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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

File Folder USSR (5/24/82-5/29/82)

KDB 11/16/2015

Box Number 22

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

255

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
170509	MEMO	W. CLARK TO REAGAN RE HAIG MEMO ON BREZHNEV'S KOMSOMOL SPEECH R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-38-1-1	1	5/24/1982	B1
170510	MEMO	HAIG TO REAGAN RE BREZHNEV'S KOMSOMOL SPEECH R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-38-2-0	2	5/19/1982	B1
170511	MEMO	S. KRAEMER TO W. CLARK RE HAIG MEMO ON BREZHNEV'S KOMSOMOL SPEECH	1	5/19/1982	B1
170512	MEMO	R. ROBINSON TO W. CLARK RE U.S. EQUIPMENT SALES TO WEST SIBERIAN PIPELINE PAR 10/12/2010 CREST NLR-748-22-38-4-8	2	5/25/1982	B1
170513	CABLE	201634Z MAY 82	1	5/20/1982	B1
170514	MEMO	C. SHOEMAKER TO J. POINDEXTER RE ORGANIZING ANTITERRORISM STAFF R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-38-6-6	2	5/24/1982	B1
170515	LETTER	N. KOCH TO R. SAYRE RE ORGANIZING ANTITERRORISM STAFF	2	5/18/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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F03-002/5

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255

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
170516	NOTE	SITUATION ROOM NOTE (W/NOTE ADDED) PAR 1/13/2012 CREST NLR-748-22-38-8-4	1	5/26/1982	B1
170517	MEMO	R. PIPES TO W. CLARK RE SOVIET SUCCESSION (INCL. ATTACHED REPORT) R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-38-9-3	4	5/27/1982	B1
170518	CABLE	MOSCOW 6603 R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-38-10-1	2	5/29/1982	B1

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THE WHITE HOUSE
DECLASSIFIED WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

NLRR 748-22-38-1-1

170503

INFORMATION BY 603 NARA DATE 11/1/86 May 24, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*

SUBJECT: Secretary Haig's Memo on President Brezhnev's Komsomol Speech

Attached for your information is a memo from Al Haig summarizing the Department of State's assessment of President Brezhnev's START and INF statements (Tab A), in Brezhnev's May 18 speech to the Komsomol.

The speech took a predictable posture in its critique of the U.S. position and in advocacy of a freeze. Nevertheless, as Al's memo points out, it "constitutes a relatively mild and constructive-sounding reply" to your May 9 speech.

Attachment

Tab A Secretary Haig's Memo

- cc Vice President
- Ed Meese
- James Baker
- Mike Deaver

~~SECRET~~

Review May 19, 1988

~~SECRET~~ 2

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 19, 1982

82 19 PII 05

170510

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
From: Alexander M. Haig, Jr. *A*
Subject: THE BREZHNEV KOMSOMOL SPEECH

Brezhnev's speech is clearly aimed at public opinion in the United States and especially Western Europe. It emphasizes grand gestures, both in START and INF, but gives little insight into the Soviet negotiating approach. It nevertheless constitutes a relatively mild and constructive-sounding reply to your Eureka speech. Brezhnev's major points and our comments follow.

DECLASSIFIED

NLR 748-22-38-2-2

TE 11/7/88
Y COB

START

Brezhnev proposes a prompt interim quantitative freeze and qualitative restraints on strategic nuclear weapons. Playing to the nuclear freeze movement, this proposal is a logical extension of Soviet proposals for an INF freeze. It does not specify the units which would be frozen or the way in which modernization could be limited. We can expect Brezhnev's call for a strategic weapons freeze to feature prominently in Soviet propaganda.

Concurring in the need for substantial reductions, he welcomes US willingness to negotiate on strategic arms and says the talks should begin immediately. He gives no signal on a date or venue, but I expect to hear from the Soviet side through diplomatic channels in the near future.

Brezhnev predictably criticizes your START proposals as facilitating a quest for US military superiority and jeopardizing Soviet security. These criticisms fall short of rejecting the US proposals, although the Soviets will clearly seek to broaden the focus of START negotiations well beyond the US proposals when talks begin.

He proposes banning or severely restricting the development of new types of strategic weapons. While this posture has public appeal, it also probably results from the Soviet desire to restrain US technology, particularly development of the D-5.

He proposes three general principles for successful strategic negotiations: the pursuit of actual limits and reductions, not camouflage for a continuing buildup;

~~SECRET~~

-2-

respect for each other's legitimate security interests and the principle of equality and equal security; and preservation of "everything positive" which has been achieved earlier. Brezhnev stopped short of mentioning SALT II.

INF

Brezhnev pays more detailed attention to INF than to START and says that "the key task today (in the quest for peace) is to lower the nuclear confrontation in Europe."

Brezhnev expresses readiness to consider deeper INF reductions than the two-third cuts the Soviet Union had previously proposed. The meaning of this will have to be explored in the INF negotiations.

He reports reduction of a "considerable" number of INF missiles. These are presumably obsolete SS-4s and SS-5s undergoing normal retirement.

He announces that "no medium-range missiles will be additionally deployed in places from which both the FRG and other countries of Western Europe could be within their reach." We believe that the Soviet moratorium offer of 16 March included SS-20s at some Asian bases within range of Western Europe. If this is true, he is making explicit an aspect of their original offer, but in so doing he admits the validity of our position that limits on missiles "in Europe" alone are inadequate.

He confirms that the Soviet INF freeze "envisages" termination of preparation for missile deployments, including construction of launch sites. This clarification is aimed at hampering our own site preparations, and it responds to US criticism that construction was continuing at some sites even after the moratorium. Very recent intelligence indicates ongoing construction at SS-20 sites, and we will watch closely to see if it stops after the speech.

Calling our desire for a US-Soviet agreement on global INF limitations "absurd," he announces that the question of missiles in the Eastern part of the USSR could only be addressed in negotiations "with those in whose hands are the nuclear means which are opposed by our missiles." Without calling for Asian INF negotiations involving China, Brezhnev says that the USSR "does not object" to such negotiations. Soviet INF negotiators will presumably now use this line in rejecting our global approach.

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
170511	MEMO S. KRAEMER TO W. CLARK RE HAIG MEMO ON BREZHNEV'S KOMSOMOL SPEECH	1	5/19/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
11/17/15 GDB

RECEIVED 19 MAY 82 11

TO PRESIDENT

FROM HAIG, A

DOCDATE 19 MAY 82

KEYWORDS: START

INF

BREZHNEV, LEONID I

USSR

CM

SUBJECT: ANALYSIS OF BREZHNEV KOMSOMOL SPEECH

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 19 MAY 82 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

KRAEMER

LINHARD

PIPES

RENTSCHLER

STEARMAN

DOBRIANSKY

WHEELER

URGENT

COMMENTS **CABINET LEVEL - 3 HR TURNAROUND

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<i>Clark</i>	<i>x 5/19</i>	<i>Fwd Pres for info</i>	<i>5/20</i>	<i>EP</i>
<i>Per</i>	<i>1P 5/24</i>	<i>for info</i>	<i>VP</i>	<i>Eu, IB, MD</i>
	<i>5/28</i>	<i>Per noted</i>		<i>SK, RP</i>

DISPATCH

WATCH FILE

PA (C) *[Signature]*

National Security Council
The White House

184
5A

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Package # 3462

09 MAY 20 11:36

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>m</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>g</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>		<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary	<u>5</u>		
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver [initials]

Other _____

COMMENTS

Recommend sending to the Pres.

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

3672

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 25, 1982

1705726

MORI/CDF C05183252

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION


ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: ROGER W. ROBINSON *RWR*

SUBJECT: U.S. Equipment Sales to the West Siberian Pipeline

The Washington representative of G.E. telephoned Norman Bailey May 24 to relay information reaching G.E. that the Soviets are intending to make a 46% capital injection (\$11-15 million) to their French competitor, Alsthom-Atlantique, to cover its retooling and plant expansion costs to manufacture the additional rotors based on G.E. technology. G.E. also claimed that the Administration may not fully understand their posture on the question of sanctions. In the way of clarification, G.E. stated that if sanctions are to be maintained, they believe it only fair for the White House to impose extra-territorial controls to curtail these kinds of abuses of their licensing arrangements.



25)

I am increasingly convinced that the Soviets are making strenuous efforts to insulate the Siberian pipeline and the planned second strand from any U.S. equipment and technology requirements. The 46% capital investment in Alsthom-Atlantique by the Soviets tends to support this view.

If pressed, I believe we could prove that G.E. would lose their rotor contracts irrespective of whether or not December 30

SECRET

Review 19 May 2002
Derivative Classification by CIA

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLR C/P 7
BY CA/NARA DATE 4/8/83

~~SECRET~~

2

7

sanctions are lifted. Caterpillar may also find itself permanently replaced as a supplier by Komatsu of Japan. We have numerous reports of "heavy-handed" Soviet pressure on turbine manufacturers to accept Alsthom rotors now and in the future. We will follow this new angle closely as concern over "victimized" U.S. companies was used today as a major argument supporting the lifting of sanctions.



25X

cc: Norman Bailey
Richard Pipes
Don Gregg

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170513	CABLE 201634Z MAY 82	1	5/20/1982	B1

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8 OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
11/17/15 GDD

ID 8203665

RECEIVED 24 MAY 82 18 9

TO POINDEXTER

FROM SHOEMAKER

DOCDATE 24 MAY 82

KOCH, N

18 MAY 82

KEYWORDS: TERRORISM

SAYRE, ROBERT

SUBJECT: ORGANIZING FOR TERRORISM

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 27 MAY 82 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

POINDEXTER

COMMENTS

REF#

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ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	<i>E 5/28</i>	<i>Poindexter approved</i>		<i>CS</i>
<i>Shoemaker</i>	<i>S 5/28</i>	<i>further action</i>		

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE *PA* (C)

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 24, 1982

170514

~~SECRET~~ACTION

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

NLRR 748-22-38-66FROM: CHRIS SHOEMAKER *CS*BY COB NARA DATE 11/17/19

SUBJECT: Organizing for Terrorism

Noel Koch's memo to Ambassador Sayre (Tab I) reflects the continuing unhappiness Noel has with the lead agency concept. The issue is whether a lead agency should have responsibility for managing minor terrorism incidents or whether this responsibility should shift to a new office within the NSC. Noel Koch feels very strongly that the latter should be adopted. This option was presented to Judge Clark prior to the submission of NSDD-30, and he decided against it. (Noel's comments about the preparation of the NSDD reflect far more his own irritation that his view was not adopted than they do any inadequacy of consultation.)

There are options we could adopt short of managing all terrorism incidents from the White House, however, which could help address Noel's concerns.

The first is to hire a staff member with solid credentials in terrorism and assign him counterterrorism responsibility. He would probably have other duties as well, but such an appointment would demonstrate increased White House concern with terrorism. We could then give him a charter that would make the lead agency report to him even in minor incidents. He could also be appointed chairman of the TIWG.

The second option builds on the first in that we would appoint an expert on terrorism to the staff with the authorities outlined above. In addition, this individual would assume the chairmanship of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism. This would give him both operational authority through the TIWG and policy oversight through the IG/T. State would oppose this, but it would move in the direction that DOD suggests.

Third, we could create an NSC office of terrorism manned by three or four people. This office would serve as a permanent secretariat to the TIWG. In addition, it would assume the interagency coordination policy role currently exercised by the IG/T.

The fourth option is to adopt Noel Koch's suggestion and have all terrorism incidents and all terrorism policy managed by the NSC staff. This would require the creation of a separate office and

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Review 5/24/1988

a restructuring of Situation Room operations so that incidents could be managed here. We would then subordinate the lead agency and all other terrorism activities to this new office. The advantages of this option are:

-- It would clearly centralize incident management here in the White House, facilitating interagency coordination and the timely preparation of options.

-- It would put real substance and visibility behind the President's counterterrorism policies.

-- It would fix terrorism responsibility once and for all in a single agency.

The disadvantages of this option are several:

-- It would require changing the size and composition of the NSC staff.

-- It would give every incident of terrorism, no matter how minor, White House visibility.

-- It is probably unnecessary given the current IG/T and lead agency mechanisms. The case has not been conclusively made that the lead agency concept does not work, notwithstanding Noel's protestations.

North concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That we discuss this issue in the TIWG meeting on June 2.

Approve ✓ Disapprove

Attachment

Tab I Noel Koch's memo to Ambassador Sayre.

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	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>

170515 LETTER

2 5/18/1982 B1

N. KOCH TO R. SAYRE RE ORGANIZING
ANTITERRORISM STAFF

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Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	1	<i>(initials)</i>	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____

SHOEMAKER

2

A

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COMMENTS

~~Call approval in to Filo~~
Called Filo 5/26.
(initials)

193

National Security Council
The White House

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15

02 MAY 25 P 2: 50

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John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bud McFarlane		<u>m</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>2</u>	<u>g</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>I</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

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ID 8203672

16

UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION
OF CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS
11/7/15 COB

RECEIVED 25 MAY 82 14

TO CLARK

FROM ROBINSON

DOCDATE 25 MAY 82

KEYWORDS: EAST WEST ECONOMICS

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS

USSR

FRANCE

INTL INVESTMENT

FRENCH SUMMIT

SUBJECT: US EQUIPMENT SALES TO WEST SIBERIAN PIPELINE

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

BAILEY

NAU

WEISS

RENTSCHLER

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

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(H /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

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Clark noted

20

DISPATCH -

W/ATTCH FILE

PA

(initials)

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PRESIDENT HAS
SEEN.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Jh


SITUATION ROOM NOTE

May 26, 1982


170516

~~SECRET~~

Soviet Bank for Foreign Trade's Urgent Requirement for Funds



In a possibly related matter, the U.S. grain consultation team recently concluded two days of talks with the Soviet team and found particularly interesting Soviet indications that financial resources and financing were a current problem.



Judge,

We must be very careful on this. Our position may be a bit of a dichotomy.

We have grain to sell and are willing to sell and even willing to extend credit. The Europeans have industrial products and are willing to sell and finance. We are asking them for credit restrictions. I've asked Henry to do a paper for President.

~~SECRET~~
REVIEW ON MAY 26, 2002
CLASSIFIED BY MULTIPLE SOURCES

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

REF 748-CC-38-84

BY CN NARA DATE 1/15/12

~~SECRET~~

mw
100

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

170517

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 27, 1982

INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED WPT

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: RICHARD PIPES *RP*

NLRB 748-22-38-9-3

SUBJECT: Soviet Succession

BY COB 1

DATE 11/17/15

Attached at Tab I is State's appraisal of the latest changes in the Soviet sweepstakes, emphasizing the head start of Andropov and Dolgikh. I would not attach too much importance to such prognoses: we are only in the first lap of a lengthy race and horses that lead as the gate opens have been known to come in last. *(8)*

Attachment:

Tab I State's memorandum of May 25, 1982

cc: Robinson
Dobriansky

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Derivative from State
Review May 27, 2002.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

19

May 25, 1982

WPC HAS SEEN

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Soviet Leadership Changes: Policy Implications

Attached for your information is an analysis
of recent Soviet Leadership Changes: Policy
Implications.

L. Paul Bremer, III.
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RDS-3, 5/25/02

SUBJECT: Soviet Leadership Changes: Policy Implications

Promotion of Andropov to the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat, and elevation of CC Secretariat member Dolgikh to Candidate Politburo status (both moves announced at the May 24 CC Plenum) should have no immediate policy impact but are pregnant with implications for the succession sweepstakes. For example:

-- As one of the few leaders with seats in both the Politburo and the Secretariat (apart from Brezhnev, the only others are Kirilenko, Chernenko and Gorbachev), Andropov now becomes a serious contender to succeed Brezhnev as CPSU General Secretary;

-- Dolgikh, a relatively youthful (age 58) specialist in industrial management, may be on the way to full Politburo status, which would also make him eligible for a senior leadership position. In any event, Dolgikh's promotion is a boost for Soviet industrialists, who have been under-represented in the senior leadership since Kosygin's death.

At least one shoe has yet to fall: if tradition is followed, Andropov will give up his job as KGB Chairman. The official announcement from today's CC Plenum did not indicate who will replace Andropov in that important position.

These leadership changes tell us little about Brezhnev's political strength. Andropov's move into the Secretariat makes him a challenger to heir-presumptive Chernenko; but Brezhnev may have felt uncomfortable with having his personal protege Chernenko as the only likely successor. And it is conceivable that, at least in the initial period of succession, Andropov and Chernenko could each inherit a piece of Brezhnev's power. Be that as it may, Suslov's death created a key vacancy in the nine-man Secretariat. Andropov, who served in the Secretariat from 1962-67 and has held other Party positions, can be regarded as a logical replacement. So Andropov's promotion does not necessarily mark a setback for Brezhnev (of course, Andropov became KGB Chairman and a full Politburo member during

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-2-

Brezhnev's reign and presumably with Brezhnev's blessing).

Similarly, Dolgikh's promotion sheds little light on Brezhnev's current position. A Secretariat member since 1972, Dolgikh's rapid rise into the central Party leadership almost certainly had Brezhnev's support. If, as rumored, Kirilenko (the senior Secretariat member responsible for industry) is ill, Dolgikh's elevation could be explained on the grounds that someone with enhanced authority was needed to assist Kirilenko in overseeing the industrial sector.

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KOB 4/21/83

KEYWORDS: USSR

SUBJECT: POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET LEADERSHIP CHANGES

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: 28 MAY 82 STATUS S FILES

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 06603
E.O. 12065: GDS 05/29/88 (MCCALL, S.) OR-P
TAGS: MNUC, PARM, US, UR
SUBJECT: (U) PETROV ARTICLE QUESTIONS U.S. COMMITMENT
ON ARMS CONTROL

1. ~~U~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: ON THE EVE OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEMORIAL DAY SPEECH, AN AUTHORITATIVE PRAVDA COMMENTARY QUESTIONS THE COMMITMENT OF PRESIDENT REAGAN AND HIS ADMINISTRATION TO ACHIEVING AGREEMENTS IN ARMS CONTROL. THE COMMENTARY CONTRASTS JUDGE CLARK'S GEORGETOWN SPEECH, THE VICE PRESIDENT'S BOSTON COLLEGE SPEECH, AND THE PRESIDENT'S ANSWERS TO WEST EUROPEAN NEWSMEN WITH THE EUREKA COLLEGE SPEECH, SUGGESTING IT IS HARD TO KNOW WHETHER TO BELIEVE THE

PRESIDENT'S "PEACEFUL WORDS" OR HIS AND HIS ADVISERS' "BELLICOSE APPEALS." THE COMMENTARY IS AN OBVIOUS SOVIET ATTEMPT TO PLAY TO THE PEACE MOVEMENT, PARTICULARLY IN WESTERN EUROPE, IN THE HOPE OF COUNTERING THE U.S. INITIATIVE GAINED BY THE EUREKA SPEECH. IT IS ALSO INTENDED TO BLUNT THE EFFECT OF ANY AGREEMENT TO BEGIN TALKS BY EMPHASIZING THAT THE SUPPOSED U.S. EFFORT TO GAIN "MILITARY SUPERIORITY" CONTINUES APACE. PROPAGANDISTIC IN PURPOSE, THE COMMENTARY DOES NOT SEEK CAREFULLY TO ADDRESS THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PRESIDENT'S START PROPOSAL. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS QUICKLY AND AUTHORITATIVELY CRITICIZED THE U.S. ZERO OPTION PROPOSAL FOLLOWING THE PRESIDENT'S NOVEMBER 18 SPEECH, THEY HAVE TREATED THE START PROPOSAL SET FORTH IN EUREKA MUCH LESS SEVERELY. END SUMMARY.

3. PRAVDA'S MAY 29 COMMENTARY OVER THE PETROV SIGNATURE (USED TO DENOTE AUTHORITATIVE VIEWS) MAKES A STANDARD PLUG FOR THE SOVIET "PEACE PLAN" FROM THE XXVI CPSU CONGRESS AND ASSERTS THAT THE 15-MONTH DELAY IN BEGINNING TALKS WAS "NOT OUR FAULT." THE SOVIET POSITION ON THE TALKS IS REITERATED: THEY SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF EACH SIDE, STRICTLY OBSERVE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY, PRESERVE EVERYTHING POSITIVE FROM THE SALT TALKS, BAN OR LIMIT TO THE UTMOST BY AGREED UPON PARAMETERS THE CREATION OF NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS, AND FREEZE SUCH WEAPONS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AS SOON AS THE TALKS BEGIN. WHILE CALLING THE DROPPING OF LINKAGE A "POSITIVE FACT," THE COMMENTARY SAYS THAT "IT IS DIFFICULT NOT TO BE BITTER" OVER THE WASTING OF TIME AND OBSTRUCTING OF SOVIET PROPOSALS OVER THE PAST YEAR AND A HALF.

4. THE COMMENTARY REPEATS THE SOVIET LINE THAT THE U.S. AGREEMENT IN THE PRESIDENT'S EUREKA SPEECH TO RESUME STRATEGIC ARMS TALKS WAS A "STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION" AND NOTES THE PRESIDENT'S "SOLEMN PROMISE" THAT THE U.S. WILL DO ITS UTMOST TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENT ON STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION WITH THE USSR. IT ALSO FAVORABLY CITES SECRETARY HAIG'S WELCOME OF BREZHNEV'S RESPONSE. AT THE SAME TIME, THE COMMENTARY COMPLAINS THAT THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS "IN NO MEASURE TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE INTERESTS OF THE SOVIET UNION'S SECURITY" BUT ARE BASED ON WASHINGTON'S UNWILLINGNESS TO SEEK A BALANCED ARRANGEMENT WITH THE USSR AND ON ITS INTENTION TO PRESS FOR MILITARY SUPERIORITY.

5. PETROV THEN GETS AROUND TO HIS MAIN ASSERTION THAT RECENT SPEECHES BY ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS CONFLICT WITH THE PRESIDENT'S PEACEFUL WORDS AND SUGGEST

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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 6603 DTG: 291020Z MAY 82 PSN: 049658
SIT754 DATE 06/03/82 TOR: 149/1043Z

-- A "MANIFESTATION OF EXTREME ADVENTURISM AND MILITARISM."

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 06603

THAT THE U.S. IS CONCERNED WITH "HOW IT CAN CAMOUFLAGE MORE CLEVERLY ITS REAL PLANS AND INTENTIONS." JUDGE CLARK'S SPEECH IS DESCRIBED AS:

-- STRANGELY DISCORDANT;

-- IT REFLECTS A NATIONAL SECURITY MEMORANDUM AND THUS CLAIMS TO BE THE ESSENCE OF THE U.S. MILITARY-POLITICAL STRATEGY;

-- GIVES PRIORITY TO THE "CULT OF THE FIST," NOT TO CURTAILING THE ARMS RACE;

-- PUTS FORWARD THE THESIS OF THE INEVITABILITY OF ENDLESS CONFRONTATION BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES AND THUS THE NEED FOR AN UNENDING ARMS RACE;

-- THE SPEECH REPRESENTS THE "WORST SPECIMEN OF ANTI-SOVIET DEMAGOGY" AND CONTAINS "CALUMNY OF THE LOWEST KIND;" AND IS

6. PETROV FINDS A SIMILAR APPROACH IN OTHER RECENT ADMINISTRATION SPEECHES. THE VICE PRESIDENT AT BOSTON IS SAID TO HAVE FIRST WAVED AN OLIVE BRANCH AND THEN PUT FORWARD A "PLOY ABOUT THE 'PEACE-BUILDING FUNCTION' OF U.S. NUCLEAR ARSENALS" AND SPOKE OF THE PERILS OF TERMINATING THE ARMS RACE. THE PRESIDENT'S MAY 26 INTERVIEW IS SAID TO SHOW AN ANTI-SOVIET BIAS AND THE WRITER ADDS THAT TO "TERM IT UNCONSTRUCTIVE WOULD BE AN UNDERSTATEMENT."

7. THE ARTICLE CONCLUDES BY QUESTIONING WHETHER THE PRESIDENT'S PEACEFUL WORDS OR "HIS BELLICOSE APPEALS AMPLIFIED BY HIS CLOSEST ASSOCIATES" SHOULD BE BELIEVED. IT SUGGESTS THAT THE STATEMENTS VARY BECAUSE THEY ARE INTENDED FOR THE DIFFERENT AUDIENCES OF THE ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT, THE USSR, AND CONSERVATIVE HAWKS IN THE U.S. IT ADDS FOR GOOD MEASURE THAT "CARE AND VIGILANCE MUST BE DISPLAYED IN ASSESSING THE COMMITMENTS, PROMISES AND ASSURANCES COMING FROM THE WHITE HOUSE." ZIMMERMANN

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