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**Collection:** Teicher, Howard J.: Files

**Folder Title:** Iran Policy-Sensitive  
(2 of 6)

**Box:** RAC Box 2

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** TEICHER, HOWARD: FILES

**Withdrawer**

CAS 1/19/2012

**File Folder** IRAN POLICY - SENSITIVE (2 OF 5)

**FOIA**

M11-392

**Box Number**

2/91682

BYRNE

8

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
127888	CABLE	060116Z NOV 86 <b>PAR 2/17/2006 NLSF96-118/3 #41</b>	2	11/6/1986	B1
127889	DRAFT CABLE	RE HECKLER/POINDEXTER <b>PAR 2/17/2006 NLSF96-118/3 #42</b>	1	11/6/1986	B1
127890	CABLE	051713Z NOV 86 <b>R 5/13/2003 NLSF96-118/3 #43</b>	2	11/5/1986	B1
127891	CABLE	060512Z NOV 86 <b>R 2/17/2006 NLSF96-118/3 #44</b>	2	11/6/1986	B1
127892	CABLE	060545Z NOV 86 <b>R 2/17/2006 NLSF96-118/3 #45</b>	2	11/6/1986	B1
127893	CABLE	060538Z NOV 85 <b>R 5/13/2003 NLSF96-118/3 #46</b>	2	11/6/1986	B1
127894	CABLE	061636Z NOV 86 <b>R 5/13/2003 NLSF96-118/3 #47</b>	2	11/6/1986	B1
127895	REPORT	RE IRAN P. 2 ONLY <b>R 5/13/2003 NLSF96-118/3 #48</b>	1	ND	B1
127896	NOTE	SITUATION ROOM ADDENDUM <b>PAR 2/17/2006 F96-118/3 #50; R 11/21/2017 M393/1 #127896</b>	1	11/10/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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**Collection Name** TEICHER, HOWARD: FILES

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CAS 1/19/2012

**File Folder** IRAN POLICY - SENSITIVE (2 OF 5)

**FOIA**

M11-392

**Box Number** 2/91662

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8

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
127897	MEMO	TEICHER, ROSS TO KEEL RE TALKING POINTS FOR 11/10/86 CPPG <i>R 2/17/2006 NLSF96-118/3 #51</i>	1	11/10/1986	B1
127898	AGENDA	FOR CCPG 11/10/86 <i>R 2/17/2006 NLSF96-118/3 #52</i>	1	ND	B1
127899	TALKING POINTS	FOR 11/10/86 CPPG <i>R 11/7/2001 NLSF96-118/3 #53</i>	5	ND	B1
127900	LIST	OF MEETING ATTENDEES <i>PAR 11/7/2001 NLSF96-118/3 #54</i>	1	ND	B1
127901	PAPER	RE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS WITH IRAN <i>PAR 2/17/2006 NLSF96-118/3 #55</i>	3	11/10/1986	B1
127902	CHART	RE IRAN <i>D 11/7/2001 F96-118/3 #56; UPHELD 12/4/2017 M393 #127902</i>	1	8/19/1986	B1 B3
127903	PAPER	RE BY COUNTRY SUMMARY <i>D 2/17/2006 F96-118/3 #57; UPHELD 12/4/2017 M393 #127903</i>	2	ND	B1
127907	NOTES	RE IRAN POLICY <i>R 2/17/2006 NLSF96-118/3 #58</i>	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** TEICHER, HOWARD R.: Files

**Archivist:** dlb

**File Folder:** Iran Policy - Sensitive (2)  
Box 91682

**Date:** 2/1/01  
**Battle/96-118/3**

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Cable	Cable #060116Z Nov 86, 2 p. <i>PART. 2/17/06 F96-118/3 #41</i>	11/6/86	B1
2. Draft Cable	re: Heckler/Poindexter, 1 p. <i>PART. " " #42</i>	11/6/86	B1
<del>3. Cable</del>	<del>Cable #051713Z Nov 86, 2 p. <i>R 5/13/03 F96-118/3 #43</i></del>	<del>11/5/86</del>	<del>B1</del>
<del>4. Cable</del>	<del>Cable #060512Z Nov 86, 2 p. <i>R 2/17/06 F96-118/3 #44</i></del>	<del>11/6/86</del>	<del>B1</del>
<del>5. Cable</del>	<del>Cable #060545Z Nov 86, 2 p. <i>R 2/17/06 F96-118/3 #45</i></del>	<del>11/6/86</del>	<del>B1</del>
<del>6. Cable</del>	<del>Cable #060538Z Nov 86, 2 p. <i>R 5/13/03 F96-118/3 #46</i></del>	<del>11/6/86</del>	<del>B1</del>
<del>7. Cable</del>	<del>Cable #061636Z Nov 86, 2 p. <i>R " " #47</i></del>	<del>11/6/86</del>	<del>B1</del>
<del>8. Report</del>	<del>re: Iran (page 2 only), 1 p. <i>R " " #48</i></del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>B1</del>
9. Report	re: Chad/Libya (page 2 only), 1 p. <i>PART. 2/17/06 F96-118/3 #49</i>	n.d.	B1
10. Note	Situation Room Addendum, 1 p. <i>PART. 2/17/06 F96-118/3 #50</i>	11/10/86	B1
<del>11. Memo</del>	<del>Teicher, Dennis Ross to Alton Keel, re: Talking Points for November 10, 1986 CPPG, Situation in Iran, 1 p. <i>R 2/17/06 F96-118/3 #51</i></del>	<del>11/10/86</del>	<del>B1</del>
<del>12. Agenda</del>	<del>[CPPG, 11/10/86] The Situation in Iran, 1 p. <i>R " " #52</i></del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>B1</del>
<del>13. Talking Pts</del>	<del>November 10, 1986 CPPG Situation in Iran, 5 p. <i>R " " #53</i></del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>B1</del>
14. List	Meeting Attendees, (partial), 1 p. <i>PART. 11/07/01 F96-118/3 #54</i>	n.d.	B3/B6
15. Paper	International Relations with Iran, 3 p. <i>PART. 2/17/06 F96-118/3 #55</i>	11/10/86	B1
16. Chart	re: Iran, 1 p. <i>D 11/07/01 F96-118/3 #56</i>	8/19/86	B1, <sup>23</sup>
17. Paper	By-Country Summary, 2 p. <i>D 2/17/06 F96-118/3 #57</i>	n.d.	B1
<del>18. Notes</del>	<del>Re: Iran Policy, 1 p. <i>R 2/17/06 F96-118/3 #58</i></del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>B1</del>

### RESTRICTION CODES

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# PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** TEICHER, HOWARD: FILES

**Withdrawer**

LOJ 5/15/2007

**File Folder** IRAN POLICY-SENSITIVE (2)

**FOIA**

F96-118/3

**Box Number** 91682

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date
<del>12</del>	<del>AGENDA</del>	<del>[CPPG, 11/10/86] THE SITUATION IN IRAN</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>ND</del>
			<i>MVH 3/6/08</i>	
<del>13</del>	<del>TALKING POINTS</del>	<del>NOVEMBER 10, 1986 CPPG SITUATION IN IRAN</del>	<del>5</del>	<del>ND</del>
			<i>MVH 3/6/08</i>	
<del>18</del>	<del>NOTE</del>	<del>IRAN POLICY</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>ND</del>
			<i>MVH 3/6/08</i>	

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

8068

PAGE 01 OF 02 THE WHITE HOUSE 0657  
SIT098

DTG: 060116Z NOV 86 PSM: 0753  
TOR: 310/0103Z

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DE YEKADS #0657 3100103  
O 060116Z NOV 86 ZFF-1 ZFF-4 ZYH  
FM THE WHITE HOUSE

*Teicher*

*PLP*

TO [REDACTED] FOIA(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS EYES ONLY SENSITIVE

DELIVER AT OPENING OF BUSINESS WH00657

PLEASE DELIVER EYES ONLY TO AMBASSADOR HECKLER OPENING OF  
BUSINESS, NOVEMBER 6, 1986. FROM ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT  
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, JOHN M. POINDEXTER.

DEAR MARGARET:

FURTHER TO OUR DISCUSSION REGARDING ALLEGED USE OF IRISH  
PASSPORTS BY BUD MCFARLANE IN IRAN, WE HAVE STUDIED THE ANSWERS  
PROVIDED BY THE IRISH FOREIGN MINISTRY AS REPORTED BY YOUR  
EMBASSY AND BELIEVE THEY TAKE JUST THE RIGHT TACK. THE U.S. IS  
CONTINUING SENSITIVE TALKS WITH SEVERAL INTERMEDIARIES TO BRING  
ABOUT THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES IN LEBANON. WE ARE SIMPLY  
UNABLE TO RESPOND TO ANY QUESTIONS WITH POSSIBLE RELATION TO THE  
HOSTAGE SITUATION AS DISCLOSURES COULD JEOPARDIZE THE SAFETY OF  
THE HOSTAGES.

I AM SURE YOU WILL UNDERSTAND THE SENSITIVITY OF THIS ISSUE  
AND THE NEED TO CONTINUE OUR NO COMMENT POLICY.

WITH WARM BEST REGARDS.

SINCERELY.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
NLS F96-118/3#41  
By LOI, NARA, Date 2/17/06

*T-88-49  
ADD 4/7/87*

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~~SECRET~~

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

THE WHITE HOUSE 0657

DTG: 060116Z NOV 86 PSN: 0763

JOHN

205

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SMITH

FOIA (b)(1)

TO [REDACTED] Please deliver EYES ONLY to Ambassador Heckler  
Opening of Business, November 6, 1986

To the Ambassador

From Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs,  
John M. Poindexter

Dear Margaret:

Further to our discussion regarding alleged use of Irish  
passports by Bud McFarlane in Iran, we have studied the answers  
provided by the Irish Foreign Ministry as reported by your  
Embassy and believe they take just the right tack. The U.S. is  
continuing sensitive talks with several intermediaries to bring  
about the release of the hostages in Lebanon. We are simply  
unable to respond to any questions with possible relation to the  
hostage situation as disclosures could jeopardize the safety of  
the hostages.

I am sure you will understand the sensitivity of this issue  
and the need to continue our no comment policy.

With warm best regards,

Sincerely,

John M. Poindexter

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Declassify on: OADR

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NLS F96-118/3#42

By LOJ, NARA, Date 2/17/06

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

NORTH MCD Keel JP

PRT: SIT  
SIT: EOB VAX

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<PREC? IMMEDIATE <CLAS? ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG? 051713Z NOV 86

FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6755  
<SECT?SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN? 4397

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE DUBLIN 04397

FOR EUR, NEA, PA/PRS

E. O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: ALLEGED MCFARLANE MISSION TO IRAN - USE OF  
IRISH PASSPORTS

1. DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ASSISTANT  
SECRETARY TED BARRINGTON INFORMED USOZHIS  
MORNING THAT GOI WAS RECEIVING NUMEROUS  
PRESS QUERIES ABOUT ALLEGED MCFARLANE  
MISSION TO IRAN AND USE OF IRISH PASSPORTS.  
HE PASSED ALONG FOLLOWING QUESTIONS AND  
ANSWERS WHICH DFA WAS EMPLOYING ON ISSUE:

2. Q: DOES GOI BELIEVE STORY OUT OF TEHRAN>

C WE HAVE NOTED MCFARLANE'S REPORTED DENIAL  
- THAT HE WAS IN TEHRAN.

Q: HAS AN IRISH PASSPORT BEEN ISSUED TO MCFARLANE>

A: DFAA HAS NO RECORD OF AN IRISH PASSPORT BEING  
S - ISSUED TO MR. MCFARLANE.

Q: HAVE YOU TAKEN THE ISSUE UP WITH THE U. S.  
- GOVERNMENT

UGC OUR EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON HAS BEEN IN TOUCH  
- WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

3. EMBASSY IS MAINTAINING "NO COMMENT" RESPONSE  
TO ALL INQUIRIES.

4. NOV. 5 EVENING PAPERS HAVE PUT PASSPORT ISSUE ON  
FRONT PAGES WITH SHRILL HEADLINES: "FURY AT US ENVOY

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 196-118/3 #43

BY CS NARA, DATE 5/13/8

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

TRICK" AND "FAKE PASSPORT ROW WITH U. S.". THE  
OPPOSITION SPOKESMAN FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS HW REPORTEDLY URGED  
THAT THE GOI "PROTEST IN THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE MANNER" B  
TO THE U. S.

HECKLER

BT

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 7682  
SIT142

DTG: 060512Z NOV 86 PSN: 077380  
TOR: 310/1457Z

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO ALL NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS NIACT IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0048  
AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 0219

~~SECRET~~ STATE 347682

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: MARR, PREL, PTER, XF  
SUBJECT: WHITE HOUSE GUIDANCE: U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN

NODIS

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AS A RESULT OF STATEMENTS MADE BY IRANIAN OFFICIALS AND PRESS REPORTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, CONSIDERABLE SPECULATION HAS BEEN AROUSED REGARDING POSSIBLE CHANGES IN U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO REAFFIRM THE BASIC COMPONENTS OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN AND PROVIDE YOU WITH REPLIES YOU MAY USE WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS ON AN "IF ASKED" BASIS. WITH RESPECT TO PUBLIC AFFAIRS. EMBASSIES SHOULD CONTINUE TO OFFER NO COMMENT TO LOCAL MEDIA, AND SHOULD STRESS THE CONFIDENTIAL NATURE OF ANY EXCHANGE ON THIS SUBJECT WITH

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F96-118/3\*44

BY NDI NARA, DATE 2/17/06

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T-BB-46  
ADJ 4/7/87

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

SECSTATE WASHDC 7682

DTG: 060512Z NOV 86

PSN: 077380

HOST GOVERNMENTS DUE TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT ANYTHING WE SAY COULD ENDANGER THE HOSTAGES.

3. U.S. POLICY MAY BE SUMMARIZED TO HOST GOVERNMENTS AS FOLLOWS:

- A. THE U.S. IS CONTINUING SENSITIVE TALKS WITH SEVERAL INTERMEDIARIES IN AN EFFORT TO BRING ABOUT THE RELEASE OF HOSTAGES HELD IN LEBANON. ANY DISCLOSURES REGARDING THE NATURE OF THESE TALKS COULD ONLY JEOPARDIZE THE SAFETY OF THE HOSTAGES.

- B. THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE IN THE LONG-STANDING U.S. POLICY OF NEUTRALITY IN THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR. WE SEEK THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE END TO THAT WAR UNDER HONORABLE CIRCUMSTANCES, TO INCLUDE THE PRESERVATION OF THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF BOTH IRAN AND IRAQ.

C. MOREOVER, WE CONTINUE TO WORK AGAINST TRANSFERS OF MILITARY OR MILITARY-RELATED EQUIPMENT TO IRAN (I.E., OPERATION STANCH).

- D. THE U.S. RECOGNIZES THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND IRAN, WHICH WOULD HELP BRING ABOUT AN END TO THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR AND AN END TO STATE-SUPPORTED TERRORISM. THE U.S. SEEKS CIRCUMSTANCES THAT WOULD LEAD TO SUCH A DIALOGUE.

4. BEIRUT AND KABUL MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM



PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 7685  
SIT143

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO ALL NATO CAPITALS IMMEDIATE IMMEDIATE  
ZEN/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 2235  
ZEN/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 5056  
USDEL SECRETARY 9984

NODIS

~~SECRET~~ STATE 347685 TOSEC 230054

NODIS  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: MARR, PREL, PTER, XF  
SUBJECT: WHITE HOUSE GUIDANCE: U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN

NODIS

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

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NLS F96-118/3#45

BY LOT, NARA, DATE 2/17/06

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

SECSTATE WASHDC 7685

DTG: 060545Z NOV 86

PSN: 077382

CONFIDENTIAL NATURE OF ANY EXCHANGE ON THIS SUBJECT WITH  
HOST GOVERNMENTS DUE TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT ANYTHING WE  
SAY COULD ENDANGER THE HOSTAGES.

3. U.S. POLICY MAY BE SUMMARIZED TO HOST GOVERNMENTS AS  
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- B. THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE IN THE LONG-STANDING U.S.  
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STATE-SUPPORTED TERRORISM. THE U.S. SEEKS CIRCUMSTANCES  
THAT WOULD LEAD TO SUCH A DIALOGUE. WHITEHEAD

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- NSPWR IRAN IRAQ SAUDI BEIRUT KUWAIT SYRIA
- NSWJB IRAN IRAQ SAUDI BEIRUT KUWAIT SYRIA
- NSCPC IRAN BEIRUT HOSTAGE SYRIA TERROR
- NSRLE BEIRUT HOSTAGE IRAN SYRIA TERROR
- NSPWH IRAN IRAQ SYRIA TERRORISM
- NSSRT IRAN IRAQ KUWAIT SYRIA
- NSTNH IRAN IRAQ SYRIA TERRORISM
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XDIS

NO. 12356: DECL: OADR  
AGS: PREL, IZ, IR  
SUBJECT: MURPHY-HAMDOON MEETING, NOVEMBER 5

. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

. IRAQI AMBASSADOR HAMDOON CALLED ON A/S MURPHY ON NOVEMBER 5 FOR A DISCUSSION OF RECENT REPORTS CONCERNING U.S.-IRANIAN CONTACTS. DAS CREEKMORE, NGA OFFICE DIRECTOR BURLEIGH, AND IRAQ DESK OFFICER BERRY (NOTETAKER) ALSO ATTENDED.

MURPHY CONFINED HIS BRIEFING TO THE FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS, WHICH HE ALSO PRESENTED TO HAMDOON AS A NON-PAPER:

THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE IN THE LONGSTANDING U.S.

BY CLJ, NARA, DATE 5/13/03  
NLS 796-718/3 #446  
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*T-88-47  
adj. 4/2/10*

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POLICY TOWARD THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR.

-- THE U.S. FAVORS THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE END TO THE WAR WITH THE INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF BOTH IRAQ AND IRAN PRESERVED INTACT.

-- THE U.S. WANTS TO SEE NEITHER A VICTOR NOR A VANQUISHED IN THIS CONFLICT.

-- THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE ITS ACTIVE OPERATION STAUNCH POLICY, WHICH IS OUR EFFORT TO INHIBIT THE TRANSFER OF ARMS TO IRAN.

-- BECAUSE OF THE SENSITIVE NATURE OF ONGOING DEVELOPMENTS IN THE REGION WITH REGARD TO AMERICAN -- AND OTHER -- HOSTAGES, I CANNOT GO INTO FURTHER DETAIL TODAY.

4. HAMDOON PROCEEDED TO SPECULATE AT LENGTH AS TO THE ORIGIN OF THE PRESS REPORTS ABOUT U.S.-IRANIAN CONTACTS, AND SUMMARIZED THE VIEWS "OF MANY PEOPLE" IN WASHINGTON ABOUT THEM. HAMDOON SAID THAT, IN HIS OPINION, ANY U.S.-IRANIAN "DEAL" THAT THERE MAY HAVE BEEN WAS A ONE-SHOT AFFAIR GROWING OUT OF CONCERN FOR THE U.S. HOSTAGES, NOT A LONG-TERM CHANGE IN U.S. POLICY BASED ON A REASSESSMENT OF THE WAR. HE SUGGESTED THAT IT IS "LEGITIMATE" FOR THE U.S. TO BE INTERESTED IN CONTACTS WITH IRANIANS, BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE REGIME.

5. THE STORY MAY HAVE BROKEN IN THE PRO-SYRIAN BEIRUT NEWSPAPER AL-SHIRAA, HAMDOON SAID, BECAUSE THE SYRIANS, ANGERED AT WHAT THEY SAW AS A DIRECT U.S.-IRANIAN ARRANGEMENT THAT EXCLUDED SYRIA, DECIDED TO EMBARRASS THE IRANIAN REGIME -- OR ELEMENTS INSIDE THE REGIME -- BY LEAKING THEIR VERSION OF THE STORY. "MOST PEOPLE SAY," HAMDOON CONTINUED, THAT SYRIA IS EMBARRASSED BY ITS ISOLATION ON THE TERRORISM ISSUE, AND DISTRESSED BY CRITICISM OF IT IN THE U.S. AND ELSEWHERE. HAMDOON PROFESSED TO BE PUZZLED, HOWEVER, AS TO WHY IRAN WOULD ENTER INTO CONTACTS WITH THE U.S. "FOR JUST SOME AMMUNITION AND SPARE PARTS."

6. WITHOUT CITING ANY SPECIFIC SOURCES, HAMDOON SAID HE HAD "INFORMATION" THAT KHOMEINI IS IN BAD HEALTH, AND SUGGESTED THAT THAT MAY HAVE TRIGGERED THE RECENT INFIGHTING IN TEHRAN.

7. FOR RIYADH AND KUWAIT: MURPHY HAS GIVEN THE TALKING POINTS IN PARA 3 TO THE SAUDI AND KUWAITI AMBASSADORS IN WASHINGTON IN RESPONSE TO THEIR TELEPHONE QUERIES.

WHITEHEAD

\*\* END OF CABLE \*\*

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4430

SECRET

SUBJECT: ALLEGED U.S. USE OF IRISH PASSPORTS IN IRAN

\*\*\* START OF TEXT \*\*\*

SECTION: 01 OF 01

BT

~~SECRET~~ DUBLIN 04430

VIENNA FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR HECKLER  
PASS NSC

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, US, EI

SUBJECT: ALLEGED U.S. USE OF IRISH PASSPORTS IN IRAN

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOREIGN MINISTER BARRY CALLED THIS AFTER-  
NOON FROM THE HAGUE, WHERE HE IS ACCOMPANYING  
PRESIDENT HILLERY ON A STATE VISIT, TO MAKE  
CLEAR HIS DISPLEASURE WITH OUR RESPONSES TO  
IRISH INQUIRIES ABOUT THE ALLEGATIONS THAT  
BUD MCFARLANE AND OTHERS USED IRISH PASSPORTS  
DURING THEIR PURPORTED VISITS TO IRAN. HE WOULD  
LIKE TO MEET YOU IN VINNA TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE.

3. BARRY SAID 48 HOURS HAD PASSED WITHOUT  
A SATISFACTORY RESPONSE TO THEIR INCIAL  
QUERIES AT STATE. NOR WAS GOI SATISFIED  
WITH LILE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN UNDER

DECLASSIFIED  
M/S 196-11/13 1997  
NARA, DATE 5/13/03

T-88-50  
029 4/7/87

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SECRETARY ARMACOST'S MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR  
MACKERNAN IN WASHINGTON.

4. THE POSSIBLE USE OF FAKED IRISH PASSPORTS  
WAS A SERIOUS MATTER THAT HAD BECOME A DOMESTIC  
POLITICAL ISSUE WITH VERY GRAVE IMPLICATIONS

FOR BILATERAL RELATIONS, BARRY CONTINUED. THE  
IRANIANS SAID THEY WOULD SHOW THE IRISH THE  
PASSPORTS IN QUESTION, BUT A DELAY HAD OCCURRED  
DUE TO A LOCAL RELIGIOUS HOLIDAY.

5. THIS IS ONE OF THE FEW TIMES BARRY HAS APPROACHED  
ME PERSONALLY ON A MAJOR ISSUE, WHICH REFLECTS THE DEPTH  
OF HIS FEELING. I HOPE YOU WILL BE ABLE TO FIT IN A  
BRIEF MEETING TO MOLLIFY HIM IN VIENNA, ALTHOUGH I  
REALIZE THERE IS NOT MUCH TIME. FAILING THAT, IF WE  
COULD EVEN TELL THE IRISH PRIVATELY THAT WE CANNOT SAY  
ANYTHING BECAUSE OF THE SENSITIVITY REGARDING POSSIBLE  
FURTHER HOSTAGE RELEASES IT WOULD HELP TREMENDOUSLY.

6. ACTION REQUESTED: GUIDANCE ON MEETING OR  
SUBSTANTIVE REPLY.

HECKLER

BT

\*\* END OF TEXT \*\*

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~~SECRET~~

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695-1149

PASS TO  
CDR Hallow

# U.S. Sent Iran Arms for Hostage Releases

## Weapons Were Supplied for Aid in Freeing 3 in Lebanon, Government Sources Say

By MICHAEL WINES and DOYLE McMANUS, Times Staff Writers

WASHINGTON—The Reagan Administration, using an Israeli-operated supply line set up through highly secret negotiations with the regime of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, last year began supplying U.S.-made missiles and weapons parts to Iran in exchange for Iran's aid in freeing Americans held hostage in Lebanon, government sources said Wednesday.

The arrangement, in which the Tehran government received plane-loads of military equipment critical to Iran in its lengthy war against Iraq, led to freedom for three hostages held by pro-Iranian extremists and, until this week, appeared to promise further releases, sources said.

### Brainchild of McFarlane

The arms shipments, begun last year with the personal approval of President Reagan after secret meetings between two top-level White House officials and Iranian representatives, led to the release last Sunday in Beirut of American University Hospital director David Jacobsen, who had been held by Islamic Jihad (Islamic Holy War), a group of Shia Muslim fundamentalists allied with Iran.

At least one earlier weapons shipment spurred the terrorists to release the Rev. Benjamin Weir, a Presbyterian minister, in September, 1985, and Father Lawrence M.

Jenco, Beirut chief of Catholic Relief Services, last July.

One source who refused to be named said that the operation was the brainchild of former national security adviser Robert C. McFarlane—who traveled secretly to Iran several times in the process of negotiating the arrangement—and a top aide, Lt. Col. Oliver L. North, the National Security Council's deputy director of political and military affairs.

The operation was supervised by North and Reagan's current national security adviser, John M. Poindexter, after McFarlane left the government in December, 1985.

Since early 1985, one source said, McFarlane and North reportedly have undertaken a string of secret missions to London, Geneva and other foreign capitals, as well as to Iran, to work out the shipments and exchanges, one source said.

### Began Concerned Over Leaks

The operation, handled almost entirely from within the White House, had been kept secret from virtually all of the highest officials in the U.S. government—including top congressional, Pentagon and State Department officials—at least until recent months, when some officials apparently began to pick up hints of what was going on.

News leaks about the operation surfaced last weekend in the Middle East and mushroomed in Britain and the United States this week. On Wednesday, White House Chief of Staff Donald T. Regan expressed public concern

that the reports were endangering American hostages, warning in a broadcast interview that "there are lives at stake here" and that "opportunities can be lost by premature disclosure."

U.S. officials concluded Wednesday that the publicity, and the resulting uproar in Iran, have dashed all hopes that two other

Iran  
PS

### Continued from Page 1

Americans still held in Lebanon by Islamic Jihad might be freed soon, an official said.

The secret dealings between the United States and Iran stand in marked contrast with the stated position of the Reagan Administration, which has frequently denounced Iran as one of the world's leading sponsors of state-supported terrorism. Indeed, while the secret exchanges were taking place, the President said repeatedly that the United States would not negotiate with terrorists or pay ransom for the release of American hostages.

In addition, the United States has maintained an arms embargo against Iran since 1979, when Khomeini's followers seized the U.S. Embassy and held 52 Americans hostage for 14 months.

### Storm of Controversy Due

Disclosure of the arrangement thus raises far-reaching questions about American policy on terrorism, the Middle East and a host of other issues. And a storm of controversy is likely to ensue, both in and outside the Administration.

Secretary of State George P. Shultz, a leading Administration advocate of a hard-line approach to terrorism and the man whose department has been actively enforcing the ban on weapons shipments to Iran, was "completely cut out" of the hostage negotiations. His aides are said to be deeply angered by the arrangement.

Secretary of Defense Casper W. Weinberger, a fierce advocate of



Serving Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Utah and Wash.

long-running war with Iran, was said to have "hit the roof" when news of the shipments reached his desk.

One government official who refused to be identified called the Administration's decision to aid Iran in its war with Iraq "a major policy shift" that had been undertaken without the usual discussions within the executive branch and with intelligence and military experts in Congress.

#### Approved by Reagan

The shipments were personally approved by Reagan in apparent contravention of the Export Administration Act, which prohibits the sale of U.S.-made arms to countries that support terrorism. Reagan himself put Iran on the "terrorist" list in 1981, and it has remained there.

"The President approved it," one official said, "and whatever documents were required, the President signed them privately and, like the Pope, kept it in his heart."

The Times learned of the secret arms shipments to Iran in late October. To avoid endangering the hostages or jeopardizing their chances for freedom, The Times agreed to withhold news of the operation until all the remaining hostages had been set free or details of the story appeared elsewhere.

U.S. sources say that the secret link to Iran has supplied that nation with what were described as ground-to-ground missiles as well

as spare parts for F-4 Phantom jets, American-made radar systems and C-130 transport planes and other war materiel.

The military value of the shipments to the Iranians could not be estimated, but Iran's air force consists entirely of American-made jets seized from Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi during Khomeini's rise to power, and its ground equipment was largely U.S.-made until China began supplying weapons in recent years.

The shipments were authorized by the White House, but were carried out by private American carriers under the top-secret direction of the Israeli government, one source said. Israeli officials involved in the operation in 1986 were identified by sources as then-Prime Minister Shimon Peres and Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin.

Israel, a supporter of Iran in its war with Iraq, frequently has been accused of—and has heatedly denied—that it was illegally exporting U.S. arms to Iran. Rabin told The Times in a September interview that "Israel is committed not to resell any American arms or even American components of Israeli-made arms without explicit U.S. permission.

"And we have kept this commitment through the years," he said. "If you can give me one example through the history of our relations that Israel sold (even) a wing that was produced in the United States without American approval, I'll swallow everything."

In fact, the United States had approved such Israeli shipments, and at least one was in progress at roughly the time Rabin talked with a Times reporter, sources said.

Israel's motivation for serving as an intermediary is not clear. However, according to court records in a federal arms smuggling case in New York, Israeli officials early this year sought Iranian help in freeing Israeli soldiers believed held in Lebanon.

In January, the names of Zecharya Baumel, Zvi Feldman and Yehuda Katz, all missing since a battle near Sultan Yaskoub on June 11, 1982, and Samir Assad, reported captured near Sidon in April, 1983, were turned over to a cousin of Hashemi Rafsanjani, the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament.

The cousin, Cyrus Hashemi, was posing as a prospective Iranian

buyer of U.S.-made arms from Israel. In fact, he was acting as an undercover informant in a U.S. Customs Service conspiracy investigation that ultimately led to the arrest of retired Israeli Gen. Avraham Bar-Am and 10 others on charges of violating U.S. export laws. The case, widely criticized in Israel, is awaiting trial.

#### No Markings on Aircraft

Former Iranian President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, now exiled in Paris, said on ABC's "Night Line" program Wednesday that in early September he learned through his own sources that "an American airplane with no markings did in fact deliver spare parts to Iran." A similar delivery took place in August of this year, Bani-Sadr claimed.

In September, the Danish Sailors

Union claimed that a ship from Denmark had carried at least 3,000 tons of American-made weapons to Iran from Israel between May and August of this year.

Union spokesman Henrik Berlau said that the Danish freighter Iles TH had carried four 900-ton shipments from the Israeli port of Eilat to the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas.

"We have the documentation, the log and the testimony of the sailors on board. We have the exact dates. There is absolutely no doubt," Berlau said.

The arms shipments apparently began at least a year earlier. On Sept. 15, 1985, a DC-8 cargo jet took off from Iran after delivering weapons to the Khomeini regime and landed in Israel—just a day after Shia terrorists released West.

Please see **HOSTAGES**, Page 13

Continued from Page 12

Israeli officials denied for two days that the plane was there, then acknowledged that the jet had landed. Air traffic controllers in Ankara, Turkey, and Beirut told reporters that the plane had reported its destination as Malaga, Spain, but then reported communications problems and headed for Tel Aviv.

The plane, identified by Turkish officials as U.S.-owned, carried the markings of International Airlines Support Group, Inc., of Miami. Richard Wellman, a spokesman for the company, told the Associated Press that the company had sold the plane to a firm called International Air Tourism of Nigeria.

That plane is now believed to have carried a weapons shipment to Iran that had originated in Israel. It was presumed, but could not be confirmed, that a similar planeload of arms earlier in the summer led to the release of Father Jenco last July.

It is not clear whether other shipments have been made in exchange for Iranian aid in stemming the tide of Shia-backed terrorism. However, the Iranian government played a role in ending the hostage crisis of June 14, 1985, when pro-Iranian Lebanese Muslim terrorists seized a Trans World Airways jet en route from Athens to Rome that was later diverted to Beirut.

The United States had asked Syria to intercede to free the hostages but only when Iran made its views known were the hostages freed. Since that incident, Shultz

has said several times that the United States has maintained informal contacts with the Iranians.

The decision to create a secret "back channel" for dealings with the Khomeini government, however, appears to have been undertaken without Shultz's knowledge and outside the usual interagency consultations that accompany major foreign-policy shifts.

State, Defense, Treasury and other Cabinet-level departments were totally unaware of the operation until hints of the shipments began to circulate at high levels shortly after McFarlane left the White House last December. It could not be learned when Shultz and Weinberger were informed of the secret channel with Iran.

One senior State Department official who deals with Iranian issues told The Times on Wednesday that "we've had a sense that some of this might have been going on, but we were informed of none of it."

"Our job was to enforce the [arms] embargo as best we could and we believed we were doing a good job of it. We believed the policy was showing increasing success."

White House spokesman Larry Speakes maintained the facade of that policy Tuesday, saying that "as long as Iran advocates the use of terrorism, the U.S. arms embargo will continue." Asked whether the Administration believes Iran now has reduced its support for terrorism, Speakes replied: "There has been no manifestation of a definitive change."

One U.S. official said, however, that the arms shipments carry "fairly enormous implications" for an American policy that has castigated other nations for dealing with known terrorists.

Times staff writer William C. Rempel contributed to this story from Los Angeles.

Iran sent mixed signals. Page 14.

#  
DIPS2. IRAN: THE POLITICAL POT BOILS

The domestic effect of Parliament Speaker Rafsanjani's allegations yesterday about a McFarlane visit remain to be seen. But the remarks come at a time of severe factional struggles. The intelligence ministry recently arrested several relatives and aides of Ayatollah Montazeri, Khomeini's chosen successor.

\* \* \*

Montazeri's authority has been gravely undermined by ministry of intelligence assertions that his supporters-- particularly his spokesman and son-in-law, Mehdi Hashemi-- plotted to overthrow the state. He reportedly tried to resign as designated successor after an angry Khomeini on October 18 rebuffed his pleas in defense of those arrested.


Ministry of intelligence vs. Montazeri. The arrests seem to have been ordered to make Montazeri's position as future leader untenable. Montazeri has had run-ins with the ministry before; this summer he publicly denounced ministry officials for "corruption," "deeds against religion," and "propelling society towards anarchy." Intelligence Minister Reyshahri has secured the backing of Ayatollah Khomeini, who in an unusual public letter decreed that only the intelligence ministry should investigate the "counterrevolutionary and deviant group."

Arrests reflect factional power struggle. Montazeri has shown an increasing tendency this year to side with conservative clerics and the traditional Islamic legal apparatus, much to the distress of radical factions in the government, including the leadership of the ministry of intelligence and the Revolutionary Guards.

Amid indications that Montazeri has privately objected to the government's handling of Iran's current economic crisis and may be opposed to Iran's plans for a "grand offensive" against Iraq, the radicals may have decided that the arrest of Mehdi Hashemi and others would be a convenient way to remove Montazeri from the scene.

Montazeri lacks strong constituency. His designation as successor, never publicly endorsed by Khomeini, has been controversial. Montazeri has developed little public following. The senior clerical leadership regards him as unqualified to succeed Khomeini or to be referred to as a grand ayatollah.


Rafsanjani's support. Rafsanjani, a consistent supporter of Montazeri, and President Khamene'i, who had not publicly backed Montazeri before, both now have loudly praised him. They are evidently distressed to see him in trouble, fearing that if his star declines, an orderly post-Khomeini transition of power may be impossible.



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WASHINGTON, D. C.

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*ΦIPS*

PRESS STATEMENT

ON ALLEGED MISUSE OF IRISH PASSPORTS

BY U.S. PERSONNEL

Arising out of media reports alleging misuse of Irish passports by U.S. personnel acting with the knowledge of the U.S. authorities, Irish representatives have been in contact with U.S. and Iranian officials and the Minister for Foreign Affairs has been personally in contact with U.S. Ambassador Heckler.

Following consideration of all the information from these conversations, the Minister for Foreign Affairs sought a meeting with Secretary of State Shultz. The meeting took place in Vienna at 6.30 a.m. today. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, on behalf of the Irish Government, told the Secretary of State that any misuse of Irish passports was totally unacceptable. The Secretary of State accepted that position.

7 November 1986

*T-BB-44  
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SITUATION ROOM ADDENDUM

November 10, 1986

~~SECRET~~

Further Reaction to Stories About McFarlane Visit to Iran

MIDDLE EAST REACTION: Iraqi officials fear the worst about the story and are eager to be reassured, Ambassador Newton reports...he adds that a loss of confidence in the word of the US would be a grave blow to our developing bilateral ties. Meanwhile, Iraq has ended news blackout with two press stories, but Newton calls it effort to vent public anger only ...US has not been accused directly. No official Iranian reaction over weekend. Lebanese Muslim leader Fadlallah says Iran has obtained "results" from the US and France on the hostage issue, but said conflicts within Iranian leadership could delay release of the hostages.

Foreign Minister Saud says story has caused "anxiety" for Riyadh...cited serious implications for region if reports true. Foreign Minister Abdel Meguid says Egypt "understands" US position...welcomes news of openings to Iran and possible emergence of moderate voices. Amir of Bahrain warns US duplicity could harm ties. President Salih calls reports disturbing and could affect US-YAR relations...Ambassador Rugh says Salih clearly upset and seems convinced arms transfers have taken place. Kuwait denies any involvement and again disavows link between hostages and Dawa prisoners.

USSR/WESTERN EUROPEAN REACTION: Embassy Dublin attributes strong Irish reaction to passport issue to government's tenuous hold on power...impact on US-Irish ties minimal... issue has started to die in media. No other State reporting on West European reaction over weekend. Only Soviet reaction has been Pravda article Sunday...said "McFarlane affair" showed US duplicity on Gulf War.

OTHER REACTIONS: Chinese Embassy in Baghdad clearly happy over stories, according to our Embassy...Chinese anticipate pressures on Beijing for selling arms will abate. (S)

SOURCES: Baghdad 04887, 04914; Riyadh 09938 NODIS; Cairo 25730 NODIS; Manama 04456 NODIS; Sanaa 07646 NODIS; Dublin 04469 NODIS; FBIS 15,21; Reuter 84

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*IPS*

ACTION

November 10, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR ALTON G. KEEL

FROM: HOWARD R. TEICHER *HRT*  
DENNIS B. ROSS *DBR(H)*

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor  
has seen

SUBJECT: Talking Points for November 10, 1986 CPPG,  
Situation in Iran

This memorandum provides you with talking points for the subject CPPG at Tab A. The Agenda is at Tab A.

There are several key objectives which the CPPG should be able to achieve:

- *Re-assignment*  
~~Reaching interagency consensus on U.S. regional interests and objectives, to include the tasking of a public articulation of these interests and objectives.~~
- *Allis*  
A tasking of an assessment of 1) The evolving leadership struggle in Iran and 2) the extent of Soviet influence, potential and current activities, in Iran.
- Discussion of short-term steps to limit damage to U.S. relations with Arab states.
- Discussion of the range of objectives available to increase U.S. leverage and long-term stability in Iran.

Against this backdrop you will have to decide whether now is the time to task the group to begin drafting an NSDD to codify our policy towards Iran.

Ron St. Martin *(T)* and Bob Earl *(T)* concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you use the talking points at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I Talking Points  
Tab A Agenda

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*T-88-61*  
*ADG 4/17/87*

ou. Relations w/ Arab

CRISIS PRE-PLANNING GROUP MEETING  
Monday, November 10, 1986  
Room 208, Cordell Hull Conference Room  
2:00-3:00 p.m.

THE SITUATION IN IRAN

Agenda

- I. Introduction Keel
- II. Intelligence Update Kerr
  - A. Nature of the Leadership Struggle
    - Key personalities
    - U.S. factor
    - Relationship to Iran-Iraq War
    - Soviet role and activism
    - Limits of predictability
  - B. Major Vulnerabilities and Potential Leverage Points
    - Can the situation be influenced from the outside?
- III. U.S. Interests Armacost
  - A. The Strategic Importance of Iran in the East-West Balance
  - B. Iran's Regional Role
  - C. Moderating Iranian Behavior
- IV. U.S. Objectives Keel
  - A. Build Leverage to Advance Interests as Internal Situation Unfolds
  - B. Avoid Prospects for Soviet Gains while Avoiding Superpower Crisis
  - C. Limit Damage to U.S. Relations with Arab States
- V. U.S. Options All
  - A. Diplomatic
  - B. Economic
  - C. Military
  - D. Public Affairs

VI. Summary

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TALKING POINTS

November 10, 1986 CPPG

Situation in Iran

I. INTRODUCTION

- We have called you all together in order to discuss how we shape our policy towards Iran.
- This group will not delve into any matters relating to our on-going efforts to secure the release of the hostages held in Lebanon. That is handled by a separate and extremely restricted compartment.
- I also want to handle this question of general policy in an extremely restricted way and must insist that you not share the details of this meeting or any papers that are circulated ~~beyond the~~ absolute minimum of those who need to know. ]
- Obviously there is some change underway in Iran which could have significant consequences for our interests.
- It is, therefore, absolutely essential that we determine now what steps we should be taking or be prepared to take to protect our interests and advance our objectives in the Persian Gulf not only now but over the long term.

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BY WOT, NARA, DATE 2/17/06

- As in many areas of policy, we have to keep our short and long-term interests and objectives in mind, and reconcile tensions between them where we can.

II. INTELLIGENCE UPDATE

- Before we discuss those interests and objectives I would like to ask the CIA to provide us with an intelligence update on the situation in Iran.

- Nature of leadership struggle.

- Vulnerability and leverage points which may be susceptible to external influence, if any.
- Also, how much do we think we can confidently predict.

III. U.S. INTERESTS

- I am confident that we have a basic consensus on the nature of our interests in Iran and the region. I would like to ask the President to review them for us.

*Strategic significance, geostrategic importance*

IV. U.S. OBJECTIVES

- We see three basic objectives for U.S. policy over the next few months to a year.

- First, we need to build American leverage which can advance our interests as the internal situation evolves. This means we must convince some elements in Iran that correct relations with the U.S. holds out the promise of a better future even though some elements will surely oppose such a relationship.
  
- Second, we must compete with the Soviets and limit the prospects for their involvement while avoiding a superpower crisis. The Soviet position in Iran is already stronger than ours and we must look for ways to compete now and in the future in its sectors where we or our Allies can give the pragmatic Iranians a choice. We have no interest in seeing Iran disintegrate: it must remain as a bulwark against the Soviets.
  
- Third, we must limit the damage to our relations with Arab states. This may or may not prove difficult to building on the near term course of events. But we must look for more than ~~rhetorical~~ ways to reassure our Arab friends that we are committed to helping protect our security interests.

#### V. OPTIONS

- First, we need to task the intelligence community to provide us with an update on the internal situation in Iran and the current Soviet-Iran relationship; character and pace of Soviet activity.

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- Second, we need to consider what diplomatic options are available to us, either U.S. initiatives or those of some friends such as Pakistan.
  
- Third, in the economic areas we need to develop an inventory of possible economic actions we need to take to advance our leverage. For instance, it would be useful if State could provide us with an update on the Iranian Claims Commission.
  
- With respect to military initiatives, I am not sure we need to do anything different than we are right now but I am open to suggestions.
  
- Finally in the public affairs area, I believe it is important for State to begin developing articulation of our regional policy. At a minimum, we must be ready to testify before Congress as soon as hearings are convened.

#### IV. SUMMARY

- I want to stress there has been no change in our basic policy towards Iran.
  
- We have long recognized Iranian strategy as a bulwark against Soviet expansionism. It is a necessary, strategic buffer separating the Soviets from the Gulf.

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- We continue to want to see a political settlement to the war between Iran and Iraq as soon as possible.
  
- We continue to call on Iran to moderate its support for subversive and terrorist movements.
  
- As we look to the future, we must be ready to take advantage of, and where necessary, try to create, opportunities to allow us to advance these interests and establish a normal relationship between the U.S. and Iran.
  
- This will not be easy, but we must make every effort to develop our understanding of the internal situation in Iran, assess the key thresholds for change in our policy, and decide on the appropriate initiative to take to accomplish those ends.
  
- Finally, we will probably require an NSDD at some point, although I am sure that we are not yet ready to formulate an NSDD at this time. I am open to suggestions.

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VP's OFFICE

Don Gregg

STATE

ARMACOST, Michael  
RAPHEL, Arnold

DOB 4/15/37  
3/16/43

SS

DOD

ARMITAGE, Richard  
PELLETREAU, Robert

4/26/45  
7/9/35

JCS

MOELLERING, Lt.Gen. John

2/4/38

CIA



2/8/44  
7/22/41



NSC

Robert Earl  
Rod McDaniel  
Peter Rodman  
Dennis Ross  
Ron St.Martin  
Howard Teicher

FOIA(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(6)

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HELGERSON, John

NSC  
Robert Earl  
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Peter Rodman  
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Ron St.Martin  
Howard Teicher

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NLS F96718/3 #154

By CS, NARA, Date 11/07/01

(RELEASE)

The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane  
November 10, 1986

US relations with Iran have been much in the news in recent days. Through all the stories, however, there is very little treatment of fundamentals; of what US interests are, how they are threatened, what we should aspire to in this relationship and how we ought to conduct ourselves so as to influence change in directions more to our liking over time. Let's stand off from events for a moment and try to take a dispassionate look at Iran from a strategic perspective.

Iran's strategic importance to the United States is self-evident from even a cursory look at a map. Sitting as it does between the Soviet Union and the Indian Ocean, it has remained for centuries a coveted avenue both for commerce and for bringing military power to bear throughout the sub-continent and beyond. As with Afghanistan and Pakistan, were the Soviet Union to dominate Iran, ~~their~~<sup>its</sup> ability to project power would be vastly improved. And concerning the current Soviet campaign in Afghanistan, the potential role of Iran in that conflict must be a matter of profound importance to the Soviet Union. It is not a trivial matter that the Soviets maintain 26 divisions on the Iranian border.

But apart from its juxtaposition to the Soviet Union, Iran has other geographic significance. Specifically, its position on the east side of the Persian Gulf gives it the opportunity to interdict Arab oil flows so vital to the economic well-being of Europe and Japan today and to the United States within ten years.

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Setting aside geographic considerations, Iran's oil is itself a key factor in fueling the world economy. At a minimum, it is in our interest to assure secure western access to it.

In short, it does not require great imagination to understand the enormous importance of Iran to our national security interests as well as to those of our allies. The corollary to this conclusion is that as a long-term proposition, we ought to try to engender a stable relationship with the Iranian government.

For the past seven years, however, that has proved impossible. Our purposes and Iran's have been fundamentally opposed. Iran has pursued a theocratic crusade devoted to expelling all Western presence from the Middle East. Their means have centered on violent terrorism and the taking of hostages. And it has been working. The rise in terrorism sponsored by Iran, Syria and Libya has been accompanied by a steady decline in Western diplomatic and commercial presence. The trends are clear; the West is leaving the Middle East. It is somewhat pedantic to point out that "...nature abhors a vacuum..."

So point one on our list of fundamental disagreements with Iran must be that while we accept their revolution as fact and do not seek to overturn it, we are determined to oppose their efforts to expel us from the Middle East to expand their

influence beyond their borders through the use of violence<sup>6</sup> and we specifically oppose their use of terrorism against innocent people. The United States has vital security interests in the Middle East that are entirely compatible with the security interests of Iran. We seek no territory nor influence within Iran and expect reciprocal behavior beyond its borders. In this same context, we oppose Iran's refusal to negotiate an end to its war with Iraq. Although Iraq was the original aggressor, we do not endorse the acquisition of territory by aggression by anyone. We call for a political settlement through negotiation and are willing to lend our support to such diplomatic efforts as Iran and Iraq may find acceptable.

Let me summarize then a few principles that ought to guide US policy toward Iran.

- o We have an enduring, vital national security interest in the maintenance of the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of Iran, free of outside influence under conditions of non-alignment, or neutrality.

- o We accept the Iranian revolution and do not seek to roll it back. But we are fundamentally opposed to its expansion beyond Iran's borders through overt hostilities or the use of terrorism. We support a negotiated end to the war with Iraq.

- o We will oppose terrorism with every appropriate

means. We will not make concessions to terrorists nor in any way contribute to ~~its~~ <sup>the</sup> continuation <sup>of terrorism</sup>. We could not envision the restoration of formal discourse with Iran prior to the release of all US hostages.

Given the scale of turmoil within Iran over the past seven years and today, it is difficult to predict when, if ever, Iranian authorities will see it in their interests to accept the legitimacy of these principles. Certainly if or when that day comes, we must be terribly wary of pitfalls such as assuming the authority of interlocutors to make decisions where ~~it~~ <sup>Such authority</sup> may not exist, <sup>or</sup> good faith where perfidy would serve their short term interest-and so forth. But when that day comes, the outcome will turn ultimately upon the judgment of those involved. And those officials in turn have a profound obligation to assure that they act in ways always compatible with American law and values. These things seldom happen in the open sunlight of town meetings. That was not the case with China and it won't be with Iran. That makes it doubly important that even as we avoid naivete', we also eschew cynicism.

As one who has had the high privilege and honor to serve in the government and thus have often faced such circumstances, I wouldn't pretend they are easy for they are not. But with study, firmness, adherence to law and principle, and prayer, the

collective wisdom of our government will usually find a successful answer. Occasionally it requires a little patience and trust. But in the certain knowledge that our system will assure the full and timely disclosure of important policy initiatives and the presumption that our government always works for progress as measured by our values, it is not too high a price to pay.



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November 10, 1986

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DISCUSSION PAPER

International Relations with Iran

The Islamic Republic of Iran has maintained diplomatic, economic, and military relations with a variety of countries throughout the world. Recently, there has been much speculation over a change in U.S. policy toward Iran. In order to intelligently respond to either criticism or this speculation, the facts behind Iran's international relations need to be considered.

Diplomatic Relations

Throughout the seven year existence of the Islamic Republic, Iran has maintained diplomatic relations with all of the European nations and all of the Middle Eastern/Arab countries with the exception of Egypt. Despite the war, even Iraq maintains normal diplomatic relations with Iran. Relations with Egypt were broken when the Shah was committed to exile in Egypt. The only western countries not to have diplomatic relations are the United States and Canada.

Economic Relations

Iran's gross national product in 1985 was more than \$80 billion, despite the deteriorating situation created by the revolutionary chaos. Major trading partners in 1985 were:

<u>Country</u>	<u>Imports</u>	<u>Exports</u>
Japan	\$ 1,360M	\$ 2,525M
Turkey	1,000M	1,500M
West Germany	1,647M	642M
Italy	611M	1,502M
Netherlands	270M	1,042M
Spain	284M	888M
France	160M	803M
United Kingdom	678M	80M
United States	74M	763M

Trade between Iran and other Middle Eastern/Arab countries is negligible and primarily conducted on the black market. Iran does provide Syria with oil in payment for trade concessions. Petroleum constitutes 98% of Iran's \$16 billion exports, although it is interesting to note that \$280 million of their exports to the United States are in agricultural products (pistachio). Machinery, food stuffs, pharmaceuticals, and military supplies make up the bulk of their inputs.

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Military Relations

Military shipments to Iran can be divided into four categories: (1) non-lethal military equipment; (2) ammunition and small arms; (3) spare parts for U.S. weapon systems; and (4) major combat weapon systems. The total value of the four categories shipped to Iran from western Europe is approximately \$500 million a year (see Tab I).

Non-lethal military equipment is freely available throughout Europe. The Europeans make no effort to prevent its shipment. The Germans, for example, recently sold bridging equipment to the Iranians. [REDACTED] have recently installed a radar system for use along the Iranian-Soviet border and claim to have close control over its use. However, there are reports that the system is operating along the Iraqi border.

Ammunition and small arms are almost as freely available as non-lethal equipment and constitute most of the western arms sales to Iran estimated to be \$300 million a year. Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Austria are the prime sources. France had been a major source, but internal politics has curtailed their involvement.

Spare parts for U.S. weapon systems is the most difficult equipment for the Iranians to purchase. [REDACTED] Israel is the worst offender. The by-country summary of sales at Tab II shows some involvement by the Europeans.

Major weapon systems are not generally available from western Europe. However, in 1984, the UK sold "hospital" ships to Iran that were retrofitted in Italy with naval guns. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Looking outside western Europe, the largest single supplier of military sales to Iran is China, which sells well over \$1 billion worth of military equipment annually. This includes anti-aircraft missiles, coastal surface-to-surface missiles, light and heavy artillery pieces, and some tanks. Eastern European countries sell between \$300 million and \$400 million worth of military equipment that includes everything except major weapon systems. Other suppliers of military equipment include North Korea, South Korea, Syria, Libya, and Chile.

Attachments

Tab I - Value Chart

Tab II - By-Country Summary

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 16-17 LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

- Put myself in Shultz position defending what we have done.
- Enough to make it acceptable to Allies/Arabs.
- Save face w/allies/arabs
- why is op. staunch still important.

Several Scripts <sup>concern about the balance / good faith measures</sup>

- o Allies (anti-terror will be key)
- o Arabs (don't double deal on Iran-Iraq, didn't change the balance, intell.)
- o ~~Moderate~~ Intelligence Comm. Needs
- o Foreign Affairs
- o Input into Nat'l Sec strategy.

Dial-a-script  
insert dirt we have  
on them as offset  
to our actions.

- Reaffirmation of our long-term strat. inter in Iran, its importance
- Iran-Iraq
- Policy hasn't changed. consistent w/advancing obj.
- stopping terror, part. state-sponsored terror.

Then unfold how actions are consistent in support of

- o in our interest to make good faith gestures w/ Iranian moderates to build trust in U.S., work w/them to advance convergen. CBM & Good Faith...
- o strengthen their position in factional maneuvering
- o positioning for succession.

Re terror

- o dealt w/groups committed to ending terror.
- o made that comm. after we demanded end to terror.
- o They complied
- o we advanced our objective

Release hostages

Not less important that you sell → more important that you not.