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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

File Folder USSR (1/18/82-1/19/82)

KDB 11/4/2015

Box Number 22

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

230

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
170252	MEMO	L. PAUL BREMER TO W. CLARK RE INTERAGENCY COORDINATION COMMITTEE ON US-SOVIET AFFAIRS (INCL. ATTACHMENT) <i>R</i> 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-12-1-9	3	1/18/1982	B1
170494	MINUTES	RE 1/7/82 ICCUSA MEETINGS <i>R</i> 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-12-2-8	4	ND	B1
170495	CABLE	MOSCOW 0628 <i>R</i> 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-12-3-7	2	1/19/1982	B1
170496	MEMO	A. LENZ TO W. CLARK RE EXPORT CONTROLS ON US SUBSIDIARIES	1	1/19/1982	B1
170497	MEMO	BREMER TO CLARK RE EXPORT CONTROLS ON U.S SUBSIDIARIES <i>R</i> 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-12-5-5	1	1/15/1982	B1
170498	MEMO	N. BAILEY TO CLARK RE EXPORT CONTROLS	1	1/18/1982	B1
170499	MEMOS	CLARK TO GEORGE BUSH, ALEXANDER HAIG ET AL. RE EXPORT CONTROLS (2 DRAFTS-NOT SENT)	2	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
170500	MEMOS	BAILEY TO CLARK RE CLARIFICATION OF SANCTIONS	2	1/15/1982	B1
170501	REPORT	RE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS (ATTACHMENT TO DOC # 170500)	4	ND	B1
170502	MEMO	L. BRADY TO J. NANCE RE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS <i>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-12-9-1</i>	1	1/12/1982	B1
170503	MEMO	DRAFT (W/EDITS) OF DOC #170496 A. LENZ TO W. CLARK RE EXPORT CONTROLS ON US SUBSIDIARIES)	1	1/19/1982	B1
170504	MEMO	ANNOTATED COPY OF DOC # 170497 (BREMER TO CLARK RE EXPORT CONTROLS ON US SUBSIDIARIES) <i>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-12-5-5</i>	1	1/15/1982	B1
170505	MEMO	ANNOTATED COPY OF DOC # 170497 (BREMER TO CLARK RE EXPORT CONTROLS ON US SUBSIDIARIES) <i>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-12-5-5</i>	1	1/15/1982	B1

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

8201105

0347

January 18, 1982

82 JAN 18 P11: 27

170252

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NLRR 748-27-12-1-9

BY KDB NARA DATE 11/4/15

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK ~~WHITE~~ -
THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

SUBJECT: Memorandum on the Interagency Coordinating Committee on U.S.-Soviet Affairs (ICCUSA)

Attached is a copy of a memorandum we are sending to members of the Interagency Coordinating Committee on U.S.-Soviet Affairs (ICCUSA) from Assistant Secretary Lawrence S. Eagleburger, in his capacity as ICCUSA Chairman, concerning U.S.-U.S.S.R. exchanges policy in light of the President's December 29 announcement of sanctions against the Soviet Union.

L. Paul Bremer, III
L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GDS/1/15/88

CVW:
0346



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

January 18, 1982

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~MEMORANDUM~~

TO: US Co-Chairmen and Executive Secretaries of
US-USSR Agreements on Cooperation in:

Agriculture	Housing
Artificial Heart	Science and Technology
Atomic Energy	Space
Energy	Transportation
Environment	World Ocean
Health	

FROM: ICCUSA - Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Chairman *LS*

SUBJECT: US-USSR Exchanges Policy

As you know, the sanctions announced by the President on December 29 include the decision not to renew US-Soviet exchange agreements coming up for renewal in the near future. These agreements are those covering space, science and technology, and energy.

The question has been raised as to how we proceed with exchange activities in light of the December 29 announcement. As was made clear at the January 7 ICCUSA meeting, it is essential that we do not go beyond or lag behind the sanctions announced by the President. These sanctions were carefully worked out to put a calculated degree of pressure on the Soviet Union and to keep further possible punitive measures in reserve.

Therefore it would be a mistake for us at this stage to begin cancelling already planned activities not affected by the President's decision or otherwise significantly cutting back on current minimal programs. For the time being we should continue to examine the advisability of each exchange activity on a case-by-case basis. The issue of whether there will be a further tightening of the screws in the exchanges field will be left to future Presidential decision.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~GDS 1/12/88~~

AMAB
Drafted: EUR/SOV: MAB ~~Boorstein~~: gh
1/12/82 Ext. 23456

AD
Clearance: EUR/SOV: E Hurwitz
EUR/SOV: RECombs *RM*
EUR: J D Scanlan
OES/SCT: S Thomsen *CA*

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
11/4/15 KDJ

RECEIVED 19 JAN 82 12

TO CLARK

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 18 JAN 82

KEYWORDS: USSR SPACE POLICY
ENERGY SCIENTIFIC
EXCHANGES

SUBJECT: ICCUSA MEMO RE US - USSR EXCHANGES POLICY

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE: STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

PIPES

STEARMAN

NAU

BERTA

COMMENTS

REF# 8201105

LOG 8200346

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

S/S 8200947

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with classified attachment

January 18 1982 P11 30

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

W. J. E.
SITE: ROOM

Attached are the minutes of the January 7, 1982 meeting of the Interagency Coordinating Committee on US-Soviet Affairs (ICCUSA).

L. Paul Bremer, III
L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
ICCUSA minutes

UNCLASSIFIED

with classified attachment

crw:
347 - 7285

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 74822-12-2-8

BY LCDB NARA DATE 1/4/85

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6

Minutes -- Jan. 7 ICCUSA

170494

Overview

Deputy Assistant Secretary Scanlan observed that it was particularly useful for ICCUSA representatives to meet at this time to discuss the sanctions recently announced by President Reagan after the imposition of martial law in Poland. He stressed that it was important not to be either behind or in front of the President on these sanctions.

Poland: Scanlan said the situation in Poland is difficult to predict and is unlikely to be clarified in the near term. Despite reports of general calm in the country, passive resistance and low worker productivity prevail. Some Solidarity members remain free while Polish authorities have acknowledged five thousand Poles have been detained; Lech Walesa remains in custody near Warsaw. Contrary to Polish claims, reliable sources indicate that no negotiations with Solidarity are underway nor does the Church feel that its talks with Polish authorities amount to negotiations. Polish authorities will try to put a better face on the situation perhaps by releasing more detainees and easing up on the more onerous aspects of martial law, but it could remain in effect for several more months, and the basic elements of the situation may well remain unchanged.

Soviet Union: There is no question of the role played by the Soviets who had long been pressuring the Poles to crack down. It was the second best and second worst solution for them: while the optimum for the Soviets would have been for the Poles to crush Solidarity politically without recourse to military force, the option selected was preferable to direct Soviet military intervention. The President's decision to impose sanctions against the USSR was based on the clear evidence of Soviet involvement in the repression in Poland. The sanctions announced December 29 include:

1. The suspension of Aeroflot services in the US.
2. The closure of the Soviet (formerly known as Kama) Purchasing Commission. Its staff has been told to leave the country by January 20. In response to a query from the FBI representative, Scanlan said that those staff members would not be allowed to adjust their status.
3. Suspension of issuance or renewal of licenses to export electronic equipment, computers and high technology to the USSR.

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GDS (1/7/88)

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4. Postponement of a start to negotiations on a new Long Term Agreement (LTA) on grain sales to the USSR. The current one year extension of the previous LTA remains in effect until September 30, 1982.

5. Suspension of negotiations on a new Maritime Agreement. The old Maritime Agreement expired December 31 and a more restrictive regime of Soviet access to US ports went into effect at that time. Scanlan noted that we are taking into consideration undue hardships to American firms caused by the imposition of tighter notification requirements and we will seek to minimize damage to American commercial interests during this transitional period.

6. Suspension of licenses required for export to the USSR of an expanded list of oil and gas equipment (including pipelayers).

7. Non-renewal of US-USSR exchange agreements which are coming up for renewal in the near future.

There had been a long list of proposed measures which had been carefully scrutinized by the President before he made his final decision on sanctions. The President's language ("suspend", "postpone") deliberately implied the reversibility of the sanctions should events in Poland warrant it. Scanlan noted the President's commitment to maintaining the US-Soviet dialogue including the arms control process (INF, START). Preparations are now underway for Secretary Haig's January 26-27 meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in which Poland will obviously figure prominently.

Allied position: Scanlan acknowledged that differences exist among the Allies about how to deal with Soviet involvement, but he felt the press had probably exaggerated them. The US was encouraged by the EC Ministers' agreement not to undercut our sanctions as well by the stronger position taken by Chancellor Schmidt after his meeting with the President. The U.S. is working on a common Alliance position towards the Soviets which Scanlan expected would be adopted by the NATO Foreign Ministers when they meet in Brussels on January 11.

Exchanges: Turning to exchanges, Scanlan reiterated that it is essential for all agencies to be neither behind nor ahead of the exchange related steps selected by the White House. The sanctions were carefully calibrated to put a measured degree of pressure on the Soviets and to keep some punitive measures in reserve. Activities should be examined on a case-by-case basis. We would be prepared to cut out some activities which

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appear contrary to the spirit of the sanctions, such as the computer-related exchanges under the Science and Technology agreement. Scanlan informed representatives that they would shortly receive guidelines for a new review of exchange agreements. This is a useful exercise in its own right; we might want to cut those areas where the balance of benefits is unfavorable whether or not international concerns so dictated. On the other side of the coin, such a review could yield convincing arguments to continue an agreement or activities. In this connection, Scanlan confirmed that this review would include those agreements which are not to be renewed under the Dec. 29 sanctions. There is no general policy obstacle to continuation of activities under those agreements until they actually lapse next summer.

Various agencies expressed appreciation for Scanlan's clarification. The DOE representative noted that his agency would now reconsider an earlier DOE memo which had mandated immediate cessation of all activities with the Soviets. Several representatives said that a State Department memo to agency heads embodying Scanlan's clarification on exchanges policy would be very useful, particularly in view of intense budget pressures. The OSTP representative felt that such a memo might be viewed as undercutting the President's sanctions; the NSF representative pointed out that any possible further steps to reduce exchanges could be carried out by simply reprogramming allocated funds whereas it would be difficult to restore funds which might be slashed merely in anticipation of hypothetical moves. Scanlan promised that we would follow up on the possibility of a State memo.

Hurwitz (State, EUR/SOV) urged all representatives to use caution with their Soviet contacts on the question of exchanges; the best tack is simply to refer them to the President's statement.

The USDA representative asked whether the USG would attempt to curtail privately-sponsored US exchanges with the USSR. Scanlan replied that while officially the US could neither encourage nor discourage such exchanges, depending on the circumstances, we could jawbone private sponsors.

The Interior representative raised the longstanding agreement the US Bureau of Mines had with its Polish counterpart and asked whether this cooperation could continue. Noting that he was not familiar with the details of this arrangement, Scanlan asked that Interior discuss the case later with State officials. He noted, however, that the US had no desire to sever the contacts and relationships the US had developed with Polish institutions and individuals.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Contacts: Scanlan reiterated guidance on USG officials' contacts with Soviet officials: No purely social contacts, working level officials may continue contacts as necessary, officials should report prior to planned meetings to the State Department's Office of Soviet Affairs (Bilateral Section). Adherence to this procedure is necessary so that the USG can monitor reciprocal access.

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11/4/15 LEND

RECEIVED 19 JAN 82 12

TO CLARK

FROM BREMER

DOC DATE 18 JAN 82

KEYWORDS: USSR POLAND
EAST WEST ECONOMICS MARITIME
INF NATO

SUBJECT: MINUTES OF ICCUSA 7 JAN MTG ON US - SOVIET AFFAIRS

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE: STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

PIPES *Kraemer*
STEARMAN *Shoemaker*
LENZ *Bentschler*
BAILEY
GUHIN

COMMENTS

REF# 8200947 LOG 8107289 8200347 NSCIFID (H / H)

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170495

PAGE 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 0628
SIT681 DATE 01/20/82

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WHSR COMMENT: PLEASE ADVISE AS TO FURTHER DISSEM

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

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DE RUEHMO #0628 0191005
O 191003Z JAN 82 ZFF-6
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

NLRR 748-22-12-3-7

BY LCDB NARA DATE 11/4/15

TO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0856
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ MOSCOW 00628
WHITE HOUSE EYES ONLY FOR NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER
FROM HARTMAN
DEPARTMENT EYES ONLY FOR SECRETARY
E. O. 12065: RDS-3 1/19/02 (HARTMAN, ARTHUR A) OR-M
TAGS: US, UR
SUBJECT: THE PENTECOSTAL ISSUE
REF: MOSCOW 534

1. ~~(ENTIRE TEXT)~~.

2. I AM SORRY TO TROUBLE YOU WITH THIS PROBLEM SO EARLY IN YOUR TENURE, BUT I'M AFRAID POINTS OF PRINCIPLE INVOLVING MY MISSION ARE INVOLVED.

3. WHEN MY DEPUTY (RETEL) DELIVERED TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO BREZHNEV ON THE PENTECOSTALS -- A LETTER, INCIDENTALLY, WHICH STRUCK JUST THE RIGHT NOTE -- THE SOVIET OFFICIAL RESPONDED THAT THERE HAD ALREADY BEEN AN EARLIER MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO BREZHNEV ON THE SUBJECT AND THAT BREZHNEV HAD RESPONDED WITH THE SOVIET UNION'S "PRINCIPLED POSITION." THE SOVIET

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

OFFICIAL PRESSED MY DEPUTY AS TO WHETHER HE KNEW OF SUCH AN EXCHANGE; SINCE NEITHER I NOR ANY OF MY STAFF WERE AWARE OF ANY PREVIOUS SUMMIT EXCHANGE ON THIS, MY DEPUTY WAS FORCED TO SAY THAT HE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF IT.

4. THE ISSUE IS THIS. IF THERE WAS NO PREVIOUS EXCHANGE, I NEED TO KNOW ABOUT IT RIGHT AWAY SO WE CAN TELL THE FOREIGN MINISTRY THAT THEY ARE TALKING THROUGH THEIR HAT. IF, HOWEVER, THERE WAS INDEED A PREVIOUS EXCHANGE -- ABOUT WHICH I HAVE BEEN KEPT IGNORANT -- THEN THE MATTER IS MUCH MORE SERIOUS. ON AN ISSUE ON WHICH I AM PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE HEALTH AND EVEN THE LIVES OF THE SEVEN PEOPLE WHO HAVE TAKEN

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

2

PAGE 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 0628

DTG: 191003Z JAN 82 PSN: 036990

REFUGE IN MY EMBASSY, I MUST INSIST ON BEING INFORMED OF EVERY BILATERAL COMMUNICATION; IF I AM NOT, MY CREDIBILITY AS AN INTERLOCUTOR CAN ONLY BE DAMAGED. BEYOND THIS, THERE IS AN IMPORTANT POINT OF PRINCIPLE HERE. I DO NOT BELIEVE I CAN DO THE JOB I WAS SENT OUT HERE TO DO UNLESS I AM PRIVY TO EVERY COMMUNICATION -- NO MATTER WHAT THE SUBJECT -- BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT.

5. ON THE SPECIFIC CASE, I WOULD APPRECIATE A REPLY BEFORE MY LUNCH WITH DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KORNIYENKO TOMORROW (WEDNESDAY).
HARTMAN

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170496	MEMO A. LENZ TO W. CLARK RE EXPORT CONTROLS ON US SUBSIDIARIES	1	1/19/1982	B1

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

January 15, 1982

Subject: Export Controls on US Subsidiaries

The new export controls on oil and gas equipment for the USSR published December 30 do not cover products of US foreign subsidiaries, where those products contain no US-origin parts. US regulations could be amended to define subsidiaries as US persons, and so catch these products, but there are good reasons for not taking such a step at this time.

Foreign countries resent and resist US assertions of extra-territorial authority. Several, including Britain, France, Australia and Canada, have passed laws to impede or prevent US subsidiaries in their territories from cooperating with US measures. The US assertion of control over foreign subsidiaries now will provoke a diplomatic row that will interfere with, and perhaps upset, our efforts to win Allied support for economic sanctions. Such action without prior consultations with our Allies would be inconsistent with the NATO declaration and could compromise the success which the Secretary achieved on Monday in securing Allied support for the NATO declaration.

We have an intensive program of consultations on the whole set of Polish issues underway -- a meeting of Polish creditors January 14, a high-level COCOM meeting January 19-20, a North Atlantic Council (NATO) meeting with senior officials on January 21. In addition, we are continuing our bilateral consultations, including a January 14 meeting between Ambassador Burns and Chancellor Schmidt. In these meetings, we continue to make clear, as we did in meetings with senior economic officials of Germany, Britain, France, Italy, and the European Commission, that we do not want European firms to undercut our sanctions by selling compressors or turbines to the USSR.

We are aware of one company, Dresser Industries, whose foreign subsidiary (in France) is contemplating a sale of gas compressors to the Soviet Union. We understand that Dresser (France) has a signed contract. Under French law, this means that Dresser (France) could not renege on its contract without some intervening action by the French government.

L. Paul Bremer, III
L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

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NLRR 748-22-12-5-5

BY KDB NARA DATE 11/4/05

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE

17A

Package # 0228

82 15 P 4: 04

	<u>TO</u>	<u>SEEN</u>
JANET COLSON	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
BUD NANCE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
JOHN POINDEXTER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
JACQUE HILL	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
JUDGE CLARK	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
JANET COLSON	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

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CY TO MEESE	<input type="checkbox"/>	SHOW CC	<input type="checkbox"/>
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CY TO DEAYER	<input type="checkbox"/>	SHOW CC	<input type="checkbox"/>
OTHER	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>

COMMENTS

Bill - Strongly concur with Norm Bailey. We have to cut off the subsidiaries or the entire exercise is meaningless.
Bud

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Soviet Involvement in Poland

Statement on U.S. Measures Taken Against the Soviet Union. December 29, 1981

The Soviet Union bears a heavy and direct responsibility for the repression in Poland. For many months the Soviets publicly and privately demanded such a crack-down. They brought major pressures to bear through now public letters to the Polish leadership, military maneuvers, and other forms of intimidation. They now openly endorse the suppression which has ensued.

Last week I announced that I had sent a letter to President Brezhnev urging him to permit the restoration of basic human rights in Poland as provided for in the Helsinki Final Act. I also informed him that, if the repression continued, the United States would have no choice but to take further concrete political and economic measures affecting our relationship.

The repression in Poland continues, and President Brezhnev has responded in a manner which makes it clear the Soviet Union does not understand the seriousness of our concern, and its obligations under both the Helsinki Final Act and the U.N. Charter. I have, therefore, decided to take

1429

the following immediate measures with regard to the Soviet Union:

- All Aeroflot service to the United States will be suspended.
- The Soviet Purchasing Commission is being closed.
- The issuance or renewal of licenses for the export to the U.S.S.R. of electronic equipment, computers and other high-technology materials is being suspended.
- Negotiations on a new long-term grains agreement are being postponed.
- Negotiations on a new U.S.-Soviet Maritime Agreement are being suspended, and a new regime of port-access controls will be put into effect for all Soviet ships when the current agreement expires on December 31.
- Licenses will be required for export to the Soviet Union for an expanded list of oil and gas equipment. Issuance of such licenses will be suspended. This includes pipelayers.
- U.S.-Soviet exchange agreements coming up for renewal in the near future, including the agreements on energy and science and technology, will not be renewed. There will be a complete review of all other U.S.-Soviet exchange agreements.

The United States wants a constructive and mutually beneficial relationship with the Soviet Union. We intend to maintain a high-level dialog. But we are prepared to proceed in whatever direction the Soviet Union decides upon -towards greater mutual restraint and cooperation, or further down a harsh and less rewarding path. We will watch events in Poland closely in coming days and weeks. Further steps may be necessary, and I will be prepared to take them. American decisions will be determined by Soviet actions.

Secretary Haig has been in communication with our friends and allies about the measures we are taking and explained why we believe such steps are essential at this time.

Once again I call upon the Soviet Union to recognize the clear desire of the overwhelming majority of the Polish people for a process of national reconciliation, renewal, and reform.

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Withdrawer

KDB 11/4/2015

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USSR (1/18/82-1/19/82)

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

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22

230

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
170501	REPORT RE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS (ATTACHMENT TO DOC # 170500	4	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.



JAN 12 1982

~~SECRET~~

James Brady

170502

we

MEMORANDUM FOR: James W. Nance
Deputy to the Assistant
to the President for National Security

FROM: Lawrence J. Brady
Assistant Secretary
for Trade Administration

SUBJECT: Economic Sanctions (Export Controls)
Applying to the USSR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-27-12-9-

BY 6107 NARA DATE 4/8/13

As the attached memorandum to me indicates, there is disagreement on the scope of the President's decision to expand the oil and gas controls on exports to the Soviet Union. This was clear at the Commerce meeting last week referred to in the attached memorandum. This memorandum sets out the two issues on extraterritorial application of the controls -- the application of controls to U.S. foreign subsidiaries and application of controls to foreign firms producing products from licensed U.S. technology.

In order to carry out the President's decision fully, we request written clarification from the NSC.

Attachment: Denysyk/Brady Memorandum, January 11, 1982

Deriv. Classified By Bo Denysyk/DAS/EA
 Source(s) Commerce Dept., DAS/EA
 Declassify On 1/12/88

~~SECRET~~



1972
Mar 20/72

Whom
Barker gets
a copy of memo
to my memo

Dear

02/10
(continued)
02/08

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

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USSR (1/18/82-1/19/82)

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22

230

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
170503	MEMO DRAFT (W/EDITS) OF DOC #170496 A. LENZ TO W. CLARK RE EXPORT CONTROLS ON US SUBSIDIARIES)	1	1/19/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

11/4/85 GDB

RECEIVED 15 JAN 82 17

2B

Rentschler

TO CLARK

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 15 JAN 82

KEYWORDS: EXPORT CONTROLS

OIL

GAS

COCOM

NATO

USSR

SUBJECT: EXPORT CONTROLS ON US SUBSIDIARIES

Economic

But what if it is U.S. technology?

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 20 JAN 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

LENZ

WEISS

FEITH

BAILEY

NAU

BERTA

RENTSCHLER

PIPES

STEARMAN

COMMENTS

Altho. believe we must be very rigorous on the question of subsidiaries. The office need to be told that we won't accept end-runs of this kind. J

REF# 8200827

LOG

NSCIFID

(L /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

170504

January 15, 1982

Subject: Export Controls on US Subsidiaries

The new export controls on oil and gas equipment for the USSR published December 30 do not cover products of US foreign subsidiaries, where those products contain no US-origin parts. US regulations could be amended to define subsidiaries as US persons, and so catch these products, but there are good reasons for not taking such a step at this time.

Foreign countries resent and resist US assertions of extra-territorial authority. Several, including Britain, France, Australia and Canada, have passed laws to impede or prevent US subsidiaries in their territories from cooperating with US measures. The US assertion of control over foreign subsidiaries now will provoke a diplomatic row that will interfere with, and perhaps upset, our efforts to win Allied support for economic sanctions. Such action without prior consultations with our Allies would be inconsistent with the NATO declaration and could compromise the success which the Secretary achieved on Monday in securing Allied support for the NATO declaration.

We have an intensive program of consultations on the whole set of Polish issues underway -- a meeting of Polish creditors January 14, a high-level COCOM meeting January 19-20, a North Atlantic Council (NATO) meeting with senior officials on January 21. In addition, we are continuing our bilateral consultations, including a January 14 meeting between Ambassador Burns and Chancellor Schmidt. In these meetings, we continue to make clear, as we did in meetings with senior economic officials of Germany, Britain, France, Italy, and the European Commission, that we do not want European firms to undercut our sanctions by selling compressors or turbines to the USSR.

We are aware of one company, Dresser Industries, whose foreign subsidiary (in France) is contemplating a sale of gas compressors to the Soviet Union. We understand that Dresser (France) has a signed contract. Under French law, this means that Dresser (France) could not renege on its contract without some intervening action by the French government.

L. Paul Bremer, III
L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 78-22-11-5-J
BY 603 NARA DATE 1/11/81

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

RECEIVED 15 JAN 82 17

30

TO CLARK

FROM BREMER

DOC DATE 15 JAN 82

Len

NAU

KEYWORDS: EXPORT CONTROLS

OIL

Economic

GAS

COCOM

NATO

USSR

SUBJECT: EXPORT CONTROLS ON US SUBSIDIARIES

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 20 JAN 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

LENZ

WEISS

FEITH

BAILEY

NAU

BERTA

RENTSCHLER

PIPES

-no comment (per Dobranjy)

STEARMAN

COMMENTS

Allen, I agree with State if the Dresser ex. they give involved no US-orig in goods. But they don't make head clear. H/N

REF# 8200827

LOG

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ASSIGNED

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DUE

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W/ATTCH FILE

(C)



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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THE WHITE HOUSE

January 15, 1982

170505

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with no US-origin parts?

L. Paul Bremer, III
L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 748-22-12-55
BY COB NARA DATE 11/14/05

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE

Package # 6728

32

82 10 P. 7: 22

	<u>TO</u>	<u>SEEN</u>
JANET COLSON	<u>✓</u>	<u>JA</u>
BUD NANCE	<u>✓</u>	<u>Bud</u>
JOHN POINDEXTER	<u>_____</u>	<u>_____</u>
JACQUE HILL	<u>_____</u>	<u>_____</u>
JUDGE CLARK	<u>✓</u>	<u>✓</u>
JANET COLSON	<u>✓</u>	<u>_____</u>

DISTRIBUTION

CY TO VP	<u>_____</u>	SHOW CC	<u>_____</u>
CY TO MEESE	<u>_____</u>	SHOW CC	<u>_____</u>
CY TO BAKER	<u>_____</u>	SHOW CC	<u>_____</u>
CY TO DEEVER	<u>_____</u>	SHOW CC	<u>_____</u>

COMMENTS

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
11/15/82 GDB

RECEIVED 15 JAN 82 16

TO CLARK

FROM BAILEY

DOC DATE 15 JAN 82

KEYWORDS: POLAND

USSR

ECONOMICS

SUBJECT: RPT OF MONITORING GRP ON POLISH / SOVIET SANCTIONS MTG ON 13 JAN

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE:

STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

PIPES

STEARMAN

WEISS

COMMENTS

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<i>RB</i>	<i>1/18</i>	<i>WPC apud Reconn #1</i>		
<i>S</i>	<i>1/18</i>	<i>Memor for Clark</i>	<i>1/19</i>	<i>RP, ST, Gw</i>
<i>C</i>	<i>1/19</i>	<i>see 0240 for action file</i>		
		<i>(incorporated into log 0240)</i>		
		<i>peg per log</i>		

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

DY (6) *dom*

National Security Council
The White House

34

LD

Package # 0240

82 1 N 27 P 3: 22

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>8/1/27</u>	
Bud McFarlane			
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark			
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary	<u>2</u>		
Sit Room			
I-Information			
A-Action			

OBE

DISTRIBUTION

CY To VP		Show CC	
CY To Meese		Show CC	
CY To Baker		Show CC	
CY To Deaver		Show CC	
Other	_____		

COMMENTS

POLAND SANCTIONS
DECISION

1/27 This package is according to Bailey. OBE Jhb

RECEIVED 15 JAN 82 17

1/4/82 (COT)

TO CLARK

FROM BREMER

DOC DATE 15 JAN 82

KEYWORDS: EXPORT CONTROLS

OIL

Economic

GAS

COCOM

NATO

USSR

SUBJECT: EXPORT CONTROLS ON US SUBSIDIARIES

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 20 JAN 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

LENZ

WEISS

FEITH

BAILEY

NAU

BERTA

RENTSCHLER

PIPES

STEARMAN

COMMENTS

REF# 8200827

LOG

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	2 1/19	processed by 0228		NB, ST, RP, GW
Clark	X 1/19	forwarded		
Wheeler	1/23	Noted by Clark, w/ comment		
Wheeler	S 1/23	further action	1/27	
Baker	S 1/25	Appropriate action		

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	C 1/28	QBT per Bailey		NB, ST, RP, GW

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

FILE

PA

(C)

not