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(8590272, 8590336)

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Executive Secretariat, National Security Council:
Head of State File

Archivist: dlb

File Folder: U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Gorbachev 8590272-8590419 Date: 5/17/99
Box 39 (page 1 of 2)

DOCUMENT AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
NSC System II #8590272			
4. Letter	Reagan to Gorbachev, 2 p. R 10/16/00 NLSF99-051 # 318	3/11/85	P1/F1/P3/F3
2. Draft Letter	Reagan to Gorbachev, 1 p. A 10/16/00 NLSF99-051 # 317	n.d.	P1/F1/P3/F3
3. Talking Pts	re: Meeting with the New General Secretary, 3 p. R F99-051 # 320 7/25/00	3/11/85	P1/F1/P3/F3
NSC System II #8590336			
4. Memo	George Shultz to Reagan, re: Letter from Gorbachev, R F99-051 # 321 7/25/00	3/25/85	P1/F1/P3/F3
5. Letter	Gorbachev to Reagan, (translation), 4 p. R 10/16/00 NLSF99-051 # 322	3/24/85	P1/F1/P3/F3
6. Memo	Copy of Item #4, 1 p. R F99-051 # 323 7/25/00	3/25/85	P1/F1/P3/F3
7. Letter	Copy of Item #5, 4 p. R 10/16/00 NLSF99-051 # 324	3/24/85	P1/F1/P3/F3
NSC System II #8590382			
8. Letter	Reagan to Gorbachev, 2 p. R 10/16/00 NLSF99-051 # 325	4/4/85	P1/F1/P3/F3
9. Letter	Copy of Item #8, 2 p. A 10/16/00 NLSF99-051 # 326	4/4/85	P1/F1/P3/F3
10. Memo	Robert McFarlane to Reagan, re: Letter to General Secretary Gorbachev, 1 p.	4/4/85	P1/F1/P3/F3

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Executive Secretariat, National Security Council:
Head of State File

Archivist: dlb

File Folder: U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Gorbachev 8590272-8590419 **Date:** 5/17/99
Box 39 (page 2 of 2)

DOCUMENT AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
#8590382, cont.			
11. Memo	Nicholas Platt to McFarlane, re: Draft Presidential Letter to Gorbachev, 1 p.	4/3/85	P1/F1/P3/F3
12. Draft Letter	Reagan to Gorbachev, 2 p. R F99-051 #328 7/25/00 A 10/16/00 NLSF99-051 #329	n.d.	P1/F1/P3/F3
13. Memo	Copy of Item #11, 1 p.	4/3/85	P1/F1/P3/F3
14. Draft Letter	Copy of Item #12, 2 p. R F99-051 #330 7/25/00 A 10/16/00 NLSF99-051 #331	n.d.	P1/F1/P3/F3
NSC System II #8590419			
15. Memo	Jack Matlock to McFarlane, re: President's Reply to Gorbachev Letter of March 24, 1 p.	4/16/85	P1/F1/P3/F3
16. Memo	Shultz to Reagan, re: Reply to Gorbachev, 1 p. R F99-051 #333 7/25/00	4/15/85	P1/F1/P3/F3
17. Memo	Copy of Item #16, 1 p.	4/15/85	P1/F1/P3/F3
18. Draft Letter	Reagan to Gorbachev, 7 p. R " #334 u R " #335 u	4/15/85	P1/F1/P3/F3

RESTRICTION CODES

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- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

RECEIVED 11 MAR 85 17

TO MCFARLANE

FROM PLATT, N

DOCDATE 11 MAR 85

MATLOCK

11 MAR 85

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S) *M57
5/25/04*

KEYWORDS: USSR

HS

CHERNENKO, KONSTANTI

SUBJECT: PRES LTR TO GORBACHEV RE DEATH OF CHERNENKO

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR SIG

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF# 8507540

8507541

LOG

NSCIFID

(B / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Matlock</i>	<i>3/11</i>	<i>Pres spl ltr</i>		
<i>c</i>	<i>3/11</i>	<i>for dispatch</i>		<i>Jay</i>

DISPATCH *ed original to Matlock per Rosie* W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 11, 1985

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

As you assume your new responsibilities, I would like to take this opportunity to underscore my hope that we can in the months and years ahead develop a more stable and constructive relationship between our two countries. Our differences are many, and we will need to proceed in a way that takes both differences and common interests into account in seeking to resolve problems and build a new measure of trust and confidence. But history places on us a very heavy responsibility for maintaining and strengthening peace, and I am convinced we have before us new opportunities to do so. Therefore I have requested the Vice President to deliver this letter to you.

I believe our differences can and must be resolved through discussion and negotiation. The international situation demands that we redouble our efforts to find political solutions to the problems we face. I valued my correspondence with Chairman Chernenko, and believe my meetings with First Deputy Prime Minister Gromyko and Mr. Shcherbitsky here in Washington were useful in clarifying views and issues and making it possible to move forward to deal with them in a practical and realistic fashion.

In recent months we have demonstrated that it is possible to resolve problems to mutual benefit. We have had useful exchanges on certain regional issues, and I am sure you

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F99-051 #318

BY smf, NARA, DATE 10/16/00

are aware that American interest in progress on humanitarian issues remains as strong as ever. In our bilateral relations, we have signed a number of new agreements, and we have promising negotiations underway in several important fields. Most significantly, the negotiations we have agreed to begin in Geneva provide us with a genuine chance to make progress toward our common ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons.

It is important for us to build on these achievements. You can be assured of my personal commitment to work with you and the rest of the Soviet leadership in serious negotiations. In that spirit, I would like to invite you to visit me in Washington at your earliest convenient opportunity. I recognize that an early answer may not be possible, but I want you to know that I look forward to a meeting that could yield results of benefit to both our countries and to the international community as a whole.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev,
General Secretary, Central Committee,
Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Moscow, U.S.S.R.



ES SENSITIVE 8507540/8507541
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520 SYSTEM II
90272

~~SECRET~~

March 11, 1985

RCM HAS SEEN

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. McFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DONALD P. GREGG
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to Gorbachev and Talking Points
for the Vice President's Use in Moscow

Attached is a draft letter from the President to be hand
delivered by Vice President Bush to incoming General Secretary
Mikhail Gorbachev, and suggested talking points for the Vice
President's use in that meeting.

Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By dik NARA, Date 5/17/99

~~SECRET~~

DECL:OADR

Draft Personal Letter from the President
To the New General Secretary

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

As you assume your new responsibilities, I would like to take this opportunity to underscore my hope that we can in the months and years ahead develop a more stable and constructive relationship between our two countries. Our differences are many, and we will need to proceed in a way that takes both differences and common interests into account in seeking to resolve problems and build a new measure of trust and confidence. But history places on us a very heavy responsibility for maintaining and strengthening peace, and I am convinced we have before us new opportunities to do so. Therefore I have requested the Vice President to deliver this letter to you.

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In recent months we have demonstrated that it is possible to resolve problems to mutual benefit. We have had useful exchanges on certain regional issues, and I am sure you are aware that American interest in progress on humanitarian issues remains as strong as ever. In our bilateral relations, we have signed a number of new agreements, and we have promising negotiations underway in several important fields. Most significantly, the negotiations we have agreed to begin in Geneva provide us with a genuine chance to make progress toward our common ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons.

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DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

Sincerely,

NLS F99-051 # 317

Ronald Reagan

BY smf, NARA, DATE 10/16/00

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

March 11, 1985

YOUR MEETING WITH THE NEW GENERAL SECRETARY

SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS

-- Please accept my condolences and sympathy on behalf of the American Government and people for your loss.

-- I would appreciate it if you would pass on my sympathy to Mr. Chernenko's family at this difficult time.

-- I bring with me a message to your leadership from our Government and people.

-- It is a message of peace.

-- We know this is a time of difficulty; we would like it to be a time of opportunity.

-- Both countries know that our systems and interests and purposes are different in vital respects, and that these differences will not go away.

-- Each side will defend and promote its interests. Our relationship is bound to be essentially competitive.

-- But it is in the interest of both countries to compete and to resolve problems in peaceful ways, and to build a more stable and constructive relationship.

-- We know that some of the things we do and say sound threatening or hostile to you.

-- The same is true for us. Many of the things you have been doing and saying for many years sound hostile or threatening to our interests, our values, even our existence.

-- I can tell you that neither the American Government nor the American people has hostile intentions toward you.

-- We recognize that you have suffered a great deal, and struggled a great deal, throughout your history.

-- We recognize the tremendous effort and suffering and contribution to the common victory in the war that ended forty years ago this year, when we were Allies.

-- That common victory was both a triumph and a tragedy.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECL:OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS

899-051 #320

BY

CAS

DATE

7/24/00

-- It was a triumph because it opened up opportunities to build a new, more stable, more peaceful world, based on self-determination and common efforts to resolve problems constructively.

-- It was a tragedy because those opportunities were not used. Instead, we have had division, more armaments, more suspicion, and more needless human suffering.

-- Of course we have also had real achievements. We have kept the peace. We have made economic progress. We have been able to solve some problems together.

-- My country believes it should be in both our interests to build realistically on those achievements and create and seize new opportunities for a more stable peace and more cooperative relations.

-- We are ready to embark on that path with you.

-- It is the path of negotiations, of steady effort toward significant objectives through give-and-take that recognizes the interests and concerns of the other side.

-- On a number of issues we have shown that we can make such progress. We have signed a number of new agreements; we are revitalizing cooperation under old agreements; we have a number of promising negotiations underway.

-- We think it is time to be more energetic, to tackle larger issues, to set higher goals.

-- That is the way we are approaching the negotiations that began yesterday in Geneva.

-- We have reached agreement at the highest level that we should strive to eliminate nuclear weapons from the face of the earth.

-- In the postwar period our two countries have never set themselves such a worthy and grandiose objective.

-- If we can radically reduce offensive nuclear weapons and make it possible to shift toward stable deterrence based on non-nuclear defense, we will have set the world on a new, more peaceful course.

-- We should approach the other issues between us with the same energy and vision.

-- We should seek to rid the world of the threat or use of force in international relations.

-- We should try to build new trust and confidence in our dealings with each other by solving problems on the basis of mutual benefit and by increasing contacts and dialogue.

-- These are goals worthy of the new generation that will come after us, of men and women and children who did not experience the war and its aftermath.

-- They are goals worthy of the generation that did.

-- They are goals that can unite us in a common endeavor across our different values and interests. The world will thank us.

-- That is the message of peace I bring. The United States is ready for that effort now.

RECEIVED 25 MAR 85 20

TO PRESIDENT

FROM SHULTZ, G

DOCDATE 25 MAR 85

GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

24 MAR 85

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

*5/25/97
MSD*

KEYWORDS: USSR

ARMS CONTROL

SUMMIT

HS

SUBJECT: GORBACHEV LTR

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION VIA PDB

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

PRESIDENT

MATLOCK

COMMENTS

REF# 8509184

LOG

NSCIFID

(B / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	<i>C 4/12</i>	<i>Pres noted</i>		

DISPATCH _____

W/ATTCH FILE _____

(C)

National Security Council
The White House

85 MAR 25 P 7: 03

System # II
Package # 90336
1663

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson			
Bob Kimmitt	1	K	
John Poindexter	2	<i>[Signature]</i>	
Paul Thompson			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane	3	M	A
Bob Kimmitt	4	K	
NSC Secretariat	5	12 APR 1975	N
Situation Room			

I = Information **A = Action** R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Copy stuffed to Matlock only. Suspect
3/26 POB.

SYSTEM II
90336THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 25, 1985

SECRET/SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT AND NSC ADVISOR MCFARLANE

RCM HAS SEEN

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*
SUBJECT: Letter from Gorbachev

Soviet Chargé Oleg Sokolov delivered to Rick Burt today the attached letter to you from Gorbachev. Dobrynin had called me earlier with a preview. The tone of the letter tracks closely with Gorbachev's comments to the Vice President and me, and could therefore reflect his personal touch.

I draw your attention in particular to the final paragraphs of the letter, in which Gorbachev says he has a "positive attitude" to the idea of holding a summit. He indicates that it would not be necessary to sign documents at such a meeting, although agreements on issues of mutual interest which had been previously worked out could be "formalized" during the meeting. He defines the main purpose of a meeting as a "search for mutual understanding on the basis of equality and taking account of the legitimate interests of each side." Gorbachev thanks you for your invitation to Washington, but asks that you agree to return to the question of timing and venue for a summit at a later point. The Soviets may be thinking of suggesting a summit in Helsinki in August, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the CSCE Final Act. In a meeting last week with Art Hartman, Gromyko pointedly asked for our plans on attendance at Helsinki.

Gorbachev's letter is also notable for its non-polemical tone. In fact, his message seems to be that we should both tone down public rhetoric and do business in a calm way that avoids "deepening our differences" and "whipping up animosity." Predictably, he also stresses the priority he attaches to arms control and my January agreement with Gromyko on the "subject and objectives" for Geneva. Here too he picks up themes he used with George and me in Moscow.

I am holding the text of the letter very closely, and will be sending you a suggested draft response for Gorbachev in the next few days. In answering press inquiries about a Soviet response to your summit invitation, I suggest we reply simply that our two governments are in touch, but that as the media knows, we do not intend to discuss our confidential diplomatic exchanges in public.

Attachment: As stated.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 799-051 #321

SECRET/SENSITIVE

DECL: OADR

BY *CS* NARA DATE 7/25/00

His Excellency
Ronald W. REAGAN,
The President of the United States of America,
Washington, D.C.

March 24, 1985

Dear Mr. President:

Let me first of all express gratitude for the sympathy shown by you personally on the occasion of a sad event for the Soviet people - the death of K.U. Chernenko.

We also appreciate the participation in the mourning rites in Moscow of the Vice-President of the United States Mr. George Bush and the Secretary of State Mr. George Shultz. I think that the conversation we had with them was - though it had to be brief - mutually useful and, one might say, even necessary under the current circumstances.

We value the practice of exchanges of views between the leaders of our two countries on the key issues of Soviet-American relations and the international situation as a whole. In this context I attach great importance to the exchange of letters, which has started between the two of us.

First of all I would like to say that we deem improvement of relations between the USSR and USA to be not only extremely necessary, but possible, too. This was the central point that I was making in the conversation with your representatives in Moscow.

For your part, you also expressed yourself in favor of more stable and constructive relations, and we regard this positively. We have also taken note of your words about the new opportunities which are opening up now.

This being the case, the problem, as we understand it, is to give - through joint effort on the level of political leadership - a proper impetus to our relations in the direction the two of us

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NLS F99-051 # 322

BY snf, NARA DATE 10/16/00

are talking about, to translate into the language of concrete policy the mutually expressed willingness to improve relations, with account taken of the special responsibility borne by our two countries, of the objective fact that the Soviet Union and the United States of America are great powers and that relations between them are of decisive importance for the situation in the world in general.

Our countries are different by their social systems, by the ideologies dominant in them. But we believe that this should not be a reason for animosity. Each social system has a right to life, and it should prove its advantages not by force, not by military means, but on the path of peaceful competition with the other system. And all people have the right to go the way they have chosen themselves, without anybody imposing his will on them from outside, interfering in their internal affairs. We believe that this is the only just and healthy basis for relations among states. For our part, we have always striven to build our relations with the United States, as well as with other countries, precisely in this manner.

Besides, the Soviet leadership is convinced that our two countries have one common interest uniting them beyond any doubt: not to let things come to the outbreak of nuclear war which would inevitably have catastrophic consequences for both sides. And both sides would be well advised to recall this more often in making their policy.

I am convinced that given such approach to the business at hand, on the basis of a reasonable account of the realities of today's world and treating with a due respect the rights and legitimate interests of the other side, we could do quite a bit to benefit the peoples of our countries, as well as the whole world, having embarked upon the road of a real improvement of relations.

It appears to us that it is important first of all to start conducting business in such a manner so that both we ourselves and others could see and feel that both countries are not aiming at deepening their differences and whipping up animosity, but, rather, are making their policy looking to the prospect of revitalizing the situation and of peaceful, calm development. This would

help create an atmosphere of greater trust between our countries. It is not an easy task, and I would say, a delicate one. For, trust is an especially sensitive thing, keenly receptive to both deeds and words. It will not be enhanced if, for example, one were to talk as if in two languages: one - for private contacts, and the other, as they say, - for the audience.

The development of relations could well proceed through finding practical solutions to a number of problems of mutual interest. As I understand it, you also speak in favor of such a way.

We believe that this should be done across the entire range of problems, both international and bilateral. Any problem can be solved, of course, only on a mutually acceptable basis, which means finding reasonable compromises, the main criterion being that neither side should claim some special rights for itself or advantages, both on subjects between the two of them and in international affairs.

No matter how important the questions involved in our relations or affecting them in this or that manner might be, the central, priority area is that of security. The negotiations underway in Geneva require the foremost attention of the two of us. Obviously, we will have to turn again and again to the questions under discussion there. At this point I do not intend to comment on what is going on at the talks - they have just started. I shall say, though, that some statements which were made and are being made in your country with regard to the talks cannot but cause concern.

I would like you to know and appreciate the seriousness of our approach to the negotiations, our firm desire to work towards positive results there. We will invariably adhere to the agreement on the subject and objectives of these negotiations. The fact that we were able to agree on this in January is already a big achievement and it should be treated with care.

I hope, Mr. President, that you will feel from this letter that the Soviet leadership, including myself personally, intends to act vigorously to find common ways to improving relations between our countries.

4.

I think that it is also clear from my letter that we attach great importance to contacts at the highest level. For this reason I have a positive attitude to the idea you expressed about holding a personal meeting between us. And, it would seem that such a meeting should not necessarily be concluded by signing some major documents. Though agreements on certain issues of mutual interest, if they were worked out by that time, could well be formalized during the meeting.

The main thing is that it should be a meeting to search for mutual understanding on the basis of equality and account of the legitimate interests of each other.

As to a venue for the meeting, I thank you for the invitation to visit Washington. But let us agree that we shall return again to the question of the place and time for the meeting.

Sincerely,

M. GORBACHEV

His Excellency
Ronald W. REAGAN,
The President of the United States of America,
Washington, D.C.

March 24, 1985

Dear Mr. President:

Let me first of all express gratitude for the sympathy shown by you personally on the occasion of a sad event for the Soviet people - the death of K.U. Chernenko.

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First of all I would like to say that we deem improvement of relations between the USSR and USA to be not only extremely necessary, but possible, too. This was the central point that I was making in the conversation with your representatives in Moscow.

For your part, you also expressed yourself in favor of more stable and constructive relations, and we regard this positively. We have also taken note of your words about the new opportunities which are opening up now.

This being the case, the problem, as we understand it, is to give - through joint effort on the level of political leadership - a proper impetus to our relations in the direction the two of us

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F99-051 # 324

BY and, NARA, DATE 10/16/00

are talking about, to translate into the language of concrete policy the mutually expressed willingness to improve relations, with account taken of the special responsibility borne by our two countries, of the objective fact that the Soviet Union and the United States of America are great powers and that relations between them are of decisive importance for the situation in the world in general.

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I am convinced that given such approach to the business at hand, on the basis of a reasonable account of the realities of today's world and treating with a due respect the rights and legitimate interests of the other side, we could do quite a bit to benefit the peoples of our countries, as well as the whole world, having embarked upon the road of a real improvement of relations.

It appears to us that it is important first of all to start conducting business in such a manner so that both we ourselves and others could see and feel that both countries are not aiming at deepening their differences and whipping up animosity, but, rather, are making their policy looking to the prospect of revitalizing the situation and of peaceful, calm development. This would

help create an atmosphere of greater trust between our countries. It is not an easy task, and I would say, a delicate one. For, trust is an especially sensitive thing, keenly receptive to both deeds and words. It will not be enhanced if, for example, one were to talk as if in two languages: one - for private contacts, and the other, as they say, - for the audience.

The development of relations could well proceed through finding practical solutions to a number of problems of mutual interest. As I understand it, you also speak in favor of such a way.

We believe that this should be done across the entire range of problems, both international and bilateral. Any problem can be solved, of course, only on a mutually acceptable basis, which means finding reasonable compromises, the main criterion being that neither side should claim some special rights for itself or advantages, both on subjects between the two of them and in international affairs.

No matter how important the questions involved in our relations or affecting them in this or that manner might be, the central, priority area is that of security. The negotiations underway in Geneva require the foremost attention of the two of us. Obviously, we will have to turn again and again to the questions under discussion there. At this point I do not intend to comment on what is going on at the talks - they have just started. I shall say, though, that some statements which were made and are being made in your country with regard to the talks cannot but cause concern.

I would like you to know and appreciate the seriousness of our approach to the negotiations, our firm desire to work towards positive results there. We will invariably adhere to the agreement on the subject and objectives of these negotiations. The fact that we were able to agree on this in January is already a big achievement and it should be treated with care.

I hope, Mr. President, that you will feel from this letter that the Soviet leadership, including myself personally, intends to act vigorously to find common ways to improving relations between our countries.

I think that it is also clear from my letter that we attach great importance to contacts at the highest level. For this reason I have a positive attitude to the idea you expressed about holding a personal meeting between us. And, it would seem that such a meeting should not necessarily be concluded by signing some major documents. Though agreements on certain issues of mutual interest, if they were worked out by that time, could well be formalized during the meeting.

The main thing is that it should be a meeting to search for mutual understanding on the basis of equality and account of the legitimate interests of each other.

As to a venue for the meeting, I thank you for the invitation to visit Washington. But let us agree that we shall return again to the question of the place and time for the meeting.

Sincerely,

M. GORBACHEV