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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 MOSCOW 16090

FOR EUR/SOV  
E.O. 12065: N/A  
TAGS: UR, US, MPOL, PARM.  
SUBJECT: SOVIET PAMPHLET: "THE THREAT OF EUROPE" - 1

1. THIS CABLE, THE FIRST OF FOUR, CARRIES THE  
TEXT OF THE INTRODUCTION AND SECTION I -- SOVIET  
MILITARY DOCTRINE -- OF THE SOVIET PAMPHLET "THE  
THREAT TO EUROPE" RELEASED IN MOSCOW NOVEMBER 20,  
1981. DEPARTMENT SHOULD PASS TO OTHER POSTS AS  
APPROPRIATE. BEGIN TEXT:

2. THE THREAT TO EUROPE

- SOVIET COMMITTEE FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY  
- AND COOPERATION  
- SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH COUNCIL ON PEACE  
- AND DISARMAMENT

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INTRODUCTION

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- III. NATO'S "DOUBLE DECISION" - A THREAT IN ACTION
  - WHY THE "DOUBLE DECISION" >    WHAT IS IT >
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  - AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND THE REST OF
  - THE WORLD

CONCLUSION

4.   EUROPE OF THE EARLY EIGHTIES IS FACED WITH A CRUCIAL CHOICE - EITHER TO LET ITSELF BE SADDLED WITH A NEW ROUND OF NUCLEAR ARMING AND DRIFT TO THE BRINK OF SUICIDE, OR TO PUT A FIRM STOP TO IT. EAST-WEST CONFRONTATION OR CO-OPERATION FOR PEACE >

THOUGH THE CHOICE SHOULD OBVIOUSLY BE IN FAVOR OF PEACE, THE WEST IS TAKING A SUCCESSION OF DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSITE DECISIONS. NATO'S "DOUBLE DECISION" ON DEPLOYING EUROMISSILES IS A CLASSIC EXAMPLE. NATO PROPAGANDISTS CLAIM THAT BUILDING UP MILITARY POWER IS A POLICY OF STABILISING AND CONSOLIDATING PEACE, AND REDUCING THE THREAT TO EUROPE THAT, THEY ALLEGE, COMES FROM THE EAST.

PEACE IS NOT SOMETHING ONE GETS AUTOMATICALLY. IT

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HAS TO BE FOUGHT FOR. BUT HOW>

THE SOVIET PUBLIC, TOO, FEELS THAT THERE IS A THREAT TO EUROPE. BUT IT IS DEEPLY CONVINCED THAT IT COMES FROM ELSEWHERE THAN IS ALLEGED IN THE WEST, NAMELY, FROM THE ARMS RACE STARTED BY THE USA AND OTHER IMPERIALIST COUNTRIES, AND THE SUSTAINED WORLD TENSIONS. TO REMOVE THIS REAL THREAT TO EUROPE, THE SOVIET UNION IS OFFERING MEASURES THAT ARE ENTIRELY DIFFERENT FROM THOSE PLANNED AND IMPLEMENTED BY THE UNITED STATES AND NATO - MEASURES DIRECTED TO HALTING THE FRUITLESS ARMS RACE, LOWERING THE LEVEL OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION, AND BUTTRESSING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. WHAT IS NECESSARY ARE HONEST AND EQUAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH NO PRELIMINARY STRINGS ATTACHED AND NO ATTEMPTS AT DICTATING TERMS - NEGOTIATIONS REPOSING ON THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY. NEGOTIATIONS AND ONLY NEGOTIATIONS ARE THE SENSIBLE WAY TO SETTLE DISPUTES. NEGOTIATIONS, NOT REARMING - THAT IS HOW THE SOVIET UNION PUTS THE ISSUE.

DISTINCTIONS IN THE APPROACH TO THE MATTER OF SAFEGUARDING PEACE NECESSITATE DIALOGUE. AND THERE MUST BE NO ROOM IN IT FOR FEARS OR PREJUDICES, LIES OR HATE, WHICH ARE THE WORST ENEMIES OF PEACE.

PERSEVERING AND BOLD MOVES ARE WANTED IN THE NAME OF AGREEMENT. WANTED, TOO, IS THE WILL TO UNDERSTAND THE OTHER SIDE.

WHAT IS THE SUBSTANCE OF THE SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE> WHERE IS THE EVIDENCE THAT THE SOVIET UNION SEEKS MILITARY SUPERIORITY> IS EAST-WEST MILITARY STRENGTH IN EUROPE REALLY BALANCED> WHY AND IN WHAT WAY IS NATO'S "DOUBLE DECISION" ON EUROSTRATEGIC WEAPONS

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EXTREMELY DANGEROUS TO EUROPEAN SECURITY AND THE  
WORLD AS A WHOLE> WHAT IS THE WAY OUT OF THE OBTAINING  
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DANGEROUS SITUATION IN EUROPE>

THIS PAMPHLET ENDEAVOURS TO ANSWER THESE AND OTHER QUESTIONS. ITS AIM IS TO SHOW THE OPINION OF THE SOVIET PUBLIC. THE INSTRUMENT IT USES IS OBJECTIVENESS THAT REPOSES ON FACT AND COMMON SENSE. THE FORM IT USES IS DIALOGUE, THE DIALOGUE WE STAND FOR. THAT IS WHY THE QUESTIONS OF AN IMAGINARY WESTERN OPPONENT AND THE ANSWERS OF HIS SOVIET COLLOCUTOR PROVIDE THE FRAMEWORK FOR A DISCUSSION OF THE MORE ACUTE PROBLEMS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY.

THE DISCUSSION OPENS WITH AN EXAMINATION OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE. AND FOR A GOOD REASON: DISTORTION OF THIS DOCTRINE IS THE ARTIFICIAL PRIME CAUSE OF MANY OF THE FEARS CULTIVATED IN THE WEST BY THOSE WHO WOULD WANT TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF A "SOVIET MILITARY THREAT".

I. SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE

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IN THE 1980S CRISES, UPHEAVALS, AND UNSETTLED POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND OTHER PROBLEMS ARE LIABLE TO BRING THE NATIONS TO THE CRITICAL LINE AGAIN AND AGAIN. IT IS IMPORTANT NOT TO STEP OVER IT, AND MORE IMPORTANT STILL TO AVERT NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST WHOSE GRUESOME SHADOW HAS BEEN CAST UPON THE WORLD SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE 80S.

THAT IS WHY NOW, AS AT ALL OTHER CRITICAL JUNCTURES OF HISTORY, IT IS HIGHLY IMPORTANT FOR GOVERNMENTS AND NATIONS TO HAVE CORRECT KNOWLEDGE OF EACH OTHER. ESPECIALLY WHERE IT CONCERNS WAR AND PEACE. WE EMPHASISE THIS, BECAUSE NOWADAYS MASS PROPAGANDA HAS GAINED GREAT POWER AND IS A MEDIUM NOT ONLY OF THE TRUTH, BUT ALSO OF ITS DISTORTION. WHAT'S MORE, IN THE WEST IT HAS BEEN FAIRLY SUCCESSFUL IN CREATING THE WRONG IMPRESSION THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS A "MILITARISO XRCE" GUIDED BY A "DOCTRINE OF CONQUESTS". THAT IS WHY WE BEGIN OUR DIALOGUE WITH WESTERN READERS WITH A LOOK AT SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE. ANSWERS TO AT LEAST SOME QUESTIONS MAY, WE HOPE, GIVE THE READER A BETTER IDEA OF THE PRESENT-DAY NOTIONS OF WAR AND PEACE.

QUESTION: DOES THE SOVIET UNION ASPIRE TO MILITARY SUPERIORITY> HAS IT ANY INTENTION OF UPSETTING THE BALANCE OF MILITARY STRENGTH IN ORDER, THEREAFTER, TO INFLUENCE THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF WESTERN EUROPE>

ANSWER: THE SOVIET UNION CONSIDERS THE PREVAILING MILITARY EQUILIBRIUM BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES, AND BETWEEN THE WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION AND NATO, ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT

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CONDITIONS FOR PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY. SPEAKING TO WILLY BRANDT ON 30 JUNE 1981, LEONID BREZHNEV SAID: "IN OUR TIME, SECURITY CAN BE REAL AND ENDURING ONLY IF IT REPOSES ON THE PREVAILING ROUGH MILITARY PARITY OF THE OPPOSITE FORCES AND ON SUBSEQUENT REDUCTION OF THEIR LEVEL."

THE SOVIET UNION HAS STRESSED TIME AND AGAIN THAT IT IS READY TO FOLLOW THIS PRINCIPLE. THAT IS RECORDED IN THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF MUTUAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE USSR AND USA SIGNED IN 1972, THE JOINT DECLARATION SIGNED BY LEONID BREZHNEV AND HELMUT SCHMIDT IN 1978, AND IN A NUMBER OF OTHER DOCUMENTS. AND THE SOVIET UNION HAS INVARIABLY FOLLOWED, AND NOW FOLLOWS, THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY IN POLITICAL PRACTICE AS IT HAS FOLLOWED IT IN SALT NEGOTIATIONS, THE VIENNA TALKS ON REDUCING ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE, THE DISARMAMENT TALKS IN GENEVA, AND IN ALL OTHER CASES BEARING ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THE SALT-1 AND SALT-2 TREATIES ARE, INDEED, EXAMPLES OF CONSTRUCTIVE USE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY.

AN OVER-ALL ROUGH STRATEGIC MILITARY EQUILIBRIUM HAS SHAPED HISTORICALLY BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES BELONGING TO THE WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION AND NATO.

IT EXISTS AT GLOBAL LEVEL AND IN EUROPE, AND HELPS TO STABILISE PEACEFUL RELATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, AND THIS ALSO ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT. OF COURSE, MILITARY EQUILIBRIUM DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE STRUCTURES OF THE RESPECTIVE ARMED FORCES ARE IDENTICAL. ONE SIDE HAS AN ADVANTAGE IN CERTAIN THINGS, AND THE SECOND IN OTHER THINGS. THE SOVIET UNION, FOR EXAMPLE, HAS MORE TANKS. BUT THE NATO  
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COUNTRIES HAVE A LOT MORE ANTI-TANK WEAPONS, WHILE  
THEY ALSO HAVE MANY TANKS.

ALL THE SAME, IF YOU ADD THINGS UP, YOU WILL SEE THAT  
OVER THE RECENT DECADES THE ARMED FORCES OF THE  
WARSAW TREATY AND NATO COUNTRIES ARE SO CLOSELY  
BALANCED THAT THE INEVITABLE ADVANTAGES OF ONE  
SIDE IN SOME KIND OF WEAPON ARE COMPENSATED BY THE  
OTHER SIDE'S ADVANTAGES IN SOME OTHER KIND.  
DISPROPORTIONS IN PARTICULAR FIELDS ARE UNAVOIDABLE,  
BUT THEY DO NOT UPSET THE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM.

SOME DISPROPORTIONS, HOWEVER, ARE OF SPECIAL  
RELEVANCE IN ANY EVALUATION OF THE RELATION OF FORCES.  
THEIR QUALITATIVE OR QUANTITATIVE MODIFICATION OR  
THEIR EXCLUSION FROM ESTIMATES WHEN DETERMINING  
THE BALANCE OF ARMED FORCES MAY BE OF AN EXCESSIVE  
NATURE AND MAY ACT AS A FACTOR DESTABILISING THE  
EQUILIBRIUM. INDEED, THIS APPLIES, AMONG OTHER  
THINGS, TO THE FOLLOWING.

- THE U. S. FORWARD BASE SYSTEM. THE SOVIET UNION  
AND ITS ALLIES SEE IT AS A POWERFUL ADDITION TO  
THE U. S. STRATEGIC POTENTIAL AND ITS PROJECTION TO  
THE IMMEDIATE PROXIMITY OF THE WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES,  
NOT CONTROLLED BY THE SALT PROCESS. THE SOVIET UNION  
HAS NO SUCH SYSTEM IN THE PROXIMITY OF THE UNITED  
STATES. BESIDES, THE UNITED STATES HAS AN EDGE IN  
NUCLEAR CHARGES IT CAN DELIVER TO TARGETS AT ONE  
LAUNCHING (VOLLEY) OF ITS DELIVERY VEHICLES.

- THE WAY THE NUCLEAR FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES  
AND OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS IN AND OUT OF NATO ARE  
DEPLOYED, THEY HAVE IN EFFECT ENVELOPED, EVEN ENCIRCLED,  
THE SOVIET UNION TO SPREAD OUT ITS DEFENCE FORCES,  
INCLUDING NUCLEAR, IN A MANNER THAT BALANCES THESE  
THREATS FROM DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS.

THE CONTINUED BUILD-UP AND IMPROVEMENT OF MASS  
UNION HAVE CREATED LEGITIMATE ALARM AMONG SOVIET  
PEOPLE.

THESE ARE THE FACTORS THAT MOTIVATE THE SOVIET UNION  
TO INSIST ON THE U. S. FORWARD BASE SYSTEM BEING INCLUDED  
IN THE ARMS LIMITATION TALKS, AND AT THE SAME TIME  
TO SOMEWHAT UPDATE ITS OWN NUCLEAR-MISSILE POTENTIAL,  
INCLUDING MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES, IN ORDER TO  
COMPENSATE FOR THE ADVANTAGES OF THE OTHER SIDE.  
BUT THE SOVIET UNION STILL BELIEVES THAT A ROUGH  
EQUILIBRIUM OF EAST-WEST STRENGTH CONTINUES TO EXIST,  
AND THAT VARIOUS UNAVOIDABLE PROBLEMS, INCLUDING  
DISPROPORTIONS, OUGHT TO BE SETTLED BY NEGOTIATION.

WHAT IS MORE, THE SOVIET UNION NEVER FAILS TO

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EMPHASISE THAT THE SIDES MUST WORK FOR A MUTUAL LOWERING OF THE LEVEL OF ARMAMENTS, PROVIDED IT DOES NOT CONTRADICT THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY. "WE ARE NOT SEEKING MILITARY SUPERIORITY TO THE WEST, WE DO NOT NEED IT. ALL WE NEED IS RELIABLE SECURITY," LEONID BREZHNEV SAID IN HIS REPLIES TO TIME, THE U. S. MAGAZINE.

QUESTION: CAN A NUCLEAR WAR BE CONSIDERED WINNABLE?  
ANSWER: WESTERN POLITICAL AND MILITARY WRITERS CONTEND THAT SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE IS BASED EXCLUSIVELY ON THE BELIEF THAT A WORLD NUCLEAR WAR CAN BE WON. BUT THAT IS A SIMPLISTIC AND DISTORTED VIEW OF OUR APPROACH. IN FACT, THE SOVIET UNION HOLDS THAT NUCLEAR WAR WOULD BE A UNIVERSAL DISASTER, AND THAT IT WOULD MOST PROBABLY MEAN THE END OF CIVILISATION. IT MAY LEAD TO THE DESTRUCTION OF ALL HUMANKIND. THERE MAY BE NO VICTOR IN SUCH A WAR, AND IT CAN SOLVE NO POLITICAL PROBLEMS. AS LEONID BREZHNEV POINTED OUT IN HIS REPLY TO A PRAVDA CORRESPONDENT ON 21 OCTOBER 1981, "ANYONE WHO STARTS A NUCLEAR WAR IN THE HOPE OF WINNING IT HAS THEREBY DECIDED TO COMMIT SUICIDE. WHATEVER STRENGTH THE ATTACKER MAY HAVE AND WHATEVER METHOD OF STARTING A  
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NUCLEAR WAR HE MAY CHOOSE, HE WILL NOT ACHIEVE HIS  
AIMS. RETALIATION IS UNAVOIDABLE. THAT IS OUR  
ESSENTIAL POINT OF VIEW."

SOVIET PEOPLE ARE NOT THINKING IN TERMS OF WINNING  
A NUCLEAR WAR, BUT OF AVERTING SUCH A WAR BY ALL  
MEANS. THEY TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE CHANGING RELEVANCE  
OF ARMED FORCE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLITICS. HERE  
IS HOW LEONID BREZHNEV PUT IT: "BY AND LARGE, IT  
IS PROBABLY SAFE TO SAY THAT PEOPLE ARE GRADUALLY  
COMING TO UNDERSTAND THAT NONE OF THE PROBLEMS IN  
THE WORLD CAN BE SOLVED FROM POSITIONS OF STRENGTH,  
BY ANY SABRE-RATTLING" (SPEECH IN ALMA-ATA, 29 AUGUST  
1980). ARMED FORCE AND DOUBLY SO NUCLEAR FORCE  
IS ACQUIRING NEW FUNCTIONS. IN THIS SENSE, WE SEE  
EYE TO EYE WITH REAR ADMIRAL GENE LE ROCQUE, DIRECTOR  
OF THE U.S. CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION, WHO  
SAYS NEITHER SIDE COULD EVENTUALLY CONSIDER ITSELF A  
VICTOR IN THE EVENT OF A MAJOR NUCLEAR WAR BETWEEN

THE USSR AND THE USA. MORE THAN A HUNDRED MILLION  
PEOPLE WOULD PERISH ON EITHER SIDE, AND UP TO THREE-  
QUARTERS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES' ECONOMIC POTENTIALS  
WOULD BE DESTROYED.

THE SAME APPLIES TO THE IDEA OF A "LIMITED NUCLEAR  
WAR" IN EUROPE OR ELSEWHERE AS CONCEIVED IN U.S.  
PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE 59 OF 25 JULY 1980. ONE  
MIGHT DISCOURSE ON "LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR" IN THEORY  
ONLY, BUT ON THE PRACTICAL PLANE IT IS NOTHING LESS  
THAN UNREALISTIC. MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION  
D.F. USTINOV, MEMBER OF THE CC CPSU POLITICAL BUREAU  
AND USSR MINISTER OF DEFENCE, HAS SAID ON THIS  
SCORE: "COULD ANYONE IN HIS RIGHT MIND SPEAK  
SERIOUSLY OF ANY LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR? IT SHOULD BE  
QUITE CLEAR THAT THE AGGRESSOR'S ACTION WILL  
INSTANTLY AND INEVITABLY TRIGGER A DEVASTATING  
COUNTERSTRIKE BY THE OTHER SIDE. NONE BUT COMPLETELY  
IRRESPONSIBLE PEOPLE COULD MAINTAIN THAT A NUCLEAR  
WAR MAY BE MADE TO FOLLOW RULES ADOPTED BEFOREHAND,  
WITH NUCLEAR MISSILES EXPLODING IN 'GENTLEMANLY  
MANNER' OVER STRICTLY DESIGNATED TARGETS AND SPARING  
THE POPULATION" (PRAVDA, 25 JULY 1981).

CONSEQUENTLY, A "LIMITED" WAR CANNOT BE KEPT WITHIN  
SUCH A WAR WILL NOT GROW INTO A UNIVERSAL NUCLEAR  
CONFLAGRATION.

FOR THIS REASON, WE CANNOT CONSIDER "LIMITED NUCLEAR  
WAR" A "POLITICAL MEANS" MAKING DETERRENCE "MORE  
DEPENDABLE". WE CONSIDER THE CONCEPT NOT A BIT LESS  
DANGEROUS THAN THE THREAT OF ALL-OUT NUCLEAR WAR.

SINCE THE WARSAW TREATY ORGANISATION IS A DEFENSIVE

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ALLIANCE, ITS ENTIRE MILITARY SYSTEM IS AN INSTRUMENT OF DEFENCE. IT IS DESIGNED TO MEET TWO BASIC POLITICAL OBJECTIVES: TO PREVENT WAR, AND TO PROVIDE DEFENCE AGAINST OUTSIDE AGGRESSION. BOTH THESE OBJECTIVES REQUIRE AN EFFECTIVE DEFENSIVE CONCEPT, AND, INDEED, A DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY AT LEAST ROUGHLY EQUAL TO THE STRENGTH OF THE POTENTIAL AGGRESSOR. THIS DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY MUST BRING IT HOME TO ANY AGGRESSOR THAT AN ASSAULT WOULD HAVE IRREDEMIABLE CONSEQUENCES FOR HIM.

QUESTION: IN THE WEST ONE HEARS NOW AND THEN THAT SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE IS OF AN AGGRESSIVELY OFFENSIVE NATURE, CONSIDERS A FIRST STRIKE POSSIBLE, AND INCLUDES PLANS FOR A SUDDEN, BLITZKRIEG-STYLE INVASION OF WESTERN EUROPE. IS THIS TRUE?

ANSWER: THAT IS ANOTHER POPULAR THEME IN WESTERN MILITARY AND POLITICAL PROPAGANDA. THEY USE A VERY SIMPLE RUSE TO ADDUCE THAT SOVIET DOCTRINE IS AGGRESSIVELY OFFENSIVE. THEY DO SO BY QUOTING FROM WORKS OF SOVIET MILITARY THEORISTS DEVOTED NOT TO DOCTRINE OR MILITARY POLICY BUT TO PARTICULAR ASPECTS OF COMBAT, SUCH AS TACTICS IN THE BATTLEFIELD. THESE QUOTES ARE PASSED OFF AS SOVIET DOCTRINE, THOUGH  
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THAT IS A DELIBERATELY INCORRECT AND SPECIOUS APPROACH. IT GIVES NOT THE SLIGHTEST IDEA OF SOVIET DOCTRINE, WHICH IS DEFENSIVE BUT, OF COURSE, NECESSARILY ENVISAGES THE TRAINING OF SOLDIERS FOR VARIOUS ACTIONS IN THE FIELD OF BATTLE.

SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE IS OF A PURELY DEFENSIVE NATURE. "WE NEVER HAD AND NEVER WILL HAVE ANY STRATEGIC DOCTRINE OTHER THAN A DEFENSIVE ONE," SAYS THE DECLARATION OF THE WARSAW TREATY STATES OF 15 MAY 1980. IT DOES NOT ADMIT OF EITHER A FIRST OR PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE, OR OF ANY "LIGHTNING" INVASION OF WESTERN EUROPE. IN SO DOING IT FOLLOWS DEFINITE

POLITICAL, ETHICAL, AND MILITARY PRINCIPLES. THERE IS NO AGGRESSIVE ELEMENT IN SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE BECAUSE THE SOVIET UNION HAS NO POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, OR MILITARY AIMS IN EUROPE OR ANYWHERE ELSE THAT IT INTENDS TO SECURE BY ARMED FORCE.

THERE ARE THOSE IN THE WEST WHO SAY THAT EVEN THOUGH THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT INTEND TO RESORT TO DIRECT ARMED FORCE IN EUROPE, IT MAY WANT TO USE IT TO EXERT POLITICAL PRESSURE. BUT HOW? SOVIET MILITARY POLICY REPOSES ON THE CLEAR UNDERSTANDING THAT NEITHER INTIMIDATION NOR PRESSURE NOR THREATS OF AGGRESSION CAN IMPOSE ANYBODY'S POLITICAL WILL ON THE OTHER SIDE OR FORCE IT TO CHANGE ITS SOCIAL SYSTEM. THAT SORT OF THING CAN ONLY CREATE GREATER TENSION AND AUGMENT THE RISK OF CONFLICT. THAT IS WHY THE POLITICAL EMPHASIS OUGHT NOT TO BE ON CREATING AN ATMOSPHERE OF WAR DANGER OR PRESSURE,

BUT ON RULING OUT WAR AS A MEANS OF SETTLING INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS. "OUR EFFORTS ARE DIRECTED PRECISELY TO PREVENTING MATTERS FROM REACHING THE POINT OF EITHER A FIRST OR A SECOND STRIKE, TO AVERTING NUCLEAR WAR IN GENERAL," LEONID BREZHNEV SAID IN HIS TULA SPEECH ON 18 JANUARY 1977.

QUESTION: WHY THEN DO SOVIET THEORETICAL WORKS ON MILITARY STRATEGY OF, SAY, THE EARLY 60S REFER TO OFFENSIVE ACTION, TO BUILDING UP A MILITARY ADVANTAGE? DOESN'T THIS PROVE THAT SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY REPOSES ON THESE PRINCIPLES EVEN TODAY?  
ANSWER: NO, IT PROVES NO SUCH THING. SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY IS NEITHER IMMUTABLE NOR EVERLASTING. IT CHANGES WITH THE CHANGING WORD. THE SAME HAPPENS IN THE UNITED STATES, WHERE THE STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE AND THEREUPON THAT OF REALISTIC DETERRENCE REPLACED A DOCTRINE OF MASSIVE RETALIATION. SOVIET

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THEORETICAL WORKS OF THE EARLY 60S REFLECTED THE VIEWS OF THEIR TIME. AND IT WAS A TIME WHEN THE UNITED STATES COMMANDED A CONSIDERABLE NUCLEAR-MISSILE ADVANTAGE, WHEN IT THREATENED THE SOVIET UNION WITH MASSIVE NUCLEAR STRIKES, AND DECLARED THAT A NUCLEAR WAR AGAINST THE USSR WAS WINNABLE. THE EQUILIBRIUM OF STRATEGIC FORCES THAT SHAPED BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE USA COMPELLED THE LATTER TO ACCEPT DETENTE, WHICH MADE CONSIDERABLE HEADWAY IN THE 70S AND SLACKENED THE WAR DANGER. TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES AND GROWTH OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILES HAD MADE NUCLEAR WAR ALTOGETHER SENSELESS. SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE, WHICH HAS ALWAYS REPOSED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF RETALIATORY, THAT IS, DEFENSIVE ACTION, SAYS NOTHING AT ALL IN THE NEW CONDITIONS OF THE 70S AND EARLY 80S OF NUCLEAR WAR BEING WINNABLE AND, MORE, LAYS THE ACCENT STILL MORE EMPHATICALLY THAN BEFORE ON PREVENTING IT, ON MAINTAINING THE MILITARY EQUILIBRIUM, AND ON LOWERING THE LEVEL OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION BY MEANS OF MILITARY DETENTE. "THERE IS NO TASK THAT WE INTEND TO ACCOMPLISH BY ARMED FORCE," LEONID BREZHNEV SAID IN AN INTERVIEW TO VORWARTS, THE WEEKLY OF THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF GERMANY.

IT IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO UNDERSTAND THE ESSENCE OF SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE IF YOU WANT AN OBJECTIVE PICTURE OF THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY SITUATION OF THE PRESENT-DAY WORLD, AND A BAD BLUNDER TO MISTAKE

CONCEPTS OF THE 60S, HOWEVER TRUE THEY MAY HAVE BEEN IN THEIR TIME, FOR THE CONTENT OF SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE TODAY.

QUESTION: IT IS SAID THAT THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES IS FAR GREATER THAN WHAT THE COUNTRY NEEDS FOR DEFENCE. IS THAT TRUE?  
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ANSWER: THE STRENGTH OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES IS NOT GREATER THAN NEEDED FOR DEFENCE. IT MATCHES THE DEFENSIVE NEEDS. TO SEE THIS YOU MUST CONSIDER AT LEAST TWO PERTINENT FACTORS: THE REGIONAL STRENGTH BALANCES AND THE GEOSTRATEGIC FACTOR.

THE SOVIET UNION'S STRATEGIC SITUATION COMPELS IT, FOR PURPOSES OF DEFENCE, TO ENSURE NOT ONLY A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM OF STRENGTH BETWEEN IT AND THE USA, AND BETWEEN THE WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES AND NATO, BUT ALSO A REGIONAL EQUILIBRIUM IN SEPARATE THEATERS, EACH WITH ITS OWN MILITARY SPECIFICS. TO BEGIN WITH, THE STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES MUST MATCH THE AREA OF THE TERRITORY THEY DEFEND, THE OVERALL LENGTH OF FRONTIERS, AND THE NATURE OF THE POTENTIAL DANGERS. NO OTHER COUNTRY IN THE WORLD HAS ANYTHING EVEN REMOTELY EQUAL OR SIMILAR TO THESE FACTORS. THE ARMIES OF THE WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES HAVE A TERRITORY OF 23,500,000 SQ KM TO DEFEND, OUT OF WHICH 22,500,000 SQ KM ARE SOVIET TERRITORY. THIS IS MORE THAN THE AREA OF THE UNITED STATES, EUROPE, AND CHINA COMBINED: THE NATO ARMIES HAVE ONLY 2 MILLION SQ KM OR ONE-ELEVENTH OF THAT AREA, TO DEFEND.

FACED IN THE WEST BY THE NATO BLOC, WHICH INCLUDES THREE NUCLEAR POWERS, THE SOVIET UNION IS SIMULTANEOUSLY EXPOSED TO DANGER IN THE EAST FROM TWO AMERICAN PACIFIC NUCLEAR FLEETS AND FROM CHINA WITH ITS GROWING NUCLEAR POTENTIAL AND THE WORLD'S MOST NUMEROUS ARMY. FURTHER MORE, THE DEPLOYMENT OF U. S. NAVAL NUCLEAR FORCES IN THE NORTHERN SECTOR OF THE INDIAN OCEAN WITHIN REACH OF SOUTHERN REGIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION COMBINES WITH THE STRING OF U. S.

MILITARY BASES STRETCHING FROM THE MEDITERRANEAN ACROSS THE MIDDLE EAST TO PAKISTAN AND COUNTRIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. IN EFFECT, THE SOVIET UNION IS COMPELLED TO RECKON WITH THE LIKELIHOOD OF A BLOCKADE BEING PUT UP AROUND IT. THIS IS BEING MADE INCREASINGLY APPARENT, AMONG OTHER THINGS, BY THE GROWING POLITICAL AND MILITARY CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA.

FURTHER, IT OUGHT TO BE BORNE IN MIND THAT BY VIRTUE OF ITS FAVOURABLE GEOGRAPHICAL SITUATION THE UNITED STATES CAN ENSURE THE DEFENCE OF ITS OWN NATIONAL FRONTIERS BY A MINIMAL FORCE. THE SOVIET UNION, ON THE OTHER HAND, IS COMPELLED TO GUARANTEE PROPER BALANCE AND DEPENDABLE DEFENCE BY DISTRIBUTING ITS FORCES ALONG THE ENTIRE LENGTH OF ITS BORDERS AND, MOREOVER, ENSURING A ROUGH EQUILIBRIUM IN THE WORLD OCEAN WHERE IT IS EXPOSED TO GROWING DANGERS

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FROM THE U. S. NUCLEAR NAVY. LASTLY, WE OUGHT TO REMEMBER THAT THE UNITED STATES CAN ADD FREELY TO ITS TROOP STRENGTH IN EUROPE AND ASIA BY MOVING RESERVES AND WEAPONRY STATIONED IN ITS NATIONAL TERRITORY, WHERE THEY ARE NOT PINNED DOWN BY ANYONE AND IN NO WAY HEMMED IN. IN THIS SENSE, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE IN A FAR LESS FAVOURABLE POSITION IN THE EVNT OF A CONFLICT.

IT IS THEREFORE COMPLETELY WRONG TO COMPARE THE AGGREGATE STRNGTH F THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES TO THE STRENGTH OF NATO TROOPS IN UROPE, AS THIS IS OFTEN DONE IN THE WEST, AND TO OVERLOOK THERADICAL DISTINCTIONS IN THE GEOSTRATEGIC POSITION OF THE USSR AND THE USA, THE WARSAW TREATY ORGANISATION AND NATO. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE MORE COMPLICATED GLOBAL GEOSTRATEGIC SITUATION OF THE SOVIET UNION MAKES ITS POSITION IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER LESS FAVOURABLE THAN THAT OF THE UNITED SATES. THIS IS PROOF ENOUGH THAT SOVIET TROOPS STRENGTH BALANCES WITH THE REAL DEFENSIVE NEEDS OF THE COUNTRY AS A WHOLE, AND DOES NOT EXCEED THESE NEEDS.

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FOR EUR/SOV  
E. O. 12065: N/A  
TAGS: UR, US, MPOL, PARM  
SUBJECT: SOVIET PAMPHLET: "THE THREAT TO EUROPE" - II  
REF: MOSCOW 16090

1. THIS CABLE, THE SECOND OF FOUR, CARRIES THE TEXT OF SECTION II -- MILITARY BALANCE AND THE THREAT TO EUROPE -- OF THE SOVIET PAMPHLET "THE THREAT TO EUROPE" RELEASED IN MOSCOW NOVEMBER 20, 1981. DEPARTMENT SHOULD PASS TO OTHER POSTS AS APPROPRIATE. BEGIN TEXT:

2. MILITARY BALANCE AND THE THREAT TO EUROPE - II  
EQUILIBRIUM OF NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE  
QUESTION. ISN'T THE MILITARY BALANCE STEADILY  
TIPPING IN FAVOUR OF THE SOVIET UNION? THIS CAN'T  
HELP CREATING ALARM IN THE WEST.  
ANSWER. DURING THE FIRST ROUGHLY TWENTY YEARS AFTER  
THE WAR, THE UNITED STATES HAD A STRATEGIC NUCLEAR  
ADVANTAGE OVER THE USSR. AT THE TURN OF THE 70S,  
THE DEFENSIVE EFFORTS OF THE SOVIET UNION ENDED  
THIS SUPERIORITY. SINCE THEN, THERE HAS BEEN  
MILITARY STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIUM.  
THIS IS ACKNOWLEDGED BY THE SOVIET UNION, AND BY WESTERN  
STATESMEN AS WELL.  
PRESIDENT CARTER, FOR EXAMPLE, SAID ON 25 APRIL  
1979 THAT THE STRATEGIC FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES  
AND THE SOVIET UNION TODAY ARE ESSENTIALLY EQUIV-  
ALENT. THE SAME WAS SAID ON 5 APRIL 1979 BY HAROLD  
BROWN, WHO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT DESPITE THE RUSSIAN  
MILITARY ACHIEVEMENTS, THE SOVIET UNION HAS NO  
MILITARY SUPERIORITY IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD, AND  
THAT TODAY THERE IS A STRATEGIC BALANCE; THE  
UNITED STATES, HE SAID, IS NOT LIKELY TO BE SIRATE-  
GICALLY BEHIND IN 1985.  
ON 20 JANUARY 1981 HAROLD BROWN REITERATED THAT THE  
UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION WERE KEEPING  
THEIR OVERALL STRATEGIC BALANCE ROUGHLY EQUIVALENT.  
A SIMILAR OPINION WAS EXPRESSED BY ALEXANDER HAIG ON  
26 FEBRUARY 1979: "THE BASIC PROBLEM THAT WE ARE  
FACED WITH IN THE ALLIANCE IS THE EMERGENCE  
OF CENTRAL STRATEGIC PARITY WITH THE  
EAST. THIS MAKES THE MAINTENANCE OF OUR REGIONAL  
BALANCES FAR MORE IMPORTANT."  
TWO YEARS LATER, ON 23 FEBRUARY 1981, SPEAKING ON  
FRENCH TELEVISION, HE ADMITTED THAT STRATEGICALLY,  
THE USSR AND THE USA ARE AT A POINT OF RELATIVE  
BALANCE AND EQUIVALENCE.

-  
IN AN INTERVIEW TO KOLNER STADT-ANZEIGER ON 18  
FEBRUARY 1981, HELMUT SCHMIDT SAID: "I NEVER SAID  
THE EQUILIBRIUM BETWEEN EAST AND WEST IN EUROPE  
IS ESSENTIALLY UPSET; I SAID: IN THIS FIELD THE

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RUSSIANS MAY UPSET IT AT ANY MOMENT." QUESTION. WHY DO THESE STATESMEN SAY TODAY THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS MILITARILY AHEAD, AND THAT SOVIET-AMERICAN PARITY NO LONGER EXISTS? ANSWER. BECAUSE THE US ADMINISTRATION DOES NOT WANT PARITY. IT WANTS THE WORLD TO IDENTIFY PARITY WITH US MILITARY SUPERIORITY. BY DEFINITION, THE ACHIEVEMENT OF MILITARY EQUILIBRIUM BY THE SOVIET UNION MEANS THE USA HAS DROPPED BEHIND AND THE PILLARS OF PEACE ARE UNDERMINED. SPOKESMEN OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION CLAIM THAT PEACE HINGES ON US MILITARY SUPERIORITY. CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, FOR EXAMPLE, SAID ON 20 MAY 1981 THAT TO PRESERVE PEACE THE UNITED STATES MUST HAVE THE KIND OF LEAD THAT IT HAD IN THE 50S AND 60S. THIS VIEW IS THE VERY OPPOSITE TO THE OPINION OF THE SOVIET UNION AND MANY WEST EUROPEAN GOVERN-  
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MENTS. THEY HOLD THAT IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY DEPEND NOT ON THE SUPERIORITY OF EITHER OF THE SIDES BUT PRECISELY ON MILITARY EQUILIBRIUM. AND SINCE THIS VIEWPOINT IS WIDESPREAD ACROSS THE WORLD, AND NOTABLY AMONG THE WEST EUROPEAN PUBLIC, ADVOCATES OF MILITARY SUPERIORITY ARE AT PAINS TO DISTORT THE OBTAINING STATE OF AFFAIRS BY IRRESPONSIBLE PRONOUNCEMENTS EQUATING PARITY TO SOVIET MILITARY SUPERIORITY, AND THUS JUSTIFYING THEIR ARMS BUILD-UP. QUESTION. THOUGH THAT IS WHAT THE SOVIET UNION MAINTAINS, IT IS CONTINUOUSLY DEVELOPING NEW TYPES OF WEAPONS. ITS DEEDS DON'T MATCH ITS WORDS: IT SAYS IT WANTS THE ARMS RACE STOPPED. BUT ISN'T THE USSR TAKING AN ACTIVE PART IN IT?

ANSWER. YOU MUST LOOK BELOW THE SURFACE OF THINGS. THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT INITIATE NEW WEAPONS. IT DEVELOPS THEM IN RESPONSE TO THE APPEARANCE OF SUCH WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES. HERE ARE THE FACTS TO PROVE IT:

TABLE 1

STRATEGIC WEAPONS MILESTONES (THE DEFENSE MONITOR, MAY 1974, P. 2.)

	UNITED STATES	SOVIET UNION
ATOM BOMB	1945	1949
INTERCONTINENTAL STRATEGIC BOMBER	1948	1954-55
NUCLEAR-POWERED STRATEGIC SUBMARINE	1960	1968
MRV MISSILES OPERATIONAL	1964	1973

BY THE BEGINNING OF THE 70S THE UNITED STATES HAD INITIATED 23 OUT OF THE 25 EXISTING MAJOR WEAPONS SYSTEMS (IBID). AND SINCE THEN THE NUMBER OF US "INITIATIVES" HAS INCREASED. THE LATEST ONE IS THE DECISION TO MANUFACTURE NEUTRON BOMBS. REMEMBER, TOO, THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS INVARIABLY OFFERED TO MUTUALLY RENOUNCE DEVELOPMENT EVERY TIME THE PROSPECT OF NEW, STILL MORE DANGEROUS TYPES OF WEAPONS APPEARED. AT THE DAWN OF THE NUCLEAR ERA THE SOVIET UNION PROPOSED THAT NUCLEAR ARMS SHOULD BE OUTLAWED AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT STOPPED. FOR MANY YEARS, IT HAS BEEN CAMPAIGNING FOR A COMPLETE HALT TO NUCLEAR TESTS. THAT WOULD HAVE STOPPED OR AT LEAST GREATLY RESTRICTED THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW TYPES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE SOVIET UNION OFFERED THE UNITED STATES TO MUTUALLY RENOUNCE MULTIPLE WARHEADS (IF THIS PROPOSAL HAD BEEN ACCEPTED, THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN NO SS-20 MISSILE). THE PROPOSAL NOT TO ADOPT CRUISE MISSILES CAME FROM THE SOVIET UNION AS WELL. THE SOVIET UNION PROPOSED THAT NO ONE IN THE WORLD SHOULD MANUFACTURE NEUTRON WEAPONS. BUT ALL THESE PROPOSALS WERE TURNED DOWN BY THE UNITED STATES IN ITS CONTINUOUS PURSUIT

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OF ELUSIVE MILITARY SUPERIORITY. QUESTION. IN THE MATTER OF EUROMISSILES, HOWEVER, DIDN'T THE INITIATIVE COME FROM THE SOVIET UNION? TAKE THE SS-20. AND THAT'S THE MISSILE THAT NOW SYMBOLISES THE INCREASED NUCLEAR THREAT TO EUROPE. NATO IS COMPELLED TO DEPLOY EUROMISSILES IN ORDER TO NEUTRALIZE THE SS-20.

ANSWER. THAT ISN'T TRUE. HERE, TOO, THE INITIATIVE BELONGS TO THE UNITED STATES AND NATO. FIRST, MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES WERE MADE BY THE SOVIET UNION AS A REACTION TO THE NUCLEAR FORWARD BASE SYSTEMS DEVELOPED BY THE AMERICANS IN THE 50S. THE FBS ARE SYSTEMS OF NUCLEAR ARMS SITED IN EUROPE AND TRAINED ON THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES, WHICH NECESSITATED THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES. THIS CAUSAL RELATION IS STILL VALID. WE WANT TO STRESS THIS SPECIALLY, BECAUSE ALL THE LOGICAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF THE NATO PROPONENTS OF REARMING DELIBERATELY IGNORE IT, AND WANT THE PUBLIC TO FORGET IT.

SECOND, SPEAKING SPECIFICALLY OF SS-20 MISSILES, THE WEST LEARNED ABOUT THEM IN 1976. IT BEGAN REFERRING TO THEM IN 1977 (HELMUT SCHMIDT'S PUBLIC  
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PRONOUNCEMENT IN LONDON IN THE AUTUMN OF 1977). AS FOR THE NEW AMERICAN EUROMISSILES, FIRST MENTION OF THEM GOES MUCH FURTHER BACK--TO THE VERY BEGINNING OF THE 70S. ACCORDING TO A CRUCIALLY SIGNIFICANT STATEMENT BY ERWIN MULLER, THE FRG DISARMAMENT PLANNING EXPERT, AMERICANS HAVE BEEN STRESSING THE NEED FOR MODERNISING THE EUROPEAN POTENTIAL OF THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE 70S. LONG BEFORE THE SOVIET UNION ADOPTED SS-20 MISSILES, THE THEN US SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SCHLESINGER ASKED CONGRESS TO ALLOCATE FUNDS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LONG-RANGE VERSION OF PERSHING-1, WHICH NOW FIGURES IN NATO'S BRUSSELS DECISION AS PERSHING-2.

AND A FEW ADDITIONAL FACTS. IN FEBRUARY 1969, ORLANDO-MARTIN CONCLUDED A CONTRACT WITH THE PENTAGON, ALBEIT FOR THE MODEST SUM OF 150,000 DOLLARS, TO DEVELOP A NEW THEATRE MISSILE. THE CONTRACT WAS RENEWED IN MAY 1971 AND JANUARY 1972, THE SUM NOW RUNNING INTO MILLIONS (THE BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, OCTOBER 1980, PP 25, 26). AND IN THE US ARMY BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 1975, PERSHING-2 WAS SINGLED OUT AS AN INDEPENDENT PROGRAMME (FISCAL YEAR 1980. ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENTS, MARCH 1979, U. S. PRINTING OFFICE, WASHINGTON, P. 135). TODAY, ORLANDO-MARTIN HAS THE NEXT GENERATION OF THAT MISSILE, PERSHING-2A, ON ITS DRAWING BOARDS.

ALL THESE YEARS, TOO, THE US WAS DEVELOPING TOMAHAWK CRUISE MISSILES AT CRASH RATES. THE FIRST CONTRACTS FOR THEM WERE CONCLUDED WITH GENERAL DYNAMICS IN 1972 (IBID, P. 137).

WHERE DOES THIS LEAVE THE CLAIM THAT NATO IS ONLY COUNTERING THE DEPLOYMENT OF SS-20? IT IS NO REACTION BUT ANOTHER US INITIATIVE IN THE ARMS RACE. DEPUTY ACADEMIC DIRECTOR OF THE HAMBURG INSTITUTE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY STUDIES DIETER S. LUTZ HAS SAID RIGHTLY THAT "THE WHOLE THING IS A TYPICAL CASE OF POST-DATED JUSTIFYING OF ONE'S OWN ARMING." (ES GEHT UMS UBERLEBEN, PAHL-RUNGENSTEJN VERLAG, COLOGNE, 1981.)

AND ANOTHER POINT: FROM 1976 TO 1978 THE NATO BLOC SHOWED NO SPECIAL CONCERN OVER SS-20 MISSILES. NO MENTION OF THEM WAS MADE IN THE COMMUNIQUE OF THE NATO COUNCIL SESSIONS OF 8 FEBRUARY 1976, 11 MAY 1977, AND 9 DECEMBER 1977. NOT UNTIL 6 DECEMBER 1978 (A YEAR BEFORE THE "DOUBLE DECISION") DID NATO'S DEFENSE PLANNING COMMITTEE MENTION THE SS-20S, AND THIS NOT AT ALL IN THE SENSE THAT THEY THREATENED WESTERN EUROPE. AND AS LATE AS 1979, THE UNITED STATES DECIDED THAT THE SS-20S WERE A GOOD PRETEXT FOR DEPLOYING THE LATEST AMERICAN

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MISSILES.

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THAT THE SS-20 MISSILES DID NOT BREED PERSHING-2  
AND CRUISE MISSILES WAS NOLENS VOLENS CONFIRMED  
BY A HIGH-LEVEL NATO GROUP CHAIRED BY US ASSIS-  
TANT SECRETARY OF DEFENCE RICHARD PERLE WHICH MET  
IN BRUSSELS IN JULY 1981. NATO BULLETIN NOUVELLES  
ATLANTIQUES OF 2 AUGUST 1981 REPORTED THAT IT FOUND  
"MODERNISING" NATO MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN EUROPE  
"IS NECESSARY NOT ONLY IN FACE OF THE SOVIET THREAT,  
BUT ALSO BECAUSE THE TECHNOLOGY NOW DEPLOYED IS  
PARTIALLY OBSOLETE (SOME OF IT BEING 15 YEARS  
OLD)". IN OTHER WORDS, THE REARMING WAS TO TAKE  
PLACE ALL THE SAME, WITH OR WITHOUT A "SOVIET  
THREAT".

QUESTION. BE THAT AS IT MAY, BUT THE SS-20 MISSILE  
HAS GIVEN THE SOVIET UNION AN EDGE IN MEDIUM-RANGE  
WEAPONS IN EUROPE. AND HASN'T THE INCREASED NUMBER  
AND IMPROVED QUALITY OF SOVIET MISSILES UPSET  
THE NUCLEAR BALANCE IN EUROPE?

ANSWER. NOT AT ALL. ANALYSING NUCLEAR STRENGTH  
RELATIONS ONE MUST NOT ISOLATE A SINGLE TYPE OF  
WEAPON, SAY GROUND-LAUNCHED MISSILES, OR A SINGLE  
QUALITY INDICATOR. NUCLEAR POTENTIALS MUST BE  
MEASURED AS A COMPLEX, COUNTING ALL QUALITY AND  
QUANTITY INDICATORS. THAT IS THE ONLY WAY TO  
ABIDE BY THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY. THE  
ATTEMPT TO BASE THE BALANCE COUNT OF NUCLEAR STRENGTH  
IN EUROPE ON JUST THE POTENTIALITIES OF THE SS-20,

STRESSING THAT NATO HAS NO ANALOGOUS MISSILES,  
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IS MADE IN BAD FAITH. THAT SORT OF ESTIMATE WHOLLY IGNORES THE CAUSAL AND OBJECTIVE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONS AND THE US NUCLEAR FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS. IF WE TAKE THE AGGREGATE EUROPEAN NUCLEAR POTENTIALS OF THE TWO SIDES, WE WILL SEE THAT THEY BALANCE OUT, AND THAT THE DEPLOYMENT OF SS-20 MISSILES DOES NOT UPSET PARITY.

THERE HAS BEEN ROUGH NUCLEAR MEDIUM-RANGE ARMS PARITY IN EUROPE FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS--WITH THE USSR AND THE NATO COUNTRIES HAVING APPROXIMATELY 1,000 DELIVERY VEHICLES EACH.

IN THE CASE OF THE USSR, THIS NUMBER COMPRISES GROUND-BASED MISSILES KNOWN IN THE WEST AS SS-20, SS-4 AND SS-5, AND INTERMEDIATE RANGE BOMBERS. IN THE CASE OF NATO, IT IS MADE UP OF THE US FORWARD BASE NUCLEAR FORCE (MEDIUM-RANGE FB-111 BOMBERS, F-111 AND F-4 FIGHTER-BOMBERS, AND A-6 AND A-7 CARRIER-BASED AIRCRAFT) TOTALLING MORE THAN 700 UNITS, AND THE NUCLEAR FORCES OF BRITAIN AND FRANCE (GROUND-BASED S-2 AND S-3 MISSILES, POLARIS AND M-20 SUBMARINE-BASED BALLISTIC MISSILES, AND VULCAN, MIRAGE AND BUCCANEER BOMBERS) TOTALLING SOME 300 UNITS. ALL THESE DELIVERY SYSTEMS HAVE A RANGE OF 1,000 TO 4,500 KILOMETRES, AND CAN REACH TARGETS WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION. THIS MEANS THAT NATO ALREADY HAS MISSILES ANALOGOUS IN COMBAT POTENTIAL TO SOVIET SS-20 MISSILES (64 SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED MIRV'D BALLISTIC MISSILES IN BRITAIN'S ARSENAL, AND 80 SUBMARINE-BASED AND 18 GROUND-BASED BALLISTIC MISSILES IN THAT OF FRANCE).

AND ANOTHER IMPORTANT POINT: NATO'S MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONS CAN ALREADY NOW CARRY 50 PERCENT MORE WARHEADS AT ONE LAUNCHING THAN THE EQUIVALENT SOVIET VEHICLES.

THE NATO COUNTRIES HAVE REPEATEDLY MODERNISED THEIR MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THEY ARE ALSO BEING UPDATED AT PRESENT (BRITAIN IS REPLACING POLARIS-A-3 SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED MISSILES WITH THE MORE SOPHISTICATED POLARIS-A-3TK, AND WILL SOON HAVE TRIDENT SUB-BASED MISSILES, WHILE FRANCE IS REPLACING M-20 SUB-BASED MISSILES WITH SINGLE WARHEADS WITH M-4 MISSILES THAT CARRY SEVEN WARHEADS, AND GROUND-BASED S-3 ONE-WARHEAD MISSILES WITH S-4 SEVEN-WARHEAD MISSILES); US FORWARD BASE WEAPONRY IS ALSO BEING UPDATED.

THE SOVIET UNION IS ALSO ENTITLED TO MODERNISING ITS MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILE ARSENAL, BECAUSE, AS WE KNOW, ALL WEAPONRY TENDS TO GROW OBSOLETE. AND IT STANDS TO REASON THAT THE NEW MISSILES ARE CONSTRUCTIVELY BETTER THAN THE OLD. BUT THEIR COMBAT CAPACITY HAS, IN THE MAIN, REMAINED THE SAME;

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THE RANGE IS THE SAME AS THAT OF THE OLD SS-5, WHILE THE AGGREGATE PAYLOAD IS EVEN LESS. AS FOR THE NUMBER OF DELIVERY VEHICLES (AND THIS HAS BEEN SAID TIME AND AGAIN), THE SOVIET UNION IS NOT UPSETTING THE BALANCE OF STRENGTH IN EUROPE BY SUBSTITUTING NEW FOR OLD MISSILES. FOR EACH NEW SS-20 MISSILE DEPLOYED, ONE AND SOMETIMES TWO OLD MISSILES ARE REMOVED. THEY ARE DISMANTLED AND ARE NOT DEPLOYED IN ANY OTHER REGIONS. QUESTION. THAT APPLIES TO QUANTITY. AND IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT THE QUESTION OF QUANTITY IS DEBATABLE. BUT THE QUESTION OF QUALITY, AS THE WEST SEES IT, CAN HARDLY BE QUALIFIED AS DEBATABLE. THE USSR IS NOT REALLY MODERNISING. ISN'T IT RADICALLY REARMING IN THE MEDIUM-RANGE FIELD? ANSWER. NO, THE SOVIET UNION IS DOING NO SUCH THING. IT IS MODERNISING, NOT REARMING. THOSE ARE TWO DIFFERENT THINGS. MODERNISATION DOES NOT UPSET THE EXISTING BALANCE OF STRENGTH. THE WEST IS TRYING TO PROVE THE REVERSE, BUT IT IS USING RANGE, ACCURACY, AND OTHER DATA OF DUBIOUS ORIGIN. MANY SOURCES ADMIT, THEREFORE, THAT THE SS-20 DANGER IS HIGHLY EXAGGERATED BY THIS PROPAGANDA. FAR BE IT FROM US TO MAINTAIN THAT THE SS-20S ARE ALL BUT INFERIOR TO THE OLD SOVIET MISSILES. THEY ARE CERTAINLY MORE SOPHISTICATED IN A NUMBER  
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OF WAYS. BUT THE MAIN THING IS THAT THE CHANGE IN QUALITY HAS NOT ALTERED THEIR COMBAT PURPOSE OR BROUGHT ABOUT AN UPHEAVAL IN SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY OR UPSET THE NUCLEAR BALANCE IN EUROPE. THE NEW MISSILES HAVE THE SAME MISSION AS THEIR PREDECESSORS--TO COUNTER NATO'S PRESENT MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONRY IN EUROPE. MORE IMPORTANT STILL, OWING TO THEIR TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS THEY CANNOT BE EMPLOYED FOR ANY OTHER MISSION, THAT IS, FOR HITTING THE STRATEGIC FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES.

QUESTION. BUT WHAT MOTIVATED THIS MODERNISATION? WHY WERE SS-20 MISSILES DEVELOPED AT ALL? WHY NOT SIMPLY KEEP THE SS-4 AND SS-5 MISSILES? PEOPLE IN THE WEST BELIEVE THAT SS-20 MISSILES WERE DEVELOPED AT BEST TO EXERT POLITICAL PRESSURE, AND AT WORST TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE CAPABILITY. ANSWER. SS-20 MISSILES WERE DEVELOPED AND DEPLOYED FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS. ON THE PURELY TECHNICAL PLANE, IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO REPLACE MISSILES THAT HAD SERVED THEIR TERM. THEY WERE TWENTY YEARS OLD. AND, AS WE HAVE ALREADY OBSERVED, THE NATO STANDARD FOR THIS TYPE OF WEAPON IS FIFTEEN YEARS. THE SOVIET UNION SIMPLY HAD TO REPLACE THEM; FAILURE TO DO SO WOULD HAVE BEEN TANTAMOUNT TO HAVING NO SUCH WEAPONS AT ALL. BESIDES, LET'S NOT FORGET THE VARIOUS PENTAGON PRONOUNCEMENTS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT STICK AT EMPLOYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE FIRST, AND CALLING ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT THE OLDER SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES "TOOK A LONG TIME TO GET STARTED... AND THIS MADE THEM VULNERABLE TO PRE-EMPTIVE ATTACK BY NATO'S QRA (QUICK REACTION ALERT) FORCES" (THE BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, OCTOBER 1980, P. 30). FURTHERMORE, AS ALREADY NOTED, THE USA AND NATO HAD LONG SINCE DEVELOPED AND BEGUN TO IMPLEMENT PLANS FOR A STEEP BUILD-UP OF THEIR MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR POTENTIAL IN EUROPE. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN TOO GREAT A RISK FOR THE SOVIET UNION NOT TO MODERNISE ITS OWN MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR POTENTIAL. THERE WERE ALSO CERTAIN POLITICAL REASONS WHY THE SOVIET UNION WAS COMPELLED TO MODERNISE ITS MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONRY. TIME AND AGAIN, THE SOVIET SIDE TRIED TO HAVE THE US FORWARD BASE NUCLEAR FORCES INCLUDED IN THE SOVIET-AMERICAN STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS. IF THIS HAD BEEN DONE, AND THE PROBLEM HAD BEEN REGULATED BY AN APPROPRIATE AGREEMENT, IT IS QUITE SAFE TO ASSUME THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE HAD NO MOTIVATIONS FOR MODERNISING THE WEAPONRY THAT COUNTERBALANCES THE US FORWARD BASE FORCES. BUT EVERY TIME THE SOVIET UNION MADE SUCH PROPOSALS, THEY WERE TREATED NEGATIVELY BY THE UNITED STATES.

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MORE. THOUGH THE SOVIET UNION HAD BEEN COMPELLED, IN THE INTERESTS OF ITS OWN AND ITS ALLIES' SECURITY, TO BEGIN THE MODERNISATION PROCESS, IT HAD IN 1979 ALONE THRICE PROPOSED TO THE WEST (IN LEONID BREZHNEV' S SPEECH OF 2 MARCH, AT THE SOVIET-AMERICAN SUMMIT MEETING IN VIENNA IN JUNE, AND IN LEONID BREZHNEV' S SPEECH OF 6 OCTOBER) TO NEGOTIATE MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND EVEN EXPRESSED READINESS TO REDUCE THEIR NUMBER IN THE WESTERN REGIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION IF NO ADDITIONAL US MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES WERE SITED IN WESTERN EUROPE. THESE PROPOSALS, TOO, WERE TURNED DOWN BY THE WEST. IT RESPONDED WITH NATO' S DECISION, IN WHICH THE MAIN ELEMENT FOR THE USA IS STATIONING ITS MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE, WITHIN CLOSE RANGE OF THE SOVIET BORDER, WITH NEGOTIATIONS PLAYING A SUBORDINATE, PROPAGANDA ROLE. IN ANY CASE, AS WE WILL PROCEED TO SHOW, THE PRESENT US ADMINISTRATION HAS GIVEN TO UNDERSTAND THAT NEITHER THE DECISION ON DEPLOYING US MISSILES NOR THE SCALE OF THE DEPLOYMENT ARE NEGOTIABLE. THE SOVIET UNION, FOR ITS PART, REAFFIRMS ITS READINESS FOR EQUAL AND--WHICH IS STILL MORE IMPORTANT--EFFECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS ON THIS CRUCIAL ISSUE, AND REITERATES THAT ALL ITS EARLIER PROPOSALS ON THIS SCORE STILL HOLD GOOD. ATTEMPTS TO PORTRAY SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES AS A FIRST-STRIKE WEAPON ARE A DISTORTION DESIGNED TO INTIMIDATE PEOPLE WHO KNOW ONLY THE WARPED NATO

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INTERPRETATION OF SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE. AS WE HAVE SAID, SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE DOES NOT ALLOW FOR A FIRST OR PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE BY THE USSR. EVEN IF WE SUPPOSE THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS PRIMING FOR A FIRST STRIKE (THE "ASSUMPTION" IS COMPLETELY FALSE, THOUGH WESTERN PROPAGANDA TAKES IT FOR GRANTED), IT OUGHT TO BE QUITE CLEAR THAT IN THE PRESENT CONDITIONS ANY PREEMPTIVE NUCLEAR STRIKE IS SENSELESS UNLESS IT DESTROYS OR AT LEAST SUBSTANTIALLY WEAKENS THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR POTENTIAL OF THE OTHER SIDE'S RETALIATORY CAPABILITY. THIS THE SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES CANNOT ACCOMPLISH, BECAUSE THEY DO NOT REACH AS FAR AS THE UNITED STATES AND CANNOT HIT US INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, A FIRST STRIKE IN WESTERN EUROPE WOULD HAVE NO SENSE FROM ANY POINT OF VIEW, FOR IT WOULD ONLY EXPOSE OUR COUNTRY TO RIPOSTE BY ANY ABSOLUTELY INTACT US STRATEGIC ARSENAL. NO LESS GROUNDLESS ARE THE ATTEMPTS AT PORTRAYING SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONRY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLITICAL PRESSURE OR BLACKMAIL. TO BEGIN WITH, THE HISTORY OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY PROVES BEYOND ANY SHADOW OF DOUBT THAT IT IS ORGANICALLY ALIEN TO DEALING FROM POSITIONS OF STRENGTH OR TO TRYING TO SECURE POLITICAL OR ECONOMIC CONCESSIONS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES BY THREATENING TO USE ARMED FORCE. SECOND, EVEN IF WE SUPPOSE, ON ONE MORE FALSE ASSUMPTION WIDE-SPREAD IN WESTERN PROPAGANDA, THAT THE SOVIET UNION STOOPED TO USING ITS MILITARY POWER IN THIS IMPROPER FASHION, IT WOULD HAVE TO HAVE MILITARY SUPERIORITY FOR THIS MODE OF OPERATION TO BE SUCCESSFUL. THE SOVIET UNION, AS WE HAVE SHOWN ABOVE, HAS NO SUCH SUPERIORITY AND DOES NOT WANT IT. THIRD, FOR MORE THAN TWENTY YEARS THE SOVIET UNION HAS HAD MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND HAS NEVER (CONTRARY TO CEASELESS PREDICTIONS ALL THAT TIME BY THE INVENTORS OF THE BIG LIE ABOUT A SOVIET THREAT) USED THEM AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLITICAL PRESSURE OR BLACKMAIL AGAINST OTHER COUNTRIES, BECAUSE THEIR PURPOSE IS ENTIRELY DIFFERENT: TO PROVIDE FOR THE SECURITY OF THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES IN FACE OF THE DANGER CREATED BY THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES. QUESTION. ALL THE SAME, DESPITE ALL THESE ARGUMENTS, IT IS STILL A FACT THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS SOPHISTICATED MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN EUROPE, WHILE NATO HAS NONE. WHY, IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, SHOULDN'T NATO MODERNISE ITS ARSENAL AND OBTAIN THE SAME KIND OF WEAPONS AS THE SOVIET UNION? ANSWER. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT MEMBERS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION HAVE NO MISSILES IN EUROPE ANALOGOUS IN CAPACITY TO SOVIET SS-20

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MISSILES. THEY HAVE WEAPONS OF THAT KIND, AND IN AMPLE QUANTITIES: THE NUCLEAR-MISSILE FORCES OF BRITAIN AND FRANCE. AS WE HAVE ALREADY SAID, THEY AMOUNT TO 162 DELIVERY VEHICLES (GROUND AND SUB-MARINE-LAUNCHED MISSILES) TRAINED IN AN ALL TOO WELL-KNOWN DIRECTION.

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IF WE TAKE THE ENTIRE NATO ARSENAL OF MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONS, INCLUDING THE US FORWARD BASE SYSTEM, THE ADDITION OF 572 NEW MISSILES, AS ENVISAGED IN THE NATO DECISION, WILL DRASTICALLY UNBALANCE THE EXISTING PARITY IN FAVOUR OF THE WEST. IN THAT EVENT, THE WEST WOULD GAIN A MORE THAN 50 PERCENT ADVANTAGE IN MEDIUM-RANGE VEHICLES OVER THE WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES. AS CONCERNS THE NUCLEAR CHARGE THESE VEHICLES CAN DELIVER AT ONE LAUNCHING, IT WILL DWARF NATO'S ALREADY EXISTING 50 PERCENT ADVANTAGE.

BUT US AND NATO STRATEGISTS ARE NOT GOING TO STOP THERE. TO JUDGE FROM AVAILABLE INFORMATION, THEY HAVE BEGUN CONDITIONING PUBLIC OPINION TO A "TRANSFORMATION" OF THE DECEMBER 1979 NATO DECISION WITH A VIEW TO RAISING THE QUANTITY AND QUALITY OF THE US MISSILES SLATED FOR DEPLOYMENT. IN JUNE 1981 THERE WAS A MEETING AT NATO HEADQUARTERS CHAIRED BY DAVID GOMPERT, US DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, TO DISCUSS PREPARATIONS FOR NEGOTIATING MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONS IN EUROPE. US OFFICIALS SAID AFTER THE MEETING,

THE ASSOCIATED PRESS REPORTED ON 19 JUNE 1981, THAT THE PREPARATIONS INCLUDE A NEW "THREAT  
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ASSESSMENT" OF THE SOVIET UNION'S SS-20 MISSILES. IN JULY 1981, FOLLOWING DELIBERATIONS BY AN ANALOGOUS NATO GROUP CHAIRED BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENCE RICHARD PERLE, A "HIGH-RANKING OFFICIAL" IS SAID TO HAVE DECLARED THE SITUATION HAD CHANGED COMPARED WITH 1979 AND THE ESTIMATES WOULD NOW HAVE TO BE REVISED (UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 2 JULY 1981). NOUVELLES ATLANTIQUES WROTE ON 2 AUGUST 1981 THAT EXPERTS AT A MEETING OF THE SAME GROUP AT THE END OF JULY HAD FOUND THAT WHAT THEY CALLED THE SOVIET THREAT "HAD NOW RISEN ABOVE THE LEVEL ASSUMED WHEN NATO'S DOUBLE DECISION WAS BEING TAKEN". AND ANOTHER HIGH-RANKING OFFICIAL, EUGENE V. ROSTOW, DIRECTOR OF THE US ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, IN A SPIEGEL INTERVIEW IN JULY 1981, TERMED THE FIGURE SET IN THE 1979 NATO DECISION AS TOTALLY MEANINGLESS. "WE DID NOT SETTLE ON ANY DEFINITE NUMBER IN OUR PREVIOUS NEGOTIATIONS," HE SAID, "AND WILL SEE WHAT THE SITUATION IS LIKE."

A "TRANSFORMATION" OF THE NATO DECISION IS ALSO BEING PREPARED AS CONCERNS QUALITY. AT THE TIME THE DECISION WAS BEING TAKEN, WESTERN PROPAGANDA WENT OUT OF ITS WAY TO STRESS ITS PROVISION THAT ALL MISSILES SLATED FOR DEPLOYMENT WILL HAVE ONE WARHEAD EACH. LATER, THIS POINT BECAME MORE AND MORE MUTED, AND WAS FINALLY COMPLETELY HUSHED. HERE IS WHY: AS THE WEST GERMAN DIE WELT REPORTED ON 28 JULY 1981, "THE UNITED STATES IS CONSIDERING THE QUESTION OF ARMING THE NEW MEDIUM-RANGE PERSHING-2 MISSILE WITH MULTIPLE WARHEADS... IT IS SAID IN INFORMED QUARTERS THAT PERTINENT MILITARY TECHNICAL RESEARCH HAS ALREADY BEEN SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED". IN OTHER WORDS, THE PLANNED BUILD-UP OF NATO MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE IS GOING TO BE ANYTHING BUT MODERNISATION, BECAUSE MODERNISATION MEANS IMPROVEMENT OF WEAPONS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THEIR OLD FUNCTIONS IN COMBAT AND OF THE PREVAILING BALANCE OF STRENGTH. IMPLEMENTATION OF NATO'S DECISION, ON THE OTHER HAND, LET ALONE OF ITS "TRANSFORMED" VERSION, IS DESIGNED TO CREATE A CONSIDERABLE QUANTITATIVE MILITARY ADVANTAGE FOR THE UNITED STATES AND NATO BOTH IN NUMBER OF NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES AND NUMBER OF NUCLEAR CHARGES THE VEHICLES CAN DELIVER AT ONE LAUNCHING.

THE REARMING OF NATO WITH NEW US MISSILES IS NO SIMPLE MODERNISATION FOR THIS OTHER REASON AS WELL: IT IS PLANNED TO DEPLOY QUALITATIVELY NEW TYPES OF WEAPON WITH AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT PURPOSE IN COMBAT FROM THAT OF THE WEAPONS WHICH THEY ARE SUPPOSED TO "SUPPLEMENT". FOR ALL THE SEEMING RESEMBLANCE OF PERSHING-2 AND SS-20 MISSILES THEY

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ARE, AS WE WILL PROCEED TO SHOW, ENTIRELY DIFFERENT TYPES OF WEAPON DESPITE ANYTHING NATO PROPAGANDA MAY SAY TO THE CONTRARY. AS FOR CRUISE MISSILES, WHAT SIMILAR TYPE OF WEAPON ARE THEY MEANT TO REPLACE, WHAT TYPE OF WEAPON IS EQUIVALENT TO THEM IN TODAY'S NATO ARSENAL? NOT ONLY ARE THEY A NEW TYPE OF WEAPON, BUT ALSO AN ENTIRELY NEW TYPE OF NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLE. THEIR DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT WILL CREATE A QUALITATIVELY NEW, STILL MORE DANGEROUS SITUATION IN THE MILITARY-STRATEGIC RESPECT AND FOR SOLVING PROBLEMS OF ARMS REDUCTION.

LET US SET FORTH OUR VIEWS ON THIS SCORE IN PROPER ORDER. UNLIKE SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONS, INCLUDING SS-20 MISSILES, WHICH CANNOT PERFORM MISSIONS OF A STRATEGIC NATURE, THE NEW US MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE, IN EFFECT, EQUIVALENT TO THE EXISTING STRATEGIC WEAPONS BECAUSE THEY HAVE THE CAPACITY TO REACH SOVIET TERRITORY. AND THAT IS NO SOVIET "PROPAGANDA CLAIM", BUT AN OBJECTIVE APPRAISAL, WHICH NATO PLANNERS, TOO, HAVE WITTINGLY OR UNWITTINGLY ADMITTED. REAGAN'S FOREIGN POLICY ADVISER ROBERT PFALTZGRAFF, FOR EXAMPLE, SAID IN AN INTERVIEW TO THE ITALIAN PAPER MANIFESTO ON 18 NOVEMBER 1980 THAT THE "MODERNISATION" OF THEATRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE IS DIRECTLY CONNECTED WITH THE QUESTION OF STRENGTHENING THE US STRATEGIC FORCES. AND ON 27 FEBRUARY 1981, KURT BECKER, CHIEF FRG GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN, DECLARED

AT A PRESS CONFERENCE THAT "EUROSTRATEGIC MISSILES UNQUESTIONABLY ARE AN ADDITION TO INTER-CONTINENTAL STRATEGIC WEAPONS". THE FINAL  
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COMMUNIQUE OF A MEETING OF NATO'S NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP ON 7-8 APRIL 1981 SAID: "THE PRIMARY AIMS OF TNF POLICY ARE DETERRENCE AND STABILITY BASED ON THE NATO TRIAD OF FORCES."  
IN SUM, THE SITING OF NEW US MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE WOULD, IN SUBSTANCE, AMOUNT TO AN ADDITION OF 572 UNITS TO THE OVERALL US STRATEGIC POTENTIAL, AND WOULD UPSET THE STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIUM BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE USA IN FAVOUR OF THE LATTER. AND THERE IS NOTHING TO GUARANTEE THAT IN FUTURE THE USA WILL NOT WANT TO DOUBLE OR TREBLE THE NUMBER OF EUROMISSILES. ON THE CONTRARY, AS WE HAVE POINTED OUT EARLIER, THERE IS ENTIRELY CREDIBLE EVIDENCE THAT IT IS ALREADY PLANNING TO DO SO. IT WILL BE RECALLED THAT UNDER THE SALT-2 TREATY THE SIDES COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO 2,400 STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES EACH, WHICH WERE THEN TO BE REDUCED TO 2,250. AT PRESENT, THE UNITED STATES HAS SOMETHING LIKE 2,300, AND THEY ARE TRAINED CHIEFLY AGAINST THE USSR. AN ADDITION OF SEVERAL HUNDRED MISSILES TO THIS NUMBER IS LIABLE TO SUBSTANTIALLY ALTER THE USSR-USA STRATEGIC BALANCE, TO SAY NOTHING OF THIS BEING A FACTUAL EVASION OF SALT-2 EVEN IF IT WERE RATIFIED. WHILE ANNOUNCING OFFICIALLY THAT THE NEW MISSILES ARE INTENDED FOR THE DEFENCE OF WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, WASHINGTON REALLY WANTS THEM FOR PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKES AGAINST SOVIET ICBMS AND OTHER VITALLY IMPORTANT TARGETS IN WESTERN REGIONS OF THE USSR. THE CHIEF CONCERN OF THE UNITED STATES IS NOT EUROPEAN SECURITY, BUT TO TRY AND REDUCE THE POWER OF THE RETALIATORY STRIKE AGAINST US TERRITORY IN THE EVENT OF AN AGGRESSION AGAINST THE USSR.  
THE WHOLE THING AMOUNTS TO INCREASING THE POWER OF THE STRATEGIC POTENTIAL TARGETED ON THE MOST DENSELY POPULATED AND INDUSTRIALLY DEVELOPED PART OF THE SOVIET UNION. WHAT WE SEE IS AN ATTEMPT TO AUGMENT THE DEPTH OF THE ASSAULT ON SOVIET TERRITORY. WHILE PERSHING-1A MISSILES HAVE A RANGE OF 740 KILOMETRES, THE RANGE OF THE PERSHING-2 MISSILES TO BE DEPLOYED FROM 1983 ON, IS 2,500 KILOMETRES. THE RANGE OF THE FUTURE PERSHING-2A MISSILES WILL BE 4,000 KILOMETRES, WHICH WILL EXPOSE TO ATTACK AREAS WELL BEYOND THE URALS (THE BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, OCTOBER 1980, P. 30).  
ANOTHER IMPORTANT POINT IS THAT THE NEW PERSHING-2 MISSILES CAN HIT THEIR TARGET WITHIN FIVE OR SIX MINUTES OF LAUNCHING.  
THE CAPABILITY TO ENFEEBLE THE SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES IN A MATTER OF MINUTES MAKES A PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE CONSIDERABLY MORE "TEMPTING". TO RISK LAUNCHING INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES WHOSE FLIGHT TO TARGET TAKES TENS OF MINUTES, GIVING THE

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OTHER SIDE TIME TO RETALIATE BY LAUNCHING ITS OWN MISSILES BEFORE THE AGGRESSOR'S NUCLEAR CHARGES REACH ITS TERRITORY AND INFLICT WHAT THE PENTAGON TERMS "UNACCEPTABLE DAMAGE", IS ONE THING, AND QUITE ANOTHER TO LAUNCH EUROSTRATEGIC MISSILES WHOSE TIME OF FLIGHT IS JUST A FEW MINUTES, THIS, THE MAKERS OF THE "NEW CONCEPT OF WEST EUROPEAN DEFENCE" FIGURE, WILL DENY THE "POTENTIAL ADVERSARY" ANY CHANCE OF A SIMULTANEOUS RETALIATORY STRIKE.

THEY COUNT NOT ONLY ON SURPRISE CAPABILITY, BUT ALSO ON THE ACCURACY OF PERSHING-2 MISSILES, WHICH HOME IN ON TARGETS WITHIN A RADIUS OF 30 TO 40 METRES. THAT IS JUST ONE-TENTH OF THE ACCURACY RADIUS OF THE PRESENT-DAY PERSHING 1-A MISSILE (IBID., P. 27). WHAT DOES THIS SIGNIFY? IT CAN SIGNIFY ONLY ONE THING: THE UNITED STATES WANTS TO HAVE IN FOREIGN TERRITORY DEPENDABLE MEANS OF HITTING HARDENED MILITARY TARGETS SUCH AS THE SOVIET ICBMS. AND THAT IS A FIRST-STRIKE FUNCTION. THE SAME FUNCTION CAN BE PERFORMED BY CRUISE MISSILES. EVEN IN THE OPINION OF WESTERN EXPERTS, THEIR CHARACTERISTICS AND MANNER OF USE IN COMBAT MAKE CRUISE MISSILES A QUALITATIVELY NEW WEAPON. THEY HAVE A LONG RANGE (UP TO 2,600 KILOMETRES) AND CAN PENETRATE AIR DEFENCE SYSTEMS AT LOW, DOWN TO 60-METRE, ALTITUDES, HOMING IN ON TARGETS WITH HIGH ACCURACY. THE STUTTGARTER ZEITUNG WROTE ON

29 MARCH 1981 THAT "AT PRESENT, THERE IS NO DEFENCE AGAINST THE LOW-FLYING CRUISE MISSILES, WHICH  
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CANNOT BE SPOTTED EITHER BEFORE LAUNCHING OR DURING FLIGHT". A CRUISE MISSILE IS UNSPOTTABLE UNTIL IT REACHES THE IMMEDIATE PROXIMITY OF ITS TARGET. CONSEQUENTLY, IT IS ALSO A FIRST-STRIKE WEAPON LIKE PERSHING-2. IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THIS IT OUGHT TO BE CLEAR THAT NATO'S PROPAGANDA CLAIMS THAT THE CRUISE MISSILE IS A RELATIVELY SLOW VEHICLE AND THEREFORE "NOT DANGEROUS", AND THAT IT INTRODUCES NOTHING NEW INTO THE STRATEGIC PICTURE, ARE FAR SHORT OF THE TRUTH. ON THE CONTRARY, AS POINTED OUT IN AN OFFICIAL STATEMENT SUBMITTED TO US CONGRESS IN MARCH 1979, "IF NATO WERE TO DECIDE TO DEPLOY A SIZEABLE NUMBER OF CRUISE MISSILES WITH A RANGE AND LOCATION WHICH MAKES THEM CAPABLE OF STRIKING TARGETS IN THE U. S. S. R., THE SOVIETS WOULD BE FACED WITH A NEW TYPE OF NATO FORCE WHICH TO THEM REPRESENTED AN INCREMENTAL STRATEGIC THREAT" (FISCAL YEAR 1980. ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENTS, MARCH 1979, P. 144).

THE QUALITY CHARACTERISTICS OF THIS WEAPON WERE, INDEED, DISCUSSED LENGTHILY DURING THE SALT-2 NEGOTIATIONS. THE SOVIET UNION SUGGESTED BANNING IT ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT WAS LIABLE TO OPEN A NEW CHANNEL IN THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE. THE UNITED STATES, ON THE OTHER HAND, INSISTED THAT DEPLOYMENT OF LONG-RANGE CRUISE MISSILES ON GROUND- AND SEA-BASED LAUNCHERS SHOULD BE PROHIBITED ONLY FOR THE DURATION OF THE PROTOCOL TO SALT-2, THAT IS, UNTIL THE END OF 1981. THAT, INCIDENTALLY, ONLY GOES TO SHOW THAT EVEN AT THAT TIME (THE SALT-2 TALKS BEGAN IN 1972), THAT IS, BEFORE THE APPEARANCE OF AND IN NO CONNECTION WITH SS-20 MISSILES, THE MEN IN THE PENTAGON HAD ALREADY BEGUN PREPARING THE GROUND FOR CRUISE MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE. DURING THE SIGNING OF SALT-2, THE USSR AND THE USA AGREED THAT QUESTIONS DEALT WITH IN THE ABOVE-MENTIONED PROTOCOL, THAT IS, AMONG OTHERS THE BANNING OF GROUND- AND SEA-BASED CRUISE MISSILES, WERE TO BE PUT ON THE SALT AGENDA. THIS WAS CLEAR EVIDENCE OF THE INTENTION OF THE TWO SIDES TO COME TO TERMS WHILE THE PROTOCOL WAS STILL IN FORCE, AND NOT LET THAT TYPE OF WEAPON EVER APPEAR IN THEIR ARMOURIES.

THE DECEMBER 1979 DECISION OF THE NATO COUNCIL SHOWS, HOWEVER, THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD, IN EFFECT, RENOUNCED ITS COMMITMENT AND HAD IN ADVANCE, BEFORE THE START OF NEGOTIATIONS, GIVEN TO UNDERSTAND THAT IT WOULDN'T HAVE ANY ACCORD ON GIVING UP CRUISE MISSILES. WHEN THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION TOOK OVER, OFFICIAL US COMMITMENTS WERE SCRAPPED, AND "PRACTICAL WORK"

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WAS LAUNCHED IN A COMPLETELY CONTRARY DIRECTION. THE WALL STREET JOURNAL OF 14 JULY 1981 OBSERVED THAT "WITHOUT FANFARE, THE ADMINISTRATION...RECENTLY AUTHORIZED THE NAVY TO EXTEND THE TOMAHAWK'S RANGE, WHICH HAD BEEN SHARPLY RESTRICTED BY THE PROTOCOL TO THE UNRATIFIED SALT-2 TREATY." THE NEW YORK TIMES OF 15 JULY 1981 WROTE REFERRING TO OFFICIAL SOURCES THAT CURRENT PLANS ENVISAGE DEPLOYMENT OF 3,000 TO 4,000 SEA-BASED AND 6,000 AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES BY THE EARLY 1990S.

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CAN THIS STEEP INCREASE IN US MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY BE IN ANY WAY DESCRIBED AS MODERNISATION? CERTAINLY, NOT. THE UNITED STATES AND NATO ARE QUITE OBVIOUSLY OUT TO CREATE A NEW TYPE OF STRATEGIC WEAPON THAT WOULD TIP THE EXISTING BALANCE OF STRENGTH IN THEIR FAVOUR BOTH REGIONALLY AND GLOBALLY.

QUESTION. THE STATIONING OF THE NEW US MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE WOULD AT ANY RATE DETER THE SOVIET UNION IN A CRISIS THAT MAY NOT EVEN BE OF ITS OWN DOING IF IT FACED OPTIONS IN DEFENCE OF ITS OWN AND ITS ALLIES' INTERESTS. WOULDN'T THE PRESENCE OF US MISSILES MAKE THE MILITARY OPTION OF RESOLVING THE CRISIS FAR MORE DIFFICULT TO TAKE?

ANSWER. THAT KIND OF REASONING ECHOES THE WIDESPREAD BUT ENTIRELY GROUNDLESS WESTERN NOTION OF SOVIET BEHAVIOUR IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS BEING "UNPREDICTABLE". THE ORIGINATORS OF THIS NOTION

ADMIT OR ASSUME THE ABSENCE OF AN IMMEDIATE RISK OF "SOVIET AGGRESSION" AT EACH GIVEN MOMENT, BUT  
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ALLEGED IN THE SAME BREATH THAT THE TRUE INTENTIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION ARE UNKNOWN AND ITS PRESENT POLICY OF PEACE IS LIABLE TO TURN OVERNIGHT INTO AGGRESSIVE POLICY. SO, THEY ARGUE, INASMUCH AS THE SOVIET UNION HAS POWERFUL ARMED FORCES, THE WEST SHOULD ARM ITSELF CONTINUOUSLY AT A RISING RATE FOR SUCH A CONTINGENCY IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO DETER THIS SUDDEN SWING IN SOVIET BEHAVIOUR. BUT THE WHOLE CONSTRUCTION RESTS ON A DISTORTION OR IGNORANCE OF BOTH THE HISTORY OF THE SOVIET STATE AND ITS BASIC FOREIGN POLICY CONCEPTS, ENSHRINED IN THE PROGRAMME DOCUMENTS OF THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY, THE LEGISLATIVE ACTS OF THE USSR, AND IN ALL SOVIET PRACTICE. THE THEORETICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL PILLARS OF SOCIALIST POLICY, LIKE ITS IMPLEMENTATION IN HISTORY, PROVIDE AMPLE AND OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE THAT IT IS NEITHER UNPREDICTABLE NOR FICKLE, AND THAT, ON THE CONTRARY, THE SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY OF PEACE ADHERES TO PRINCIPLE AND IS STRICTLY CONSISTENT. THIS FOLLOWS FROM THE VERY ESSENCE OF THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM. "IN THE SOVIET UNION," AS LEONID BREZHNEV STRESSED ON FRG TELEVISION ON 6 MAY 1978, "THERE ARE NEITHER CLASSES NOR SOCIAL GROUPS THAT HAVE ANY STAKE IN WAR OR WAR PREPARATION AND EXPECT TO PROFIT FROM THEM. CERTAINLY, WE HAVE MUNITIONS FACTORIES AND WE HAVE AN ARMY--BUT NEITHER THE MANAGERS OF THESE FACTORIES NOR THE ARMY COMMAND, NEITHER WORKERS NOR SOLDIERS, ASSOCIATE THEIR WELL-BEING WITH WAR OR MILITARY ORDERS. WE WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE--TO THE ENORMOUS ADVANTAGE OF ALL OUR SOCIETY--TO CONVERT THE MUNITIONS FACTORIES TO CIVILIAN PRODUCTION, TO PEACEFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE AIMS." THE SOVIET UNION RESORTS TO ARMS IN ONE EVENT ONLY: IF THERE IS AN ARMED ATTACK ON IT OR ON COUNTRIES WITH WHICH IT HAS MUTUAL AID AGREEMENTS. THAT IS WHY THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO NEED FOR "DETERRING" THE SOVIET UNION FROM AGGRESSION. FURTHERMORE, AND THAT IS THE GREATEST DANGER, THE NEW US NUCLEAR MISSILES TO BE STATIONED IN WESTERN EUROPE WOULD NOT BE A "POTENTIAL OF DETERRENCE" BUT A POTENTIAL OF AGGRESSION AND PROVOCATION--A POTENTIAL OF AGGRESSION BECAUSE PERSHING-2 AND CRUISE MISSILES ARE FIRST-STRIKE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND A POTENTIAL OF PROVOCATION BECAUSE THEY ARE DESIGNED TO INVOLVE WESTERN EUROPE IN ANY NUCLEAR OR NEUTRON VENTURE THE UNITED STATES MAY START AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION, EVEN VERY FAR AWAY FROM EUROPE. IN THAT EVENT, WILL THE SOVIET UNION BE ABLE TO DISREGARD THE US NUCLEAR MISSILES STATIONED IN CLOSE PROXIMITY AND DESIGNED TO STRIKE SOVIET DEFENCES AND CENTRES OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERSHIP IN A MATTER OF MINUTES? HAVE THE SUPPORTERS OF NATO'S "REARMING" GIVEN ANY

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THOUGHT TO WHAT THE ANSWER TO THAT QUESTION IS LIKELY AND BOUND TO BE?  
THE PROVOCATIVE NATURE OF THE AMERICAN NUCLEAR POTENTIAL IS ALSO SEEN IN THE FACT THAT IT IS INTENDED NOT FOR "DETERRENCE" AT ALL, BUT FOR US AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS IN ALL PARTS OF THE WORLD. SPEAKING BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES ON 24 JULY 1981, EUGENE V. ROSTOW, DIRECTOR OF THE US ARMS CONTROL AND DISARM-AMENT AGENCY, SAID: "WITH AN ASSURED SECOND-STRIKE CAPABILITY, WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO USE MILITARY FORCE IN DEFENSE OF OUR INTERESTS IF IT SHOULD BECOME NECESSARY TO DO SO, NOT ONLY IN EUROPE, BUT IN MANY OTHER STRATEGICALLY CRITICAL PARTS OF THE WORLD AS WELL. IN MY VIEW--AND HERE I SPEAK FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN--THIS IS AND MUST REMAIN THE MINIMAL GOAL OF OUR NUCLEAR ARSENAL AND OUR MINIMAL GOAL IN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS." THE QUESTION THAT ARISES IN THIS CONNECTION IS, WHO NEEDS TO BE DETERRED? AS WE SEE IT, THE COURSE OF ACTION OUTLINED BY ROSTOW CERTAINLY CALLS FOR DETERRENCE. BECAUSE THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES, TO WHICH IT WANTS TO HITCH ITS NATO ALLIES--AMONG OTHER THINGS BY "MODERNISING" MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONRY--REPOSES ON FORCE, ON THE NOTION THAT IT IS THINKABLE, EVEN NECESSARY, TO RESORT TO FORCE IN ANY SITUATION THE UNITED STATES MAY DEEM CRITICAL AND AFFECTING ITS "VITAL INTERESTS" WHICH, BY ITS OWN DEFINITION, EXTEND TO THE ENTIRE WORLD.

QUESTION. ALL THE SAME, DON'T EUROMISSILES STRENGTHEN  
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AMERICA'S NUCLEAR GUARANTEES, AND THEREFORE ALSO STRENGTHEN THE SECURITY OF WESTERN EUROPE? AFTER ALL, IF THESE GUARANTEES ARE STRONGER AND MORE RELIABLE, THERE IS LESS RISK OF A DIRECT MILITARY CONFRONTATION BETWEEN NATO AND WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES.

ANSWER. WE HOLD THAT THIS IS INCORRECT EVEN FROM THE WESTERN POINT OF VIEW. (FROM THE SOVIET POINT OF VIEW IT IS INCORRECT BECAUSE THE USSR HAS NO PLANS OF ATTACKING OR "ABSORBING" WESTERN EUROPE, AND NO GUARANTEES ARE NEEDED THEREFORE AGAINST A NON-EXISTENT DANGER.) THAT IS SIMPLE, THOUGH NOT SIMPLISTIC, LOGIC. LET'S MAKE A FEW ASSUMPTIONS. LET'S ASSUME, FOR ONE THING, THAT THE AMERICAN NUCLEAR GUARANTEES ARE NOW UNDEPENDABLE IN THE SENSE THAT AMERICA WILL NOT WANT TO SACRIFICE CHICAGO FOR HAMBURG. WOULD THEY BE MORE DEPENDABLE IN THE PRESENCE OF EUROMISSILES? IN THAT CASE, TOO, THE AMERICAN SENSE OF SELF-PRESERVATION MAY TURN OUT TO BE JUST AS STRONG.

LET'S NEXT ASSUME THAT THE US NUCLEAR GUARANTEES ARE DEPENDABLE AS THEY ARE. IF THIS IS SO, WHY THE EUROMISSILES? THE AVAILABLE STRATEGIC POTENTIAL OF THE UNITED STATES IS MORE THAN ENOUGH TO BACK UP THE NUCLEAR GUARANTEES.

AND LET'S ASSUME, FINALLY, THAT THE UNITED STATES REALLY EXPECTS TO BE ABLE TO LIMIT THE NUCLEAR CONFLICT TO EUROPE, AND WANTS A POWERFUL NUCLEAR POTENTIAL THERE TO DIVERT THE SOVIET COUNTER-STRIKE. IF THIS IS SO, IT IS A DOWNRIGHT BETRAYAL OF WEST EUROPEANS, FOR IN THAT CASE THE AMERICANS WANT TO SURVIVE AT THE PRICE OF EUROPEAN LIVES. EUROPEANS WOULD BE THEIR NUCLEAR HOSTAGES.

BY ALL EVIDENCE, THE UNITED STATES IS DESIGNING A VARIANT OF NUCLEAR WAR THAT WOULD GIVE IT ITS GLOBAL AIMS WITHOUT THE RISK OF ITS BEING DESTROYED. ONE SUCH VARIANT IS A "LIMITED" OR "EUROSTRATEGIC" NUCLEAR WAR, WITH US STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES NOT BEING USED IN THE HOSTILITIES, SO THAT HOLOCAUST DOES NOT SPREAD TO THE AMERICAN CONTINENT. IN OTHER WORDS, WESTERN EUROPE IS CAST IN THE ROLE OF A LIGHTNING ROD THAT WOULD ABSORB THE STRIKE AND DIVERT IT FROM AMERICA. EUROMISSILES ARE A MILITARY TECHNICAL MEANS PRECISELY FOR FIGHTING A "EUROSTRATEGIC" WAR.

SEEN FROM THIS ANGLE, AMERICA'S CATEGORICAL REJECTION OF THE WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES' ATTEMPTS TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF SITING THE NEW US MISSILES ON SEABORNE FACILITIES RATHER THAN ON THE TERRITORY OF NATO MEMBERS, ACQUIRES A MOST SINISTER COMPLEXION. THE UNITED STATES WANTS TO HAVE ITS MISSILES STATIONED ON SOIL BELONGING TO ITS ALLIES PRECISELY BECAUSE IT WANTS THEM TO BE HOSTAGE OF THE

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AMERICAN CLAIM TO WORLD LEADERSHIP AND TO DENY THEM THE CHANCE OF TAKING A MORE OR LESS INDEPENDENT STAND IN THE CRITICAL SITUATIONS WHICH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS CLAIM IS BOUND TO CREATE. BY RESERVING THE RIGHT TO THE FINAL DECISION ON TRIGGERING EUROSTRATEGIC MISSILES, AND THIS, MIND YOU, ALSO IN THE EVENT OF CRISES OR CONFLICTS FAR AWAY FROM WESTERN EUROPE THAT HAVE NO DIRECT BEARING ON WEST EUROPEAN INTERESTS, THE US STRATEGISTS ARE OBVIOUSLY BENT ON CREATING A SITUATION IN WHICH EUROPEAN NATO MEMBERS WOULD HAVE NO FREEDOM OF CHOICE AND WOULD BE COMPELLED TO FOLLOW THE "LEADER OF THE WESTERN WORLD" AS IT SECURES ITS GREAT-POWER "VITAL INTERESTS" IN THE SHAPE IN WHICH IT ALONE CONCEIVES THEM.

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IF MATTERS REACH THE POINT OF NEW AMERICAN MISSILES APPEARING IN EUROPE, THIS WILL CREATE A THREAT TO ADJACENT REGIONS, NOT LEAST OF ALL THE MEDITERRANEAN. A CONSIDERABLE PART OF THE NEW AMERICAN MISSILES IS INTENDED FOR SITING IN THAT REGION, ON ITALIAN TERRITORY, MORE PRECISELY IN SICILY, FROM WHERE THE WEAPONS CAN BE USED TO THREATEN, AND "IF NECESSARY" TO STRIKE, PRACTICALLY ANY COUNTRY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND NORTHERN AFRICA. THIS WILL GIVE THE UNITED STATES ADDITIONAL MUSCLE FOR PRESSURE ON MEDITERRANEAN AND AFRICAN COUNTRIES WHOSE POLICY OR INTERNAL SYSTEM MAY "DISPLEASE" IT, AND TO ASSOCIATE OTHER

NATO COUNTRIES WITH SUCH PRESSURE EVEN IF IT DOES NOT SERVE THE LATTER'S NATIONAL INTERESTS.  
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DEPLOYMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE OF US MISSILES INTENDED FOR NUCLEAR STRIKES AGAINST THE TERRITORY OF THE SOVIET UNION IS ALSO PREJUDICIAL TO THOSE EUROPEAN STATES THAT ARE OUTSIDE THE POLITICO-MILITARY GROUPINGS. AS NOTED BY SWEDISH MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OLY ULLSTEN IN A SVENSKA DAGBLADET ARTICLE OF 17 DECEMBER 1979, "SWEDEN'S GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION CREATES THE REAL RISK OF CRUISE MISSILES CROSSING OUR AIRSPACE. THE SAME APPLIES TO FINLAND." THIS, INDEED, RAISES THE QUESTION OF THE OBLIGATION OF COUNTRIES NOT INVOLVED IN THE CONFLICT TO OPPOSE AND INTERDICT THE USE OF THEIR TERRITORY AND AIRSPACE BY BELLIGERENT COUNTRIES, AND ALSO THE QUESTION OF THE RIGHTS OF COUNTRIES ATTACKED ACROSS THE TERRITORY OR AIRSPACE OF NON-BELLIGERENT STATES.

IN SUM, EUROMISSILES CAN IN NO WAY BUTTRESS THE SECURITY OF WESTERN EUROPE. ON THE CONTRARY, THEY WILL ONLY AUGMENT THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR, AND WITH THE APPEARANCE OF NEUTRON BOMBS THAT RISK WILL BECOME GREATER STILL. DEPLOYMENT OF EUROMISSILES WILL GREATLY PREJUDICE THE SECURITY OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE OTHER WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES, AND INDEED THE VITAL INTERESTS AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, FIRST OF ALL THE NATO MEMBERS, AND WILL REPRESENT A SERIOUS THREAT TO PEACE.

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FOR EUR/SOV  
E. O. 12065:    N/A  
TAGS:    UR, US, MPOL, PARM  
SUBJECT:    SOVIET PAMPHLET: "THE THREAT TO EUROPE" - III  
REF:    A) MOSCOW 16090    B) MOSCOW 16091

1. THIS CABLE, THE THIRD OF FOUR, CARRIES THE TEXT OF SECTION III---NATO'S "DOUBLE DECISION", A THREAT IN ACTION---OF THE SOVIET PAMPHLET "THE THREAT TO EUROPE" RELEASED IN MOSCOW NOVEMBER 20, 1981. DEPARTMENT SHOULD PASS TO OTHER POSTS AS APPROPRIATE. BEGIN TEXT:  
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2. III. NATO'S "DOUBLE DECISION"- A THREAT IN ACTION  
WHY THE "DOUBLE DECISION"? WHAT IS IT? QUESTION. SUPPOSE WE ASSUME THAT ALL YOUR ARGUMENTS ARE VALID AND PROVE THE DANGER OF SITING NEW AMERICAN NUCLEAR MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE. STILL, THEY BECOME IRRELEVANT BECAUSE NATO IS NOT SIMPLY PLANNING TO REINFORCE ITS EUROSTRATEGIC NUCLEAR POTENTIAL, BUT IS ALSO OFFERING TO HOLD NEGOTIATIONS ON MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN EUROPE WITH NO PRELIMINARY CONDITIONS. AS A RESULT, THE DEPLOYMENT OF PERSHING-2 AND CRUISE MISSILES MAY PROVE UNNECESSARY. ISN'T THAT THE PURPORT OF NATO'S "DOUBLE DECISION" TAKEN IN BRUSSELS IN DECEMBER 1979? IT NOW DEPENDS ON THE SOVIET UNION RATHER THAN NATO WHETHER THESE NEGOTIATIONS TAKE PLACE AND WHAT RESULTS THEY YIELD. ISN'T THAT SO? ANSWER. UNFORTUNATELY, NOT QUITE, OR RATHER NOT AT ALL. TO PROVE THIS, LET'S RECALL WHAT THE "DOUBLE DECISION" SAYS. THE REMINDER WILL ALSO BE USEFUL BECAUSE A LOT OF NOISE IS BEING MADE IN THE WEST ABOUT IT OFFERING THE SOVIET UNION FAIR, SERIOUS, AND EFFECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS WITH NO PRELIMINARY CONDITIONS. BUT THIS NOISY BARRAGE IS BEING USED IN AN ATTEMPT TO KEEP THE PUBLIC IN THE DARK ABOUT THE ACTUAL CONTENT OF THAT DECISION: AND, LET'S ADMIT IT, THE DISSEMINATION OF THIS HALF-TRUTH, WHICH IS TANTAMOUNT TO UNTRUTH, HAS BEEN FAIRLY EFFECTIVE. IN AUGUST 1981, BONN'S PARLAMENTARISCH-POLITISCHER PRESSEDIENST SAID A PUBLIC OPINION POLL IN THE FRG REVEALED THAT ITS CITIZENS HAD NO MORE THAN A VAGUE IDEA OF WHAT THE "DOUBLE DECISION" WAS ALL ABOUT. ONLY 9 PERCENT OF THOSE QUESTIONED WERE ABLE TO SAY CORRECTLY WHAT THE DECISION STOOD FOR, WHILE 48 PERCENT COULD SAY NOTHING AT ALL.  
THE "DOUBLE DECISION" DOES, INDEED, SAY THAT ITS AUTHORS "FULLY SUPPORT THE DECISION TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES... TO NEGOTIATE ARMS LIMITATIONS ON LRTNF AND TO PROPOSE TO THE USSR TO BEGIN

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NEGOTIATIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE." THE PROPOSAL IS MADE NOT WITHOUT PRELIMINARY CONDITIONS BUT, AS IT SAYS IN THE TEXT OF THE DECISION, FOR NEGOTIATIONS "ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES WHICH HAVE BEEN ELABORATED IN INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE".

WHAT ARE THESE "LINES"?

THE "DOUBLE DECISION" SAYS CATEGORICALLY THAT THE "IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AGREED LIMITATIONS ON US AND SOVIET LAND-BASED LONG-RANGE THEATRE NUCLEAR MISSILE SYSTEMS". WHAT THIS MEANS IS THAT ONLY SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES, ON THE ONE HAND, AND PERSHING-2 AND CRUISE MISSILES, ON THE OTHER, ARE NEGOTIABLE.

ALL US FORWARD BASE MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONS, THE VERY WEAPONS THE SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES ARE MEANT TO COUNTER TODAY, ARE THUS TO BE EXCLUDED FROM THE OFFERED NEGOTIATIONS. AND THIS APPROACH TO THE "DOUBLE DECISION" CLAIMS TO BE "CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY BETWEEN THE SIDES". ON THIS POINT, THE SO-CALLED SERIOUS PROPOSAL FOR NEGOTIATIONS HAS IN CATEGORICAL TERMS SET A PRELIMINARY CONDITION THAT DIRECTLY AFFECTS THE SECURITY OF THE WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES, WHOSE ACCEPTANCE WOULD PREDETERMINE A CHANGE IN THE RELATION OF STRENGTH IN NATO'S FAVOUR BY MEANS OF "NEGOTIATIONS".

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FOR EUR/SOV  
IT HAS ALREADY BEEN SHOWN HERE WHAT THE AMERICAN FORWARD BASE WEAPONS ARE, HOW POWERFUL THEY ARE, AND HOW PREJUDICIAL TO THE SECURITY OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE OTHER WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES. WE HAVE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONRY IS AN EFFECT OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF US NUCLEAR FORWARD-BASED FORCES. SO, TO ACCEPT THE PRELIMINARY CONDITION SET IN THE "DOUBLE DECISION" WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO ACCEPTING THE NECESSITY OF LIMITING THE EFFECT, WHILE ITS CAUSE IS LEFT INTACT. IT IS SAID IN THE NATO DECISION THAT "ANY AGREED LIMITATIONS ON THESE SYSTEMS MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY BETWEEN THE SIDES. THEREFORE, THE LIMITATIONS SHOULD TAKE THE FORM OF THE DE JURE EQUALITY BOTH IN CEILINGS AND IN RIGHTS." BY CALLING FOR EQUAL LIMITATIONS EXCLUSIVELY ON MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES, THE "DOUBLE DECISION", IN EFFECT, WANTS NATO TO HAVE DE JURE RIGHTS TO UPSET THE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM OF STRENGTH IN ITS OWN FAVOUR. YET, AS LEONID BREZHNEV NOTED, "THE EQUILIBRIUM IS NOT COMPLETE EQUALITY. EACH SIDE HAS ITS OWN STRUCTURE OF ARMED FORCES. IN OUR CASE, SAY, LAND FORCES HAVE THE MOST MISSILES, WHILE IN THE CASE OF THE US IT IS THE AIR FORCE THAT HAS MOST OF THEM, AND SO ON." THE SAME POINT OF VIEW HAS ALSO BEEN EXPRESSED IN THE WEST. FEDERAL CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT, FOR ONE, OBSERVED IN A DIE WELT INTERVIEW ON 6 NOVEMBER 1979 THAT "EQUILIBRIUM IS ALSO A REGIONAL POLITICAL CATEGORY AND NOT ONLY A CONCEPT ASSOCIATED WITH A SPECIFIC ARM OF THE SERVICE". BUT TO ASSOCIATE IT WITH A SPECIFIC ARM OF THE SERVICE IS EXACTLY WHAT NATO'S DECEMBER 1979 DECISION IS TRYING TO DO. BY SETTING THE PRELIMINARY CONDITION OF EQUALITY IN CEILINGS FOR SOVIET AND AMERICAN LAND-BASED MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES, WHILE WEAPONRY IN WHICH NATO HAS AN ADVANTAGE IS EXCLUDED FROM NEGOTIATIONS, THE "DOUBLE DECISION" REALLY DECLARES EQUALITY IN WORD ONLY, WHILE DENYING IT IN DEED. SHOULD THE SOVIET UNION ACCEPT THIS PRELIMINARY CONDITION, IT WOULD, FIRST, COMMIT ITSELF TO REDUCING THE NUMBER OF ITS MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES, WHILE US FORWARD BASE FORCES, WHICH OPPOSE THEM, WILL NOT BE SUBJECT TO REDUCTION. SECOND, THE "EQUALITY" OF LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET AND AMERICAN MISSILES PROVIDED FOR IN NATO'S DECISION REQUIRES, IN EFFECT, THAT THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD FORGET ABOUT THE FRENCH AND BRITISH NUCLEAR POTENTIALS, AND NOT DARE THINK OF INCLUDING THEM IN THE GENERAL COUNT OF THE NUCLEAR EQUILIBRIUM IN EUROPE.

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THESE TWO POINTS ARE ENOUGH TO SHOW THAT THE NATO DECISION DOES NOT REALLY PROVIDE FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT PRELIMINARY CONDITIONS, AND THAT THE CONDITIONS SET BY THE WEST WOULD MAKE THE NEGOTIATIONS A MEANS OF LEGALISING AND CONSOLIDATING ITS MILITARY SUPERIORITY.  
BUT THAT IS NOT ALL. WHILE PREPARING AND TAKING THE "DOUBLE DECISION", AND ESPECIALLY AFTER IT WAS TAKEN, THE UNITED STATES SET ITS SIGHTS ON ALTERING IT TO SUIT ITS OWN ENDS. THIS IS BEING DONE IN TWO WAYS: THOSE PARTS OF THE DECISION THAT AUGUR THE GREATER ADVANTAGE TO WASHINGTON ARE BEING TOUGHENED, WHILE THOSE THAT ARE LESS ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE USA ARE BEING ALTERED TO AN EXTENT THAT SOME OF THEM BECOME THEIR OWN OPPOSITE.  
ABOVE ALL, THIS APPLIES TO THE RELUCTANCE OF THE UNITED STATES TO INCLUDE ITS NUCLEAR FORWARD BASE FORCES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THAT SOVIET INSISTENCE ON INCLUDING THEM IS JUSTIFIED IS, HOWEVER, ACKNOWLEDGED IN WESTERN EUROPE, AND THIS ALSO BY GOVERNMENT QUARTERS. STUTTGARTER ZEITUNG OF 29 MARCH 1981, FOR EXAMPLE, WRITES THAT FEDERAL CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT ACKNOWLEDGED THE DEMAND AS BEING LEGITIMATE DURING HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW IN THE SUMMER OF 1980. SUDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG OF 2 JULY 1981, SPEAKING OF WILLY BRANDT'S VISIT TO MOSCOW, SAID THAT IN HIS TALKS WITH SOVIET LEADERS, THE SDPG CHAIRMAN SHOWED UNDERSTANDING FOR THE SOVIET POSITION

CONCERNING THE INCLUSION OF THE SO-CALLED FORWARD BASE MISSILES IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE USA ON  
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FOR EUR/SOV  
EUROSTRATEGIC MISSILES. AND FRG DEFENCE MINISTER.  
HANS APEL SAID IN A SPIEGEL INTERVIEW IN JULY 1981  
THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE SOVIET UNION'S WISH TO INCLUDE  
US FORWARD BASE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE IN THE  
NEGOTIATIONS ON MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES.  
SO FAR, HOWEVER, THE AMERICANS WON'T EVEN HEAR OF  
THE QUESTION OF THEIR FORWARD BASE WEAPONRY  
BEING RAISED AT THE NEGOTIATIONS. THAT LEAVES  
US WITH A CURIOUS SET-UP: WHILE INSISTING ON  
THE PRINCIPLE OF "LINKAGE", I. E. TYING UP THE  
START AND COURSE OF ANY NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET  
UNION, INCLUDING THOSE ON MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONRY  
IN EUROPE, WITH THE "BEHAVIOUR" OF THE USSR IN  
MATTERS TOTALLY UNRELATED TO THEM, THE REAGAN  
ADMINISTRATION SCRIMMAGING FOR UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES  
THINKS ITSELF ENTITLED TO UNTYING THINGS THAT ARE  
INDISSOLUBLY AND OBJECTIVELY TIED UP. NOR ARE ANY  
ARGUMENTS OF SUBSTANCE GIVEN TO IN THE LEAST  
JUSTIFY THE UNFASTENING OF THE TIE, SAVE ONE:  
INCLUSION OF FORWARD BASE SYSTEMS WILL "COMPLICATE"  
THE TALKS. IT OUGHT TO BE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT  
THIS APPROACH IS NOT EVEN REMOTELY CONDUCIVE TO  
"SIMPLIFYING" THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND IGNORES VITALLY  
IMPORTANT SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE SOVIET UNION  
AND ITS ALLIES. CONSEQUENTLY, THE ATTEMPT AT  
RESTRICTING THE SUBJECT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS  
IS REALLY MEANT TO TORPEDO THEM.  
THE DESIGNS TO "TRANSFORM" THE "DOUBLE DECISION"  
SERVE NOTICE THAT, IN EFFECT, THE UNITED STATES  
DOES NOT CONSIDER ITSELF BOUND BY THAT PART OF IT  
WHICH FIXES THE QUANTITY AND QUALITY OF THE  
AMERICAN MISSILES DESIGNATED FOR DEPLOYMENT IN  
WESTERN EUROPE.  
THE USA IS ALSO GOING BACK ON THE PROVISION WHICH  
WAS PORTRAYED IN DECEMBER 1979, AND IS STILL BEING  
PORTRAYED, AS THE ESSENCE OF THE NATO DECISION--  
THAT "NATO'S NEED FOR THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES  
WILL BE CONSIDERED IN THE LIGHT OF THE RESULTS  
OF THE NEGOTIATIONS". TO CHECK PUBLIC ALARM OVER  
THE MILITARIST PLANS, PEOPLE ARE TOLD THAT THE  
RESULTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS MAY MAKE DEPLOYMENT  
OF US MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE UNNECESSARY.  
ADDRESSING PARLIAMENT ON 7 DECEMBER 1979, THE THEN  
HEAD OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT, FRANCESCO COSSIGA,  
STRESSED "THERE SHOULD NOT BE THE SLIGHTEST  
DOUBT AS TO NATO'S RESOLVE AND ABILITY TO REVISE  
ITS PROGRAMME IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET READINESS  
TO AGREE TO A LOWER LEVEL OF EQUILIBRIUM BETWEEN  
THE THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES CONFRONTING EACH OTHER".

AN SDPG CONGRESS RESOLUTION ADOPTED IN DECEMBER  
1979 CONTAINS STILL MORE ENERGETIC LANGUAGE. IT  
SAYS THERE SHOULD BE NO AUTOMATIC FULFILLMENT

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OF NATO'S DECISION, AND THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE EXPECTED RESULTS MUST ALLOW NATO POLITICAL LEADERS TO RE-EXAMINE THE ADOPTED DECISIONS AT ANY TIME, AND REVISE THEM IF NECESSARY. THE RESOLUTION AMPLIFIED THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT MUST APPROVE THE DEPLOYMENT IN EUROPE OF MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONS BY THE UNITED STATES ONLY ON THE CONDITION THAT THE DECISION OF SHIPPING THEM IN WILL BE REVERSED IF THE ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS YIELD SATISFACTORY RESULTS. ADMITTEDLY, MOST OF THE RESPONSIBLE WEST EUROPEAN POLITICAL LEADERS WHO ACCEPT THE NATO DECISION CONTINUE TO KEEP TO THIS GUIDELINE, AT LEAST IN THEIR PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS. "WE DON'T WANT AMERICAN REARMING FIRST, IN ORDER TO NEGOTIATE ARMS LIMITATIONS AFTERWARDS" (FEDERAL CHANCELLOR HELMUT SCHMIDT, REPORT ON THE STATE OF THE NATION IN THE BUNDESTAG ON 9 APRIL 1981). "WE DON'T WANT TO GO THE OLD WAY: FIRST TO REARM, AND THEN BEGIN THE NEGOTIATIONS" (FRG FOREIGN MINISTER HANS-DIETRICH GENSCHER ON WEST GERMAN TELEVISION, 19 MARCH 1981). "NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE AIM OF A FAR-REACHING LIMITATION ON NEW MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAVE PRIORITY... THE STATIONING OF AMERICAN MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONS AS AN ANSWER TO SOVIET SS-20 MISSILES WILL DEPEND ON THE RESULTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE AMERICANS AND THE SOVIETS" (SDPG CHAIRMAN WILLY BRANDT, INTERVIEW IN KIELER RUNDSCHAU, 11 JUNE 1981).

"THE NATO DECISION ON MODERNISING TACTICAL NUCLEAR ARMS IN WESTERN EUROPE WAS TAKEN ON THE CONDITION THAT A SERIOUS EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO COME TO  
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FOR EUR/SOV  
TERMS ON LIMITING MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES" (LORD CARRINGTON, FOREIGN SECRETARY OF GREAT BRITAIN, IN AN INTERVIEW TO THE NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, USA, ON 28 FEBRUARY 1981). "THE GERMAN BUNDESTAG... STRESSES... THE PROVISION OF THE DOUBLE DECISION THAT THE WEST WILL SCRUTINISE THE NEED FOR NATO MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN THE LIGHT OF THE CONCRETE RESULTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS" (JOINT SDPG AND FDP MOTION IN THE BUNDESTAG ON 26 MAY 1981). "THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WILL APPROVE THE DEPLOYMENT OF MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONS IN EUROPE... ONLY ON THE CONDITION THAT IF THE ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS YIELD RESULTS, THIS DECISION WILL BE REPEALED" (SDPG BOARD RESOLUTION OF 12 FEBRUARY 1981). THIS IS NO MORE THAN A SAMPLING OF STATEMENTS AND RESOLUTIONS TO THIS EFFECT, BUT IT IS QUITE ENOUGH TO CHARACTERISE THE POSITION ON THE WEST EUROPEAN SUPPORTERS--REPEAT, SUPPORTERS--OF THE "DOUBLE DECISION". BUT WHAT ABOUT THE POSITION OF THOSE FOR WHOM THIS DECISION WOULD ALSO SEEM TO BE OBLIGATORY, NAMELY, THE US ADMINISTRATION AND THE NATO MILITARY LEADERSHIP? TO USE THE DIPLOMATIC IDIOM, IT IS IN NO WAY IDENTICAL TO THE ONE IN THE ABOVE STATEMENTS. THEIR POSITION IS THAT REDUCTION OF THE NUMBER OF AMERICAN MISSILES PLANNED FOR DEPLOYMENT, LET ALONE THEIR COMPLETE RENUNCIATION, CANNOT BE THE AIM OF ANY NEGOTIATIONS, AND THAT "REAL NEGOTIATIONS" CAN BEGIN ONLY AFTER THE AMERICAN MISSILES TAKE THEIR STATIONS ON LAUNCHING PADS IN WESTERN EUROPE. ON 7 DECEMBER 1979, IN AN INTERVIEW TO DIE WELT, US GENERAL BERNARD W. ROGERS, SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE, SAID IN SO MANY WORDS THAT THE NUMBER OF MISSILES SPECIFIED IN NATO'S DECISION WAS NOT ENOUGH TO "CARRY OUT MY MILITARY TASKS", THAT HE WOULD BE "SERIOUSLY DISTURBED" IF ANY ATTEMPT WERE MADE TO REDUCE THIS NUMBER, AND THAT IT WAS UNREASONABLE TO TRY. THE PRONOUNCEMENTS OF MEMBERS OF THE PRESENT US ADMINISTRATION LEAVE NO DOUBT ABOUT THEIR POSITION. ON 9 MARCH 1981, SPEAKING AT A JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE WITH HANS-DIETRICH GENSCHER, US STATE SECRETARY HAIG SAID IN HIS OPINION THE "TWO-TRACK" DECISION ENVISAGED MODERNISATION OF THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE FIRST, AND TALKS ON THEIR BALANCED LEVELS LATER. ON 22 MARCH 1981 THE WASHINGTON POST REPORTED THAT THE US PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER RICHARD V. ALLEN SAID, "THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT ACCEPT ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS ON WEAPONS IN EUROPE AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR A MAJOR BUILD-UP OF MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES". IN THE OPINION OF US ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

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LAWRENCE S. EAGLEBURGER, EXPRESSED IN AN INTERVIEW TO BILD ZEITUNG ON 27 JUNE 1981, THE WEST "NEEDS MISSILES STATIONED IN EUROPE IF IT WANTS TO NEGOTIATE SUCCESSFULLY WITH THE RUSSIANS ON REDUCING THEIR ARMAMENTS". STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN WILLIAM DYESS "EXPLAINED" AT A PRESS CONFERENCE ON 5 FEBRUARY 1981 THAT THE US WHOLLY SUPPORTED (SIC) THE DECISION TAKEN BY THE ALLIES IN DECEMBER 1979 ON STATIONING MISSILES OF UPGRADED RANGE ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT AND THEREUPON HOLDING NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS. DIRECTOR OF THE US ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, EUGENE ROSTOW, CLEARED UP ALL REMAINING DOUBTS ABOUT THE US POSTURE CONCERNING THE "DOUBLE DECISION". IN JULY 1981, ASKED BY A SPIEGEL CORRESPONDENT WHETHER HE THOUGHT THE DEPLOYMENT OF PERSHING-2 AND CRUISE MISSILES IN THE FRG AND OTHER WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WAS NEGOTIABLE, ROSTOW SAID: "NO. IT'S A COMMITMENT, A DECISION THAT WAS TAKEN BY NATO. IT WOULD BE THE END OF EVERYTHING IF NATO MADE DECISIONS, AND THEN DISCOVERED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD A VETO OVER THEM." THERE IS A NUMBER OF POINTS ONE WANTS TO RAISE ABOUT THE STANCE OF THE US ADMINISTRATION. TO BEGIN WITH, IT IS PROPER TO RECALL THAT WHILE THE "DOUBLE DECISION" WAS STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION WITHIN NATO, THE SOVIET UNION AND MANY POLITICAL AND PUBLIC FORCES IN WESTERN

EUROPE, AND IN THE UNITED STATES AS WELL,  
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FOR EUR/SOV  
HAD WARNED THAT MILITARIST FORCES WOULD DO  
THEIR UTMOST TO LEAVE IN FORCE ONLY ONE PART OF  
IT, THE ONE ON REARMING, WHILE THE "NEGOTIATIONS"  
PART WOULD BE USED AS A SCREEN, A MEANS OF  
PLACATING THE PUBLIC, WHICH WOULD IN THE END  
BE CONFRONTED WITH A FAIT ACCOMPLI. AT THAT  
TIME--AND NOW TOO, FOR THAT MATTER--THESE WARNINGS  
WERE DESCRIBED AS "PURE PROPAGANDA" WITH NO  
BASIS IN FACT. BUT EVERYTHING CITED ABOVE ABOUT  
THE MOOD OF THE US ADMINISTRATION SHOWS ALL TOO  
CLEARLY WHO WAS RIGHT--THOSE WHO WARNED OR THOSE  
WHO SPURNED THEIR WARNINGS. IT IS NECESSARY  
TO REMIND PEOPLE OF THIS BECAUSE TODAY, TOO, THE  
PUBLIC OF WESTERN EUROPE IS HAVING THE WOOL PULLED  
OVER ITS EYES WITH CLAIMS, AS THE ONE BY NATO'S  
SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE GROUP, THAT "THE UNITED STATES  
AND ITS ALLIES APPROACH THESE IMPORTANT NEGOTIATIONS  
(ON MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS--AUTHOR)...  
WITH ALL SERIOUSNESS" (NOUVELLES ATLANTIQUES,  
JUNE 1981). HENCE THERE IS NOTHING TO FEAR,  
AND ONE MUST SIMPLY WAIT FOR THE RESULTS OF THE  
NEGOTIATIONS. THE "PLACATIVE" CAMPAIGN OF 1979  
HAS COST WESTERN EUROPE DEARLY: THE AMERICANS  
WON THE "RIGHT" TO STATION THEIR NEW NUCLEAR  
MISSILES ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT. AND ACCEPTANCE  
OF THE PRESENT "PLACATIVE" CONTENTIONS MAY  
COST IT STILL MORE DEARLY: THE STATIONING OF THE  
MISSILES WILL BECOME A FACT WITH NO SERIOUS  
NEGOTIATIONS ON MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONS WITH THE SOVIET  
UNION TAKING PLACE.  
AFTER ALL, DESPITE THE WIDELY PUBLICISED STATEMENTS  
OF THE NATO COUNCIL AND ITS SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE  
GROUP, AND OF THE PRIME AND FOREIGN MINISTERS  
OF WESTERN EUROPE, CONCERNING THE INTENTION TO HAVE  
SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE USSR, THE NEGOTIATIONS  
WILL BE CONDUCTED NOT BY THEM, BUT SINGLY  
BY THE UNITED STATES, FOR WHICH THE VERY IDEA OF  
AN ACCORD WITH THE SOVIET UNION IS UNACCEPTABLE  
BECAUSE, AS ROSTOW SAID, IT WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT  
TO A SOVIET "VETO". AND ROSTOW'S STATEMENT WAS  
NO SLIP OF THE TONGUE, FOR ON 10 JULY 1981, UNITED  
PRESS INTERNATIONAL AND ASSOCIATED PRESS REPORTED  
"A SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL" WHO WAS  
DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN PREPARING THE NEGOTIATIONS  
ON MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE  
AND WHO HAD JUST MET HIGH-RANKING WEST EUROPEAN  
STATESMEN (BUT WHO LACKED THE COURAGE TO LET THE  
CORRESPONDENTS GIVE HIS NAME) AS SAYING: "THE  
UNITED STATES NEGOTIATES ON BEHALF OF THE WEST.  
THE EUROPEANS, THOUGH THEY WILL BE KEPT INFORMED,  
PLAY NO DIRECT ROLE IN THE EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS  
ON THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES." THEREUPON, HE GAVE TO  
UNDERSTAND HOW THE UNITED STATES, ACTING "ON BEHALF

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OF THE WEST", CONCEIVED THE NEGOTIATIONS: "THE WESTERN ALLIANCE MUST GO AHEAD WITH DEPLOYING MODERN NUCLEAR MISSILES IN EUROPE BECAUSE ANY OTHER COURSE GIVES THE SOVIET UNION VETO POWER OVER THE ALLIANCE'S DECISIONS." THE ASSOCIATED PRESS VERSION OF THIS PRONOUNCEMENT IS MORE RUGGED, AND PROBABLY MORE AUTHENTIC: "AND, DAMN IT, IF THE ALLIANCE NOW CANNOT PROCEED WITH THAT DECISION WE WILL HAVE TOLD THE SOVIET UNION THAT THEY HAVE VETO OVER OUR DECISIONS." THE SUMMARY PURPORT OF THE "SENIOR OFFICIAL'S" BT

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FOR EUR/SOV

UTTERANCES WAS THIS: THE UNITED STATES REJECTS ANY ALTERNATIVE TO THE PLANNED DEPLOYMENT IN EUROPE OF LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES (THE REFERENCE IS REALLY TO MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES. --ED.). THAT'S THAT, AND, TO USE HIS IDIOM, BE DAMNED ALL DISQUISITIONS ABOUT THE "DOUBLE DECISION", THE PRIORITY OF NEGOTIATIONS, THE CHANCES OF REDUCING THE NUMBER OF MISSILES TO BE STATIONED, AND, MUCH MORE, ANY "ZERO VARIANT". NONE OF THAT IS THINKABLE BECAUSE IT WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO A SOVIET "VETO". NOW PICTURE FOR A MOMENT THAT A SOVIET OFFICIAL TOOK THE SAME POSITION AND SAID THAT ANY ATTEMPT TO SET LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE FORCES BY AGREEMENT IS UNTHINKABLE BECAUSE ITS IMPLEMENTATION WILL BE AN INTOLERABLE AMERICAN OR NATO VETO OVER ITS ARMS MODERNISATION PROGRAMME, WHICH IS ITS OWN PURELY INTERNAL AFFAIR. THERE'S HARDLY ANY DOUBT THAT THE WEST WOULD SEIZE UPON SUCH A PRONOUNCEMENT AS A PRETEXT TO REFUSE NEGOTIATIONS.

THE US ADMINISTRATION IS REJECTING MORE THAN JUST THE IDEA OF AN AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION. ITS SPOKESMEN SAY OPENLY THEY DO NOT INTEND TO RECKON WITH THE OPINION OF AMERICA'S NATO ALLIES BECAUSE IF IT DIVERGES FROM THAT OF WASHINGTON, BOWING TO IT WOULD ALSO BE LIKE BOWING TO A VETO. CASPAR WEINBERGER'S POSTURE ON THE NEUTRON BOMB DECISION, AS OFFICIALLY ANNOUNCED, WAS THAT THE UNITED STATES COULD NOT LET EUROPEAN POLITICAL PROBLEMS OVERSHADOW MATTERS CONCERNING THE POTENTIAL OF THE AMERICAN ARMED FORCES. PRESIDENT REAGAN SIDED WITH WEINBERGER ON THE GROUND THAT "THE EUROPEANS SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN A VETO OVER THE UNITED STATES' WEAPONS DECISIONS". HE SAID HE WOULD NOT CONTINUE "TO ALLOW A RANGE OF AMERICAN POLICY DECISIONS TO REMAIN HOSTAGE TO ALLIED SUPPORT FOR THE NEW MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES" (THE NEW YORK TIMES, 9 AUGUST 1981). WHAT THIS MEANS IS THAT THE USA ACCORDS ITS ALLIES THE ONE RIGHT OF APPROVING WHAT IT MAY HAPPEN TO DECIDE.

IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE, IT MAY BE A GOOD IDEA TO PONDER ON PRONOUNCEMENTS LIKE THE ONE BY, SAY, HANS-DIETRICH GENSCHER: "NATO HAS, FOR ITS PART, DETERMINED IN THE DECISION THAT THE NEED FOR REARMING CAN BE RE-EXAMINED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CONCRETE RESULTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. NOW, IT IS UP TO THE SOVIET UNION TO MAKE SUCH CONCRETE RESULTS IN THE TALKS POSSIBLE" (HESSE RADIO INTERVIEW, 24 MAY 1981). BUT WHAT CAN BE UP TO THE SOVIET UNION IF ITS EVERY POPOSAL ON LIMITING OR REDUCING MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE WILL BE REGARDED BY THE "ATTORNEY OF THE WESTERN NATIONS" AS AN INTOLERABLE VETO?

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. ADDRESSING THE BUNDESTAG ON 30 JANUARY 1981, CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT STRESSED THAT THE "DOUBLE DECISION" IS SO FAR THE FIRST AND ONLY AMERICAN COMMITMENT ON ARMS LIMITATION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, AND HAS GOT TO BE PRESERVED. BUT JUDGE FOR YOURSELF WHETHER THIS "FIRST AND ONLY" US COMMITMENT TO ITS ALLIES HAS IN FACT BEEN PRESERVED.

. IT FOLLOWS PLAINLY FROM THE AFORESAID, AS WE SEE IT, THAT THE "DOUBLE DECISION" DOES NOT, EITHER IN ITS ORIGINAL AND MUCH LESS IN ITS "TRANSFORMED" VERSION, TESTIFY TO THE READINESS OF THE UNITED STATES AND NATO FOR TRULY FAIR AND EFFECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY.

. QUESTION. ALL THE SAME, THE WEST EUROPEAN ALLIES HAVE OBTAINED US ASSURANCES THAT IT WILL START NEGOTIATIONS ON MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONS. THIS HOLDS OUT HOPE OF SUCCESS FOR THE SECOND PART OF THE "DOUBLE DECISION" - THE NEGOTIATIONS. IT IS, THEREFORE, HARDLY NECESSARY TO DRAMATISE THE SITUATION. THE UNITED STATES HAS PROMISED TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY, AND WE IN WESTERN EUROPE ARE INCLINED TO BELIEVE AMERICAN PROMISES. BESIDES, YOU APPEAR TO OVER-REACT TO PRONOUNCEMENTS OF  
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FOR EUR/SOV  
INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE US ADMINISTRATION.  
THOUGH THEY DO EVOKE CONSTERNATION AND ALARM, THEY  
EXPRESS NOTHING BUT PERSONAL OPINIONS, NOT THE  
STANDPOINT OF THE US GOVERNMENT AS SUCH.

ANSWER. LET'S LOOK AT THE SECOND PART OF THIS  
CONTENTION FIRST. IT IS INDEED FREQUENTLY  
DECLARED THAT SOME WARLIKE PRONOUNCEMENTS BY SPOKESMEN  
OF THE US ADMINISTRATION DO NOT EXPRESS THE  
ADMINISTRATION'S POINT OF VIEW. BUT THE STATEMENTS  
WE HAVE CITED SO FAR, AND THOSE WE ARE STILL GOING  
TO CITE, WERE NEITHER DENIED NOR DECLARED TO HAVE  
BEEN PURELY PERSONAL OPINIONS. BESIDES - AND THIS  
IS IMPORTANT AND ALARMING - QUITE FREQUENTLY  
"PERSONAL" OPINIONS TURNED IN DUE COURSE INTO OFFI-  
CIAL ONES, AND THIS ON ANYTHING BUT OBSCURE ISSUES.  
YOU MAY RECALL THAT IN JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1981,  
WEINBERGER SAID THE US MAY GO AHEAD WITH HE  
MANUFACTURE OF THE NEUTRON BOMB. ON THAT OCCASION,  
ADMINISTRATION SPOKESMEN PROMPTLY DECLARED THAT HIS  
STATEMENTS DID NOT REFLECT THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION.  
A SPECIAL MESSAGE TO THE NATO ALLIES ASKED THEM TO  
ATTACH NO SIGNIFICANCE TO THE DEFENSE SECRETARY'S  
WORDS. BUT WHAT WAS THE END OF THAT STORY? WEINBER-  
GER'S "PERSONAL" OPINION HAS NOW BEEN TURNED INTO  
AN OFFICIAL DECISION TO GO AHEAD WITH THE FULL-SCALE  
MANUFACTURE OF NEUTRON BOMBS.

THIS OCCURRENCE SHOWS GRAPHICALLY AND QUITE  
CONVINCINGLY THAT IT IS HIGHLY DANGEROUS TO DIS-  
REGARD ANY STATEMENT BY US OFFICIALS IF IT CONCERNS  
THEIR DEDICATION TO THE IDEA OF WINNING MILITARY  
SUPERIORITY, ESCALATING THE ARMS RACE, REJECTING  
SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS, AND REPLACING THEM BY THE METHOD  
OF ULTIMATUMS.

BUT WHEN WE SAY THAT BY ALL EVIDENCE THE  
UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO START NEGOTIATIONS BUT  
NOT CONDUCT THEM SERIOUSLY, THAT IS, TO SEEK  
AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION, WE DO NOT INFER  
THIS FROM ONLY THE CITED PRONOUNCEMENTS OF US  
OFFICIALS, THOUGH THEY REVEAL CONCLUSIVELY ENOUGH  
IN WHAT DIRECTION THEY MEAN TO DEAL. WE ALSO INFER  
IT FROM THE ACTIONS OF THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION,  
AIMED AT MAXIMALLY COMPLICATING THE NEGOTIATIONS  
BEFORE THEY HAVE EVER BEGUN, TO DRAG THEM OUT,  
AND MEANWHILE DEPLOY PERSHING-2 AND CRUISE MISSILES  
IN WESTERN EUROPE. LET'S RECAPITULATE THESE  
ACTIONS.

TO BEGIN WITH, THE REFUSAL TO RATIFY THE  
SALT-2 TREATY.

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. IT WILL BE RECALLED THAT WHEN THE "DOUBLE DECISION" WAS BEING PREPARED AND THEN ADOPTED, ITS PLANNERS MAINTAINED THAT THE SO-CALLED MODERNISATION OF NATO'S NUCLEAR POTENTIAL WOULD ONLY BE NECESSARY IF SALT-2 ENTERED INTO FORCE. AND HERE IS WHY: BEFORE SALT-2, AMERICA'S WEST EUROPEAN NATO PARTNERS WERE "SHIELDED" BY US STRATEGIC MISSILES, BUT ONCE THE TREATY IS IMPLEMENTED, FIXING EQUAL CEILINGS FOR SOVIET AND AMERICAN STRATEGIC WEAPONS, THIS SHIELD WILL BECOME INEFFECTIVE, AS IT WERE, BECAUSE THE STRATEGIC FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES WILL BALANCE OUT AND THE AMERICANS WILL HAVE NOTHING LEFT TO SHIELD WESTERN EUROPE.

. THIS TRAIN OF THOUGHT REPOSES ON WHOLLY FALSE ASSUMPTIONS. THE CLAIM THAT WESTERN EUROPE WOULD BE DEFENCELESS IF THERE WAS PARITY OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN STRATEGIC FORCES DELIBERATELY IGNORES THE POWERFUL FORWARD BASE NUCLEAR FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES, AND THE NUCLEAR FORCES OF BRITAIN AND FRANCE. BESIDES, THE NEW AMERICAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTENDED FOR DEPLOYMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE ARE NOT INDEPENDENT OR DETACHED FROM AMERICA'S STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THEY AUGMENT THE STRATEGIC ARSENAL OF US INTERCONTINENTAL WEAPONS WITH WHAT WOULD, IN EFFECT, BE A NO LESS STRATEGIC ARSENAL OF THE LATEST MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

. STILL, FACTS ARE FACTS. THE WEST EUROPEAN NATO GOVERNMENTS HAVE GIVEN THEIR CONSENT TO FULFILLING THE "DOUBLE DECISION" ON THE ESSENTIAL

CONDITIONS THAT THE SALT-2 TREATY IS RATIFIED AND ENTERS INTO FORCE. THIS IS SAID IN THE TEXT OF THE DECISION, WHICH ENVISAGES THAT "LIMITATIONS ON AMERICAN AND SOVIET LONG-RANGE THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES (THE REFERENCE IS TO MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES.) SHALL BE DISCUSSED AT BILATERAL TALKS IN THE  
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FOR EUR/SOV  
SALT-3 FRAMEWORK", THAT IS, IN THE FRAMEWORK OF  
NEGOTIATIONS THAT WOULD FOLLOW THE ENTRY INTO  
FORCE OF THE SALT-2 TREATY. THE SAME WAS SAID,  
AMONG OTHERS, BY FRG DEFENCE MINISTER HANS APEL.  
"NATO COULD ADOPT ITS RESOLUTION," HE SAID, " ON  
THE CONDITION THAT IT ENTERS INTO FORCE WHEN THE  
US SENATE RATIFIES THE SALT-2 TREATY" (ASSOCIATED  
PRESS, 4 OCTOBER 1979). ON 15 OCTOBER 1979, AP  
QUOTED HENRI SIMONET, FOREIGN MINISTER OF BELGIUM,  
AS SAYING THAT HE WOULD NOT AGREE TO THE IDEA OF  
THE NATO MINISTERS ADOPTING THE DECISION IF THERE  
IS NO CERTAINTY THAT SALT-2 WILL BE RATIFIED. AND  
IT SAYS IN THE SAME REPORT THAT THE NETHERLANDS  
PRIME MINISTER ANDRIES VAN AGT STATED HIS GOVERN-  
MENT WOULD NOT COMMIT ITSELF UNCONDITIONALLY TO THE  
NATO MISSILE DECISION UNTIL THERE IS A DECISION ON  
THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TREATY. AND A  
RESOLUTION OF THE SDPG CONGRESS, HELD SHORTLY BEFORE  
THE NATO COUNCIL SESSION SAID THAT IF THE SALT-2  
TREATY FELL THROUGH AS A RESULT OF REARMING IN  
THE FIELD OF MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE THREAT  
OF A NEW ARMS RACE WOULD INCREASE DANGEROUSLY, AND  
THE SITUATION WOULD CHANGE RADICALLY.

TO BE SURE, THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF SALT-2  
WOULD IN NO WAY, AS WE HAVE SHOWN, NECESSITATE  
ANY BUILD-UP OF NATO'S EUROPEAN NUCLEAR POTENTIAL.  
BUT IF THE MEMBERS OF THE BLOC CONSIDERED THEIR NO-  
TION RIGHT, THEY OUGHT TO HAVE DISPLAYED AT LEAST  
A MODICUM OF LOGIC IN THEIR VIEWS AND ACTIONS AND  
EITHER REFUSED TO ADOPT THE DECISION OR AT LEAST  
POSTPONED IT, BECAUSE SALT-2 HAD NOT BEEN RATIFIED  
BY DECEMBER 1979.

THEY DID NEITHER, AND PUT THEIR TRUST IN  
AMERICA'S PROMISE.

NOW IT IS MORE THAN CLEAR THAT THE REAGAN  
ADMINISTRATION HAS NO INTENTIONS OF RATIFYING  
THE SALT-2 TREATY, HAVING DECLARED IT "UNEQUAL"  
AND STATING ITS "READINESS TO CONTINUE THE SALT  
PROCESS" ON THE CONDITION THAT THE ELEMENTS OF  
SALT-2 WHICH IT LIKES ARE PRESERVED, WHILE THE  
PROVISIONS THAT ENSURE SOVIET SECURITY ARE REVISED  
TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE UNITED STATES.

NOT ONLY DOES THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION THEREBY  
SPURN THE AGREED STANDPOINT OF THE SOVIET UNION  
AND THE USA, WHICH DESCRIBED THE SALT-2 TREATY IN A  
JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF 18 JUNE 1979 AS A "MUTUALLY  
ACCEPTABLE BALANCE BETWEEN THE INTERESTS OF THE  
SIDES BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL  
SECURITY", BUT ALSO THE OPINION OF ALL ITS ALLIES,  
WHO SAID IN THE NATO COUNCIL'S COMMUNIQUE OF  
15 DECEMBER 1979 (ISSUED BY THE SESSION THAT

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ADOPTED THE "DOUBLE DECISION") THAT SALT-2 "REFLECTED THEIR DESIRE FOR GENUINE ARMS CONTROL MEASURES WHICH SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE STABILITY OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS... THE TREATY MAKES IT POSSIBLE TO MAINTAIN A STRONG US STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DETERRENT, WHICH REMAINS VITAL TO THE DEFENCE OF THE ALLIANCE. THUS THIS TREATY, WHICH WILL HAVE THE EFFECT OF CURBING THE BUILD-UP OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE WORLD, IMPROVES THE PROSPECTS FOR DETENTE WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE. MINISTERS EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE TREATY WOULD SOON COME INTO FORCE... THEY ALSO EXPRESSED THE BELIEF THAT RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO OTHER POSSIBILITIES OF PROGRESS IN THE FIELD OF ARMS CONTROL".

BY FOILING THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE SALT-2 TREATY AND BY INDEFINITELY DELAYING RENEWAL OF THE SALT PROCESS, THE US ADMINISTRATION IS STRIKING A BLOW NOT AT THAT PROCESS ALONE, BUT ALSO AT THE NEGOTIATIONS ON MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE. BY ALL EVIDENCE, IT INTENDS TO CONDUCT THEM IN DISREGARD OF THE INCONTESTABLE FACT THAT ALL AMERICAN MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE ARE EQUIVALENT TO AMERICAN STRATEGIC INTERCONTINENTAL WEAPONS BECAUSE THEY ARE WITHIN REACH OF SOVIET TERRITORY. THE PROBLEMS OF STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AND EUROSTRATEGIC ARMAMENTS ARE OBJECTIVELY

LINKED. AND IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE ABSENCE OF SALT NEGOTIATIONS WILL INEVITABLY AND DRASTICALLY  
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UNCLAS SECTION 09 OF 13 MOSCOW 16098

FOR EUR/SOV  
COMPLICATE NEGOTIATIONS ON MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONRY.  
THE SOVIET UNION IS BEING PUT IN A POSITION WHERE  
IT WOULD HAVE TO AGREE TO QUANTITY CEILINGS OF  
WHAT ARE IN FACT AMERICAN STRATEGIC WEAPONS BEFORE  
IT HAS ANY IDEA OF WHAT THE UNITED STATES INTENDS  
TO DO WITH THE OTHER COMPONENTS OF ITS STRATEGIC  
ARSENAL (AND JUDGING FROM AVAILABLE EVIDENCE IT  
INTENDS TO KEEP INCREASING THAT ARSENAL IN ORDER TO  
SECURE MILITARY SUPERIORITY THROUGH THE DEPLOYMENT  
OF NEW MX AND TRIDENT BALLISTIC MISSILES, AND B-1  
AND STEALTH STRATEGIC BOMBERS).

AMERICA'S DESIRE TO PUT OFF SALT NEGOTIATIONS  
INDEFINITELY, AND TO CONDUCT THEM, IF THEY EVER  
BEGIN, IN DISREGARD OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY  
AND EQUAL SECURITY, IS NOTHING BUT A MANOEUVRE,  
AMONG OTHER THINGS, TO TURN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON  
MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONS INTO AN IDLE EXERCISE.

IT IS ONLY FAIR TO NOTE THAT THE DANGEROUS  
IMPLICATIONS OF THIS UNDERTAKING ARE SEEN NOT  
ONLY IN THE USSR, BUT ALSO IN THE USA AND IN  
WESTERN EUROPE. TRUE, STATESMEN OF THE WEST  
EUROPEAN NATO COUNTRIES DO NOT - AS IS BEING  
RIGHTLY DONE BY VERY MANY SPOKESMEN OF POLITICAL  
AND PUBLIC FORCES - RAISE THE QUESTION OF  
AMERICA'S REFUSAL TO RATIFY SALT-2 HAVING DIVESTED  
THE "DOUBLE DECISION" OF ITS FOUNDATION, AND OF  
REVOKING IT ON THESE GROUNDS, THOUGH THEIR PRE-  
VIOUS PRONOUNCEMENTS SHOULD HAVE MADE THEM DRAW  
SUCH A CONCLUSION. EVIDENTLY FOR THE SAKE OF  
"ALLIED SOLIDARITY" AND AGAIN TRUSTING AMERICA'S  
PROMISE, THEY NOW PUT THE QUESTION DIFFERENTLY,  
STRESSING THAT THE SALT PROCESS MUST BE CONTINUED  
AND THE NEGOTIATIONS ON MEDIUM-RANGE WEAPONS MUST  
BE LINKED TO IT IN SOME WAY. AT A WASHINGTON  
PRESS CONFERENCE IN MARCH 1981, FRG DEFENCE MINISTER  
APEL EMPHASISED THAT THE MATTER OF MEDIUM-RANGE  
MISSILES SHOULD, AS BEFORE, BE TIED IN WITH THE  
SALT PROCESS (DPA, 26 MARCH 1981), AND ADDRESSING  
THE SDPG FACTION OF THE BUNDESTAG UPON HIS RETURN  
FROM THE USA, HE SAID HE HOPED HE HAD "SUCCEEDED  
IN SQUASHING THE IDEA THAT NEGOTIATIONS ON MEDIUM-  
RANGE WEAPONS IN EUROPE CAN BE SEPARATED FROM THE  
SALT PROCESS. ON NO ACCOUNT COULD WE ACCEPT THAT...  
THE NATO DOUBLE DECISION SAYS CLEARLY THAT THESE  
NEGOTIATIONS ARE TO TAKE PLACE IN THE FRAMEWORK  
OF THE SALT PROCESS." FORMER US STATE SECRETARY  
CYRUS VANCE NOTED IN A STERN INTERVIEW IN JULY  
1981 THAT WITHOUT A SALT-2 AGREEMENT THERE COULD BE  
NO REAL PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON MEDIUM-  
RANGE MISSILES IN EUROPE. THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION  
ON DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY, CONSISTING OF EXPERTS  
FROM EAST AND WEST, AND CHAIRED BY OLOF PALME, HAS

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COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT FAILURE OF THE SALT PROCESS WOULD HAVE "THE MOST IMMEDIATE IMPACT... ON THE TALKS... TO LIMIT THE DEPLOYMENT OF THEATRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS; THESE NEGOTIATIONS PROBABLY COULD NOT CONTINUE IN THE ABSENCE OF U. S. -SOVIET STRATEGIC DIALOGUE" (FINAL DOCUMENT OF A SITTING OF THE COMMISSION ON 7-8 FEBRUARY 1981 IN VIENNA). LAST BUT NOT LEAST, EVEN THE NATO NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP, MEETING ON 13-14 NOVEMBER 1980 AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL, SPOKE OUT IN FAVOUR OF NEGOTIATING "LONG-RANGE THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCES AS WELL AS INTER-CONTINENTAL STRATEGIC FORCES".

THE WESTERN PRESS PUT THE PROBLEM STILL MORE CLEARLY. THE NEW YORK TIMES OF 8 JUNE 1981, WROTE: "SINCE THE ADMINISTRATION OPPOSES THE SALT-2 TREATY, NO PROGRESS CAN BE MADE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS REDUCTION IN EUROPE." THE SAME PAPER SAID ON 17 JULY 1981: "THE ALLIES KNOW, HOWEVER, THAT THEIR VALUE (THE VALUE OF US PROMISES TO BEGIN MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE USSR--AUTHOR) DEPENDS ON PROGRESS TOWARD AN OVERALL SALT AGREEMENT. WITHOUT A COMPREHENSIVE TREATY, NO EUROPEAN MISSILE ACCORD IS FEASIBLE."

THE STANCE OF THE US ADMINISTRATION ON THE LINK BETWEEN THE SALT PROCESS AND MEDIUM-RANGE ARMS NEGOTIATIONS IS ENTIRELY INDEFINITE (OR, MORE PRECISELY, NEGATIVE) AS CONCERNS THE SUBSTANCE OF THE SALT PROCESS OR THE TIME IT WILL BE RESUMED.

ESSENTIALLY, IT IS RELUCTANT TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE  
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UNCLAS SECTION 10 OF 13 MOSCOW 16098

FOR EUR/SOV  
EXISTENCE OF ANY OBJECTIVE LINK. THE UNITED STATES IS "NOT PREPARED" TO RELATE NEGOTIATIONS ON THEATRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS (HERE TOO, THE REFERENCE IS TO MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES. -ED.) CONTROL TO THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS, SAID US STATE SECRETARY ALEXANDER HAIG AT A PRESS CONFERENCE IN MANILA ON 21 JUNE 1981.

"SINCERE" DESIRE FOR "MEANINGFUL" NEGOTIATIONS AND OF "RESPECT" FOR THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF THE OTHER SIDE, LET ALONE THE STANDPOINT OF ITS OWN ALLIES.

BUT THE POINT WE WANT TO MAKE IS THAT BY BREAKING THE LINK BETWEEN THE SALT PROCESS AND THE EUROPEAN MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS NEGOTIATIONS, THE U. S. ADMINISTRATION IS DELIBERATELY COMPLICATING THE NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE THEY HAVE EVER BEGUN.

THE SAME AIM IS PURSUED BY THE "INNOVATION" THAT THE UNITED STATES WANTS TO INTRODUCE AS A SUBJECT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, AMOUNTING TO AN ATTEMPT TO FRUSTRATE THE TALKS FROM THE OUTSET OR, IN ANY CASE, TO MAXIMALLY COMPLICATE AND DRAG THEM OUT IN ORDER TO GAIN A "LEGITIMATE" EXCUSE FOR STARTING TO DEPLOY NEW NUCLEAR MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE. THE REFERENCE IS TO THE SPATIAL SPHERE TO WHICH THE LIMITATIONS AND REDUCTIONS SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT AT THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE TO APPLY. UNTIL RECENTLY, THIS SPHERE WAS SELF-UNDERSTOOD: EUROPE INCLUDING THE EUROPEAN PART OF THE SOVIET UNION. EVEN THE TEXT OF NATO'S "DOUBLE DECISION" SAYS THAT IT WAS ADOPTED "TO CURB THE ARMS RACE IN EUROPE." THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE TWO SIDES THAT THE GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE CONFINED TO EUROPE WAS RECORDED IN THE NAME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT BEGAN BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES IN GENEVA ON 17 OCTOBER 1980 AND WERE BROKEN OFF BY THE AMERICAN SIDE IN NOVEMBER OF THAT YEAR. THEY WERE DESCRIBED AS A PRACTICAL DISCUSSION OF ISSUES RELATED TO THE LIMITATION OF NUCLEAR ARMS IN EUROPE (PRAVDA, 18 OCTOBER 1980). THE QUESTION TODAY -- AND THAT IS HOW IT IS ALSO PUT IN THE WEST -- CONCERNS RESUMING THESE NEGOTIATIONS, NOT STARTING SOME ENTIRELY NEW TALKS.

DESPITE THIS, THE USA ANNOUNCED AT A HIGH-LEVEL NATO MEETING IN JUNE 1981 CHAIRED BY U. S. DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE DAVID GOMPERT, THAT AT THE NEGOTIATIONS IT WOULD SEEK SUCH LIMITATION OF SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES AS WILL COVER ALL SS-20 MISSILES, INCLUDING THOSE STATIONED IN EASTERN REGIONS OF THE USSR AND TRAINED ON CHINA AND JAPAN (ASSOCIATE PRESS AND REUTERS, 18 AND 19 JUNE 1981). THE SAME WAS RECORDED IN THE STATEMENT ISSUED BY A SITTING IN EARLY AUGUST 1981 OF

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NATO'S SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE GROUP CHAIRED BY U. S. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE LAWRENCE S. EAGLEBURGER.

IT IS MORE THAN CLEAR, THEREFORE, THAT THE NEW AMERICAN "INITIATIVE" TO ALTER THE NATURE OF THE COMING NEGOTIATIONS IS CREATING A COMPLICATION THAT WILL TAKE A MUCH LONGER TIME TO OVERCOME -- IF THAT WILL BE AT ALL POSSIBLE -- THAN THE "DOUBLE DECISION" ENVISAGES FOR STARTING THE DEPLOYMENT OF PERSHING-2 AND CRUISE MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE.

ANOTHER MOST SERIOUS MOVE TO TRIP UP THE NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR ARMS LIMITATION IN EUROPE WAS PRESIDENT REAGAN'S DECISION TO GO AHEAD WITH THE FULL-SCALE MANUFACTURE OF NEUTRON WEAPONS. THE OPINION THAT IT WILL HAVE A MOST NEGATIVE EFFECT ON THE NEGOTIATIONS IS UNIVERSAL. AND THERE IS NO NEED TO SPEAK ABOUT THE REACTION TO IT OF THE GOVERNMENTS AND PUBLIC IN THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. IT IS STRONGLY NEGATIVE, OF COURSE. THE REACTION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTIES AND PRACTICALLY ALL THE SOCIALIST AND SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC PARTIES OF WESTERN EUROPE IS LIKEWISE NEGATIVE. THE SAME REACTION IS SEEN IN SOME GOVERNMENT QUARTERS IN WESTERN EUROPE. GRO HARLEM BRUNDTLAND, THE PRIME MINISTER OF NORWAY, SAID THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT PROTESTED AGAINST REAGAN'S DECISION BECAUSE IT WOULD COMPLICATE EAST-WEST ARMS REDUCTION NEGOTIATIONS THAT ARE TO BEGIN THIS AUTUMN (ASSOCIATED PRESS, 10 AUGUST 1981). DENMARK'S FOREIGN MINISTER STRONGLY

CENSURED THE U. S. PRESIDENT'S DECISION AND SAID HE WAS SURPRISED BY IT IN VIEW OF THE PLANNED SOVIET-AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS ON ARMS REDUCTION IN EUROPE (REUTERS, 10 AUGUST 1981). HANS-JURGEN WISCHNEWSKI, DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE SDPG, SAID IN A SPECIAL STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF HIS PARTY THAT "DIRECTLY BEFORE... THE IMPENDING NEGOTIATIONS OF THE TWO GREAT POWERS  
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FOR EUR/SOV  
ON THE LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS, THIS AMERICAN DECISION IS BOUND TO ENCUMBER THE INDISPENSABLE TALKS" (DPA, 11 AUGUST 1981). AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE REPORTED FROM BRUSSELS ON 11 AND 13 AUGUST 1981 THAT A NUMBER OF DELEGATIONS AT A NATO COUNCIL SITTING ON 10 AUGUST EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT THE U. S. DECISION TO MANUFACTURE NEUTRON BOMBS WOULD RENDER MORE DIFFICULT THE NEGOTIATIONS "ON REDUCING EUROMISSILES."

OTHER DELEGATIONS, IT IS TRUE, WHILE THEY DID NOT VENTURE TO SAY OUTRIGHT THAT THE DECISION WOULD BENEFIT THE NEGOTIATIONS, OBSERVED THAT IT WILL "STRENGTHEN WASHINGTON'S POSITION IN THE EUROMISSILES NEGOTIATIONS WITH MOSCOW."

WHAT THIS LAST PRONOUNCEMENT AMOUNTS TO IS AN ADMISSION THAT WASHINGTON WILL BEHAVE AT THE TALKS NOT AS AN EQUAL AND EQUALLY COMMITTED PARTNER, BUT AS SOMEONE WHO BELIEVES HE HAS THE RIGHT OF IMPOSING TERMS FROM "POSITIONS OF STRENGTH." THE MAKERS OF THE NEUTRON ARMS DECISION DO NOT, IN FACT, DENY THAT THEIR INTENTION IS TO DEAL THAT WAY, AND THAT THE NEUTRON DECISION WAS TAKEN, AMONG OTHER THINGS, TO APPLY "MUSCLE" AT THE NEGOTIATIONS. SPEAKING ON WEST GERMAN TELEVISION ON 10 AUGUST, CASPAR WEINBERGER SAID IN SO MANY WORDS THAT THE NEUTRON WARHEADS WERE MEANT TO ENABLE THE U. S. TO CONDUCT THESE NEGOTIATIONS FROM MORE DEPENDABLE POSITIONS. THE DECISIVE THING HERE, HE SAID, IS THAT THE U. S. WILL BE STRONGER WHEN IT ENTERS THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND NOT WEAKER. OTHERWISE, HE AVERRED, IT COULD BECOME AN OBJECT OF NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL OR PRESSURE. WEINBERGER'S HYPOCRITICAL COMPLAINTS ABOUT "WEAKNESS", AS WE HAVE SHOWN ABOVE, ARE FAR REMOVED FROM THE TRUTH. BUT THAT THE U. S. ADMINISTRATION CONCEIVES STRENGTHENING ITS POSITIONS AT THE NEGOTIATIONS EXCLUSIVELY BY BUILDING UP MILITARY POWER FOR NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL AND PRESSURE, AND NOT BY FINDING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS, BY MUTUAL CONCESSIONS AND, CONSEQUENTLY, NOT BY WINNING PUBLIC OPINION TO ITS SIDE BUT BY ARROGANTLY IGNORING IT -- THAT, INDEED, IS ALL EXCEEDINGLY DANGEROUS. NATURALLY, SUCH "STRENGTHENING OF POSITIONS" AT THE NEGOTIATIONS IS ALL TOO CLEARLY A BID TO TORPEDO OR, AT LEAST, TO SABOTAGE THEM FOR SO LONG AS IT TAKES TO SECURE THE CHERISHED AIM AND DEPLOY NEW AMERICAN NUCLEAR MISSILES IN EUROPE.

IN ANY CASE, IT SHOULD BE CLEAR TO THE UNITED STATES, TO ITS ALLIES, AND THE PUBLIC AT LARGE, THAT THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH WANTS THE NEGOTIATIONS AND WANTS THEM TO START AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, WILL NOT COUNTENANCE A LANGUAGE OF THREATS AND BLACKMAIL, AND THE MANY TIMES BANKRUPT LANGUAGE "FROM POSITIONS OF STRENGTH."

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AND THOSE WHO TRY TO SPEAK THAT LANGUAGE WITH IT WILL BEAR THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE INEVITABLE FAILURE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

THE PROVOCATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THE AMERICAN NEUTRON BOMB DECISION, AIMED DIRECTLY AGAINST THE SUBSTANCE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON LIMITING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE, HAVE NOT ESCAPED THE WEST EUROPEANS. SMALL WONDER THAT MANY OF THEM ASK THEMSELVES, AS DID THE WEST GERMAN AUGSBURGER ALLGEMEINE OF 11 AUGUST 1981: "WE WONDER IF REAGAN'S DEMARCHE WASN'T CHIEFLY AIMED AT THWARTING THE EUROSTRATEGIC ARMS NEGOTIATIONS IN ORDER TO STATION PERSHING-2 AND CRUISE MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE WITHOUT HINDRANCE?" THE FRENCH LIBERATION OF 10 AUGUST 1981 HAD NO DOUBTS ON THAT SCORE, AND WROTE THAT "THE AMERICAN LEADERS... WERE IN THE ACT OF RENDERING IMPOSSIBLE THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS ENVISAGED AT THE END OF 1981. THE AGGRAVATION OF TENSION IN EUROPE WHICH WILL RESULT THEREFROM WILL GIVE THE AMERICANS A GOOD CHANCE TO DEMAND GREATER 'ATLANTIC SOLIDARITY'."

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THIS, ONE CAN ONLY MARVEL AT THE OPINION EXPRESSED BY FRG GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN LOTHAR RUHL, WHO SAID IN AN INTERVIEW ON DEUTSCHLANDFUNK IN COLOGNE ON 10 AUGUST 1981 THAT THERE WOULD BE "NO DIFFICULTIES AT THE DISARMAMENT TALKS WITH THE USSR, FOR NO CONNECTION IS TO BE SEEN BETWEEN MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN EUROPE AND THE NEUTRON WEAPON EVEN IF

SOVIET PROPAGANDA WERE TO TRY TO CONSTRUCT IT." BUT, WHATEVER RUHL MAY SAY TO THE CONTRARY, SUCH A CONNECTION WAS CONSTRUCTED, AND ABSOLUTELY CLEARLY, NOT BY "SOVIET PROPAGANDA" BUT, AS WE HAVE SHOWN, BY THE GODFATHER OF THE "NEUTRON DECISION", CASPAR WEINBERGER. SECOND, EVEN BEFORE THE SOVIET PRESS HAD TIME TO PRESENT ITS ARGUMENTS ON THE ISSUE, THE WESTERN PRESS, WESTERN  
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FOR EUR/SOV  
EXPERTS, AND WESTERN POLITICAL LEADERS HAD -- WITH  
NO PROMPTING FROM MOSCOW THAT THE MORBID IMAGINATION  
OF CERTAIN PEOPLE SEES IN ALL THINGS -- ON THEIR OWN  
ESTABLISHED THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE U.S. NEUTRON  
BOMB DECISION AND NATO'S "DOUBLE DECISION" ON AMERICAN  
MISSILES. THE NEUTRON BOMBS AND THE NEW AMERICAN  
MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES ARE WEAPONS DESIGNED FOR  
AN ATTEMPT TO START A NUCLEAR WAR AND "LIMIT" IT TO  
EUROPE, TO TURN A NUCLEAR "BATTLE" IN EUROPE FROM  
UNTHINKABLE TO THINKABLE AND POSSIBLE. BOTH THE  
NEUTRON BOMB AND THE MISSILES ARE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE  
USE OF ONE WILL, IN EFFECT AUTOMATICALLY, ENTAIL THE  
USE OF THE OTHER.

A FEW DAYS LATER, ON 17 AUGUST 1981, RUHL UNCONSCIOUSLY  
REFUTED WHAT HE HAD SAID BEFORE, DECLARING IN AN  
INTERVIEW TO ANOTHER RADIO STATION, SUDDEUTSCHER  
RUNDFUNK, THAT "THE INTRODUCTION OF NEUTRON WEAPONS  
WAS ONCE ENVISAGED AS PART OF THE OVER-ALL TECHNICAL  
MODERNISATION OF THE NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS OF THE ALLIED  
ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE". HE THEREBY ADMITTED THAT THE  
NEUTRON BOMB AND THE NEW MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES ARE  
LINKED AS COMPONENTS OF ONE AND THE SAME PROCESS OF  
"MODERNISING" (READ BUILDING UP) NATO'S NUCLEAR POTENTIAL  
IN EUROPE.

STRONG DOUBTS ARISE ABOUT U.S. INTENTIONS TO HAVE  
TRULY MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR ARMS LIMITATION  
IN EUROPE IN CONNECTION WITH THE "LINKAGE" PRINCIPLE  
DEFINED, AMONG OTHERS, BY ALEXANDER HAIG IN AN ABC  
INTERVIEW ON 18 APRIL 1981. HE SAID "LINKAGE IS THE  
BASIC CONCEPT OF HIS (REAGAN'S) ADMINISTRATION, MEANING  
THAT NEGOTIATIONS, THEIR PROGRESS, VOLUME AND LEVEL  
WILL BE DETERMINED BY THE BEHAVIOR OF THE SOVIET UNION  
ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE IN THE BROADEST SENSE OF  
THE TERM."

A FEW DAYS LATER, ON 24 APRIL, IN AN INTERVIEW TO THE  
ITALIAN LA STAMPA, HAIG AMPLIFIED: "THE PROGRESS OF ARMS  
CONTROL MUST TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE COMPORTMENT  
OF THE SOVIET UNION ON A WORLD SCALE. WHAT IS CALLED  
LINKAGE, OR CONNECTION IS AN ESSENTIAL ASPECT OF OUR  
FOREIGN POLICY."

APPLYING THIS GENERAL "PRINCIPLE" IN PRACTICE, THE UNITED  
STATES IS SAYING EVEN NOW THAT IT MAY REFUSE TO START  
THE NEGOTIATIONS OR BREAK THEM OFF IF IT FINDS SOME  
TRUE OR IMAGINED ACTION OF THE SOVIET UNION, WITH  
NO BEARING ON THE PROBLEM UNDER DISCUSSION, TO BE  
OBJECTIONABLE. MATTERS HAVE REACHED A POINT WHERE  
EVEN THE DISLOCATION OF SOVIET ARMED FORCES WITHIN THE  
SOVIET UNION MAY OBSTRUCT THE START OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.  
WEINBERGER, FOR ONE, SAID IN APRIL 1981 THAT "THE  
SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE TO REMOVE ITS MILITARY FORCES

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FROM AROUND POLAND BEFORE THERE COULD BE ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION" (THE NEW YORK TIMES, 15 APRIL 1981).

WHAT IS MORE, THE UNITED STATES HAS FOISTED THIS ABSURD CONCEPTION ON ITS NATO ALLIES. THE COMMUNIQUE OF THE NATO COUNCIL'S ROME SESSION, 4-5 MAY 1981, SAYS THE NATO COUNTRIES "WILL MAINTAIN A DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND WILL WORK TOGETHER FOR GENUINE DETENTE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS, WHENEVER SOVIET BEHAVIOUR MAKES THIS POSSIBLE."

ONE CAN HARDLY DISAGREE WITH THE OPINION SET FORTH IN THE 11 MAY 1981 ISSUE OF SPIEGEL: "THE MEETING IN ROME WAS STEP BACK FROM NATO'S DOUBLE DECISIONS OF 1979. THE UNCONDITIONAL PROPOSAL FOR DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS HAS NOW BEEN FURNISHED WITH PRELIMINARY CONDITIONS... GIVEN THESE PRELIMINARY CONDITIONS, THE AMERICANS HAVE AN ARGUMENT THEY CAN USE AT ANY MOMENT TO EVADE SERIOUS ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS." ONLY ONE SLIGHT CORRECTION IS IN ORDER: AS WE HAVE SHOWN EARLIER, THE "DOUBLE DECISION" DOES CONTAIN PRELIMINARY CONDITIONS, AND THE NATO COUNCIL'S ROME SESSION HAS MERELY ADDED TO THEIR NUMBER.

THE TACTICS OF THE U.S. PREPARATIONS FOR NEGOTIATING NUCLEAR ARMS LIMITATION IN EUROPE PERFECTLY FITS THE CONCEPT REAGAN FORMULATED IMMEDIATELY AFTER HIS ELECTION.

IN AN INTERVIEW PUBLISHED IN THE 17 NOVEMBER 1980 ISSUE OF TIME, HE SAID: "IN NEGOTIATIONS YOU ARE GOING TO HAVE TO MAKE IT PLAIN TO THE SOVIETS THAT THERE ARE SOME DISADVANTAGES FOR THEM IF THEY DO NOT GO ALONG. MAYBE THE DISADVANTAGE WOULD BE THAT YOU WOULDN'T NEGOTIATE." IN OTHER WORDS, EITHER ACCEPT OUR DEMANDS, WHICH ARE BACKED BY ARMED FORCE, OR WE WILL NOT EVEN PRETEND  
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TO PLAY AT NEGOTIATIONS, AND WILL SIMPLY REJECT THEM.  
IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE, AS WE SEE IT, IT OUGHT TO  
BE CLEAR WHY WE HAVE SERIOUS AND UNDERSTANDABLE  
MISGIVINGS ABOUT THE REASSURANCES AND PRONOUNCEMENTS,  
LIKE THE ONE MADE BY CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT IN A  
DEUTSCHLANDFUNK INTERVIEW ON 10 MARCH 1981 : "AS SOON  
AS THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT STARTS NEGOTIATING WITH  
THE SOVIET UNION," HE SAID, "IT WILL BE APPARENT THAT  
IT IS NOT NEGOTIATING TO SECURE AMERICAN SUPERIORITY  
BY CONTRACTUAL MEANS BUT TO CONSOLIDATE THE EQUILIBRIUM".

THE STATEMENTS AND ACTIONS OF THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION  
SPEAK OF THE REVERSE. THEY SHOW THAT THE ONLY SERIOUS  
INTENTION THE UNITED STATES HAS IS TO UNDERMINE THE  
NEGOTIATIONS. AND IF THE USA AND ITS ALLIES ARE  
ALLOWED TO DO SO, A VERY BLEAK FUTURE WILL LIE IN STORE  
FOR NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING A MOST CRUCIAL ISSUE OF  
EUROPEAN AND WORLD SECURITY.

AS WE SEE IT, THE UNITED STATES IS MAKING THE MOST OF  
THE AMBIGUOUS INTERPRETATIONS OF THE DOUBLE DECISION".  
ALL OF THEM SAY, FOR ONE THING, THAT THE NEW AMERICAN  
MISSILES ARE TO BE STATIONED IN WESTERN EUROPE ONLY IF  
NEGOTIATIONS FAIL (YET THE AMERICANS, AS SHOWN ABOVE,  
HOLD THAT THE MISSILES MUST BE DEPLOYED IRRESPECTIVE  
OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THEIR RESULTS). THEY MAKE NO  
MENTION AT ALL OF THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR FAILURE  
OF THE NEGOTIATIONS OR, TO BE MORE PRECISE, THEY TAKE  
IT FOR GRANTED THAT IF THE TALKS FAIL THE ONLY  
POSSIBLE CULPRIT CAN BE THE SOVIET UNION. BUT WHAT IF  
THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE TORPEDOED BY THE UNITED STATES,  
WHICH IS WHAT IT IS PREPARING TO DO? IN THAT EVENT,  
WILL FAILURE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ALSO GIVE GROUNDS  
FOR THE STATIONING OF AMERICAN MISSILES? THIS QUESTION  
IS FAR FROM AN IDLE ONE. HARTMAN  
BT

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