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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL: HEAD OF STATE FILE: Records,
1981-1989

Box 41

U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Gorbachev (8790730)

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Executive Secretariat, National Security Council:
Head of State File

Archivist: dbb

File Folder: U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Gorbachev 8790730-8791196) **Date:** 5/25/99
Box 41

DOCUMENT AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
NSC System II #8790730			
1. Memo	Frank Carlucci to Reagan, re: Gorbachev's Reply to Your Letter on the Iran-Iraq War, 2 p.	7/21/87	P1/F1/P3/F3
2. Letter	Gorbachev to Reagan, (translation), 4 p. <i>R 10/16/00 NLSF99-051 # 504</i>	7/18/87	P1/F1/P3/F3
3. Letter	Gorbachev to Reagan, (Russian), 5 p. <i>R 10/16/00 NLSF99-051 # 505</i>	7/18/87	P1/F1/P3/F3
4. Cable	No Cable #, Text of Letter - Reagan to Gorbachev, 2 p. <i>R 10/16/00 NLSF99-051 # 506</i>	6/27/87	P1/F1/P3/F3
5. Memo	Fritz Ermarth to Carlucci, re: Gorbachev's Reply to the President on Iran-Iraq, 1 p.	7/20/87	P1/F1/P3/F3
NSC System II #8790986			
6. Letter	Gorbachev to Reagan, (translation), 8 p. <i>R 10/16/00 NLSF99-051 # 508</i>	[9/15/87]	P1/F1/P3/F3
7. Letter	Gorbachev to Reagan, (Russian), 5 p. <i>R 10/16/00 NLSF99-051 # 509</i>	9/10/87	P1/F1/P3/F3
NSC System II #8791196			
8. Memo	George Shultz to Reagan, re: Gorbachev's Letter, 2 p.	10/30/87	P1/F1/P3/F3
9. Letter	Gorbachev to Reagan, (Russian), 4 p. <i>R F99-051 # 510 7/25/00</i> <i>R 10/16/00 NLSF99-051 # 511</i>	10/28/87	P1/F1/P3/F3

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].
- C Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

7/26/87

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 20 JUL 87 11

PRESIDENT

FROM GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

DOC DATE 18 JUL 87

LEVITSKY, M

18 JUL 87

ERMARTH

20 JUL 87

KEYWORDS: USSR

PERSIAN GULF

IRAN

IRAQ

HS

SUBJECT: SOVIET RESPONSE TO PRES 29 JUN MSG ON PERSIAN GULF

ACTION: APPROPRIATE ACTION

DUE: 22 JUL 87 STATUS C

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

ERMARTH

OAKLEY

GREEN

COURTNEY

COMMENTS ** RESPONSE TO CROSSHATCH 18027 ***

REF#

8720766

LOG

NSCIFID

(H / H)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Carlucci</i>	<i>X 7/20</i>	<i>FWed to Pres for info</i>		
<i>Pres</i>	<i>IP 7/21</i>	<i>FWiz info</i>		
	<i>C 7/21</i>	<i>Noted by Pres</i>		<i>FWed, Chron</i>

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

(C)

JM

National Security Council
The White House

87 JUL 20 P 8: 18

System # _____
Package # 90730
DOCLOG JM AIO

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Courtney	<u>1</u>	<u>WAC</u>	<u>A</u>
Marybel Batjer	_____	_____	_____
Grant Green	<u>2</u>	<u>G</u>	_____
Colin Powell	<u>3</u>	<u>CP</u>	_____
Frank Carlucci	<u>4</u>	<u>FC</u>	<u>A</u>
Grant Green	_____	_____	_____
Lou Michael	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	<u>W.W. 7/21</u>	<u>D</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>	<u>W.W. 7/21</u>	<u>N</u>

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Baker Other _____

COMMENTS _____
Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

21 10 11 14

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 1 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

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A



8720766

United States Department of State 6

Washington, D.C. 20520

SYSTEM II
90730

July 18, 1987

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. FRANK C. CARLUCCI
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Soviet Response To President's Letter on Persian Gulf

On Saturday, Ambassador Dubinin passed to Under Secretary Armacost a response to the President's letter of June 29 on the Persian Gulf.

Attached is the Russian and an unofficial English translation of the letter.

Melvyn Levitsky
Executive Secretary

Attachment: As stated.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL:OADR.DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By WSP NARA, Date 5/26/99

His Excellency
Ronald W. Reagan
The President of the United States
of America
Washington, D.C.

July 18, 1987

Dear Mr. President,

I have carefully read your message and considered the views contained in it.

We, too, are seriously concerned over the growing tensions in the Persian Gulf area. We discussed this issue more than once with the U.S. side, including at the time of Secretary of State Shultz's visit to Moscow. Our position of principle on this acute and complex problem has been set forth in the recent statement by the Soviet government.

One has to note with regret that thus far it has not been possible to slow down the dangerous trend in this region, let alone reverse it. There are several reasons for this.

First, it is the continuation of the senseless bloodshed between Iran and Iraq, which contributes, objectively, to aggravating the situation. Here, as I understand, there are opportunities, and good ones, for joint actions by our two countries in the UN Security Council in favor of an earliest cessation of this prolonged conflict on just terms. There are, however, other sources of the escalation of tensions, which

I shall discuss further.

Before doing so, I wish to inform you, Mr. President, about the many-sided efforts that the Soviet Union has been making to settle the Iran-Iraq conflict. As you may be aware, we have established special direct contacts with the leaderships of Iran and Iraq and are engaged at this time in intensive talks aimed at bringing the positions of the belligerents closer together, and encourage them toward a peaceful solution.

I would like to particularly emphasize that these efforts pursue no selfish ends, let alone directed against legitimate interests of third countries. Our only goal is to prevent a situation where a dangerous line would be crossed, beyond which a regional conflict could escalate into an international crisis, our objective is to help end the war.

We intend to continue and intensify those efforts.

Such an active bilateral diplomacy is called upon, as we see it, to organically supplement and bolster the broad multilateral efforts to end the Iran-Iraq war, and we attach paramount importance to our participation in those efforts. And I agree with your view that in this area the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have good prospects for constructive cooperation. Currently, our two countries, along with other UN Security Council members, are playing an active role in working out effective measures to promptly to channel the Iran-Iraq conflict toward peaceful solutions. Our representatives have been instructed to press on with the efforts seeking, in particular an immediate ceasefire, an end to all hostilities and a prompt withdrawal of all troops to internationally recognized borders.

It is our firm conviction that a special role in carrying out the decisions now being prepared by the world community belongs to the UN Secretary General. Indeed, it is on his actions that will depend to no small degree the further steps which may be required if the adopted resolution is resisted by either of the parties in the conflict. In the event of such an undesirable development the recommendations of the Secretary General will, understandably, carry a lot of weight. In this connection, we expect, Mr. President, that you will find it possible to give necessary support to the peacemaking mission of the Secretary General and will join us in contributing to its success.

As for your proposal that experts participate in the work being done in the Security Council, I can reaffirm our positive attitude to it, given, naturally, the concurrence of the Council's other permanent members.

Now I must come back to the question of the causes for the increased tensions in the Persian Gulf area. I must say frankly: these are not confined to the continued hostilities between Iran and Iraq. We cannot ignore the buildup of the US military presence in the area, to say nothing of the contrived pretexts used in an attempt to disguise it. True, there are not only your warships, but ours as well in the Persian Gulf. However, simply looking at the facts as they are - and I am sure you have every possibility to do so - would show that our naval presence is in no way comparable to yours either in scale or in operational functions. A few Soviet warships to which references are being made in Washington, are escorting on a temporary

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basis our merchant vessels at the request and with the knowledge of the littoral states.

Moreover, guided by the desire to use every opportunity to make the situation better, the Soviet Government has proposed that all warships of the states outside of the region be withdrawn as early as possible while Iran and Iraq in their turn refrain from actions which would pose a threat to international shipping.

We are gratified by the constructive reaction of most countries, including those involved in the conflict, to that proposal. We would like to expect that the US leadership will also view it in a positive light, in the spirit of cooperation.

Also, some statements by representatives of your administration seem to indicate an interest on the American side. If such an impression is justified, then we would be prepared to discuss this question with the US in more concrete terms in any format suitable for you.

Speaking in broader terms, I want to emphasize that I share the idea which you expressed in concluding your letter: when our countries decide to act together, the results will not be long in coming.

Sincerely,

M.GORBACHEV



СОВЕТСКОМУ
СОЮЗУ СОВЕТСКИХ
СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИХ РЕСПУБЛИК

Уважаемый господин Президент,

Я внимательно ознакомился с Вашим посланием, с содержащимися в нем соображениями.

Растущая напряженность в районе Персидского залива вызывает и у нас серьезную озабоченность. Этот вопрос мы уже не раз обсуждали с американской стороной, в том числе в ходе визита госсекретаря Шульца в Москву. Наша принципиальная позиция по этой острой и сложной проблеме излагается в недавнем Заявлении Советского правительства.

К сожалению, приходится констатировать, что опасный ход событий в этом районе пока не удалось замедлить, а тем более обратить вспять. Причин для этого несколько.

Во-первых, это - продолжение бессмысленного кровопролития между Ираном и Ираком, которое объективно способствует накалу обстановки. Здесь, как я понимаю, имеются предпосылки, причем неплохие, для совместных действий наших двух стран в Совете Безопасности ООН в пользу ско-

ЕГО ПРЕВОСХОДИТЕЛЬСТВУ
РОНАЛЬДУ У. РЕЙГАНУ
ПРЕЗИДЕНТУ СОЕДИНЕННЫХ ШТАТОВ АМЕРИКИ
г. Вашингтон

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F99-051 #505

BY SM, NARA, DATE 10/16/00

рейшего окончания на справедливых условиях многолетнего конфликта. Есть, однако, и другие источники эскалации напряженности, о которых я скажу далее.

Вначале хотел бы информировать Вас, господин Президент, о многогранных усилиях, предпринимаемых Советским Союзом по урегулированию ирано-иракского конфликта. Как Вам, видимо, известно, мы установили специальные прямые контакты с руководством Ирана и Ирака и ведем в настоящее время интенсивные переговоры, направленные на то, чтобы сблизить позиции воюющих сторон, побудить их к мирному решению.

Хотелось бы особо подчеркнуть, что эти усилия не преследуют каких-то корыстных целей и тем более не направлены против законных интересов третьих стран. Наша единственная задача - предотвратить переход опасной черты, за которой региональный конфликт может перерасти в международный кризис, способствовать прекращению войны.

Эти усилия мы намерены продолжить и активизировать.

Такая активная двусторонняя дипломатия призвана, по нашему замыслу, органично дополнить и подкрепить широкие, многосторонние усилия по прекращению ирано-иракской войны, участие в которых мы придаем первостепенное значение. И я согласен с высказанным Вами мнением, что на этом направлении у СССР и США имеются хорошие перспективы для конструктивного сотрудничества. Сейчас наши две страны, наряду с другими членами Совета Безопасности ООН, играют активную роль в выработке эффективных мер по безотлагательному

переводу ирано-иракского конфликта в русло мирных решений. Наши представители имеют инструкции не сбавлять усилий, направленных, в частности, на немедленное прекращение огня, всех военных действий и незамедлительный отвод всех войск к международно признанным границам.

Особое место, по нашему твердому убеждению, в реализации подготавливаемых международным сообществом решений принадлежит Генеральному секретарю ООН. Ведь от его действий в немалой степени будет зависеть и дальнейшие шаги, которые могут потребоваться в случае, если принятая резолюция натолкнется на сопротивление того или иного участника конфликта. При таком нежелательном повороте рекомендации Генерального секретаря, понятно, имели бы немалый вес. В этой связи мы рассчитываем, что Вы, господин Президент, найдете возможным оказать необходимую поддержку миротворческой миссии Генерального секретаря и совместно с нами будете способствовать ее успеху.

В том, что касается Вашего предложения об участии экспертов в работе Совета Безопасности, могу подтвердить наше положительное к нему отношение, разумеется, при согласии и остальных постоянных членов Совета.

Должен теперь вернуться к вопросу о причинах возросшей напряженности в районе Персидского залива. Скажу откровенно, они не ограничиваются продолжением боевых действий между Ираном и Ираком. Мы не можем игнорировать наращивание военного присутствия США в этом районе, а тем более надуманные

предлоги, которыми его пытаются закамouflировать. Спору нет, в Персидском заливе находятся не только Ваши, но и наши военные корабли. Однако простое ознакомление с объективными фактами, а я уверен, что для этого у Вас есть все возможности, показывает, что ни по масштабам, ни по выполняемым функциям наше военно-морское присутствие не идет ни в какое сравнение с Вашим. Несколько советских военных кораблей, на которые ссылаются в Вашингтоне, на временной основе сопровождают наши торговые суда по просьбе и с ведома прибрежных государств.

Более того, движимое стремлением использовать все возможности для оздоровления обстановки Советское правительство предложило, чтобы все военные корабли государств, не относящихся к этому району, были в кратчайшие сроки выведены из Персидского залива, а Иран и Ирак в свою очередь воздерживались от действий, которые создавали бы угрозу международному судоходству.

У нас вызывает удовлетворение конструктивная реакция большинства стран, включая и участников конфликта, на это предложение. Хотелось бы рассчитывать, что и американское руководство отнесется к нему в позитивном ключе, в духе сотрудничества.

К тому же некоторые заявления представителей Вашей администрации как будто свидетельствуют о заинтересованности американской стороны. Если такое впечатление обосновано, то мы были бы готовы более конкретно обсудить с Соединенными Штатами этот вопрос в любом удобном для Вас формате.

Если же говорить в широком плане, то хочу подчеркнуть, что разделяю ту мысль, которой Вы завершаете свое письмо: когда наши страны решают действовать совместно, результаты не заставят себя ждать.

С уважением,

М.ГОРБАЧЕВ

18 июля 1987 г.

B

~~SECRET~~

IO/UNP:HLAMPERT
06/27/87 EXT. 70047 WANG:0889A
P:MHARMACOST

NSC:
IO/UNP:GDKULICK
EUR:TSIMONS
S/S-0:

IO:NSSMITH;IO:DGOODMAN (SUBS)
S:
S/S:
NEA:MVCREEKMORE

IMMEDIATE MOSCOW

IMMEDIATE PARIS, LONDON IMMEDIATE, BEIJING IMMEDIATE,
BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE, USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
EXDIS

DECL:OADR

MOPS, PARM, UNSC, IR, IZ, UR

PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE ON IRAN-IRAQ

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM THE
PRESIDENT TO GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV. THERE WILL
BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

3. DEAR MR. GENERAL SECRETARY:

OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF
THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAVE MADE EXTRAORDINARY PROGRESS
IN THE EFFORT TO ADVANCE THE GOAL WE ALL SEEK, TO BRING
TO AN END THE TRAGIC AND DANGEROUS CONFLICT BETWEEN
IRAQ AND IRAN. WE HAVE NOW REACHED A MAJOR MILESTONE
IN THIS EFFORT, WITH AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ON A
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION MANDATING AN IMMEDIATE
CEASEFIRE AND WITHDRAWAL TO INTERNATIONAL BORDERS. I
MUCH APPRECIATE THE COOPERATIVE ATTITUDE OF THE SOVIET
UNION, WHICH HAS CONTRIBUTED SUBSTANTIALLY TO THIS
REMARKABLE ACHIEVEMENT.

ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION IS URGENT, AND I BELIEVE

~~SECRET~~

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NLS 799-051 # 506

BY smf, NARA, DATE 10/16/00

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YOU SHARE OUR JUDGMENT THAT FOR THE RESOLUTION TO HAVE AN IMPACT ON THE COMBATANTS THEY MUST REALIZE THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS PREPARED TO TAKE MEASURES TO ENFORCE ITS ORDER. THUS, I WOULD URGE WE REACH AGREEMENT NOW, AT LEAST AMONG THE PERMANENT MEMBERS, ON SPECIFIC IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES. THESE WOULD INCLUDE MECHANISMS FOR VERIFYING A CEASEFIRE/WITHDRAWAL IN THE EVENT OF COMPLIANCE, OR ENFORCEMENT MEASURES, PREFERABLY AN ARMS EMBARGO, IN THE EVENT OF REFUSAL OF ONE OR BOTH PARTIES TO COMPLY.

I AM CONVINCED THAT WE MUST NOW FOCUS INTENSIVELY ON REACHING THIS AGREEMENT. THEREFORE, I HAVE ASKED SECRETARY SHULTZ TO LEAD OUR DELEGATION IN NEW YORK WHEN THIS ISSUE IS BROUGHT BEFORE THE COUNCIL. I HAVE INSTRUCTED AMBASSADOR WALTERS TO EXPLORE THESE ISSUES CAREFULLY WITH YOUR OFFICIALS IN MOSCOW. FINALLY, I ALSO URGE THAT OUR DELIBERATIONS IN NEW YORK BE INTENSIFIED, AND HAVE DIRECTED THAT, BEGINNING THE WEEK OF JULY 6, OUR UN DELEGATION BE AUGMENTED BY EXPERTS TO ASSIST IN BRINGING THIS MATTER TO A SPEEDY CONCLUSION.

SUCCESS IN THIS VITAL ENDEAVOR DEPENDS UPON OUR COMMON COMMITMENT TO PRESS AHEAD RESOLUTELY AND SWIFTLY TO RESOLVE THE REMAINING ISSUES, WHILE WE CONTINUE TO SUPPORT STRONGLY THE COMPLEMENTARY MEDIATION EFFORTS OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL. AS UNDERSECRETARY ARMACOST NOTED TO AMBASSADOR DUBININ, THE U.S. AND THE USSR CAN PLAY A SPECIAL ROLE IN THIS PROCESS. WHEN OUR COUNTRIES DECIDE TO WORK TOGETHER AT THE UN, WE CAN ACHIEVE RESULTS.

WITH WARMEST PERSONAL WISHES, RONALD REAGAN

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RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

TIME STAMP

07 JUL 87 11:19

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: SYSTEM II
90730

ACTION OFFICER: ERMARTH DUE: 22 JUL

- Prepare Memo For President
- Prepare Memo Green to Peterson / Murr
- Prepare Memo For Carlucci / Powell
- Appropriate Action
- Prepare Memo _____ to _____

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS* PHONE* to action officer at ext. 5112

FYI	FYI	FYI
<input type="checkbox"/> Batjer	<input type="checkbox"/> Herbst	<input type="checkbox"/> Reger
<input type="checkbox"/> Bemis	<input type="checkbox"/> Howard	<input type="checkbox"/> Rodman
<input type="checkbox"/> Brooks	<input type="checkbox"/> Kelly, B.	<input type="checkbox"/> Rosenberg
<input type="checkbox"/> Burns	<input type="checkbox"/> Kelly, J.	<input type="checkbox"/> Ross
<input type="checkbox"/> Childress	<input type="checkbox"/> Kimberling	<input type="checkbox"/> Rostow
<input type="checkbox"/> Cobb	<input type="checkbox"/> Kissell	<input type="checkbox"/> Saunders
<input type="checkbox"/> Cockell	<input type="checkbox"/> Kraemer	<input type="checkbox"/> Scharfen
<input type="checkbox"/> Cohen	<input type="checkbox"/> Ledsky	<input type="checkbox"/> Smith
<input type="checkbox"/> Collins	<input type="checkbox"/> Linhard	<input type="checkbox"/> Sommer
<input type="checkbox"/> Danzansky	<input type="checkbox"/> Mahley	<input type="checkbox"/> Sorzano
<input type="checkbox"/> Dean, B.	<input type="checkbox"/> Major	<input type="checkbox"/> Steiner
<input type="checkbox"/> Donley	<input type="checkbox"/> Matthews	<input type="checkbox"/> Stevens
<input type="checkbox"/> Douglass	<input type="checkbox"/> McNamara	<input type="checkbox"/> Tahir-Kheli
<input type="checkbox"/> Ermarth	<input type="checkbox"/> Michael	<input type="checkbox"/> Tice
<input type="checkbox"/> Farrar	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Oakley	<input type="checkbox"/> Tillman
<input type="checkbox"/> Flower	<input type="checkbox"/> Paal	<input type="checkbox"/> Tobey
<input type="checkbox"/> Fortier	<input type="checkbox"/> Perina	<input type="checkbox"/> _____
<input type="checkbox"/> Grimes	<input type="checkbox"/> Platt	<input type="checkbox"/> _____
<input type="checkbox"/> Heiser	<input type="checkbox"/> Porter	<input type="checkbox"/> _____
<input type="checkbox"/> Henhoeffer	<input type="checkbox"/> Pugliaresi	<input type="checkbox"/> _____

INFORMATION Green Courtney Secretariat
 Carlucci (advance) Powell (advance) _____

COMMENTS

DECLASSIFIED
 Which (Class) On/When, August 28, 1987
 By dlb NARA, Date 5/24/98

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