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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 11/16/2015

File Folder USSR (4/28/82) (4)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 22

SKINNER

251

ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
170417 MEMO	L. PAUL BREMER TO W. CLARK RE 4/26/82 INTERAGENCY COORDINATING COMMITTEE ON US-SOVIET AFFAIRS MEETING (W/MINUTES ATTACHED)	5	4/28/1982	B1
	R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-34-1-5			
170420 MEMO	COPY OF DOC #170413 (W. CLARK TO REAGAN RE SEN. JACKSON'S PROPOSAL)	1	5/10/1982	B1
170422 MEMO	UNDATED COPY OF DOC #170413 (W. CLARK TO REAGAN RE SEN. JACKSON'S PROPOSAL)	1	ND	B1
170423 MEMO	G. SHULTZ TO BUD MCFARLANE (INCL. ATTACHMENT)	4	2/12/1983	B1
	R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-34-3-3			

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

8211823

2999

170417

UNCLASSIFIED

April 28, 1982

29

S

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: April 26, 1982 ICCUSA MEETING

Attached are the minutes of the April 26, 1982 meeting of the Interagency Coordinating Committee on US-Soviet Affairs (ICCUSA).

L. Paul Bremer, III
L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

As stated.

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(With Classified Attachment)

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
4/16/85 GDS

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 148-22-34-1-5

BY KDB NARA DATE 11/14/85

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Minutes
Interagency Coordinating Committee on US-Soviet Affairs
April 26, 1982

Overview of US-Soviet Relations

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Scanlan drew attention to Leonid Brezhnev's reappearance at the April 22 Lenin Day ceremonies which had ended weeks of guessing about the Soviet leader's health and whereabouts. While Brezhnev's reemergence proved he was still alive, it will not still the speculation over who will be his eventual successor. Chernenko and Andropov are both being touted while Kirilenko's apparent illness appears to have taken him at least temporarily out of the running.

Scanlan noted that the questionable state of Brezhnev's health may have influenced the Soviet counterproposal of an October summit to President Reagan's offer to meet with Brezhnev if the latter attends the UN's Special Session on Disarmament in June. The desire to one-up the President may have been uppermost in the Soviets' calculation. Brezhnev's offer is now under study; our response will be determined by events and the character of our dialogue in the coming period.

Preparations are now in full swing for the President's trip to Europe which will include the Bonn and Versailles summits with our Allies. One of the US's main goals is to limit subsidized credits and official guarantees to the Soviet Union. Under Secretary Buckley has been deeply engaged in this effort which had recently taken him to Europe again. We hope to have achieved a unified position on this issue before the President's trip to Europe in June.

Turning to the various geopolitical problems which plague US-Soviet relations, Scanlan said that we have seen no evidence that the Soviets have softened their positions but that we will continue to probe their intentions.

Regarding Poland, we are now waiting to see how Jaruzelski carries through on a pledge to release a "significant number" of detainees by the end of April. The Poles have also stated their intention to lift some aspects of martial law, including the curfew, by that same date. We have sought to ascertain from the Poles what the future role of Solidarity and in particular Lech Walesa will be and have made clear the importance Americans attach to these questions. We have received no indication of what those plans are; perhaps the Poles themselves don't know how to handle this problem.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
GDS 4/27/88

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

In Afghanistan, the Soviets have increased their troop levels to around 95,000 and their spring offensive against the opposition is underway. We have seen no movement on the part of the Soviets to seek a negotiated settlement although we have made clear that we will not acquiesce to their continued occupation. Afghanistan Day and our recently released report on Soviet use of chemical and biological warfare have helped to keep public pressure on the Soviets. Diego Cordovez, the UN Secretary General's special representative on Afghanistan, recently completed a trip to the area. It is doubtful that he made much headway. The US remains opposed to any efforts which would lend the Babrak regime legitimacy.

Turning to bilateral issues, Scanlan reported that we had recently responded to a Soviet query on our intentions with regard to the property held for us in Kiev. While we will continue to retain several apartments in the city, the state of our relations would not allow us to sign an agreement which would preserve our rights to a major office and residential complex. Although the Soviets have suggested that we may lose our rights to the complex, we are prepared to live with that possibility.

In line with our policy of preserving cooperative programs with the Soviets with clear benefit to the US, we have notified the Soviets of our decision to extend for one year without modification the Governing International Fisheries Agreement (GIFA). We also advised them of the deletion of two ports (Seattle and Honolulu) to which they have access under the agreement. We are prepared to discuss alternative ports with them but they have not yet suggested any.

In the arms control field, we are now in the final stages of our interagency review of START. We hope talks may begin this summer. The INF talks are now in recess until May.

Scanlan concluded his remarks with a reference to the Soviet treatment of the Falkland Islands dispute which he termed unhelpful and opportunistic. Although President Reagan had clearly advised the Soviets to "butt out" we suspect they are busy figuring out how to "butt in".

US Human Rights Policy

Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Elliott Abrams described our human rights policy under the Reagan Administration. We are more interested in actual results than in speeches which merely sound good. Tactically, we prefer quiet diplomacy in those areas where we have some diplomatic clout and are achieving a

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- 3 -

measure of success. The Administration is also concerned that publicity could result in the destabilizing of regimes whose successors could prove to have worse human rights records. El Salvador is a clear case in point; Vietnam and Iran serve as past examples. If quiet diplomacy fails, then we can employ overt tactics such as votes in the UN and international banking institutions and the denial of bilateral military and economic assistance.

Abrams posed the question of how we can be most effective in influencing the human rights behavior of the Soviet Union. Since we obviously do not have the diplomatic leverage which we possess in such countries as the Philippines or Korea, we must rely more on public discourse. Our public criticism serves two parallel purposes. One extrinsic effect is to underscore for other countries the contrast between East and West. For example, little in Europe is known of the more unsavory aspects of Castro's regime in Cuba. We can expect to have an effect within the Soviet Union as well since the Soviets are sensitive to public opinion and particularly to European opinion. The Soviet decision to allow the emigration of Sakharov's daughter-in-law, Lisa Alekseyeva, is a case in point. Although the Soviets did not respond to private approaches, public demonstrations on her behalf had the desired effect.

Abrams stressed his conviction that a moral component of US foreign policy is an inescapable fact of American politics. While we have no illusions about our ability to change Soviet or other societies, our political goal is to help those individuals, whether religious or political dissenters, who seek to establish an island outside of government control.

Abrams advised exchange visitors to make their human rights concerns known to their Soviet hosts. They could do this most effectively by arguing that exchanges with the Soviet Union cannot be insulated from political relations and that the US, and in particular the scientific community, will have to draw away from exchange programs in the face of human rights abuses. He felt that we should encourage all those involved in exchange programs to meet with dissidents in the Soviet Union although an obvious concern would be to avoid placing either American or Soviet participants in danger.

Exchanges

Scanlan noted that all representatives had received a copy of the review of the bilateral exchange agreements which had been undertaken after the imposition of martial law in Poland. Our conclusion was that the level and content of exchange activity are appropriate to the current state of US-Soviet relations. The review, including COMEX's contribution,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 4 -

indicates that the exchanges have provided significant benefit to the US. He urged that all representatives study the document and provide any comments to the Office of Soviet Affairs (Hurwitz).

Scanlan reported that the Soviets had recently reversed their longstanding position on the bilateral agriculture agreement by signalling their willingness to resume activity under the agreement which they had previously refused to do in the absence of a high-level Joint Committee Meeting (prohibited by us as a post-Afghanistan sanction). The State Department is now working with USDA on how to respond to the Soviets.

Scanlan confirmed that we will be sending a note to the Soviets informing them of our non-renewal of the Energy Agreement. The return of the US magnet provided in the context of the Magnetohydrodynamics (MHD) program is a separate issue which we are discussing with the Department of Energy. Metzler (DOE) noted that the future of the MHD program was itself unclear and subject to budgetary considerations.

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6

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
1/16/05 E-DS

RECEIVED 29 APR 82 08

TO CLARK

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 28 APR 82

KEYWORDS: USSR HUMAN RIGHTS
EXCHANGES

SUBJECT: MINUTES OF APR 26 ICCUSA MTG

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE: STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO
PIPES
STEARMAN
DOBRIANSKY
MYER
LORD

COMMENTS

REF# 8211823 LOG NSCIFID (C / C)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

UNCLASSIFIED UPDATES
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE
11/16/15 KOB

RECEIVED 29 APR 82 20

TO PRESIDENT

FROM JACKSON, HENRY M

DOCDATE 28 APR 82

PIPES

30 APR 82

PIPES

04 MAY 82

KEYWORDS: USSR

CCO

SUBJECT: SENATOR JACKSON LTR TO PRES

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: 07 MAY 82 STATUS P FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

PIPES

KRAEMER

LORD

WHEELER

BAILEY

COMMENTS ** NO COPIES OF LETTER TO COMMENT/INFO STAFFERS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(B / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	- 5/11	Pres spl ltr		Rubenstein
	5/11	Clark spl ltr		
Leper	S 5/11	Further info		
	C 5/21	Wheeler spl memo		
	- 9/16	recl jackson ltr		

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE STL (C)

SC/S PROFILE

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
11/16/15 620
RECEIVED 29 APR 82 20
ID 8290267

8

TO PRESIDENT

FROM JACKSON, HENRY M

DOCDATE 28 APR 82

KEYWORDS: USSR

CCO

SUBJECT: SENATOR JACKSON LTR TO PRES

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

PIPES

KRAEMER

LORD

WHEELER

BAILEY

COMMENTS ** NO COPIES OF LETTER TO COMMENT/INFO STAFFERS

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ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Clark</i>	<i>X 4/30</i>	<i>Pres for sig</i>		
	<i>- 5/4</i>	<i>Noted by McFarlane w/ comment</i>		
<i>Pipes</i>	<i>S 5/4</i>	<i>Further action</i>	<i>5/7</i>	<i>RK</i>
<i>Clark</i>	<i>X 5/5</i>	<i>Pres for sig</i>		<i>RK, SIC</i>
<i>Pres</i>	<i>P 5/10</i>	<i>Sig</i>		

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

National Security Council
The White House

RECEIVED

Package #

98267

9

02 MAY 11 P 1: 19

- John Poindexter
- Bud McFarlane
- Jacque Hill
- Judge Clark
- John Poindexter
- Staff Secretary
- Sit Room

SEQUENCE TO HAS SEEN ACTION

SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
1	✓	D/A
2	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver

Other _____ COMMENTS

Further action required.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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File Folder

USSR (4/28/82) (4)

FOIA

F03-002/5

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Box Number

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
170420	MEMO COPY OF DOC #170413 (W. CLARK TO REAGAN RE SEN. JACKSON'S PROPOSAL)	1	5/10/1982	B1

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 11, 1982

Dear Senator Jackson:

Pursuant to your telephone call ten days ago, I briefed the President on your proposal for a Joint US-USSR Communications and Intelligence Center. As you will note from his response a fast interagency review is under way.

Thank you for your good counsel in this matter and we will be back to you when we have reached a plateau -- however large.

Sincerely,



William P. Clark

The Honorable
Henry M. Jackson
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 11, 1982

Dear Senator Jackson:

Thank you for your letter of April 28 in which you suggest the creation of a Joint U.S.-USSR Communications/Information Center. The idea, which Senator Nunn has also raised, is very intriguing.

I am instructing that steps be taken for an interagency review of this proposal. I shall certainly notify you of the results. In the meantime, thank you for sharing your thoughts with me.

Sincerely,



The Honorable Henry M. Jackson
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

HENRY M. JACKSON
WASHINGTON

ROOM 137
RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
(202) 224-3441

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C.

COMMITTEES:
ENERGY AND
NATURAL RESOURCES
ARMED SERVICES
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
INTELLIGENCE

13

April 28, 1982

SYSTEM II
90267

CLOSE HOLD
SENSITIVE

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

I deeply appreciated your thoughtful phone call following my appearance on Face the Nation last Sunday. This is my promised personal letter to you to follow up on my suggestion for a Joint U.S.-USSR Communications/Information Center. As you may know, this is an aspect of arms control on which Senator Nunn has worked for some time and in which he is also greatly interested.

What I have in mind is that our government now put a high priority on establishing, with the Soviets, a permanent Joint Communications/Information Center which -- particularly in times of heightened international tension or crisis -- could minimize the risk of U.S.-Soviet hostilities or conflict being precipitated by inadvertence, miscalculation or simple misunderstanding. As more and more countries acquire nuclear weapons or devices -- and proliferating terrorist groups are on the loose -- the danger increases of incidents that, unless quickly controlled or contained, might trigger a nuclear conflict, particularly incidents subject to initial misinterpretation or misunderstanding.

The prime purpose of such a center would be to provide a continuing U.S.-USSR dialogue and cross-checking of information at a very senior staff level with immediate access to the top leadership in both countries, able, as necessary, to get the chiefs-of-state themselves into direct communication at a moments notice. Such continuing reciprocal communication would have the added advantage of making the prime communicators more or less known quantities to each other -- a phenomenon that, of itself, would facilitate or ease meaningful dialogue in any period of stress or crisis.

In any such communications exchange, we would obviously need at all times to protect and safeguard essential aspects of American defense and of intelligence-gathering capabilities.

There are actually two long-standing precedents for the sort of thing I have in mind: Panmunjom and the Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC). Neither is an exact model, but both offer a rich

April 28, 1982

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history that can be drawn upon.

In practical terms, I believe we would want (1) to use and build on the current hot-line (teletype) for head-of-state direct, personal interchange, (2) establish a joint U.S.-USSR facility, manned by small highly professional staffs, and (3) provide an immediately adjacent American facility (with presumably a matching Soviet facility) which would house the terminals of secure communications links to Washington, plus rooms where senior Americans and their staffs could talk in private.

From the start, it should be understood and agreed with the Soviets that this center was not to be a vehicle or forum for polemics or propaganda, and that it would function in private.

As I see it, the burgeoning popular focus on nuclear weapons, and the widespread fears of nuclear holocaust are due in very great measure to the concern that a nuclear war might break out just because Moscow and Washington were out of touch with each other so that accidents and other incidents could "get out of hand". I am convinced that a joint institution along the lines I am suggesting -- that would represent and assure continuing superpower dialogue -- would go far to lessen these anxieties and fears.


Moreover, given that START negotiations are bound to take considerable time, this initiative offers the possibility that our government could conclude an early arms control agreement with the Soviet Union that could help build world confidence in the possibilities for stability and peace.

I would hope the kind of initiative I have outlined here only in preliminary fashion would intrigue you, and that there would be an opportunity for a small bipartisan group of us from the Congress to talk with you personally about it in the very near future. At this time I know that Senator Nunn and Senator Warner who is chairman of the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces would be glad to join in that meeting.

I'm sure you would share my view that it is important to insulate this kind of effort from the political adversary arena, particularly during the coming election campaigns.

With best regards.

Sincerely yours,


Henry M. Jackson U.S.S.

uw
15

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Attachment

May 4, 1982

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

4/16/82 CDB

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

SIGNED

FROM: RICHARD PIPES *RP*

SUBJECT: Letter to the President from Senator Jackson

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President providing the preliminary analysis requested, along with an interim response to Senator Jackson (Tab A). The incoming letter is at Tab B. Sven Kraemer is drafting a Presidential letter to Senator Nunn.

Sven *SK* Kraemer concurs. *Bob* Robert Kimmitt concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign and forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Interim response to Senator Jackson
- Tab B Incoming letter of April 28, 1982

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Attachment

160

16

National Security Council
The White House

RECEIVED

Package # 90267

22 MAY 5 AIO: 00

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>M</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter	<u>5</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Staff Secretary	<u>6</u>		<u>D</u>
Sit Room			

KRAEMER/pics 7 UBM 5/10 12pm A-7

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver UB

Other _____

COMMENTS

Let's truly get this idea tested if it is worth it + give Jackson status in 10 days etc

National Security Council

4/30

Clark/McFarlane

Comment Sheet

Number SYSTEM II - 90267

Date 29 APRIL 1982

Please treat the attached as CLOSE HOLD.

DO NOT MAKE COPIES. Do not consult outside the NSC Staff at this time.

Prepare a warm reply from the PRESIDENT that provides an interim response.

Prepare a preliminary analysis of the proposal suitable for me to discuss with the President on Monday. Will decide where to go from that point.

Action	Coordinate	Info
✓ PIPES	KRAEMER **	WHEELER **
	LORD **	
	BAILEY **	**NOTE

Copies not provided direct

URGENT

DUE DATE 0700 3 MAY 1982

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

JP 18

May 3, 1982

Dick Pipes
Bob Kimmit

Subject: The Jackson JCIC

Frankly I think this is pretty shameful even for Scoop Jackson. What he has done is pirate a proposal Sam Nunn had done all the homework on. Jackson rushed into the public with it on Face the Nation and now is trying to get the President to engage him in the follow up on it.

My preference would be to send Jackson a terse acknowledgement but to send an unsolicited letter to Nunn, noting the appeal of his proposal; stating that the President had referred it to State, DOD and CIA for consideration and would like to stay in touch on it.

Please dig out the package which is now in staffing on the Nunn proposal and see if what I propose here is consistent with the staff's thinking. If so, let's go that way. Please consult with Dick Pipes./Bob Kimmit.

Bud
Bud

19



National Security Council
The White House

156
20

Package # 90267

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>JA</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>7</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>		
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>		<u>A</u>
John Poindexter	<u>5</u>		
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver

Other _____

COMMENTS

Judge wanted to cover this at 0930 on Monday. Will have to make it Tuesday.

7

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Attachment

April 30, 1982

CONFIDENTIAL (S) (U) 4/16/85 CON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: RICHARD PIPES *RP*

SUBJECT: Letter to the President from Senator Jackson

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President providing the preliminary analysis requested, along with an interim response to Senator Jackson (Tab A). The incoming letter is at Tab B.

Kramer is drafting a Presidential letter to Senator Nunn.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign and forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Kramer concurred

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Interim response to Senator Jackson
- Tab B Incoming letter of April 28, 1982

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Attachment

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Senator Jackson:

Thank you for your letter of April 28 in which you suggest the creation of a Joint U.S.-USSR Communications/Information Center to help avert, in time of crisis, U.S.-Soviet hostilities from breaking out due to miscalculation or misunderstanding. The idea is most intriguing. It represents a very constructive contribution to the panoply of arms control and arms reduction measures now under active consideration.

I am issuing instructions that qualified personnel on the NSC Staff and the relevant Departments give this proposal thorough consideration. As soon as these analyses have been completed, I will be in touch with you as well as with Senators Nunn and Warner.

In the meantime, let me express my appreciation for your thoughtful suggestion and your offer to remove issues affecting highest national security concerns from the arena of partisan politics.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Henry M. Jackson
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

National Security Council
The White House

System # II

Package # _____

24

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>FEB 1985</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	<u>Add to file</u>

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

AMK
170423 25



United States Department of State
Office of the Secretary

February 12, 1985


~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

FOR: BUD MC FARLANE
FROM: George P. Shultz

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR 748-22-34-33
BY COB NARA DATE 11/18/05

Per our conversation.

Attachment



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COMMUNIQUE

The State visit of His Majesty King Fahd bin Abd al-Aziz al-Saud has reaffirmed the long-standing bonds of friendship and mutually beneficial-cooperation that have existed between the United States and Saudi Arabia for over fifty years. In their meetings on February 11 and 12, President Reagan and King Fahd concentrated on the search for a stable and lasting peace (between Israel and its Arab neighbors) which the two leaders agreed was their primary concern.

The President reaffirmed his continuing commitment to the positions for peace which he announced on September 1, 1982 and renewed his pledge that the United States will support those positions in negotiations. The King expressed his belief that the Arab consensus expressed in the communique issued at Fez in September 1982 provided a just basis for negotiations leading to a comprehensive peace. (The President and the King recognized the need for direct negotiations between the parties most concerned in order to achieve a stable peace.)

Their discussions recognized the principle of exchanging territory for peace, as contemplated in United Nations Security Council Resolutions, and stressed that a stable peace must provide security for all states in the area ~~where~~ and the exercise of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. Both agreed to maintain their dialogue on this urgent issue.

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The State visit of His Majesty King Fahd bin Abd al-Aziz al-Saud has reaffirmed the long-standing bonds of friendship and mutually beneficial cooperation that have existed between the United States and Saudi Arabia for over fifty years. In their meeting on February 11 and 12, President Reagan and King Fahd concentrated on the search for a just, stable and lasting ^{solution to the Arab- Israeli conflict} ~~peace~~ in the Middle East which the two leaders agreed was their primary concern. The King expressed his belief that the Arab consensus expressed in the communique issued at Fez in September 1982 provided a just basis for negotiations leading to a comprehensive peace. The President expressed his appreciation for the Fez consensus, positive elements of which have been recognized by the United States. He reaffirmed his continuing commitment to the positions for peace which he announced on September 1, 1982 ^{as a basis for entering negotiations} and renewed his pledge that the United States will support those positions in ^{direct} negotiations ^{between the parties most concerned.} Their discussions recognized the principle of exchanging territory for peace, as contemplated in United Nations Security Council Resolutions, and stressed that a stable peace must provide security for all states in the area and the exercise of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. Both agreed to maintain their dialogue on this urgent issue.

The two leaders discussed the situation in Lebanon and agreed on the need for rapid restoration of its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. In discussing Afghanistan, they called for withdrawal of Soviet forces, a political resolution of the conflict and the safe and honorable return of Afghan refugees.

The President and the King discussed the continuing war between Iran and Iraq. They deplored the tragic loss of life and destruction it has brought and the threat to regional stability and peace which it poses. They pledged to continue to support efforts to bring the fighting to a speedy end.

The two leaders also expressed satisfaction with US-Saudi military cooperation. This contributes to Saudi Arabia's ability to defend itself and enhances its capacity to contribute to maintenance of stability in the Gulf, which is of benefit to the international community. Both countries look forward to continuing this military cooperation.

The discussions between the President and the King, to which Cabinet members and ministers contributed, charted the course for continued development of U.S.-Saudi relations. In this regard, Saudi Arabia's emergence as an exporter of industrial goods, as well as of crude oil, was examined in the light of the United States' traditional commitment to open markets for goods and investment. The delegations of the two countries foresaw growth and rising mutual benefit from a sustained partnership in trade, development and regional cooperation that joins Saudi resources and aspirations with American technological leadership.