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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

**Withdrawer**

KDB 11/3/2015

**File Folder** USSR (12/24/81-12/26/81)

**FOIA**

F03-002/5

**Box Number** 22

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225

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
170247	CABLE	STATE 339490 <b>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-7-1-5</b>	3	12/24/1981	B1
170441	MEMO	J.NANCE TO L. PAUL BREMER RE EXTENSION OF US-USSR AGREEMENT <b>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-7-2-4</b>	1	12/24/1981	B1
170443	MEMO	P. DOBRIANSKY TO J. NANCE RE EXTENSION OF US-USSR AGREEMENT <b>R 11/3/2015 CREST NLR-748-22-7-2-4</b>	1	12/22/1981	B1
170444	MEMO	J. NANCE TO REAGAN RE EXTENSION OF US-USSR AGREEMENT (NOT SENT)	1	ND	B1
170446	MEMO	L. PAUL BREMER TO NANCE RE EXTENSION OF US-USSR AGREEMENT <b>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-7-4-2</b>	2	12/12/1981	B1
170449	MEMO	NANCE TO BREMER RE EXTENSION OF US-USSR AGREEMENT (NOT SENT) <b>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-7-5-1</b>	1	ND	B1
170450	REPORT	RE EUR/IG REPORT EXTENSION OF US- USSR AGREEMENT IN ARTIFICIAL HEART RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT <b>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-7-6-0</b>	3	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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225

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
170453	MEMO	J. NANCE TO REAGAN RE LETTER FROM BREZHNEV <i>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-7-7-9</i>	5	12/25/1981	B1
170454	CABLE	250640Z DEC 79 (SIC) <i>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-7-8-8</i>	5	12/25/1981	B1
170455	MEMO	L. PAUL BREMER TO J. NANCE RE PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT <i>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-7-9-7</i>	1	12/25/1981	B1
170456	MEMO	SEC. HAIG TO REAGAN RE RECOMMENDED NEXT STEPS TOWARD USSR (W/ADDED NOTE AND ATTACHMENT) <i>R 4/8/2013 CREST NLR-748-22-7-10-5</i>	6	12/26/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

1  
170247

PAGE 01 OF 03 SECSTATE WASHDC 9490  
SIT478 DATE 12/30/81

DTG: 240223Z DEC 81 PSN: 006015  
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MESSAGE:

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TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW NIACT IMMEDIATE 0000

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FOR AMBASSADOR ONLY - LONDON FOR EAGLEBURGER ONLY  
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 12/23/01 (BREMER, L. PAUL, III)  
TAGS: PEPR, PPDC, UR, US, PL

SUBJECT: LETTER TO BREZHNEV ON POLAND

1. ~~5~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. PARA 3 CONTAINS TEXT OF LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO SOVIET PRESIDENT BREZHNEV ON THE SITUATION IN POLAND AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR US-SOVIET RELATIONS. THE LETTER WAS TRANSMITTED DIRECTLY TO MOSCOW BY THE WHITE HOUSE VIA MOLINE

3. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE RECENT EVENTS IN POLAND HAVE FILLED THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES AND ME WITH DISMAY. SINCE THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW ON DECEMBER 13, THE MOST ELEMENTARY RIGHTS OF THE POLISH PEOPLE HAVE BEEN VIOLATED DAILY: MASSIVE ARRESTS WITHOUT ANY LEGAL PROCEDURES; INCARCERATIONS OF TRADE UNION LEADERS AND INTELLECTUALS IN OVERCROWDED JAILS AND FREEZING DETENTION CAMPS; SUSPENSION OF ALL RIGHTS OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION; AND, LAST BUT NOT LEAST, BRUTAL ASSAULTS BY SECURITY FORCES ON CITIZENS.

THE RECENT EVENTS IN POLAND CLEARLY ARE NOT AN "INTERNAL MATTER" AND IN WRITING TO YOU, AS THE HEAD OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, I AM NOT MISADDRESSING MY COMMUNICATION. YOUR COUNTRY HAS REPEATEDLY INTERVENED

**DECLASSIFIED**  
NLRR 748-22-7-1-5  
BY ICDB NARA DATE 11/3/05

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03 SECSTATE WASHDC 9490

DTG: 240223Z DEC 81 PSN: 006015

IN POLISH AFFAIRS DURING THE MONTHS PRECEDING THE RECENT TRAGIC EVENTS. NO CLEARER PROOF OF SUCH INTERVENTION IS NEEDED THAN THE LETTER OF JUNE 5, 1981, FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU TO THE POLISH LEADERSHIP WHICH WARNED THE POLES THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD NOT TOLERATE DEVELOPMENTS THERE. THERE WERE NUMEROUS OTHER COMMUNICATIONS OF THIS NATURE WHICH PLACED PRESSURE ON THE POLISH GOVERNMENT AND DEPICTED THE REFORM MOVEMENT AS A THREAT TO THE "VITAL INTERESTS" OF ALL SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. THESE COMMUNICATIONS, ACCOMPANIED BY A STEADY BARRAGE OF MEDIA ASSAULTS AS WELL AS MILITARY EXERCISES ALONG POLAND'S BORDERS, WERE COUPLED WITH WARNINGS OF INTERVENTION UNLESS THE POLISH GOVERNMENT SHARPLY RESTRICTED THE LIBERTIES AND RIGHTS WHICH IT WAS GRANTING ITS CITIZENS.

. ALL THESE ACTIONS REPRESENTED A CLEAR VIOLATION OF MANY INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS TO WHICH THE SOVIET UNION IS A SIGNATORY. LET ME ONLY MENTION ONE PROVISION OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT WHICH YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, PERSONALLY INITIALED ON BEHALF OF YOUR COUNTRY IN 1975. THERE YOU HAVE AGREED WITH OTHER COUNTRIES TO REFRAIN "FROM ANY INTERVENTION, DIRECT OR INDIRECT, INDIVIDUAL OR COLLECTIVE, IN THE INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS FALLING WITHIN THE DOMESTIC JURISDICTION OF ANOTHER PARTICIPATING STATE, REGARDLESS OF THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS."

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

. OUR TWO COUNTRIES HAVE HAD MOMENTS OF ACCORD AND MOMENTS OF DISAGREEMENT, BUT SINCE AFGHANISTAN NOTHING HAS SO OUTRAGED OUR PUBLIC OPINION AS THE PRESSURES AND THREATS WHICH YOUR GOVERNMENT HAS EXERTED ON POLAND TO STIFLE THE STIRRINGS OF FREEDOM.

. ATTEMPTS TO SUPPRESS THE POLISH PEOPLE -- EITHER BY THE POLISH ARMY AND POLICE ACTING UNDER SOVIET PRESSURE, OR THROUGH EVEN MORE DIRECT USE OF SOVIET MILITARY FORCE -- CERTAINLY WILL NOT BRING ABOUT LONG-TERM STABILITY IN POLAND AND COULD UNLEASH A PROCESS WHICH NEITHER YOU NOR WE COULD FULLY CONTROL.

. THE ONLY SENSIBLE SOLUTION IS TO ALLOW THE POLISH GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE TO BEGIN A PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION, AND TO DO SO NOW, BEFORE THE SITUATION DETERIORATES FURTHER. THIS CANNOT BE DONE IN THE PRESENT ATMOSPHERE OF POLITICAL TERROR, MASS ARRESTS AND BLOODSHED. REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SPIRITUAL, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL FORCES IN POLAND NEED TO BE PROMPTLY RELEASED FROM DETENTION AND A NEW NATIONAL DIALOGUE INITIATED. THIS IS AS ESSENTIAL TO SOLVING POLAND'S MAJOR ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AS IT IS TO HEALING ITS POLITICAL WOUNDS. IT IS THE SOLE PATH TO LONG-TERM STABILITY IN POLAND AND THEREFORE IN EUROPE AS A WHOLE.

. THE SOVIET UNION CAN EITHER ACKNOWLEDGE THE NEED FOR THIS PROCESS OR CONTINUE TO PREVENT IT. THE CONSEQUENCES OF EACH OF THESE COURSES FOR OUR RELATIONSHIP SHOULD BE CLEAR.

. OVER THE COURSE OF 1981 WE HAVE BEGUN TO DEVELOP A FRAMEWORK TO GUIDE OUR RELATIONS IN THE YEARS TO COME. IN SECRETARY HAIG'S LAST MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO AND IN MY LAST LETTER TO YOU, WE SET FORTH A CONCRETE AGENDA FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON CRITICAL REGIONAL AND ARMS CONTROL ISSUES. IT HAS BEEN OUR HOPE AND

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 03 OF 03 SECSTATE WASHDC 9490

DTG: 240223Z DEC 81 PSN: 006015

INTENTION TO PROCEED IN 1982 TO TRY TO ACHIEVE SPECIFIC  
PROGRESS ON EACH ITEM ON THIS AGENDA.

. THE SOVIET UNION MUST DECIDE WHETHER WE CAN MOVE  
AHEAD WITH THIS AGENDA, OR WHETHER WE WILL TRAVEL A  
DIFFERENT PATH. THE HEAVY RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SOVIET

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

UNION FOR THE PRESENT REPRESSION IN POLAND THREATENS TO  
UNDERMINE THE BASIS FOR AN IMPROVEMENT IN OUR

RELATIONSHIP. WE RECOGNIZE THE INTEREST OF THE SOVIET  
UNION IN A STABLE POLAND. BUT A PROCESS OF  
RECONCILIATION AND MODERATE REFORM IN POLAND  
REPRESENTS NO THREAT TO THE SOVIET UNION. THE UNITED  
STATES CANNOT ACCEPT SUPPRESSION OF THE POLISH PEOPLES  
LEGITIMATE DESIRE FOR SUCH A PROCESS OF RENEWAL,  
PARTICULARLY WHEN IT IS IMPOSED UNDER EXTERNAL  
PRESSURE. SHOULD THE SOVIET UNION PERSIST IN AIDING  
THE COURSE OF CONTINUED SUPPRESSION IN POLAND, THE  
UNITED STATES WILL HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO TAKE CONCRETE  
MEASURES AFFECTING THE FULL RANGE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP.

. SOVIET ACTIONS IN THE DAYS AND WEEKS AHEAD WILL  
DETERMINE OUR DECISIONS. AS LEADERS OF TWO GREAT AND  
POWERFUL NATIONS, WE BEAR A MUTUAL OBLIGATION TO  
DEMONSTRATE WISDOM, MODERATION AND RESTRAINT. LET ME  
ASSURE YOU THAT I AM PREPARED TO JOIN IN THE PROCESS OF  
HELPING TO HEAL POLAND'S WOUNDS AND TO MEET ITS REAL  
NEEDS IF YOU ARE PREPARED TO RECIPROCATE. I CALL UPON  
YOU TO MAKE CLEAR THAT YOU UNDERSTAND THE NEED FOR  
NATIONAL RECONCILIATION IN POLAND. THE ALTERNATIVE IS  
NOT IN THE INTEREST OF ANYONE.

. I HOPE TO HEAR FROM YOU IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

. SINCERELY,  
. RONALD REAGAN

END TEXT. HAIG

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DTG: 240223Z DEC 81 PSN: 006015

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

170441

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
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NLRR 748-22-7-2-4

December 24, 1981

BY (LTD) NARA DATE 11/3/05MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER, III  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY  
DEPARTMENT OF STATESUBJECT: Extension of US-USSR Agreement in the Field  
of Artificial Heart Research and Development

We concur with the State Department's position on subject issue: We should take no action at this time thus permitting an automatic extension of the Artificial Heart Agreement for a five-year period.

James W. Nance  
Acting Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on December 23, 1987

John - I agree

RECEIVED

81 DEC 23 P 7: 03

SIGNED

JANET COLSON	_____	<i>Bud,</i> I don't think we can do what Paula recommends. We can always abrogate the agreement. It should be on our list for future action. To do it now would be wrong signal.	
BUD NANCE	_____		
DICK ALLEN	_____		
IRENE DERUS	_____		
JANET COLSON	_____		
BUD NANCE	_____		
PETER	_____		
CY TO VP	_____		SHOW CC _____
CY TO MEESE	_____		SHOW CC _____
CY TO BAKER	_____		SHOW CC _____
CY TO DEAVER	_____	SHOW CC _____	
CY TO BRADY	_____	SHOW CC _____	

Comments:

*If you agree, I'll change  
 Tab II.*  
*John*



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

December 22, 1981

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES W. NANCE

NLRR 748-22-7-2-4  
BY COB NARA DATE 4/3/85

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY *PD*

SUBJECT: Termination of U.S.-USSR Agreement in Field of Artificial Heart Research and Development

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President requesting his authority to terminate the U.S.-USSR Agreement in the field of artificial heart research and development. At Tab II is a memorandum to Jerry Bremer notifying him of the President's decision. Both memoranda are self-explanatory. *(c)*

*RP* Richard Pipes and William Stearman concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I and upon his approval the memorandum to Jerry Bremer at Tab II.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove ✓

*New memo prepared.*  
**SIGNED**  
*RP*

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A State's memorandum of December 12, 1981.
- Tab II Memorandum from you to Jerry Bremer terminating the subject agreement

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
Review December 22, 1987.

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170444	MEMO  J. NANCE TO REAGAN RE EXTENSION OF US- USSR AGREEMENT (NOT SENT)	1	ND	B1

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

December 12, 1981

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170446

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NLRR 748 27-7-4-2

BY 1603 NARA DATE 11/3/15

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JAMES W. NANCE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Extension of US-USSR Agreement in the Field  
of Artificial Heart Research and Development

The US-USSR Agreement in the field of Artificial Heart Research and Development will be automatically extended for five years on June 28, 1982, provided neither side takes action to terminate it six months prior to that date (December 28, 1981).

As the attached report indicates, the lead agency, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) believes that the Agreement has resulted in concrete benefits to the U.S. and that while it is operating at a reduced level of activity, it should be extended.

The Committee on Exchanges (COMEX) concluded that activities under the Agreement have resulted in benefits to the U.S. and concurs with the DHHS recommendation that the Agreement be renewed.

The lead agency report has also been reviewed by members of the Interagency Coordinating Committee on U.S.-Soviet Affairs (ICCUSA). All either concurred in the recommendation that the Agreement be renewed or offered no comment.

The Department of State favors permitting the automatic extension to take place. Although we have substantially cut back on exchange activities in the wake of the Afghanistan invasion, we have tried to leave the structure of cooperation intact. We are continuing with certain routine exchanges which are of benefit to us. We feel this approach gives us the flexibility to adjust the tightening or relaxing of our

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exchanges policy to future shifts in the political situation. Consistent with this approach, we permitted the automatic extension in May, 1980, of the Transportation Agreement, and in November, 1981, of the Environmental Protection and Health Agreements. We also recommended in a recent memorandum to the NSC that the Oceans Agreement be renewed through an exchange of notes for a three year period, effective December 15, 1981.

The Soviets, for their part, have informally expressed their willingness to continue cooperative activity under this Agreement.

Permitting the automatic extension of the Artificial Heart Agreement for a five year period does not require our formally notifying the Soviets. Extension of the Agreement for a lesser period or amending the basic agreement in any way would require us to open negotiations with the Soviets - a step we would prefer to avoid at the present time.

*Roche me Shely for*

L. Paul Bremer, III  
Executive Secretary

Attachments:  
As stated.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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NLRR 748-22-7-5-1

BY LCJ NARA DATE 11/3/15

170335

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER, III  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Termination of U.S.-USSR Agreement in the  
Field of Artificial Heart Research and  
Development

The President has authorized me to inform you of his decision that in view of developments in Poland the U.S.-USSR Agreement in the field of Artificial Heart Research and Development be allowed to expire and that the necessary steps be taken to advise the Soviet Union prior to December 28, 1981. This was the date specified in your memorandum of December 12, which states that this agreement "will be automatically extended for five years on June 28, 1982, provided neither side takes action to terminate it six months prior to that date". (C)

James W. Nance  
Acting Assistant to the  
President for National  
Security Affairs

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Review December 22, 1987.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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170450

NLRR (est) NR 748-707-6-0  
BY CW NARA DATE 4/9/13

EUR/IG REPORT ON THE EXTENSION OF THE  
US-USSR AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION IN  
THE FIELD OF ARTIFICIAL HEART  
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

The US-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Artificial Heart Research and Development will be extended by its terms on June 28, 1982 unless either party gives notice of termination no less than six months prior to this date (no later than December 28, 1981).

The Artificial Heart Agreement was signed in Moscow on June 28, 1974 by Secretary of State Kissinger and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko during the Nixon-Brezhnev Summit. It is one of eleven such agreements concluded at three summits in 1972, 1973, and 1974. Of the others, six have already been renewed for additional five year periods, two were extended for reduced periods, one is pending approval for an extension for a reduced period (Oceans Agreement) and one was initially signed for a ten year term. None, therefore, has been terminated up to the present.

The Artificial Heart Agreement was last extended in 1977. Since then, while US-Soviet relations have cooled, the level of activity under the Artificial Heart Agreement has not declined significantly, largely in view of the humanitarian aspect of this exchange. Overall, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) believes there has been reciprocal benefit to both sides.

The Department of Health and Human Services is the lead agency for the Agreement. Under DHHS, the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute participates in Agreement activities. On the Soviet Side, the Ministry of Health coordinates Soviet involvement, with the participation of the Soviet Academy of Medical Sciences and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Attached is a DHHS report which provides a description of progress and benefit in those areas. Forms of cooperation range from exchanges of delegations or information to extensive joint research endeavors of continuing mutual benefit.

Soviet interest in science and technology developments in the field of artificial heart research and development

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specifically and the field of cardiovascular research generally is quite high. The Artificial Heart Agreement does facilitate their access. Overall, however, DHHS believes benefits are about equal. Technology transfer is carefully monitored by the U.S. side, and the technology involved is of a generally open nature.

SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS AND AGENCY RECOMMENDATIONS

DHHS's evaluation comments indicate:

-- Benefits to the U.S. from the Agreement include opportunities for joint testing of components, biomaterials and control systems in connection with the development of families of mechanical circulatory devices as well as joint in vitro and in vivo testing of artificial hearts.

-- Balance and reciprocity continue to apply in considering Agreement implementation.

Agency Recommendations

DHHS recommends allowing extension for the five year period provided for in the original Agreement as set forth in their report (attached). DHHS also recommends that the Artificial Heart Agreement be incorporated within the US-USSR Health Agreement if this can be accomplished with a minimum of effort and without upsetting the working relationships between both sides.

State recommends the five year extension be permitted to take place. State believes that while we should continue to limit and monitor the overall level of exchanges in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, we should maintain the framework of cooperation intact, especially in the areas of health, pollution control, and safety. State is satisfied there is a reasonable balance of benefit in the exchange activities now taking place under the Artificial Heart Agreement. State does not concur in the DHHS recommendation that the Artificial Heart Agreement be incorporated within the Health Agreement. While this may seem appropriate for better planning and implementation of activities, State does not believe overall U.S. interests are served by discussing this possibility with the Soviets at this time.

DOD made no recommendation on the extension of the Agreement.

Committee on Exchanges (COMEX) concurs in the DHHS recommendation to renew the Artificial Heart Agreement.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

COMEX believes the DHHS report provides a realistic assessment of the benefits obtained by the U.S. side.

Other Agencies offered no comment or concurred.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Report of the  
 Department of Health and Human Services  
 Concerning Continuation of the US-USSR Agreement for Cooperation  
 in Artificial Heart Research and Development

Background

This report covers exchanges and cooperative activities between the US and the USSR in the area of mechanical circulatory devices and artificial heart research and development.

In June 1974, after two years of exploratory discussions and exchanges under the auspices of the US-USSR Health Agreement, the two sides signed a three-year agreement designating the field of artificial heart research as a new area of cooperation. Dr. Michael E. DeBakey, President, Baylor University College of Medicine in Houston, and Professor Valery I. Shumakov, Director, Institute of Organ and Tissue Transplantation in Moscow, were named US and Soviet coordinators.

With the signing of the Agreement in 1974, a series of meetings were held to lay plans for developing and improving various components of circulatory support systems. Exchanges of technical working teams, experimental protocols, data and equipment, and visits of medical doctors, scientists, technologists, and engineers to leading institutions in both countries followed. The first exchanges of total artificial hearts and drive units developed in the United States and Soviet Union took place as early as March 1976, less than two years after the signing of the Agreement.

As in the cardiovascular disease priority area under the US-USSR Health Agreement, cooperation between both sides has been of the highest order. The Soviet side has shown itself willing to provide plans, materials, devices, and data--as has the US side--which has contributed to the development of a meaningful cooperative effort.

Benefits

The following have been identified as specific benefits to the US side:

- o Joint testing of components, biomaterials and control systems in connection with the development of families of mechanical circulatory devices.
- o Joint in vitro and in vivo testing of artificial hearts.

Recommendation

The Department of Health and Human Services notes that there have been benefits to the US side as a result of the US-Soviet Artificial Heart Agreement. On balance, the Department assesses the benefits to each side to be about equal.

The Department recommends that the Agreement be renewed for an additional five-year term. It is also recommended that the Artificial Heart Agreement be incorporated within the US-Soviet Health Agreement if this can be accomplished with a minimum of effort and without upsetting the working relationships between both sides.

US-USSR AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION  
IN ARTIFICIAL HEART RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT  
SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES

Since 1974:

- 1. Number of Exchanges -- 58 scientists exchanges for a total of 31 man-months
- 2. Number of Joint Symposia -- 2 (most recent in September, 1981)
- 3. Publications -- 9 US papers  
11 Soviet papers

Recent Developments:

- 1. July, 1981, US side received an artificial heart control unit from the Soviets.
- 2. U.S. - developed biomaterials shortly to be sent to the Soviets.
- 3. August, 1981, three Soviets were in the U.S. for detailed joint testing of a Soviet artificial heart control system.
- 4. A joint publication has recently been completed concerning testing of US and Soviet artificial heart devices.

**UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS**  
**Cooperation in Artificial Heart Research and Development**

*Agreement signed at Moscow June 28, 1974;*  
*Entered into force June 28, 1974.*

AGREEMENT BETWEEN  
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND  
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS  
ON COOPERATION  
IN ARTIFICIAL HEART RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet  
Socialist Republics;

Reaffirming the importance that medical science has for mankind  
today;

Realizing the advisability of further uniting the efforts of  
both countries in resolving the pressing problems of medical science;

Recognizing the great importance of scientific research and  
the study of heart disease, which is one of the leading causes of  
mortality in both their countries as well as throughout the world;

Desiring to expand and strengthen common efforts to promote the  
development of an artificial heart;

Realizing that the development of an effective artificial heart  
could eventually lead to a reduction in mortality;

In pursuance and further development of the Agreement between  
the Government of the United States of America and the Government of  
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Cooperation in the Field  
of Medical Science and Public Health, signed May 23, 1972;<sup>[1]</sup>

In accordance with the General Agreement between the United  
States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on  
Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation, signed June 19, 1973;<sup>[2]</sup>

Have agreed as follows:

<sup>1</sup> TIAS 7344; 23 UST 836.  
<sup>2</sup> TIAS 7649; 24 UST 1395.

ARTICLE I

Both parties undertake to develop and extend scientific and technical cooperation in artificial heart research and development on the basis of equality, reciprocity and mutual benefit.

ARTICLE II

The cooperation will be concentrated in the areas of research on, and joint development and testing of devices, materials, instruments and control mechanisms which will provide cardiovascular support including total heart replacement.

ARTICLE III

The cooperation provided for in the preceding Articles may be implemented principally in the following ways:

- a. exchange of scientific and technical information;
  - b. organization of joint conferences, workshops and meetings of experts;
  - c. exchanges of specialists and delegations;
  - d. preparation of joint publications and technical manuals;
- and
- e. familiarization with and exchange of technical aids and equipment.

In the course of implementing this Agreement, other forms of cooperation may also be determined by mutual agreement.

ARTICLE IV

The parties will delegate practical implementation of this Agreement to the US-USSR Joint Committee for Health Cooperation. The Committee shall approve the programs of cooperation, designate the participating organizations responsible for the realization of

these programs, and periodically review the progress of the cooperation.

ARTICLE V

Cooperation shall be financed on the basis of reciprocal agreements worked out by the Joint Committee, using the resources of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare of the United States of America and the Ministry of Health of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as well as the resources of those organizations and institutions taking part in the cooperation.

ARTICLE VI

Such cooperation will be carried out in accordance with the laws and regulations of the respective countries.

Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prejudice or modify other agreements concluded between the two parties.

ARTICLE VII


This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature and shall remain in force for three years after which it will be extended for successive five year periods unless one party notifies the other of its intent to terminate this agreement not less than six months prior to its expiration.

This Agreement may be modified by mutual agreement of the parties.

DONE at Moscow on June 28, 1974, in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

 [1]  
Secretary of State

 [2]  
Minister of Foreign Affairs

<sup>1</sup> Henry A. Kissinger  
<sup>2</sup> A. Gromyko



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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)  
143/15 EOB

RECEIVED 14 DEC 81 09

TO NANCE

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 12 DEC 81

KEYWORDS: USSR MEDICAL  
SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGES

SUBJECT: EXTENSION OF US - USSR AGREEMENT IN FIELD OF ARTIFICIAL HEART RESEARCH  
& DEVELOPMENT

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR NANCE DUE: 16 DEC 81 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

PIPES

STEARMAN



We should  
withhold approval for  
renewal until the  
situation in Poland  
becomes clearer.



COMMENTS

REF# 8135928

LOG

WJ NSCIFD

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 14 DEC 81 09

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TO NANCE

FROM BREMER

DOC DATE 12 DEC 81

KEYWORDS: USSR

MEDICAL

SCIENTIFIC

EXCHANGES

SUBJECT: EXTENSION OF US - USSR AGREEMENT IN FIELD OF ARTIFICIAL HEART RESEARCH  
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ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR NANCE DUE: 16 DEC 81 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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Dobriansky 12/18 ACTION TRANSFERRED 12/21

Nance X 12/23 *just to pass for review*

12/24 *once disapproved return*

C 12/24 *once rpl memo index PD*

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 25, 1981

170453

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED

FROM: JAMES W. NANCE

NLRR 74822-779

SUBJECT: Letter from Brezhnev

BY KDB NARA DATE 4/3/15

Attached is a letter we have just received from Brezhnev over MOLINK. We have had it translated here in the NSC. As you will see, it is abrasive, and accuses you of gross interference in the internal affairs of Poland and Russia. However, the interesting part of the letter is that it is not as abrasive as some previously received from Brezhnev and asks that we talk. It tries to minimize our differences over Poland as being secondary to overall U.S./Soviet relations and the need for arms control agreements. He hints in response to your assertion we would be forced to take certain actions toward the Soviet Union if it persisted in pressuring Poland, that so little is left in U.S./Soviet collaboration anyway that your threat isn't very frightening. The tacit assumption of the letter is that an irreversible change has taken place in Poland's reverting to the Soviet model, that Poland therefore has ceased to be a "problem", and the U.S. and the Soviet Union should go on to other issues.

I have discussed the letter with Ed Meese and The Vice President. We are planning the following actions unless you direct otherwise.

1. I will prepare for you a complete list of actions we can take against the Soviet Union. This list will be graduated in severity, will afford you many options and will be predicated on the discussions we had during the NSC meetings.
2. I have scheduled a meeting on Monday morning, with

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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The Vice President chairing, in which we will discuss the list of options I will provide you. Participants in the meeting will be all the principles of the Special Situation Group (SSG).

3. Following the meeting, the Vice President and Ed Meese will call you with the recommendations from the SSG to obtain your approval. They will be speaking from the list of options I will provide you to assist you in making your decisions.

Should you desire any changes in our proposed plan of action, The Vice President and I will be readily available by phone.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 01 OF 05 MESSAGE TO THE PRES 2217 DTG: 250640Z DEC 79 PSN: 009220  
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OP IMMEDIATE /PRIORITY

NLRR 748-22-7-8-8

BY KOB NARA DATE 10/3/05

HIS EXCELLENCY

RONALD REAGAN  
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

YOUR MESSAGE ON THE DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS LINK HAS MADE ALL THE MORE PRESSING THE NECESSITY OF CALLING UPON YOU AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USA TO END AT LAST THE INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF A SOVEREIGN STATE - THE POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC. THIS INTERFERENCE IN THE MOST DIVERSE FORMS - OVERT AND COVERT - HAS BEEN UNDERWAY FOR A LONG TIME, ALREADY.

ESSENTIALLY, IN YOUR CURRENT COMMUNICATION, YOU HAVE PLACED YOUR PERSONAL SIGNATURE UPON THE FACT THAT GROSS INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF POLAND IS THE OFFICIAL POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. WE HAVE CONDEMNED AND CONTINUE TO CONDEMN SUCH A POLICY. WE CONSIDER IT UNACCEPTABLE.

ATTEMPTING TO CONCEAL THIS POLICY OF YOURS, YOU REFER, ENTIRELY BESIDE THE POINT, TO THE LETTER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF OUR PARTY DATED 5 JUNE OF THIS YEAR, ADDRESSED

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 02 OF 05 MESSAGE TO THE PRES 2217 DTG: 250640Z DEC 79 PSN: 009220

TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE PZPR (POLISH UNITED WORKERS' PARTY). QUITE APART FROM THE FACT THAT IN SO DOING YOU DISTORT THE SENSE OF THIS LETTER, YOU AGAIN PROCEED FROM THE POSITION OF INTERFERENCE, IN THIS CASE INTERFERENCE IN THE MUTUAL RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO POLITICAL PARTIES - THE CPSU AND THE PZPR, BETWEEN WHICH, AS BETWEEN THE OTHER PARTIES OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, THERE EXIST THEIR OWN COMPLETELY EQUAL AND FRIENDLY NORMS AND (PRACTICE OF RELATIONS). THIS PRACTICE WAS BORN NOT YESTERDAY AND NOT TODAY.

IF A FRANK EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS BETWEEN COMMUNIST PARTIES AND THE EXPRESSIONS BY THEM OF THEIR OPINIONS TO EACH OTHER IS NOT PLEASING TO SOMEONE IN THE UNITED STATES, THEN, IN RESPONSE, WE MUST FIRMLY SAY: THAT IS THE BUSINESS OF THE PARTIES THEMSELVES AND OF NO ONE ELSE. AND THEY HAVE NOT PICKED ANYONE ELSE AS A JUDGE TO IMPOSE HIS NORMS UPON THEM.

IT IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT TO EMPHASIZE THIS MATTER OF PRINCIPLE.

FROM THE STANDPOINT OF OUR PARTY, ANTIPATHY HAS BEEN AND CONTINUES TO BE EXPRESSED IN RELATION TO THOSE IN POLAND WHO ARE ENEMIES OF THE EXISTING SYSTEM THERE AND WHO VIOLATE THE LAWS AND ORDER OF THE COUNTRY, WHO ARE PLUNGING IT INTO CHAOS.

YOU, YOURSELF, AS HEAD OF THE STATE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ARE SPEAKING OUT AGAINST THE EXISTING STATE SYSTEM IN POLAND - IN OTHER WORDS, CALLING FOR THE OVERTHROW OF THIS SYSTEM. THIS IS NOT AN IMAGINARY BUT MOST GENUINE INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF ANOTHER SOVEREIGN STATE.

AND THIS IS TAKING PLACE NOT ONLY IN RELATION TO POLAND. SIMILAR ATTEMPTS ARE BEING UNDERTAKEN ALSO IN RELATION TO THE SOVIET UNION. AMERICAN OFFICIALS, YES, EVEN YOU PERSONALLY, ARE UNINTERRUPTEDLY REVILING OUR SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SYSTEM, OUR INTERNAL ORDER. WE RE-

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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SOLUTELY REJECT THIS.

IN THE LIGHT OF THESE AND MANY OTHER GENERALLY KNOWN FACTS WHAT THEN REMAINS OF YOUR ARGUMENTS CONCERNING OUR ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT IN THE INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND? NOTHING WHATEVER.

YOUR COMMUNICATION CITES THE GOOD PROVISION OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT UNDER WHICH IS AFFIXED BOTH MY SIGNATURE AND THE SIGNATURE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. INDEED THIS PROVISION, WHICH STIPULATES THE REFRAINING FROM ANY INTERFERENCE IN AFFAIRS WHICH COME UNDER THE INTERNAL COMPETENCE OF ANOTHER STATE, REMINDS ONE BETTER THAN ANYTHING ELSE OF THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES ADVANCING ANY SORT OF DEMANDS REGARDING THE INTRODUCTION IN THEIR OWN COUNTRY OF MARTIAL LAW BY THE HIGHEST POLISH ORGANS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STATE CONSTITUTION. IT REMINDS ONE OF THE INADMISSABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES ATTEMPTING TO DICTATE TO THE POLES WHAT THEY MUST AND MUST NOT DO.

NO ONE SHOULD INTERFERE WITH WHAT THE POLES AND THE POLISH AUTHORITIES ARE DOING AND WILL BE DOING IN THEIR OWN HOME.

YOU CLAIM [TO HAVE THE RIGHT] TO DECIDE FOR THE POLES, INSTEAD OF THE POLES THEMSELVES, BY WHAT PATHS AND MEANS POLISH SOCIETY SHOULD DEVELOP IN THE FUTURE. BUT THE SOCIAL ORDER IN POLAND WAS CHOSEN NOT BY WASHINGTON, NOT BY MOSCOW, AND NOT BY ANY OTHER CAPITOL, BUT BY THE POLES THEMSELVES. NO ONE CAN DIRECT THE LEADERSHIP OF POLAND ON HOW TO CONDUCT ITS OWN AFFAIRS, OR BY WHICH METHODS TO STABILIZE THE SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY FASTER AND BETTER.

ATTEMPTS TO IMPOSE ONE'S WILL ON OTHER GOVERNMENTS GROSSLY VIOLATE THE ELEMENTARY NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. I WOULD GO FURTHER: THEY ARE THOROUGHLY AMORAL. AND NO SORT OF WORD GAME REGARDING THE RIGHTS OF MAN CAN CONCEAL THIS FACT.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 04 OF 05 MESSAGE TO THE PRES 2217 DTG: 250640Z DEC 79 PSN: 009220

THE SOVIET UNION REJECTS THE CLAIMS OF ANYONE TO INTERFERE IN THE EVENTS OCCURRING IN POLAND.

IN YOUR COMMUNICATION MENTION IS MADE OF MILITARY MANEUVERS NEAR POLAND. YOU CLEARLY WISH TO INTERPRET THESE MANEUVERS IN YOUR OWN WAY, CONNECTING THEM TO THE SITUATION IN POLAND. BUT THIS IS COMPLETELY UNFOUNDED CONJECTURE.

AND IF ONE IS TO TOUCH ON THE SUBJECT OF MILITARY MANEUVERS, THEN THE FOLLOWING QUESTION ARISES: HOW MANY MANEUVERS HAVE THE MILITARY FORCES OF THE COUNTRIES OF NATO, INCLUDING THE USA, CONDUCTED AND CONTINUE TO CONDUCT IN WESTERN EUROPE NEAR THE BORDERS FOR EXAMPLE OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (EAST GERMANY) AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA. COULD THEY NOT PRESENT TO THE UNITED STATES THEIR BILL IN THIS MATTER? COULDN'T, TOO, WE ASSESS SUCH MANEUVERS AS A THREAT TO THE SOVIET UNION AND THE OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES?

SUCH IS THE VALUE OF YOUR REFERENCES TO MILITARY MANEUVERS.

YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, HINT THAT IF THE EVENTS IN POLAND SHOULD FURTHER DEVELOP IN A MANNER WHICH IS DISPLEASING TO THE UNITED STATES, THEN A BLOW MAY BE DELIVERED ALONG THE ENTIRE RANGE OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS.

BUT IF WE ARE TO SPEAK WITHOUT EQUIVOCATION, IT IS YOUR ADMINISTRATION THAT HAS ALREADY DONE ENOUGH TO DISRUPT, OR AT THE VERY LEAST, UNDERMINE EVERYTHING POSITIVE WHICH, AT THE COST OF GREAT EFFORT, HAS BEEN ACHIEVED BY PREVIOUS AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIONS IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES. TODAY, UNFORTUNATELY, NOT THAT MUCH REMAINS FROM THE PREVIOUSLY ATTAINED, MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL, POLITICAL CAPITAL.

WHAT CAN ONE SAY OF SUCH HINTS? SURELY, BEFORE HAVING RECOURSE TO THEM, ONE SHOULD MORE CALMLY TAKE EVERYTHING INTO ACCOUNT.

IN GENERAL IT WILL DO NO HARM TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING OBSERVATION:

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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THE GENERAL TONE OF YOUR COMMUNICATION IS NOT QUITE THAT WHICH THE LEADERS OF SUCH POWERS AS THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES SHOULD ASSUME IN CONVERSATION WITH ONE ANOTHER. THIS IS ESPECIALLY THE CASE IF ONE TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE WEIGHT AND THE POSITION THEY CARRY IN THE WORLD, THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE STATE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. SUCH IS OUR VIEW.

IT WOULD NOT BE US, NOT THE SOVIET UNION, THAT WOULD BEAR THE RESPONSIBILITY IN THE EVENT SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS WERE TO SUFFER FURTHER DISINTEGRATION.

IT SEEMS THAT IT WOULD BE MUCH MORE USEFUL IF THE LEADERS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES RESPONSIBLY AND WITH COMPOSURE DISCUSSED PROBLEMS WHICH FOR THE PEOPLES ARE TRULY OF VITAL IMPORTANCE - HOW TO SLOW DOWN AND STOP THE ARMS RACE WHICH FOR A LONG TIME ALREADY HAS ASSUMED A SENSELESS INTENSITY AND SCOPE, HOW TO PRESERVE PEACE ON EARTH. WE FAVOR PLACING PRECISELY THESE PROBLEMS IN THE CENTER OF ATTENTION OF THE LEADERSHIP OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES AND HAVING THEM FIND AN INTELLIGENT SOLUTION. I ASSUME AND I'M EVEN CONVINCED THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE NEED THIS NO LESS THAN THE SOVIET PEOPLE AND OTHER NATIONS.

RESPECTFULLY,

L. BREZHNEV

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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BY 1003 NARA DATE 11/3/15

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JAMES W. NANCE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Presidential Statement on the Second Anniversary  
of the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

The need to maintain pressures on the Soviets at the time of the Polish crisis argues forcefully for a Presidential statement on the second anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 27, 1981. Such a statement would effectively top off other public affairs efforts we have already made for the occasion. These comprise an unclassified Department of State analysis of the Afghan situation, a statement made by Assistant Secretary Veliotos (text attached), and a backgrounder for the U.S. and foreign press, all embargoed until 6:00 p.m., Saturday, December 26.

A proposed statement is attached. We suggest that it also be released to the press at 6:00 p.m., Saturday, December 26.

*L. Paul Bremer, III*

L. Paul Bremer, III  
Executive Secretary

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GDS 12/24/87

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NLRR 748-22-7-10-5

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

170456

BY KCB NARA DATE 11/3/15

December 26, 1981

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Alexander M. Haig, Jr. 

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

Subject: Recommended Next Steps Toward the USSR in  
Light of Brezhnev's Letter

Brezhnev's reply: Brezhnev's letter is the harshest Presidential level communication we have received from the Soviet Union in recent years. Despite a half-hearted attempt to maintain a statesmanlike tone, the letter is uncompromisingly tough in rejecting our charges against the Soviet Union and in its allegations of U.S. interference in Poland. Beyond its predictable rebuttal of our charges, Brezhnev's reply unequivocally rejects our effort to affect Soviet policy toward Poland.

NO.

At the same time, the reply established the rationale, phony though it may be, for a possible Soviet military intervention in Poland by claiming that the United States--and you personally--are calling for the overthrow of the existing Polish state system. Brezhnev in fact claims that "gross interference in the internal affairs of Poland is the official policy of the United States."

Recommended Next Steps: In light of Brezhnev's letter, it is clear that we must now take concrete actions to demonstrate our resolve and impose real costs on the Soviet Union, while not going so far as to produce a split within NATO. The steps we are proposing are unilateral U.S. actions which we should take in any event. But we should at a minimum give our Allies 24-48 hours, between your decisions and public announcement of our sanctions, to digest our actions and join with us to the maximum possible extent. It is important that this process look like Allied consultations, even though in fact we will essentially be informing the Allies of our intentions.

We also should hold some major sanctions in reserve, should Soviet actions against Poland subsequently intensify. Once you have decided on the specific actions to be taken now, we will prepare an appropriate reply to Brezhnev.

NO.

I recommend that you approve the following immediate steps (Details at Tab A):

Economic:

--Suspend negotiations on a new maritime agreement;

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- 2 -

--Announce that bilateral science and technology agreements that are coming up for renewal are being held in abeyance;

--Step up efforts with the Allies to tighten COCOM restrictions on trade with the USSR;

--Suspend Aeroflot service to the U.S.;

--Reduce Soviet commercial presence by terminating Kama Purchasing Commission;

--Suspend further discussion of a new grains agreement with the Soviet Union;

--Suspend processing of applications for exports to the Soviet Union, including Caterpillar;

--Require export licenses on foreign policy grounds for the sale of all energy related oil and gas equipment to the Soviet Union;

--Suspend the export license for transfer to the Soviet Union of International Harvester Combine-Harvester Technology;

Political:

--Propose to our Allies emergency CSCE session on Poland;

--Work with Allies to hold early NATO Ministerial meeting on the Polish situation;

--Increase VOA and RL broadcasting to the Soviet Union;

Related Measures Toward Poland:

--Provision of humanitarian assistance to Poland;

--Call for inspection of Polish detention centers by ICRC and other international human rights organizations.

Attachment:

Discussion of Proposed Steps

*Mr. President we will provide further advice following Monday's meeting - You can expect foregoing*

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DISCUSSION OF PROPOSED MEASURES  
AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION

ECONOMIC:

--Suspend negotiations on a new maritime agreement:

Negotiations on a new maritime agreement had been expected to resume in January. When the old agreement expires on December 31, we will impose a strict port access regime on the Soviets which will require them to request permission of the Coast Guard before their merchant ships can call at U.S. ports. We will generally refuse requests for vessels trading between the U.S. and third countries, but we would not by this measure try to hinder our exports of grain and other permitted products to the Soviet Union.

--Announce that bilateral science and technology agreements

that are coming up for renewal are being held in abeyance: The agreement on artificial heart research will be renewed automatically this month unless we notify the Soviets otherwise. In addition, the bilateral agreements on science and technology and energy are scheduled for renewal during the first half of 1982. We should notify the Soviets that we are holding renewal of all three agreements in abeyance.

--Step up efforts to tighten COCOM restrictions on trade

with the USSR: An extraordinary meeting of COCOM is already scheduled for January 19-20 in Paris. We want that meeting to produce a consensus for tighter restrictions on strategic trade with the Soviets, with special attention to technology and critical equipment for the nine defense-priority industries that constitute the economic infrastructure for the Soviet military. To step up our efforts, we will send you drafts of letters you can send to your COCOM counterparts, emphasizing the importance of a strong COCOM to Western security.

--Suspend Aeroflot service to the United States:

The CAB can make the suspension effective in about a week. Aeroflot currently has two weekly Moscow-Washington flights. No U.S. airline flies scheduled service to Moscow, so the USSR will probably retaliate by refusing Pan Am's current request for overflight privileges. Travel between the USSR and the West will continue since most European airlines fly to Moscow, and the Europeans are unlikely to drop these services.

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- 2 -

--Reduce Soviet commercial presence by terminating Kama Purchasing Commission: This will require that we revoke the six-month operating authority extension to April 18, 1982, which we granted to Kama in October, 1981. By closing Kama River, we will reduce the Soviet commercial presence in the US by 10, to a new total of 72. The Soviets could retaliate against the resident representatives of some 30 U.S. firms accredited in Moscow.

--Suspend further discussion of a new grains agreement with the Soviet Union: The U.S.-Soviet grains agreement was extended last August for one year; it now expires on September 30, 1982, and allows the current trade to continue. There is no urgency to initiating discussions--should we wish to have another grains agreement--since the agreement has another nine months to run. However, if we do not conclude a new agreement by September, we will face the alternative of unrestricted Soviet access to our grains market or the imposition of a grains embargo. Under current legislation, we cannot embargo grain exports unless we impose the embargo on almost all other commodities.

--Suspend processing of applications for exports to the Soviet Union, including Caterpillar: This measure would stop new approvals indefinitely and would cover items controlled for either national defense or foreign policy purposes. We would retain the flexibility to approve cases for extraordinary reasons, such as the public health and safety. This measure would stop the export of 200 Caterpillar pipelayers, valued at about \$90 million, because that license has not yet been issued. The loss would be borne by the company. A Japanese firm is the only immediate alternate supplier, but with enough lead time, several European firms could develop production capacity.

--Require export licenses on foreign policy grounds for the sale of all energy related oil and gas equipment to the Soviet Union: Existing U.S. controls on exploration and production equipment would be expanded to include equipment for refining for energy use and for transmission, including compressors needed for the West Siberian pipeline. Coupled with the suspension of processing of license applications, this measure would indefinitely stop U.S. exports for the pipeline and other projects. This decision will block a potential \$175 million in General Electric compressor exports and could lead to a loss of 8,000 jobs in New York and South Carolina (company's

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estimate). French and British firms are likely alternative suppliers.

--Suspend the export license for transfer to the Soviet Union of International Harvester combine-harvester technology: We would eventually have to decide whether to reinstate or revoke this license, which has been issued. Blocking this export will cost the firm earnings of \$300 million. Many foreign firms are potential alternative suppliers.

POLITICAL:

--Propose to our Allies emergency CSCE session on Poland: A call for such a meeting would highlight Polish/Soviet violations of the Final Act and increase pressure on the Polish Government to relax the martial law regime. Even if the Soviets and their Allies refuse to agree, thereby preventing the consensus necessary for convening the meeting, a call for it would dramatize our revulsion over Polish/Soviet behavior and might marginally help deter Soviet military intervention.

--Work with Allies to hold early NATO Ministerial meeting on the Polish situation: I am already in touch with other NATO Foreign Ministers concerning the possibility of an emergency NATO Ministerial meeting early in the new year. We have already made some progress in gaining European agreement with our approach to the Polish crisis, and your Christmas speech and correspondence with Brezhnev will provide additional impetus for this process.

--Increase VOA and RL broadcasting to the Soviet Union: VOA already has contingency plans for increasing its broadcasting to the USSR. I recommend that, while you are in California, you swear in Frank Shakespeare as the head of the Board of International Broadcasting so that he can take charge of a coordinated RL and RFE effort to increase the volume and effectiveness of broadcasting by these radios to the Soviet Union.

RELATED MEASURES TOWARD POLAND:

--Provision of humanitarian assistance to Poland: The \$100 million we had intended for CCC guaranteed sales to Poland cannot be converted to humanitarian food aid. However, we can provide such aid either by specific legislation, targeted to

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- 4 -

the unique situation in Poland, or through Title II of PL 480. The Title II budget is almost completely committed, e.g. for assistance to Polish refugees in Austria. Moreover, we could transfer funds from Title I. Unallocated Title I funds amount to about \$15 million. In addition, we could transfer funds publicly earmarked for other country programs but not formally committed, although with serious foreign policy costs. If we were to proceed with Title II aid, we would need assurances that the U.S. voluntary agencies were able to handle the volumes in question. We would, in any case, take steps to ensure delivery of this assistance to the Polish people.

--Call for inspection of Polish detention centers by ICRC and other international human rights organizations: This step could increase international pressure on the Polish authorities to grant access to these centers, and it might also influence the martial law regime to take steps to ameliorate the reportedly severe conditions in which Polish detainees are held

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