100 Rothe discovers in the cable traffic that the Rumsfeld party has been approved by the Iraqi government to visit Iraq on December 17 or 18. This has not been confirmed by the Rumsfeld party, but we should anticipate adjusting the content of our messages on these dates.

1130 Cox was at the WHSR during a briefing. He reported that the WHSR has been having difficulty with our messages; that they all contain rulers, tabs, and carriage control characters. None of us knew that. We thought we were

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sending the messages in the correct form. VanHorn is working on this problem.

COMMENT: It is clear that in order for us to find out how all of our efforts are being received by the WHSR, and others, we are the ones who will have to make the inquiries.

1200 We have determined to cut off the information flow as of now. Not much traffic is coming in anyway.

1315 Today's report is finished and being edited. Tomorrow we will convene at 1100 and Wood will call in before he comes here, to see if he is needed. Tomorrow we hope to be finished by 1500.

1330 Editing and correcting is completed.

1337 Message is sent. Participating in the preparation were Rothe, VanHorn, Williams and Wood.

1341 Rothe calls WHSR to make sure they received the message. They say they got it in its complete and unexpurgated form.

11 DEC 1983

1120 All members of the Rumsfeld group arrive.

1145 Williams discovers the new schedule for the Rumsfeld mission. Rothe asks VanHorn to use this to update the SCHEDULE file in RUMSFELD. Today Amabassador Rumsfeld is in Oman.

1245 Wood calls in but Rothe says it is not necessary for him to come in.

1315 The information is cut off.

1340 All cable traffic information is entered and waiting to be edited. We are still reviewing newspapers to see if they yield anything. Rothe brought in the New York Times and Colestock is tracking down the Washington Post.

1400 Message is sent. Participating in the preparation were Colestock, Rothe, VanHorn and Williams.

12 DEC 1983

1500 Message traffic reviewed and sent to printer for edit, but no paper available.

1615 Messages printed after printer backlog finished.

1645 Problem with Profiling: when messages restarted profiles must be restarted. There is no automatic mechanism to do this and if you are not at the terminal, there is no way to tell what has been lost between the restart of the messages and the restart of the profile. Discussed the problem with Wayne and John and they think they can set something up, but it will take time to implement.

1800 Incoming data shut off.

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1900 Message sent. A-team consisted of Colestock, Woods, VanHorn.

13 DEC 1983

0700 Traffic review; no problems.

1815 Message out; lengthy, but operation at its smoothest. I love it when a plan comes together. A-team consisted of Colestock, Woods, VanHorn, Williams.

14 DEC 1983

0700 Traffic review. Found problem associated with query for specific day's date time group on a message. Since the messages are placed in databases by the time of receipt, one day's traffic may be in two separate databases and two separate queries have to be run.

0900 Alerted powers that be of increasingly high pitched war drums in the Persian Gulf. Many tasks and actions emanate from this alert. Does not adversely impact on putting out message to Rumsfeld.

1300 Planners Staff Meeting

1530 Meeting with Dr. Beal, Fred Rothe, Will Walls, Harry Colestock in 208 on Persian Gulf. Bill VanHorn and Terry Bell provided administrative support as ideas on a National Plan of Action was formulated.

1810 Message sent. Again, a lengthy effort but out in minimum time. A-team was Colestock, Williams, Woods, Britton.

2000 Meeting on Persian Gulf broke up with additional tasks for tomorrow.

15 DEC 1983

0700 Traffic review.

1810 Message transmitted. Sit room made a couple of changes on the message at our request before they sent it.

16 DEC 1983

0715 Message review. 780 broken and having to develop new queries in individual sign on not RUMSFELD environment.

1100 Tasking throughout day on Persian Gulf took some time away from review.

1600 751 system down for backup.

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1700 751 back for use. Profiles all useless. Queries have to be rebuilt and reviewed in their entirety.

1750 Review complete.

1837 Message out. A-team of Colestock, VanHorn.

17 DEC 1983

1100 Colestock in to review messages and discuss Pgulf activities.

1150 Britton in to type message.

1400 Message out. No problems ; Message very short.

18 DEC 1983

1200 Colestock in to review information. Problems in getting in to rooms. Without a key, trying to rely on the guards was not wise. Waited 15 minutes and then decided to use terminals in 206 and 208 without benefit of printer.

1215 Britton in for typing.

1400 Problem: GEScan queries for the 17th also bring up 16 Dec date-time groups. Wastes a lot of time. Colestock goes to White House reception. Britton works on typing.

1450 Colestock returns.

1543 Message Sent. A-team of Colestock and Britton leaving after sending lengthy message.

19 DEC 1983

0700 Messages under review.

1300 Staff meeting. Review of Rumsfeld report- no major problems. Checking to see whether itinerary changed. Still looks as if 22 Dec will be the last.

1815 Message transmitted. A-team consisted of Colestock, VanHorn, Williams, Wood.

20 DEC 1983

0715 Problem with GEScan. Computer had problems last night and

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database is messed up. Mike Kidd is getting it straight and putting Dec20 traffic in a separate database for separate scanning from the D14D20 database.

- 0900 Most of problems resolved and reviewing messages. Tasking for NSPG of Iran-Iraq taking most of time.
- 1530 Practice for NSPG. Most of CMF involved. Britton typing message, Wood reviewing.
- 1915 Message traffic final review following extended practice session on NSPG.
- 1930 Message finally out. A-team of Colestock, Britton, Wood.

21 Dec 1983

- 0815 Found out that Rumsfeld will be home this afternoon and no message will be put out this evening.

29 Dec 1983

Observations by Rothe: Enough time has elapsed to review some of the issues surrounding the preparation of a daily message to a special envoy. These thoughts are not arranged in any particular order.

Personnel: during the first week four(4) people--Britton, Rothe, Williams and Wood--were involved in the preparation of the report. This was probably one or two too many. One analyst and one admin is probably enough, but an additional research assistant and an editor should be available and on call. An editor is particularly important to maintain the quality of the product. Another observation is that much of our editing was done on the cable traffic that we copied into the message, so that our product was probably the cleanest version presented to the envoy. Fatigue became a factor toward the end of the mission. Rothe was detailed to the NSPG preparations and Colestock, in addition to those preparations prepared the message. We must find a way to eliminate, if possible, the fatigue factor. The mission is time consuming and occupied the analyst's time almost completely. Colestock in particular was running on empty toward the end of the mission.

Substance: it is clear that during this mission the CMF

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role was that of reporter, rather than analyst. Analysis that did take place was of the "gatekeeping" or selection variety rather than thought, synthesis and writing from the evidence and intelligence. Other than that, the CMF team appeared to provide the desired information, but future missions should clarify if more active analysis is desired--such as assessing the general mood of the situation--or even more detailed thought on the day-to-day operations of the envoy.

Process: in general, the preparation process went very smoothly. The technical staff always provided able assistance and the initial preparations permitted fast and smooth preparation of the report. It is important to note, however, that the CMF had enough advance notice of the mission to prepare and practice for the mission. Future missions of this type will benefit from this experience, but other different missions would benefit from advance notice.

Envoy: these comments are based on Rothe's observations of the envoy's activities based on the cable traffic the CMF received that reported on the meetings and statements of the envoy. The envoy, and presumably his staff, spend all their time travelling, preparing for a meeting and meeting. Preparing for a meeting involves organizing the questions that need to be asked and reviewing existing US policy statements for background and clarity. Virtually no time is available for careful and long range thought. All knowledge, conceptions and analysis brought to bear on the meetings were gained prior to departure, and no updating was possible during the trip. The significance of this observation is that the envoy, because of predetermined preoccupation, is not able to adapt to changing circumstances--particularly if the changes are subtle but significant. A mechanism should be established to provide more substantive input and with enough impact to capture the envoy's attention. Caveat: this observation(input with impact) may change with a debriefing from the envoy.

Recommendations: some of these may be the same as though as derived from other exercises. Nevertheless, they bear repeating in this context. (1) Attempt to guarantee the advance notice of any special projects--this permits preparation and practice. (2) Organize personnel so that we do not have people running on empty toward the end of the mission. This may require drawing on all analysts,

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regardless of geographic specialty. We do not have enough people to divide up by regions and this would move us more toward being generalists. (3) Send someone with the envoy to understand exactly what a mission involves and how the CMF role could be improved. Much of what the CMF was doing was based on our knowledge and expertise rather than precise knowledge of the needs of the envoy. (4) Supplementing three(3) is the simple need to have a debriefing with the envoy and his staff.

03 JAN 84

0800 Notified of need to generate a new Rumsfeld cable since the envoy was to be departing for the Middle East again tonight at 2100EST.

0900 Colestock contacted Howard Teischer and Phil Dur to coordinate on new message and any recommendations for changes. Mr. Teischer will not be accompanying Mr. Rumsfeld and he stated the message should be passed to Mr. Tom Miller, Mr. Rumsfeld's executive assistant.

1100 We initially decided to put the cable out on the morning of the 4th since Mr. Rumsfeld would not be arriving in Beirut until later in the day, but after a call to Tom Miller, he suggested a cable to be read on the plane at the stop in London. He also wanted us to change the header at the top of the messages because some of the [redacted] folks were leary of letting the messages out their sight and would delay getting the message to Mr. Rumsfeld until he came [redacted]

1500 Brainstorming session on Lebanon. Dr. Beal, Rothe, Jones, Colestock, Walls, and Williams in attendance. Not much movement on issues, but a lot of ideas floating around with more commonality of understanding of problem and its complexity.

1830 Short message put out. No problems. A-team consisted of Colestock and Van Horn.

04 JAN 1984

0700 Colestock reviewed our message [redacted] to Rumsfeld and found striking similarities. Pointed out to Dr. Beal and Jim Lucas. Will be looking at future production to see if this trend continues.

1100 Strategy meeting on Lebanon. Beal, Rothe, Colestock,

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Walls, Williams, and Michener in attendance. Finished at 1245 with instructions to think about discussion and meet again about 1600.

- 1300 CM Staff meeting.
- 1500 Continued efforts to get profiling working but problems from time to time as it would stop.
- 1600 Other activities took players away from 1600 meeting.
- 1700 Rothe to put together notes from 1100 meeting for Beal to pass on to powers tomorrow.
- 1845 Message out . A-team of Colestock, Britton, and Wood.

05 JAN 1984

- 0630 Colestock in to draft another copy of Lebanon strategy to complement Rothe paper.
- 1700 Coordination with Dr. Beal and Howard Teicher on CMF comment on one the messages. No major problems. He did suggest we include report on Iraqi pipeline since he knew Mr.Rumsfeld was interested in the subject.
- 1710 Ward Williams obtaining data and maps on proposed Lebanese redeployment. Maps will be attached to hardcopy of message for Beal, Poindexter, Lucas(file copy), Sit Room, Dur, and Teicher.
- 1730 Contacted DeGraffenreid's office to make sure they had no inputs for the message. They did not, but they will continue to support.
- 1845 Message out. A-team of Colestock, Williams, Britton, Wyatt and Wood.
- 1945 Put finishing touches on CMFchron while Williams finished the six map attachments for tomorrow's message.

6 JAN 1984

- 0700 Traffic review, Colestock.
- 1815 Message out;no problems. A-team of Colestock, Wood, Britton, and Wyatt.

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7 JAN 1984

1315 Rothe arrives; VanHorn and Larson are already here.

1600 Rothe messes up Crowley's GETEMPS program, Plato calls Crowley and gets everything straightened out. The prompt commands were ambiguous for someone who has not used the program in some time. There is not much traffic today.

1630 Message traffic is cut off. Not much was reported today. The updated Rumsfeld schedule has been entered. Plato, here today on another mission, provided invaluable assistance and is now an official member of the A-Team. Rothe, because of his efforts with GETEMPS, is awarded the John Crowley memorial typing award for the week.

1700 Larson proof-read the message and VanHorn prepared the message. Members of the A-Team were Larson, Plato, Rothe and VanHorn. Message is sent.

8 JAN 1984

1430 Rothe arrives with the Redskins ahead 14 to 0. Larson and VanHorn are already here.

1600 Cable traffic is slow, but the Redskins won 24 to 21 on a FG by Moseley(1 of 5) in the last 48 seconds.

1700 Information flow is officially cut-off. VanHorn is preparing and Larson is reviewing press.

1745 VanHorn completes draft of report. Members of the A-Team today are Larson, Rothe and VanHorn.

1815 Cox drops in 208; he had been in 201 for a few minutes.

1835 Message is sent.

09 JAN 1984

0700 Colestock back reviewing hot stuff. Much of the traffic in the system is being flagged for Rumsfeld directly and there is no need to forward it.

1630 Message traffic has been slow and it appears a backlog is now coming in as queue is building up quickly.

1930 Message finally finished after lengthy review and edit period. A-team of Colestock, Woods, and Wyatt.

10 JAN 1984

0700 Colestock in for review. Traffic flow much better today.

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1700 Message received from Degraffenreid's office for inclusion in message.

1830 Message out. Smooth operation by Colestock, Woods, and Van Horn.

11 JAN 1984

1145 Colestock in for message review after meeting out at BDM Corporation all morning. Will Walls was requested to do a review of print media to help with the process. Saved a lot of Colestock's time.

1300 Planning Staff meeting.

1400 Traffic heavy and interesting. Feedback from Dur on inclusion of Degraffenreid message (Memo from McFarlane to President) was he was surprised and concerned about us including it. His concern was for state folks on mission seeing it and telling their counterparts in Washington of its contents.

1635 Passed important message from Rumsfeld to McFarlane et al to Dur. It essentially requested action on deciding what US levers on Syria would be. Rumsfeld is to arrive in Damascus tomorrow. SIGH!

2000 Message out. Heavy bunch of messages. Tired A-Team of Colestock, Woods, and Wyatt.

12 JAN 1984

0700 Colestock in for message review. Major problems with GEsCan. Some corruption in database. Estimated time of return of capability is 0930.

1000 GEsCan problems cleared up.

1100 Assignment from Dr. Beal on Persian Gulf National Plan of Action. Rothe, Colestock, and Michener will work.

1700 VAX 780 dies untimely death. No capability. J. Crowley attempting to fix problem.

1830 We are unable to fix. All of message already typed has to be retyped and GEsCan will have to be completed on BIU. Eric Larson, Colestock, Britton and Woods work on EDT and

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GEScan to complete message.

2000 Finished typing; now trying to get message out. No luck.

2010 Trying to get J. Smalls on idiosyncracies of program for sending message. He is unavailable. Problem in question on which port message is sent to.

2030 Finally get data from M. Kidd after try to VanHorn.

2040 Message finally out.

13 JAN 1984

0940 Colestock in for message review. Not much in files. Took some time to clean up GEScan since it went down with computer crash last night.

1830 No major problems. Message out . Colestock, Van Horn Woods tonight's A-team.

14 JAN 1984

1600 Colestock, Larson, and Wyatt in for message preparation.

1830 Lots of traffic. Message out 1845.

15 JAN 1984

1600 Colestock and Wyatt in for message prep. Everyone must have been taking a vacation. Not much traffic . NY Times and WashPost formed most of message.

1730 Message out.

16 JAN 1984

0700 Colestock in for traffic review. No problems with computer-- hallelujah!

1730 GESCAN problems; had to restart all profiles. I knew it was too good to be true-- a whole day without problems is impossible.

1824 Message out. Colestock, VanHorn and Woods on the line.

17 JAN 1984

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- 0700 Colestock in for message review. All profiles died last night. Had to review and re-review over 400 messages to get caught up. Normal review is about 150 messages.
- 0930 Discussed weekend duty with R. Jones. We will discuss further and train during next few days so he can put out message on Saturday and Sunday.
- 1430 Strategy session on PGULF with Beal, Rothe, Colestock, Walls, and Hinckley. Difficulties in framing terms of reference. Decided to write what we could and have [REDACTED]
- 1830 Message out. A big one. We got Rumsfeld's itinerary which indicated he would be back in US Friday night 20 Jan. After consultations with Lucas and Beal, we decided to tellenvoy party we would be going on Monday-Friday message schedule during his stay in US unless advised otherwise. A-team of Colestock, Britton, Jones, Woods.
- 2030 Calls to Lucas, Colestock, and VanHorn from White House Sit Room stating that message did not go out. Van Horn came in to resolve problem. Difficulty was length of message. Finally finished by about 2230.

JANUARY 18

- 0700 Colestock in for message review. All profiles died again last night. Sigh!
- 1000 Procedure for final sending of message. Call Sitroom to inform them that the message is on its way. They will call us back when they have received the message. If ten (10) minutes elapses without a phone call, call the Sitroom to check on the message.
- 1330 Lots of message traffic of import, but also heavy snowstorm. Message out with A-team of Colestock, Wyatt, Woods, and Van Horn. Profiles set for tomorrow.

19 JAN 1984

- 0620 Colestock calls Rothe and informs him that his four wheel drive vehicle will not make it over the country roads of West Virginia and that Rothe, as agreed last night, will take the cable for today.

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- 1400 At some point, we were not receiving the messages. Kidd fixes, but we had the same problem later in the day.
- 1730 Information flow is stopped. A-Team members today were Britton, Kidd, Rothe, VanHorn and Wood.
- 1755 Message is sent. We are waiting for Sitroom response that they have received the message. Also, tomorrow is the last day until further notice. We will not, repeat not, work over the weekend.
- 1805 Britton calls Sitroom and they confirm that the message has been received in good shape.

20 JAN 1984

- 0700 Colestock back from a lovely day in the country shoveling snow and keeping the home fires burning.
- 0800 Colestock working with Jones to get him up to speed on how to do Rumsfeld cable in case Jones has to do it this weekend. Current Rumsfeld itinerary has him returning to US on Saturday. However, press of this A.M. says he is going back to Mideast. We will investigate.
- 0830 Ron Britton called to State to find out itinerary. No change from official line. We will check again later.
- 0845 Message malfunction last night. Five hours of downtime. Mike Kidd fixing.
- 0940 Colestock browsing through 270 messages and tagging when system malfunction at message 206. No response. Mike Kidd fixing. We may lose all tagged messages and we may have to go through queue again.
- 1030 Call to State again and they reconfirm that Rumsfeld is still coming back to states tomorrow. But they did say to standby for changes.
- 1045 GEsCan back. Thanks, Mike.
- 1500 Message traffic nice and slow after reviewing about 500 messages.
- 1715 Found out why messages hadn't come in after repeated comments to folks on the fact that no messages had come in query profiles for several hours. We had our queries set for DTGS and in the process of setting up some other programs the dtgs on messages got set to ORIG, so all the queries were looking at the wrong fields.

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- 1815 Problem finally cleared up and queries reset and messages reviewed.
- 1845 Message sent. A-team of Colestock, VanHorn and Woods.
- 1945 Horrendous problems in comm line . Message still hasn't made it to sit room for release. Colestock leaving, Bill still waiting for resolution of problems.
- 2030 Had to give to Sitroom to repoke message manually.

25 JAN 1984

1400 Notified Rumsfeld, Dur and Tom Miller(State) would be going back to Mideast the evening of the 26th. We're back on. We have the go-ahead to include policy items in the cable and with the five day break Colestock had some time to do some strategic thinking about the problem. Additionally, Colestock asked VanHorn to come up with some ideas on how to better format the message items to be more eye catching.

26 JAN 1984

- 0700 Colestock in for message review.27 JAN 1984
- 0700 Colestock in for message review. Naturally, all the profiles died last night and queries had to rebuilt and the entire day's traffic reviewed again. Rumsfeld's itinerary received.
- 1600 Lots of good traffic. Good words from Geoff Kemp to Dr. Beal on how the RUMS cable shortens his workday. Bill VanHorn's adjustments to cable format have made it much more readable. First insertion of policy information last night has not elicited any negative reviews.
- 1800 Message out. No problems. A-team of Colestock, Wyatt, and R. Jones.
- 2145 Van Horn arrives to send RUMSFELD message due to the computer room going down sometime after we had sent the earlier message. When they came back up at 2100, our message had gone to the Big Bit Bucket in the Sky.
- 2220 Receipt of RUMSFELD message has now been acknowledged by the SITROOM. Also, the incoming traffic is now working

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correctly.

28 JAN 1984

- 1600 Colestock in for message review. Naturally, all profiles had died and have to read 400 messages.
- 1615 Britton in. Picking up New York Times from the sitroom for review.
- 1900 Talked with Van Horn about transmission problem last night and the need to get all involved in this process knowledgeable.
- 2000 Message sent, waiting for a final okay from Sitroom.
- 2010 Sitroom stated that system had gone down while message was being sent. They will wait a few minutes to see if the other part was saved. Sigh!
- 2030 Message resent several times; finally out.

29 JAN 1984

- 1600 Colestock in for message review. Profiles appear to have been alive since last night-- a first!
- 1615 Britton in for typing.
- 1620 Profiles and all processing stop for some unknown reason . Restarted and reinitiated all profiles. I knew it was too good to last.
- 1700 After search for missing lines in one message, tried to do it for another using RAW program and it could not find any message in the 29th day. What else can go wrong. I can hardly wait.
- 1830 Message out. Entered warning note on Lebanese offensive as CMF analysis.

30 JAN 1984

- 0700 Colestock in for message review.
- 0730 Notified by G. Jones that system (780) is to come down. Time back ????

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- 0845 Asked Johnathan on when system would be back. He stated 1300. Decided to go to 751 directly. Had to set up new queries because all existing queries and profiles were via RUMSFELD.
- 1130 Asked again when system would be back. Notified by tech rep it would be tomorrow. John Crowley notified. Will have system back up by 1400.
- 1300 CMF Staff meeting.
- 1400 Back to traffic review and edit.
- 1430 Received hot message from DIA on Marines killed and wounded in Lebanon. Notified Dr. Beal.
- 1440 Went to Kemp and Teicher office to notify them of developments. Teicher was testifying on the hill and Kemp was too busy.
- 1445 Notified D. Fortier on developments and gave him a copy of the message. He also passed judgment on our analytical piece on possible US military entanglement in the impending LAF offensive.
- 1500 751 down. What next?
- 1640 Howard Teicher called and I notified him of losses of marines. The sitroom had also notified him earlier as he was testifying on the hill.
- 1830 Got message out before system crashes in some fashion. A-team of Colestock, VanHorn, and R. Jones.

31 JAN 1984

- 1045 Colestock in for message review. Profiles did not die. Hallelujah!
- 1100 Discussed this weekend with R. Jones. He will take the cable. Training is complete and he will go for dry run tomorrow. Lucas approved.
- 1730 Profiles have made it all this way ;going for a record.
- 1800 Message out. No problems. Beal/Colestock Lebanon Policy Working Group discussions.

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1930 Closing up shop after solving one half of the problem as a result of current LAF offensive.

1 FEB 1984

0700 Colestock in for traffic review. Profiles working well. We have broken the record for live profiles-over 30 hours. Rothe to review results of Lebanon Policy Working Group.

0710 System to be down between 0900 and 1100 today. I knew it was too good to last.

1400 R. Jones reviewing and tagging messages. We encountered some problems in procedures, but corrected and he should be all set for the weekend duty.

1500 Continual system problems in getting on a biu and the actual functioning of the system.

1830 Taking time to get it all together because of higher priority activities. Additionally, Dr. Beal and Colestock putting together Cosmic piece on policy in Lebanon.

1930 Message out.

2 FEB 1984

0700 Colestock in for traffic review. Had to log off almost immediately for some computer work.

0730 System back and we're reviewing again understanding that the database is corrupt and Mike Kidd will take about two hours around midday to fix. Sigh!

1600 Typical system frustrations and problems with working conditions in room 303 throughout day.

1845 R. Jones completed message and E. Larson acted as quality control. Ron Bitton on the keys along with B. VanHorn in the afternoon.

3 FEB 1984

0700 Colestock in but R. Jones will do the message in preparation for weekend duty.

0900 Several procedural problems worked out.

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1900 Message out.

2000 Discussion between Colestock and Beal on the nature of the situation. Colestock states we are definitely in a crisis mode(i.e., President is likely to have to make decisions in a rapidly developing situation).

4 FEB 1984

1330 R.JONES in to begin RUMSFELD message preparation.

1400 E.LARSON arrived to edit and assist RUMSFELD message preparation.

1430 LAURA WYATT is here for message prep. and transmission duties.

1830 Message completed however, much difficulty encountered in passing same to WHSR. Larson called J. CROWLEY for assistance.

(Note; Very inconvenient, if you dont have a key to downstairs, for retrieving printouts---Called security each time a trip was made to room 208)

5 FEB 1984

1400 R.JONES arrived for duty.

1430 LARSON and WYATT arrived.

1500 Noted that RUMSFELD profiles set by R.Jones the night before did not work. Called J. Crowley and discovered that measures taken on 4 FEB to transmit message to WHSR caused a priority change therefore, RUMSFELD profiles did not run. (As told to me by Larson and Crowley)

1800 Tried (with Larsons assistance) to run print routines on letter quality printer in room 303. Lots of problems encountered with missing print files since print buffer is too small to hold more than one message at a time. SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING: Reccomend that a need exists for a high speed print device to be installed on the second deck of room 303!!!

1900 Message passed to WHSR. Traffic level overall is low but vely, vely, inteltesting. It would appear to me that the

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Lebanon government is very close to becoming defunct, kaput, etc.,.

6 FEB 1984

0700 Colestock back on the trail of truth.

1300 Traffic rather slow. Staff meeting.

1600 Traffic hot and heavy along with heavy fighting.

1900 Message out. No problems. A-team of Colestock, Larson, Van Horn.

7 FEB 1984

0700 Colestock in for message review.

0800 Discussions with Dr. Beal on situation. Rothe and Colestock tasked to produce situation report and policy recommendations.

1030 Memo completed from Beal to McFarlane.

1650 Hinckley reads Colestock's Lament, How can he help?

1815 Message out. Not much despite heavy activity in Lebanon. President announces phased withdrawal of marines along with new rules of engagement further entangling us in situation via long range naval artillery support for Gemayel government(what there is left of it). A-team of Colestock, Britton, and Larson.

8 FEB 1984

0700 Colestock in for another day of watching carnage and creative violence.

0900 Hinckley asks Jones (Greg) to find rest of CMFCHRON file and restore it to Rumsfeld environment. He does.

1830 Message out. A-team of Colestock, Larson, and VanHorn. Policy recommendations have no effect as US gets beaten badly by blunders.

9 FEB 1984

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0700 Colestock in for another round.

1815 Message out. Everything running smoothly except US policy. A-team of Colestock, Larson, and Britton.

10 FEB 1984

0700 Colestock continues to roll. Andropov doesn't.

1200 Message traffic continues heavy. Most government agencies concerned with Lebanon are in crisis mode(task force).

1815 Message out. No problems except heavy data load. A-team of Colestock, Wyatt, and Larson.

11 FEB 1984

1600 Colestock in for message review. Traffic has not let up. Looks like a long night.

1615 Van Horn in for typing, etc. We had to take some time to figure out how to get messages to printer TTAl. Sent to environment and then sent to ttal. Can't do it directly from 751.

2030 Message out . A-team of Colestock, VanHorn.

12 FEB 1984

1600 Colestock in for another shot.

1615 Van Horn in .

1835 Message out . No problems this evening. Last night's difficulties were the result of some message data base problems.

13 FEB 1984

0700 Colestock in for another week of trying to save Lebanon from itself and the US policy vacuum.

1300 Colestock announced that Rumsfeld is in the D.C. area during CMF staff meeting. R. Beal stipulated that the CMF would continue to monitor the situation but would cease to publish the daily RUMSFELD MSG..

1600 R. Jones made last cut for RUMSFELD MSG which was passed

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by the WHSR to STATE OPS for Rumsfeld. Comment added "that unless otherwise informed this would be the final RUMSFELD SUPPORT MSG. from the CMF". Situation in Beirut is very confused and fast breaking.

19 MAR 1984

1000 J. Lucas briefed D. Wood on new requirement for CMC daily cable support once again for Special Envoy Rumsfeld, beginning tomorrow, 20 March. Inasmuch as Messrs. Colestock and Rothe are beset with Iran-Iraq chores, Dick Wood and Rick Jones are the team tasked with preparing cables for this round. Lucas directed that daily Iran-Iraq Threat Situation Summaries are to be included in Rumsfeld cables.

1300 Dick Jones was informed at weekly CMC staff meeting that he and Dick Wood would be the Rumsfeld cable support team beginning tomorrow.

1500 Dick Jones called Rumsfeld's office at State to get R's itinerary. Talked with Tom Miller, who will be accompanying Rumsfeld and receiving his cables. Itinerary as follows: 20 Mar: lv Washington; 21 Mar: London; 22 Mar: Tel Aviv; 23 Mar: Beirut; 24 Mar: Khartoum; 25 Mar: Bahrain; 26 Mar: Doha. Further info to follow.

20 MAR 1984

0725 Wood in, begins browsing messages in Lebanon Profile for tonight's first Rumsfeld message. Systems go down, profiles lost, recreated. Confusion reigns, especially on part of Wood, who wonders what on earth he's doing (or is supposed to do).

1940 Somehow, it all comes together--sort of--and after a good many fits and starts (especially fits), Wood manages to put together a cable message, with a considerable assist from Harry, Dick Jones, Fred Rothe, and Bill Van Horn. Cable successfully off to WHSR at 1945.

21 MAR 1984

0930 Wood calls WHSR to learn where, and whether, last night's Rumsfeld cable sent. Sit Room says Rumsfeld never left yesterday, cable was sent [REDACTED] was instructed this morning to destroy cable. Rumsfeld is said to be leaving this morning and will receive tonight's

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cable in Cairo, but his itinerary "is changing every five minutes," according to Sit Room.

0930 Dick Jones begins scanning traffic for tonight's cable.

1030 RUMSFELD PROFILE DIES -R.Jones restarts however, number of messages were missed. Developed regular GSCAN and picked up missing segments.

1500 Fred R. finishes the threat sit sum for Iran/Iraq which was included in toto for Rumsfeld.

1830 Rumsfeld msg sent to WHSR for transmission.

22 March 84

0800 D. Wood begins profile scan for Rumsfeld items (some of which he selected late last night)

1000 R. Jones selects press items for Rumsfeld msg.

1845 Wood and Van Horn complete Rumsfeld cable and send it to WHSR for transmission. Entire Iran-Iraq TSS was again included at Jim Lucas' instruction.

23 March 84

1800 Jones and Van Horn complete Rumsfeld cable and send it to WHSR for transmission. Routine exercise; no problems.

24 March 84

1800 Wood and Britton complete Rumsfeld cable and send it to WHSR for transmission. Routine; no problems.

25 March 1984

Jones and Britton complete Rumsfeld cable and send it. Routine; no problems.

26 March 1984

1900 Wood and Van Horn complete Rumsfeld cable and send it. Routine; no problems.

27 March 1984

1730 Jones and Van Horn complete Rumsfeld cable and send it.

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Routine; no problems. Cable in from Rumsfeld re itinerary indicates he will return to Washington on Thursday 29 March, so tomorrow's cable will be the last for this go-round.

28 March 1984

1800 Wood and Van Horn complete Rumsfeld cable and send it. Message included final line to effect this was final cable in this series until CMC were asked to resume the service. Routine process; no problems.