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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Executive Secretariat, National Security Council:
Head of State File

Archivist: dlb

File Folder: U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Gorbachev 8890725-8890750 **Date:** 5/25/99

Box 41

DOCUMENT AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
NSC System II #8890725			
1. Letter	Gorbachev to Reagan, (Russian) 3 p. R 10/16/00 NLSF99-051 #520	9/13/88	P1/F1/P3/F3
2. Letter	Gorbachev to Reagan, (translation), 4 p. A 10/16/00 NLSF99-051 #521	9/13/88	P1/F1/P3/F3
3. Memo	Colin Powell to Reagan, re: Soviet Proposals on the Krasnoyarsk Radar, 1 p.	9/19/88	P1/F1/P3/F3
4. Memo	George Shultz to Reagan, re: Gorbachev Letter on Krasnoyarsk, 2 p. R 99-051 #523 7/25/00	9/16/88	P1/F1/P3/F3
5. Letter	Gorbachev to Reagan, (translation), 3 p.	9/13/88	P1/F1/P3/F3
NSC System II #8890750			
6. Letter	Gorbachev to Reagan, (translation), 3 p. R 10/16/00 NLSF99-051 #525	9/20/88	P1/F1/P3/F3
7. Letter	Gorbachev to Reagan, (Russian), 5 p. R 10/16/00 NLSF99-051 #526	9/20/88	P1/F1/P3/F3
8. Letter	Copy of Item #6, 3 p. A 10/16/00 NLSF99-051 #527	9/20/88	P1/F1/P3/F3

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 16 SEP 88 15

TO POWELL

FROM LINHARD

10/22/88

DOC DATE 16 SEP 88

TOBEY

16 SEP 88

HEISER

16 SEP 88

KEYWORDS: ABM

USSR

GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

VERIFICATION

TREATIES

HS

SUBJECT: SOVIET PROPOSALS RE KRASNOYARSK / GORBACHEV LTR TO PRES / OFFICIAL STATE TRANSLATION

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

POWELL

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

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ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

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DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

TIME STAMP

SYSTEM II
90725 add-on

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: _____

88 SEP 22 AM 03

ACTION OFFICER: ****FOR RECORD PURPOSES**** DUE: _____

- Prepare Memo For Powell/Negrofonte
- Prepare Memo Stevens to Peterson / Murr
- Prepare Memo For Dawson/Dolan
- Appropriate Action
- Prepare Memo _____ to _____

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext. _____

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- INFORMATION Stevens Perito Secretariat
- Powell (advance) Negrofonte (advance) Exec. Sec. Desk

COMMENTS

STATE OFFICIAL TRANSLATION

Logged By AC

Return to Secretariat



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

SEP 21 1988

SYSTEM II
90725 add-on~~SECRET~~MEMORANDUM FOR COLIN L. POWELL
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Gorbachev Letter to the President on Krasnoyarsk

Attached is the original Russian text of General Secretary Gorbachev's letter to the President on Krasnoyarsk, which Ambassador Dubinin gave the Secretary on September 15. Also attached is State's translation of the letter (the Secretary sent the President a copy of the Soviet Embassy's unofficial translation under cover of his September 16 memo).

Melvyn Levitsky
Executive SecretaryAttachments:
as stated~~SECRET~~
DECL:OADRDECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By dlb NARA, Date 5/24/97

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Уважаемый господин Президент,

Внимательно ознакомился с Вашим письмом от 12 августа. Хотел бы в откровенном и конструктивном духе, характерном для нашего диалога, поделиться своими соображениями по поводу затронутого в нем вопроса о соблюдении Договора по ПРО.

Этот вопрос неоднократно обсуждали и мы с Вами, и наши эксперты, последний раз - на недавних консультациях по рассмотрению Договора по ПРО. В ходе переговоров обе стороны изложили свои озабоченности относительно соблюдения договора. К сожалению, представители США так и не дали убедительных ответов на поднятые нами вопросы, в то время как советская сторона весьма детально разъяснила ситуацию вокруг строившейся РЛС в районе Красноярска, подтвердив, что она не является РЛС предупреждения о ракетном нападении. В свете наших ответов высказываемые вновь и вновь претензии американской стороны вызывают недоумение, наводят на мысль, что за ними, возможно, стоят какие-то иные, более далеко идущие расчеты.

Его Превосходительству
Рональду У. РЕЙГАНУ
Президенту Соединенных Штатов Америки
г. Вашингтон

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F99-051 # 520

BY and, NARA, DATE 6/14/00

15

Думаю, Вы согласитесь со мной в том, что было бы непростительно, если бы наши взаимные претензии относительно нарушений Договора по ПРО привели к подрыву всего, что удалось сделать для выправления советско-американских отношений благодаря усилиям обеих сторон. Руководствуясь целью не допустить этого, мы в порядке доброй воли не только приостановили строительство Красноярской РЛС, но и выразили готовность демонтировать её оборудование, если будет достигнута между нашими странами договоренность о соблюдении Договора по ПРО в том виде, как он был подписан в 1972 году. Такое решение служило бы реальным подтверждением приверженности сторон Договору по ПРО - приверженности, о которой Вы, господин Президент, неоднократно говорили и писали мне.

Одновременно не могу не подчеркнуть, что у нас вызывает растущее беспокойство положение, возникшее в связи со строительством американских РЛС в Туле и Файлингдейлз. Начавшая работу РЛС в Туле, по оценкам наших специалистов, представляет собой явное нарушение Договора по ПРО. Ваши специалисты отрицают это. Но, как известно, американская пословица гласит: "Увидеть значит проверить". Поэтому мы надеемся на Ваше согласие с тем, чтобы было организовано посещение этой РЛС советскими специалистами.

Что же касается Красноярской РЛС, то хочу информировать Вас о нашем решении, которое раз и навсегда положит конец

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всяким спекуляциям о её характере, а именно: мы готовы создать на базе этой РЛС центр международного сотрудничества в интересах использования космического пространства в мирных целях. Центр мог бы быть включен в систему Всемирной космической организации, которую мы предложили создать, чтобы обеспечить всем государствам возможность участия в мирном исследовании и использовании космоса.

Мы готовы обсудить с представителями Соединенных Штатов, как и других заинтересованных стран, конкретные меры, которые позволят преобразовать Красноярскую РЛС в центр международного сотрудничества в мирной космической деятельности. Хочу через Вас передать американским ученым приглашение посетить Красноярскую РЛС для обсуждения связанных с этим вопросов.

Хотелось бы в заключение выразить надежду, что в своих практических действиях Ваша администрация, господин Президент, будет руководствоваться стремлением сохранить Договор по ПРО как важный инструмент поддержания стратегической стабильности в условиях, когда наши страны - полагаю, договоренность об этом не за горами - будут осуществлять 50-процентное сокращение стратегических наступательных вооружений. В этом контексте мы будем ожидать с американской стороны также практических шагов, которые сняли бы нашу озабоченность относительно американских РЛС в Гренландии и Великобритании.

С уважением,

М. ГОРБАЧЕВ

13 сентября 1988 года

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO. 127092
AO
Russian

Dear Mr. President,

I have read your letter of August 12 very carefully.

I would like, in the frank and constructive spirit that characterizes our dialogue, to share with you my thoughts regarding the question of ABM Treaty compliance raised in your letter.

This question has been repeatedly discussed both by ourselves and by our experts, most recently during the latest consultations to review the ABM Treaty. In the course of the negotiations the sides have stated their concerns regarding compliance with the treaty. Regrettably, thus far the US representatives have failed to provide persuasive answers to the questions we raised, while the Soviet side has clarified in great detail the situation surrounding the radar which was under construction in the Krasnoyarsk area, having reiterated that it is not a missile attack warning radar. In light of our answers the complaints expressed again and again by the US side

His Excellency
Ronald w. Reagan
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

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NLS F99-051 # 521

BY and, NARA, DATE 10/16/08

cause perplexity and suggest that, perhaps, there are some other, more far-reaching calculations behind them.

I think you will agree with me that it would be impardonable if our mutual complaints about the violations of the ABM Treaty were to undermine all that we, thanks to the efforts of both sides, have succeeded in accomplishing to improve US-Soviet relations. With the aim of not allowing this to occur we have, as a gesture of good will, not only discontinued the construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar, but have also expressed willingness to dismantle its equipment, if our countries reach agreement to observe the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972. Such a solution would represent a true confirmation of the commitment of the sides to the ABM Treaty, a commitment about which you, Mr. President, have repeatedly spoken and written to me.

At the same time I cannot fail to emphasize that we are increasingly concerned over the situation that has arisen in connection with the construction of US radars in Thule and Fylingdales Moor. In the assessment of our experts, the now operational Thule radar is a clear violation of the ABM Treaty. Your specialists deny that. But, as you know, an American proverb says: "Seeing is believing". So we are hoping that you will agree to a visit of this radar by Soviet specialists.

As for the Krasnoyarsk radar, I wish to inform you of our decision which will once and for all put an end to all speculations about its nature, to wit: we are ready to establish on the base of this radar a center for international cooperation in the interest of the peaceful use of outer space. This center could be incorporated into the system of a World Space Organization which we proposed, so as to make it possible for all states to participate in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space.

We are prepared to discuss with United States' representatives, as well as with other interested countries, the concrete measures that would make it possible to transform the Krasnoyarsk radar into a Center for International Cooperation in Peaceful Space Activities. I would like, through your intermediary, to invite American scientists to visit the Krasnoyarsk radar in order to discuss the questions connected therewith.

In conclusion, I wish to express my hope that your administration, Mr. President, will be guided in its practical actions by the desire to preserve the ABM Treaty as an important instrument for maintaining strategic stability in conditions where our two countries -- I believe the agreement on that is not far away -- will be implementing the 50 percent reduction in their strategic offensive arms. In this context,

we will expect the US side also to take practical steps which would remove our concern over the US radars in Greenland and Great Britain.

Respectfully,

M. GORBACHEV

September 13, 1988

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
FROM LINHARD *no system*

RECEIVED 16 SEP 88 15

TO POWELL

DOCDATE 16 SEP 88

TOBEY

16 SEP 88

HEISER

16 SEP 88

KEYWORDS: ABM

USSR

HS

VERIFICATION

TREATIES

SUBJECT: SOVIET PROPOSALS RE KRASNOYARSK / GORBACHEV LTR TO PRES

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE

DUE:

STATUS C FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

POWELL

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

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(A *AK*)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

C 9/20 Pres Notes

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DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

National Security Council
The White House

AC

88 SEP 16 P 2: 47

System #
Package # 90725
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Bob Perito	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
Marybel Batjer	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Paul Stevens	<u>2</u>	<u>PM</u>	<u>A</u>
John Negroponte	<u>3</u>	<u>JON</u>	<u> </u>
Colin Powell	<u>4</u>	<u>CP</u>	<u> </u>
Paul Stevens	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Situation Room	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	<u>9/19 AC</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP ✓ Duberstein Other MB

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

CLP - REL suggested appending Borbacher letter to attached memo, which was already in prep.
PM

90725

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

9/16

CLP -

Guidance on handling? Copy has been stuffed for appropriate action. In discussion of salutation on letter Wick is carrying, I mentioned to President that most recent Gorbuchov letter, received by State yesterday, was addressed "Dear Mr. Pres." So the President is aware that letter was received. I did not mention substance.

✓ ↓ I had
TOLD HIM A
LETTER WAS IN
SUBSTANCE. THIS IN BOOK
PUT AM UNLESS PER
SEES A COVER NEED FOR
NOTE FROM 132.
— PM
CJ

8-15-15

15

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 3 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

16

A

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 16, 1988

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: George P. Shultz *WPS*
SUBJECT: Gorbachev Letter on Krasnoyarsk

Soviet Ambassador Dubinin called on me today. He delivered a Gorbachev letter responding to your August 12 message on Krasnoyarsk (an unofficial translation is attached). Gorbachev:

- writes that we should not let "mutual" complaints about ABM Treaty compliance undermine what we have achieved;
- recalls the Soviet offer to dismantle the "equipment" at Krasnoyarsk if we agree to observe the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972;
- repeats alleged Soviet concerns about U.S. radars at Thule and Fylingdales Moor (although without linking these directly to Krasnoyarsk) and the Soviet request to visit the Thule radar; and
- offers to discuss measures to convert Krasnoyarsk into an international space research center, and invites U.S. scientists to travel there to explore this.

There is no suggestion of any physical changes to the radar facility in the process of its proposed conversion to a "center for international cooperation in peaceful space activities." I put the question directly to Dubinin; he could not answer.

The Soviets appear to be seeking a fig leaf to resolve the Krasnoyarsk issue. At first glance, this seems little more than a variation of the "joint manning" idea informally floated to General Burns during the ABM Treaty review. If so, our

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F99-051 #523

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

BY CAS, NARA, DATE 7/25/00

response can only be negative: it neither corrects the violation nor lengthens the lead-time for ABM breakout that the Soviets have gained through construction of Krasnoyarsk to date. In fact, conversion of the radar to a "research center" would presumably entail our agreement to completion and activation of the radar.

Whether Gorbachev's letter represents the final Soviet word or an opening gambit setting the stage for Shevardnadze to offer something more substantial next week remains to be seen. I intend to press Shevardnadze hard on meeting our concern over Krasnoyarsk, and tell him that this idea does not suffice.

Attachment:
as stated

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

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RECEIVED 23 SEP 88 15

TO PRESIDENT FROM GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S DOC DATE 20 SEP 88

KEYWORDS: USSR ABM SHEVARDNADZE, EDUARD

ARMS CONTROL USSR HUMAN RIGHTS

HS

SUBJECT: GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV LTR TO PRES / FOMIN SHEVARDNADZE VISIT

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE: STATUS C FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

JAMESON

LEDSKY

LINHARD

STEVENS

PERITO

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8890639 8890725 NSCIFID (J / J

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

C 9/23 For Record Purposes Chron

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This - or official
version - shd be
put in system, for
approp. action / staffing.

— pm

Unofficial translation

September 20 , 1988

Dear Mr. President,

I take advantage of the visit by Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard A. Shevardnadze to Washington in order to continue our private discussion.

In one of our conversations in Moscow it was suggested that we might have a chance to meet once again this year to sign a treaty on drastic reductions in strategic offensive arms in the context of compliance with the ABM Treaty. Regrettably, this goal that both of us share has been set back in time, although I continue to think that it can still be attained, even if beyond this year.

I take some consolation in the awareness that still in effect is our agreement to do the utmost in the remaining months of your presidency to ensure the continuity and consistency of the fundamental course that we have chosen. As I recall, you said you would do your best to preserve the constructive spirit of our dialogue, and I replied that in that respect our intentions were quite identical. And so they are indeed, which is a source of great hope for our two peoples.

Four months have gone by since the summit talks in Moscow-- a short period of time given the dynamic and profound developments in international affairs and those that fill the political calendar in the Soviet Union and the United States. Still, a great deal has been accomplished in putting into effect the jointly agreed platform for the further advancement of Soviet-US relations. For the first time in history, nuclear missiles have been destroyed, and unprecedented mutual verification of the just begun process of nuclear disarmament is becoming an established and routine practice. In several regions of the world, a process of political settlement of conflicts and national reconciliation has got under way. The human dimension of our relations, to which we have agreed to give special attention, is becoming richer. Ordinary Soviet people continue to discover America for themselves, marching across it on a peace walk, and right now, as you are reading this letter, another public meeting between Soviet and US citizens is being held in Tbilisi.

His Excellency
Ronald W. Reagan,
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

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NLS F99-051 # 525

Someone might object that in the past, say in the 1930s or 1970s, Soviet-US relations also had their upturns. I would think, however, that the current stage in our interaction is distinguished by several significant features. The four summit meetings over the past three years have laid good groundwork for our dialogue and raised it to a qualitatively new level. And, as we know, from high ground it is easier to see the path we have covered, the problems of the day, and the prospects that emerge.

A unique arrangement for practical interaction has been established, which is supported by fundamental political affirmations and, at the same time, filled with tangible content. This has been facilitated by the principal approach on which we agreed already in Geneva, i.e. realism, a clear awareness of the essence of our differences, and a focus on active search for possible areas where our national interests may coincide. Thus, we gave ourselves a serious intellectual challenge -- to view our differences and diversity not as a reason for permanent confrontation but as a motivation for intensive dialogue, mutual appreciation and enrichment.

Overall, we have been able to achieve fairly good results, to start a transition from confrontation to a policy of accomodation. And this is, probably, not just a result of a frank and constructive personal relationship, although, obviously, personal rapport is not the least important thing in politics. Paraphrasing a favourite phrase of yours, I would say that talking to each other people learn more about each other.

And yet, the main thing that made our common new policy a success is, above all, the fact that it reflects a gradually emerging balance of national interests, which we have been able in some measure to implement. We feel, in particular, that it is favorable to the development of new approaches, of new political thinking, first of all in our two countries -- but also elsewhere. The experience of even the past few months indicates that an increasing number of third countries are beginning to readjust to our positive interaction, associating with it their interests and policies.

Ironically as it may sound, it is our view that the strength of what we have been able to accomplish owes quite a lot to how hard it was to do.

It is probably not by a mere chance that the jointly devised general course in the development of Soviet-US relations is now enjoying broad-based support in our two countries. So far as we know, both of your possible successors support, among other things, the key objective of concluding a treaty on 50 percent cutbacks in Soviet and US strategic arsenals. In the Soviet leadership, too, there is a consensus on this.

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And yet it has not been possible to bring the Geneva negotiations to fruition, a fact about which I feel some unhappiness. It is our impression that we have to tango alone, as if our partner has taken a break.

In another letter to you, I have already addressed the matter which you raised in your letter of August 12 regarding compliance with the ABM Treaty. I think you would agree with me that it would be unforgivable if our mutual complaints of violations of the ABM Treaty resulted in undermining what we have been able to accomplish to rectify Soviet-US relations through the efforts of both sides.

I would like Eduard Shevardnadze's visit to the United States and his talks with you and Secretary Shultz to result in reviving truly joint efforts to achieve deep cuts in strategic offensive arms. Our Minister has the authority to seek rapid progress on the basis of reciprocity in this exceptionally important area.

Today, the process of nuclear disarmament is objectively interrelated with the issues of deep reductions, and the elimination of asymmetries and imbalances, in conventional arms and complete prohibition of chemical weapons. In these areas too, there is a good chance of making headway toward agreements.

I am confident, Mr. President, that you and I can make a further contribution to the emerging process of settlement of regional conflicts, particularly to a consistent and honest compliance with the first accords that have already been concluded there.

In Moscow we also reinforced the foundation for a dynamic development of our bilateral relations and helped to open up new channels for communication between Soviet and American people, including young people and artists. All these good endeavours should be given practical effect, and we stand ready to do so. I am aware of your deep personal interest in questions of human rights. For me too, it is a priority issue. We seem to have agreed that these problems require an in-depth consideration and a clear understanding of the true situation in both the United States and the Soviet Union. Traffic along this two-way street has begun and I hope that it will be intense.

Our relationship is a dynamic stream and you and I are working together to widen it. The stream cannot be slowed down, it can only be blocked or diverted. But that would not be in our interest.

Politics, of course, is a part of the possible but it is only by working and maintaining a dynamic dialogue that we will put into effect what we have made possible, and will make possible tomorrow what is yet impossible today.

Sincerely,

Mikhail GORBACHEV

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NLS PP-051 # 526

BY Amf, NARA, DATE 10/16/00

Уважаемый господин Президент,

Мольбуюсь поездкой в Вашингтон министра иностранных дел Э.А. Шеварднадзе, чтобы продолжить наш доверительный разговор.

В ходе одной из бесед в Москве прозвучала мысль о том, что, может быть, нам доведётся встретиться в этом году ещё раз - для подписания договора о радикальном сокращении стратегических наступательных вооружений в условиях соблюдения Договора по ПРО. К сожалению, эта наша общая цель отодвинулась во времени, хотя, я продолжаю верить, она остаётся достижимой пусть даже за пределами нынешнего года.

В известной мере утекает понимание того, что действует договорённость сделать максимум возможного в остающиеся месяцы Вашего президентства для обеспечения преемственности, последовательности избранного нами принципиального курса. Помнится, Вы сказали, что сделаете всё для сохранения конструктивного духа нашего диалога, и я ответил, что в этом наши намерения полностью совпадают. Это действительно так и в этом источник больших надежд для наших двух народов.

После переговоров на высшем уровне в Москве прошло четыре месяца - срок короткий, если учесть те динамичные глубинные процессы, которые развернулись в международной жизни, заполняют календарь политической жизни СССР и США. А всё же немало сделано для реализации совместно согласованной платформы дальнейшего

Его Превосходительству
Рональду У. РЕЙГАНУ,
Президенту Соединённых Штатов Америки

поступательного развития советско-американских отношений. Уничтожены пераые в истории ядерные ракеты, утверждается и становится привычным делом беспрецедентный взаимный контроль за начавшимся процессом ядерного разоружения. В ряде районов мира начался процесс политического урегулирования конфликтов и национального примирения. Обогащается и человеческое измерение наших взаимоотношений, которому мы договорились уделять повышенное внимание. Простые советские люди продолжают постигать для себя Америку, пересекая её походом мира, а сейчас, когда вы читаете это письмо, проходит очередная встреча советской и американской общественности в Тбилиси.

Вам могут возразить, что и раньше, скажем, в 60-е или 70-е годы, отмечались подъёмы в отношениях между Советским Союзом и Соединёнными Штатами Америки. Но, думается, нынешний этап нашего взаимодействия отличается рядом существенных особенностей. Четыре встречи на высшем уровне за последние три года подвели под наш диалог хорошую базу, подняли его на качественно новую высоту. А с высоты, как известно, виднее и пройденный путь, и проблемы переживаемого момента, и открывающиеся перспективы.

Сложился уникальный механизм практического взаимодействия, подкреплённый принципиальными политическими констатациями и одновременно наполненный осязаемым содержанием. Этому способствовал главный подход, о котором мы условились ещё в Теневе, — реализм, ясное понимание сути разногласий, упор на активные поиски возможных областей совпадения национальных интересов. Таким образом, сами себе мы бросили серьёзный интеллектуальный вызов: рассматривать наши различия и многообразие не как основание для перманентной конфронтации, а как побудительный мотив к интенсивному диалогу, взаимному познанию и обогащению.

В целом, нам удалось добиться неплохих результатов, начать переход от противоборства к встречной политике. А дело здесь, наверное, не только в откровенных и конструктивных личных отношениях, хотя, разумеется, личный контакт в политике – не последняя вещь. Перефразируя Ваше любимое выражение, можно сказать, что, общаясь друг с другом, больше узнаешь друг о друге.

А всё-таки главная причина успеха нашей с Вами новой политики в том, что она отражает постепенно вызревающий баланс национальных интересов, который мы сумели в какой-то мере реализовать. В частности, на наш взгляд, она благоприятствует формированию новых подходов, нового политического мышления, прежде всего в наших двух странах. Но не только. Даже опыт самых последних месяцев показывает, что всё большее число третьих стран начинает переориентироваться на наше позитивное взаимодействие, связывать с ним свои интересы и политику.

Может быть, это прозвучит как парадокс, но, как нам кажется, прочность уже достигнутого не в последнюю очередь связана с тем, как нелегко оно достигалось.

Видимо, не случайно совместно выработанное общее направление развития советско-американских отношений сейчас пользуется широкой поддержкой в наших странах. Насколько нам известно, оба Ваших возможных преемника поддерживают, в частности, ключевую задачу заключения договора о 50-процентном сокращении стратегических арсеналов СССР и США. Есть консенсус по этому вопросу и в советском руководстве.

А всё же не удалось продвинуть переговоры в Женеве к конечному результату. Тут я испытываю определённую неудовлетворённость.

Складывается впечатление, что танго нам приходится танцевать в одиночку. Наш партнёр как бы взял паузу.

В отдельном послании к Вам я уже останавливался на вопросе, затронутом Вами в письме от 12 августа, о соблюдении Договора по ПРО. Думаю, Вы согласитесь со мной в том, что было бы непростительно, если бы наши взаимные претензии относительно нарушений Договора по ПРО привели к подрыву того, что удалось сделать для выправления советско-американских отношений благодаря усилиям обеих сторон.

Хотелось бы, чтобы визит Э.А. Шеварднадзе в США и его переговоры с Вами и господином Шульцем привели к возрождению действительно совместных усилий в деле достижения глубоких сокращений стратегических наступательных вооружений. У нашего министра есть мандат добиваться быстрого движения на этом архиважном направлении на основе взаимности.

Сегодня процесс ядерного разоружения объективно взаимосвязан с вопросами глубоких сокращений и ликвидации ассиметрий и дисбалансов в области обычных вооружений, полного запрещения химического оружия. Имеются солидные шансы продвинуться и здесь к договорённостям.

Уверен, что мы с Вами, господин Президент, можем внести дополнительный вклад в начавшееся урегулирование региональных конфликтов, и в частности, в последовательное и честное соблюдение уже достигнутых здесь первых соглашений.

В Москве мы укрепили фундамент и для динамичного развития двусторонних отношений, помогли открыть новые каналы для общения между советскими и американскими людьми, будь то молодёжь или творческая интеллигенция. Надо все эти добрые начинания воплощать

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5.

в дела, и мы к этому готовы. Знаю Ваш личный глубокий интерес к вопросам прав человека. А для меня это – приоритетный вопрос. Мы, кажется, пришли к согласию, что с этими проблемами нужно разобраться глубоко, составить ясное представление о действительном положении как в США, так и в СССР. Движение по этой двусторонней улице началось и будет, надеюсь, оживлённым.

Наши отношения – динамичный поток, и мы с Вами работаем над расширением его русла. Замедлить поток нельзя – его можно только перегородить или сменить ему направление. А это не отвечало бы нашим интересам.

Конечно, политика – это искусство возможного, но только работой, динамичным диалогом мы реализуем то, что сделали возможным, а пока невозможное сегодня сделаем возможным завтра.

С уважением

М. Горбачёв

20 сентября 1988 года

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Return to Secretariat

Unofficial translation

September 20 , 1988

Dear Mr. President,

I take advantage of the visit by Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard A. Shevardnadze to Washington in order to continue our private discussion.

In one of our conversations in Moscow it was suggested that we might have a chance to meet once again this year to sign a treaty on drastic reductions in strategic offensive arms in the context of compliance with the ABM Treaty. Regrettably, this goal that both of us share has been set back in time, although I continue to think that it can still be attained, even if beyond this year.

I take some consolation in the awareness that still in effect is our agreement to do the utmost in the remaining months of your presidency to ensure the continuity and consistency of the fundamental course that we have chosen. As I recall, you said you would do your best to preserve the constructive spirit of our dialogue, and I replied that in that respect our intentions were quite identical. And so they are indeed, which is a source of great hope for our two peoples.

Four months have gone by since the summit talks in Moscow-- a short period of time given the dynamic and profound developments in international affairs and those that fill the political calendar in the Soviet Union and the United States. Still, a great deal has been accomplished in putting into effect the jointly agreed platform for the further advancement of Soviet-US relations. For the first time in history, nuclear missiles have been destroyed, and unprecedented mutual verification of the just begun process of nuclear disarmament is becoming an established and routine practice. In several regions of the world, a process of political settlement of conflicts and national reconciliation has got under way. The human dimension of our relations, to which we have agreed to give special attention, is becoming richer. Ordinary Soviet people continue to discover America for themselves, marching across it on a peace walk, and right now, as you are reading this letter, another public meeting between Soviet and US citizens is being held in Tbilisi.

His Excellency
Ronald W. Reagan,
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

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Someone might object that in the past, say in the 1930s or 1970s, Soviet-US relations also had their upturns. I would think, however, that the current stage in our interaction is distinguished by several significant features. The four summit meetings over the past three years have laid good groundwork for our dialogue and raised it to a qualitatively new level. And, as we know, from high ground it is easier to see the path we have covered, the problems of the day, and the prospects that emerge.

A unique arrangement for practical interaction has been established, which is supported by fundamental political affirmations and, at the same time, filled with tangible content. This has been facilitated by the principal approach on which we agreed already in Geneva, i.e. realism, a clear awareness of the essence of our differences, and a focus on active search for possible areas where our national interests may coincide. Thus, we gave ourselves a serious intellectual challenge -- to view our differences and diversity not as a reason for permanent confrontation but as a motivation for intensive dialogue, mutual appreciation and enrichment.

Overall, we have been able to achieve fairly good results, to start a transition from confrontation to a policy of accomodation. And this is, probably, not just a result of a frank and constructive personal relationship, although, obviously, personal rapport is not the least important thing in politics. Paraphrasing a favourite phrase of yours, I would say that talking to each other people learn more about each other.

And yet, the main thing that made our common new policy a success is, above all, the fact that it reflects a gradually emerging balance of national interests, which we have been able in some measure to implement. We feel, in particular, that it is favorable to the development of new approaches, of new political thinking, first of all in our two countries -- but also elsewhere. The experience of even the past few months indicates that an increasing number of third countries are beginning to readjust to our positive interaction, associating with it their interests and policies.

Ironically as it may sound, it is our view that the strength of what we have been able to accomplish owes quite a lot to how hard it was to do.

It is probably not by a mere chance that the jointly devised general course in the development of Soviet-US relations is now enjoying broad-based support in our two countries. So far as we know, both of your possible successors support, among other things, the key objective of concluding a treaty on 50 percent cutbacks in Soviet and US strategic arsenals. In the Soviet leadership, too, there is a consensus on this.

And yet it has not been possible to bring the Geneva negotiations to fruition, a fact about which I feel some unhappiness. It is our impression that we have to tango alone, as if our partner has taken a break.

In another letter to you, I have already addressed the matter which you raised in your letter of August 12 regarding compliance with the ABM Treaty. I think you would agree with me that it would be unforgivable if our mutual complaints of violations of the ABM Treaty resulted in undermining what we have been able to accomplish to rectify Soviet-US relations through the efforts of both sides.

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Today, the process of nuclear disarmament is objectively interrelated with the issues of deep reductions, and the elimination of asymmetries and imbalances, in conventional arms and complete prohibition of chemical weapons. In these areas too, there is a good chance of making headway toward agreements.

I am confident, Mr. President, that you and I can make a further contribution to the emerging process of settlement of regional conflicts, particularly to a consistent and honest compliance with the first accords that have already been concluded there.

In Moscow we also reinforced the foundation for a dynamic development of our bilateral relations and helped to open up new channels for communication between Soviet and American people, including young people and artists. All these good endeavours should be given practical effect, and we stand ready to do so. I am aware of your deep personal interest in questions of human rights. For me too, it is a priority issue. We seem to have agreed that these problems require an in-depth consideration and a clear understanding of the true situation in both the United States and the Soviet Union. Traffic along this two-way street has begun and I hope that it will be intense

Our relationship is a dynamic stream and you and I are working together to widen it. The stream cannot be slowed down, it can only be blocked or diverted. But that would not be in our interest.

Politics, of course, is the art of the possible but it is only by working and maintaining a dynamic dialogue that we will put into effect what we have made possible, and will make possible tomorrow what is yet impossible today.

Sincerely,

Mikhail GORBACHEV