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File Folder USSR - SOVIET PAMPHLET - "THE THREAT OF EUROPE" (2)

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
170268	CABLE	MOSCOW 16137 <i>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-21-1-9</i>	10	11/23/1982	B1
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170851	MEMO	R. ALLEN TO ED MEESE, JIM BAKER, AND MIKE DEEVER RE "THE THREAT TO EUORPE." (INCL. PAGES 1-6 OF ATTACHMENT) <i>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-21-3-7</i>	7	11/24/1982	B1
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FOR EUR/SOV
E. O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: UR, US, MPOL, PARM
SUBJECT: SOVIET PAMPHLET: "THE THREAT TO EUROPE" - IV
REFS: (A) MOSCOW 16090, (B) MOSCOW 16091
- (C) MOSCOW 16098

1. THIS CABLE, THE FOURTH OF FOUR, CARRIES THE TEXT OF SECTION IV -- A REALISTIC PROGRAMME OF ENSURING PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND THE REST OF THE WORLD -- AND THE CONCLUSION OF THE SOVIET PAMPHLET "THE THREAT TO EUROPE" RELEASED IN MOSCOW NOVEMBER 20, 1981. DEPARTMENT SHOULD PASS TO OTHER POSTS AS APPROPRIATE. BEGIN TEXT:

IV. A REALISTIC PROGRAMME OF ENSURING PEACE
- AND SECURITY IN EUROPE
- AND THE REST OF THE WORLD

QUESTION: ALL YOU HAVE SAID GIVES RISE TO SEVERAL QUESTIONS: DOES THE SOVIET UNION THINK IT POSSIBLE TO OVERCOME THE DANGEROUS SITUATION WHICH IT BELIEVES HAS TAKEN SHAPE IN EUROPE AND THE WORLD? CAN IT OFFER ANY POSITIVE WAY OUT OF THAT SITUATION? OR IS IT FATALISTICALLY PREPARING FOR NUCLEAR WAR ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE U. S. AND NATO POLICIES MAKE THAT WAR INEVITABLE?

ANSWER: NOTHING COULD BE FURTHER FROM THE TRUTH THAN WHAT YOU SAID OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY. IT IS BASED, FIRST, ON THE CONVICTION THAT A THERMONUCLEAR CATASTROPHE CAN BE AVERTED AND, SECOND ON SECURING EFFECTIVE MEASURES WHICH, IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, WOULD RULE OUT WAR AND ANY OTHER USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. THAT IS PRECISELY THE OBJECTIVE OF THE SOVIET PEACE PROGRAMME ELABORATED AT THE 24TH AND 25TH CONGRESSES OF THE CPSU AND CONSISTENTLY PURSUED IN THE SOVIET UNION'S FOREIGN RELATIONS. SPECIFICALLY, THE SOVIET UNION PROCEEDED FROM IT IN ADVANCING SUCH IMPORTANT INITIATIVES AS:

- THE PROPOSAL ABOUT CEASING THE MANUFACTURE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND REDUCING THEIR STOCKPILES, UP TO THEIR COMPLETE ELIMINATION;
- THE PROPOSAL ON BANNING NEUTRON WEAPONS;
- THE PROPOSAL ON BANNING ALL OTHER TYPES OF MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS;
- THE STATEMENT THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL NOT

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USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST THE NON-NUCLEAR COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE NOT ALLOWED NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO BE STATIONED ON THEIR TERRITORIES;

- THE PROPOSAL FOR THE PARTICIPANTS OF THE EUROPEAN CONFERENCE TO PROMISE NOT TO USE NUCLEAR OR CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS FIRST AGAINST ONE ANOTHER;

- THE PROPOSAL ABOUT RENOUNCING THE EXPANSION OF THE EXISTING OR THE CREATION OF NEW MILITARY BLOCS IN EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE;

- THE PROPOSAL ABOUT CONVENING AN ALL-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ON MILITARY DETENTE AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE.

THE SOVIET UNION DID ALL IT COULD TO FACILITATE THE SIGNING OF THE SALT-2 TREATY AND TREATIES ON A COMPLETE NUCLEAR TEST BAN, ON BANNING RADIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS, AND ON REDUCING ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

THE SOVIET UNION IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FACT THAT ITS PROPOSALS, BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY, HAVE BEEN REJECTED, NEGOTIATIONS BROKEN OFF, AND ALREADY SIGNED TREATIES NOT RATIFIED. THAT RESPONSIBILITY RESTS WITH THOSE WHO WANT TO SECURE MILITARY SUPERIORITY AND THEREFORE REJECT THE NEED FOR LIMITING AND STOPPING THE ARMS RACE.

THE SOVIET PROPOSALS ON STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND CURBING THE ARMS RACE REMAIN IN FORCE.
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"THE CENTRAL DIRECTION IN THE FOREIGN POLICY OF OUR PARTY AND GOVERNMENT IS, AS IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN, TO LESSEN THE DANGER OF WAR AND TO CURB THE ARMS RACE," LEONID BREZHNEV SAID AT THE 26TH CPSU CONGRESS.

"AT THE PRESENT TIME THIS OBJECTIVE HAS BECOME ONE OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE AND URGENCY BECAUSE RAPID AND PROFOUND CHANGES ARE UNDER WAY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY. QUALITATIVELY NEW TYPES OF WEAPONS, ABOVE ALL WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, ARE BEING DEVELOPED. THESE ARE WEAPONS OF A TYPE THAT MAY MAKE CONTROL OVER THEM, AND THEREFORE ALSO THEIR AGREED LIMITATION, EXTREMELY DIFFICULT, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE. A NEW ROUND OF THE ARMS RACE WILL UPSET INTERNATIONAL STABILITY, AND GREATLY INCREASE THE DANGER OF ANOTHER WAR."

PROCEEDING FROM THE CONVICTION THAT A RADICAL IMPROVEMENT IN THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE IS IMPERATIVE, THE 26TH CONGRESS OF THE CPSU ADVANCED A SET OF NEW INITIATIVES FORMULATED IN LEONID BREZHNEV'S REPORT AND AIMED AT SETTLING TODAY'S MOST URGENT INTERNATIONAL ISSUES. THE CONGRESS HAS:

- REAFFIRMED THE PROPOSAL ABOUT EXPANDING THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN THE MILITARY SPHERE CARRIED OUT BY DECISION OF THE EUROPEAN CONFERENCE, AND GIVING ADVANCE NOTICE OF NAVAL AND AIR FORCE EXERCISES AND OF LARGE-SCALE TROOP MOVEMENTS;

- SUGGESTED CONSIDERABLY EXPANDING THE ZONE OF SUCH MEASURES BY APPLYING THEM TO THE ENTIRE EUROPEAN PART OF THE USSR, PROVIDED THE WESTERN STATES, TOO, EXTEND THE ZONE OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES ACCORDINGLY;

- PROPOSED HOLDING CONCRETE NEGOTIATIONS ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN THE FAR EAST WITH ALL INTERESTED COUNTRIES, WITH DUE CONSIDERATION FOR THE REGION'S SPECIFIC FEATURES;

- EXPRESSED THE SOVIET UNION'S READINESS TO DISCUSS QUESTIONS CONNECTED WITH AFGHANISTAN, SEPARATELY OR TOGETHER WITH QUESTIONS OF PERSIAN GULF SECURITY (THIS, NATURALLY, APPLYING ONLY TO THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE AFGHAN PROBLEM, AND NOT TO INTERNAL AFGHAN AFFAIRS);

- DECLARED THAT IT IS TIME TO GO BACK TO HONEST COLLECTIVE SEARCH OF AN ALL-EMBRACING, JUST AND REALISTIC SETTLEMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM, WHICH COULD BE DONE IN THE FRAMEWORK OF A SPECIALLY CONVENED INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE;

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- CALLED FOR RESTRAINT IN THE FIELD OF STRATEGIC ARMS AND EXPRESSED THE SOVIET UNION'S READINESS TO CONTINUE THE RELEVANT NEGOTIATIONS ON THEIR LIMITATION WITH THE UNITED STATES WITHOUT DELAY, PRESERVING ALL THE POSITIVE ELEMENTS THAT HAVE SO FAR BEEN ACHIEVED IN THIS AREA; THOSE NEGOTIATIONS CAN BE CONDUCTED ONLY ON THE BASIS OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY;

- SUGGESTED COMING TO TERMS ON LIMITING THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE NEW SUBMARINES EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR MISSILES - THE OHIO TYPE BY THE UNITED STATES, AND SIMILAR ONES BY THE USSR - AND ON BANNING MODERNISATION OF EXISTING AND DEVELOPMENT OF NEW BALLISTIC MISSILES FOR THESE SUBMARINES;

- PROPOSED AGREEMENT ON SETTING A NEW MORATORIUM ON THE DEPLOYMENT IN EUROPE OF NEW MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES OF NATO COUNTRIES AND THE SOVIET UNION, THAT IS, FREEZING THE EXISTING QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE LEVEL OF THESE WEAPONS, NATURALLY INCLUDING THE U.S. FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIS REGION; THE MORATORIUM COULD ENTER INTO FORCE THE
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MOMENT NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN ON THIS SCORE, AND COULD
REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL A PERMANENT TREATY IS
CONCLUDED ON LIMITING OR, STILL BETTER, REDUCING
SUCH NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE; THE TWO SIDES WOULD
STOP ALL PREPARATIONS FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF
RESPECTIVE ADDITIONAL WEAPONS, INCLUDING US PERSHING-2
MISSILES AND LAND-BASED STRATEGIC CRUISE MISSILES;

- SUGGESTED THAT A COMPETENT INTERNATIONAL
COMMITTEE SHOULD BE SET UP, WHICH WOULD DEMONSTRATE
THE VITAL NECESSITY OF PREVENTING A NUCLEAR
CATASTROPHE; THE COMMITTEE COULD BE COMPOSED OF THE
MOST EMINENT SCIENTISTS OF DIFFERENT COUNTRIES, AND
THE WHOLE WORLD SHOULD BE INFORMED OF THE CONCLUSIONS
THEY DRAW;

- STATED THAT IN MANY WAYS THE INTERNATIONAL
SITUATION DEPENDS ON THE POLICIES OF THE USSR AND
THE UNITED STATES, WHILE THE STATE OF RELATIONS
BETWEEN THEM AT PRESENT AND THE ACUTENESS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS REQUIRING A SOLUTION NECESSITATE
AN ACTIVE DIALOGUE AT ALL LEVELS; EXPRESSED READINESS
TO HAVE SUCH A DIALOGUE AND STRESSED THAT THE CRUCIAL
FACTOR HERE IS MEETINGS AT SUMMIT LEVEL;

- SUGGESTED CONVENING A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF THE TOP
LEADERS OF ITS MEMBER-STATES TO SEEK IMPROVEMENT
IN THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND TO PREVENT WAR;
IF THEY SO WISH, LEADERS OF OTHER COUNTRIES COULD
ALSO TAKE PART IN THE SESSION.

ALL THIS SHOWS THAT THE SOVIET UNION OFFERS, AND HAS
ANNOUNCED TO THE ENTIRE WORLD, A POSITIVE PROGRAMME
OF IMPROVING THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE. IN SO DOING,
IT IS FAR REMOVED FROM THE THOUGHT OF PRESENTING IT
LIKE AN ULTIMATUM. "WE MAKE NO EXCLUSIVE CLAIMS TO
STRENGTHENING PEACE," LEONID BREZHNEV SAID IN KIEV
ON 9 MAY 1981. "WE ARE FOR AN EXTENSIVE DIALOGUE,
AND ANY CONSTRUCTIVE INITIATIVE WILL ALWAYS MEET
WITH UNDERSTANDING ON OUR PART."

THAT THIS IS REALLY SO IS ALSO BORNE OUT BY THE FACT
THAT AFTER THIS PROGRAMME FOR STRENGTHENING PEACE WAS
PUBLISHED, THE SOVIET UNION HAS ELABORATED ON MANY
OF ITS PROVISIONS AND ADVANCED NEW PEACE INITIATIVES.

QUESTION: YOU UNDERSTAND THAT WE ARE ABOVE ALL
INTERESTED IN ISSUES OF EUROPEAN SECURITY. WE DO NOT
DENY THERE ARE SOME POSITIVE ELEMENTS IN SOVIET
INITIATIVES IN THAT RESPECT - SPECIFICALLY, YOUR
EXPRESSION OF READINESS TO NEGOTIATE LIMITATION AND
REDUCTION OF MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE.

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BUT THE SOVIET UNION HAD NOT VOICED THAT READINESS UNTIL AFTER NATO'S "DOUBLE DECISION". IF THERE HAD BEEN NO SECOND TRACK TO THAT DECISION - NAMELY, THE PROSPECT OF NATO REARMAMENT AND THE FIRM WESTERN COMMITMENT IN THAT REGARD - ONE COULD HAVE HARDLY EXPECTED THE SOVIET UNION TO AGREE TO HOLD ITS TALKS OR ACCEPT THE NEED FOR AN AGREEMENT ON REDUCING MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THEREFORE, WASN'T THE "DOUBLE DECISION" NECESSARY AND DIDN'T IT PRODUCE A POSITIVE EFFECT?

ANSWER: WE MUST SAY THAT THIS VIEW, TOO, EITHER IGNORES THE FACTS OR IS OBLIVIOUS OF THEM. AND THE FACTS SHOW THAT THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO NEED TO "FORCE" THE SOVIET UNION TO AGREE TO NEGOTIATIONS ON LIMITING AND ENDING THE ARMS RACE: THE USSR HAS ALWAYS BEEN READY FOR THEM, AND, MOREOVER, WAS THE FIRST TO PROPOSE THEM. THAT IS ALSO TRUE OF MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE.

LET US RECALL THAT MANY YEARS BEFORE THE IDEA OF A "DOUBLE DECISION" TOOK SHAPE, NAMELY, DURING THE SALT-1 AND SALT-2 TALKS, THE SOVIET SIDE HAD PROPOSED THAT THOSE NEGOTIATIONS ALSO COVER THE PROBLEM CREATED BY THE U.S. FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WHICH FORCED THE USSR TO DEVELOP ITS OWN MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONS. FOR EXAMPLE, SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREI GROMYKO REFERRED TO THAT ISSUE AT A PRESS CONFERENCE IN MOSCOW ON 31 MARCH 1977, WHEN

HE SAID: "EVEN AS WE CONCLUDED THE FIRST STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENT WE MADE OFFICIAL STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECT THAT WE MUST RETURN TO THAT ISSUE" (PRAVDA, 1 APRIL 1977). ON 23 NOVEMBER 1979, AT A PRESS CONFERENCE IN BONN, ANDREI GROMYKO OBSERVED: "WHILE PREPARING THE SALT-2 TREATY WE ALSO TRIED ... TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF U.S. FORWARD-BASED WEAPONS.
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FOR EUR/SOV
BUT THE AMERICANS REFUSED CATEGORICALLY. FRANKLY,
THE SOVIET UNION MADE A CONCESSION, IT AGREED TO
HAVE A TREATY THAT DID NOT TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION
THE GEOGRAPHICAL FACTOR WHICH BENEFITTED ONLY THE
WEST, THE UNITED STATES" (PRAVDA, 25 NOVEMBER 1979).
BESIDES, BY STUBBORNLY REFUSING TO DISCUSS THE
FORWARD-BASED WEAPONS AND BY ITS ATTEMPTS AT MAKING
THAT REFUSAL A MANDATORY CONDITION OF TALKS ON
MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE, THE UNITED
STATES ACTUALLY WANTS TO TURN A UNILATERAL CONCESSION
BY THE SOVIET UNION INTO A STANDING RULE AND TO
EXCLUDE ITS FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS ALTOGETHER FROM
THE ARMS LIMITATION TALKS. THERE IS NO NEED TO EXPLAIN
THAT THIS APPROACH IS AIMED AT PERPETUATING A
UNILATERAL WESTERN ADVANTAGE AND THAT IT THEREFORE
UNDERMINES THE VERY BASIS OF NEGOTIATING ARMS
LIMITATION.

AFTER THE WEST HAD LAUNCHED THE NOISY AND, AS WE
HAVE SHOWN, GROUNDLESS CAMPAIGN ABOUT "SOVIET
SUPERIORITY" IN MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONS, THE USSR
AGAIN REPEATEDLY PROPOSED THAT TALKS BE HELD ON
THAT ISSUE.

"AS FOR THE SOVIET UNION," LEONID BREZHNEV DECLARED
ON 2 MARCH 1979, "IT HAS REPEATEDLY STATED THAT IT
FAVOURS NOT BUILD-UP BUT LIMITATION OF NUCLEAR
MISSILES AND OTHER WEAPONS THROUGH AGREEMENT BASED
ON COMPLETE RECIPROCITY. THAT IS ALSO TRUE OF THE
MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONS IN EUROPE-NATURALLY, WITH
DUE REGARD TO THE U. S. MILITARY BASES THERE."

SPEAKING IN VIENNA ON 17 JUNE 1979 AT A DINNER IN
HONOUR OF THE U. S. PRESIDENT, LEONID BREZHNEV
OBSERVED THAT "THE SALT-2 TREATY WILL OPEN THE WAY
FOR ADVANCING FURTHER TOWARDS SALT-3. THIS WORK
WILL PROBABLY BE EVEN MORE COMPLICATED. A NUMBER
OF SERIOUS STRATEGIC AND GEOGRAPHICAL FACTORS
THAT SO FAR HAVE REMAINED OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK
OF OUR TALKS WILL HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT."
ON 25 JULY 1979 ANDREI GROMYKO SAID AT A PRESS
CONFERENCE IN MOSCOW: "PROGRESS IN THE FUTURE
NEGOTIATIONS ON CONCLUDING A THIRD STRATEGIC ARMS
LIMITATION AGREEMENT IS ONLY POSSIBLE IF THEY
TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ALL FACTORS AFFECTING THE STRATEGIC
SITUATION IN THE WORLD, INCLUDING EUROPE. THAT
MEANS THE FOLLOWING: SUCCESS IS POSSIBLE ONLY WITH
THE NEGOTIATIONS DEAL WITH THE QUESTION OF U. S.
FORWARD-BASED WEAPONS... THE AMERICAN SIDE IS WELL
AWARE OF THAT" (PRAVDA, 26 JUNE 1979).

REFERRING TO THE SALT-3 TALKS WHICH WERE TO BEGIN
IMMEDIATELY UPON THE SALT-2 TREATY'S ENTRY INTO

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FORCE, LEONID BREZHNEV SAID IN BERLIN ON 6 OCTOBER 1979: "WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THESE TALKS WE AGREE TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITIES OF LIMITING NOT ONLY INTERCONTINENTAL BUT ALSO OTHER TYPES OF ARMAMENTS, BUT WITH DUE ACCOUNT, OF COURSE, OF ALL RELATED FACTORS AND WITH STRICT OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF THE EQUAL SECURITY OF BOTH SIDES."

A MONTH LATER, ON 6 NOVEMBER 1979, IN AN INTERVIEW TO PRAVDA, LEONID BREZHNEV REFERRED TO THE MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND SAID: "AS REGARDS A PRACTICAL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF THESE WEAPONS, THERE IS ONLY ONE WAY TO FOLLOW - THAT OF STARTING NEGOTIATIONS. THE SOVIET UNION IS OF THE VIEW THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS MUST BE EMBARKED ON WITHOUT DELAY. WE ARE PREPARED FOR THIS. IT IS NOW UP TO THE WESTERN POWERS."

THAT PROPOSAL MEANT THAT IN ITS SINCERE DEDICATION TO SETTling THE ISSUE OF MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, THE SOVIET UNION WAS DRAWING THE LOGICAL CONCLUSIONS FROM THE EXISTING SITUATION. AND ALREADY AT THAT TIME, IN LATE 1979, IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS AIMING AT DELAYING THE SALT-2 TREATY RATIFICATION AND, CONSEQUENTLY, THE START OF NEGOTIATIONS ON SALT-3 WHICH WERE SUPPOSED TO CONCERN MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONS, AMONG OTHER THINGS. TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE URGENT NEED TO SETTLE THAT PROBLEM, THE SOVIET

UNION PROPOSED, AS ANDREI GROMYKO DECLARED AT THE 23 NOVEMBER 1979 PRESS CONFERENCE IN BONN, THAT "THE NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN IMMEDIATELY, WITHOUT WAITING FOR SALT-3".

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THUS FACTS AND OFFICIAL STATEMENTS BY SOVIET STATESMEN,
INCLUDING THOSE MADE AT TOP LEVEL, CLEARLY SHOW
THAT THERE WAS NO NEED FOR ADOPTING A "DOUBLE
DECISION" FOR "FORCE" THE SOVIET UNION TO SIT
DOWN TO TALKS ON LIMITING MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR
WEAPONS IN EUROPE. THE USSR ITSELF INSISTED ON THOSE
TALKS AND SUBMITTED SPECIFIC PROPOSALS ON STARTING
THEM, AND ONLY THE NEGATIVE WESTERN STAND MADE IT
IMPOSSIBLE TO HOLD THEM.

AFTER THE NATO "DOUBLE DECISION" WAS ADOPTED, A
DEAFENING ADVERTISING CAMPAIGN WAS LAUNCHED, DESIGNED
TO CONVINCING PUBLIC OPINION THAT NATO WAS THE ONE
THAT FIRST SUGGESTED MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONS TALKS,
THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS PREPARED TO BEGIN THEM
AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE, AND THAT THE BALL WAS NOW IN
THE SOVIET UNION'S COURT. THE WEST IS STILL

PUBLICISING THE VERSION THAT THE POSITION THE
SOVIET UNION TOOK AFTER THE "DOUBLE DECISION" HAS
LED TO AN UNWARRANTED DELAY IN AGREEING ON WHEN
THE TALKS SHOULD START. BUT THAT IS ESSENTIALLY
AN ADMISSION THAT IT WAS AN ATTEMPT AT ISSUING AN
ULTIMATUM TO THE SOVIET UNION. IT WAS ACTUALLY A
DEMAND THAT THE USSR SHOULD SUBMISSIVELY AND
UNQUESTIONINGLY AND WITHOUT "UNDUE DELAY" AGREE TO
A NEGOTIATING BASIS WHICH, AS WE HAVE DEMONSTRATED,
OBVIOUSLY PUT THE SOVIET UNION AT A DISADVANTAGE
AND UNILATERALLY FAVOURED THE WEST. THIS CALLS TO
MIND THE FOLLOWING COMPARISON. IN LATE 1979 AND EARLY
1980 THERE WERE DEMANDS THAT THE SOVIET UNION
IMMEDIATELY SIT DOWN TO NEGOTIATE; EACH DAY OF
"DELAY" WAS PRESENTED AS "PROOF" THAT THE USSR
WAS UNWILLING TO NEGOTIATE AND THAT IT WAS EVEN
GIVING UP THE VERY IDEA OF TALKS. BUT WHEN IN THE
AUTUMN OF 1980 THE UNITED STATES BROKE OFF THE TALKS
ALREADY UNDER WAY AND DELAYED, WITHOUT ANY JUSTIFICATION,
THEIR RESUMPTION PRACTICALLY THROUGHOUT 1981, THE
VERY PEOPLE WHO HAD DENOUNCED THE SOVIET UNION, TOOK
PAINS TO FIND EXCUSES AND PORTRAYED THE U. S. POSITION
AS "NATURAL", "GIVING RISE TO NO MISGIVINGS" AND EVEN
TESTIFYING TO "SERIOUS PREPARATIONS FOR THE TALKS".
FOR US IT IS A GRAPHIC ILLUSTRATION OF THE SO-CALLED
UNBIASED WESTERN APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS AND
TO THE WAY THEIR PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BEHAVE.

THOSE WHO STAGED THAT CAMPAIGN WENT OUT OF THEIR
WAY TO PLAY DOWN THE FACT THAT FOR MANY YEARS IT HAS
BEEN THE UNITED STATES AND NATO WHO HAVE
CATEGORICALLY REFUSED - AS WE HAVE DEMONSTRATED -
TO PURSUE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BASIS SUGGESTED BY
THE SOVIET SIDE. BESIDES, WE MUST ALSO RECALL THAT
SOVIET PROPOSALS ON THAT SCORE WERE NOT ULTIMATUMS;

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THE USSR AGREED TO ANY REASONABLE COMPROMISE OVER THE BASIS OF NEGOTIATIONS. THAT, ESSENTIALLY, WAS WHAT MADE THE SALT-1 AND SALT-2 NEGOTIATIONS AND THE SIGNING OF THE TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS POSSIBLE. THE ONLY DEMAND THE SOVIET UNION HAS ALWAYS ADVANCED AND WILL ADVANCE IS THAT THE NEGOTIATING BASIS SHOULD CONFORM TO THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY OF THE SIDES.

THAT IS PRECISELY WHAT THE "BASIS" SUGGESTED IN THE "DOUBLE DECISION" IGNORES. NO WONDER THE SOVIET UNION HAS REJECTED IT. AGAIN, WHAT WAS REJECTED WAS THE ONE-SIDED AND UNJUST "BASIS", AND NOT SOVIET READINESS TO HOLD NEGOTIATIONS, AT WHICH THE SIDES COULD COME TO TERMS, AMONG OTHER THINGS, ABOUT A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE BASIS.

AS LEONID BREZHNEV SAID IN HIS INTERVIEW TO PRAVDA ON 13 JANUARY 1980, "WE ARE FOR TALKS, BUT FOR HONEST AND EQUAL TALKS, FOR THE OBSERVANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY. IT IS PRECISELY THIS KIND OF TALKS THAT WE RECENTLY PROPOSED TO START ON THE QUESTION OF MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR ARMS. NOBODY CAN EXPECT THE SOVIET UNION TO ACCEPT NATO'S TERMS DESIGNED TO ALLOW IT TO CONDUCT TALKS FROM POSITIONS OF STRENGTH."

THEREFORE, TODAY EVERYTHING HINGES ON WHETHER THE UNITED STATES AND NATO DISPLAY THEIR READINESS TO

RETURN TO THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY, TO SEARCHING FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT ON THE BASIS AND SUBJECT OF NEGOTIATIONS, OR WHETHER THEY CONTINUE TO CLING TO THEIR PRESENT ULTIMATUM-
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LIKE AND BIASED POSIITION.

ALREADY AFTER THE "DOUBLE DECISION" WAS TAKEN, THE SOVIET UNION PROVED BY SPECIFIC PROPOSALS THAT IT AIMED AT FACILITATING AN AGREEMENT ON THAT KEY ISSUE.

IN THE EARLY MONTHS OF 1980, THE SOVIET SIDE REPEATEDLY STATED THAT EFFECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS COULD START IF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATO DECISION WERE OFFICIALLY OR FACTUALLY SUSPENDED (SEE, FOR EXAMPLE, THE COMMUNIQUE OF THE CPSU AND THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY IN PRAVDA OF 11 JANUARY 1980, OR ANDREI GROMYKO'S SPEECH IN HIS CONSTITUENCY ON 18 FEBRUARY 1980 IN PRAVDA OF 19 FEBRUARY 1980).

SUSPENSION OF THE "DOUBLE DECISION" WOULD HAVE ALSO MEANT SUSPENSION OF THE ULTIMATUM-LIKE DEMANDS MENTIONED ABOVE. THAT COULD HAVE MADE IT POSSIBLE TO AGREE ON A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE NEGOTIATING BASIS. THAT TIME, TOO, THE WEST FAILED TO RESPOND TO THE REASONABLE SOVIET INITIATIVE.

IN ITS ATTEMPT AT PROVING THE EFFICIENCY OF THE "DOUBLE DECISION" AS A MEANS OF PRESSURE ON THE USSR, NATO PROPAGANDA ALLEGES THAT IT WAS PRECISELY THAT DECISION WHICH "FINALLY" IN THE COURSE OF THE USSR-FRG SUMMIT TALKS IN MOSCOW ON 30 JUNE-1 JULY 1980 FORCED THE SOVIET UNION TO WITHDRAW ITS OBJECTIONS TO BEGINNING TALKS ON MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONS IN EUROPE. BESIDES, THE IMPRESSION IS BEING CREATED THAT THOSE TALKS CONVINCED THE SOVIET UNION OF THE JUST NATURE OF THE NATO NEGOTIATING TERMS.

THE ACTUAL SITUATION IS QUITE DIFFERENT. FIRST, AS WE HAVE ALREADY DEMONSTRATED, THE SOVIET UNION HAD NEVER OBJECTED TO TALKS ON MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONS; ON THE CONTRARY, IT HAD ALWAYS WORKED TO ENSURE THEIR EARLIEST START AND SUGGESTED VARIOUS FORMS DEPENDING ON THE ACTUAL SITUATION. SO, AS FAR AS THAT CLAIM IS CONCERNED, THE RESULTS OF THE MOSCOW TALKS ARE EXPLAINED NOT BY THE ALLEGED IMPACT OF THE "DOUBLE DECISION" ON THE USSR BUT BY THE USSR'S POSITION OF PRINCIPLE.

SECOND, IT IS A MISTAKE TO MAINTAIN THAT THOSE TALKS HAVE CHANGED THE SOVIET VIEW OF THE "DOUBLE DECISION" AND THAT THE USSR IS NOW ALLEGEDLY PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE UNJUST CONDITIONS WHICH THE NATO DECISION PRESENTS AS MANDATORY. THE TRUE SOVIET POSITION WAS SET FORTH IN A DOCUMENT OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE POLITBURO, THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET PRESIDUM AND THE USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, CONCERNING

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THE SOVIET-FRG SUMMIT TALKS AND PUBLISHED ON 5 JULY 1980: "HAVING REITERATED THE POSITION IT HAS PREVIOUSLY SET FORTH REGARDING THE MORE CORRECT WAYS OF SETTLING THE ISSUE OF MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONS IN EUROPE, THE SOVIET SIDE, GUIDED BY THE COMPREHENSIVE INTERESTS OF PEACE AND SECURITY, HAS SUGGESTED STARTING NEGOTIATIONS ON MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES SIMULTANEOUSLY AND IN ORGANIC CONNECTION WITH THE ISSUE OF U.S. FORWARD-BASED WEAPONS. THIS IMPLIES THAT POSSIBLE ACCORDS ON THOSE QUESTIONS CAN BE IMPLEMENTED ONLY AFTER THE SOVIET-AMERICAN STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TREATY (SALT-2) ENTERS INTO FORCE" (PRAVDA, 5 JULY 1980).

NO DOUBT, THAT STEP WAS MEANT TO ENCOURAGE THE WEST TO FINALLY BEGIN EQUAL NEGOTIATIONS, AND TO ENABLE IT TO FIND A WAY OUT OF THE IMPASSE IT HAD WORKED ITSELF INTO BY THE "DOUBLE DECISION". FIRST, THE NEW SOVIET PROPOSAL OBVIOUSLY MADE IT POSSIBLE TO AGREE ON THE BASIS AND SUBJECT OF NEGOTIATIONS NOT BEFORE TALKS BEGAN IN EARNEST BUT IN THE COURSE OF THOSE TALKS - NATURALLY, AT THEIR VERY BEGINNING. SECOND, THE NEW SOVIET INITIATIVE ESTABLISHED A FLEXIBLE LINK BETWEEN THE SALT PROCESS AND THE SOLUTION OF THE EUROPE-BASED MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES PROBLEM. TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE DELAY IN THE SALT-2 TREATY'S ENTRY INTO FORCE, WHICH CANNOT BE BLAMED ON THE USSR, THE SOVIET SIDE, MINDFUL OF FACILITATING EARLIER TALKS ON MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONS, DID NOT

LINK THEM TO THE START OF SALT-3. AT THE SAME TIME, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE OBJECTIVE INTERCONNECTION BETWEEN THOSE TWO PROBLEMS AND THE OBVIOUS DESIRE OF THE WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES THAT THIS INTERCONNECTION SHOULD BE PRESERVED, THE SOVIET UNION
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PROPOSED THAT THE AGREEMENT ON MEDIUM-RANGE
WEAPONS BE IMPLEMENTED AFTER THE SALT-2 TREATY
ENTERED INTO FORCE.

OBVIOUSLY, THE NEW SOVIET INITIATIVE DID NOT MEAN
AGREEMENT WITH THE TERMS OF THE "DOUBLE DECISION".
THE DOCUMENT QUOTED ABOVE EXPRESSLY STATES THAT
THE SOVIET SIDE, FIRST, REITERATES ITS PREVIOUS
POSITION ON THE MORE CORRECT WAYS OF SETTLING THE
EUROPE-BASED MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONS QUESTION AND,
SECOND, HOLDS THAT THE MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS
QUESTION MUST BE DISCUSSED SIMULTANEOUSLY AND IN
ORGANIC CONNECTION WITH THE ISSUE OF U. S. FORWARD-
BASED NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

THE WEST FAILED TO USE THE OPPORTUNITY, CREATED BY
THE SOVIET PROPOSAL, TO IMMEDIATELY BEGIN REALLY
MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATIONS. WE KNOW THAT ALTHOUGH
THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION DID CONTACT THE SOVIET
UNION ON THAT QUESTION, IT SOON BROKE THOSE CONTACTS
OFF. INITIALLY, THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION COMPLETELY
REFUSED TO RENEW THE TALKS, AND ONLY UNDER PRESSURE
FROM ITS ALLIES PROMISED TO RESUME THEM. BUT IT
REDUCED THAT PROMISE TO NAUGHT BY ITS STUBBORN REFUSAL
TO LISTEN TO REASON, TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE
LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS OF ITS NEGOTIATING
PARTNER, AND BY SETTING ENDLESS PRECONDITIONS AIMED
AT PROVOKING FAILURE OF THE TALKS. AS LEONID
BREZHNEV STRESSED IN HIS TALK WITH OLOF PALME IN
MOSCOW ON 12 JUNE 1981, WASHINGTON "STILL AIMS AT
ENSURING LIMITATION OF ONLY SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE
MISSILES, LEAVING ASIDE THE US FORWARD-BASED WEAPONS.
THAT APPROACH IS IN GLARING CONTRADICTION TO THE
PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY, AND THE
SOVIET SIDE CANNOT AGREE TO THAT" (PRAVDA, 13 JUNE
1981).

FALSIFYING THE TRUE POSITION HELD BY THE SOVIET
UNION AND TRYING TO PICTURE IT AS THE "CULPRIT"
OF THE ARMS RACE, NATO PROPAGANDA IS AT PAINS TO
PLANT ANOTHER FALSE NOTION IN THE MINDS OF THE
WESTERN PUBLIC. ESSENTIALLY, THAT NOTION ALLEGES
THAT BEFORE THE ADOPTION OF THE "DOUBLE DECISION",
THE SOVIET UNION HAD HELD THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS
COULD ONLY LIMIT AND NOT REDUCE ITS MEDIUM-RANGE
WEAPONS. AND ONLY NATO'S FIRM COMMITMENT TO CARRY
OUT THE "DOUBLE DECISION" HAD FORCED THE SOVIET UNION
TO CONCEDE THE POSSIBILITY OF REDUCTION.

THOSE ARGUMENTS TURN EVERYTHING UPSIDE DOWN. IT IS
THE UNITED STATES WHICH REJECTS ANY POSSIBILITY NOT
ONLY OF REDUCING BUT EVEN LIMITING ITS MEDIUM-RANGE
NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATIONED IN EUROPE. THE UNITED

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STATES WANTS THE FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS TO FORMALISE ITS RIGHT TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF SUCH WEAPONS AND TO RADICALLY CHANGE THEIR QUALITY.

ON THE CONTRARY, THE SOVIET UNION HAS FROM THE VERY START ADVOCATED AGREEMENT ON REDUCING MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE-NATURALLY, ON A MUTUAL BASIS. MOREOVER, THE USSR HAS EXPRESSED ITS READINESS FOR UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS, ON CONDITION THAT THE OTHER SIDE DOES NOT BUILD UP ITS NUCLEAR POTENTIAL.

AS SOON AS THE ISSUE OF THE MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONS TALKS CAME UP FOR PRACTICAL DISCUSSION - THAT IS, DURING THE CONCLUSION OF THE SALT-2 TREATY - THE SOVIET UNION PLEDGED THAT THOSE TALKS WOULD BE AIMED AT SECURING AGREEMENT ON REDUCING THOSE WEAPONS. LET US RECALL THAT AT THAT TIME BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION MAINTAINED THAT ISSUES RELATED TO MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONS WOULD BE DISCUSSED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF SALT-3. THAT FOLLOWS BOTH FROM THE DOCUMENTS SIGNED SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE SALT-2 TREATY AND FROM SUBSEQUENT DECLARATIONS BY THE TWO SIDES. SPECIFICALLY, THE JOINT SOVIET-US STATEMENT SIGNED IN VIENNA ON 18 JUNE 1979 SAID THAT QUESTIONS CONCERNING GROUND-BASED CRUISE MISSILES (THE VERY MISSILES WHOSE DEPLOYMENT IS ENVISAGED IN THE "DOUBLE DECISION") WOULD BE DEALT WITH IN THE COURSE OF SALT-3 IN ORDER TO SECURE "SIGNIFICANT AND SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS IN THE NUMBERS" AND "QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS" OF THAT TYPE OF WEAPON.

DURING HIS VISIT TO THE GDR, LEONID BREZHNEV SAID IN HIS SPEECH ON 6 OCTOBER 1979: "WE ARE PREPARED TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEPLOYED IN THE WEST OF THE SOVIET UNION FROM THEIR PRESENT LEVEL, BUT ONLY, OF COURSE, IN BT

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THE EVENT THAT NO ADDITIONAL MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE DEPLOYED IN WESTERN EUROPE." THE 9 OCTOBER 1979 COMMUNIQUE ON THE RESULTS OF THE VISIT STRESSED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS READY TO TAKE THAT STEP "AS A UNILATERAL GESTURE OF GOODWILL".

FROM THEN ON, WHENEVER THE ISSUE IS RAISED, THE SOVIET UNION INVARIABLY REITERATES THAT ITS OBJECTIVE IS REDUCING MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONS IN EUROPE. ON 23 FEBRUARY 1981, AT THE 26TH CPSU CONGRESS, LEONID BREZHNEV SPOKE OF NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WOULD PRODUCE "A PERMANENT TREATY ... LIMITING OR STILL BETTER, REDUCING SUCH NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE". ON 30 JUNE 1981, SPEAKING AT A DINNER IN MOSCOW IN HONOUR OF WILLY BRANDT, HE AGAIN STRESSED: "WE BELIEVE IT IS TIME TO ADVANCE TOWARDS REDUCING NUCLEAR MISSILES." ON 15 JUNE 1981, AT A LUNCHEON IN HONOUR OF THE BELGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, ANDREI GROMYKO REFERRED TO THE ISSUE AS FOLLOWS: "IF OUR PARTNERS ARE READY FOR IT, WE AGREE TO REDUCE THE RESPECTIVE TOTAL NUCLEAR POTENTIAL, AND THIS SUBSTANTIALLY - AS LEONID BREZHNEV HAS REPEATEDLY STATED." AN ARTICLE BY SOVIET DEFENCE MINISTER DMITRI USTINOV, PUBLISHED IN PRAVDA ON 25 JULY 1981, SAYS: "IF NATO COUNTRIES DO NOT STATION ADDITIONAL US MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES IN EUROPE, THE USSR IS PREPARED TO REDUCE THE CURRENT NUMBER OF ITS MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONS DEPLOYED IN ITS WESTERN REGIONS.

IN HIS TALK WITH BRITISH LABOUR PARTY LEADER MICHAEL FOOT AND DEPUTY LEADER DENIS HEALEY ON 17 SEPTEMBER 1981, LEONID BREZHNEV SAID THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT INTEND TO INSIST ON RETAINING THE FULL NUMBER OF MISSILES DEPLOYED IN ITS WESTERN REGIONS, AND MAY AGREE TO REDUCE IT (PRAVDA, 18 SEPTEMBER 1981).

THUS THE "DOUBLE DECISION" WAS UNCALLED FOR: THERE WAS NO NEED EITHER TO "FORCE" THE SOVIET UNION TO AGREE TO NEGOTIATIONS OR TO "PERSUADE" IT TO ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF MUTUALLY REDUCING MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE, FOR THE USSR HAS ALWAYS BEEN READY FOR BOTH.

THE UNITED STATES NEEDED THE "DOUBLE DECISION" FOR AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT REASON: FIRST, TO SECURE ITS ALLIES' AGREEMENT TO THE DEPLOYMENT ON THEIR TERRITORIES OF US NUCLEAR MISSILES CAPABLE OF PERFORMING STRATEGIC AND NOT TACTICAL TASKS-I.E., OF DELIVERING STRIKES AGAINST THE STRATEGIC FORCES OF THE SOVIET UNION. THAT, AS CONCEIVED BY THE UNITED STATES LEADERS, WOULD GIVE THE USA STRATEGIC

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MILITARY SUPERIORITY. AT THE SAME TIME, US STRATEGISTS REALISE THAT SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONS CANNOT PERFORM A SIMILAR FUNCTION-I. E., DELIVER STRIKES AGAINST US STRATEGIC FORCES. THEREFORE, THE PENTAGON IS INTERESTED NOT ONLY IN NEGOTIATING A REDUCTION OF SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONS, BUT ALSO IN DEPLOYING AS MANY AS POSSIBLE OF ITS OWN MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE AT ALL COSTS. THE SECOND PART OF THIS PAMPHLET CITES US OFFICIAL STATEMENTS THAT PROVE THIS POINT. THEY SHOW THAT NEITHER THE "ZERO VERSION"-I. E., COMPLETE RENUNCIATION OF SITING NEW US MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE-NOR REDUCTION ARE ACCEPTABLE TO THE PRESENT US ADMINISTRATION, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER OR NOT THE SOVIET UNION AGREES TO REDUCE - AND IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT - ITS MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONS IN EUROPE.

SECOND, THE UNITED STATES NEEDS THE "DOUBLE DECISION" TO TRY AND USE THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR STRATEGIC REARMAMENT INHERENT IN IT IN ORDER TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THE SOVIET UNION. BUT IT IS NOT THE KIND OF PRESSURE IT ADVERTISES (TO "FORCE" THE SOVIET UNION TO AGREE TO NEGOTIATION AND REDUCTION), BUT THE KIND WE HAVE ALREADY SEEN PRACTISED BY THE UNITED STATES: THE ATTEMPT AT MAKING THE SOVIET UNION AGREE TO SUCH NEGOTIATING CONDITIONS, SUCH A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM, WHICH WOULD PUT THE USSR AT A DISADVANTAGE AND WHICH WOULD BOTH PRACTICALLY

ENSURE AND LEGALLY ENTRENCH-IN TERMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW-THE MILITARY STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY OF THE UNITED STATES. FOR THAT, THE "DOUBLE DECISION" IS INDEED NECESSARY. BUT THAT IS NOT AT ALL THE "PEACE-MAKING" MOVE WHICH IS BEING PUBLICLY ASCRIBED TO IT

AND WHICH, IN ACTUAL FACT, IS FARTHEST FROM ITS
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MIND. USING THE "DOUBLE DECISION" TO TWIST THE ARM OF THE SOVIET UNION WILL YIELD NO RESULTS, BECAUSE THE USSR IS NOT THE KIND OF COUNTRY ONE CAN TALK TO IN THE LANGUAGE OF THREATS AND DIKTAT; ITS LEADERS CANNOT BE DUPED INTO GIVING UP THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THEIR OWN PEOPLE AND OF OTHER NATIONS. THAT USE OF THE "DOUBLE DECISION" CAN ONLY LEAD TO ONE THING - DELIBERATE WRECKING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND A NEW SPIRAL OF THE ARMS RACE, SPELLING GREAT DANGER FOR ALL MANKIND AND ESPECIALLY FOR THE NATIONS OF WESTERN EUROPE.

THE EFFECT OF THE "DOUBLE DECISION" IS CLEAR - THE OPPORTUNITIES IT OFFERS THE UNITED STATES HAVE VERY SERIOUSLY AGGRAVATED THE SITUATION IN WHICH THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE TO TAKE PLACE; THE CHANCES OF THEIR SUCCESS HAVE BEEN SEVERELY PREJUDICED. EVEN BEFORE THE ADOPTION OF THE "DOUBLE DECISION", THE SOVIET UNION WARNED THAT THINGS WOULD END PRECISELY THAT WAY. FOR EXAMPLE, HAVING PROPOSED, ON 6 NOVEMBER 1979, THAT TALKS ON MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOULD START IMMEDIATELY, LEONID BREZHNEV STRESSED THAT "IT IS IMPORTANT ... THAT NO HASTY ACTION BE TAKEN WHICH WOULD COMPLICATE THE SITUATION OR OBSTRUCT THE ACHIEVEMENT OF POSITIVE RESULTS.

THERE WILL BE A GREATER CHANCE OF OBTAINING SUCH RESULTS IF NO DECISIONS ARE TAKEN ON THE PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED SYSTEMS PENDING THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. AND, CONVERSELY, THE CHANCES WILL BE UNDERMINED IF SUCH DECISIONS ARE TAKEN WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF NATO" (PRAVDA, 6 NOVEMBER 1979).

AT THAT TIME, THE NATO GOVERNMENTS REFUSED TO HEED THAT WARNING, TO CONSIDER ITS SERIOUS AND SOUND BASIS. ON THE CONTRARY, THEY TRIED TO CONVINCED THEIR NATIONS THAT NOTHING LIKE THAT WOULD HAPPEN, THAT ADOPTING THE "DOUBLE DECISION" BEFORE THE TALKS STARTED, LET ALONE ENDED, WOULD DO NOTHING TO COMPLICATE BUT WOULD INSTEAD HELP THE CREATION OF A BETTER CLIMATE FOR THE TALKS. ONE CAN CONCEDE THAT MANY WEST EUROPEAN POLITICIANS REALLY BELIEVED THAT. BUT AN ERROR - WHETHER IN GOOD FAITH OR NOT - IS STILL AN ERROR; IT HURTS ABOVE ALL THOSE WHO ENTERTAIN IT AND, IN POLITICS, IT HURTS THE COUNTRY AND PEOPLE ON WHOSE BEHALF THE ONE IN ERROR ACTS.

SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS HAVE ALREADY SHOWN WHO WAS RIGHT - THOSE WHO ISSUED THE WARNINGS OR THOSE WHO WAVED THEM ASIDE OR, WORSE STILL, PICTURED THEM AS "THREATS".
THIS REMINDER IS NOT PURELY ACADEMIC. TODAY, THE

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SOVIET UNION IS AGAIN CALLING ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT, AS LEONID BREZHNEV NOTED IN HIS TALK WITH OLOF PALME ON 12 JUNE 1981, ONE CANNOT ALLOW THE QUESTION OF THE TALKS TO BE USED AS A SCREEN BEHIND WHICH THE NATO DECISION ON DEPLOYING NEW US MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED (SEE PRAVDA, 13 JUNE 1981).

EVEN NOW, DESPITE THE WELL-FOUNDED AND WIDESPREAD WEST EUROPEAN DOUBTS ABOUT THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE US ADMINISTRATION'S APPROACH TO THE TALKS, A CAMPAIGN HAS BEEN LAUNCHED IN THE WEST THAT THE WARNINGS AND DOUBTS NEED NOT BE HEEDED, AND THAT NOTHING SHOULD BE DONE TO INFLUENCE THE UNITED STATES TO CONDUCT THE TALKS CONSTRUCTIVELY. "THE FEARS THAT THE WESTERN SIDE DOES NOT AT ALL WANT TALKS, SPREAD BY SOVIET PROPAGANDA," FRG CHANCELLOR HELMUT SCHMIDT SAID IN A FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU INTERVIEW PUBLISHED ON 30 JUNE 1981, "WILL NO LONGER APPEAR IN NEWSPAPER COLUMNS IN A FEW MONTHS, BECAUSE BY THAT TIME THE TALKS WILL HAVE BEGUN. WE CAN LET DEVELOPMENTS RUN THEIR NATURAL COURSE." SIMILAR VIEWS WERE VOICED AT THE TIME THE "DOUBLE DECISION" WAS BEING PREPARED. AND WE ALL KNOW WHAT THAT LED TO. BUT NOW THE QUESTION IS EVEN MORE SERIOUS. NOW THE ISSUE NO LONGER CONCERNS ADOPTION OF A DECISION, BUT ITS IMPLEMENTATION, I. E., THE PRACTICAL DEPLOYMENT OF NEW US MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE. CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT HIMSELF, IN A KOLNER STADT-ANZEIGER

INTERVIEW OF 19 FEBRUARY 1981, NOTED THAT THE MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE "A DIFFICULT PROBLEM. HERE, AGREEMENT CANNOT BE REACHED IN A YEAR OR TWO YEARS." MEANWHILE, THE "DOUBLE DECISION" HAS SCHEDULED DEPLOYMENT OF THE US MISSILES IN 1983.

IN THESE CONDITIONS, WAVING ASIDE WARNINGS, RELYING
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FOR EUR/SOV
ON THE NATURAL COURSE OF DEVELOPMENTS, AND MAINTAINING
THAT THE ACTUAL - AND NO LONGER JUST CONTEMPLATED -
DEPLOYMENT OF U. S. MISSILES WOULD NOT AFFECT TALKS
NEGATIVELY AND WOULD EVEN CONTRIBUTE TO THEIR
PROGRESS - ALL THAT AMOUNTS TO NOTHING BUT A BID
TO TURN THE TALKS INTO A MEANINGLESS PROCESS, INTO
A SMOKESCREEN HIDING THE PARAMOUNT - AND FOR SOME,
THE ONLY - AIM OF THE "DOUBLE DECISION": U. S.
REARMAMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE.

FINALLY, IN ANSWERING THE QUESTION ABOUT THE IMPACT
OF THE "DOUBLE DECISION" AND ITS USE BY THE WEST IN
PREPARATIONS FOR AND IN THE CONDUCT OF THE FUTURE
NEGOTIATIONS, WE WOULD LIKE TO CITE ONE MORE
PRONOUNCEMENT OF CHANCELLOR HELMUT SCHMIDT, A
RECOGNISED WESTERN AUTHORITY ON MEDIUM-RANGE
WEAPONS. IN HIS FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU INTERVIEW
WHICH APPEARED ON 30 JUNE 1981 AND WHICH WE HAVE
MENTIONED EARLIER, HE SPOKE ABOUT MILITARY EQUILIBRIUM
AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN TODAY'S WORLD: "THE IDEA OF
EQUILIBRIUM RECENTLY UNDER ATTACK BY MANY INTELLIGENT
PEOPLE, IS ALSO EXTREMELY NECESSARY BECAUSE OTHERWISE
EAST-WEST ACCORDS ON ARMS LIMITATION WOULD BE
COMPLETELY INCONCEIVABLE. NO ONE WOULD EVER AGREE
TO SIGN A TREATY AND THEN RATIFY IT IF IN THAT TREATY
HE HAS TO ADMIT THAT THE OTHER WORLD POWER CAN BE
STRONGER, MUCH STRONGER. ROUGH EQUILIBRIUM IS
NECESSARY TO MAKE THE POLICY OF ARMS LIMITATION AT
ALL POSSIBLE. IN A WAY, ROUGH EQUILIBRIUM IS THE
KEY CONCEPT IN ANY REALISTIC AND SERIOUS ARMS
CONTROL DIPLOMACY."

THE LOGIC OF THAT IS BEYOND QUESTION. BUT IT GIVES
RISE TO QUESTIONS OF ANOTHER KIND. WHO ARE THOSE
"INTELLIGENT PEOPLE" ATTACKING THE CONCEPT OF MILITARY
EQUILIBRIUM? WHO IS OPENLY PROCLAIMING THE
OBJECTIVE OF ATTAINING MILITARY SUPERIORITY AND
ENDEAVOURING TO SECURE IT, INCLUDING THE ATTEMPT
AT ALTERING THE NUCLEAR BALANCE IN EUROPE? IN HIS
BBC INTERVIEW ON 19 MAY 1981, US DEFENCE SECRETARY
CASPAR WEINBERGER COMPLAINED THAT THE US DID NOT HAVE

"THE KIND OF LEAD THAT WE HAD IN THE 50S AND THE
60S WHICH IS THE WAY YOU PRESERVE PEACE." NOT
EQUILIBRIUM BUT A US LEAD. THAT THEORETICAL
PRECEPT HAS LED TO THE PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCE OF THE
WEINBERGER PLAN WHICH, ACCORDING TO THE NEW YORK
TIMES OF 14 AUGUST 1981, IS "TO ENABLE THE US TO
REGAIN NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY OVER THE SOVIET UNION
WITHIN THIS DECADE". AND SPEAKING IN NORFOLK, VA.,
ON 26 APRIL 1981, WEINBERGER DECLARED THAT PARITY
OR SUFFICIENCY IN NAVAL POWER DOES NOT SUIT THE
UNITED STATES. HE AMPLIFIED: THE USA MUST AND

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WILL HAVE NAVAL SUPERIORITY.

THE US ADMINISTRATION'S APPROACH TO ARMS LIMITATION AND REDUCTION AGREEMENTS IS, INDEED, SHAPED BY THE OBJECTIVE OF ATTAINING MILITARY SUPRIORITY. ON 27 MAY 1981 PRESIDENT REAGAN SAID AT WEST POINT: "THE ARGUMENT, IF THERE IS ANY, WILL BE OVER WHICH WEAPONS AND NOT WHETHER WE SHOULD FORSAKE WEAPONRY FOR TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS." AND THE DIRECTOR OF THE US ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, SPEAKING BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES ON 24 JULY 1981 COMPLETELY DENIED ANY POSITIVE VALUE OF AGREEMENTS IN THAT FIELD: "MANIFESTLY, ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS CANNOT AND DO NOT GUARANTEE THE PEACE."

AND HERE IS THE SOVIET POSITION ON THAT PARAMOUNT ISSUE. AT THE 26TH CONGRESS OF THE CPSU, LEONID BREZHNEV SAID: "THE MILITARY AND STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIUM PREVAILING BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE USA, BETWEEN THE WARSAW TREATY AND NATO, OBJECTIVELY SERVES TO SAFEGUARD WORLD PEACE. WE HAVE NOT SOUGHT, AND DO NOT NOW SEEK, MILITARY SUPERIORITY OVER THE OTHER SIDE. THAT IS NOT OUR POLICY. BUT NEITHER WILL WE PERMIT THE BUILDING UP OF ANY SUCH SUPERIORITY OVER US." SPEAKING IN PRAGUE ON 31 MAY 1978 HE STRESSED: "THERE IS NO TYPE OF ARMAMENTS THE SOVIET UNION WOULD REFUSE TO LIMIT OR BAN ON A MUTUAL BASIS UPON AGREEMENT WITH OTHER STATES. THE ONLY IMPORTANT

THING IS THAT IT SHOULD BE DONE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ANYONE'S SECURITY, ON CONDITIONS OF FULL RECIPROCITY
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OF THE STATES POSSESSING THE ARMAMENTS IN QUESTION. " THAT SOVIET POSITION OF PRINCIPLE WAS REITERATED IN THE APPEAL OF THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET TO THE PARLIAMENTS AND PEOPLES OF THE WORLD, ADOPTED ON 23 JUNE 1981 AND SAYING, AMONG OTHER THINGS: "IN THIS NUCLEAR AGE DIALOGUE AND NEGOTIATIONS ARE EQUALLY NEEDED BY ALL, JUST AS PEACE, SECURITY AND CONFIDENCE IN THE FUTURE ARE NEEDED BY ALL. THERE IS NO RATIONAL MEANS OF SOLVING DISPUTED PROBLEMS, NO MATTER HOW ACUTE AND COMPLEX, OTHER THAN BY NEGOTIATION." THESE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES UNDERLIE ALL PRACTICAL STEPS TAKEN BY THE SOVIET UNION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE, INCLUDING THOSE CONCERNING MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE.

WE BELIEVE THAT A COMPARISON OF THESE TWO COURSES WOULD LEAD THOSE INTERESTED IN PRESERVING MILITARY EQUILIBRIUM TO ASK THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS: WHICH OF THESE COURSES IS AIMED AT MAKING TREATIES AND ACCORDS ON ARMS LIMITATION IMPOSSIBLE? WHICH OF THEM IS DIRECTED TO WRITING OFF ANY ARMS LIMITATION POLICY, ANY REALISTIC AND SERIOUS ARMS CONTROL DIPLOMACY?

ONE MORE QUESTION, THIS TIME FROM US: WHAT WILL BE THE PRACTICAL REACTION OF THE ALLIES OF THOSE ASPIRING TO MILITARY SUPERIORITY IF ATTEMPTS TO SECURE IT WRECK NEGOTIATIONS? THAT IS ONE MORE FAR FROM IDLE QUESTION.

QUESTION. BUT IF THE SOVIET UNION IS READY FOR TALKS AND IS PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OF MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE, WHY DOES IT PROPOSE A MORATORIUM, I.E., A FREEZE ON THE EXISTING BALANCE OF FORCES IN EUROPE WHICH PUTS THE WEST AT A DISADVANTAGE? BESIDES, DOESN'T THE PROPOSAL OF A MORATORIUM IMPEDE THE BEGINNING OF THE TALKS ON MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES?

ANSWER: SINCE THAT SOVIET INITIATIVE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLY CONFUSED AND, TO BE BLUNT, DELIBERATELY MISREPRESENTED IN THE WEST, WE WOULD LIKE TO QUOTE THE ACTUAL WORDING OF THE OFFICIAL SOVIET PROPOSALS AND EXPLANATIONS.

AT THE 26TH CPSU CONGRESS, LEONID BREZHNEV SAID: "WE SUGGEST COMING TO TERMS THAT ALREADY NOW A MORATORIUM SHOULD BE SET ON THE DEPLOYMENT IN EUROPE OF NEW MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR-MISSILE WEAPONS OF THE NATO COUNTRIES AND THE SOVIET UNION, THAT IS, TO FREEZE THE EXISTING QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE

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LEVEL OF THESE WEAPONS, NATURALLY INCLUDING THE US FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIS REGION. THE MORATORIUM COULD ENTER INTO FORCE AT ONCE, THE MOMENT NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN ON THIS SCORE, AND COULD REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL A PERMANENT TREATY IS CONCLUDED ON LIMITING OR, STILL BETTER, REDUCING SUCH NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE. IN MAKING THIS PROPOSAL, WE EXPECT THE TWO SIDES TO STOP ALL PREPARATIONS FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF RESPECOIVE ADDITIONAL WEAPONS, INCLUDING US PERSHING-2 MISSILES AND LAND-BASED STRATEGIC CRUISE MISSILES."

IN HIS SPEECH IN PRAGUE ON 7 APRIL 1981, LEONID BREZHNEV SAID: "NATURALLY, OUR MORATORIUM PROPOSAL IS NOT AN END IN ITSELF. IT HAS BEEN MADE TO CREATE A MORE FAVOURABLE CLIMATE FOR NEGOTIATIONS. IN OUR OPINION, THE OBJECTIVE HERE IS ... PRECISELY REDUCTION OF THE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ACCUMULATED IN EUROPE" (PRAVDA, 8 APRIL 1981).

SPEAKING AT A LUNCHEON IN HONOUR OF WILLY BRANDT ON 30 JUNE 1981, LEONID BREZHNEV SAID: "THE USSR IS PREPARED TO SUSPEND DEPLOYMENT OF ITS MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN THE EUROPEAN PART OF OUR COUNTRY ON THE DAY TALKS BEGIN ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE MATTER. AND THAT, OF COURSE, ONLY IF THE UNITED STATES TELLS US THAT IT WILL NOT BUILD UP ITS MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE DURING THE TALKS EITHER" (PRAVDA, 1 JULY 1981).

ON 25 JULY 1981 USSR DEFENCE MINISTER DMITRI USTINOV WROTE IN PRAVDA: "THE MORATORIUM PROPOSAL IS BASED ON THE ROUGH PARITY BETWEEN NATO AND SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH HAS EXISTED FOR SEVERAL YEARS IN EUROPE - ABOUT 1,000 DELIVERY VEHICLES
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ON EACH SIDE. AS WE SEE IT, THE MORATORIUM IS TO CHECK THE FURTHER BUILD-UP OF THE EXISTING MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES IN EUROPE BY BOTH SIDES... THE MORATORIUM IS NOT A PRECONDITION FOR THE BEGINNING OF THE TALKS. BUT IF THE SIDES ACCEPTED IT, IT WOULD ENSURE MORE RELIABLE PREREQUISITES FOR STEMMING THE DANGEROUS BUILD-UP OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON EUROPEAN SOIL."

A COMPLETELY DISTORTED INTERPRETATION OF THE CONCEPT AND MEANING OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL IS BEING FOISTED ON THE WESTERN PUBLIC. IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE PROPOSAL WAS ADVANCED, THERE WERE CLAIMS THAT THE SOVIET UNION VIEWED THE MORATORIUM AS A PRECONDITION FOR STARTING THE TALKS. THAT INVENTION WAS SHORT-LIVED, AND NOW NO ONE CAN MAINTAIN ANY LONGER THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL CAN IN ANY WAY IMPEDE OR DELAY THE BEGINNING OF THE TALKS.

SIMULTANEOUSLY, THE CLAIM WAS LAUNCHED AND IS STILL BEING WIDELY DISSEMINATED THAT ACCEPTANCE OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL WOULD PERPETUATE "SOVIET NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY" IN EUROPE. THAT CLAIM WAS OFFICIALLY VOICED IN THE COMMUNIQUE'S OF THE NATO NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP MEETING OF 7-8 APRIL 1981 AND THE NATO COUNCIL SESSION OF 4-5 MAY 1981. THE LATTER COMMUNIQUE SAYS THAT "THE LATEST SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A MORATORIUM ON LRTNF (LRTNF - LONG-RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE MEANING PERSHING-2 AND CRUISE MISSILES) DEPLOYMENTS IS WHOLLY UNACCEPTABLE TO THESE ALLIES. IT WOULD FREEZE THEM INTO INFERIORITY BY BLOCKING THE NATO MODERNISATION PROGRAMME ALTOGETHER." (NATO REVIEW, NO. 3, JUNE 1981, P. 28). THE NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP, WHICH HELD ITS SESSION AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL, STATED IN ITS COMMUNIQUE: "THE RECENT SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A MORATORIUM WOULD NOT ADDRESS THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS CAUSED BY THE MOMENTOUS BUILD-UP OF SOVIET ARMS... THIS

PROPOSAL COULD ONLY PERPETUATE AN IMBALANCE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE ALLIANCE CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY ESTABLISHED IN THE DECEMBER DECISION AS ESSENTIAL TO LRTNF ARMS CONTROL" (IBID, P. 32).

SINCE THEN THOSE ARGUMENTS, IN VARIOUS GUISE, KEEP POPPING UP IN SPEECHES, INTERVIEWS AND ARTICLES BY THE ADVOCATES OF NATO'S REARMAMENT. LET US ANALYSE EACH OF THE ARGUMENTS ADVANCED AGAINST THE MORATORIUM PROPOSAL.

THE KEY ARGUMENT IS THAT A MORATORIUM WOULD CONSOLIDATE, EVEN PERPETUATE THE STATUS QUO WHICH FAVOURS THE SOVIET UNION. BUT, FIRST, AS IT IS CLEAR FROM

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THE STATEMENTS BY THE SOVIET SIDE WE HAVE QUOTED, IT DOES NOT EXPECT THE MORATORIUM TO REMAIN IN FORCE INDEFINITELY: IT IS ENVISAGED ONLY FOR THE DURATION OF THE TALKS, AND UPON THEIR COMPLETION AGREEMENTS ARRIVED AT IN THE COURSE OF THE TALKS WOULD ENTER INTO FORCE, FIXING THE LEVEL OF MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON BOTH SIDES. THUS THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT CONTEMPLATE PERPETUATING THE EXISTING ORDER OF THINGS; ON THE CONTRARY, IT SUGGESTS THAT IT SHOULD BE CHANGED IN THE DIRECTION OF REDUCING THE LEVEL OF THE EXISTING ARMAMENTS.

SECOND, THAT ARGUMENT, ESPECIALLY AS FORMULATED BY THE NATO NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP, IS A DEVIIOUS BUT DELIBERATELY MISLEADING JUGGLING WITH TERMS AND CONCEPTS TO PASS OFF VICE FOR VIRTUE. THE GROUP'S COMMUNIQUE SPEAKS OF AN IMBALANCE OF FORCES WHICH DOES NOT SUIT THE "PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY" STATED IN NATO'S "DOUBLE DECISION". BUT AS WE HAVE SHOWN IN DETAIL, THAT FALSE "EQUALITY" COMPLETELY EXCLUDES ALL US FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM THE BALANCE OF NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE. IF THOSE ARE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT - AND THAT IS IMPERATIVE IF WE ARE TO REMAIN REALISTS - THE ENTIRE CONCEPT OF "IMBALANCE" LOSES ALL JUSTIFICATION AND THE "PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY" BECOMES A SYNONYM OF WESTERN SUPERIORITY. THOSE NATO STRATEGEMS ARE DESIGNED TO CONCEAL A VERY SIMPLE FACT: THE MORATORIUM PROPOSAL IS UNACCEPTABLE TO

NATO (ACTUALLY, TO THE UNITED STATES) NOT BECAUSE ITS ACCEPTANCE WOULD IN ANY WAY PERPETUATE THE IMAGINARY IMBALANCE BUT BECAUSE IT WOULD MAKE US FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS SUBJECT TO THE MORATORIUM AND CONSEQUENTLY, TO THE TALKS. IN OTHER WORDS, THE REJECTION OF THE MORATORIUM PROPOSAL STEMS FROM THE SAME YEARNING FOR MILITARY SUPERIORITY BY KEEPING US FORWARD-
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BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS INTACT. THE MORATORIUM WOULD
PRESERVE THE EXISTING BALANCE; ITS REJECTION IS
AIMED AT SECURING AN ADVANTAGE FOR THE WEST.

LET US ALSO NOTE THAT THE NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP'S
DEFINITION OF THE "PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY" AS
"ESSENTIAL TO LRTNF ARMS CONTROL" IS YET ANOTHER
INDICATION THAT, ACCORDING TO NATO, THE EXCLUSION
OF US FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS FROM THE TALKS IS NOT
OPEN TO DISCUSSION, AND IS ONE OF THE PRELIMINARY
CONDITIONS WHOSE EXISTENCE THE AUTHORS AND ADVOCATES
OF THE "DOUBLE DECISION" SO VEHEMENTLY DENY.

THE SECOND ARGUMENT AGAINST THE IDEA OF A MORATORIUM
IS THAT ITS IMPLEMENTATION WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO
BLOCKING THE NATO MODERNISATION PROGRAMME ALTOGETHER.
BUT THE AUTHORS OF THE "DOUBLE DECISION" THEMSELVES
HAVE REPEATEDLY STATED THAT THEIR GOAL IS EITHER
THE "ZERO VERSION" (I. E., PRECISELY A COMPLETE
BLOCKING OF THE MODERNISATION PROGRAMME) OR THE
LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL (COMPARED TO THE ONE STIPULATED
IN THE "DOUBLE DECISION") OF US MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES -
NATURALLY, ON CONDITION THAT AN AGREEMENT IS REACHED
ON THE REDUCTION OF SIMILAR WEAPONS BY THE SOVIET
SIDE. BUT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A MORATORIUM
IS ULTIMATELY DIRECTED TOWARDS THE SAME OBJECTIVE -
TOWARDS QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE FREEZING OF
THE EXISTING LEVEL OF MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONS FOR THE
DURATION OF THE TALKS AIMED AT REDUCING THESE
WEAPONS ON BOTH SIDES, I. E., ON THE SOVIET SIDE TOO.
"OUR MORATORIUM PROPOSAL," ANDREI GROMYKO STRESSED
AT THE DINNER IN HONOUR OF THE FRG FOREIGN MINISTER
ON 3 APRIL 1981, "IS AIMED AT PREVENTING, FOR THE
DURATION OF THE TALKS, BOTH A NUMERICAL BUILD-UP OF

THE RESPECTIVE SYSTEMS IN EUROPE AND A QUALITATIVE
IMPROVEMENT OF THE EXISTING ONES, SINCE THAT WOULD
ONLY DELAY AND COMPLICATE THE TALKS. MEANWHILE,
THE LEVEL ALLOWED TO EACH SIDE WOULD BE DETERMINED
JOINTLY IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THAT
WOULD BE AN AGREED LEVEL BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF
EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY" (PRAVDA, 4 APRIL 1981).

THE OBJECTION TO THE MORATORIUM ON THE GROUNDS THAT
IT "BLOCKS THE NATO MODERNISATION PROGRAMME" IS
ACTUALLY NOT AN OBJECTION TO THE IDEA OF A MORATORIUM
BUT A REJECTION OF THE VERY POSSIBILITY OF A "ZERO
VERSION" OR OF ANY NUMERICAL REDUCTION OF US
MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE ENVISAGED IN THE "DOUBLE
DECISION".

THE THIRD ARGUMENT AGAINST THE MORATORIUM, MAINTAINING
THAT ITS INTRODUCTION WOULD NOT "ADDRESS THE

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FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS", PRODUCES AN ODD IMPRESSION. COULD IT BE THAT ITS INVENTORS ARE UNAWARE OF THE FACT THAT THE VERY CONCEPT "MORATORIUM" STANDS FOR A TEMPORARY MEASURE WHICH IS NOT AIMED AT SOLVING MAJOR ISSUES BUT AS CREATING BETTER, CALMER CONDITIONS FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT ARE TO SOLVE THEM?

THAT IS PRECISELY WHAT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL IS AIMED AT. IT IS ONE THING TO HOLD COMPLEX AND CONSEQUENTLY PROTRACTED NEGOTIATIONS AND AWAIT THEIR RESULTS IN A SITUATION WHICH RULES OUT THE DANGER THAT, BEFORE THE TALKS END AND IRRESPECTIVE OF THEIR PROGRESS, NEW NUCLEAR MISSILES WOULD APPEAR IN EUROPE, UPSETTING THE BALANCE OF FORCES AND THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY. IT IS AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT THING TO HOLD TALKS WHEN THAT DANGER IS PERFECTLY REAL, KNOWING THAT THE US SIDE IS DOING ITS UTMOST TO DELAY THE START OF THE TALKS AND COMPLICATE THEIR PROGRESS SO AS TO RULE OUT ANY POSSIBILITY OF CONCLUDING THE NEGOTIATIONS BY THE TIME THE NEW US MISSILES APPEAR IN EUROPE. BESIDES, ONE MUST NOT FORGET THAT THE ACTUAL DEPLOYMENT OF THOSE MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE WOULD ABRUPTLY UPSET THE BASIS ON WHICH THE TALKS COULD BE HELD NOW. A NEW, MUCH MORE COMPLEX AND DANGEROUS

SITUATION WOULD EMERGE AND ITS NEGATIVE IMPACT ON THE PROGRESS OF THE TALKS WOULD BE INEVITABLE.

SPEAKING AT THE CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA ON 7 APRIL 1981, AND TOUCHING ON THE ISSUE OF THE MORATORIUM, LEONID BREZHNEV RECALLED THAT "IN ONE OF HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS MADE THIS FEBRUARY, FRG CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT, FOR EXAMPLE,
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FLATLY DENIED THAT THE EAST-WEST BALANCE OF FORCES
IN EUROPE HAD BEEN UPSET. HOWEVER, THE CHANCELLOR
SAID HE FEARED THAT THE RUSSIANS MAY UPSET IT AT
ANY MOMENT. US STATE SECRETARY HAIG ALSO SPOKE
RECENTLY ABOUT 'RELATIVE BALANCE AND EQUIVALENCE'.
TRUE, HE SAID, HE WAS WORRIED THAT THE EQUIVALENCE
MIGHT CHANGE TO SOVIET SUPERIORITY BY THE MIDDLE
OF THIS DECADE.

"GIVEN SUCH AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT SITUATION
AND ITS PROSPECTS, IT WOULD BE LOGICAL FOR WESTERN
LEADERS TO SEIZE ON OUR PROPOSAL. AND IF, INSTEAD
OF THAT, SOME OF THEM ARE TRYING TO BELITTLE IT,
THIS IS CERTAINLY NOT BECAUSE THE EUROPEAN BALANCE
OF FORCES HAS CHANGED IN A FEW DAYS. THEY ARE
DOING IT BECAUSE THEY WOULD LIKE TO CHANGE IT IN
FAVOUR OF THE WEST AND DO NOT WANT TO HAVE THEIR
HANDS TIED BY A MORATORIUM."

THAT IS BORNE OUT, AMONG OTHER THINGS, BY THE
PECULIAR STAND TAKEN BY FRG FOREIGN MINISTER HANS-
DIETRICH GENSCHER. IN HIS 8 AUGUST 1981 INTERVIEW
TO THE RADIO STATIONS WESTDEUTSCHER RUNDFUNK AND
NORDDEUTSCHER RUNDFUNK HE CALLED ON THE SOVIET
UNION TO HELP EASE EAST-WEST TENSIONS. HAVING
EXPRESSED HIS CONVICTION THAT THE SOVIET UNION
WOULD BE ABLE TO DO IT, MR. GENSCHER ADDED THAT
"THE USSR CAN DO IT BY FACILITATING TALKS WITH THE
UNITED STATES ON MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES, BY SUSPENDING
ITS ADVANCE ARMAMENT WITH MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES AND
THUS MAKE THE TALKS EASIER INSTEAD OF COMPLICATING
THEM BY EACH NEWLY DEPLOYED MISSILE". (THE MINISTER
VOICED THAT VIEW IN SEVERAL OTHER STATEMENTS TOO.)

BUT THAT MEANS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE NEED FOR A
MORATORIUM AND OF ITS POSITIVE ASPECTS. HOWEVER,
ACCORDING TO MR. GENSCHER, IT IS TO BE UNILATERAL
AND IS TO APPLY ONLY TO SOVIET WEAPONS, WHILE GIVING
A FREE HAND TO THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER NATO
COUNTRIES IN BUILDING UP AND UPDATING THEIR NUCLEAR
POTENTIALS IN EUROPE. ALTHOUGH ADMITTING THAT A
SUSPENSION OF MEDIUM-RANGE ARMING WOULD FACILITATE
THE TALKS, MR. GENSCHER FOR SOME REASON MAINTAINS
THAT ONLY A SOVIET SUSPENSION WOULD CREATE SUCH AN
EFFECT, WHILE THE DEPLOYMENT OF US MISSILES, OR THE
MODERNISATION AND BUILD-UP OF OTHER US FORWARD-BASED
SYSTEMS, OR THE MANUFACTURE OF NEUTRON WEAPONS
DESTINED FOR EUROPE DOES NOT COMPLICATE THE TALKS
AND HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH THEM AT ALL. MR. GENSCHER
REFERS TO SOVIET ARMAMENT AS "ADVANCE" ONLY BECAUSE
HE IGNORES WESTERN NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE. ONLY
THAT DISTORTED VIEW OF THE WORLD CAN DISMISS THE
BALANCED SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A MORATORIUM AS

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"UNACCEPTABLE".

QUESTION: AS YOU ADMIT, GENERAL MILITARY EQUILIBRIUM DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE SIDES' ARMED FORCES STRUCTURES ARE IDENTICAL. THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES HAVE AN ADVANTAGE IN CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND THEY DO NOT INTEND GIVING IT UP. THAT IS WHY, TO MAINTAIN PARITY, DOESN'T THE WEST HAVE TO OFFSET THAT ADVANTAGE BY, AMONG OTHER THINGS, STRENGTHENING AND UPDATING ITS NUCLEAR POTENTIAL?

ANSWER: CONVENTIONAL LAND, AIR AND NAVAL ARMAMENTS ARE A SPHERE WHERE WESTERN MANIPULATION OF FIGURES IS GREATEST AND WHERE IT DISTORTS THE TRUE PICTURE.

FIRST, IT IS NOT FAIR TO COMPARE THE CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES, OF THE WARSAW TREATY AND NATO WITHOUT TALKING INTO ACCOUNT THE GEOSTRATEGIC FACTOR WHICH WE DISCUSSED EARLIER IN THIS BOOKLET.

SECOND, ANY ASSESSMENT OF THE MILITARY BALANCE IN EUROPE MUST TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE ENTIRE COMPLEX OF NATO AND WARSAW TREATY ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, INSTEAD OF ARBITRARILY ISOLATING THEIR INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS, AS WESTERN EXPERTS OFTEN DO. FOR A LONG TIME, EACH SIDE HAD INDEPENDENTLY AND WITH DUE ATTENTION TO ALL OBJECTIVE FACTORS EVALUATED ITS SECURITY REQUIREMENTS AND DETERMINED THE WAYS AND MEANS OF ENSURING THAT SECURITY. ALL

THAT HAS DIRECTLY AFFECTED THE DIFFERENCES IN THE MILITARY STRUCTURES OF BOTH SIDES IN EUROPE, THE EXISTING IMBALANCE BETWEEN CERTAIN TYPES OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. THEREFORE, IF WE TAKE ISOLATED COMPONENTS, SOME WOULD INDEED INDICATE THAT THE WARSAW TREATY HAS AN ADVANTAGE. BUT IN OTHER TYPES, THE ADVANTAGE IS WITH NATO. ON THE WHOLE, HOWEVER, ARMAMENTS ARE BALANCED.

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WESTERN EXPERTS OFTEN CITE THE WARSAW TREATY'S NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY IN TANKS. IT IS TRUE THAT SOME ADVANTAGE DOES EXIST. BUT THE NATO COUNTRIES ENJOY OVERWHELMING SUPERIORITY IN ANTI-TANK HELICOPTERS AND OTHER ANTI-TANK WEAPONS. WESTERN ARMIES ARE EQUIPPED WITH OVER TEN TYPES OF MODERN ANTI-TANK WEAPONS - TOW, HOT, COBRA, DRAGON, MOSQUITO, MILAN, ETC. EVEN ACCORDING TO WESTERN FIGURES, NATO POSSESSES ALMOST 200,000 ANTI-TANK GUIDED MISSILES.

IN EVALUATING THE EUROPEAN ALIGNMENT OF STRENGTH IN TACTICAL AIRCRAFT, ONE MUST REMEMBER THAT THE MAJORITY OF WARSAW TREATY AIRCRAFT ARE DESIGNED TO PERFORM DEFENSIVE FUNCTIONS WITHIN THE AIR DEFENCE SYSTEM, WHILE THE PURPOSE OF MOST NATO PLANES IS CLEARLY OFFENSIVE.

AS TO THE NUMBER OF TROOPS IN SUCH AN IMPORTANT AREA AS CENTRAL EUROPE, BOTH SIDES EXCHANGED OFFICIAL FIGURES AT THE VIENNA TALKS AS EARLY AS 1976. ACCORDING TO THOSE FIGURES, NATO STRENGTH IN CENTRAL EUROPE WAS 981,000 (INCLUDING 791,000 GROUND TROOPS) AND THAT OF THE WARSAW TREATY WAS 987,300 (INCLUDING 805,000 GROUND TROOPS). IN 1980, THE NEW EXCHANGE OF UPDATED FIGURES SHOWED THAT NATO STRENGTH WAS 991,000 AND THAT OF THE WARSAW TREATY, 979,000 - MEANING THAT THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAD NOT INCREASED BUT EVEN REDUCED THEIR TROOPS STRENGTH IN CENTRAL EUROPE. ON THE CONTRARY, THE WEST HAD ADDED TO ITS STRENGTH. WHILE THE SOVIET UNION, MILITARILY THE STRONGEST MEMBER OF THE WARSAW TREATY, HAS REDUCED ITS ARMED FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, HAVING UNILATERALLY WITHDRAWN 20,000 OF ITS SERVICEMEN FROM THE GDR, THE STRENGTH OF THE US MILITARY CONTINGENT IN THE AREA HAS GROWN SIGNIFICANTLY OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE US MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE FRG ALONE HAS INCREASED BY NEARLY 30,000 MEN COMPARED TO 1976. WESTERN ESTIMATES OF THE STRENGTH OF WARSAW TREATY TROOPS FOR SOME REASON USUALLY OVERSTATE THE ACTUAL FIGURE BY ABOUT 150,000. THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES' INQUIRIES INTO THE METHODS USED IN WESTERN ESTIMATES ESSENTIALLY REMAIN UNANSWERED. BUT AN ANALYSIS OF THE FIGURES USED BY THE WESTERN SIDE GOES TO SHOW THAT ITS CALCULATIONS OF WARSAW TREATY STRENGTH ARE FALLACIOUS, IF NOT DELIBERATELY DISTORTED. FOR EXAMPLE, WESTERN EXPERTS INCLUDE IN THEIR COUNT POLAND'S COAST GUARD PERSONNEL AND THOSE - MOSTLY DRAFTEES - WHO ARE ORGANIZATIONALLY REGISTERED WITH THAT COUNTRY'S TERRITORIAL DEFENCE FORCES, ETC.

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THE STATUS OF CIVILIAN PERSONNEL AND RESERVISTS IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT IN CALCULATING STRENGTH. THE WESTERN COUNTRIES EMPLOY ABOUT 300,000 CIVILIANS IN THEIR ARMED FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE AGREED NOT TO INCLUDE THEM IN THE TOTAL STRENGTH OF NATO SERVICEMEN. BUT WE MUST NOT FORGET THAT MOST OF THOSE CIVILIANS ARE HIGHLY SKILLED AND EXPERIENCED SPECIALISTS WHO REPAIR TANKS AND AIR FORCE EQUIPMENT, OPERATE RADAR DEVICES, SERVICE MISSILE SYSTEMS, ETC. THEIR LENGTH OF EMPLOYMENT IS USUALLY 15 TO 20 YEARS. IN THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES' ARMIES THOSE FUNCTIONS ARE PERFORMED BY SERVICEMEN WHO ARE THEREFORE INCLUDED IN THE TOTAL STRENGTH OF WARSAW TREATY TROOPS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THAT ESTIMATE UNILATERALLY FAVOURS THE WEST. AND CERTAIN QUARTERS IN THE WEST USE THE DIFFERENCES IN FIGURES AS A CONTRIVED PRETEXT FOR PREVENTING AGREEMENT ON REDUCING ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND FOR AVOIDING THE ADMISSION THAT THEY ARE ROUGHLY BALANCED. AND THEN THE WEST USES THE ALLEGED IMBALANCE IN THE ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS TO BUILD UP ITS NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THUS CLOSING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE.

ACCORDING TO DATA PUBLISHED IN THE WEST, 4,900,000 SERVICEMEN ARE ON ACTIVE DUTY IN THE NATO COUNTRIES, WHILE THE FIGURE FOR THE WARSAW TREATY IS 4,700,000 (THE MILITARY BALANCE, 1980-1981, P. 96). ACCORDING TO THE 1980 YEARBOOK OF THE STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL

PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES ACCOUNTED FOR 26.4 PERCENT OF 1979 MILITARY EXPENDITURE IN THE WORLD, WHILE THE SHARE OF THE NATO COUNTRIES WAS 43 PERCENT.

IT IS A FAVOURITE CLAIM OF THE WESTERN PRESS THAT,
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FOR EUR/SOV
JUDGING BY THE SOVIET NAVAL EFFORT, THE USSR IS STRIVING TO SECURE NAVAL SUPERIORITY. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIET UNION IS OFTEN VIEWED AS A LAND POWER, ITS 40,000 KILOMETERS OF SEA FRONTIER AND ITS ACCESS TO THREE OCEANS PROVE THAT IT IS ALSO AN IMPORTANT SEA POWER WHICH LEGITIMATELY NEEDS AN OCEAN-GOING NAVY OF ITS OWN. OVER THE PAST 20 YEARS THE USSR HAS INDEED BUILT A POWERFUL OCEAN-GOING NAVY CAPABLE OF EFFECTIVELY PERFORMING ITS STRICTLY DEFENSIVE MISSION WHICH STEMS FROM THE DEFENSIVE NATURE OF SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE. AS SOVIET LEADERS HAVE REPEATEDLY POINTED OUT, THE USSR DOES NOT SEEK NAVAL SUPERIORITY, MEANWHILE WE HAVE SEEN THAT US LEADERS HAVE ON MANY OCCASIONS ASSERTED THEIR CLAIMS TO NAVAL SUPERIORITY. THE WEST BEGAN TO HOLD FORTH ON THE "THREATENING" GROWTH OF THE SOVIET NAVY IN THE MID-60S, BUT FROM 1965 TO 1976 THE UNITED STATES LAUNCHED 20 PERCENT MORE SURFACE NAVAL VESSELS OF MAJOR TYPES (AIRCRAFT CARRIERS, CRUISERS, DESTROYERS AND FRIGATES) THAN THE SOVIET UNION. BESIDES, WE SHOULD NOT FORGET THAT THE SOVIET UNION'S ALLIES DO NOT POSSESS NAVIES OF ANY GREAT SIGNIFICANCE, WHILE MANY OF THE US ALLIES CONTRIBUTE PERCEPTIBLY TO THE OVERALL WESTERN NAVAL POTENTIAL. IF WE TAKE ALL THE NATO COUNTRIES, AND ALSO JAPAN, AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND, IT TURNS OUT THAT OVER THE SAME PERIOD (1965-1976) THE WEST BUILT TWO TO THREE TIMES AS MANY SURFACE VESSELS AS THE SOVIET UNION DID (SURVIVAL, SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER, 1976, P. 205). THE NATO COUNTRIES ALONE POSSESS 50 PERCENT MORE AIRCRAFT CARRIERS, CRUISERS, DESTROYERS AND FRIGATES THAN THE USSR. ANOTHER IMPORTANT FACT IS THAT US ALLIES CONTROL THE STRAITS (FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE BLACK AND BALTIC SEAS) WHICH PROVIDE THE SOVIET NAVY WITH EGRESS TO THE OPEN SEAS. THEREFORE, SOVIET NAVAL SUPERIORITY DOES NOT EXIST.

US NAVAL PERSONNEL IS 60 PERCENT MORE NUMEROUS THAN THAT OF THE SOVIET UNION. THE TOTAL TONNAGE OF US SUBMARINES, AIRCRAFT CARRIERS, CRUISERS, DESTROYERS AND FRIGATES IS ALSO GREATER THAN THE TOTAL TONNAGE OF COMPARABLE SOVIET VESSELS. TRUE, THE NUMBER OF US NAVAL VESSELS DID DECREASE IN THE 70S OWING TO THE SCRAPPING OF VESSELS BUILT DURING WORLD WAR II. BUT ACCORDING TO THE STATEMENTS OF THE US COMMAND, THE LAUNCHING OF MORE EFFICIENT VESSELS HAS MORE THAN OFFSET THAT NUMERICAL DECREASE. THE UNITED STATES POSSESSES FIVE TIMES THE NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTERS IN THE SOVIET NAVY. THE US HAS AN IMMENSE NAVAL POTENTIAL OF "TRANSFERABLE POWER": 13 AIRCRAFT CARRIERS WHOSE DISPLACEMENT RANGES FROM 60,000

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TO 90,000 TONS. THE SOVIET UNION HAS NO AIRCRAFT CARRIERS. IN TERMS OF AMPHIBIOUS VESSELS, THE US NAVY IS MORE THAN TWICE AS STRONG, AND IN TERMS OF THE MARINE CORPS, 15 TIMES AS STRONG AS THE SOVIET UNION (CALCULATED FROM: JANE'S FIGHTING SHIPS, 1980-1981, IND., 1980, PP. 464-465; 588-589).

THE FACT THAT SOVIET VESSELS NOW APPEAR REGULARLY IN MANY REGIONS OF THE WORLD OCEAN IS PICTURED AS A CASE OF "THREATENING" SOVIET NAVAL "EXPANSION". BUT SOVIET NAVAL VESSELS APPEARED IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE INDIAN OCEAN ONLY AFTER NATO FLEETS WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABLE OF STRIKING TARGETS WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION HAD BEEN DEPLOYED THERE. ONE MIGHT RECALL HERE THAT THE PERSIAN GULF COUNTRIES ARE THREATENED BY AN ARMADA OF 30 US WARSHIPS AND NOT BY ANY SOVIET NAVAL VESSELS. IT IS THE UNITED STATES AND NOT THE SOVIET UNION WHICH IS ACTIVATING A SPECIAL FIFTH FLEET FOR THE INDIAN OCEAN. BESIDES, THE SOVIET UNION NEITHER POSSESSES NOR SEEKS NAVAL BASES ABROAD, WHILE THE UNITED STATES HAS OVER TEN LARGE NAVAL BASES IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES. AND ANOTHER POINT. IN ANALYSING THE SOVIET AND US NAVAL PRESENCE, WESTERN EXPERTS OFTEN USE THE TERM "SHIP DAY" (ARRIVED AT BY MULTIPLYING THE NUMBER OF VESSELS IN A GIVEN AREA BY THE NUMBER OF DAYS THEY HAVE SPENT THERE) TO ALLEGE A SIGNIFICANT SOVIET ADVANTAGE. THAT YARDSTICK FOR GAUGING THE NAVAL PRESENCE IS

CLEARLY BIASED: IT EQUATES THE PRESENCE OF A GIANT AIRCRAFT CARRIER WITH 90 PLANES ON BOARD TO THAT OF A TANKER. HOWEVER, THAT ASPECT IS NEVER EXPLAINED IN THE WEST. A VITALLY IMPORTANT POINT IS THAT THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT CONSIDER IT NORMAL FOR FLEETS TO PATROL AREAS FAR FROM THEIR NATIONAL COASTS FOR LONG
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FOR EUR/SOV PERIODS. THEREFORE, AS EARLY AS 1970 THE USSR PROPOSED LAUNCHING TALKS ON RESTRICTING NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN VARIOUS REGIONS OF THE WORLD OCEAN. IN 1977, SUCH TALKS ON THE INDIAN OCEAN BEGAN WITH THE UNITED STATES, BUT WASHINGTON BROKE THEM OFF AFTER EIGHTEEN MONTHS. NOR DID THE NATO COUNTRIES RESPOND TO OTHER SOVIET NAVAL INITIATIVES, NAMELY: TURNING THE MEDITERRANEAN INTO A ZONE OF STABLE PEACE AND COOPERATION, AND CONVENING AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE TO DEAL WITH QUESTIONS OF ENSURING THE SECURITY OF SHIPPING ROUTES. THE SOVIET UNION SUPPORTED THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES' PROPOSAL FOR ESTABLISHING A PEACE ZONE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION. HOWEVER, THE WEST RESPONDED BY ABRUPTLY BUILDING UP ITS NAVAL POWER THERE.

THIS MEANS THAT THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO NEED TO OFFSET THE IMAGINARY SOVIET ADVANTAGE IN CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS BY BUILDING UP THE WESTERN NUCLEAR POTENTIAL. THAT IS NOTHING BUT A SMOKE SCREEN TO CONCEAL THE UNITED STATES' ASPIRATIONS TO NAVAL SUPERIORITY, AN ATTEMPT AT PASSING THEM OFF AS A "DEFENSIVE MEASURE".

QUESTION: THE WEST DISTRUSTS VARIOUS SOVIET PROPOSALS BECAUSE THEY ARE VERY OFTEN AIMED AT SPLITTING ITS RANKS, AT PROVOKING DISCORD AMONG THE DIFFERENT POLITICAL FORCES IN WESTERN COUNTRIES. STILL MORE OFTEN THEY ARE ONE-SIDED, THEY TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION ONLY THE INTERESTS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND COUNTRIES FRIENDLY TO IT, ISN'T THAT SO?

ANSWER: NO. WE WILL NEVER ACCEPT CHARGES OF "PERFIDY" OR "EGOISM". LET US TAKE THE LATTER CHARGE FIRST. NATURALLY, IN ADVANCING THIS OR THAT PROPOSAL, THE SOVIET UNION ACTS IN THE INTEREST OF ITS OWN AND ITS ALLIES' SECURITY. BUT IT IS ALSO PERFECTLY AWARE OF THE FACT THAT IF ITS PROPOSAL IS AIMED AT DAMAGING THE SECURITY OF THE OTHER SIDE, IT WILL NEVER BE ACCEPTED. LEONID BREZHNEV STRESSED IN HIS 9 MAY 1981 SPEECH IN KIEV THAT "THE FREEDOM AND SECURITY OF OTHER STATES IS A MATERIAL CONDITION OF OUR OWN FREEDOM AND SECURITY. AT THE SAME TIME, OUR FREEDOM AND SECURITY IS A NECESSARY CONDITION OF OTHER COUNTRIES' FREE AND INDEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT."

THAT IS WHY ALL SOVIET INITIATIVES TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF THE OTHER SIDE AS THE SOVIET UNION SEES THEM. CLEARLY, THE COUNTRIES TO WHICH THE USSR ADDRESSES ITS PROPOSALS CAN HAVE A DIFFERENT IDEA BOTH OF THEIR OWN INTERESTS AND OF THOSE OF THE USSR. BUT

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THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS WHICH MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO ARRIVE AT MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE DECISIONS IS AIMED PRECISELY AT SETTLING SUCH DIFFERENCES.

MEANWHILE THE WEST, AND ESPECIALLY ITS PROPAGANDA, AGREE TO RECOGNISE SOVIET PROPOSALS AS REALISTIC AND SUBJECT TO DISCUSSION ONLY IF THEY FULLY REFLECT THE WESTERN VIEWPOINT AND INTERESTS (AS THE WEST ITSELF SEES THEM) ALREADY AT THE TIME THESE PROPOSALS ARE ADVANCED. IN OTHER WORDS, THE WEST VIRTUALLY EXPECTS THE SOVIET UNION TO PROPOSE ONLY SUCH CONDITIONS FOR SETTLING THIS OR THAT PROBLEM WHICH, EVEN BEFORE THE START OF THE TALKS, WOULD SUIT WHAT THE WEST BELIEVES WILL BE THEIR OUTCOME. IN SHORT, THE WEST DEMANDS THAT THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD ACCEPT ALL WESTERN CONDITIONS WITHOUT RESERVATIONS AND WITHOUT NEGOTIATION. IF THE SOVIET UNION, QUITE LOGICALLY, REFUSES TO FOLLOW THAT COURSE AND DEFENDS ITS OWN INTERESTS BY SUGGESTING A REASONABLE COMPROMISE TO HELP ARRIVE AT A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION, THE WEST DISMISSES THE SOVIET INITIATIVES AS "ONE-SIDED", "ABSOLUTELY UNACCEPTABLE" AND GENERALLY OUT OF THE QUESTION. THUS, THE POINT IS NOT AT ALL THE ALLEGED "ONE-SIDEDNESS" OR "EGOISM" OF SOVIET INITIATIVES BUT THE TRULY ONE-SIDED WESTERN REFUSAL TO DISCUSS THEM AND LOOK FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL ISSUES.

EQUALLY, THE SOVIET UNION IS NOT GUILTY OF SCHEMING TO PIT SOME WESTERN COUNTRIES AGAINST OTHERS AND THUS DAMAGE THEIR SECURITY.

WESTERN PROPAGANDA LOVES TO ASSERT THAT THE SOVIET UNION AIMS AT PLAYING OFF WESTERN EUROPE AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, AT CONVINCING THE FORMER THAT
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ITS SECURITY IS IN NO WAY LINKED TO US SECURITY.
NOTHING OF THE KIND. THE SOVIET UNION IS WELL
AWARE THAT EUROPEAN SECURITY IS CONNECTED WITH THE
SECURITY OF THE NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES AND REGIONS,
INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES. THE SOVIET UNION
WOULD NEVER THINK OF ENSURING EUROPEAN SECURITY
BY ENDANGERING THE UNITED STATES. US SECURITY
MUST BE EQUALLY ASSURED AS THAT OF ALL EUROPEAN
COUNTRIES. THAT IS PRECISELY WHY THE SOVIET UNION
INSISTS ON HOLDING TALKS WITH THE UNITED STATES
ON MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND WHY IT INSISTS
ON RESUMING THE SALT TALKS.

SOVIET PROPOSALS MAY EVOKE DEBATES, SOMETIMES SHARP
AND BITTER, IN THE WESTERN WORLD. BUT THAT IS NOT
BECAUSE THESE PROPOSALS ARE "PERFIDIOUS". THE
POINT - AND A POINT GENERALLY ACCEPTED AND REQUIRING
NO DEMONSTRATION - IS THAT THE INTERESTS OF DIFFERENT
WESTERN COUNTRIES AND OF DIFFERENT STRATA OF THEIR
POPULATION ARE NOT IDENTICAL. ONE CAN SAY, IN MORE
SIMPLE TERMS, THAT SOME OF THEM RECOGNISE THE NEED
FOR PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AND COOPERATION WITH THE
SOVIET UNION AND THE OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, WHILE
OTHERS HAVE A STAKE IN CONFRONTATION AND A POSITIONS-
OF-STRENGTH POLICY.

NO WONDER, THEREFORE, THAT THE REACTIONS TO THE
PEACE INITIATIVES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND OF THE
SOCIALIST COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE RANGE FROM ACCLAIM
AND INTEREST AMONG SOME TO HOSTILITY AMONG OTHERS.
TO EXPECT THAT SOVIET PROPOSALS GENERATE ABSOLUTELY
NO DEBATES IN THE WEST IS TANTAMOUNT TO EXPECTING
THE SOVIET UNION TO GIVE UP ADVANCING ANY FOREIGN
POLICY INITIATIVES FOR FEAR OF BEING CHARGED WITH
"PROVOKING" A SPLIT IN THE WESTERN ALLIANCE.

THE SOVIET POSITION ON THE ISSUE OF MEDIUM-RANGE
NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE, EXPLAINED IN THIS BOOKLET,
IS ENOUGH TO SHOW THAT THE CHARGES OF "PERFIDY"
AND "EGOISM" ARE UNFAIR.

ONE CAN ALSO CITE OTHER EXAMPLES.

NO SOONER THE SOVIET UNION SUGGESTED EXTENDING THE
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN THE MILITARY SPHERE
TO THE ENTIRE EUROPEAN PART OF THE USSR ON THE
CONDITION - FULLY IN ACCORD WITH THE PRINCIPLE
OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY - THAT THE WEST
SHOULD FOLLOW SUIT, THAN THAT BALANCED INITIATIVE
WAS DISMISSED AS "ONE-SIDED". THERE ARE DEMANDS
THAT THE SOVIET UNION ABANDON ITS POSITION EVEN
BEFORE THE CONVENING OF AN ALL-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE
ON MILITARY DETENTE AND DISARMAMENT WHICH IS TO

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DISCUSS THAT ISSUE. IT IS NO SECRET THAT MANY WEST EUROPEAN NATIONS VIEW THE SOVIET STAND WITH UNDERSTANDING, WHILE THE UNITED STATES REJECTS IT OUT OF HAND. COULD THAT ALSO BE A "SOVIET PROVOCATION" TO SPLIT THE WESTERN WORLD?

ON 4 APRIL 1981 LEONID BREZHNEV TOLD A CORRESPONDENT OF THE GREEK NEWSPAPER TA NEA: "THE SOVIET UNION HAS REPEATEDLY DECLARED THAT IT WILL NEVER USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH RENOUNCE THE MANUFACTURE AND ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DO NOT HAVE THEM ON THEIR TERRITORY. THAT ALONE IS A SUFFICIENTLY RELIABLE GUARANTEE. BUT WE ARE PREPARED TO GO FURTHER AND CONCLUDE A SPECIAL AGREEMENT WITH ANY NON-NUCLEAR COUNTRY AT ANY TIME ... IF THAT COUNTRY IN TURN UNDERTAKES NOT TO HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON ITS TERRITORY.

IN HIS 27 JUNE 1981 INTERVIEW TO THE FINNISH NEWSPAPER SUOMEN SOSIALIDEMOKRAATTI, LEONID BREZHNEV SAID: "THE SOVIET UNION HAS ALREADY STATED ITS POSITIVE ATTITUDE, AND THIS SPECIFICALLY TOWARDS THE PROPOSAL ON TURNING NORTHERN EUROPE INTO A NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE. UNLIKE WESTERN EUROPE, WHERE PEOPLE ARE EVEN NOW LITERALLY SITTING ON TOP OF A NUCLEAR VOLCANO, THOSE DEADLY WEAPONS ARE SO FAR ABSENT HERE. AND NATURALLY, IT WOULD BE A GOOD THING IF THE NUCLEAR-FREE STATUS OF NORTHERN EUROPE WERE FORMALISED AND ACQUIRED A PROPER LEGAL BASIS.

FOR ITS PART, THE SOVIET UNION IS READY TO UNDERTAKE NOT TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST THE NORTH EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WHICH WILL BECOME PARTIES TO THE NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE ARRANGEMENT - THAT IS, WILL RENOUNCE THE MANUFACTURE, ACQUISITION OR STATIONING ON THEIR TERRITORIES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THAT
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SOVIET GUARANTEE COULD BE FORMALISED BY CONCLUDING EITHER A MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT TO WHICH THE USSR WOULD BE A PARTY OR BILATERAL AGREEMENTS WITH EACH COUNTRY PARTY TO THE ZONE. I REPEAT, WE ARE READY TO DO IT AT ANY TIME. NATURALLY, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SUCH A ZONE WOULD BE GREATER FOR ITS PARTIES IF THEY RECEIVED SIMILAR GUARANTEES FROM NATO NUCLEAR POWERS AS WELL.

"GUARANTEES OF THE NON-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST THE COUNTRIES PARTIES TO THE ZONE ARE THE MAIN AND FOR THOSE COUNTRIES THE MOST IMPORTANT COMMITMENT THE SOVIET UNION IS PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE. BUT THAT DOES NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF CONSIDERING CERTAIN OTHER MEASURES CONCERNING OUR OWN TERRITORY IN THE REGION BORDERING ON THE NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE IN NORTHERN EUROPE. THE SOVIET UNION IS READY TO DISCUSS THAT QUESTION WITH INTERESTED COUNTRIES."

ON 9 JUNE 1981, LEONID BREZHNEV SAID AT A DINNER IN HONOUR OF CHADLI BENDJEDID:

"THE SOVIET UNION BELIEVES THAT THE MEDITERRANEAN CAN AND MUST BE TRANSFORMED FROM AN AREA OF MILITARY AND POLITICAL CONFRONTATION INTO AN AREA OF STABLE PEACE AND COOPERATION.

"WE BELIEVE THESE ENDS COULD BE SERVED BY CONCLUDING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

- "-EXTENDING THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN THE MILITARY SPHERE, WHICH HAVE PROVED EFFECTIVE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TO COVER THE MEDITERRANEAN;
- "-EFFECTING AN AGREED REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES IN THAT REGION;
- "-WITHDRAWING NUCLEAR-ARMED WARSHIPS FROM THE MEDITERRANEAN;
- "-RENOUNCING THE SITING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THE TERRITORIES OF THE NON-NUCLEAR MEDITERRANEAN STATES;
- "-A COMMITMENT BY THE NUCLEAR POWERS NOT TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST ANY MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRY WHICH DOES NOT ALLOW THE SITING OF SUCH WEAPONS ON ITS TERRITORY" (PRAVDA, 10 JUNE 1981).

ON 7 AUGUST 1981, LEONID BREZHNEV AND TODOR ZHIVKOV NOTED DURING THEIR MEETING IN THE CRIMEA: "THE USSR AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA HOLD THAT THE CREATIDN OF NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES IN CERTAIN

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AREAS OF EUROPE, INCLUDING THE BALKANS, COULD DO MUCH TO EASE TENSIONS" (PRAVDA, 8 AUGUST 1981).

AGAIN, THE WEST LAUNCHED A CAMPAIGN TO PORTRAY THOSE CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS AS "ONE-SIDED" AND "UNACCEPTABLE", ALL BECAUSE A NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE IN, SAY, THE NORTH OF EUROPE WOULD EXTEND TO THE TERRITORY OF SOME OF THE UNITED STATES' NATO ALLIES AND WOULD THEREFORE LIMIT "THE FREEDOM OF ACTION" OF THAT BLOC. BUT A NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE IN THE BALKANS WOULD ALSO EXTEND TO THE TERRITORIES OF SOME OF THE SOVIET UNION'S WARSAW TREATY ALLIES, THOUGH NEITHER THE USSR NOR ITS FRIENDS OBJECT TO HAVING THEIR FREEDOM OF ACTION LIMITED IN THAT WAY.

US SPOKESMEN EVEN CLAIM THAT THE VERY PROPOSAL FOR CREATING A NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE IN THE NORTH OF EUROPE WOULD IMPEDE THE TALKS ON MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE. THEY NEVER BOTHER TO EXPLAIN WHY.

OF COURSE, IT IS NOT THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSALS ARE ALLEGEDLY ONE-SIDED, BUT THAT THEY RUN COUNTER TO THE COURSE OF AGGRAVATING TENSIONS AND ESCALATING THE ARMS RACE WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS EMBARKED UPON AND WHICH IT IS DOING ITS UTMOST TO IMPOSE ON ITS ALLIES.

ALL SOVIET PROPOSALS AND INITIATIVES PROCEED FROM THE GENERAL POSITION OF PRINCIPLE HELD BY THE SOVIET

UNION AND THE OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE SOCIALIST COMMUNITY. THIS POSITION WAS REASSERTED IN THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE STATEMENT ON THE RESULTS OF LEONID BREZHNEV'S MEETINGS WITH THE LEADERS OF THE FRATERNAL PARTIES AND COUNTRIES IN THE CRIMEA IN JULY AND AUGUST 1981. THE DOCUMENT SAYS:

"A REASONABLE AND JUST SETTLEMENT OF OUTSTANDING
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INTERNATIONAL ISSUES IS POSSIBLE, BUT IT CANNOT
BE ACHIEVED BY TALKING THE LANGUAGE OF FORCE OR
THREATENING ITS USE. THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
POSSESS ALL THAT IS NEEDED TO PROTECT THEIR VITAL
INTERESTS AND THEY WILL TAKE ALL THE MEASURES
NECESSARY FOR IT. AT THE SAME TIME THEY, AS ALWAYS,
MAINTAIN THAT PEACE SHOULD BENEFIT ALL COUNTRIES,
ALL PEOPLES. PEACE BELONGS TO EVERYBODY, AND ITS
DEFENCE AND STRENGTHENING MUST BE THE CONCERN OF
ALL STATES" (PRAVDA, 23 AUGUST 1981).

CONCLUSION

CONCERN FOR THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT
IS GROWING IN ALL COUNTRIES OF EUROPE. PEOPLE ARE
WISING UP TO THE TRUE, NOT FANCIED, DANGER HANGING
OVER THEM AND CONSISTING IN THE LOOMING NEW ROUND
OF NUCLEAR MISSILE ARMING, STOCKPILING OF MASS
DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, AND A MOUNTING RISK OF NUCLEAR
CONFLICT.

A MASSIVE MOVEMENT IS RISING IN EUROPE AGAINST THE
THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR AND FOR PEACE - A MOVEMENT OF
UNPRECEDENTED SCALE AND POWER.

MEETINGS AND MARCHES, POWERFUL INTERNATIONAL
DEMONSTRATIONS, AND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES
INVOLVING PEOPLE FROM DIFFERENT SECTIONS OF THE
ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT ARE TAKING PLACE ALL OVER THE
CONTINENT.

MILLIONS OF PEOPLE ARE PUTTING THEIR SIGNATURES TO
PETITIONS AND APPEALS AGAINST THE INTENTIONS OF
STATIONING NEW AMERICAN MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN
EUROPE, LAUNCHING THE PRODUCTION OF NEUTRON WEAPONS,
AND IN SUPPORT OF IMMEDIATE NEGOTIATIONS THAT WOULD
HALT FURTHER NUCLEAR MISSILE ARMING.
MANY THINGS DIVIDE THE PARTICIPANTS OF THE MOVEMENT,
FOR THEY REPRESENT DIFFERENT FORCES, HOLDING
DIFFERENT POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS BELIEFS.

BUT FAR GREATER SIGNIFICANCE ATTACHES TO THEIR
UNDERSTANDING OF THE COMMON DESTINY OF THE EUROPEAN
NATIONS. IN THE DISTURBED WORLD OF OUR DAY IT IS
IMPORTANT TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE PRESENT SITUATION
IN EUROPE, WITH GOVERNMENTS AND NATIONS BEING
SADDLED WITH MILITARY CONFRONTATION INSTEAD OF THE
PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AND COOPERATION, AS ENVISAGED
IN THE FINAL ACT OF THE HELSINKI CONFERENCE, MUST
NOT REMAIN WHAT IT IS.

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THE SHAPING SITUATION, THE NEW THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF THE EUROPEAN NATIONS, CALL FOR INCREASINGLY CLOSE COOPERATION AMONG ALL ANTI-WAR FORCES AND FOR THE INVOLVEMENT OF ALL PEOPLE IN THE COMMON EFFORT, NO MATTER HOW DIFFERENT THEIR VIEWS AND CONVICTIONS.

TODAY, THIS VERY MOMENT, EVERYTHING MUST BE DONE JOINTLY TO BLOCK THE AMATEURS OF UNBRIDLED ARMING AND MILITARY ADVENTURES, AND TO SAFEGUARD AND DEPENDABLY SECURE PEACE.

MEANINGFUL ACTION IS NECESSARY IN THE NAME OF PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. SOVIET PEOPLE, WHO HAVE EXPERIENCED THE HARDSHIPS OF THE MOST GRUESOME WAR EVER SUFFERED BY ANY NATION, ARE DEEPLY CONSCIOUS OF THE MEASURE OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR SAFEGUARDING AND CONSOLIDATING PEACE IN EUROPE AND THE REST OF THE WORLD.

THE SOVIET PUBLIC SUPPORTS AND DOES ITS BEST TO ASSIST THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE PROGRAMME FOR THE EIGHTIES ADOPTED BY THE 26TH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION. THIS PROGRAMME ENVISAGES MEASURES FOR REDUCING NUCLEAR-MISSILE AND CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS, CONTAINS PROPOSALS FOR SETTTLING EXISTING AND PREVENTING NEW CONFLICTS AND CONFLICT SITUATIONS, AND IS IMBUED WITH A DESIRE TO DEEPEN DETENTE AND TO FURTHER PEACEFUL COOPERATION AMONG COUNTRIES ON

ALL CONTINENTS.

THE SOVIET PUBLIC TREATS WITH ATTENTION ALL CONSTRUCTIVE IDEAS THAT COULD HELP CURB THE ARMS RACE AND CONSOLIDATE PEACE, INCLUDING THE INITIATIVES ADVANCED BY THE DIVERSE FORCES OF THE EUROPEAN ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT.
BT

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PAGE 01
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9301

UNCLAS SECTION 21 OF 21 MOSCOW 16101

FOR EUR/SOV
WE ARE FOR A FURTHER EXPANSION OF CONTACTS AND COOPERATION WITH VARIOUS POLITICAL AND PUBLIC FORCES, WITH WHOM WE SHARE CONCERN ABOUT THE INCREASED MILITARY DANGER, THE UNPRECEDENTED SCALE OF THE ARMS RACE, AND THE DESIRE TO ELIMINATE THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR.

EXPRESSING THE FIRM RESOLVE OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE TO SAFEGUARD AND DEPENDABLY SECURE PEACE, THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR, AT ITS 5TH SESSION, ADOPTED AN APPEAL TO THE PARLIAMENTS AND PEOPLES OF THE WORLD.

IF THAT APPEAL IS SERIOUSLY STUDIED OUTSIDE THE SOVIET UNION, IT CAN BECOME THE ESSENTIAL IMPULSE FOR THE ADOPTION OF URGENT MEASURES IN THE FIGHT TO SAVE PEACE. IT IS THE SUPREME DUTY OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC IN THE EAST AND WEST OF EUROPE TO HELP TO ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE BY ALL AVAILABLE MEANS IN ORDER TO OVERCOME THE PRESENT CRITICAL COURSE OF EVENTS ON OUR CONTINENT.
THE PEOPLES HAVE PAID MUCH TOO HIGH A PRICE FOR FAILING TO PREVENT THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
THAT TRAGEDY MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO RECUR.

REASON MUST TRIUMPH OVER FOLLY!
HARTMAN
BT

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AMEMBASSY WARSAW 8625
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 05 MOSCOW 16137
E.O. 12065: GDS 11/23/87 (PASCOE, B. LYNN) OR-P
TAGS: PARM, UR
SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF SOVIET PUBLICATION "THE THREAT TO
EUROPE"

REFS: (A) MOSCOW 16090 (NOTAL), (B) MOSCOW 16091 (NOTAL),
(C) MOSCOW 16098 (NOTAL), (D) MOSCOW 16101 (NOTAL),
(E) MOSCOW 16084 (NOTAL)

1. ~~C~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. SUMMARY. THE SOVIETS ISSUED THEIR MUCH PROMISED

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BY KDB NARA DATE 11/6/05

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RESPONSE TO THE U. S. PUBLICATION "SOVIET MILITARY POWER" ON THE EVE OF BREZHNEV'S VISIT TO BONN. ENTITLED "THE THREAT TO EUROPE," THE BROCHURE BRINGS TOGETHER THE FULL RANGE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE COMMENTS THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN USING WITH WESTERN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN VISITORS IN THEIR EFFORT TO THWART THE NATO DECISION OF LRTNF DEPLOYMENTS. THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH HAS UNDERCUT THE IMPACT OF SOME OF THE SOVIET ARGUMENTS -- PARTICULARLY ITS ARGUMENT THAT THE U. S. WOULD HAVE NO INTEREST IN A "ZERO OPTION" -- BUT THE SOVIETS CLEARLY VIEW IT AS A BASIC PROPAGANDA TOOL TO BE USED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE BONN VISIT AND AFTER. END SUMMARY.

3. THE SOVIET PAMPHLET "THE THREAT TO EUROPE" (TEXT REFS A-D) WAS UNVEILED WITH CONSIDERABLE FANFARE AT A NOVEMBER 20 PRESS CONFERENCE IN MOSCOW. DIVIDED INTO FOUR SEPARATE PARTS -- SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE, THE MILITARY BALANCE AND THE THREAT TO EUROPE, NATO'S DOUBLE DECISION - A THREAT IN ACTION, A REALISTIC PROGRAM OF ENSURING PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND THE REST OF THE WORLD -- THE PAMPHLET TAKES THE FORM OF A QUESTION AND ANSWER EXCHANGE BETWEEN A "WESTERN OPPONENT" AND A SOVIET COLLOCUTOR. WELL EXECUTED, AND DETERMINEDLY REASONABLE IN TONE, THE PAMPHLET PORTRAYS THE USSR AS CONSTANTLY

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SEEKING SECURITY THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS.

4. THROUGH THE PAMPHLET'S 74 PAGES, MOSCOW'S DOCTRINE AND ACTIONS ARE DESCRIBED AS DEFENSIVE. THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP IS EXPLAINED AS A REACTION TO WESTERN SUPERIORITY IN THE 60'S AND NECESSARY BECAUSE OF "THE GEOSTRATEGIC FACTOR," I. E., THE USSR AND ITS ALLIES HAVE A GREATER TERRITORY TO PROTECT AND ARE "ENVELOPED, EVEN ENCIRCLED" BY THE U. S. AND OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS. THE U. S., ON THE OTHER HAND, IS PICTURED AS UNRELIABLE IN ITS DEALINGS WITH ITS NATO ALLIES, AND AS SEEKING TO EMPLOY PERSHING II'S AND GLCMS IN EUROPE TO ALTER THE STRATEGIC BALANCE IN ITS FAVOR.

5. THE BULK OF THE PAMPHLET IS AIMED DIRECTLY AT UNDERMINING THE WESTERN DECISION ON LRTNF DEPLOYMENTS. THE BASIC ARGUMENT IS OLD STUFF: A ROUGH BALANCE CURRENTLY EXISTS BETWEEN U. S. AND USSR STRATEGIC FORCES AND BETWEEN THEATER FORCES IN EUROPE. THE SOVIETS HAVE LONG BEEN PROPOSING TALKS AIMED AT ESTABLISHING FORCE LEVELS, EVEN REDUCING EXISTING LEVELS, AND HAS PROPOSED A MORATORIUM ON DEPLOYMENT OF MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES, IF NATO AGREES NOT TO DEPLOY

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AMEMBASSY WARSAW 8626
BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 05 MOSCOW 16137
NEW MISSILES PENDING THE OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS
ON THEATER FORCES. BY CONTRAST, THE U. S. HAS NO
INTEREST IN SUCH NEGOTIATIONS SINCE IT IS SEEK-
ING TO UPSET THE BALANCE AND ACHIEVE SUPERIORITY
BY DEPLOYING 572 NEW CRUISE MISSILES AND PERSHING II'S,
WHICH ARE "FIRST STRIKE" WEAPONS AIMED AT SOVIET
STRATEGIC TARGETS. THROUGHOUT, THE EMPHASIS IS ON
INCLUDING U. S. FBS IN ANY TALKS.

6. THE MAIN POINTS OF VARIOUS SECTIONS FOLLOW.

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I. SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE

- . -- THE PREVAILING BALANCE IS IMPORTANT FOR PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY.
- . -- DESPITE THE "OVERALL ROUGH STRATEGIC MILITARY EQUILIBRIUM" SOME DISPROPORTIONS ARE OF SPECIAL RELEVANCE: I.E., U.S. FORWARD BASED SYSTEMS AND THE U.S. AND "OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS IN AND OUT OF NATO" HAVE IN EFFECT "ENVELOPED, EVEN ENCIRCLED" THE USSR AND ITS ALLIES.
- . -- THE USSR THEREFORE MUST "INSIST" THAT FBS BE INCLUDED IN ARMS TALKS AND AT THE SAME TIME "TO UPDATE SOMEWHAT" ITS OWN NUCLEAR MISSILE POTENTIAL.
- . -- A NUCLEAR WAR IS NOT WINNABLE AND WOULD BE A "UNIVERSAL DISASTER." THE SAME APPLIES TO A "LIMITED" NUCLEAR WAR.
- . -- SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE, DESPITE WESTERN DISTORTIONS, IS DEFENSIVE, IS BASED ON RETALIATION, AND AIMS AT PREVENTING WAR.
- . -- THOSE WHO CLAIM SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE IS AGGRESSIVELY OFFENSIVE QUOTE SOVIET MILITARY THEORISTS FROM THE 60'S, WHO REFLECTED THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

- . VIEWS OF THE TIME, OR THOSE DEVOTED TO TACTICS, NOT DOCTRINE. SOVIET, LIKE AMERICAN, DOCTRINE HAS EVOLVED.
- . -- "SOVIET MILITARY POLICY REPOSES ON THE CLEAR UNDERSTANDING THAT NEITHER INTIMIDATION NOR PRESSURE NOR THREATS OF AGGRESSION CAN IMPOSE ANYBODY'S POLITICAL WILL ON THE OTHER SIDE OR FORCE IT TO CHANGE ITS SOCIAL SYSTEM."
- . -- THE SOVIET UNION'S LARGE CONVENTIONAL FORCE IS JUSTIFIED AS NECESSARY TO DEFEND A TERRITORY OF 23 MILLION SQUARE KILOMETERS WHILE NATO COUNTRIES MUST DEFEND ONLY 2 MILLION SQUARE KILOMETERS.

II. THE MILITARY BALANCE AND THE THREAT TO EUROPE

- . -- BY THE TURN OF THE '70S THE USSR ENDED THE U.S.'S MILITARY SUPERIORITY. SINCE THEN THERE HAS BEEN MILITARY-STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIUM, BUT THE U.S. NOW SEEKS SUPERIORITY, NOT PARITY.
- . -- THE USSR HAS ONLY REACTED TO U.S. SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENTS. FOR EXAMPLE, MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES WERE A SOVIET REACTION TO U.S. NUCLEAR FBS DEVELOPED BY THE U.S. IN THE '50S. "THIS CAUSAL

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AMEMBASSY WARSAW 8627
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 05 MOSCOW 16137
RELATION IS STILL VALID."

. -- THE WEST LEARNED OF THE SS-20S IN 1976 AND
SHOWED NO SPECIAL CONCERN UNTIL THE U. S. "DECIDED
THAT THE SS-20S WERE A GOOD PRETEXT" FOR DEPLOY-
ING THE LATEST MISSILES.

. -- SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES ARE A COUNTER TO
U. S. FBS AND ARE NOT STRATEGIC SYSTEMS LIKE THE
U. S. SYSTEMS IN EUROPE.

. -- USSR IS ALSO MODERNIZING FOR POLITICAL REASONS,

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SINCE THE U. S. HAS IGNORED SOVIET PROPOSALS TO INCLUDE FBS IN ARMS LIMITATIONS.

. -- SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN EUROPE HAVE NO FIRST STRIKE FUNCTION AND WOULD BE USELESS AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLITICAL PRESSURE OR BLACKMAIL. "THE HISTORY OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY PROVES BEYOND ANY SHADOW OF DOUBT THAT IT IS ORGANICALLY ALIEN TO DEALING FROM POSITIONS OF STRENGTH, OF TRYING TO SECURE POLITICAL OR ECONOMIC CONCESSIONS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES BY THREATENING THE USE OF FORCE."

. -- FRENCH AND BRITISH NUCLEAR STRIKE FORCE IS ANALOGOUS WITH THE SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES, BUT THE U. S. NOW WANTS TO INTRODUCE BOTH QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS IN THE KINDS OF MISSILES IT WANTS TO EMPLOY IN EUROPE.

. -- THE U. S. WOULD BE REARMING, NOT MODERNIZING BY DEPLOYING GLCMS AND PERSHING IIS, WHICH ARE DIRECTLY CONNECTED WITH STRENGTHENING U. S. STRATEGIC FORCES. "WASHINGTON REALLY WANTS THEM FOR PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKES AGAINST SOVIET ICBMS AND OTHER VITALLY IMPORTANT TARGETS" IN THE USSR.

. -- "THE CHIEF CONCERN OF THE U. S. IS NOT EUROPEAN SECURITY, BUT TO TRY AND REDUCE THE POWER OF THE

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

RETALIATORY STRIKE AGAINST U. S. TERRITORY IN THE EVENT OF AN AGGRESSION AGAINST THE USSR."

. -- "EUROMISSILES" WILL NOT BUTTRESS EUROPEAN SECURITY. "BY ALL EVIDENCE," THE U. S. IS DESIGNING A VARIANT OF NUCLEAR WAR THAT WOULD ACHIEVE ITS GLOBAL AIMS WITHOUT RISKING ITS OWN TERRITORY. IN A "LIMITED OR EUROSTRATEGIC" WAR, WITHOUT USING U. S. STRATEGIC MISSILES, HOSTILITIES WOULD NOT SPREAD TO THE AMERICAS AND WESTERN EUROPE WOULD BE "CAST IN THE ROLE OF A LIGHTNING ROD."

. -- "EUROMISSILES" MIGHT ALSO BE USED IN THE EVENT OF CRISES FAR AWAY FROM EUROPE, SUCH AS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN BASIC OR NORTH AFRICA.

III. NATO'S "DOUBLE DECISION" - A THREAT IN ACTION

WHY THE "DOUBLE DECISION?" WHAT IS IT?

. -- UNDER THE "DOUBLE DECISION" ONLY SOVIET MEDIUM RANGE MISSILES AND THE PERSHING IIS AND CRUISE

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AMEMBASSY WARSAW 8628
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 04 OF 05 MOSCOW 16137
MISSILES ARE TO BE THE SUBJECT OF NEGOTIATION; THE
U. S. FBS IS TO BE EXCLUDED.

. -- THIS HAS SET A PRELIMINARY CONDITION "WHOSE
ACCEPTANCE WOULD ADVERSELY CHANGE THE BALANCE OF
POWER" IN NATO'S FAVOR. BESIDES, SOVIET MEDIUM-
RANGE MISSILES ARE A RESPONSE TO THE U. S. FBS.
TO ACCEPT THE "DOUBLE DECISION'S" CONDITIONS WOULD
BE TO LIMIT THE EFFECT WHILE RETAINING THE CAUSE.

. -- IT IS UNFAIR TO IGNORE THE FRENCH AND BRITISH
NUCLEAR POTENTIALS.

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. -- THE U. S. IS RENEGING ON ITS PROMISE TO NEGOTIATE BEFORE DEPLOYING. "THE U. S. REJECTS ANY ALTERNATIVE TO THE PLANNED DEPLOYMENT IN EUROPE OF LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES" AND, THUS THERE IS NO CHANCE OF REDUCING MISSILE NUMBERS, LET ALONE ANY "ZERO VARIANT."

. -- THE U. S. INTENDS TO COMPLICATE NEGOTIATIONS, DRAG THEM OUT AND MEANWHILE DEPLOY PERSHING II AND CRUISE MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE. FBS WERE TO HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED IN SALT-3, BUT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAS NO INTENTION OF RATIFYING SALT II.

. -- BY ALL EVIDENCE, THE U. S. INTENDS TO CONDUCT NEGOTIATIONS ON MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE "IN DISREGARD OF THE INCONTESTIBLE FACT THAT ALL AMERICAN MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE ARE EQUIVALENT TO AMERICAN STRATEGIC INTERCONTINENTAL WEAPONS."

. -- THE NEUTRON BOMB DECISION WAS ANOTHER EFFORT TO COMPLICATE NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR ARMS LIMITATIONS IN EUROPE.

IV. A REALISTIC PROGRAM OF ENSURING PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND THE REST OF THE WORLD

MOSCOW 6137
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

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THIS SECTION IS DEVOTED LARGELY TO A DESCRIPTION OF THE SOVIET "PEACE PROGRAM" LAID DOWN AT THE CPSU XXVITH AND EARLIER PARTY CONGRESSES AS A MEANS OF DEMONSTRATING THAT THE SOVIET UNION OFFERS A "POSITIVE PROGRAM FOR IMPROVING THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE. IT ARGUES THAT THE USSR HAS LONG CALLED FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON LIMITING OR REDUCING MEDIUM RANGE MISSILES BUT THAT THE U. S. HAS AVOIDED SO DOING. THE SECTION HAS A DISCUSSION OF SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR NORTHERN AND BALKAN NUCLEAR FREE ZONES, AND REPEATS BREZHNEV'S CALL FOR TURNING THE MEDITERRANEAN INTO A ZONE OF PEACE. CONVENTIONAL FORCE LEVELS IN EUROPE ARE SAID TO BE APPROXIMATELY EQUAL, AND THE USSR'S ROLE AS A NAVAL POWER IS LEGITIMATIZED.

NATO AND THE U. S. ARE PICTURED AS OBJECTING TO BREZHNEV'S MORATORIUM PROPOSAL SINCE IT WOULD BRING THE U. S. FBS UNDER THE MORATORIUM. THE OBJECTION THAT A MORATORIUM WOULD BLOCK NATO'S

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AMEMBASSY WARSAW 8629
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 05 OF 05 MOSCOW 16137
MODERNIZATION PROGRAM IS ACTUALLY A REJECTION
OF THE "VERY POSSIBILITY OF A 'ZERO VERSION' OR
OF ANY NUMERICAL REDUCTION OF U.S. MISSILES IN
WESTERN EUROPE." THE SECTION ALSO CLAIMS THAT
ALL SOVIET PROPOSALS AND INITIATIVES TAKE INTO
CONSIDERATION THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF THE
OTHER SIDE AS THE USSR SEES THEM, BUT THE WEST
"VIRTUALLY EXPECTS" THE USSR TO ACCEPT ALL WESTERN
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"WOULD NEVER THINK OF ENSURING EUROPEAN SECURITY
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 05 MOSCOW 16137

E.O. 12065: GDS 11/23/87 (PASCOE, B. LYNN) OR-P

TAGS: PARM, UR

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF SOVIET PUBLICATION "THE THREAT TO EUROPE"

REFS: (A) MOSCOW 16090 (NOTAL), (B) MOSCOW 16091 (NOTAL),
(C) MOSCOW 16098 (NOTAL), (D) MOSCOW 16101 (NOTAL),
(E) MOSCOW 16084 (NOTAL)

1. ~~(C)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY. THE SOVIETS ISSUED THEIR MUCH PROMISED RESPONSE TO THE U.S. PUBLICATION "SOVIET MILITARY POWER" ON THE EVE OF BREZHNEV'S VISIT TO BONN. ENTITLED "THE THREAT TO EUROPE," THE BROCHURE BRINGS TOGETHER THE FULL RANGE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE COMMENTS THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN USING WITH WESTERN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN VISITORS IN THEIR EFFORT TO THWART THE NATO DECISION OF LRTNF DEPLOYMENTS. THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH HAS UNDERCUT THE IMPACT OF SOME OF THE SOVIET ARGUMENTS -- PARTICULARLY ITS ARGUMENT THAT THE U.S. WOULD HAVE NO INTEREST IN A "ZERO OPTION" -- BUT THE SOVIETS CLEARLY VIEW IT AS A BASIC PROPAGANDA TOOL TO BE USED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE BONN VISIT AND AFTER. END SUMMARY.

3. THE SOVIET PAMPHLET "THE THREAT TO EUROPE"

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(TEXT REFS A-D) WAS UNVEILED WITH CONSIDERABLE FANFARE AT A NOVEMBER 20 PRESS CONFERENCE IN MOSCOW. DIVIDED INTO FOUR SEPARATE PARTS -- SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE, THE MILITARY BALANCE AND THE THREAT TO EUROPE, NATO'S DOUBLE DECISION - A THREAT IN ACTION, A REALISTIC PROGRAM OF ENSURING PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND THE REST OF THE WORLD -- THE PAMPHLET TAKES THE FORM OF A QUESTION AND ANSWER EXCHANGE BETWEEN A "WESTERN OPPONENT" AND A SOVIET COLLOCUTOR. WELL EXECUTED, AND DETERMINEDLY REASONABLE IN TONE, THE PAMPHLET PORTRAYS THE USSR AS CONSTANTLY SEEKING SECURITY THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS.

4. THROUGH THE PAMPHLET'S 74 PAGES, MOSCOW'S DOCTRINE AND ACTIONS ARE DESCRIBED AS DEFENSIVE. THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP IS EXPLAINED AS A REACTION TO WESTERN SUPERIORITY IN THE 60'S AND NECESSARY BECAUSE OF "THE GEOSTRATEGIC FACTOR," I. E., THE USSR AND ITS ALLIES HAVE A GREATER TERRITORY TO PROTECT AND ARE "ENVELOPED, EVEN ENCIRCLED" BY THE U. S. AND OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS. THE U. S., ON THE OTHER HAND, IS PICTURED AS UNRELIABLE IN ITS DEALINGS WITH ITS NATO ALLIES, AND AS SEEKING TO EMPLOY PERSHING II'S AND

GLCMS IN EUROPE TO ALTER THE STRATEGIC BALANCE IN ITS FAVOR.

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PROPOSING TALKS AIMED AT ESTABLISHING FORCE
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USMISSION USBERLIN 5542
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0644
AMEMBASSY WARSAW 8626

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 05 MOSCOW 16137

NEW MISSILES PENDING THE OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THEATER FORCES. BY CONTRAST, THE U. S. HAS NO INTEREST IN SUCH NEGOTIATIONS SINCE IT IS SEEKING TO UPSET THE BALANCE AND ACHIEVE SUPERIORITY BY DEPLOYING 572 NEW CRUISE MISSILES AND PERSHING II'S, WHICH ARE "FIRST STRIKE" WEAPONS AIMED AT SOVIET STRATEGIC TARGETS. THROUGHOUT, THE EMPHASIS IS ON INCLUDING U. S. FBS IN ANY TALKS.

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I. SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE

- . -- THE PREVAILING BALANCE IS IMPORTANT FOR PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY.
- . -- DESPITE THE "OVERALL ROUGH STRATEGIC MILITARY EQUILIBRIUM" SOME DISPROPORTIONS ARE OF SPECIAL RELEVANCE: I.E., U. S. FORWARD BASED SYSTEMS AND THE U. S. AND "OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS IN AND OUT OF NATO" HAVE IN EFFECT "ENVELOPED, EVEN ENCIRCLED" THE USSR AND ITS ALLIES.
- . -- THE USSR THEREFORE MUST "INSIST" THAT FBS BE INCLUDED IN ARMS TALKS AND AT THE SAME TIME "TO UPDATE SOMEWHAT" ITS OWN NUCLEAR MISSILE POTENTIAL.

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- . -- SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE, DESPITE WESTERN DISTORTIONS, IS DEFENSIVE, IS BASED ON RETALIATION, AND AIMS AT PREVENTING WAR.
- . -- THOSE WHO CLAIM SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE IS AGGRESSIVELY OFFENSIVE QUOTE SOVIET MILITARY THEORISTS FROM THE 60'S, WHO REFLECTED THE VIEWS OF THE TIME, OR THOSE DEVOTED TO TACTICS, NOT DOCTRINE. SOVIET, LIKE AMERICAN, DOCTRINE HAS EVOLVED.
- . -- "SOVIET MILITARY POLICY REPOSES ON THE CLEAR UNDERSTANDING THAT NEITHER INTIMIDATION NOR PRESSURE NOR THREATS OF AGGRESSION CAN IMPOSE ANYBODY'S POLITICAL WILL ON THE OTHER SIDE OR FORCE IT TO CHANGE ITS SOCIAL SYSTEM."
- . -- THE SOVIET UNION'S LARGE CONVENTIONAL FORCE IS JUSTIFIED AS NECESSARY TO DEFEND A TERRITORY OF 23 MILLION SQUARE KILOMETERS WHILE NATO COUNTRIES MUST DEFEND ONLY 2 MILLION SQUARE KILOMETERS.

II. THE MILITARY BALANCE AND THE THREAT TO EUROPE

- . -- BY THE TURN OF THE '70S THE USSR ENDED THE U. S.'S MILITARY SUPERIORITY. SINCE THEN THERE HAS BEEN MILITARY-STRATEGIC EUILIBRIUM, BUT THE U. S. NOW SEEKS SUPERIORITY, NOT PARITY.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 231734Z NOV 81 PSN: 022560

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DEVELOPED BY THE U.S. IN THE '50S. "THIS CAUSAL
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USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0645
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 05 MOSCOW 16137

RELATION IS STILL VALID."

. -- THE WEST LEARNED OF THE SS-20S IN 1976 AND SHOWED NO SPECIAL CONCERN UNTIL THE U.S. "DECIDED THAT THE SS-20S WERE A GOOD PRETEXT" FOR DEPLOYING THE LATEST MISSILES.

. -- SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES ARE A COUNTER TO U.S. FBS AND ARE NOT STRATEGIC SYSTEMS LIKE THE U.S. SYSTEMS IN EUROPE.

. -- USSR IS ALSO MODERNIZING FOR POLITICAL REASONS, SINCE THE U.S. HAS IGNORED SOVIET PROPOSALS TO INCLUDE FBS IN ARMS LIMITATIONS.

. -- SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN EUROPE HAVE NO FIRST STRIKE FUNCTION AND WOULD BE USELESS AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLITICAL PRESSURE OR BLACKMAIL. "THE HISTORY OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY PROVES BEYOND ANY SHADOW OF DOUBT THAT IT IS ORGANICALLY ALIEN TO DEALING FROM POSITIONS OF STRENGTH, OF TRYING TO SECURE POLITICAL OR ECONOMIC CONCESSIONS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES BY THREATENING THE USE OF FORCE."

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TATIVE AND QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS IN THE KINDS OF MISSILES IT WANTS TO EMPLOY IN EUROPE.

. -- THE U.S. WOULD BE REARMING, NOT MODERNIZING BY DEPLOYING GLCMS AND PERSHING IIS, WHICH ARE DIRECTLY CONNECTED WITH STRENGTHENING U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES. "WASHINGTON REALLY WANTS THEM FOR PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKES AGAINST SOVIET ICBMS AND OTHER VITALLY IMPORTANT TARGETS" IN THE USSR.

. -- "THE CHIEF CONCERN OF THE U.S. IS NOT EUROPEAN SECURITY, BUT TO TRY AND REDUCE THE POWER OF THE RETALIATORY STRIKE AGAINST U.S. TERRITORY IN THE EVENT OF AN AGGRESSION AGAINST THE USSR."

. -- "EUROMISSILES" WILL NOT BUTTRESS EUROPEAN SECURITY. "BY ALL EVIDENCE," THE U.S. IS DESIGNING A VARIANT OF NUCLEAR WAR THAT WOULD ACHIEVE ITS GLOBAL AIMS WITHOUT RISKING ITS OWN TERRITORY. IN A "LIMITED OR EUROSTRATEGIC" WAR, WITHOUT USING U.S. STRATEGIC MISSILES, HOSTILITIES WOULD NOT SPREAD TO THE AMERICAS AND WESTERN EUROPE WOULD BE "CAST IN THE ROLE OF A LIGHTNING ROD."

. -- "EUROMISSILES" MIGHT ALSO BE USED IN THE EVENT OF CRISES FAR AWAY FROM EUROPE, SUCH AS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN BASIC OR NORTH AFRICA.

III. NATO'S "DOUBLE DECISION" - A THREAT IN ACTION

WHY THE "DOUBLE DECISION"> WHAT IS IT>

. -- UNDER THE "DOUBLE DECISION" ONLY SOVIET MEDIUM RANGE MISSILES AND THE PERSHING IIS AND CRUISE
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AMEMBASSY TOKYO 4685
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USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0646
AMEMBASSY WARSAW 8628

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 04 OF 05 MOSCOW 16137

MISSILES ARE TO BE THE SUBJECT OF NEGOTIATION; THE
U. S. FBS IS TO BE EXCLUDED.

. -- THIS HAS SET A PRELIMINARY CONDITION "WHOSE
ACCEPTANCE WOULD ADVERSELY CHANGE THE BALANCE OF
POWER" IN NATO'S FAVOR. BESIDES, SOVIET MEDIUM-
RANGE MISSILES ARE A RESPONSE TO THE U. S. FBS.
TO ACCEPT THE "DOUBLE DECISION'S" CONDITIONS WOULD
BE TO LIMIT THE EFFECT WHILE RETAINING THE CAUSE.

. -- IT IS UNFAIR TO IGNORE THE FRENCH AND BRITISH
NUCLEAR POTENTIALS.

. -- THE U. S. IS RENEGING ON ITS PROMISE TO NEGO-
TIATE BEFORE DEPLOYING. "THE U. S. REJECTS ANY
ALTERNATIVE TO THE PLANNED DEPLOYMENT IN EUROPE
OF LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES" AND, THUS THERE IS
NO CHANCE OF REDUCING MISSILE NUMBERS, LET ALONE
ANY "ZERO VARIANT."

. -- THE U. S. INTENDS TO COMPLICATE NEGOTIATIONS,
DRAG THEM OUT AND MEANWHILE DEPLOY PERSHING II AND
CRUISE MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE. FBS WERE TO
HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED IN SALT-3, BUT THE REAGAN
ADMINISTRATION HAS NO INTENTION OF RATIFYING
SALT II.

. -- BY ALL EVIDENCE, THE U. S. INTENDS TO CONDUCT

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NEGOTIATIONS ON MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE "IN DISREGARD OF THE INCONTESTIBLE FACT THAT ALL AMERICAN MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE ARE EQUIVALENT TO AMERICAN STRATEGIC INTERCONTINENTAL WEAPONS."

-- THE NEUTRON BOMB DECISION WAS ANOTHER EFFORT TO COMPLICATE NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR ARMS LIMITATIONS IN EUROPE.

IV. A REALISTIC PROGRAM OF ENSURING PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND THE REST OF THE WORLD

THIS SECTION IS DEVOTED LARGELY TO A DESCRIPTION OF THE SOVIET "PEACE PROGRAM" LAID DOWN AT THE CPSU XXVTH AND EARLIER PARTY CONGRESSES AS A MEANS OF DEMONSTRATING THAT THE SOVIET UNION OFFERS A "POSITIVE PROGRAM FOR IMPROVING THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE. IT ARGUES THAT THE USSR HAS LONG CALLED FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON LIMITING OR REDUCING MEDIUM RANGE MISSILES BUT THAT THE U.S. HAS AVOIDED SO DOING. THE SECTION HAS A DISCUSSION OF SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR NORTHERN AND BALKAN NUCLEAR FREE ZONES, AND REPEATS BREZHNEV'S CALL FOR TURNING THE MEDITERRANEAN INTO A ZONE OF PEACE. CONVENTIONAL FORCE LEVELS IN EUROPE ARE

SAID TO BE APPROXIMATELY EQUAL, AND THE USSR'S ROLE AS A NAVAL POWER IS LEGITIMATIZED.

NATO AND THE U.S. ARE PICTURED AS OBJECTING TO BREZHNEV'S MORATORIUM PROPOSAL SINCE IT WOULD BRING THE U.S. FBS UNDER THE MORATORIUM. THE OBJECTION THAT A MORATORIUM WOULD BLOCK NATO'S BT

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 05 OF 05 MOSCOW 16137

MODERNIZATION PROGRAM IS ACTUALLY A REJECTION OF THE "VERY POSSIBILITY OF A 'ZERO VERSION' OR OF ANY NUMERICAL REDUCTION OF U.S. MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE." THE SECTION ALSO CLAIMS THAT ALL SOVIET PROPOSALS AND INITIATIVES TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF THE OTHER SIDE AS THE USSR SEES THEM, BUT THE WEST "VIRTUALLY EXPECTS" THE USSR TO ACCEPT ALL WESTERN CONDITIONS WITHOUT RESERVATIONS. THE USSR IS NOT ATTEMPTING TO SPLIT THE WESTERN ALLIES AND "WOULD NEVER THINK OF ENSURING EUROPEAN SECURITY BY ENDANGERING THE U.S."

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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November 24, 1981

NLRR 748-22-2037

BY KDB DATE 11/6/85

MEMORANDUM FOR ED MEESE
JIM BAKER
MIKE DEEVER

FROM: Dick Allen

SUBJECT: Soviet Publication "The Threat to Europe"

Attached is a summary of the recently released Soviet publication "The Threat to Europe" provided by our embassy in Moscow. The publication is a response to our "Soviet Military Power."

The entire text is available upon request.

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REVIEW ON NOVEMBER 24, 1987
CLASSIFIED BY RICHARD ALLEN

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SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF SOVIET PUBLICATION "THE THREAT TO EUROPE"

1. (1) - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY. THE SOVIETS ISSUED THEIR MUCH PROMISED RESPONSE TO THE U. S. PUBLICATION "SOVIET MILITARY POWER" ON THE EVE OF BREZHNEV'S VISIT TO BONN. ENTITLED "THE THREAT TO EUROPE," THE BROCHURE BRINGS TOGETHER THE FULL RANGE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE COMMENTS THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN USING WITH WESTERN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN VISITORS IN THEIR EFFORT TO THWART THE NATO DECISION OF LRTNF DEPLOYMENTS. THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH HAS UNDERCUT THE IMPACT OF SOME OF THE SOVIET ARGUMENTS -- PARTICULARLY ITS ARGUMENT THAT THE U. S. WOULD HAVE NO INTEREST IN A "ZERO OPTION" -- BUT THE SOVIETS CLEARLY VIEW IT AS A BASIC PROPAGANDA TOOL TO BE USED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE BONN VISIT AND AFTER. END SUMMARY.

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3. THE SOVIET PAMPHLET "THE THREAT TO EUROPE" (TEXT REFS A-D) WAS UNVEILED WITH CONSIDERABLE FANFARE AT A NOVEMBER 20 PRESS CONFERENCE IN MOSCOW. DIVIDED INTO FOUR SEPARATE PARTS -- SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE, THE MILITARY BALANCE AND THE THREAT TO EUROPE, NATO'S DOUBLE DECISION - A THREAT IN ACTION, A REALISTIC PROGRAM OF ENSURING PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND THE REST OF THE WORLD -- THE PAMPHLET TAKES THE FORM OF A QUESTION AND ANSWER EXCHANGE BETWEEN A "WESTERN OPPONENT" AND A SOVIET COLLOCUTOR. WELL EXECUTED, AND DETERMINEDLY REASONABLE IN TONE, THE PAMPHLET PORTRAYS THE USSR AS CONSTANTLY SEEKING SECURITY THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS.

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PROPOSING TALKS AIMED AT ESTABLISHING FORCE LEVELS, EVEN REDUCING EXISTING LEVELS, AND HAS PROPOSED A MORATORIUM ON DEPLOYMENT OF MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES, IF NATO AGREES NOT TO DEPLOY NEW MISSILES PENDING THE OUTCOME OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THEATER FORCES. BY CONTRAST, THE U.S. HAS NO INTEREST IN SUCH NEGOTIATIONS SINCE IT IS SEEKING TO UPSET THE BALANCE AND ACHIEVE SUPERIORITY BY DEPLOYING 572 NEW CRUISE MISSILES AND PERSHING II'S, WHICH ARE "FIRST STRIKE" WEAPONS AIMED AT SOVIET STRATEGIC TARGETS. THROUGHOUT, THE EMPHASIS IS ON INCLUDING U.S. FBS IN ANY TALKS.

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- . -- THE PREVAILING BALANCE IS IMPORTANT FOR PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY.
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TATIVE AND QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS IN THE KINDS OF MISSILES IT WANTS TO EMPLOY IN EUROPE.

. -- THE U.S. WOULD BE REARMING, NOT MODERNIZING BY DEPLOYING GLCMS AND PERSHING IIS, WHICH ARE DIRECTLY CONNECTED WITH STRENGTHENING U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES. "WASHINGTON REALLY WANTS THEM FOR PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKES AGAINST SOVIET ICBMS AND OTHER VITALLY IMPORTANT TARGETS" IN THE USSR.

. -- "THE CHIEF CONCERN OF THE U.S. IS NOT EUROPEAN SECURITY, BUT TO TRY AND REDUCE THE POWER OF THE RETALIATORY STRIKE AGAINST U.S. TERRITORY IN THE EVENT OF AN AGGRESSION AGAINST THE USSR."

. -- "EUROMISSILES" WILL NOT BUTTRESS EUROPEAN SECURITY. "BY ALL EVIDENCE," THE U.S. IS DESIGNING A VARIANT OF NUCLEAR WAR THAT WOULD ACHIEVE ITS GLOBAL AIMS WITHOUT RISKING ITS OWN TERRITORY. IN A "LIMITED OR EUROSTRATEGIC" WAR, WITHOUT USING U.S. STRATEGIC MISSILES, HOSTILITIES WOULD NOT SPREAD TO THE AMERICAS AND WESTERN EUROPE WOULD BE "CAST IN THE ROLE OF A LIGHTNING ROD."

. -- "EUROMISSILES" MIGHT ALSO BE USED IN THE EVENT OF CRISES FAR AWAY FROM EUROPE, SUCH AS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN BASIC OR NORTH AFRICA.

III. NATO'S "DOUBLE DECISION" - A THREAT IN ACTION

WHY THE "DOUBLE DECISION"> WHAT IS IT>

. -- UNDER THE "DOUBLE DECISION" ONLY SOVIET MEDIUM RANGE MISSILES AND THE PERSHING IIS AND CRUISE
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MISSILES ARE TO BE THE SUBJECT OF NEGOTIATION; THE U.S. FBS IS TO BE EXCLUDED.

. -- THIS HAS SET A PRELIMINARY CONDITION "WHOSE ACCEPTANCE WOULD ADVERSELY CHANGE THE BALANCE OF POWER" IN NATO'S FAVOR. BESIDES, SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES ARE A RESPONSE TO THE U.S. FBS. TO ACCEPT THE "DOUBLE DECISION'S" CONDITIONS WOULD BE TO LIMIT THE EFFECT WHILE RETAINING THE CAUSE.

. -- IT IS UNFAIR TO IGNORE THE FRENCH AND BRITISH NUCLEAR POTENTIALS.

. -- THE U.S. IS RENEGING ON ITS PROMISE TO NEGOTIATE BEFORE DEPLOYING. "THE U.S. REJECTS ANY ALTERNATIVE TO THE PLANNED DEPLOYMENT IN EUROPE OF LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES" AND, THUS THERE IS NO CHANCE OF REDUCING MISSILE NUMBERS, LET ALONE ANY "ZERO VARIANT."

. -- THE U.S. INTENDS TO COMPLICATE NEGOTIATIONS, DRAG THEM OUT AND MEANWHILE DEPLOY PERSHING II AND CRUISE MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE. FBS WERE TO HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED IN SALT-3, BUT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION HAS NO INTENTION OF RATIFYING SALT II.

. -- BY ALL EVIDENCE, THE U.S. INTENDS TO CONDUCT NEGOTIATIONS ON MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE "IN DISREGARD OF THE INCONTESTIBLE FACT THAT ALL AMERICAN MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE ARE EQUIVALENT TO AMERICAN STRATEGIC INTERCONTINENTAL WEAPONS."

. -- THE NEUTRON BOMB DECISION WAS ANOTHER EFFORT TO COMPLICATE NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR ARMS LIMITATIONS IN EUROPE.

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IV. A REALISTIC PROGRAM OF ENSURING PEACE AND SECURITY
IN EUROPE AND THE REST OF THE WORLD

THIS SECTION IS DEVOTED LARGELY TO A DESCRIPTION
OF THE SOVIET "PEACE PROGRAM" LAID DOWN AT THE CPSU
XXVITH AND EARLIER PARTY CONGRESSES AS A MEANS OF
DEMONSTRATING THAT THE SOVIET UNION OFFERS A
"POSITIVE PROGRAM FOR IMPROVING THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE.
IT ARGUES THAT THE USSR HAS LONG
CALLED FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON LIMITING OR REDUCING
MEDIUM RANGE MISSILES BUT THAT THE U. S. HAS
AVOIDED SO DOING. THE SECTION HAS A DISCUSSION
OF SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR NORTHERN AND BALKAN
NUCLEAR FREE ZONES, AND REPEATS BREZHNEV'S CALL
FOR TURNING THE MEDITERRANEAN INTO A ZONE OF
PEACE. CONVENTIONAL FORCE LEVELS IN EUROPE ARE

SAID TO BE APPROXIMATELY EQUAL, AND THE USSR'S
ROLE AS A NAVAL POWER IS LEGITIMATIZED.

NATO AND THE U. S. ARE PICTURED AS OBJECTING TO
BREZHNEV'S MORATORIUM PROPOSAL SINCE IT WOULD
BRING THE U. S. FBS UNDER THE MORATORIUM. THE
OBJECTION THAT A MORATORIUM WOULD BLOCK NATO'S
MODERNIZATION PROGRAM IS ACTUALLY A REJECTION
OF THE "VERY POSSIBILITY OF A 'ZERO VERSION' OR
OF ANY NUMERICAL REDUCTION OF U. S. MISSILES IN
WESTERN EUROPE." THE SECTION ALSO CLAIMS THAT
ALL SOVIET PROPOSALS AND INITIATIVES TAKE INTO
CONSIERATION THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF THE
OTHER SIDE AS THE USSR SEES THEM, BUT THE WEST
"VIRTUALLY EXPECTS" THE USSR TO ACCEPT ALL WESTERN
CONDITIONS WITHOUT RESERVATIONS. THE USSR IS
NOT ATTEMPTING TO SPLIT THE WESTERN ALLIES AND
"WOULD NEVER THINK OF ENSURING EUROPEAN SECURITY
BY ENDANGERING THE U. S."

HARTMAN
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