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(April 1984) (1 of 2)

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country File

Withdrawer

MJD 12/28/2011

File Folder CHINA, PRC (APRIL 1984) (1 OF 2)

FOIA

F00-173/5

Box Number 007R

TUCKER

51

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
126697	MEMO	ROBERT MCFARLANE TO THE PRESIDENT RE MEETING W/STUDENTS (W/ATTACHED TALKING POINTS)	4	4/14/1984	B1
126698	MEMO	DAVID LAUX TO ROBERT MCFARLANE RE DROP-BY	1	4/14/1984	B1
126699	MEMO	DAVID LAUX TO ROBERT MCFARLANE RE TALKING POINTS (W/ATTACHMENT)	4	4/16/1984	B1
126700	MEMO	GASTON SIGUR TO ROBERT MCFARLANE RE POSSIBLE DISCUSSIONS	1	4/20/1984	B1
126713	REPORT		1	7/25/1983	B1
126701	REPORT		13	2/28/1984	B1
126709	REPORT		1	4/10/1984	B1
126711	REPORT		1	ND	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
126712	REPORT		1	ND	B1
126707	REPORTS		2	3/28/1984	B1
126715	REPORT		1	4/19/1984	B1
126702	MEMO	GASTON SIGUR TO ROBERT MCFARLANE RE TALKING POINTS	1	4/19/1984	B1
126703	MEMO	TY COBB/PETER SOMMER TO GASTON SIGUR RE TALKING POINTS	2	4/17/1984	B1
126705	MEMO	GASTON SIGUR TO ROBERT MCFARLANE RE SINO-US EXCHANGE	1	4/18/1984	B1

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RECEIVED 12 APR 84 09

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FROM LAUX

DOCDATE 11 APR 84

THOMPSON

11 APR 84

LAUX

14 APR 84

*mr
12/28/11*

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R

AP

SUBJECT SP FOR PRES DROP-BY ON GROUP OF CHINESE STUDENTS APR 16

ACTION: THOMPSON SGD MEMO

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

LAUX

SIGUR

THOMPSON

KIMMITT

MARTIN

COMMENTS

REF#

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NSCIFID

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DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE *PA MEN* (C)

National Security Council
The White House

1115

System # I

Package # 3000

8: APR 14 P 4: 10

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin			
Bob Kimmitt	1	IC	
John Poindexter			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane	2	W	A
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	3		N
Situation Room			
Tom Shull			

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
126697	MEMO ROBERT MCFARLANE TO THE PRESIDENT RE MEETING W/STUDENTS (W/ATTACHED TALKING POINTS)	4	4/14/1984	B1

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LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Americans

The President

The Vice President

Gaston Sigur- NSC

Don Gregg - OVP

David Laux - NSC

Paul Wolfowitz - Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs

Robert Nevitt - USIA

George Beasley - USIA

Margaret Pearson - USIA

John Fredenburg - USIA

Mary Bullock - Director, Committee on Scholarly Communication with the PRC

David Michael Lampton, Acting Director of this committee

Chinese Students

HAO Yufa - Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS)

SHEN Xiaofang (f) - SAIS

ZHU Peixing - SAIS

CHEN Jiahua - U.S. Department of Agriculture

WANG Mingxu - University of Maryland

SHEN Zhenliang - University of Maryland

WANG Dongming - Georgetown University

WANG Weimin - Georgetown University

TANG Yunbin - Georgetown University

WANG Haixia (f) - Georgetown University

CHEN Jieping - George Washington University

CHEN Muzhu (f) - American University

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126698	MEMO DAVID LAUX TO ROBERT MCFARLANE RE DROP-BY	1	4/14/1984	B1

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SYSTEM II PROFILE

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ID 8490476

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TO MCFARLANE

FROM LAUX

*mp
12/28/11*

DOCDATE 16 APR 84

KEYWORDS CHINA P R

PRESIDENTIAL TRAVEL

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR NSC LUNCHEON MTG 16 APR RE PRES TRIP TO CHINA

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF#

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8490481

NSCIFID

(B / *B*)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

C APR 17 1984

Mcfarlane noted

4

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126699	MEMO DAVID LAUX TO ROBERT MCFARLANE RE TALKING POINTS (W/ATTACHMENT)	4	4/16/1984	B1

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RECEIVED 16 APR 84 15

TO KIMMITT

FROM MCFARLANE *MCF 12/28/84*

DOCDATE 16 APR 84.

SIGUR

18 APR 84

SIGUR

20 APR 84

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R

ARMS CONTROL

HAN HSU

SUBJECT. GUIDANCE FOR PREPARATION OF SINO - US EXCHANGES ON STRATEGIC ISSUES

ACTION. PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 18 APR 84 STATUS C FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

SIGUR

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FORTIER

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FROM MCFARLANE ^{MM 12/28/11}

DOCDATE 16 APR 84

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SIGUR

20 APR 84

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R

ARMS CONTROL

HAN HSU

SUBJECT GUIDANCE FOR PREPARATION OF SINO - US EXCHANGES ON STRATEGIC ISSUES

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE. 18 APR 84 STATUS IX FILES SII

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FOR CONCURRENCE

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ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Mcfarlane</i>	X 4/18	<i>for decision</i>		
<i>Mcfarlane</i>	X 4/19	<i>also for information</i>		
	APR 20 1984	<i>Mcfarlane approved</i>		
<i>Sigur</i>	S APR 20 1984	<i>further action per profs noted</i>		
<i>Mcfarlane</i>	IX APR 20 1984	<i>also for information</i>		

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

National Security Council
The White House

1127 ml

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System # II

Package # 90479 A/O

84 APR 20 P 4: 26

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bob Kimmitt			
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>I</u>
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>	MAY 11 1984	<u>N</u>
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126700	MEMO GASTON SIGUR TO ROBERT MCFARLANE RE POSSIBLE DISCUSSIONS	1	4/20/1984	B1

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126713	REPORT	1	7/25/1983	B1

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126701	REPORT	13	2/28/1984	B1

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
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FOREIGN AFFAIRS



Fall 1981

\$4.75 a copy

International Peace and Security—*Brian Urquhart*
Making the All-Volunteer Force Work—*Charles C. Moskos*
On Sino-U.S. Relations—*Huan Xiang*
The Taiwan Relations Act—*Jacob K. Javits*
Norway's Search for a Nordpolitik—*Johan J. Holst*
The Arctic—*Lincoln P. Bloomfield*
South Africa—*John de St. Jorre*
East Asia—*E. S. Browning*
Water for the Third World—*Asit K. Biswas*
McNamara at the World Bank—*William Clark*

Huan Xiang

ON SINO-U.S. RELATIONS

Since the founding of the People's Republic of China, Sino-U.S. relations have developed by twists and turns. Tying up with the changing postwar international situation, the development passed through different stages each covering roughly a decade.

From the late 1940s to the late 1950s was a period of confrontation between the "two world camps." Throughout this period, China was blockaded, besieged and looked upon with enmity. For well-known reasons, China and the United States met on the battlefield in Korea.

The next decade saw important changes in the "two world camps." It was a period in which the Soviets built up their strength while the United States was bogged down in the Vietnam War. Soviet expansionism showed itself with increasing clarity. During this decade, a number of factors making for better U.S.-China relations were already emerging. But there was not yet a fundamental change in their confrontation.

The 1970s was a period in which the United States and the Soviet Union attempted but failed to achieve a new balance of force through "détente." As Chairman Mao Zedong pointed out, "The United States wants to protect its interests in the world and the Soviet Union wants to expand; this can in no way be changed." In those ten years, it became increasingly clear that Soviet-U.S. rivalry was intensifying, and it became the source of turmoil and tension in the present-day world. However, the two rivals were in different positions. Strategically, the Soviet Union had already gone onto the offensive on a global scale after an all-round expansion of its strength, mainly its military strength. On the other hand, the United States, as former President Nixon said in his 1971 speech at Kansas City, was "no longer in the position of complete preeminence or predominance." Faced with Soviet threats and challenges at every turn, it switched over to the strategic defensive step by step.

In view of the changed international situation, Chairman Mao Zedong, who had for a long time watched and probed deeply into the development of the various basic contradictions and the

Huan Xiang is Vice President of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, in Beijing.

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relative growth and decline of the various forces in the contemporary world, advanced the thesis differentiating the three worlds, in which he scientifically summed up the world strategic situation and indicated the trends of international conflict in the contemporary world. This thesis has become the guideline underlying China's foreign policy. The gist of it is that Soviet social-imperialism is pushing a hegemonist policy of aggression and expansion and its spearhead is directed not only at the Third World and at the group of industrialized nations, primarily Japan and Western Europe, which are called in China the Second World, but more importantly right at the United States; that the main source of a new world war is the Soviet Union; and that for the sake of safeguarding world peace, all the countries and peoples opposed to Soviet expansion should unite and wage a tit-for-tat struggle against Soviet hegemonism.

By this time, Washington, too, had come to see that the United States and its allies alone were not strong enough to meet the Soviet challenge. Speaking of U.S. relations with China in a foreign policy report sent to Congress on February 9, 1972, Nixon stated that the United States "could not afford to be cut off from a quarter of the world's population." China, for her part, believed that the main threat to her came from the north. In a word, both China and the United States felt the need to change their policies to meet the new challenge. It was against this background and through the joint efforts of the two countries that Sino-U.S. relations began to change, culminating in the Shanghai Communiqué during President Nixon's 1972 visit to China, which ended their 20-odd years' confrontation. Their relations were normalized six years later, in 1978 during the Carter Administration.

Sino-U.S. relations have now entered a new stage, the fourth since the war. A historic task facing both China and the United States is to consolidate and expand their relations so as to play a more effective role in defense of world peace and security against the threat of war. Provided the two countries keep the situation and their historic task clearly in mind, treasure what they have already achieved, and are good at drawing useful lessons from past twists and turns, it would not be difficult for them to find a way to a successful development of their relations in the 1980s, a decade of unrest and uncertainty.

A review of the past decade shows clearly that China and the

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United States were brought together again by the growing Soviet menace to world peace and security, which they both have to face. These common strategic interests constitute a very important basis underlying Sino-U.S. relations which, it is hoped, will continue to grow on this basis.

However, when one considers Sino-U.S. relations in the 1980s and beyond, it would not be enough to confine oneself to this point. Relations between two countries like China and the United States should have their own value and their own logic. The development of their relations will greatly facilitate their progress in the economic, cultural and other fields. And, objectively, continuous consolidation and development of their relations are bound to create better conditions for world peace and prosperity. All this provides a solid foundation for Sino-U.S. relations. It is also where the long-term interests of the two peoples lie. This approach may help the two countries solve some present differences with relative ease and improve their relations further.

It is no secret that China and the United States have different social systems, but the difference is no obstacle to their cooperation on the basis of equality and friendship. This is firstly, and naturally, because the two countries on the whole do not constitute a major threat to each other; instead they are faced with a common major threat. The objective situation emphasizes the need for them to cooperate and not to enter into confrontation. Moreover, the two countries have immense common interests in a wide range of other areas and, especially, inherent conditions favorable for developing their relations. For instance, both China and the United States have fairly good geographic conditions and rich resources, and both have a vast domestic market. At present, they are at different levels of development and their needs are different. Therefore, relatively speaking, there is little chance of their getting into a conflict, still less a major conflict, in the economic field, but enormous potentialities for their supplementing each other through economic exchanges.

The Chinese people and the American people are both great peoples, industrious, intelligent and with a great love for peace and freedom. The Chinese people have all along admired the American people for their enterprising spirit and businesslikeness, and the American people, on their part, have always appreciated the Chinese people's intelligence and hard-working spirit. Historically, many Chinese shed blood and sweat for the development of the New World; today their descendants working in different walks of life are still contributing their share to American society.

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On the other hand, the American people, the progressive forces in particular, had full sympathy for and gave valuable support to the Chinese people when the latter were engaged in their long struggle against foreign aggression and for victory in their revolution at home. It is on the basis of all this and through long years of cultural exchanges that the two peoples have built up a fast and enduring friendship, which remained alive even in the years when they were cut off from each other.

Our two nations made glorious contributions to humanity in different historical periods. If they can cooperate in the long years to come, they will, together with the people of other countries, help create a brighter future for humanity. With a profound historical perspective, the two governments should take a positive, constructive attitude, and explore all latent possibilities to ensure that Sino-U.S. relations will develop steadily and healthily according to their inner logic, in the long-term interests of the two peoples and for the peace and prosperity of Asia, the Pacific region and the world. This is by no means an extravagant hope.

Of course, the two sides have some different views and even obsessions about each other. This is not surprising, considering their different social systems and the estrangement that once existed between them. However, if we ignore these misgivings and don't try to dispel them, they may impede or even create new twists and turns or a retreat in the relations between the two countries.

III

Top on the list of these obsessions are those involving ideological factors. For example, some people always think "the communist China and the capitalist United States would be irreconcilable."

The relationship between different social systems is indeed a question to be explored and considered carefully, for the question arose right from the day of victory in the Russian October Revolution led by Lenin, and it will remain for a long time to come. This is historically inevitable and no one can write it off even if he tries. However, a serious study of the theory of communism and a concrete analysis of the changes in postwar international relations will show that the above-quoted view is not well founded.

No Marxist would ever hesitate to state that communism will inevitably replace capitalism. He is not a Marxist if he does not believe this, just as a disciple of capitalism would not be what he is if he did not believe in the eternity of capitalism. But Marxists

also believe that it is entirely up to the people of a country to choose their own social system and it is futile for any outside force to try to do that on their behalf. Marxists always stand for peaceful coexistence among countries with different social systems; they do not stand for an "export of revolution." Particularly, they are opposed to any aggression or expansion carried out in the name of "revolution" or of "supporting revolution," and are opposed to the use of force or any attempt to use force as a means to settle differences arising from the difference in social systems and interests.

China is led by the Chinese Communist Party, a party that cherishes the ideals of communism and adheres to the basic tenets of Marxism. She is today building socialism—not communism, which will be something for the distant future. And a long period of exploration and experimentation is still needed to find the specific road for China to complete her socialist construction. China is not in a position to impose her will upon others. Nor does she intend to do so.

As for capitalism, no one today expects it to pass away overnight. Even in the future, it will still be up to the people of each country to make their own choice.

People may well leave these issues of the future to history and concentrate on the realistic question of how to develop Sino-U.S. relations. Experience shows that overemphasis on ideological differences, mixing them up with state relations, would do more harm than good.

Another obsession involves the relations among China, the Soviet Union and the United States. For example, quite a few people now have worries about an "unavoidable reconciliation some day between China and the Soviet Union."

In fact, if they observe carefully, it will not be difficult for them to find that Sino-Soviet antagonism is not at all a transient phenomenon arising from a single issue, but has its roots deep down in the soil, past and present. For the antagonism is caused by the Soviet ruling clique which, having inherited the mantle of the old Tsars of global expansion, has for a long time pursued a hegemonist and big-power chauvinist policy toward China and tried hard to bring China under its control politically, militarily and economically.

Sino-Soviet discord goes far beyond the scope of bilateral relations. It is well known that China has all along firmly opposed the Soviet Union's worldwide expansionism, its aggression against other countries and its sabotage of peace.

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The Soviet Union regards China as a major obstacle to its efforts to carry out an offensive strategy around the world and to seek world hegemony. It has stepped up its anti-China activities. Its set policy is to control China, at least not to allow the presence in the East of an independent, anti-hegemonistic and powerful China. In such circumstances, will Sino-Soviet relations change? A clear-cut answer was given by Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping in an interview with a *Christian Science Monitor* correspondent on November 15 last year, when he said:

When foreign friends ask me whether there will be any change in Sino-Soviet relations, I ask them whether they expect any change in the Soviet strategy of expansion and hegemonism, whether the Soviet Union will change its social imperialist policy.

The Soviet Union must do something real in order to show that it has changed its strategy, that it has given up hegemonism. For instance, it must reduce its troop level along the Sino-Soviet border from 1 million men at least to the level of Khrushchev's time. It must withdraw its troops from Mongolia, Afghanistan, from Southeast Asia. . . .

Conversely, if there is no change in the Soviet's hegemonistic course of action, then there will be no change in Sino-Soviet relations in even as long as a decade or 20 years.¹

Others fear that in developing Sino-U.S. relations they might be "drawing fire" against themselves and might "get involved in a Sino-Soviet conflict." They even suspect China of "deliberately inciting a conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union while China tries to 'sit on top of the mountain to watch the tigers fight.'"

In fact, the Soviet hegemonists had regarded the United States as their main rival in the world even before the latter began developing its relations with China. The whole world, the American people included, has long acknowledged that the main threat to the United States comes from the Soviet Union. Whether a conflict or even a war will break out between the United States and the Soviet Union will naturally depend on how their contradictions develop according to their intrinsic logic. No outside force is capable of inciting such a conflict or war. Everybody knows that China is making an unprecedentedly arduous endeavor to free her people, i.e., one-fourth of mankind, from poverty and backwardness, and she needs a durable and stable international environment of peace. China is a peace-loving country as is determined by the nature of her society, by her inherent conditions

¹ Interview with Earl W. Foell, *Christian Science Monitor*, December 3, 1980, p. B1.

and her foreign policy objectives. It is an incontestable fact that there is no record whatsoever of New China ever engaging in a military adventure in contemporary history. The anxiety that development of Sino-U.S. relations might "draw fire" against oneself probably reflects a cowardly sentiment, a fear of "irritating" the Soviet Union. In reality, "irritated" or "not irritated," the Soviet Union will remain the same. Nobody has irritated it in Africa or Afghanistan, but it is there all the same.

As for a war between the United States and the Soviet Union, it is impossible for China to derive any benefit out of it, nor has China ever intended to do so. For a country like China or the United States to "sit on top of the mountain to watch the tigers fight" in a global conflagration is only an illusion against the common sense of history. The more realistic outcome may be a situation in which "when the city gate catches fire, the fish in the moat suffer." During World War II, the United States, separated as it was by vast oceans from the European and Asian battlefields, could not manage to stay outside. For China, the possibility would be even less.

IV

Another obsession involves views and appraisals of China's strength.

One view is that China is both weak and poor and that she does not have enough strength to play a strategic role in containing Soviet expansion, politically or militarily.

Admittedly, China today is less developed than the two superpowers in the economic and other fields. But it would be a mistake to conclude that China is negligible in the endeavor to oppose hegemonism and contain Soviet expansion. As a matter of fact, China is not only the main force holding back Soviet expansion in East Asia, but also an important factor restraining the Soviet Union from taking military actions in other directions. Any underrating of China's strength is one-sided; it will inevitably lead to strategic errors.

China is poor, but not weak-kneed. She is a big power with rich human and material resources. She has undergone many ordeals in history, which shows that none of her enemies, however strong, ever succeeded in subduing China but they themselves were worn out by China. This was the case with Japan during World War II. What is more, China does not believe there is anything really so frightful. She dares to counterattack any invaders, no matter who, as is due. This is known to all. As for weaponry and

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equipment, the People's Liberation Army is not so well equipped as the armed forces of the superpowers. Needless to say, China will strive to bridge the gap in order to lessen the suffering a future war might inflict and to shorten the duration of war. But this does not mean that prior to this China is unable to defend herself or to make contributions to the fight against hegemonism and in defense of world peace. China has always been good at defeating a better-equipped enemy. After all, the arms gap between the Chinese and Soviet armed forces today is not so big as envisaged by casual observers without any serious investigation or detailed analysis.

Another view is that China has no alternative but to rely on the United States and that she "has to implore the United States for help," both militarily and economically.

The international community has developed to such an extent today that the relations among nations have become closer and closer. This is not only because they need one another in developing their economies and culture, but because the global expansion of Soviet hegemonism has bound the interests in security of the countries concerned more closely. In these circumstances, it is obviously one-sided to think of any unilateral dependence of one nation on another. If one has to speak in terms of dependence, a more appropriate word should be interdependence. As to who has more to ask from whom, it will not be difficult to find through a careful analysis of the needs of the two countries that China has no more to ask from the United States than the other way round.

Since China introduced an economic policy of opening to the outside world, some people there have entertained a view that China, which used to depend on the Soviet Union, will henceforth depend on the United States, as if she had no other alternatives. This is of course also a mistaken impression arising from a habit of overrating oneself and underrating others, an impression that is groundless and has a smack of arrogance in it. China always welcomes all genuine assistance from friends on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. Her contacts with the outside world were limited in the past, chiefly by the then-prevailing international conditions. But China is never in the habit of depending on any foreign country, still less will she put herself at the mercy of others. Khrushchev failed to understand this temperament of the Chinese and tried to apply pressure on China by tearing up contracts and withdrawing Soviet experts. In the end, he had to eat the bitter fruits he himself had sown. In fact, guided by the experience gained over a long period of time, China has followed

a path of "relying mainly on one's own efforts while seeking foreign assistance as an auxiliary." She has made this choice after a careful analysis of her internal and external conditions.

Firstly, China has all the requirements for carrying out a principle of relying primarily on her own efforts. The country is rich in human and material resources and highly self-sufficient and, after 30 years of construction, has built up a sizable industrial base. It is "bulky"; it is imbued with heroism and endowed with other valuable spiritual assets born of a history which has seen a good deal of hardship. No force on earth has ever been able to overpower a billion people who are confident of their strength. Therefore, relatively speaking, China is able to weather the storm and protect her peaceful construction. The Chinese people are determined to regenerate their country through hard struggle and they are no less intelligent than any other people in the world. China's modernization program may proceed faster with foreign assistance, and slower without it. But with or without such assistance, it will succeed all the same.

Secondly, China has not lost her sense of reality to such an extent as to imagine that there is any foreign country in the world which is capable of satisfying the needs of China's one billion people.

Thirdly, international cooperation involves many complex factors. The Chinese people have taken note of the fact that as close as the United States and its NATO allies are, they have talked for years fruitlessly about cooperation in the research and development of some tanks, although the issue is by no means a big one.

Thus, self-reliance is China's only logical choice. To be more accurate, the only way for China to successfully realize her "four modernizations" is to rely mainly on her own efforts while seeking external assistance as an auxiliary.

As far as the situation in the United States is concerned, a great change has occurred since the 1950s. The United States has correctly recognized the need to rebuild and increase its economic, scientific, technological and moral strength. The U.S. government has deeply felt the need to unite with its European and Japanese allies and with the Third World, including China, to meet international challenges. In fact, the United States and China need each other, because in this crisis-ridden world, particularly when the Soviet Union is posing a grave threat to world peace and stability, no country, be it China or the United States, can face these challenges single-handedly. Unity is the need of all anti-hegemonist forces.

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Some people are worried that once China becomes powerful, it might seek hegemony and engage in expansionism.

This is a groundless conjecture arising from ignorance of China's situation. The late Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai pointed out that China would always regard herself as part of the Third World and would never seek hegemony, today or in the future when she becomes a powerful socialist country. This is determined by China's social system and our foreign policy. China has not only explicitly stipulated this in our Constitution, but also has committed herself internationally. China has no intention to set up any sphere of influence in any region, nor has she ever menaced any foreign country. On the contrary, modern history shows that China was repeatedly invaded and menaced by others. For a long time, China supported Vietnam's national liberation war to help it win national independence without asking the latter for any remuneration. This is a fact. China has never demanded rights to station her troops in Vietnam or set up military bases there. Nor has China ever asked for "special privileges" or claimed "special relations" with Vietnam, as Vietnam is doing to Laos and Kampuchea and the Soviet Union to Vietnam today.

In a speech at the Sixth Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly in 1974, Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping unequivocally declared: "China is not a superpower, nor will she ever seek to be one." "If one day China should change her color and turn into a superpower, if she too should play the tyrant in the world, and everywhere subject others to her bullying, aggression and exploitation, the people of the world should identify her as social-imperialism, expose it, oppose it and work together with the Chinese people to overthrow it." This is a solemn pledge China made to the whole world.

v

In recent years, Sino-U.S. relations have by and large developed rather quickly and smoothly, but not without snags. The Taiwan question has remained the major obstacle.

There is no denying that, though with different administrations, since the 1950s the U.S. government has continuously adopted a policy of "two Chinas" on the Taiwan question. This was not surprising in the past. However, it is noteworthy that after the official establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States and after the U.S. government has affirmed that there is only one China, with Taiwan as an integral part of

her territory and the government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate government of China, the U.S. Congress should have passed a "Taiwan Relations Act," regarding Taiwan as an "independent political entity," and stipulating outright that the United States should continue to provide arms to Taiwan in support of the Taiwan local authorities' opposition to China's central government. This attempt to arbitrarily impose a country's domestic law on international relations and to use a domestic law to unilaterally negate its international commitments constitutes a violation of the sovereignty of another country and an interference in another country's internal affairs; it is unjustifiable in international law. Naturally, it cannot possibly be accepted by the Chinese people. Judging from both short-term and long-term interests of the Chinese and the American people, the policy of "two Chinas" or "one China, two governments," whatever form it may take, will not produce any good effect, but only sow the seeds of tragedies. This was true in the past and will prove to be so in the future.

Many explanations have been offered for the above-mentioned anomalies. But, it should be pointed out, none is convincing or tenable.

One explanation is that "the United States has interests to protect in Taiwan."

The question is what the "interests" are that need "protection." If they are economic interests, the Chinese government has on many occasions clearly stated that after Taiwan's return to the embrace of the motherland, the investments and other legitimate rights and interests of foreigners shall be protected and respected as before. The various laws enacted by China on absorbing foreign capital have expressed this stand of the Chinese government even more clearly. So this explanation is only a subterfuge.

Another explanation is that "America cannot let her friends down."

Refusal to forsake a friend in an unprincipled way is a manifestation of faith which no one would oppose. But this cannot serve as a legitimate ground for creating "two Chinas"—because "all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China." The return of Taiwan to the embrace of the motherland is the common aspiration of all the Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. This has already been acknowledged openly by the U.S. government in the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué. So how can the moves which are detrimental to China's reunification and run counter to

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the wishes of the Chinese people, those in Taiwan included, be explained away by "loyalty to friends"? If there are friends abandoned by the United States, they should be the hundreds of millions of Chinese people, whom the United States turned its back on after the founding of New China in 1949 when it hung on to the handful of Chiang Kai-shek elements repudiated by the Chinese people. This historical error should have been corrected long ago. Today, many Americans think that the Chinese in Taiwan are their friends. Why can't they remain their friends after Taiwan returns to the embrace of the motherland and becomes part of a reunified China? Why should the United States want to make friends only with the tiny number of Chinese in Taiwan who are obstructing Taiwan's return to the motherland, and not with the far greater number of Chinese on the mainland, and even prefer to hurt the national feeling of these people and offend them?

A third explanation is that "in the interests of security and of peace in Taiwan, the island should not be abandoned."

This explanation itself gives rise to a question: As far as security is concerned, where do U.S. strategic interests lie? The United States has repeatedly stated that it wants to join other countries in dealing with Soviet expansionism. Does it mean that its holding on to Taiwan is a move against the Soviet Union? At whom does it aim when it sells arms to the Taiwan authorities? The effect is just the opposite. What it does is damaging to the foundation of Sino-U.S. relations, which are vital to its strategic interests. China cannot be less concerned than the United States with the peace and tranquility in Taiwan, which is after all a Chinese province. The Chinese in Taiwan are the kith and kin of the Chinese on the mainland. China has repeatedly stated that she does not want a fratricide and that she will strive for a peaceful reunification. For this purpose, she has on many occasions set forth a series of fundamental principles and policies that respect Taiwan's reality and take into account Taiwan's special needs. To begin with, she has proposed such practical steps as the starting of postal exchanges, trade, navigation and air traffic.

Without outside interference, a peaceful reunification is entirely possible and the life of peace in Taiwan can truly be safeguarded. However, if the United States gives the one billion Chinese people a stab in the back by continuing its arms sales to Taiwan and changing in essence the unofficial nature of its relations with Taiwan, it would hurt the Chinese people's feelings. And this would lead to the conclusion that the United States wants to keep

Taiwan under its control and obstruct China's peaceful reunification and for this purpose it does not hesitate to antagonize the Chinese people. In so doing, the United States will greatly increase the danger of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. The reason should be quite obvious.

Evidently, none of the explanations has touched the crux of the question. In reality, there probably is a basic guideline among a number of Americans, that is, to obstruct China's reunification, to keep Taiwan in the U.S. sphere of influence and to use it to hold China in check. This antiquated sphere-of-influence theory should never be used in Sino-U.S. relations. It is sheer power politics, and is both unwise and unrealistic, to try and place various checks around a country in the hope that this would prevent it from growing too big and independent, from becoming a "potential enemy," and would keep it perpetually under one's control.

It should be noted that a weak and chaotic China will only make things easier for Soviet hegemonism while a powerful and prosperous China will contribute to world peace and stability and, therefore, is truly in the national interests of the United States. This is a point many Americans of insight have shared and quite a number of U.S. government leaders have repeatedly stated. A glance at the history of New China's growth and a serious analysis of China's internal and external conditions will show that the emergence of a growingly prosperous and powerful China in the East will be an inevitable corollary of twentieth-century history. Whether others endorse it or obstruct it is not likely to make a great difference. The best choice would be to go with the tide, try to adapt to it and find ways of cooperation instead of going against it.

In fact, history has long arrived at its own conclusion about how the policy of containing China fared. In the 1960s, precisely because it intended to prevent China from becoming powerful, the United States pinned itself down in the Vietnam War and sapped its own energy while its major rival, the Soviet Union, grew in strength. In the 1980s, if the United States should want to cause friction with China on the Taiwan issue in order to prevent it from becoming powerful, the outcome might be disastrous.

Still another view is: "Isn't China opposed to hegemonism? As long as the United States is tough with the Soviet Union, China will swallow the bitter pill of Taiwan." It is too rash to come to this conclusion. Surely, China has always been very considerate of

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the overall situation. In the past, she made such generous allowances for others as were necessary and possible in the interest of opposing Soviet hegemonism—the major threat to world peace and stability. But China would never barter away her sovereignty, nor will she bow to pressure and swallow a “bitter pill” that is detrimental to her national interests and dignity.

For more than a century, the Chinese people have fought against foreign aggression and interference and for national independence and unity. Countless numbers of them have shed the last drop of their blood in this struggle. Since the founding of the People’s Republic, the complete unification of the motherland has been a strong and unshakable determination of the one billion Chinese people, including those in Taiwan. To them, the Taiwan question is a highly sensitive issue. Past experience shows that no one should miscalculate in any way the strong sentiment of the Chinese nation, which went through untold tribulations in a hundred vicissitudinous years.

Sino-U.S. relations, which were resumed only recently, can hardly stand such emotional upheavals. When one side makes a move, the other side will not go without a countermove. Insisting on occupying Taiwan as a means to pin China down or to hold it in check will start a vicious cycle leading to continuous escalation. Such insistence presupposes China as a “potential enemy.” If this is allowed to continue for long, it might create a tragedy between the two nations. All those with an insight, particularly the statesmen among them, should have a sober evaluation of the issue.

The situation is critical. In the interest of world peace, China and the United States need to develop their relations in a joint endeavor against hegemonist expansion, and not to dilly-dally or complicate the matter. The history of international relations shows that overall strategic unity must be based on healthy bilateral relations. It is inconceivable that the Sino-U.S. relationship, strategically a relationship “of overriding importance,”² can be strengthened by damaging their bilateral relations. Any damage to or retrogression in Sino-U.S. relations will have grave repercussions in Asia and the Pacific region; it is bound to affect the world situation in opposing hegemonism. On the other hand, once such interferences as the “Taiwan Relations Act” are removed, Sino-U.S. relations will develop with new vitality. This would be a

² Assistant Secretary of State John Holdridge’s statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 27, 1981. The same phrase was used earlier by Secretary Haig in *Time*, March 16, 1981, p. 24.

major contribution to world peace and to the fight against hegemonism.

VI

To ensure a stable and healthy development of Sino-U.S. relations in and after the 1980s, it is important to keep enriching and strengthening the substance of these relations in all aspects. Prior to a detailed discussion of the real possibilities, it would be useful to make clear the nature of the relations to be strengthened and the proper attitude the two parties should adopt towards each other.

At present, a rumor is circulating that China is seeking a military alliance with the United States. This is entirely groundless. In fact, neither China nor the United States has ever had such an intention. Judging from existing conditions, it would be more desirable for them to develop a relationship that will enable them to take concerted actions in international affairs on the basis of common strategic interests and to engage in friendly bilateral exchanges according to the principle of equality and mutual benefit. They may consult each other and cooperate on political issues without automatically assuming any obligations such as those between allies. This will help to tap the potential of Sino-U.S. relations to the maximum. In their contacts, the two countries should treat each other as equals and respect each other's national interests and sentiments; we should adopt a sincere and not a "card-playing" attitude. "Card-playing" will not win the respect of the other party; on the contrary, it will cause a confidence crisis. What's more, instead of helping to contain Soviet expansionism, it might furnish an opportunity for the Soviet hegemomists.

It is particularly important that both countries should faithfully abide by the principles contained in the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué and the 1978 communiqué on the inception of Sino-U.S. diplomatic relations, and other principles pertaining to bilateral and international relations, as an indispensable prerequisite to a stable long-term Sino-U.S. relationship. These include the "one China" principle, the opposition to hegemonism and the five principles of mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual nonaggression, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence.

Since his inauguration, President Reagan has stated on many occasions that the United States would respect the principles

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contained in the communiqué on the setting up of Sino-U.S. diplomatic relations. Secretary of State Alexander Haig reiterated during his visit to China in June this year that "President Reagan is committed to the steady strengthening of U.S.-China relations." And he pointed out that in the effort to resist aggression, "the United States considers China to be a close and valued friend." These positive statements by the present U.S. government are undoubtedly welcomed by the people of the two countries who are interested in the development of Sino-U.S. relations, in opposing hegemonism and in safeguarding world peace. They are looking forward to further actions.

Much should be done to substantiate Sino-U.S. relations. To be more specific, they include:

1) *More exchanges between government officials and between people of other circles to facilitate mutual understanding and coordination of the two countries.* While contemplating the actual content of strengthening bilateral relations, people will naturally be drawn to diplomatic and security issues. In this respect, there are plenty of things that need to be done, such as officials of different levels, especially those in high positions, of the two countries meeting regularly or at some interval to exchange their views on global and regional situations; to consult on diplomatic, security and other issues of common concern; and to explore the ways for furthering long-term cooperation between the two countries, etc. At present, we have already made a start; however, there is still room for improvement both in quantity and quality and it should be regularized. Of course, the degree of coordination between the two countries on diplomatic and security issues is closely related to the strategic relations and overall bilateral relations of the two countries.

Experience shows that, in international relations, mutual understanding increases friendship, while misunderstanding yields bitter fruit. To further their diplomatic and security relations, China and the United States must increase their understanding and reduce their misunderstanding of each other. In this respect, besides the exchanges of visits and consultations between high-ranking government officials, increasing the visits between people of other circles is also indispensable. This refers not only to those who make business contacts, but to tourists of different professions, interests and ages who are also for increasing mutual understanding and strengthening friendly ties. China is striving to pave the way for such developments.

2) *The promotion of Sino-U.S. trade and economic cooperation.* This is

an extremely important aspect of Sino-U.S. relations. Though at present the absolute figure for bilateral trade is not big, the growth has been fairly rapid. Last year it approached five billion U.S. dollars, a far cry from what it had been a few years ago. Indeed, as China is now readjusting her economy, it is not easy, for the time being, to increase her foreign trade enormously. However, the prospects of Sino-U.S. trade and economic cooperation are undoubtedly bright, considering the progress in China's economic readjustment and development. The fact is that China's economic readjustment is precisely intended to guarantee a better, continuous and steady development and therefore will lay a stronger and more reliable material foundation for expanding her economic and trade relations with other countries. Even in the period of readjustment, China's economic exchanges with other countries will not stand still, still less will they shrink. China has not changed her policy of opening to the outside world; she will continue to develop economic and technical cooperation with other countries, utilize foreign capital, import advanced technologies and learn from other countries their useful managerial experience.

China's present economic situation is marked by a temporary retrenchment in some fields, a vigorous development in others and a temporary shift of emphasis in some branches of work. All in all, China has a fairly big potential for foreign trade and for absorbing foreign capital. The United States may by flexible means adapt to China's rearranged priority list and create some necessary conditions for two-way trade. To put it more specifically, the United States may cooperate right now with China and facilitate exchanges on the following key items which are to be developed during China's economic readjustment:

- technical renovation of existing enterprises. China has 400,000 industrial and communications and transport enterprises, including motor vehicle and aircraft industries. There is a wide range of possibilities for cooperation with foreign countries;
- the opening of oil, coal, power and other energy resources;
- medium and small projects in the light, textiles, chemical and electronics industries, which require little investment but produce quick results in catering to domestic needs and in increasing China's export earnings.

China has rich human and natural resources, and the United States a developed industry and advanced technology. Much can be done if they try to make up each other's deficiencies and

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increase cooperation on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. There are now some problems in Sino-U.S. trade. They should be solved as soon as possible through a general arrangement between the two countries, each in the light of its concrete conditions, to give the problems an all-round consideration instead of tackling them piecemeal. The American government should look further ahead into the future.

It should be noted here that the factors restricting Sino-U.S. trade are not entirely Chinese. The many discriminating and restricting measures the U.S. government has to this day maintained against trade with China are important obstacles. In the export of advanced technologies, the United States has for a long time withheld licenses for a considerable number of products. It has also imposed various restrictions on imports from China and this is one of the main reasons for China's huge trade deficits. The situation is rather incompatible with the present relations between the two countries and, particularly, with the United States' declaration that it considers "China to be a close and valued friend." It is self-evident that a prolonged delay in keeping promises will not only impede Sino-U.S. economic relations, but exert negative influence on their strategic relations.

3) *Expansion of Sino-U.S. scientific, technical and cultural cooperation and exchanges.* Again much can be accomplished in this field. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, many Chinese have wanted to study in the United States and many Americans to study in China or to conduct other exchanges. This is an indication of friendly feeling between our two peoples. Thanks to the support of the Chinese government and the facilities provided by U.S. governmental and non-governmental organizations, many Chinese scholars and students are now in the United States for different periods of research, exchanges and study. At the same time, growing numbers of American scholars and students have come to China to engage in research, exchanges and study, despite the temporary manpower and material limitations in this country. Their number will increase further when the facilities in China are improved. This will be very helpful to their research work in specialized fields and to their understanding of China. A number of joint research projects are already yielding gratifying results. All this will greatly help to restore and strengthen the traditional ties between the two peoples. History shows that academic exchanges have a far-reaching influence on the consolidation and development of international relations and friendship. Through diligent cultivation, the seeds sown

today will yield a bumper crop. Such exchanges should be continued on a large scale and for a long time to come.

The international situation in the 1980s is turbulent. The Soviet Union is "putting a noose round its own neck," surrounded by the worst difficulty in a decade. But it has not changed, nor does it intend to change, its expansionist policy. No one should underestimate its capacity and adventurism. Soviet and Vietnamese aggression in Afghanistan and Kampuchea is not yet curbed, and the flames of war in the Persian Gulf are not likely to die out soon. Poland, a strategic area in Europe, is faced with an increasingly ominous threat of Soviet armed invasion. Most of the countries on this planet are undergoing ordeals of an economic nature.

Though the future will be fraught with crises, it holds out hopes, too. These will include a new awakening of humanity in the fight against hegemonism and for world peace, new achievements in man's struggle to conquer nature and poverty, and new possibilities for better Sino-U.S. relations.

From a long-term point of view, Sino-U.S. relations are very hopeful. A stable and lasting relationship of friendship and cooperation between a powerful China and a powerful United States will be a major factor contributing to the prosperity of the two countries and to world peace. But there are shadows in these relations. Failure to deal with them properly may lead to tension, retrogression, and even new confrontation in Sino-U.S. relations. Should things turn out that way, it would not be good tidings to China, the United States or the rest of the world. At this historic juncture, both China and the United States have the responsibility to make the correct strategic choice so as to meet future challenges.

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126709	REPORT	1	4/10/1984	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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126711	REPORT	1	ND	B1

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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126712	REPORT	1	ND	B1

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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126707	REPORTS	2	3/28/1984	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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126715	REPORT	1	4/19/1984	B1

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The White House

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System # II

Package # 90479 Addition

84 APR 19 9:44

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Bob Kimmitt			
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>4</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>I</u>
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>	<u>[Signature]</u> 1984	<u>N</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

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126702	MEMO GASTON SIGUR TO ROBERT MCFARLANE RE TALKING POINTS	1	4/19/1984	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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126703	MEMO TY COBB/PETER SOMMER TO GASTON SIGUR RE TALKING POINTS	2	4/17/1984	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Package #

90479

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Dep. Exec. Sec'y	1	[Signature]	
Bob Kimmitt	2	[Signature]	
John Poindexter	3	[Signature]	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	4		
Bud McFarlane	5	[Signature]	A
Bob Kimmitt		[Signature]	
NSC Secretariat	6	[Signature]	A
Situation Room			

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	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>
126705	MEMO	1	4/18/1984	B1
	GASTON SIGUR TO ROBERT MCFARLANE RE SINO-US EXCHANGE			

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