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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
127830	NOTE	TO VINCENT CANNISTRARO RE REPORT PAR 12/4/2002 NLSF96-118/2 #218; UPHELD 12/4/2017 M393 #127830	1	4/1/1985	B1 B3
127832	REPORT	RE IRAN PAR 12/4/2002 NLSF96-118/2 #219; PAR 12/4/2017 M393 #127832	8	4/1/1985	B1 B3
127834	ROUTING SLIP	D 12/4/2002 F96-118/2 #220; UPHELD 12/4/2017 M393 #127834	1	ND	B1 B3
127835	REPORT	RE IRAN D 12/4/2002 F96-118/2 #221; UPHELD 12/4/2017 M393 #127835	9	2/28/1985	B1 B3
127836	CABLE	252304Z FEB 85 D 12/4/2002 F96-118/2 #222; UPHELD 12/4/2017 M393 #127836	4	2/25/1985	B1 B3
127838	REPORT	RE IRAN D 12/4/2002 F96-118/2 #223	20	ND	B1 B3

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DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. note	to Vincent Cannistraro re: report, 1p PART 12/4/02 F96-118/2 #218	4/1/85	P1/F1 133
2. report	re: Iran, 8p	4/1/85	P1/F1 63
3. routing slip	1p PART " " #219	nd	P1/F1 63
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5. cable	752304Z FEB 85, 4p D " " #221	2/25/85	P1/F1 63
6. report	re: Iran, 19p D " " #222	7/1/85	P1/F1 63

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File Folder IRAN (SUPER - SENSITIVE) 1984 (2)

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F96-118/2

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ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date
2	REPORT RE IRAN	8 <i>with 3/6/08</i>	4/1/1985

File
Iran

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निकट पूर्व/दक्षिण एशिया विश्लेषण कार्यालय
ادارة التحليل لشؤون الشرق الاوسط وجنوب آسيا
המחלקה לניתוח המזרח התיכון ודרום אסיה
اداره تجزيه و تحليل غاور ميانه و جنوب آسيا
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis
Directorate of Intelligence

1 April 1985

Mr. Vincent Cannistraro
Director of Intelligence Programs
National Security Council

Vincent

Attached is the memorandum you requested on Iranian opposition. I hope you find it and the other memo I sent you useful. If you would be interested, I would be happy to have the Chief of the [redacted] and the senior political analyst on Iran come down and talk with you about Iranian matters. This would need to be done quickly, however, as they both will be leaving in mid-April for a TDY to the Middle East.

[redacted]
Chief, [redacted] Division

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ADJ 4/7/87

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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

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EO 13526
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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

1 April 1985

IRAN: STATUS OF OPPOSITION GROUPS

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLR M393/1 #127832

BY RW NARA DATE 12/4/17

Summary

The Khomeini regime is facing its greatest challenges since securing control of Iran. Factionalism within the regime, dwindling oil income, and the recent military setbacks are causing increased domestic unrest. Nonetheless, organized opponents of the regime--both within and outside Iran--appear to lack sufficient strength to exploit the regime's problems. Opposition groups inside Iran remain on the defensive because of harsh government repression. Regime opponents in exile have little support in Iran and continue to bicker among themselves. Rather than opposition groups, we believe factions within the regime have a better chance of gaining control and altering Iranian policies. Iran's mounting economic problems and war weariness, however, are creating conditions that could permit a non-clerical coalition to coalesce and gain popular support. [redacted]

* * *

Long-running power struggles within the Khomeini regime are intensifying, both because of the Ayatollah's failing health and because the regime faces serious problems with the economy and in the war with Iraq.

This paper was prepared by [redacted] Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, Persian Gulf Division. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Persian Gulf Division, [redacted]

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- Lower oil revenues and low foreign exchange reserves prevent the government from relying on imports to maintain current consumption levels and to provide materials for domestic industry.
- Economic austerity is adding to domestic unrest and regime spokesmen are urging the public to lower its expectations.
- Iran's latest offensive was a dismal failure despite months of preparation.
- Iraq appears determined to maintain a heightened level of economic and military pressure on Iran to force it to the negotiating table. []

The regime's efforts to deal with these problems are being complicated by factional infighting. Moderates believe that the best way to preserve an Islamic regime in Iran is to adopt a less aggressive foreign policy and to adjust domestic policies in an effort to deal with economic difficulties. Radicals believe that any relaxation of revolutionary policies will lead Iran back into subservience to the West--and also end their political careers. Khomeini, whose support is still critical for any faction's success, recently seems to have been tilting away from the radicals. []

Groups opposed to the Khomeini regime--both inside Iran and abroad--have been unable to exploit the government's problems, and we believe they are unlikely to wield significant influence in Iran even after the Ayatollah dies.

- No leader capable of challenging Khomeini's personal appeal or that of the Islamic government he symbolizes has emerged within any opposition group. The role of a strong personality to galvanize popular opposition--as Khomeini did against the Shah--is considered crucial by most experts on Iran.
- Prominent exiles engage in endless bickering and posturing. Although some maintain limited contacts inside Iran, there is little evidence of popular support for any of them.
- Opposition groups active within Iran are subject to repression and continuous surveillance by the regime. These groups remain an irritant rather than a significant threat. []

Nonetheless, Iran's economic downturn and popular war weariness are issues that eventually could unite disparate elements in the population against clerical rule. War policy already is debated within the regime in terms of how the day-to-day well-being of the regime's lower class supporters will be affected. Iranian leaders also appear to recognize that economic problems can cause a broad segment of the populace to turn against the regime. The government has moved to placate conservative bazaaris and has beaten and arrested dozens of striking workers in hopes of preventing a unified opposition labor movement. Although there is little information about the organization of strikes, one new group--the Solidarity Committee of Iranian Workers, based in Esfahan where Communist influences have been strong among workers--claims it coordinated strike actions in several cities late last year, according to the exile press. []

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Opposition Groups in Iran

There are several groups inside Iran in open opposition to the Khomeini regime. Although all cooperated in the anti-Shah movement and hoped to play influential roles in the revolutionary government, they have been excluded by the clerics and have turned against the regime. Recognizing that these groups pose a threat, Tehran has brutally suppressed them. []

Mujahedin-e Khalq. This Islamic-Marxist nationalist group assassinated several US advisors in Iran during the revolution. Led by exiled Masud Rajavi, it posed the most serious challenge to the Khomeini regime until it was suppressed in 1981. Rajavi fled to France in 1981 and the status of current Mujahedin leadership in Iran is unknown. The group had a committed cadre of around 10,000 educated urban youths at its peak in early 1981 and had penetrated the government and the Revolutionary Guard. It still claims to have several thousand cadre, although we suspect this figure is exaggerated. []

The Mujahedin-e Khalq has an active propaganda program outside Iran and has been involved in the recent resurgence of scattered terrorist actions in Iran and abroad. The group maintains an uneasy alliance through the National Resistance Council with former President Bani-Sadr and the Kurdish Democratic Party. []

Paykar. This group is a leftist offshoot of the Mujahedin-e Khalq. It has always been small and its members are regular targets of regime repression. []

Tudeh Communist Party. The pro-Soviet Tudeh had about 5,000 members before its leaders were arrested for treason and the party was repressed in 1983. Tudeh had cooperated with the Khomeini regime, but it also had penetrated both the government and military. Some senior members associated with the military were executed following the crackdown in 1983. Civilian leaders have not yet been tried. An underground organization may still function in Iran, but the new party leadership is in exile in Europe. []

Fedayen-e Khalq. This small radical leftist group carries out scattered terrorist activity in Iran and abroad. It split in 1979, one part merging with the Tudeh Party and the other remaining active in northwestern Iran along with dissident Kurds. It has been repressed by the Khomeini regime and its leadership is unknown. []

Kurdish Democratic Party. Abdol Rahman Qasemlu, its leader, claims that the party has 10,000 members, but it probably has far fewer than that under arms. Repeated regime offensives since 1979 have forced the Kurdish guerrillas into the mountains, where they continue hit-and-run operations. Iraq and European socialist groups provide some aid and the Party remains in an uneasy alliance with the Mujahedin-e Khalq. []

Solidarity Committee of Iranian Workers. According to the Iranian exile press, this group emerged in late 1984 during a period of apparently coordinated strikes in major urban centers. The exile press claims the group is modeled on the Polish Solidarity Union. No details are available on its []

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leadership, but it may be the nucleus of a coordinated labor movement. If it exists, this would be the first internal group to challenge the regime since the suppression of the Mujahedin-e Khalq and it could attract popular support because of economic austerity and war weariness. []

The Opposition Outside Iran

Iranian exiles have been unable either to unite or to maintain strong links into Iran. Bickering among the groups and competition for resources have diverted their energies. Exiled oppositionists and their supporters can be divided into two groups--those who were part of the revolutionary coalition, but later ran afoul of the Khomeini regime, and those who opposed the revolution. Prominent among the former are:

- Former Defense Minister Admiral Ahmad Madani, 56 years old. Madani fled Iran in 1980 after antagonizing pro-Khomeini radicals. He seems to retain a positive reputation in Iran, but has only limited influence among some moderate clerics and laymen as well as among some military elements. Madani may be the only exile leader with sufficient support to have a chance of returning to an official position in an Islamic post-Khomeini regime.
- Former President Abol Hasan Bani-Sadr, 57 years old. He fled Iran with Mujahedin-e Khalq leader Rajavi in 1981 and retains none of the popularity he enjoyed when Khomeini seemed to endorse him. A Paris-educated radical economist, he has no personal appeal to Islamic radicals or moderates.
- Mujahedin-e Khalq leader Masud Rajavi, in his late 30s. He was a charismatic leader of the Mujahedin-e Khalq, but lost much of his credibility when he fled Iran in 1981, leaving behind his militant wife who was subsequently killed by regime security forces. He remains an articulate spokesman for the Mujahedin's Islamic-Marxist doctrine which appeals to educated urban youths, but is suspect among older, less upwardly-mobile Iranians.
- Tudeh remnants scattered throughout Europe, the USSR, and Afghanistan after the government cracked down on the Party in 1983. Considered an appendage of the USSR, its leaders have little personal following in Iran. []

Exiled leaders who opposed the Islamic Revolution from the start have little support inside Iran.

- Former Prime Minister Shapur Bakhtiar, in his early 70s, probably retains a weak following among the Westernized urban population remaining in Iran, perhaps including some older military men. He may also be able to run limited anti-Khomeini operations inside Iran. He has no Islamic appeal, however, and cultivates an image more French than Iranian--a professional exile par excellence.
- Reza Pahlavi, the late Shah's 24-year-old elder son, benefits from a nostalgic popular hindsight triggered by the current hardships in Iran. Although some elements of the population taunt regime members

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by shouting pro-Pahlavi slogans during demonstrations, the royal family retains little support in Iran. Royalists may, however, be able to stage limited operations inside Iran. The "young Shah" has no well-defined political personality or program, although he recently named a committee to consider forming a government-in-exile.

Opposition Factions Within the Regime and Other Interest Groups

The following groups accept, in varying degrees, the principal of clerical influence in the government. They disagree, however, with some aspects of the current regime and are attempting to reshape clerical rule. We believe these groups will play key roles in the struggle for control after Khomeini and are attempting to exploit current difficulties for their own advantage. (A list of key regime members and their affiliations is attached to this memorandum.)

Moderates within the Regime. These clerics, laymen, bazaaris, and government technocrats believe that Iran's interests--and their own--lie in reducing clerical involvement in government. They would like to screen radical proposals for central control of economic activity, land reform, prolonging the war with Iraq, and limiting foreign contacts to other revolutionary regimes. We believe the moderates probably are strong enough in the newly elected Consultative Assembly to sidetrack radical programs. Moreover, they recently have been strengthened by support from Khomeini in his statements on domestic legislation and foreign policy.

Conservatives Outside the Regime. This faction is dominated by elderly senior Shia clerics who are strongly opposed to close identification of the clergy with the government. They would like to reduce the day-to-day political role of clerics and rescind radical foreign and domestic policies. Of the four senior clerics who have most strongly criticized the regime, two recently died. Two other senior clerics sometimes cooperate with Tehran because they hope--along with their moderate allies--to affect the succession to Khomeini.

Military. The regime has repeatedly uncovered coup plots and purged the armed forces, but still suspects their loyalty. The ubiquity of clerical advisors and informers reduces the possibility of effective independent political activity by the military or action on behalf of an exile leader. Moderate and conservative clerics have cultivated contacts within the regular and paramilitary forces and would attempt to use these links to gain military support if the power struggle among regime factions becomes violent.

Revolutionary Guard Officers and Radical Lay Technocrats. Both groups play an important role in the Khomeini regime. Regime concern about the influence of the Guard is reflected in Khomeini's admonitions that it stay out of politics. Despite these warnings, factions within the regime have sought support among Revolutionary Guard units in anticipation of future strife. Many Guard officers and radical lay technocrats are opportunists who are not deeply Islamic and probably resent the prominence of the clerics. These elements probably hope eventually to oust the clerics in favor of a government dominated by "progressive" lay groups.

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The Guard--never a cohesive organization--presently appears to be even less unified than in the past. Experienced Guard officers are disillusioned and several sources have reported that the Guard is losing men at all levels. These trends probably will be strengthened by Iran's latest defeat. Nearly all the forces committed to the attack were Revolutionary Guards and we believe they comprised over 90 percent of the casualties. There is an alternative, although less likely, possibility that the recent losses and other government actions limiting Guard prerogatives could spur Guard unity against a "common" enemy--the clerical regime. If elements of the Guard unite, they would become a key player in the Iranian power struggle. Should the Guard help overthrow clerical rule, it would be unlikely to support moderate policies that would be more favorable to US interests. []

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Personalities in the Khomeini Regime

Prominent Leaders Not Tied to Any Faction

These individuals are sometimes referred to as the pragmatists because they align with various factions depending on the issue and their own political stakes.

- Ayatollah Montazeri, Khomeini's heir apparent, is a senior cleric in his 50s who has increasingly taken on duties delegated by Khomeini. Labeled a radical in the early years of the regime, he has more recently become a leading spokesman for more moderate policies.
- Majles Speaker Rafsanjani, a junior cleric in his 40s, is a skilled politician, second only to Khomeini in power. A firm believer in tight clerical control, he has been associated with both radicals and moderates. He is probably more willing than Montazeri or President Khomeini to deal with the USSR.
- President Khomeini, a junior cleric in his 40s, is less politically adept than Rafsanjani, but is known as an excellent speaker. He also has been associated with both radicals and moderates. Khomeini opposes Montazeri as Khomeini's sole heir. He probably will run for re-election this fall.

Moderates

We believe the following Iranian leaders are moderates who generally favor more normal ties with the West.

- Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani, a senior cleric in his 50s, has longstanding ties to Khomeini. He leads an important moderate clerical association based in Tehran and has strong links to the Revolutionary Guard. He may be a candidate in the presidential election this fall.
- Majles Deputy Speakers Yazdi and Rabani-Amlashi are mid-level clerics in their late 40s or early 50s. They have spoken out strongly against radical proposals for extensive clerical involvement in government, far-reaching economic and social changes, and an intransigent foreign policy. Instead, they favor a government focused on the Assembly and led by capable laymen under general clerical guidance.
- Foreign Minister Velayati, a Western trained physician in his 40s, is typical of the technocrats who are working to create a less radical Islamic regime. He probably hopes to become Prime Minister.

Conservative Clerics

- Grand Ayatollahs Marashi-Majafi, Golpayegani, Shariat-Madari, and Tabatabai-Qomi, top level clerics in their 80s and 90s, are theoretically Khomeini's spiritual peers. All have used their wide popular influence to encourage opposition to many of the regime's radical programs. Shariat-Madari and Qomi are under house arrest.

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(Two other Grand Ayatollahs opposed to the Khomeini regime have died of natural causes since last fall.) [redacted]

Radicals

The following prominent radicals are typical of those who are not pro-Soviet, but whom we believe are willing to cooperate with the USSR, especially if they felt Iran was under increased threat from the US.

- Deputy Foreign Minister for Political Affairs Sheikholeslam, a layman in his 30s, was a leader of the hostage-takers at the US Embassy. He is a strong advocate of radical foreign policy positions and has been closely linked to terrorist activities.
- Revolutionary Guard Commander Rezaei and Guard Minister Rafiqzadeh, laymen in their 30s, who have longstanding links to influential radical clerics and radical Arab states and groups.
- Heavy Industries Minister Nabavi, a layman in his 40s, has been labelled a leftist [redacted]. According to Rafiqzadeh, Nabavi is an excellent manager. Nabavi has ties to an armed paramilitary group whose sympathizers hold other influential positions.
- Hojat ol-Eslam Khomeini, a junior cleric in his 40s, was the spiritual advisor of the hostage-takers and a deputy speaker of the Assembly until mid-1984. Close to Khomeini's son, Ahmad, Khomeini now holds a shadowy position as a personal advisor to the Ayatollah and hopes to win his endorsement for the presidential election later this year. He has been closely linked to Iranian terrorist activity. [redacted]

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
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U. S. POLICY OPTIONS FOR POST-KHOMEINI
IRAN
September 9, 1985

BDM/W-85-1270-WP

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Prepared for the National Security Council, Washington, D. C.

THE BDM CORPORATION

FOREWORD

The BDM Corporation is pleased to submit to the National Security Council its concept of a work program designed to formulate U.S. policy options for post-Khomeini Iran.

The BDM Corporation estimates a level of effort of 1.5 to 1.75 man years and eight months completion time, including preparation of a Final Report and briefings as required.

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A. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The United States is faced with the growing reality of the approaching termination of the personal and autocratic political authority of the Ayatollah Khomeini. Because of his advanced age, and reports of poor health, it is highly likely that the Ayatollah will not remain in effective power for an extended period of time. Furthermore, because of the lingering nature of Khomeini's increasing infirmity, it is difficult to predict both the manner and time of his departure from the control of Iran's government. This state of affairs presents the United States with the imperative of considering a wide range of contingencies and subsequent policy options and responses to Khomeini's departure from power. Moreover, the unpredictable nature of Khomeini's demise also impels the United States to prepare policy options so that it can capitalize on immediate, midterm and longer term contingencies.

The BDM Corporation recognizes the complexity of the present and future Iranian/Persian Gulf political, religious, economic, and military environments, and the impact these factors place on subsequent U.S. policy options resulting from Khomeini's removal from power. In its analytic approach, the BDM analysts will consider the most likely post-Khomeini contingency conditions and optimal U.S. policy options with regard to costs, risks, and benefits to be derived within the context of immediate, midterm or longer term crises conditions.

B. PROBLEM UNDERSTANDING

The United States needs to be prepared to respond to the eventuality of Ayatollah Khomeini's removal from power in order to prevent a furtherance of the anti-American/antimoderate autocratic Khomeini regime established in 1979, or the establishment of a pro-Soviet satellite which could result from the political chaos following Khomeini's departure. The United States should be prepared to take action immediately in accordance with its national interests by utilizing resources inside and outside

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Iran, and its own diplomatic, economic, and financial assets to ensure a favorable outcome in Iran of its policy objectives.

The strategic importance of Iran to its immediate region and the free world is of the highest order. Continuation of the radical and fundamentalist policies of the present regime will further destabilize the region and could significantly alter the region's political configuration. Iran's transformation to that of a Soviet satellite would have dire consequences affecting the strategic balance between the free world and the Soviet Union.

Because of the urgency of the need to be able to respond accordingly with high confidence of success to the inevitable political crisis which is most likely to occur with Khomeini's departure, The BDM Corporation is prepared to undertake a comprehensive policy option study program.

C. PROGRAM OBJECTIVE AND ANALYTIC APPROACH

The program objective is to produce an array of post-Khomeini Iran contingencies ranging in likelihood of occurrence and related optimal U.S. response/policy options with cost, risk, and benefit analyses.

In order to achieve the objective most efficiently and in a timely manner, the proposed program's analytical approach will focus on three primary study areas from which the program tasks are developed. The primary study areas are as follows:

1. Iran's Current and Future Status (Internal and External Political Factors)

The BDM study team will investigate Iran's internal political dynamics to include the roles and power potential of the religious oligarchy (e.g., the Ayatollahs Sheriatmadari, Ghomi, Golpiegani, and Ruhanni), the Armed Forces (especially the Army), and the political establishment (President Khamenei, Parliament Speaker Rafsanjani). Nonruling political and regional power groups will be investigated also, to include the moderate forces headed by former Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan; the extremist religious and pro-Soviet Mujahedin-e-Kalq, the underground Marxist Fedayeen-e-Kalq, and the outlawed Communist Tudeh Party.

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Furthermore, requiring particular attention are the regional tribal groups which have long identified with the ruling power groups and ethnic groups seeking autonomy and in opposition to Khomeini (e.g., the Kurds, now led by the pro-Soviet Abdur-al-Rahman).

Equally important to the formulation of U.S. policy options are the current and future roles of the anti-Khomeini opposition groups outside Iran. Though these groups are not in agreement regarding the ultimate national leadership and are divided along a political spectrum ranging from monarchists to republicans, from extremely pro-U.S. to neutralism, and further, along lines of emigre leadership personalities, these emigre groups are in strong agreement on three important points: anti-Communism, establishment of a post-Khomeini constitutional/representative government, and the urgent necessity of U.S. support for the successful achievement of an anti-Communist, democratic, post-Khomeini Iran. The more important potential leaders to be addressed in the proposed study program include Dr. Ali Amini, former Prime Minister; Dr. Shahpur Bakhtiar, the last prime minister before the Shah's demise; Mohssen Pezeshkpour, leader of the Pan-Iranist Party, an anti-Communist group with followers inside Iran, especially in the Khuzestan region; the conservative National Front under Admiral Madani; the Azadegan Group, a moderate, constitutionalist group with support of important military groups, led by the former Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief, the late Gen. Bahram Aryane, and now by Dr. Assad Homayoun, the former Minister to Washington. This group endeavors to act as an umbrella for all the democratic, anti-Khomeini factions.

The ultimate role and impact of the late Shah's son, Reza Pahlavi, in the current anti-Khomeini and post-Khomeini environment is yet to be ascertained and appreciated. Though comparatively young (age 25) and politically inexperienced, he has the support of the former SAVAK and Bahai religious leaders besides some traditional and conservative clergy. The progress to post-Khomeini leadership of Reza Pahlavi will be one of the most critical aspects of the "external" Iranian environment of anti-Khomeini groups and thus of particular value to U.S. policy formulation relating to Iran's future.

2. U.S. Interests in Iran and the Persian Gulf Region

Because of its location and petroleum resources, Iran will be of paramount strategic importance to the United States. Iran, since the 1960s, has risen to predominance in the region to the point where it is now in a position to threaten the political and military stability of its neighbors and, indeed, to impress its own brand of radicalism/religious fundamentalism on the region counter to U.S. security interests. The analysis of this focal point of the study will address especially political, military/strategic, and economic (mainly petroleum) considerations, and the ongoing Iran-Iraq War and its impact on the future U.S. position in the region. A comprehensive analysis of U.S. interests in Iran and the Gulf region will be a necessary input to the formulation of post-Khomeini contingency policy options and, most importantly, on the cost/risk benefit assessment of these options. Moreover, the identification and delineation of U.S. regional interests will provide a frame of reference to guide the U.S. concerning which of the anti-Khomeini opposition groups the U.S. should support and how that support will be rendered.

3. Other Nations' Interests in Iran and the Persian Gulf Region

It is easy to understand the vital interest of the Soviet Union, the industrialized world, and Iran's neighbors in the future status of Iran. In order for a credible formulation of U.S. policy options and their cost/risk benefits, it is essential that this be accomplished within the context of the other powers/blocs regional interests and involvements. In this light, it is vital to the United States to bear in mind that whatever option it chooses to exercise, the risk of confrontation with the Soviet Union or direct Soviet intervention in Iran exists. Likewise, any direct U.S. action might cause the Iranian government to block free traffic flow through the Strait of Hormuz, thus necessitating the involvement of U.S. military forces to ensure uninterrupted oil flow. Thirdly, a U.S. response to conditions in Iran must take into account Iranian reaction against Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the other Gulf states. Thus, this portion of the analysis will be directed at the principal powers' interests (e.g., military, strategic, economic) in the region to include the Soviet Union,

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Western Europe, and Japan, and the regional states, especially Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The projected analysis will consist of six tasks including a Final Report, arranged in a manner to permit a rapid completion time, yet ensuring the inclusion of those essential tasks required to produce a range of credible U.S. policy options with associated cost/risk benefits. The projected tasks are as follows:


- (1) Task 1a: Analyze and evaluate the current and future status of Iran (internal and external factors),
- (2) Task 1b: Determine U.S. national security interests (current and future) concerning Iran and the Persian Gulf,
- (3) Task 1c: Determine attitudes and special interests of other nations/blocs concerning Iran and the Persian Gulf,
- (4) Task 2a: Develop matrix/matrices of contingencies for immediate conditions in Iran,
- (5) Task 2b: Develop matrix/matrices of contingencies for midterm conditions,
- (6) Task 2c: Develop matrix/matrices of contingencies for long-term conditions in Iran,
- (7) Task 3: Assess/evaluate contingencies with reference to the likelihood of occurrence and impact on U.S. national interests,
- (8) Task 4: Determine array of U.S. policy options relating to derived post-Khomeini contingencies,
- (9) Task 5: Perform cost/risk benefits analysis and assessment for each U.S. policy option, and
- (10) Task 6: Prepare Final Report and Briefings.

D. LEVEL OF EFFORT

The BDM Corporation estimates a total period of eight months will be required to accomplish the study including the Final Report and preparation of briefings and an Interim (Midproject) Report if desired. This can be accomplished by utilizing two full-time senior staff analysts and several

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part-time support analysts and consultants for specialized tasks on a need basis. The manpower staffing requirement is estimated to be 1.5 to 1.75 man years. If an accelerated schedule is desired, BDM has the capability to compress the study period and devote additional analysts to the effort.





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