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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

**Withdrawer**

KDB 11/9/2015

**File Folder** USSR (3/25/82) (1)

**FOIA**

F03-002/5

**Box Number** 22

SKINNER

241

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
170302	GUIDANCE	COMBATting SOVIET FORGERIES: OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE	2	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 25, 1982

*Gil*  
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GILBERT A. ROBINSON  
Deputy Director  
International Communication Agency

SUBJECT: Soviet Forgeries Field Manual

Thank you for the most interesting manual on Soviet forgeries. It is extremely valuable to have such an analysis at hand both to prevent damaging forgeries and to limit the damage once they have been publicized.

*Bill*

William P. Clark

MW  
2

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

10/9/85 GDD

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ with  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Attachment

March 24, 1982

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: RICHARD PIPES *RP*

SUBJECT: Soviet Forgeries Field Manual

Attached at Tab I for your signature is an acknowledgment of the subject manual (Tab II) sent you by Gilbert Robinson of ICA.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to Gilbert Robinson at Tab I.

Approve                      Disapprove                     

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum to Mr. Robinson for signature
- Tab II Soviet Forgeries Field Manual

cc: Carnes Lord  
William Stearman

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ with  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Attachment

National Security Council  
The White House

Package # 1735

2 11 14

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
Bud McFarlane			
Jacque Hill	<u>2P</u>		
Judge Clark	<u>3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary	<u>4</u>		
Sit Room			
I-Information	A-Action	R-Retain	D-Dispatch

DISTRIBUTION

CY To VP		Show CC	
CY To Meese		Show CC	
CY To Baker		Show CC	
CY To Deaver		Show CC	
Other	_____		

COMMENTS

National Security Council  
The White House

Package # 1735

82 MAR 11 AM 10:05

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>JP</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>BM</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>JH</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>JC</u>	<u>I</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			<u>A</u>
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch

DISTRIBUTION

CY To VP		Show CC	
CY To Meese		Show CC	
CY To Baker		Show CC	
CY To Deaver		Show CC	
Other	_____		

COMMENTS

**International  
Communication  
Agency**

United States of America

Washington, D. C. 20547

Office of the Director



**USICA**

11 MAR 1982

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1/2/15 600

1735

5

(UNCLASSIFIED WITHOUT ATTACHMENT)

MAR 10 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable  
Judge William P. Clark, Jr.  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
The White House

FROM: Gilbert A. Robinson *grd*  
Acting Director

SUBJECT: Soviet Forgeries Field Manual

I thought you might be interested in the attached unclassified report on Soviet and Soviet-proxy forgeries of U.S. Government documents. It will be distributed to all USICA Posts for their use as a reference manual.

The first section describes characteristics of forgeries and general patterns of occurrence. Section two (tabbed) is an annex of ten forgery case studies keyed to references in the previous text.

Classified operational guidance to Posts, which accompanies the manual, recommends actions both to discourage forgeries and to limit their damage to U.S. interests.

In preparing the report, we received valuable guidance from both State and CIA. We think the report will be useful in our efforts to combat Soviet active measures.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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*FOIA*

F03-002/5

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170302	GUIDANCE  COMBATTING SOVIET FORGERIES: OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE	2	ND	B1

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B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]


B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.



**RESEARCH REPORT**



**USICA**

**Office of Research  
International Communication Agency  
United States of America**

FORGERIES OF U.S. DOCUMENTS

This report was prepared by  
the European Branch

February 1982

R-5-82

## FORGERIES

### Introduction

This report is on forgeries of U.S. documents. Most such forgeries are done by the Soviets, and some by the East Germans and the Czechoslovaks -- those espionage services with the technical capability.

During 1945-1975, roughly three to four forgeries were detected each year. Since 1976, the number of known forgeries has doubled.

A single forgery may be used many times, many places. The most frequently used forgery to date (see the U.S. Army Field Manual FM 30-31B, Tab A) surfaced in some 20 countries since 1975.

Many problems can be caused by even a single appearance in one country. Moreover, a good forgery seldom is discredited in a single effort. It can surface in various forms around the world during its life and be replayed endlessly in the press.

### Characteristics Of Forgeries

Anything can be forged. Soviet forgeries have included entire issues of Newsweek magazine, complete U.S. Army field manuals, maps, classified cables, personal letters, and mailgrams. No document is above suspicion simply because of its form.

Forgeries contain false, misleading, or incomplete information. They may be:

- o complete fabrications--such as the entire Army Field Manual ("Stability Operations--Intelligence", FM 30-31B, Tab A), which was used to allege a strategy of U.S. subversive activities, including that the U.S. was linked to the kidnapping and murder of Aldo Moro.
- o altered versions of genuine documents and official forms--such as the forged "State Airgram A-8950" in Tab B which purported to show that the U.S. government was bribing foreign officials.

- o composites of several documents--some genuine and others altered or fabricated--as in the recent "Holocaust Again for Europe" document (Tab C) which supposedly revealed U.S. plans on the use of nuclear weapons in Europe.

Since 1976, Soviet forgeries have been used in support of the following propaganda themes: (1) U.S. subversion activities, e.g., Army Field Manual FM 30-31B (Tab A); (2) U.S. relations with its NATO Allies, with particular emphasis on Greek-Turkish relations, illustrated by a forged State Department telegram (Tab F) and the text of a phony Presidential speech (Tab G); and (3) the Middle East peace process, with emphasis on Sadat, e.g., forged State documents "signed" by the U.S. Ambassador to Egypt (Tab J).

These forgeries seem to have two general aims. The first is to show U.S. meddling in other countries' internal affairs. This is usually attempted with forgeries of general-purpose documents (such as Field Manual FM 30-31B) that can be used again and again in different contexts to substantiate claims of U.S. interference.

The second aim of a forgery is to create personal enmity between U.S. and foreign leaders, as was the case with a forged text of an interview with then-Vice President Mondale (Tab D) in which he allegedly disparaged Begin and Sadat.

Forgeries try to warp the decision process in target countries by misleading government leaders and opinion-makers. Such forgeries are not always publicly released. A forged letter in which a U.S. Air Force colonel allegedly confirmed that the U.S. colluded with NATO Allies and China to supply weapons to Zaire is a case in point (Tab E). The letter was handed quietly to members of the Belgian Cabinet, probably to encourage them to re-think their NATO ties.

Forgeries are also used to influence public opinion in target countries, usually by being planted in the domestic media. An example is the "Holocaust" document (Tab C).

#### Can Forgeries Be Anticipated?

The Soviets can move very quickly to exploit an opportunity. While most major forgeries require months of intensive effort, a recent forgery (a State Department classified cable) took only two weeks to produce.

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While the Soviets seize specific targets of opportunity, forgeries do not appear randomly. Forgeries occur most often:

- o In periods of increased U.S.-Soviet tensions. Active measures are a major element of Soviet foreign policy whatever the state of U.S.-Soviet relations. Forgeries, however, are a barometer of U.S.-Soviet relations. During the height of detente in the early 70s, there were very few Soviet forgeries. The pace quickened after 1976 when tensions between the superpowers increased.
- o During intense anti-U.S. progaganda campaigns. Forgeries often are used to substantiate major themes of Soviet propaganda offensives. The "Heard letter" (Tab E) supported propaganda charges that China was joining NATO in a collusion of imperialists and Maoists against Third World liberation movements. Forgeries of a Presidential speech (Tab G) and of a State Department telegram (Tab F) sought to create strains within NATO.
- o After major international events--e.g., summit meetings or acts of terrorism in NATO countries. The forged U.S. Army field manual (FM 30-31B, "Stability Operations--Intelligence, Tab A) which first surfaced in 1975, was used, in conjunction with a major Soviet propaganda offensive, to support the Soviet claim that the U.S. was linked to the Red Brigades' 1978 murder of Aldo Moro.
- o After Western press and government criticism of the Soviet bloc--e.g., Western comment on a link between the Moro kid-nappers and the Soviet bloc.
- o After widely-publicized incidents embarrassing to the U.S. An example is "Airgram A-8950" (Tab B) which sought to exploit the damage already done to the U.S. image by revelations of the bribery practices of U.S. businesses abroad.

#### Detecting Forgeries

Forgeries of USG documents and communiques often are authentic-looking, particularly if there is ample time to prepare them. The Soviets have become so proficient that even experts sometimes have difficulty detecting forgeries by technical criteria or format alone. An example of an authentic-looking forgery is on the next page.

Only a very close examination of this forgery reveals several minor, but telling, discrepancies: (A) improper expiration date; (B) an incorrect country code for the Netherlands; (C) a required paragraph classification symbol missing; and (D) the use of outdated downgrading instructions.

A

11/26/80  
 Intelligence Agency  
 Washington, D.C. 20301  
**CONFIDENTIAL**  
 INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION REQUIREMENT  
 EXPIRATION DATES ALWAYS LAST DAY OF MONTH

See Distribution List	A. DISAMBIGUATION	EXPIRATION DATE 17 Oct 70	CONTROL NUMBER
		DISPATCH DATE 31 Mar 70	
Subject: Anti-US Activities and Their Sponsors Western Europe (U)		PRIORITY 1A	CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET (S), CONFIDENTIAL (C), SECRET (S), UNCLASSIFIED (U) IT NO. NO. 01, 02, 03
See Distribution List	REQUIRE & PARAGRAPH CLASSIFICATION MISSING		NO PRIORITY 1-3-70 (Subs Deleted in 1973?) See Distribution List

C

B

- a. Requirements: Request information as follows on anti-US activities and their sponsors in the host country:
- (1) Identity of sponsoring and of participating organizations and political parties, areas of their activity, titles and details of editorial publications, names and political affiliations of leaders, locations of their offices and their home addresses, total number of participants, when feasible, furnish photographs and/or recognition characteristics of active participants in anti-US activities.
  - (2) Plans, dates, time and site of activities.
  - (3) Interest displayed toward US military facilities, possible intentions to demonstrate at facilities, to distribute propaganda to US military personnel or in housing areas, to erect or to paint signs at facilities, to instigate incidents with personnel, to disrupt military operations or festival-type activity, and to destroy, damage or bespoil US government or US private property.
  - (4) Main themes of public demonstrations, texts of banners, posters, leaflets and other literature (furnish samples), identity of speakers and themes of major speeches, nature of other attractions and identity of performers.
  - (5) Details of incidents, involvement of US military personnel, activity of interdenonstrators, public reaction.
  - (6) Plans of host country services and police to control anti-US organizations and their activities, means applied (both overt and covert), intervention in and prevention of incidents, confiscation of propaganda materials, overall effectiveness of police and counterintelligence measures.

Annexes A thru M Listing of Anti-US Organizations			
FORM 3, Downgraded at 12 year intervals; not automatically declassified.			
FORM 3, 1965	CLASSIFICATION	FOR YOUR INFORMATION OF THIS FORM MAY BE USED UNTIL 3 JULY 1983	

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
 THIS TYPE DOWNGRADING INSTRUCTIONS HAVE NOT BEEN USED SINCE 1974/73  
 Attach to Distribution List

D

14

For the PAO, the most useful advice is: Get Help! Do not attempt to prove forgeries on your own.

In detecting forgeries, knowledge of U.S. policy is indispensable. Very often a document may intuitively not "feel" right or, more importantly, be at variance with U.S. policy. In either case, the PAO should turn immediately to appropriate people in the Mission for assistance.

Forgeries may contain several types of errors that experienced officers can detect. Obvious format errors such as an improper action office (e.g., Personnel being asked to deal with a matter more appropriately handled by the Desk), technical errors (e.g., wrong typeface), poor grammar, or inappropriate classification may be clues.

Also, forgeries often contain statements that the USG simply does not make. For example, a forged classified cable stated that the U.S. might "force" NATO Allies to accept the U.S. position on an issue; or a forged interview with the Vice President that had him saying that neither Begin nor Sadat were suitable to the task of achieving peace in the Middle East (Tab D).

Some patterns have been observed that may help in exposing forgeries:

- o Use of security classifications. Because classified documents attract more attention than unclassified ones, most forgeries will bear a classification. On occasion, an improper classification is used, for example, a TOP SECRET classification given to the forged U.S. Army Field Manual (Tab A). In some cases, when the forgery is to be passed off as private correspondence between high-ranking officials, their status serves the same purpose as classification.
- o Use of official letterheads. Soviet-bloc countries make great efforts to collect U.S. forms, letters, official signatures, and the like as models for their forgeries. And they use real, not fictitious, names of officials and organizations. Their efforts are not limited only to USG forms or letters. In one instance, the letterhead of the NATO Secretary General was used for a forged letter to the U.S. Ambassador to NATO (Tab H).

Montage techniques in which parts of different documents are combined to form a single document, as well as the use of original forms, are common.

- o Use of photocopies, not originals. The photocopy machine has replaced photographic forgeries. Photocopying permits "cutting and pasting," so that facsimile signatures can be printed and multiple copies made. Use of photocopies prevents technical examination of the original. Documents often are not in sharp focus or full size.
- o Use of cover letters. Cover letters are often used to transmit forgeries to target groups or individual--e.g., government officials, newspaper editors. The letter is usually anonymous--the writer excusing the absence of a signature by claiming fear for his life or position.

The letter explains why the recipient is getting the document and usually characterizes the content of the forgery. For example, in the case of the forged U.S. Army Field Manual FM 30-31B (Tab A), the cover letter was supposedly sent from an American who opposed "U.S. military involvement in matters beyond the scope of reasonable American interest." Another forged document was distributed because, the writer of the cover letter said, the document contained information that constituted a U.S. plot in the Middle East.

- o Use of logical scenarios. Rather than fanciful plots or coups, Soviet forgeries tend to be more general concerns that can exacerbate negative feelings about the U.S. and its intentions. Vague charges about spying by the Peace Corps, anti-host government intrigue by the U.S., or anti-host country attitudes by key officials are easy to believe and difficult to disprove.

Allegations that can be easily checked are almost never made. Forgeries usually capitalize on perceived local prejudices and anti-U.S. feelings, and tend therefore to be believable. A recent example is the "Green Letter" (Tab I) formally denying that the deaths of 80 infants in Italy were due to chemical and bacteriological weapons stored on a U.S. military base (in fact, no such weapons are stored on the base).

- o Use of documents given gratis. Soviet forgeries are usually sent by mail with no request for payment. Sometimes (as in the forged field manual FM 30-31B, Tab A) the document is posted in a public place where it can be discovered. There is no direct link between the person offering the document and the recipient, nor any chance to ask questions. The forgery is offered, often to journalists, by "idealists" concerned about nefarious activities of the U.S.



- o Designed for media replay. An objective of many forgeries is to get enough replay of the issue so that the original source becomes obscured and the lie acquires a life of its own. Press stories in a second country quoting a media source in the country in which the forgery surfaced can be picked up and replayed indefinitely, giving new impetus to the disinformation operation. The forgery of field manual FM 30-31B is perhaps the best example. Since 1978, the manual and/or articles concerning it have appeared in the world press in more than 20 countries.

In summary, the Soviet "formula" is low-key and authentic-looking: signatures of known officials, real organizations, actual letterheads and government forms, classified or personal communiques, real symbols and identifiers, realistic format and physical appearance, logical (not fanciful) plots, and unsensational exploitation of existing strains, prejudices, and hostilities. Rarely is anything "new" manufactured. Typically, the forgery accentuates and exacerbates what is already present.

TAB A

17

A. Content of Forgery--A U.S. Army Field Manual purporting to give guidance to Army intelligence regarding interference in host country affairs, subversion of host country officials and military officers. Asserts that the U.S. envisions "the use of extreme leftist organizations to safeguard the interests of the United States in friendly nations where communists appear close to entering the government."

B. Purpose and Use of Forgery--To raise host country suspicions of American military presence, thus reducing U.S. foreign military presence abroad. Also used to show that CIA plays similar role to military intelligence.

The most widely replayed Soviet forgery, FM 30-31B has surfaced in over 20 countries since 1978. Soviet propagandists have exploited this forgery:

- o to link the U.S. to various terrorist groups , e.g., 1978 kidnapping and murder of Italian Christian Democratic leader Aldo Moro by the Red Brigades and the Red Brigade kidnapping of U.S. Army General James Dozier.
- o to contribute to the Soviet anti-nuclear campaign.

Several foreign governments have made inquiries concerning the document since it first surfaced.

C. Date, Place, and Method of Surfacing--The first mention of Army Field Manual FM 30-31 (which actually exists) was contained in a Turkish newspaper "Baris" in March, 1975. The newspaper did not reprint a facsimile of the document. In September of the next year a photocopy of the forged FM 30-31B was left on the bulletin board of the Embassy of the Phillippines in Bangkok, Thailand, with a cover note from an anonymous "concerned citizen" addressed to President Marcos.

This surfacing attracted little attention. However, the forgery reappeared in 1978 when it was reprinted in two Spanish publications--"El Pais" (18 September) and "El Triunfo" (23 September)--due to efforts of a Spanish communist and a Cuban intelligence officer.

Since then, the manual and/or articles concerning it have appeared in the press of more than 20 countries. Its greatest impact came from replays in the Netherlands, Greece, Italy, and Porgugal in 1978. The forged manual also surfaced in Mozambique in 1978 and the United States in 1979.

D. Format of Forgery--A rather fuzzy photocopy of a forged, typewritten document purporting to be U.S. Army Field Manual 30-31B, "Stability Operations--Intelligence," bearing the forged signature of then Army Chief of Staff General William Westmorland. Document is stamped "TOP SECRET." Note: Genuine field manuals FM 30-31 and FM 30-31A exist, but FM 30-31B is a total fabrication.

September 14, 1976

His Excellency  
President Ferdinand E. Marcos  
Malacanang Palace  
Manila  
Republic of the Philippines

Dear Mr. President:

In 1974 I sent to Mr. Kukrit Pramoj, who is well-known to you and whom I deeply respect, some secret American documents revealing the dangers for the countries concerned of having U.S. troops and advisers stationed on their territories. Recent developments in Thailand suggest that those documents were both timely and to the point for Mr. Kukrit Pramoj.

Now I am sending these documents to you in the hope that they will also be of use to your Government. I am doing this as one of an American group opposed to excessive U.S. military involvement in matters beyond the scope of reasonable American interest.

Respectfully,

FORGEE

Inclusion 2 to AR-9X-114-76

Personal/Confidential

11/2/15 ASD

His Excellency  
President Ferdinand E. Marcos  
Malacanang Palace  
Manila  
Republic of the Philippines

PERSONAL

H.E. President Ferdinand E. Marcos

c/o H.E. Manuel T. Yan  
Ambassador of the Republic of the Philippines  
760, Sukhumvit Road  
Bangkok



~~TOP SECRET~~

FM 30-31D

Supplement B  
to FM 30-31

Headquarters  
Department of the Army  
Washington, D.C.  
12 March 1970

STABILITY OPERATIONS  
INTELLIGENCE - SPECIAL FIELDS

	Paragraph	Page
Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION		1
Chapter 2. BACKGROUND		
General	1	3
Need for Political Flexibility	2	3
Characteristic Vulnerabilities of KC Regimes	3	4
Chapter 3. U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE TASKS		
Identification of Special Targets	4	5
Recognition of KC Vulnerabilities	5	6
U.S. Army Intelligence Action	6	7
Chapter 4. INTELLIGENCE GUIDANCE		
General	7	9
Recruitment for Intelligence Purposes	8	9
Assistance to U.S. Citizens Abroad	9	10
Penetration of the Regime Movement	10	10
Agency Special Operations	11	11
U.S. Army Intelligence Advantages	12	11
Distribution List		13

TOP SECRET

GROUP-1  
Excluded from  
Automatic DOWNGRADING

(Reverse Blank)

~~TOP SECRET~~  
*11/2/70*

~~TOP SECRET~~

FM 30-31B

Supplement B  
to FM 30-31Headquarters  
Department of the Army  
Washington, D.C.  
17 March 1970STABILITY OPERATIONS  
INTELLIGENCE - SPECIAL FIELD

	Paragraph	Page
Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION		1
Chapter 2. BACKGROUND		
General	1	3
Need for Political Feasibility	2	3
Characteristic Vulnerability of Regimes	3	4
Chapter 3. U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE TASKS		
Identification of Special Interests	4	5
Recognition of Vulnerabilities	5	6
U.S. Army Intelligence Action	6	7
Chapter 4. INTELLIGENCE GUIDANCE		
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Agency Special Operations	11	11
U.S. Army Intelligence Advantages	12	11
Distribution List		13

GROUP-1  
Excluded from  
Automatic Downgrading

(Reverse Blank)

~~TOP SECRET~~

22

TAB B

U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT AIRGRAM A-8950

23

A. Content of Forgery--A U.S. State Department airgram instructing recipients to collect information on ways to bribe European officials and to develop other covert means by which to damage or eliminate foreign trade competition.

B. Purpose and Use of Forgery--The document evidently was intended to exploit damage already done to the U.S. image following revelations that U.S. companies operating abroad had engaged in bribery of foreign government officials. The cover letter also contained the message that the CIA was linked to State Department operations abroad, with a particular emphasis on U.S. allies in NATO.

The "London Sunday Times" picked up the allegations and published a story in November 1976 that identified the charges as being based on a forgery. In a technique often used by the Soviet Union, the TASS news agency reported the "Times" article, but omitted any mention of the bogus nature of the airgram, thus extracting additional mileage from the forgery.

C. Date, Place, and Method of Surfacing--The forged airgram was sent with a cover letter (in French) by one "Robert Pont" (fictitious) to NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns and several West European governments in late 1976.

D. Format of Forgery--The bogus document was an altered version of a genuine State Department airgram (A-8950) dated 3 December 1974. The valid airgram was simply a statement of economic, financial, and commercial information requirements worldwide for FY 1975.

This forgery is considered by the U.S. to have been a success despite the numerous discrepancies in the document. These included: the signature of a fictitious person on the cover letter; use of titles such as "President," "Chancellor," and "Prime Minister" which were not capitalized; use of slash marks instead of parentheses to offset phrases; and employment of photocopies of the forgery which were dim and minimally legible.



Paris, le 5 août 1976.

Monsieur le Secrétaire Général,

Je suis entré par hasard en possession d'un document de l'Ambassade des Etats Unis à Paris dont le contenu m'a, en tant qu'Espagnol, profondément ému et indigné. Il s'agit en effet d'une instruction de la CIA et du Département d'Etat, transmise aux Ambassades et Consulats américains et instruisant comment les représentants des USA doivent pratiquer l'espionnage principalement contre les alliés des Etats Unis, membre de l'OTAN.

Je me permets de vous transmettre ce document avec l'urgente prière de le porter à la connaissance des membres du Conseil de l'OTAN et de vous demander de protester de la manière la plus catégorique envers le gouvernement des Etats Unis en exigeant qu'il cesse ce genre de pratiques révoltantes envers des Etats-amis.

Je transmets en même temps ce document à la connaissance de certaines personnalités françaises et d'autres pays membres de l'Alliance Atlantique.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Secrétaire Général, l'expression de mes sentiments distingués.

Monsieur Joseph M. A. LUNS  
Secrétaire Général de l'OTAN

1110 BRUXELLES

*Robert Post*

COPY

EMBASSY  
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
PARIS

CONFIDENTIAL  
10/9/75 608

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

Handling: Classification: Message Reference No:  
/CONFIDENTIAL/ A - 2950

TO: ALL AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS AND USOECD PARIS,  
USEC BRUSSELS, USNATO BRUSSELS, US MISSION GENEVA,  
USIAEA VIENNA, USUNIDO VIENNA, USUN NEW YORK

FROM: Department of State

RG52: GDS

TAGS: ECRF XX

SUBJECT: FY 1975 Coordinated Statement of Priority Economic, Financial,  
and Commercial Intelligence Requirements Worldwide of the  
Washington Economic Community

REF: Department of State Airgram A - 2281, 24 March 1973

The referenced Airgram, the first in this series, commenced with a statement that remains valid:

The Executive Branch's priority needs for economic intelligence on foreign countries are determined by important US interests and the strategies adopted to protect or advance them. These interests and strategies have a new importance resulting from the changed place of the US economy in the world. US economic intelligence needs center around the motivations and assessments of changes in the intentions, plans, and capabilities of other countries in the economic field.

CONFIDENTIAL

By: CJ.FORD/A.SOKOLSKI	Drafting date: 11/27/74	Phone No: 143-5577	Contents and classification approved by:
Inccs: CIA/ODR H.ERNST	ED/SA: R.COLD		ED/CBA: J.BILLER
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	ED/OCA: N.S.LAKAS		

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In particular, reporting is requested on how host-country domestic and international economic policies and programs are likely to support or conflict significantly with US policies and programs. The past interest to the extent that it illuminates these essential ingredients of US economic policy formulation.

In the intervening period, since March 1973, detailed guidance has been supplied triannually to eight regions of the world by the Economic Alert Lists (EALs). (The annual Economic Reporting Guides, after a poll of representative embassies, have been abolished.) The EALs are prepared by the US Intelligence Board's Economic Intelligence Committee and include input from the entire Washington economic community. They are disseminated by the Department as executive agent of the Combined Economic Reporting Program (CERP). The current update of the overall statement (now on a fiscal year basis) places in context specific guidance provided subsequently by the Economic Alert Lists and is intended for all officers charged with responsibility bearing directly or indirectly on the broad economic/financial/commercial area.

The general priority subjects set forth below are to a varying degree applicable to all diplomatic and consular posts. They are the eight economic topics contained in the Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) for FY 1975, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence, and are designed to be responsive to and to support the following substantive objective for the intelligence community: "Provide reliable, timely, and comprehensive information and assessments relevant to US international economic policy decisions and negotiations."

These questions were formulated, it will be noted, in consultation with senior policy officers of the principal departments and entities concerned with international economic relations.

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TAB C

A. Content of Forgery--A series of documents purporting to present U.S. war plans for Europe, including the listing of nuclear targets.

B. Purpose and Use of Forgery--This fabrication is designed to exploit European concern about nuclear weapons by claiming, among other things, that the U.S. would use such weapons against the territory of its NATO Allies. A series of surfacings since summer 1980 suggests that the documents are being used in the Soviet effort to encourage West European opposition to NATO nuclear force modernization.

The introduction to the war plans declares that the documents show that "U.S. thinking is still dominated by preparation for war..." It also alleges that the U.S. will sacrifice Western Europe to nuclear war in order to save itself.

C. Date, Place, and Method of Surfacing--This collection is one of the most extensively used Soviet documentary fabrications. The documents first appeared in 1967 in a Norwegian magazine called Orientering. From 1967 to 1971, some or all of the documents were sent to numerous newspapers and magazines in at least ten West European countries.

The documents have started to surface again over the last two years, beginning in London in June 1980, about the time the British government announced its decision on GLCM basing sites. The documents surfaced in 1981 in the Netherlands, Norway, Belgium, Malta, Greece, Britain, and France.

In each recent surfacing, the documents were mailed as a pamphlet (published in Britain) to a recipient from the London area. No return address was provided.

D. Format of Forgery--The collection consists of fabricated or altered U.S. war plans dating from the early 1960s that the U.S. considers to be outdated. At least some of these documents were passed to the Soviet Union by Sgt. Robert Lee Johnson, who in 1965 was convicted of espionage and sentenced to 25 years in prison.

The documents now surface usually as a pamphlet entitled "Top Secret Documents on U.S. Forces Headquarters in Europe, Holocaust Again for Europe." The pamphlet bears the notation that it is "Information Books No. 1," suggesting that other fabrications of this type may be forthcoming.

TOP SECRET  
149/15 608  
DOCUMENTS

ON US FORCES  
HEADQUARTERS  
IN EUROPE

The seal of the United States Army Europe is visible in the background. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a globe. The eagle is surrounded by a circular border containing the text "UNITED STATES ARMY EUROPE". Above the eagle are three stars.

HOLOCAUST

AGAIN FOR EUROPE

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~~TOP SECRET~~ DOCUMENTS

ON US FORCE'S HEADQUARTERS

IN EUROPE

INFORMATION BOOKS No 1

~~TOP SECRET~~

16/1/5 000

OPERATION PLAN  
USCINCEUR NR 100-1  
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~~TOP SECRET~~ *u/a/s*

~~SECRET~~ *u/a/s*

Headquarters  
US EUROPEAN COMMAND  
APO 128, US Forces

OPERATION PLAN  
USCINCPAC NR 100-1

Appendix 3 to Annex N Civil Affairs  
USCINCPAC OPLAN NR 100-1  
STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT

ANNEXES:

- A Not used.
- B Assignment of Forces
- C Command Relationships
- D Intelligence
- E Logistics and Personnel
- F Communications-Electronics
- G Not used
- H Chemical, Biological and Radiological Warfare
- I Unconventional Warfare (Issued separately)
- J Psychological Operations
- K Not used
- L Not used
- M Maps and Charts
- N Civil Affairs
- O Information Activities

AUTHENTICATION:

*B Espino*  
B. E. ESPINO  
Major General, US Army  
Director, J-3 Division

DRAFT OF AN EMERGENCY STATUS OF FORCES (SOF) AGREEMENT

(It is assumed that such an Emergency SOF Agreement will be concluded in the form of an Exchange of Notes between the Foreign Ministry or other appropriate authority of (country) and the US Ambassador, or Commander of the US Forces in (country).)

PREAMBLE

1. The Embassy of the United States of America (the Commander US Forces in \_\_\_\_\_) presents its (his) compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has the honor to state that the discussions that have taken place between us concerning the status of US Forces deployed, or to be deployed, in \_\_\_\_\_ at the request of the \_\_\_\_\_ Government, have led to agreement as follows:

SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS

2. a. The designated US commander or, in his absence, the senior US military commander present shall have exclusive control of the US Forces and the direction thereof.

b. The US Forces shall have the right to occupy any area of facility considered necessary for the accomplishment of their mission or for their safety and continued security, as determined by US military commanders, and to install such equipment therein as they shall deem necessary for these purposes.

c. Military commanders of the US Forces may take such measures as they deem necessary to provide adequate security for their installations, personnel and equipment, and for the movement of supplies and personnel in \_\_\_\_\_. Within installations utilized by the US military forces, military commanders shall have absolute and full authority to maintain discipline and order among members of the US Forces. Outside such installations, military police of the US Forces shall have full authority, subject to such further arrangements as may be made with the local police authorities, to maintain discipline and order among members of the US Forces. In the event of acts of violence against US installations, equipment, or personnel by persons other than members of the US Forces, such persons may be apprehended by the US Forces and turned over to the Government of \_\_\_\_\_ for appropriate disposition in accordance with laws of that country.

Change 3 to USCINCPAC OPLAN NR 100-1

THIS APPENDIX CONSISTS OF 4 PAGES

Change 3 to USCINCPAC OPLAN 100-1

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