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Collection: Teicher, Howard J.: Files
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name TEICHER, HOWARD: FILES

Withdrawer

CAS 1/18/2012

File Folder IRAN (SUPER SENSITIVE) 1984 (1)

FOIA

M11-392

Box Number 1/91682

BYRNE

4

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
127711	PAPER	RE IRAN PAR 2/8/2006 NLSF96-118/2 #196	2	ND	B1
127712	PAPER	RE IRAN D 1/3/2001 F96-118/2 #197; 8/15/02 UPHELD ON APPEAL;	2	ND	B1 B3
127714	MEMO	TO ASST SEC OF STATE FOR NEAR EAST AND SOUT ASIAN AFFAIRS D 12/4/2002 F96-118/2 #198; PAR 12/4/2017 M393 #127714	1	6/11/1985	B1 B3
127716	REPORT	D 12/4/2002 F96-118/2 #199; UPHELD 12/4/2017 M393 #127716	2	6/7/1985	B1 B3
127718	MEMO	TO ROBERT MCFARLANE D 12/4/2002 F96-118/2 #200; UPHELD 12/4/2017 M393 #127718	4	3/8/1985	B1 B3
127719	REORT	D 12/4/2002 F96-118/2 #201; UPHELD 12/4/2017 M393 #127719	5	3/7/1985	B1 B3
127721	MEMO	VINCE CANNISTRARO TO TEICHER RE DRAFT PAPER PAR 11/22/2000 NLSF96-118/2 #202	1	ND	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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Collection Name TEICHER, HOWARD: FILES

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CAS 1/18/2012

File Folder IRAN (SUPER SENSITIVE) 1984 (1)

FOIA

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
127723	DRAFT PAPER	RE IRAN PAR 2/8/2006 NLSF96-118/2 #203	10	5/24/1985	B1
127724	ROUTING SLIP	DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233	1	5/15/1985	P5
127725	MEMO	CANNISTRARO TO POINDEXTER RE MEETING D 1/3/2001 NLSF96-118/2 #204; 8/15/02 UPHELD ON APPEAL; D UPHELD 1/30/2015 M11-392/1 #127725	2	5/15/1985	B1 B3
127727	MEMO	TO GEOFFREY KEMO RE ATTACHED REPORT D 12/4/2002 F96-118/2 #205; UPHELD 12/4/2017 M393 #127727	1	2/10/1984	B1 B3
127728	ROUTING SLIP	D 12/4/2002 F96-118/2 #206; UPHELD 12/4/2017 M393 #127728	1	ND	B1 B3
127729	REPORT	D 12/4/2002 F96-118/2 #207; UPHELD 12/4/2017 M393 #127729	4	2/9/1984	B1 B3
127731	DRAFT CABLE	RE TWA HIJACKING (ANNOTATED) D 2/8/2006 F96-118/2 #208; R 11/21/2017 M393/1 #127731	2	7/2/1985	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
127732	CABLE	RE TWA HIJACKING D 2/8/2006 F96-118/2 #209; R 11/21/2017 M393/1 #127732	2	7/2/1985	B1
127733	MEMO	JOCK COVEY TO POINDEXTER RE MEETINGS D 2/8/2006 F96-118/2 #210; R 11/21/2017 M393/1 #127733	1	ND	B1
127735	DRAFT MESSAGE	D 2/8/2006 F96-118/2 #211; R 11/21/2017 M393/1 #127735	2	ND	B1
127736	REPORT	RE IRAN PAR 12/4/2002 F96-118/2 #212	19	ND	B1 B3
127737	REPORT	RE IRAN PAR 12/4/2002 F96-118/2 #213; PAR 12/4/2017 M393 #127737	20	ND	B1 B3
127738	PAPER	RE AMERICAN HOSTAGES D 2/8/2006 F96-118/2 #214; R 11/21/2017 M393/1 #127738	2	ND	B1
127740	NON-PAPER	RE US HOSTAGES D 2/8/2006 F96-118/2 #215; R 11/21/2017 M393/1 #127740	3	ND	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
127742	NON-PAPER	RE US HOSTAGES <i>D 2/8/2006</i> <i>F96-118/2 #216; R 11/21/2017</i> <i>M393/1 #127742</i>	6	ND	B1
127743	REPORT	RE IRAN (P. 3 ONLY) <i>PAR 2/8/2006</i> <i>F96-118/2 #217; UPHELD</i> <i>12/4/2017 M393 #127743</i>	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: TEICHER, HOWARD J.: Files

Archivist: mjd

FOIA ID: F96-118/2

File Folder: Iran (Super - Sensitive) 1984 (1) Box 91682

Date: 09/15/1999

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. paper	re: Iran, 2p P 2/8/06 F96-118/2 #196	nd	P1/F1
2. paper	re: Iran, 2p D 1/3/01 F96-118/2 #197, 8/15/02 APPEAL	nd	P1/F1, B3
3. memo	Clair George to Asst. Sec. of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs, 1p D 12/4/02 F96-118/2 #198	6/11/85	P1/F1, B3
4. report	2p D ~ ~ #199	6/7/85	P1/F1, B3
5. memo	George to Robert McFarlane, 4p D ~ ~ #200	3/8/85	P1/F1, B3
6. report	5p D ~ ~ #201	3/7/85	P1/F1, B3
7. memo	Vince Cannistraro to Teicher re: draft paper, 1p P 11/22/00 F96-118/2 #202	nd	P1/F1, F3
8. draft paper	re: Iran, 10p P 2/8/06 F96-118/2 #203	5/24/85	P1/F1
9. routing slip	1p	5/15/85	P5
10. memo	Cannistraro to Poindexter re: meeting, 2p D 1/3/01 F96-118/2 #204, 8/15/02 APPEAL	5/15/85	P1/F1, B3
11. memo	to Geoffrey Kemp re: attached report, 1p D 12/4/02 F96-118/2 #205	2/10/84	P1/F1, B3
12. routing slip	1p D ~ ~ #206	nd	P1/F1, B3
13. report	4p D ~ ~ #207	2/9/84	P1/F1, B3
14. draft cable	re: TWA hijacking (annotated), 2p D 2/8/06 F96-118/2 #208	7/2/85	P1/F1
15. cable	re: TWA hijacking, 2p D 2/8/06 F96-118/2 #209	7/2/85	P1/F1
16. memo	Jock Covey to Poindexter re: meetings, 1p D 2/8/06 F96-118/2 #210	nd	P1/F1

RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

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F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
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Collection: TEICHER, HOWARD J.: Files

Archivist: mjd

FOIA ID: F96-118/2

File Folder: Iran (Super – Sensitive) 1984 (1) Box 91682

Date: 09/15/1999

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
17. draft message	2p D 2/8/06 F96-118/2 #211	nd	P1/F1
18. report	re: Iran, 18p PART. 12/4/02 F96-118/2 #212	12/-/83	P1/F1, B3
19. report	re: Iran, 19p PART. - - #213	10/-/84	P1/F1, B3
20. paper	re: American Hostages, 2p D 2/8/06 F96-118/2 #214	nd	P1/F1
21. non-paper	re: US Hostages, 3p D 2/8/06 F96-118/2 #215	nd	P1/F1
22. non-paper	re: US Hostages, 6p D 2/8/06 F96-118/2 #216	nd	P1/F1
23. report	re: Iran (page 3 only), 1p P 2/8/06 F96-118/2 #217	nd	P1/F1

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PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

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Collection Name TEICHER, HOWARD: FILES

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LOJ 5/24/2007

File Folder IRAN (SUPER - SENSITIVE) 1984 (1)

FOIA

F96-118/2

Box Number 91682

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date
1	PAPER	RE IRAN	2 MVH 3/6/08	ND
8	PAPER	DRAFT RE IRAN	10 MVH 3/6/08	5/24/1985
18	REPORT	RE IRAN	18 MVH 3/6/08	12/1/1983
19	REPORT	RE IRAN	19 MVH 3/6/08	10/1/1984
23	REPORT	RE IRAN (PAGE 3 ONLY)	1 MVH 3/6/08	ND

~~TOP SECRET~~

U.S. Policy Toward Iran After the Death of Khomeini

Our minimum policy objective in Iran is to block any Soviet action to increase its influence in Iran after the death of Khomeini. The Soviets are likely to utilize clandestine contacts and programs in Iran to try and increase their influence, and it is necessary to develop ways of countering this. [REDACTED]

FOIA(b) (1)

A related policy objective is to defeat any radical Arab efforts to assist the more radical elements in Iran in their struggle for power after the death of Khomeini.

Our maximum policy objective is to bring about a government in Iran more friendly to the United States.

The first step toward reaching both our minimum and maximum objectives is to improve our knowledge of and contacts with a broad range of political actors in Iran. In order to do this the following program objectives are established.

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~~REDACTED~~

~~ICIFD~~

~~REDACTED~~

FOIA(b) (1)

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

These requirements should be addressed in two phases. First, an effort to satisfy them promptly must be made in order to prepare ourselves as best we can in the event that Khomeini dies in the

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NLS FFC-11812 #196

By AMX, NARA, Date 2/08/06

HT 92

next 60 days. This short-term effort will rely primarily on existing assets and whatever expedient measures are available.

Second, planning should begin now on the assumption that Khomeini does not die within the next 60 days in order to develop programs that use the extra available time to satisfy the requirements listed above more fully. This planning should be complete and ready for presentation to the PCG within 30 days.

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Declassify OADR

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 2-4 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

[Redacted]

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



Washington, D.C. 20505

11 JUN 1985

Handwritten initials and a circle symbol

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Department of State

Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

Senior Staff Assistant for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
National Security Council

SUBJECT: Remarks Made by Iranian Ambassador to the United Nations Concerning Current Iranian Attitudes Toward the USSR and the United States

Attached for your information is a report on the above subjects. No further use of this information in any form may be made without the approval of this Agency. (U)

Handwritten signature of Clair E. George

Clair E. George
Deputy Director for Operations

Attachment:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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NLRN M393 #127714

BY *AW* DATE 12/4/17

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[Redacted]

Handwritten notes:
H17 33
12/27/80
20

ROUTING

To	Name and Address	Date	Initials
1	H. TEICHER	3/12	
2	J. COVEY	3/12	
3	J. STARK	3/12	
4			
5			
6			

1	ACTION	FILE
	APPROVAL	INFORMATION
2/3	COMMENT	PREPARE REPLY
	CONCURRENCE	RECOMMENDATION
	DIRECT REPLY	RETURN
	DISPATCH	SIGNATURE

REMARKS:
Draft memo to RCM

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

FILE *mm* *al/14/12*




NSC/ICS CONTROL NO. 400259


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7 34
13/12/12
20

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TO: HOWARD TEICHER
FROM: VINCE CANNISTRARO

SUBJECT: Comments On Your Draft Iran Paper

I think the paper describes the situation as it is and delineates the actions available to us. The only specific fixes I would suggest are as follows:

Pg 5. Last sentence , first paragraph. "Radicals within the regime, and the leftist opposition, are the groups most likely to influence the course of events in ways inimical to Western interests". We should clarify which "leftist opposition" is meant. The left opposition outside the country, or those elements within the regime. It is difficult to see a regime worse for our interests than the current one, with the exception of a regime which is a client of the Soviets. The Tudeh would provide such a client relationship. Presumably the Mujahedin-e Khalq would not, especially with their rather soft "social democratic" image they claim to be adopting.

Pg 8. Clarify bullet by rephrasing along suggested lines:

"providing support to elements inside Iran who are in opposition to Khomeini and the radicals". (This would allow support to conservative mullahs, as well as support to Army elements, etc.)

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

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R

~~REDACTED~~

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NLS F96-118/2 4/26/02

By CAS, NARA, Date 11/22/11

Handwritten notes: "H 7 20", "12/2-150", "CC"

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 28, 1985

TO: VINCE CANNISTRATO

FROM: HOWARD TEICHER

Attached for your review/
comments ASAP.

Thanks

~~TOP SECRET~~DRAFTU.S. Policy Toward Iran

Dynamic political evolution is taking place inside Iran. Instability caused by the pressures of the Iraq-Iran war, economic ^e deterioration and regime infighting create dangers and opportunities for the United States. The current situation favors Moscow's interests. The Soviet Union is better positioned than the U.S. to exploit and benefit from any power struggle that results in changes in the Iranian regime, as well as increasing socio-political pressures. In this environment, the emergence of a regime more compatible with American and Western interests is unlikely. Therefore, the primary short-term challenge to U.S. policy is to block Moscow's efforts to increase Soviet influence (now and after the death of Khomeini) by building U.S. leverage that enables us to exert greater influence over Iranian politics.

Western Interests

Within the U.S. policy community, interagency concensus has been reached on U.S. and Western interests in Iran.

Broad U.S. interests are:

- (1) Prevention of confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union over Iran while containing Soviet influence in an oil-rich, strategically located major country;

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 NLS F96-118/2 #203
 By RAF, NARA, Date 2/8/06

- (2) Iran's resumption of a moderate and constructive role as a member respectively of the non-communist political community, of its region, and of the world petroleum economy;
- (3) maintenance of Iran's internal cohesion and territorial integrity.

Specific major U.S. and Western interests include:

- (4) Iran's emergence, as steadily and as soon as possible, from the extremism of its fundamentalist revolution and from its attachment to state-sponsored terrorism as a tool of policy;
- (5) open access to Iranian and Persian Gulf oil, including unimpeded transit of the Strait of Hormuz;
- (6) continued Iranian resistance to the expansion of Soviet power in general, and to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in particular;
- (7) an early end to the Iran-Iraq war which does not fundamentally alter the balance of power in the region;
- (8) an end to the Iranian government's sponsorship of terrorism, and its attempts to destabilize governments of other regional states;

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- (9) elimination of Iran's flagrant abuses of human rights;
- (10) a balanced and less hostile post-war relationship between Iran and the Arab states of the Gulf, as well as between Iran and Iraq;
- (11) movement toward eventual normalization of U.S.-Iranian diplomatic consular and cultural relations, and bilateral trade/commercial activities;
- (12) resolution of American legal and financial claims through the Hague Tribunal; and
- (13) Iranian moderation on OPEC pricing policy.

Present Iranian Political Environment

The Iranian leadership faces its most difficult challenges since 1981. The regime's popularity has declined significantly in the past six months, primarily because of intensified disillusionment with a seemingly unending war, the continued imposition of Islamic social policies on a population increasingly reluctant to accept such harsh measures, and a faltering economy brought on primarily by declining oil revenues. The impact of these problems is intensified by the realization that Ayatollah Khomeini's mental and physical health is fragile, which in turn

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casts a pall of uncertainty over the daily decision-making process.

Unless the acceleration of adverse military, political and economic developments is reversed, the Khomeini regime will face serious instability (i.e. repeated anti-regime demonstrations, strikes, assassination attempts, sabotage and other destabilizing activities throughout, increasingly involving the lower classes). This condition will sap officials' energies and government resources, intensifying differences among Iranian leaders as the government tries to avoid mistakes that would provide popular upheaval and threaten continued control.

While it is impossible to predict the course of the emerging power struggle, it is possible to discern several trends which must be accounted for by U.S. policy. As domestic pressures mount, decision-making is likely to be monopolized by individuals representing the same unstable mix of radical, conservative and ultra-conservative factions that now control the Iranian government. The longer Khomeini lingers in power, the more likely the power struggle will intensify, and the greater the number of potential leaders who might effect the outcome of the struggle.

The ultimate strength of various clerical groups and the power coalitions they may form are not known. However, the weaknesses of various opposition groups -- inside Iran and abroad -- are

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evident, especially the lack of a leader with sufficient stature to rival Khomeini and his ideas. The most likely faction in a power struggle to shift Iranian policy in directions more acceptable to the West -- should their influence increase -- are conservatives working from within the government against the radicals. Radicals within the regime, and the leftist opposition, are the groups most likely to influence the course of events in ways inimical to Western interests.

The Iranian regular armed forces represent a potential source of both power and inclination to move Iran back into a more pro-Western position. Representatives of every faction inside and outside the regime recognize the potential importance of the military and are cultivating contacts with these forces.

However, as long as the Army remains committed in the war with Iraq it will not be in a position to intervene in Tehran.

The other instrument of state power, the Revolutionary Guard, is becoming increasingly fractured. It will probably come apart following Khomeini's death, and might ^{even} engage in a major power struggle before then. In any scenario, the Guard will be at the center of the power struggle.

The Soviets are well aware of the evolving developments in Iran. They will continue to apply carrot-and-stick incentives to Iran in the hope of bringing Tehran to Moscow's terms for an improved

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bilateral relationship that could serve as a basis for major growth in Soviet influence in Iran.

Despite strong clerical antipathy to Moscow and communism, Tehran's leadership seems to have concluded that improvement of relations with the Soviet Union is now essential to Iranian interest. They do not seem interested in improving ties with us. This Iranian assessment is probably based on Tehran's view of what Moscow can do for -- and against -- Iran rather than on an ideological preference to conduct relations with Moscow. The USSR already has much leverage over Tehran -- in stark contrast to the U.S.

Moscow views Iran as a key area of opportunity. The Soviets have pushed Iran to halt attacks on the USSR in the Iranian media, to cease aid to Afghan rebels, to permit the replacement of Soviet diplomats expelled in May 1983, and to end the persecution of the Tudeh Party. In return, Moscow is certain to offer economic and technical assistance, and possibly even military equipment. While they have heretofore balked at providing major weapon systems, the Soviets might relax their embargo if the right political opportunities presented themselves. While Moscow would probably not act in a manner that severely disrupts its relations with Baghdad, given Iraq's dependency on the USSR for ground forces equipment, Moscow possesses considerable room for maneuver if it senses major openings in Tehran for the establishment of a position of significant influence.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

The U.S. position in Tehran is unlikely to improve without a major change in U.S. policy. The challenge to the U.S. in the post-Khomeini period will be severe. Any successor regime will probably seize power in the name of Islam and the revolution and can be expected to have a built-in^{anti-} American bias. A more conservative regime, still Islamic, might lessen the emphasis on revolution and terrorism and could move cautiously toward a more correct relationship with the U.S. On the other hand, radical forces will try to exacerbate anti-American feelings to strengthen their own positions at the expense of the conservatives.

Our leverage with Iran is sharply reduced by the current degree of hostility that springs from the ideology of the radical clergy, especially as it serves their foreign policy goals. Moreover, the moderate and conservative elements of the clergy may also share the radicals' belief that we are inveterately hostile to the Islamic government, making accommodation with the U.S. impossible. The clerical regime continues to believe that the U.S. has not accepted the revolution and intends to reverse the course of events and install a puppet government. This perception has been reinforced by our restoration of diplomatic relations with Iraq, efforts to cut the flow of arms to Iran, and direct threats of military action in retaliation for Iranian-inspired anti-U.S. terrorism.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~U.S. Policy

The dynamic political situation in Iran and the consequences for U.S. interests of growing Soviet and radical influence, compel the U.S. undertake a range of short- and long-term initiatives that will enhance our leverage in Tehran. Short-term measures should be undertaken in a manner that reinforces the prospects for restoring U.S. influence in Iran to the maximum extent possible, *over the longer-term.*



- Take advantage of growing political fragmentation by:
 - discreetly communicating our desire for correct relations to potentially receptive Iranian leaders;
 - establishing links with clerical, Army, leftist and Bazaar leaders; and
 - providing support to elements *(inside Iran who are)* opposed to Khomeini and the radicals.
- Avoid actions which could alienate groups potentially receptive to improved U.S.-Iranian relations.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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- Respond to Iranian-supported terrorism with military action against terrorist infrastructure.
- Encourage Western allies and friends to help Iran meet its import requirements so as to reduce the attractiveness of Soviet assistance and trade offers, while demonstrating the value of correct relations with the West. This includes provision of selected military equipment as determined on a case-by-case basis.
- Complicate the ability of Iran's radical allies (notably Libya and Syria) to assist Iran.

FOIA(b) (1)

- 
- Enhance our effort to discredit Moscow's Islamic credentials with a more vigorous VOA effort targeted on Iran.
- Increase contacts with allies and friends (U.K., France, Japan, etc.) on the evolution of the Iranian situation and possible means for influencing the direction of change, 

FOIA(b) (1)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

FOIA(b)(1)



FOIA(b)(1)



- With respect to the Gulf war:
 - Continue to encourage third party initiatives to seek an end to the war.
 - Increase military cooperation with Gulf Cooperation Council countries, and bolster U.S. military capabilities in the Gulf area to enable CENTCOM to be fully capable of carrying out its mission.

Drafted by:
Howard Teicher

~~TOP SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Jock,

See attached note from Poindexter.
When you are ready to discuss the
memo, give me a call.

VC
Vince

T

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 9 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

ROUTING

TQ	Name and Address	Date	Initials
1	VADM POINDEXTER	5/15/85	
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

~~TOP SECRET VEIL~~

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CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S) *msm 9/14/92*

NSC/ICS CONTROL NO. 400504

COPY NO. 1 OF 3

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	ACTION	FILE
	APPROVAL	INFORMATION
	COMMENT	PREPARE REPLY
	CONCURRENCE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION
	DIRECT REPLY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RETURN
	DISPATCH	SIGNATURE


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NSC INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENT



Warning Notice
Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
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~~TOP SECRET VEIL~~

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 10 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

MAX KING MORRIS

PKM

23 August 1985

Dear Howard:

This letter summarizes what I heard from Mehrdad Khonsari and his colleague, Gen. Shahrदार, last week enroute to the airport. Their general comments to me indicated they thought the final meeting was a logical follow-on to the earlier ones and was productive for both sides. Questions asked about the details of plan papers and about earlier questions' answers were valid. Both said the atmospherics were good.

One point troubled them, however, and Khonsari asked me to convey it to you, and, through you, to John Poin-dexter. The point relates to the basis for the review/analysis of the Bakhtiar group by the people up river. Mehrdad fears this review may fasten on details rather than on judgments as to concepts and findings as to strengths of the group inside.

This concern comes from what happened at the final meeting. Our two visitors were surprised over the failure of the "team" to ask for (indeed, even to show interest in) any talks with supporters from inside the country. You will recall that our friends mentioned to you that they told the team that senior military leaders supporting their boss could not leave their posts/commands and come out for interviews, this for obvious reasons. Leaders of other constituencies, however, could be brought out and our friends told this to the team at all meetings.

Mehrdad told me that at the final meeting both he and the general again emphasized both points, specifically offering to bring out known tribal leaders. They told the team that the people were ready and could be brought out now and without any great difficulty.

To the dismay of both our friends, the interviewers indicated no desire now for such talks, talks that would go far, I think, to verify the credibility of what our friends have told you and verify the extent of support inside. Surely such talks, as finite measures of reliability, would be crucial to any objective finding as to actual strength of Bakhtiar in country.

Our friends also listed materials they have on hand now inside, and offered to take a rep inside to view. This again would have the dual purpose of expediting your process of determining credibility and feasibility, and to verify what more actually is needed.

HT 37
12/29/85
SC

Again, no response was elicited. Surely this, too, would be a vital measure as to whether or not these people "are for real", a measure that one believes you would need for your judgment on go or no-go with them.

Mehrdad is concerned lest the team and its agency base their findings on the craftsmanship of the written papers delivered to them, not on credibility of overall concepts and reliability of the players. He realizes the plans were prepared by people never before in the counter-strike role, i.e. on the outside, trying to get in. His view, which I trust you share, is that you and John and others at the decision level must make a judgment based on what type, quality and amount of support Dr. B. has inside, in the military, in the tribes, in the clergy in the bazaars, etc. This is what counts, along with determination of purpose plus the mood of the citizens, i.e. supportive of change or unsupportive.

If the hoped-for "go" decision is made, these people want the benefit of the people up the river who are versed in this business. They need to be told "this is ok, this needs changes, etc." As they said to you, that sort of critique by your pros is something they need just as much as they need financial and tangible support.

As I said earlier, Mehrdad's only worry was about the lack of interest in making some objective checks on inside support, via interviews outside or inside. From his own early days in diplomacy, he realizes that nit-picking on details of papers can cause delay or even lead to adverse decisions which ignore more vital measures of capabilities.

I assured Mehrdad and his colleague (who I believe has a real future if they are successful) that I would convey this philosophical concern to you and, through you, to John. I reminded them that you had indicated alertness to any "NIH" undercurrent that might surface, and that I believed the judgment would be based at your level on concepts, strengths and credibility, not on details which we all know will change often as movement goes ahead when the clock starts.

Mehrdad was told by the team that they would be in touch in Paris, providing him with special informational support. Again, mind you, both men said the meeting was cordial.

I hope the momentum now achieved is continued, and that a decision comes soon so the clock can start on lead-time. They will move, I am sure, this year which ends, for them, in March 1986. When they do, I hope they have what they need.

*Best regards,
Max*

FROM THE DESK OF
MAX KING MORRIS

8-23-85

Howard —

We were appreciative of
your time constraints. Thanks
again.

When time does permit, I
would like to talk about
IISS — and would be
happy to nominate you for
membership. I talk with
Bob O'Neill, the director,
every few weeks. Let me know.
Yours age,
Max

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

EXPIRES (1) W/ STATE
75 JUL 33 112:1
NO

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
B
S/S # UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED
35 JUL 3 112: 21
STATE DEPARTMENT
SECRETARY'S OFFICE

M 7/14/49

MESSAGE NO 001,82 CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL No. Pages 2
FROM Jim Collins S/S 632-8448 7224NS
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Telegram to Tokyo, subj: Message from the Secretary
for Foreign Minister Abe on the TWA Hijacking

TO (Agency)	DELIVER TO	Extension	Room No.
NSC	HOWARD FETTER MARTIN NSC/S Pearson	395-5650	

FOR CLEARANCE INFORMATION PER REQUEST COMMENT

REMARKS: Attached draft cable for your comments.

S/S Officer: CB J. Andres

127731

DRAFT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7983J

EAP/J:W CORBETT
7/2/85 EXT. 22912
S: THE SECRETARY

EAP/J:THUBBARD
NEA/NGA:PLYDON
M/CTP:GBAILEY AND P:WITOM
S/S:

EAP:HISON
NEA/ARN:MACASEY
S/S-0:
S:

IMMEDIATE TOKYO

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL. PTER. JK. US. LE. IR

SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO FOREIGN MINISTER
ABE ON THE TWA HIJACKING

1. ((- ENTIRE TEXT))

2. EMBASSY SHOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE
SECRETARY TO FOREIGN MINISTER ABE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
NO PUBLIC RELEASE OF THE LETTER IS PLANNED BUT DEPARTMENT
HAS NO OBJECTIONS IF THE GOJ CHOOSES TO DO SO. NO SIGNED
ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR MR. FOREIGN MINISTER:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGES OF JULY 1 AND JUNE 29, AND
FOR JAPAN'S PRIVATE EFFORTS TO ENLIST SYRIAN AND IRANIAN
COOPERATION IN ENDING THE TWA HOSTAGE TAKING. I AM
PROFOUNDLY GRATEFUL THAT THE 39 TWA HOSTAGES HELD IN
BEIRUT HAVE BEEN RETURNED TO THEIR FAMILIES AND FRIENDS.
AT THE SAME TIME WE MOURN THE LOSS OF AN AMERICAN SAILOR,
ROBERT STETHEN, WHO SERVED HIS COUNTRY BRAVELY AND WITH
HONOR. WE CANNOT FORGET THE VICTIMS OF TERRORISM.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M3931 #127731
BY AW NARA DATE 11/21/17

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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IRAN b2

CONFIDENTIAL

1 2

I APPRECIATE YOUR WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT OF TERRORISM WITH SPEAKER RAFSANJANI OF IRAN'S MAJLES DURING HIS VISIT TO JAPAN. IRAN HAS NOT YET MADE CLEAR WHAT JUSTICE WILL BE SERVED UPON THE HIJACKERS WHO MURDERED TWO U.S. AID OFFICIALS AT TEHRAN AIRPORT IN DECEMBER 1984. WE ARE ALSO FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT IRAN CAN INFLUENCE THE KIDNAPPERS IN LEBANON WHO CONTINUE TO HOLD SEVEN AMERICANS HOSTAGE, DEMANDING THE RELEASE OF ARAB TERRORISTS CONVICTED IN KUWAIT.

I would appreciate your seeking a IF YOU HAVE AN APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNITY IN YOUR FURTHER MEETINGS, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL FOR YOU TO RAISE THESE POINTS IN DISCUSSING THE ISSUE OF TERRORISM WITH SPEAKER RAFSANJANI. DESPITE IRAN'S CONSTANT DISCLAIMERS, WE STRONGLY BELIEVE IRAN IS IN A POSITION TO CONTRIBUTE GREATLY TO CALMING THE TERRORIST FUROR WHICH TRAGICALLY PLAGUES THE MIDDLE EAST.

I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN KUALA LUMPUR ON JULY 22.

SINCERELY YOURS.

GEORGE P. SHULTZ
END TEXT.YYY

~~If you believe have the opportunity, you could pass to him the following message to Rafsanjani:~~

Quote: The United States ~~is~~ still expects justice will be served upon the hijackers who murdered two US AID officials at Tehran Airport in December 1984. ~~It is~~ ^{the United States} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~discouraged~~ ^{discouraged} ~~however,~~ ^{however,} ~~to have~~ ^{no} ~~at the delay,~~ ^{at the delay,} and is considering its meaning.

For now, the United States ~~is~~ believes that it may share certain interests with Iran, and would be prepared to discuss ^{how those interests} could be addressed ^{in a positive fashion.} ~~in a positive fashion.~~ The United States seeks correct relations, and does not desire a further deterioration.

CONFIDENTIAL

T-BB-32/87
ADG 417/87

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED

35 JUL 3 P 5: 12 T

B

S/S # UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

URGENT

MS 11 11/7/44

MESSAGE NO 001751 CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL No. Pages 2

FROM: Jim Collins S/S 632-8448 7224NS
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Telegram to Tokyo, subj: Message from the Secretary for Foreign Minister Abe on the TWA Hijacking

TO: (Agency) _____ PER TO: _____ Extension _____ Room No. _____

NSC

ROBERT PEARSON

395-3044

NSC

~~SECRETARIAT~~

MARTIN

Signe
Feicher

Loeth

FOR: CLEARANCE INFORMATION PER REQUEST COMMENT

REMARKS: Request clearance for this to have this
copy transmitted prior to the Secretary's departure to Asia
early Friday, July 5 A.M.

S/S Officer: CP 6/

CROSSHATCH

TIME-STAMPED COVERSHEET TO S/S.

63

127732

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

7983J

EAP/J:W CORBETT
7/2/85 EXT. 22912
S: THE SECRETARY

EAP/J:THUBBARD
NEA/NGA:PLYDON
M/CTP:GBAILEY AND P:WITOH
S/S:NPLATT NSC:

EAP:HISON
NEA/ARN:MACASEY
S/S-0:
S:CETHOMPSON

IMMEDIATE TOKYO

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PTER, JA, US, LE, IR

SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO FOREIGN MINISTER
- ABE ON THE TWA HIJACKING

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. EMBASSY SHOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE
SECRETARY TO FOREIGN MINISTER ABE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
NO PUBLIC RELEASE OF THE LETTER IS PLANNED BUT DEPARTMENT
HAS NO OBJECTIONS IF THE GOJ CHOOSES TO DO SO. NO SIGNED
ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

BEGIN TEXT:
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THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGES OF JULY 1 AND JUNE 29, AND
FOR JAPAN'S PRIVATE EFFORTS TO ENLIST SYRIAN AND IRANIAN
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AT THE SAME TIME WE MOURN THE LOSS OF AN AMERICAN SAILOR,
ROBERT STETHEN, WHO SERVED HIS COUNTRY BRAVELY AND WITH
HONOR. WE CANNOT FORGET THE VICTIMS OF TERRORISM.

Handwritten notes:
SUS
WCC
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HI
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DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M3931#127732

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

| 2

69

I APPRECIATE YOUR WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT OF TERRORISM WITH SPEAKER RAFSANJANI OF IRAN'S MAJLES DURING HIS VISIT TO JAPAN. IRAN HAS NOT YET MADE CLEAR WHAT JUSTICE WILL BE SERVED UPON THE HIJACKERS WHO MURDERED TWO U.S. AID OFFICIALS AT TEHRAN AIRPORT IN DECEMBER 1984. WE ARE ALSO FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT IRAN CAN INFLUENCE THE KIDNAPPERS IN LEBANON WHO CONTINUE TO HOLD SEVEN AMERICANS HOSTAGE, DEMANDING THE RELEASE OF ARAB TERRORISTS CONVICTED IN KUWAIT.

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I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN KUALA LUMPUR ON JULY 11.

SINCERELY YOURS,

GEORGE P. SHULTZ
END TEXT.YYY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PNW

Could I see the
Iran file? Am
looking for current
version of the NSDD
and drafts of the
message to Rafsanjani.
Joan may ~~to know~~
know where it all is.

[Signature]

National Security Council
The White House

System # TI
Package # 90750
1866

85 JUL 6 P 1: 45

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	
William Martin			
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u>J</u>	<u>D</u>
Paul Thompson			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane	3		X
William Martin			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
	<u>COVEY</u> <u>3</u>		

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other Porter, Sigen

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: ASAD
(Date/Time)

Since George Shultz has agreed to send such a signal, I would still like for you to work with State to draft such a message - the sooner the better.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

107733
65

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL JOHN M. POINDEXTER

From: Jock Covey *J*

Subject: Japan/Iran: Rafsanjani talks in Tokyo

Yukio Okamoto came in Friday to report on the second and final meeting between Nakasone and Rafsanjani the evening of Wednesday 7/3 (Tokyo time).

According to Okamoto, both Nakasone and Rafsanjani pronounced themselves satisfied with the visit, and agreed that relations between Japan and Iran had entered a new stage. Nakasone then told Rafsanjani that if Iran had any message for the United States, he would be prepared to deliver it. Rafsanjani responded as follows:

Iran does not want to sever relations with the United States. The United States has its good points, and Iran does not embrace bad feelings (sic) toward the American people. But it will not be easy to resume the previous relationship in the near future. The United States must first rectify past policies and compensate for past mistakes. Therefore the United States must take the first step to improve relations. In that case, Iran will not fan anti-American feelings. Please tell the United States and other Western countries that Iran loves peace and does not wish for conflicts.

Comment: The opportunity to send a message of our own through the Japanese has now passed. Nonetheless, the fact that Nakasone volunteered himself as a channel will in itself be read as a subtle and dignified message. That is not a bad place to leave things for the moment -- holding open the possibility of sending back an equally terse (but cautiously openminded) message at a time of our own choosing. The Japanese channel will undoubtedly be available whenever we choose to do so.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRM 393 (1) # 107733
BY *RW* NARA DATE 11/21/17

T-BB-33
ADG 4/7/87

~~SECRET~~

D R A F T

127735
Φ IRAN

66

MESSAGE TO RAFSANJANI

The President requests that Prime Minister Nakasone convey the following message to Iranian Speaker of the Parliament

Rafsanjani: "The President of the United States has asked me to convey the following message to you in the utmost secrecy. The United States of America accords the complete recognition of the Islamic Republic of Iran and wishes to see the evolution of a relationship between the United States and Iran based on the principles of mutual respect and noninterference in the internal affairs of either country.

The United States is a country which places great emphasis on the importance of religious values in constructing a moral framework for daily life. The American people hold Islam in the deepest respect as an important world faith devoted to establishing a moral order and religious way of life for all Muslims.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M3931 #127735
BY AN NARA DATE 11/21/17

The President does not believe that Western civilization need be on a collision course with Islamic civilization in world affairs. On the contrary, belief in God should help bring together Americans and Iranians in an age when religious beliefs are often systematically crushed in favor of aethistic philosophies of life and government. Moreover, the United States understands why Shiah Muslims around the world are interested in improving their position. The United States Government is interested in helping to facilitate such a development.

~~SECRET~~

7-28-34
4/7/87

~~SECRET~~

While recognizing that American and Iranian interests are sometimes in conflict, the United States is convinced that mutual interests can best be served by solving problems through dialogue and negotiation rather than through violence. The United States wants to improve relations with Iran, not see them deteriorate further.

Recognizing the prominent influence of the Government of Iran in the middle east, the United States assumes that Iran is acting in a constructive manner to help bring about the release of the seven Americans being held captive in Lebanon, along with hostages of other nationalities. Such criminal behavior cannot be permitted in an international order based on the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.


The United States Government looks forward to the initiation of a dialogue with the Government of Iran with regard to future relations. Furthermore, the President is willing, with the utmost discretion, to dispatch an emissary to conduct such a dialogue at a mutually convenient time and place."

~~SECRET~~



Directorate of
Intelligence

~~Secret~~



FILE

0107 ~~Teichen~~

Khamenei and Rafsanjani: Rivals for Power in Iran



An Intelligence Assessment

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

By CKS NIS F96-118/2 #212, MARA, Date 12/4/02

~~Secret~~

NESA 83-10349
December 1983

Copy 012

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**Intelligence Sources
or Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)**

**National Security
Information**

**Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions**

Dissemination Control Abbreviations	NOFORN (NF)	Not releasable to foreign nationals
	NOCONTRACT (NC)	Not releasable to contractors or contractor/consultants
	PROPIN (PR)	Caution—proprietary information involved
	ORCON (OC)	Dissemination and extraction of information controlled by originator
	REL...	This information has been authorized for release to...
	FGI	Foreign government information
	WN	WNINTEL—Intelligence sources or methods involved

Declassify: OADR
Derived from multiple sources

All material on this page
is Unclassified.



Directorate of
Intelligence


~~Secret~~



Khamenei and Rafsanjani: Rivals for Power in Iran



An Intelligence Assessment



~~Secret~~
NESA 83-10349
December 1983



**Khamenei and Rafsanjani:
Rivals for Power in Iran**

Key Judgments

*Information available
as of 16 December 1983
was used in this report.*


The views of Iranian President Ali Khamenei and *Majlis* (Assembly) Speaker Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, two of the most powerful leaders in Iran, strongly influence Iran's policies toward the war with Iraq, succession to Khomeini, the economy, and the United States. Khamenei and Rafsanjani derive much of their authority from their close personal relationship with Ayatollah Khomeini. In addition, Khamenei, as President, controls much of the government's administrative apparatus. Rafsanjani, as Speaker of the *Majlis*, is in charge of the legislative arm of the government.

Not surprisingly, Khamenei and Rafsanjani are rivals for power. Neither is of sufficient clerical rank to directly succeed Khomeini, but each wants to be influential behind the scenes. Rafsanjani seems to favor Ayatollah Montazeri, a more senior cleric who is currently the front-runner to succeed Khomeini. Reportedly Rafsanjani hopes to manipulate Montazeri, who is widely viewed in Iran as weak. President Khamenei, on the other hand, favors rule by a three- or five-man council of senior clerics. Khamenei reportedly hopes that such a council would dilute Montazeri's power and limit Rafsanjani's ability to manipulate policy.


The personal conflict between the two men is aggravated by institutional rivalry. Since early 1982 the office of the Presidency has been strengthened by Khamenei, enabling him to begin consolidating his authority within the regime. At the same time, the *Majlis* under Rafsanjani's leadership has become an influential lawmaking body, and Rafsanjani has emerged as the most influential personality in Iran after Ayatollah Khomeini. The two have criticized each other publicly, and Ayatollah Khomeini has been forced to intervene to limit their rivalry. He permits neither to achieve a decisive advantage over the other.

In contrast to their differences over the succession, the positions of Khamenei and Rafsanjani on other issues such as the war, the economy, and foreign policy are similar. They both favor centralization of the economy and have recently moderated their private positions on Iran's war policy. They are both hostile toward the United States. They probably favor a tolerant attitude toward the Soviets and closer cooperation with Moscow on economic and military matters as long as there is no strategic military understanding or massive presence of Soviet experts in Iran. Both support the "export of the revolution" by means of propaganda and subversion, although Khamenei is slightly less radical than Rafsanjani on this issue.



The rivalry between Khamenei and Rafsanjani has important implications for the future of Iran and, as a result, for US policy in the Persian Gulf. We believe it is likely that the clerics, Rafsanjani, and Khamenei will work out a mutually acceptable division of power after Khomeini's death, at least in the short term, and that Iran's policies will remain much the same as under the Ayatollah. A smooth succession is likely because no cleric will defy Khomeini's written will soon after his death and all the clerics know that an intense succession struggle could destroy their hold on power. A regime influenced by Rafsanjani and Khamenei could moderate its foreign policy stance slightly as the two men become more confident in their ability to retain power and in their ability to work together. Eventually their hostility toward the United States could lessen if they found it expedient, but neither man is strong enough to alter unilaterally Iran's relations with the United States. Relations with the USSR will probably depend on factors beyond the control of either man such as Soviet support for Iraq and for Iranian dissidents and Soviet actions in Afghanistan. 

In the less likely event that the two men do not work out a mutually satisfactory sharing of power, Iran is likely to experience serious political turmoil. While the Ayatollah is alive, he can keep their rivalry in check.



Khamenei and Rafsanjani: Rivals for Power in Iran [Redacted]

President Ali Khamenei and *Majlis* (Assembly) Speaker Ali Akbar Rafsanjani are two of the most important people in Iran's clerical regime. Their views on the succession, foreign policy, the war with Iraq, and the economy have a significant impact on the course of the Islamic Republic. Their influence will increase after Ayatollah Khomeini dies or retires, although we do not believe that either will succeed him. Both are middle-level clerics, one step below ayatollah and too junior to succeed Khomeini directly. At present we believe senior cleric Hussein Ali Montazeri is the most likely successor to Khomeini. [Redacted]

There are senior clerics and revolutionary organizations outside the government whose authority and influence at times exceed that of Rafsanjani and Khamenei. Since early 1982, however, President Khamenei has had some success in establishing government control over revolutionary organizations. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

We believe this situation has increased personal conflicts between Khamenei and Rafsanjani, whose relationship is already aggravated by institutional rivalries. [Redacted]

Power Bases

Rafsanjani. Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, we believe, is an ambitious and opportunistic politician who derives much of his authority from his close personal relationship with Ayatollah Khomeini. He benefits from real or at least popularly perceived family relationships with Khomeini. An unconfirmed report indicates that [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Rafsanjani joined Khomeini's household at an early age and was raised there. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Rafsanjani's record of anti-Shah activity and his imprisonment by the Shah give him excellent revolutionary credentials. [Redacted]


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Rafsanjani's role as one of the leaders of Tehran's Friday prayers and his position as spokesman for Iran's Supreme Defense Council give him important forums to influence policy and public opinion.² During the past 21 months Rafsanjani has led Friday prayers 48 times, far more than any other Iranian leader. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

² Friday prayers are a primary tool in Iran for establishing direct contact between the ruling fundamentalist clerics and the people. At Friday prayer services throughout Iran, clerics deliver sermons that are coordinated by authorities in Qom. They provide a political and religious context in which the people are instructed on how to view current events. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

Rafsanjani has made the Majlis, a rubberstamp assembly under the Shah, an influential lawmaking body and another forum in which he can influence events. Analysis of Majlis proceedings indicates that as Speaker he controls the direction of debate and has final review of legislation.

[Redacted]

Rafsanjani helped found the Islamic Republic Party, the only legal party in Iran, and is a member of its Administrative and Central Committees. Lack of press coverage of his party activities suggests he is not active in party functions, but his membership gives him further access to additional power centers. By controlling party funds he has considerable say in who receives significant party positions, according to an American researcher on modern Iran [Redacted]


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arrested in the early 1970s for aiding the anti-Shah Fedayeen. He participated in propaganda activities among theological students in Mashhad and was influential in forming the ideological position of the Islamic Republic Party, according to press reports. [Redacted]

Khamenei. Khamenei's revolutionary credentials are similar to Rafsanjani's. He, too, is close to Khomeini, having studied under the Ayatollah during the 1960s in Iraq. [Redacted] He also has a history of anti-Shah activity. He was

Sources of Influence for Rafsanjani and Khamenei





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Much of Khamenei's authority derives from his position as chief executive, which gives him overall control of the government's administrative apparatus. As President he is responsible for carrying out constitutional laws and for organizing the relationship between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. He also can veto bills and nominate the Prime Minister.


Khamenei was reelected secretary general of the Islamic Republic Party in May 1983 and won a seat on its Central Committee but, according to Iranian press reports, came in second to Rafsanjani in the voting. Khamenei controls the Islamic Republic Party newspaper, *Islamic Republic*, which he has used to attack his enemies and advance both the regime's policies and himself.



Khamenei also has an important forum to influence policy as Tehran's Friday prayer leader.³ That he succeeded Ayatollah Montazeri⁴ as Friday prayer



³ Rafsanjani is only one of several acting Friday prayer leaders in Tehran.
⁴ Ayatollah Montazeri holds some of Ayatollah Khomeini's authority over the judiciary and Revolutionary Guard but holds no official position in the government.



leader indicates he was seen by Khomeini as a clerical comer and that he probably has a better academic record than Rafsanjani, according to an American researcher on modern Iran. [redacted]

damaged his vocal cords, has reduced his public speaking engagements but gained him the title from Khomeini of Living Martyr in a nation obsessed with martyrdom. [redacted]

[redacted]

³ An assassination attempt in 1981, which

³ Because of injuries Khamenei sustained during an assassination attempt, he usually leads Friday prayers only on religious and revolutionary holidays, which may explain the larger audiences. [redacted]

Competition

We believe that the rivalry between the two men that has developed since the revolution is mainly over power rather than ideology. The competition is magnified by a rivalry between the executive and legislative branches of government. Khamenei, at times, has publicly accused the Majlis of hurting government policy because of its slowness in passing bills. Rafsanjani has publicly complained that some of the bills presented to the Majlis are poorly conceived [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Succession Issue. We believe the power struggle between Khamenei and Rafsanjani is centered on the question of who should succeed Ayatollah Khomeini and the form of the regime after he dies. [redacted]

[redacted] In seeking political advantage they take tactical positions on the succession issue that often contradict their previous stands. Ayatollah Montazeri has been presumed by Iranians to be Khomeini's choice as heir. Khamenei and Rafsanjani, while supporting the concept of a clerical monopoly on political leadership, have been described by different sources as both supporting and opposing Montazeri as heir. Public statements by both men suggest that Rafsanjani supports Montazeri, while Khamenei favors a three- to five-man council of senior clerics which could possibly be dominated by ayatollahs, such as Meshkini and Musavi-Ardabili, from Azarbayjan, Khamenei's ancestral province. We believe Rafsanjani supports Montazeri largely because he believes Montazeri has Ayatollah Khomeini's backing. Rafsanjani also hopes to be able to manipulate the situation if Montazeri becomes leader [redacted]

Actions in January 1983 by the Council of Experts, which is to choose a successor to Khomeini, suggest that a compromise over the succession may have been reached. The Council elected Ayatollah Meshkini, whose views on the succession are similar to Khamenei's, as chairman. Rafsanjani, however, was elected as one of two deputy chairmen. In addition, we believe Khomeini's will calls for a single successor who should call on the Council of Experts for guidance. [redacted]

These two moves have established the basis for a power-sharing arrangement. [redacted]

[redacted] we believe Khamenei, by virtue of his support for Meshkini and

The Succession Issue

The course of the Islamic Republic depends to a large extent on how the clerics manage the succession to Khomeini. We believe Khomeini's will ensures a smooth succession, at least in the short term, because no cleric will be able to defy Khomeini's written orders immediately following his death. The possibility of a smooth succession is also increased by the establishment of the Council of Experts and by the clerics' knowledge that their control of the government would be threatened by an intensive succession struggle. Political opportunism and the theological and historical precedents that define clerical ideology encourage compromise among the clerics.

In December 1982 the clerical regime elected an 83-man Assembly of Experts whose job it is to choose Khomeini's successor(s). Under the Constitution, the Assembly may select either one cleric or a council of three or five clerics.

Without Khomeini's overarching authority, there is a chance that the clerics' disputes could become uncontrollable. No other cleric in Iran has Khomeini's stature of unopposed authority, and Shiism has a tradition of violent clashes between rival clerical groups while one dominant faction is being replaced by another. We believe such clashes could trigger wider violence that would threaten the stability of the Islamic Republic. Many clerics retain close ties to

factions in the Revolutionary Guard and to individuals in the regular Army. The organizations currently act as constraints on each other, and the professional military seems less inclined than the Guard to political involvement. If splits in clerical ranks precipitated a breakdown in regime authority, ambitious leaders in both the Guard and the Army would probably attempt to align themselves with their various clerical associates in a bid for power, increasing the possibilities for a descent into anarchy.

We believe the grand ayatollahs may enter the succession process to modify the regime's ideology in favor of curbing clerical involvement in running the government. They have stayed in the background for the most part since 1979, but recently grand Ayatollah Shirazi, ayatollahs in Mashhad and Esfahan, and possibly even grand Ayatollah Kholi have sponsored demonstrations against the government in Iranian cities, according to the Iranian media. We believe such activities, if sustained, would challenge the activist clerics and would be especially threatening after Khomeini's death.

We do not believe the Soviets would become involved in a succession process unless there was a total breakdown in authority. While some leading clerics may have ties with the Soviets, there is no evidence that any would attempt to or could use Soviet power to further their ambitions. A Soviet connection would be the kiss of death to any cleric. His opponents would use it as a major rallying point to remove him from power.

his position as President, will retain enough power, however, to balance Rafsanjani. We believe part of the deal may involve elevating both Rafsanjani and Khamenei to the rank of ayatollah when Khomeini dies. Both are having religious studies written in their name that must be accepted by the senior ayatollahs before the two contenders can assume that rank.

Positions on Other Major Issues

The positions that Rafsanjani and Khamenei take on other issues, such as the war with Iraq, foreign policy, and the economy, appear similar if not identical. Their views do not always accord with their radical

Public Positions on the War

Rafsanjani	Khamenei	Rafsanjani	Khamenei
Iraq invades, September 1980			
Question of war and peace is up to Khomeini, September 1980		Peace conditions now include repatriation of Iraqi exiles, May 1982	Iran wants Saddam tried and \$150 billion in reparations. Peace conditions now include repatriation of Iraqi exiles. Will remain in state of war until reparations guaranteed, May 1982
Overthrow of Saddam is Iraqi people's responsibility, October 1980			
Iraqi offensive stalemates and Iraq asks Turkey to mediate, November 1980-January 1981		Not concerned with money or war damage but if Ba'th remains even without Saddam, he will press for reparations. Impossible that we will stay at border. The way to Jerusalem is through Karbala, June 1982	
Negotiations for cease-fire out of question as long as Iraq remains in Iran, January 1981			
Tehran agrees to receive Islamic Conference, UN, and non-aligned mediation plans		Iran attempts invasion, high casualties, July 1982	
No negotiation with Saddam under any circumstance. Aggressor should be tried and punished, March 1981	No cease-fire that does not condemn and punish aggressor. Progress toward peace almost impossible. Conditions for peace: (1) unconditional withdrawal; (2) punishment of and admission that Iraq is aggressor; (3) accept 1975 Algiers Accord, March 1981	Invasion to stop shelling of cities, to get reparations, to open road to Jerusalem. Iran needs no mediation since conditions remain the same, July 1982.	
		Invasion fails, August-October 1982	
Iran makes major gains, July 1981-June 1982. Khomeini makes prowar statements		Reparations can be paid in installments, August 1982	Request that UAE use all its efforts to stop war. Islamic conference mission had no new points. Cease-fire only when conditions met, October 1982
Peace conditions: (1) tribunal to identify aggressors; (2) payment of reparation, October 1981	So long as Iraqi troops in Iran, accepting peace and compromise will bring misery to Iran, November 1981	We want to achieve our rights in a way which will not make millions of Iraqis homeless, September 1982	We respect mediation efforts being taken to achieve our rights. We will go as far as it takes to silence enemy artillery, September 1982
1975 Algiers Accord valid and should be implemented, October 1981	Question of war damage and punishing aggressor will not prevent ending war once Iraqi troops withdraw, December 1981	Iranian units cross border, November 1982-January 1983	
		Mediation delegations should not come unless they have something new to say, December 1982	Rejects Islamic Conference Peace proposal, November 1982
If enemy remains in Iran cannot stop ourselves from penetrating Iraq. Reserve the right to go anywhere, December 1981		Iranian offensive, February 1983	
Conditions for peace: (1) withdrawal of Iraqi troops; (2) trial and punishment of Iraq; (3) restoring Iran its usurped rights, January 1982	Peace viable only when not encouraging or rewarding aggression, January 1982	Last decisive operation launched. Period of grace granted by Iran was construed as weakness. Offensive will not stop until Gate of War is sealed. War has entered new stage. Saddam not our main enemy, the United States is. If we stay on our border we can still defeat Iraq, February 1983	We will not abandon conditions for peace. Withdrawal of Iraqi forces no longer main condition. Main condition is Saddam be punished. We cannot pay any attention to Saddam or his proposals, February 1983
Most important thing is Saddam and Ba'th be punished. Will gain rights by force. Could infiltrate Iraqi territory if wished. If peace terms not accepted we have right to take Baghdad but do not aim at entering Iraq, April 1982	No designs on Iraqi territory. Identification and punishment of aggressor must be done by world's wise men and peace lovers, April 1982		Iranian people will never kneel down to Iraqi-imposed war, January 1983

Public Positions on the War (continued)

concern for casualties and support for a reduction in fighting.

Rafsanjani	Khamenei
Offensive fails, March-May 1983	
Operations limited to avoid casualties; we are trying to refrain from bloodshed. We have gone as far as we had planned to, March 1983	
Martyrdom should be avoided . . . not the chief objective of the war, May 1983	
Khomeini makes prowar statements, May-July 1983	
Final solution is liberation of the people of Iraq. We will intensify our resistance, June 1983	As long as demands not met we will continue war. We should make Ramadan more blessed by increasing readiness to crush enemy, June 1983

[Redacted]

orientation, reported group affiliation, or social class. Khamenei sometimes appears more idealistic and dogmatic, but when necessary, pragmatism prevails. Rafsanjani's positions appear to shift according to the political climate [Redacted]

War. Both men appear to be in general agreement on Iran's strategy in its war with Iraq. Throughout most of the war Rafsanjani and Khamenei have publicly spoken against a negotiated settlement and repeatedly warned the Arab Gulf states not to aid Iraq. Khamenei said in October 1981 that the war should be seen as a jihad (holy war), and in February 1982 he said the war could end only with the defeat and humiliation of Iraq's President Saddam Husayn.

[Redacted]

In the spring of 1983, both men publicly moderated their positions, probably as a result of heavy casualties and growing popular disaffection for the conflict. Khamenei's statements indicated support for reduced fighting and possibly a negotiated settlement. Rafsanjani also made statements that showed increased

Khamenei and Rafsanjani on Relations With the United States

Khamenei

"Our archenemy is the United States . . . we will never tolerate that superpower . . . the one that is at the top of our list of enemies is the United States."

"We have no plan whatsoever to cooperate with or get near the United States. I hope our government will remain on this path . . . forever."

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

We believe that neither leader has been co-opted by the Soviets. Both have repeatedly condemned the USSR for its invasion of Afghanistan and are fundamentally dedicated to Islam, which has little in

Rafsanjani

"America continues to be our enemy, and accordingly we are America's enemy . . . I believe that this will continue for a long time."

Tehran's Relations With Moscow

Soviet-Iranian relations are at their lowest level since the Islamic revolution in 1979. Open polemics between the two countries have become standard fare. The Khomeini regime has arrested leaders of the Tudeh on charges of spying for the KGB, closed the offices of a variety of Soviet organizations in Iran, and harassed the Soviet Embassy in Tehran. The Kremlin has swung its support in the war to Iraq and has become less concerned about Tehran's reaction to Soviet operations against Afghan insurgents near the Iranian border. [Redacted]

As long as Khomeini remains in power, Soviet influence in Iran will be minimal. Iran under Khomeini has become more dependent on Soviet and East European trade and transit routes, but this has not led to significant Soviet political leverage. Khomeini's reluctance to deal directly with the Soviets on a major scale is shared by most leading clerics in Iran, including Rafsanjani and Khamenei. After Khomeini dies, policies could moderate slightly if the Line of the Imam faction increases its power. Close relations between Iran and the Soviet Union while the clerics rule, however, are highly unlikely. [Redacted]

common with Communism. They probably favor a tolerant attitude toward the Soviets and closer cooperation with Moscow on economic and military matters as long as there is no strategic military understanding or massive presence of Soviet experts in Iran. [Redacted]

Export of the Revolution. Both men favor exporting the Islamic Revolution by means of propaganda and subversion. Analysis of their public statements suggests that, like Ayatollah Khomeini, both men see the world in terms of oppressor and oppressed and advocate dissemination of the revolution's social message to non-Muslim countries as well as aid to "liberation movements." [Redacted]

Khamenei and Rafsanjani on Export of the Revolution

Khamenei

"Iran shall convey the voice of revolution to the peoples of the world in every possible way."

Rafsanjani

"The export of the revolution is something that we cannot prevent."

"The question of unity (against imperialism and Marxism) is not confined to Africa and the Islamic countries."

[Redacted]

Khamenei on Muslim Unity

"We are friendly with Muslim and non-Muslim states as long as they do not attack us."

"The Islamic nation (Iran) does not regard its destiny as separate from the destiny of the world's Muslims."

"Purity and brotherhood link us to our Sunni brothers."

"There is no difference between Shia and Sunni."

"Iran seeks friendship, understanding, cooperation, and peaceful coexistence with all the Persian Gulf states."

[Redacted]

Khamenei appears willing to moderate his position on this issue, however, according to his public statements. He has said publicly that Iran is against using sabotage to export the revolution and that Iran's support for liberation movements is mostly spiritual. Khamenei stated in April 1982 that Iran wanted close relations with Turkey, Pakistan, and the Gulf states, but he has also called on the Gulf Arabs to overthrow their rulers and establish Islamic governments. He is a particularly active advocate of close economic and political ties with Turkey. He publicly rules out relations only with the United States, Israel, Jordan, France, and Egypt. He is also a strong advocate of close Sunni/Shia relations, and while calling on Muslim governments to follow Iran's example, he emphasizes Iran's desire for correct relations with the Gulf states [Redacted]

Rafsanjani has been less outspoken on exporting the revolution than Khamenei, probably because it is not a major issue for him. His record on other issues, however, leads us to believe that he also would moderate his position if he found it expedient to do so. [Redacted]

Economy. Both leaders favor centralization of the economy and stress that priority should be given to solving the country's economic problems. They favor

land reform, centralized supervision of commerce, and centralized planning. Neither appears to favor sudden, radical changes, however, preferring to use bureaucratic and constitutional processes for change. They also are usually pragmatic on the issues of development, favoring foreign technical advice when necessary and when using it does not threaten economic independence. Rafsanjani favors an amnesty for exiled Iranian economic experts to encourage their return. Both favor employing and training Iranian technical experts even if they are not fervently Islam-

[Redacted]

Rafsanjani on "a Socialist Economy"

"Islam does not approve of poverty and great wealth."

"When the Hidden Imam returns, people will receive to the extent they need and will contribute to the extent they are able."

"The high cost and unjust distribution of goods . . . is the last hope of the counterrevolution."

"Ownership of property does not mean one can misuse it."

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Khamenei's position on economics has been more consistent. He considers economic progress a major goal: "Our most major concern is currently the economy." Development must be balanced, however, and not depend on oil revenues or foreign imports. He strongly favors industrial and planning centralization and redistribution of wealth, and he apparently cooperates with Rafsanjani, at least some of the time, on this issue. In March 1982 he praised Majlis cooperation in government economic programs and budget planning [Redacted]

Vulnerabilities

[Redacted]

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
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*The *Hojjatiyeh* faction favors strict Islamic law, use of Western technology to help the economy, limited clerical intervention in secular affairs, and export of the revolution. The *Hojjatiyeh* opposes major economic reform and a single successor to Khomeini. The *Line of the Imam* emphasizes the more revolutionary aspects of Iran's revolution and favors good relations with the USSR, a centralized economy, and a single clerical successor to Khomeini.

[Redacted]

Khomeini's Position

Khomeini appears to try to balance Rafsanjani and Khamenei, permitting neither to achieve a decisive advantage over the other. [redacted]



With Rafsanjani apparently in ascendancy by the end of 1982, Khomeini began countering Rafsanjani's power by building up Khamenei. Rafsanjani was hurt on the Tudeh issue during the spring of 1983 and, probably at Khomeini's insistence, declared publicly in May 1983 that "a vote for him (Khamenei) is a vote for the Imam, the clergy, the Majlis. . . ." Khomeini, in January 1983, praised Khamenei, saying "you should not think you can find anyone in all the world . . . like Khamenei . . . who is committed to Islam and who is trying to serve this nation wholeheartedly." [redacted]

Outlook

While Khomeini remains alive, his ability to balance Rafsanjani and Khamenei will probably keep their rivalry in check. The rivalry will continue, however, at times boiling over and becoming public. Khomeini has made numerous speeches warning the clerics that personal rivalries and ambition are un-Islamic and should cease [redacted]

Rafsanjani's and Khamenei's differences appear more personal than ideological, and they will probably keep changing their positions and alliances depending on their perception of the political climate. Rafsanjani, weakened slightly by the Tudeh crackdown, will be careful not to be caught off guard again. Both leaders will seek to manipulate different factional groups, hoping their views will prevail [redacted]

Implications for the United States

The rivalry between Khamenei and Rafsanjani has important implications for the future of Iran and, as a result, for US policy in the Persian Gulf. If the succession deteriorates into open conflict, there is a strong possibility that it could turn violent. Both men have links with the security forces, which could tempt them to resort to force if their interests are seriously challenged. Other factions would become involved, causing a general deterioration of the security situation in Iran. This could result in a chaotic situation that could disrupt oil exports and encourage Soviet intervention. Available information indicates Rafsanjani's and Khamenei's influence with the Revolutionary Guard and military is about equal, and we believe it is impossible to determine which leader would win such a struggle. [redacted]

If, as is more likely, the succession is smooth and Rafsanjani and Khamenei retain their positions of influence, the regime's policies will remain much the same. Some moderation is possible as they become more confident in the regime's and in their own ability to survive. Neither leader is strong enough to be the determining factor in Iran's policies, but hostility toward the United States could lessen if they view it in Iran's interest despite their current public position. Relations with the USSR could also improve, but we do not believe either leader would argue for close ties, and a basically nonaligned policy will be maintained. [redacted]

Both men would probably push for a mediated settlement in the war with Iraq, which would considerably lessen the chance of hostilities spreading to the moderate oil-exporting states in the Persian Gulf. Khamenei and possibly Rafsanjani would argue for less aggressive export of the revolution, but neither would stop Iranian meddling completely. [redacted]

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
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Iran: Growing Prospects for Instability



An Intelligence Assessment

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October 1984

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
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Iran: Growing Prospects for Instability [Redacted]

An Intelligence Assessment

This paper was prepared by [Redacted]
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis,
with a contribution from [Redacted] Office of
Central Reference. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
[Redacted] NESA, [Redacted]

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NESA 84-10285
October 1984



Iran: Growing Prospects for Instability

Key Judgments

*Information available
as of 28 September 1984
was used in this report.*

Political instability in Iran is likely to increase significantly following Ayatollah Khomeini's death as clerical and lay factions compete for power. Without Khomeini, there will be no one in Iran with the stature and charisma to capture the support of the masses or contain clerical infighting:

- Nearly six years after the revolution, the clerics have yet to agree on key philosophical and theological guidelines for the Islamic Republic of Iran. Even the issue of clerical control has not been resolved.
- The clerical regime has not developed the mechanisms to manage domestic and foreign policy disputes without resort to Khomeini.
- The regime's popularity continues to decline because of growing official corruption, economic stagnation, deteriorating public services, and the financial and human costs of the war with Iraq.

We believe the Revolutionary Guard will be the key in determining the stability of post-Khomeini Iran. If, as is most likely, the Guard fragments, this would raise the prospect of a violent power struggle. If, on the other hand, most of the Guard backs one candidate or coalition, its arms and widespread local power base would provide the winning margin and allow for a smoother transition of power.

We do not see any likely alternatives to an Islamic-oriented regime with a strong clerical influence in the aftermath of Khomeini's death. In our judgment, neither the Shah's son nor any other Iranian exile leader possesses the necessary domestic assets to gain control. The regular military continues to be purged of officers suspected of antiregime sentiments, and most regular Army units are at the front, well away from the centers of power in Tehran and Qom. Iranian minorities have largely parochial interests; they wish to be as far removed as possible from Tehran's control.

We believe a successor government in Iran will espouse a policy of nonalignment. Nevertheless, there are key interest groups in Iran that would be willing to improve Tehran's relations with the United States or the USSR:

- Conservative clerics, bazaar merchants, and some officers in the regular military appear willing to reduce Iran's hostility toward the United States. The need to show allegiance to the Islamic revolution, however, probably would limit overt ties to Washington.



- A government controlled by a Revolutionary Guard leader or a left-leaning technocrat would be suspicious of the USSR but would be more willing than the current regime to look to Moscow for both military and economic aid. It also could be less hostile to Soviet foreign policy goals in the region. The need to sell oil and to import consumer goods, raw materials, and equipment, however, probably would lead even a left-leaning regime in Tehran to maintain economic ties with Western Europe, Japan, Turkey, and Pakistan.

If Iran experienced a prolonged upheaval, the Soviets would enjoy expanded opportunities for exploitation, particularly among Iran's minorities near the lengthy border with the USSR. We believe, however, that Moscow's ability to influence events in Iran would be limited—Moscow's natural ally, the Tudeh party, has been suppressed and its leaders jailed or executed. Other left-leaning groups have also been suppressed. Moscow could provide support to the remnants of such groups during a period of protracted instability, but we believe its willingness to act boldly would be constrained by the risks of confrontation with the West. Alternatively, a prolonged upheaval and a fragmented Revolutionary Guard could lead to a more important role for the regular military, providing limited opportunities for the United States.





Iran: Growing Prospects for Instability


Six years after the removal of the Shah and three years after the consolidation of clerical power, an environment of uncertainty persists in Iran. Khomeini's health is declining. The 84-year-old Ayatollah is suffering from progressive senility as well as from heart, kidney, and prostate problems. A simmering succession struggle has already begun. Iran's costly war with Iraq, a faltering, war-strained economy, and the regime's brutal use of repression to stifle internal dissent are causing popular discontent to grow. Although this discontent poses no immediate threat to the regime, it will provide fuel for the factional **infighting** we expect to occur when Khomeini dies.



Ayatollah Khomeini 


Wide World ©


The Clerical Consolidation

Iran remained in turmoil for nearly three years following the revolution as various components of the anti-Shah coalition vied for power. Only by late 1981 did the clerics consolidate control over the government. They then quickly increased oil exports by lowering prices, seized the initiative in the war against Iraq, and began planning for economic development. The clerics' consolidation of power increased concerns among the Arab states of the Persian Gulf and in the West that Iran would attempt to establish hegemony over the entire Gulf area. 


These glowing prospects for the regime's institutionalization at home and expanding influence abroad have not been fulfilled:

- The war and differences over strategy have blunted Iran's efforts to export the revolution.
- After driving Iraqi forces from Iranian territory in 1982, the war has gone badly for Tehran as one offensive after another into Iraq was defeated and enormous casualties mounted. We estimate that Iran has suffered at least 200,000 dead since the Iraqi invasion began in September 1980.
- Iran's clerical community shared little more than a hazy vision of how to return to the golden age of Islam.

- The economy is stalled between differing clerical philosophies over the role of the state in controlling and directing the economy, as well as a continuing lack of skilled managers. 


The clerical regime, moreover, has not yet developed the mechanisms to manage domestic and foreign policy disputes without resort to Khomeini. Nor, in our judgment, do any of the other clerics in the regime approach Khomeini's appeal to lower-class Iranians. In short, the clerical regime has consolidated its control but has failed to institutionalize its rule or ensure its survival after its founder-creator leaves the scene. 

Clerical Infighting

In May 1983 the US Intelligence Community agreed that clerical factionalism had "emerged as the regime's primary weakness."¹ Indeed, so fundamental are the divisions within the Iranian regime that the central issue of the proper role of clerics in governing remains unresolved. 

the clergy are divided roughly into three groups. At one extreme are activists such as Khomeini who advocate strict clerical supervision of society under





the leadership of a supreme religious jurisprudent (*velayat-e faqih*). In the middle are clerical moderates who argue for general clerical supervision, with less direct intervention in the government. At the other extreme are quietists who oppose any clerical involvement in politics—and, hence, the whole structure of Khomeini's Islamic Republic. [redacted]

The activists and the moderates presently control the regime. Although they agree on the general principle of clerical rule, [redacted] they dispute the degree to which clerics ought to govern directly and the extent of government control over social and economic life. The quietists are on the sidelines. Included in the quietist group are Iran's grand ayatollahs—those senior clerics who theoretically are Khomeini's religious equals. [redacted]

Clerical leaders and their lay allies maintain influence through a wide range of power centers, both within and outside the formal government structure. Several revolutionary organizations that sprang up during the revolution, such as the *komitehs*, the Foundation for the Oppressed, and the Revolutionary Guard, remain largely autonomous. Moreover, clerical associations and important individual clerics and laymen have their own networks of followers—many of whom are armed—and financing, [redacted]. The most important institutions and associations, both in and out of government, have leaders who play key roles in the current jockeying over how to share power after Khomeini's departure. [redacted]

The Economy and War Heighten Popular Discontent

Iran's economy continues to falter and is a serious point of contention among the country's factions. Official Iranian statistics reveal that unemployment and underemployment remain high, rapid inflation persists, and there is widespread inefficiency and waste. Government industrial and agricultural planning has nearly ceased because of factional disagreements within the regime. Those progressive clerics and their supporters who favor land reform, nationalization, and government control use Islamic teachings to argue that everything belongs ultimately to Allah and is to be used for the common good. Conservative clerical opponents and their supporters, particularly among the bazaar merchants, quote Koranic verses demonstrating the right to own unlimited amounts of property. [redacted]

Shiite Theology and the Khomeini Regime

Shiite Islam in Iran reveres the first 12 direct descendants of Muhammad as divinely inspired imams (leaders) and, therefore, rightful successors to the Prophet to rule over Islam. Shias believe the last of these 12 descendants went into hiding in the ninth century A.D. but will return at the end of time to establish the universal rule of justice. The dominant Shia school in Iran has traditionally questioned the legitimacy of any temporal government until the return of the "hidden Imam," and most clerics have avoided open association with secular regimes. As a result, the clergy came to be regarded as the protector of the masses against government tyranny. This association became even closer under the Pahlavi dynasty when the impact of Westernization intensified and other avenues for the expression of political grievances were suppressed. [redacted]

Khomeini was able to focus this mass sympathy. He also obtained the support of many clerics and lay politicians who believed the Shah's regime would destroy their influence. Once in power, however, Khomeini established a theocratic state that went far beyond the dominant tradition separating clerics from government involvement. Indeed, Khomeini's two central concepts—the inextricable union of religion and politics and the need for a supreme religious jurisprudent to provide strict guidance over a society governed by clerics—are considered heretical by Shia traditionalists, who, [redacted] still represent the majority of clerics in Iran. [redacted]

Such theologically based arguments leave little room for compromise. Thus, even when the Majles has passed economic legislation after extensive debate—such as the act to nationalize foreign trade—the conservative Council of Guardians¹ has rejected the legislation as "un-Islamic." A five-year economic

¹ The Council of Guardians is comprised of six clerics appointed by Khomeini and six lay jurists nominated by the Supreme Judicial Council and approved by the Majles. They are responsible for ensuring that bills passed by the Majles conform with the constitution and Islamic law. [redacted]

development plan, first proposed in 1982, still languishes in the Majles. Agriculture—the centerpiece of the regime's economic propaganda—continues to stagnate. Public statements by regime officials indicate that land reform has come to a standstill. Eighty percent of Iranian land remains in the hands of large landowners, and rural inhabitants continue to flock to the cities, reducing available manpower for agriculture while increasing Iran's dependence on imported foodstuffs. [redacted]

Even if the regime could devise a coherent economic program, we believe widespread corruption would undermine its effectiveness. For example, Iran's official media have criticized the Foundation for the Oppressed, a multibillion-dollar conglomerate of commercial and industrial enterprises, for its inept management and corrupt officials.³ The foundation is headed by a former hardware salesman loyal to the regime. He appointed his brother-in-law, a former truckdriver, as one of his two deputies. [redacted]

[redacted] bribes are necessary to secure required government approvals, that officials are paid off to approve uncompleted contracts, and that faulty workmanship is rampant. [redacted]

As a result, the economy is even more dependent on oil for export earnings than under the Shah. Iran reported its total nonoil export earnings amounted to \$340 million in 1983—just 2 percent of the \$19 billion it earned from petroleum earnings. With oil revenues down because of the stepped-up war in the Gulf and the slack oil market, the regime has clamped down on imports. [redacted]

[redacted] the resulting shortages have renewed popular complaints about the economy.

[redacted] bazaar merchants dissatisfied with regime economic management financed many successful candidates in the Majles elections of April 1984 who are expected to reflect the bazaaris' conservative interests. [redacted]

³ The Foundation for the Oppressed was created in 1979 when the Khomeini regime inherited the holdings of the Shah's Pahlavi Foundation. It owns thousands of businesses and buildings throughout Iran. The profits are supposed to be used by the regime to aid Iran's poor, but Tehran admits that corruption and mismanagement have restricted its effectiveness. [redacted]

The Grand Ayatollahs


A religious hierarchy exists within Shia Islam that has no counterpart in orthodox Sunni practice. At the top of this religious pyramid stand the "grand" ayatollahs—those few whose scholarship and devotion are so widely recognized that they are regarded as legitimate independent interpreters of Islamic law. In Iran today there are five men besides Khomeini who have such recognition, all but one older than Khomeini. They are theoretically Khomeini's equals, but his preeminence since the revolution has overshadowed them. [redacted]

[redacted] none of the other grand ayatollahs actively support Khomeini. In part, this reflects their sense of diminished status, but also their long-held belief in the quietist tradition of clerical nonintervention in secular rule. [redacted]

Grand Ayatollah Golpayegani, for example, believes that the concept of velayat-e faqih has very limited application. Such a jurisprudent has the right only to dispose of lost property and administer the property of lunatics and orphans. In his view, interference in other spheres, political or military, is excluded in canon law. He and the other grand ayatollahs oppose government confiscation of property and regard nationalization, land reform, and many taxes as contrary to the precepts of Islam. [redacted]


Despite their displeasure with the current regime, these senior religious figures have spoken out against it only rarely. Their many followers and students, however, are well aware of their opposition to the regime. [redacted]

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
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The war has increasingly become a liability that the regime seems unable to resolve. Tehran has been unable to defeat the Iraqis, but Khomeini's insistence on ousting Iraqi President Saddam Husayn prevents a peace settlement. High casualties have cost the regime popular support, apparently even among its most ardent backers in the lower classes. [redacted]

Despite these complaints, public statements of Iranian leaders reveal that many within the regime still are worried about ending the war without clear victory. Such leaders as Majles Speaker Rafsanjani and President Khomeini appear to fear this would call into question both Tehran's claim of religious invincibility and the wisdom of pursuing a war that has produced so many deaths in vain. [redacted]

The conflict has turned hundreds of thousands of Iranians into refugees. Many have flocked to Iran's major cities, aggravating an already serious strain on public services. The Shah's inability to meet the needs of Iran's urban areas in the last years of his reign was a major contributing factor to the revolution. Since the Shah's departure, Tehran's population has doubled to over 8 million people. [redacted] that the influx has created a severe shortage of housing, large numbers of unemployed, periodic water shortages, power outages, inadequate medical facilities and a shortage of doctors, and long lines to purchase basic commodities. The Iranian Government recently warned Tehran's residents that air pollution in the city had become a serious health hazard. Similar, if less drastic, reports have come in from Iran's other major cities. [redacted]

Other signs of disenchantment with the regime abound. [redacted] numerous and apparently spontaneous antiregime demonstrations throughout Iran over the past six months. Voter turnout for the Majles elections held in April 1984 was uniformly reported as light and unenthusiastic, despite the regime's campaign to get out the vote by stamping identification cards at polling stations for use in obtaining rations. [redacted] low morale among both students and faculty on college

campuses despite religious screening to weed out malcontents. Many in Iran are paying bribes to have their children's academic records falsified to gain admission to foreign schools or to have doctors alter medical records to avoid military service. [redacted]


Succession and the Struggle for Power

The political infighting revolving around the succession to Khomeini is adding to the divisions within Iran. The Islamic Republic's constitution mandates that the succession to Khomeini's post as supreme political-religious authority be formally decided by a cleric-dominated 60-man Assembly of Experts in religious law. The constitution allows a choice between a sole heir or a leadership council of three or five senior clerics. [redacted]

We expect the initial phase of succession to go smoothly. Shia Islamic ritual calls for 40 days of public mourning during which the regime's leaders are likely to channel the highly charged emotions of the population toward support for the government. We expect that Ayatollah Montazeri will be confirmed as Khomeini's successor during this period. He has long been considered Khomeini's preferred choice as heir and has already taken on many of Khomeini's duties and prerogatives. Majles Speaker Rafsanjani, now second only to Khomeini in political power, has endorsed Montazeri more than once, as has Khomeini's son, Ahmad. Iran's government-controlled press has been referring to Montazeri as a "Grand Ayatollah" to raise his religious standing to the level appropriate for supreme religious jurisprudent. [redacted]

Montazeri, however, lacks Khomeini's religious stature and his commanding presence. Without someone of Khomeini's stature, we believe factional disputes and rising discontent over the war and the economy are likely to produce an extended period of political instability. [redacted] mutual suspicions among the clerics and their lay associates are already running high. We do not believe that any single Iranian leader has sufficient power to emerge quickly as a dominant leader. Rather, in the weeks and months following Khomeini's death, we expect

Montazeri and the Succession: Two Views



Iran's grand ayatollahs—who see Khomeini as junior to them—reject Montazeri because of his inadequate religious credentials. Moreover, they do not believe that the Assembly of Experts has the right to name the supreme Shia cleric. Only they, as legitimate interpreters of Islam, are proper arbiters on this kind of issue.

The abilities of heirs-in-waiting, however, often have been underestimated before they have assumed top leadership. Most observers dismissed President Sadat of Egypt, for example, as only an interim successor to Gamal Abd al-Nasir

he is more capable than is widely perceived.

his image has been deliberately undermined to prevent the consolidation of clerical rule.

he is well connected to the Revolutionary Guard. Montazeri has a reputation as a hardliner on the war with Iraq and on the strict observance of Islamic law, but in recent months he has softened his public positions on such issues as the war and on social policy. Such an attempt to broaden his political base suggests his political savvy.

the struggle for power to increase as leaders of competing governmental, religious, and revolutionary organizations maneuver to secure more dominant political positions.

Montazeri will have to convince these other leaders that unbridled infighting threatens their collective hold on power. If important regime figures, such as Majles Speaker Rafsanjani and President Khomeini—who as junior clerics are not candidates to succeed Khomeini—steadfastly line up behind Montazeri, he probably will have time to attempt to

consolidate his rule. such support for Montazeri is unlikely. Khomeini, for example, does not wish to see Montazeri become Khomeini's sole heir because he believes that would increase Rafsanjani's power.


The Revolutionary Guard will be central to the regime's ability to maneuver during this period and is likely to play a key role. Only half the Guard is at the front; the remainder is maintained as a security force in nearly every town and village throughout Iran.

the Guard remains strong and independent despite government attempts to gain control over it. Guard policy is set by a shadowy Command Council of about 30 men, each of whom probably controls a sizable armed group. We do not know the identities of all the members, but we believe the Council includes Minister of Heavy Industries Behzad Nabavi, Commerce Minister Hasan Abedi-Jafari, and Deputy Foreign Minister Javad Mansuri, the former Deputy Operations Commander of the Guard and a leader of street toughs known as *hezbollahi* (Party of God followers).

Guard Minister Mohsen Rafiq-Dust has admitted publicly that the Command Council exercises more authority over the Guard than either he or its Commander, Mohsen Rezai. Both obtained their Guard jobs originally because of their close relationships with senior regime leaders rather than from their strength within the Guard itself. Individual leaders of the Guard, moreover, act without government sanction. The hijacking of an Air France airliner in July 1984, for example, was the work of an element within the Guard, not approved in advance by the government. We believe that Guard leaders emphasize their loyalty to Khomeini, in part because this allows them to act independently in the absence of explicit guidance from him.

Ayatollah Khomeini in recent weeks has repeatedly warned the Guard to stay out of politics, probably reflecting the regime's concern over Guard independence. In the unlikely event that the Guard stayed out of succession politics and remained basically intact,

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Members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard [redacted]



APG

its use as a tool of repression over the population would give factional leaders more time to work out their differences. Alternatively, if the Guard backed one candidate or coalition, its support probably would be decisive. Such a move would ensure clerical rule while further increasing the influence of the Guard. [redacted]


In a climate of distrust and increasing competition, however, we believe it is more likely that various regime leaders will seek to strengthen and expand their contacts among the leaders of the Guard—especially if its loose structure of independent warlords remains. We also believe that factions at the far right and left within the regime's political spectrum are most likely to resort to force to avoid being squeezed out of power. The breakup of the Guard into warring factions ultimately could lead to anarchy and civil war. There are unconfirmed stories that a cleric close to Montazeri, for example, has been developing a loyal Guard cadre and arms caches near Esfahan for just such an eventuality. [redacted]

We doubt that the *regular military* will play a significant role in shaping the power struggle following Khomeini's death. [redacted] the regime remains suspicious of its loyalty and maintains

extremely tight supervision over it. Clerics have been inserted at all levels as political-ideological commissars. Moreover, the regime has advanced its loyalists into positions of command, and there have been repeated purges; any officer suspected of antiregime sentiment is immediately removed. [redacted]

[redacted] the resulting difficulties of organizing against the regime. Even if that were possible, we believe that officers would be unsure of their ability to command the loyalty of their troops. Most soldiers are drafted from the lower classes, the regime's power base. Almost all the regular military, moreover, is stationed at the front along the border with Iraq. [redacted]

Bazaar merchants played a supporting role in bringing Khomeini to power by providing money and other resources. They have since become increasingly disaffected by the strict implementation of Islamic law, the violent repression practiced by the government, and the economic stagnation under the current regime, [redacted]



Bazaaris have never been the leading political force in Iran, always preferring to provide support from the sidelines. We doubt that they will become a driving force in post-Khomeini Iran. Commerce remains their prime focus. We believe the strong business competition that exists in the bazaar and the bazaaris' close personal ties within various political factions impede the development of a unified organization. Although the bazaaris have some shared political goals—primarily a secure business environment and minimal government interference—historically, they have not wanted to rule Iran. [redacted]

We have watched the various Iranian *exile groups* since the fall of the Shah and believe that none of them have appreciable support inside Iran. Moreover, none have displayed organizational or operational skills. They lack realistic programs of political action and have not found common cause among themselves

or with forces in Iran. They are likely to remain on the sidelines as observers of events, more determined to score points against one another than to provide a credible alternative to the Khomeini regime or its successor. [redacted]

None of the exiles appear to be attractive allies for forces inside the country. Of all the exiles, the Shah's son probably has the most residual support, the beneficiary of nostalgia among Iran's upper and middle classes. Nevertheless, even those who favor a monarchy are unlikely to seek a restoration of the discredited Pahlavi dynasty. Any future kings and kingmakers are more likely to emerge from those who have remained in Iran. [redacted]

The Shah's son, Reza Pahlavi



Pictorial Parade ©

Implications for the United States

Whatever successor regime eventually emerges—short of an unlikely Communist takeover—we believe that certain general imperatives will guide Iranian policy:

- Islam is likely to remain a key component of any successor regime. Even secularists would be forced to recognize its political force.
- No regime will want to be seen as dominated by either superpower. "Neither East nor West" is, in our judgment, a genuinely popular slogan in Iran. The image of the US "satan" will be an important symbol of continuity. Moscow's military support for Iraq, the occupation of Afghanistan, and Iranian suspicions of Moscow's intentions, as well as hostility to Communist ideology, will limit Soviet prospects. Any Iranian regime is likely to hew closely to a policy of nonalignment.
- The need to sell oil, import consumer goods, and generate some economic development is likely to foster relatively good economic relations between Iran and industrial nations, as well as neighboring Turkey and Pakistan.
- Iran's role as a major power in the Persian Gulf and its rivalries with Iraq and Saudi Arabia will persist.

[Redacted]

Although any post-Khomeini regime is likely to espouse nonalignment, we believe there are groups who would be willing to lessen Iran's hostility toward one or the other superpower. [Redacted]

[Redacted] the majority of members on the Revolutionary Guard Command Council are left leaning and favor the radical restructuring of Iranian society along "Islamic socialist" lines. Public pronouncements [Redacted] indicate that this view is echoed among lay technocrats, some clerics, and many students. Many lay technocrats, now in their late thirties and early forties, were educated in the United States during the 1960s and reflect the student political activism that characterized that era. [Redacted]

"Islamic socialism" remains very popular among Iranian students, although regime repression has cowed these students into silence. These groups tend to be well organized and well armed. [Redacted]

A regime dominated by Revolutionary Guard leaders and other associated left-leaning groups would be suspicious of the USSR, but their deep ideological hatred of the United States would probably cause them to be more willing than the current regime to seek increased economic and military aid from Moscow. Such a regime would provide Moscow with its best opportunity in Iran. It could also be less hostile to Soviet foreign policy goals in the region. [Redacted]

Those groups who favor less hostile relations with the United States currently are either less active and less organized than the others or are not accustomed to political leadership roles. These groups include bazaar merchants, the conservative clergy including the grand ayatollahs, elements in the regular military, and the middle and upper classes. With the exception of the military, which is predominantly located at the front, these groups are not well armed and are likely to remain intimidated by the Revolutionary Guard. For these groups to gain dominance, the strength of the Guard would have to be exhausted in an extended period of violence between warring factions. The ability of the bazaaris to provide financial support to various factions could then become a crucial variable.

[Redacted]

Although a prolonged period of upheaval would enhance chances that groups less hostile to the United States might gain power, it also would provide the Soviets with expanded opportunities in Iran, especially among Iran's ethnic minorities along their common border. Twice in this century the USSR has sponsored short-lived socialist republics inside Iran. [redacted]

We believe, however, that the Soviets' ability to influence events in Iran would be limited. [redacted]

Soviet willingness to intervene militarily would be constrained, in our judgment, by the possibility of superpower confrontation.⁴ We continue to believe that the Soviets take seriously declarations by the United States that it would respond to overt Soviet moves against Iran. [redacted]

[redacted]

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National Security Council
The White House

System # _____

Package # _____

PTIRAN

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	_____
William Martin	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
William Martin	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	<u>2</u>	<u>ML</u>	<u>discuss to RCM</u>

[Handwritten initials and scribbles]

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan, Buchanan Other JMP, OLN, JC, HRT, BCF

COMMENTS Should be seen by: ASAP (Date/Time)

Bud,
Attached are 3 documents:
1. Rapsanjini letter to Nakasone of 8/14
2. Summary of non-paper re Nakasone emissary trip
3. Detailed non-paper account of emissary trip.

Forwarded per Ganta Sigus FX, Bst

T-88-35
009 4/17/82

127738
Aug 14 1975
to P.M. Nakhle for
Rajonjan

1. WE DO NOT KNOW HOW MUCH THE CLAIM OF AMERICAN HOSTAGES BEING HELD IN LEBANON IS SUBSTANTIATED.
2. IN CASE IT IS TRUE. WE HAVE NO IDEA WHO IS RESPONSIBLE WHILE THE PROBABILITY THAT THE AMERICAN AND THE ISRAELI AGENTS HAVE DONE THIS FOR ADVENTURIST GOALS ALSO EXISTS.
3. WE ARE NOT AT ALL CONFIDENT OF AMERICAN PEACE SEEKING APPROACH IN THE REGION AND SUCH EVENTS MIGHT HAVE BEEN CREATED TO PROVIDE PRETEXTS FOR SUPPRESSION AND INTERVENTION IN THE AREA.
4. SUPPOSEDLY THIS HOSTAGE TAKING IS DONE BY THE AMERICAN ADVERSARIES. WE ARE NOT SURE THAT U. S. SEEKS TO SOLVE IT AND DOES NOT PREFER THE STATUS QUO FOR ITS INTERVENTION IN THE AFFAIRS OF OTHERS AND FOR INTERNAL CONSUMPTION.
5. THE U S MOVE AFTER THE TWA CRISIS REAFFIRM SUCH SUSPICIONS. THE SYRIAN OFFICIALS TOLD US THAT U. S. HAD PROMISED THAT THE LEBANESE PRISONERS KEPT IN ISRAEL IN CONTRARY TO ALL INTERNATIONAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS WOULD BE FREED

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M393/1 #127738

BY AW NARA DATE 11/21/17

FOLLOWING THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES. BUT IT DID NOT FULFILLITS COMMITMENT.

6. IT SEEMS THAT U. S. BY DOING THIS INTENDS TO PROVOKE AND ANGER THE PEOPLE OF THE REGION TO TAKE SUCH ACTIONS.
7. IF THIS IS THE U. S. POLICY. YOU AND US MAY BE SERIOUSLY INVALIDITATED IN THE EYES OF THE OPPRESSED PEOPLE OF LEBANON.
8. IN ORDER TO PROVE THAT THE HOSTAGE ISSUE WAS SERIOUS AND AMERICA WAS DETERMINED TO FREE THEM. THE U. S. SHOULD FULFILL ITS PREVIOUS COMMITMENT AND LEBANESE PRISONERS BE FREED FROM ISRAELI JAILS .
9. SUCH EVENTS. CAN BE EXPECTED TO. BE REPEATED IN THE WORSE FORM EVEN IF THE HOSTAGES CLAIMED BY U. S. ARE FREED.
10. WE EXPECT THE WISE JAPANESE OFFICIALS TO HEED OUR FRIENDLY NOTES AND NOT BE DECEIVED BY THESE DECEIVERS SO THAT THEIR EFFORTS WILL NOT BE IN VAIN OR BE ILL-FAMED.

127740
(Non-paper)

Secret

THE SEVEN US HOSTAGES HELD IN LEBANON

1. Ambassador Yoshihiro NAKAYAMA visited Iran (6-9 August) and Syria (10-12 August), and met with Speaker Rafsanjani and Foreign Minister Velayati in Iran, and President Asad and Foreign Minister Sharah in Syria. Ambassador Nakayama handed to Speaker Rafsanjani and President Asad letters of Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone requesting their assistance in securing the release of the seven US hostages held in Lebanon, and held talks with each of them on this question.

2. (1) In Iran, Ambassador Nakayama met with Speaker Rafsanjani on 7 August and Foreign Minister Velayati on 8 August.

(2) In the meetings, Speaker Rafsanjani said that in the case of TWA hostages, it was clear that the hostages were held captive in Lebanon; but with regard to the 7 US hostages, Iran does not know if they are in Lebanon or not. Foreign Minister Velayati also said that the fact that 7 US nationals are taken hostages is claimed only by the US makes Iran doubt the US allegation, and that even if the US allegation is true and 7 US nationals are taken hostages, it would be difficult to grasp the true situation since there are so many groups and organizations active in Lebanon.

(3) In the meetings, the two Iranian leaders said that the US must use its influence upon Israel to have the Lebanese hostages released as agreed to at the time of the release of the TWA hostages. Only then, they said, can Iran act in concert with Syria to secure the release of the 7 US hostages.

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NLRR M3931 #127740
BY PW NARA DATE 11/21/17

108

3. In Syria, Ambassador Nakayama met with foreign Minister Sharah on 10 August and President Asad on 11 August.

(1) In the meeting with Foreign Minister Shara, Foreign Minister Shara said,

(a) As the Syrian side explained to Foreign Minister Abe when he visited Syria, the Syrian position remains to be that Syria would make utmost efforts to secure the release of the hostages.

(b) The question is that ~~we~~^{they} do not know where and how the hostages are kept. The foreign press report that Syria will release the hostages during the Arab Summit meeting is totally groundless. The implication that the hostages are kept in the hands of Syria is contrary to the ^{fact} feet.

(2). ← In the meeting with President Asad, Ambassador Nakayama was able to secure from the President his words that he would make utmost efforts to secure the release of the hostages and that he would embark upon initiatives to secure the release after Israel released the Lebanese hostages.

As to the hostages, President Asad said following:

Syria has had some talks with these groups on the question of 7 US hostages, but they said that they have nothing to do with the hostage taking. They, however, said that they would try to locate them, but no word is heard from them as of now.

On 12 August, the Ambassador was unexpectedly asked to see Foreign Minister Sharah for the second time. The meeting, Foreign Minister Sharah explained, was requested as the result of his consultation with President Asad.

In the meeting, Foreign Minister Sharah and Ambassador Nakayama came to the following understanding:

(a) Syria ~~promises to~~^{will} make its efforts to secure early release of the 7 US hostages

175

(b) In the event the hostages are safely released, Ambassador Nakayama ^{will} ~~would personally~~ persuade Prime Minister Nakasone and Foreign Minister Abe ^{to} ~~and seek an~~ increase [<] in Japan's economic assistance to Syria to show the appreciation for Syrian efforts.

127742
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Secret 170

THE SEVEN US HOSTAGES HELD IN LEBANON

--Main points of the result of the mission of Ambassador Hiroharu NAKAYAMA, Special Envoy of Prime Minister Yasuhiro NAKASONE, to Syria and Iran--

Ambassador Hiroharu NAKAYAMA visited Iran (6-9 August) and Syria (10-12 August), and met with Speaker Rafsanjani and Foreign Minister Velayati in Iran, and President Asad and Foreign Minister Sharah in Syria. Ambassador Nakayama handed to Speaker Rafsanjani and President Asad letters of Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone requesting their assistance in securing the release of the seven US hostages held in Lebanon and held talks with each of them on this question.

The following is the main points of what each of them stated to Ambassador Nakayama:

A. Iran

I. Speaker Rafsanjani (7 August 1985)

(Ambassador Nakayama praised the special efforts paid by Iran in securing the TWA hostages, and sought their assistance in securing the release of the 7 US hostages. Ambassador told the Speaker that in the event the hostages are released with the Iranian assistance, he would make efforts to influence the Japanese government and Japanese firms to step up economic assistance to Iran and to increase purchase of Iranian oil in order to express the appreciation.

1. Speaker Rafsanjani stated that Iran also regards the question of 7 US hostages in Lebanon as a very serious problem. He, however, stated that the US attitude to this problem raises doubts as to the true motive of the US. Iran fears that the issue may be a US plot to advance a certain US objective in

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NLRRM3931 # 127742
BY AW NARA DATE 11/21/17

Lebanon. If the US seriously wishes to secure the release of the hostages, it would have taken more significant steps, but in reality, it has not done so. The US promised President Asad of Syria the release of the 300 Shi'ite prisoners, once the TWA hostages are free, but they still remain captive in the Israeli hand. Speaker Rafsanjani asked Ambassador Nakayama to convey to Prime Minister Nakasone that the US must influence Israelis to secure the release of the Lebanese hostages in compliance with the agreement reached at the time of the release of the TWA hostages. The Lebanese think that US has betrayed Syria and Iran.

Only when the agreement reached at the release of the TWA hostages is strictly adhered to, can Iran, in concert with Syria, take initiatives in their efforts to secure the release of the 7 US hostages. If the US wants a solution to this problem, then the US must take the action.

2. Speaker Rafsanjani said that it was his understanding that the taking of the 7 US hostages is linked with the recent bombing in Kuwait.

3. Speaker Rafsanjani said that Iran is not in a position to negotiate with the US on this issue, but that the problem is a matter between Lebanon and the U.S.

4. Speaker Rafsanjani said that in the case of TWA hostages, it was clear that the hostages were held captive in Lebanon; but with regard to the 7 US hostages, Iran does not know if they are

112

Secret

-3-

in Lebanon or not.

II. Foreign Minister Velayati (8 August 1985)

(Additional points to what Speaker Rafsanjani stated)

1. The Foreign Minister said that Iran wants Japan to convey to the US that the US must implement the agreement reached at the time of release of the TWA hostages, and that it should not lend its hands to the crime the Israel is committing in Lebanon.

2. He said that Iran doubts whether the US really wants a settlement of the problem. He felt that Reagan Administration may simply be utilizing the issue in order to alleviate domestic political difficulties. He said that the fact that 7 US nationals are taken hostages is claimed only by the US makes Iran doubt the US allegation. Even if the US allegation is true and 7 US nationals are taken hostages, it would be difficult to grasp the true situation since there are so many groups and organizations active in Lebanon.

B. Syria

I. President Asad (11 August 1985)

1. President Asad stated that although the release of the Lebanese hostages is a matter agreed upon in relation to the release of the TWA hostages and has no bearing on the question of 7 US hostages currently held in Lebanon, the full implementation of the agreement on the release of 735 Lebanese hostages in exchange for the TWA hostages might offer opportunities for securing the release of the 7 hostages. President Asad said that

193

Secret

-4-

he has received a word from the U.S. government that Israel would release the 735 Lebanese hostages during August, and that he wishes to embark upon some initiatives to secure the release of the US hostages once the 735 Lebanese hostages are released.

2. (1) President Assad explained Syria's basic position on international terrorism that it rejects international terrorism irrespective of where the terrorism occurs, and that in particular, it strongly opposes terrorism against the general public who are not involved in military conflicts. He, however, added that differentiation should be made between terrorism and resistance against the forces which infringes upon sovereignty, of which the Israeli incursion into Lebanon is the worst of its kind. Israel possesses advanced weapons and it is only natural for the Lebanese people, who have no such weapons, to resort to whatever possible means to manifest their resistance against the Israeli forces.

(2) On the 7 US hostages, President Asad stated the following:

(a) Syria has conveyed to various groups in Lebanon that hostage taking of civilians who have no direct bearing upon the Israeli incursion into Lebanon would not contribute to the solution of the problem, and there exists a consensus of thought among the major groups in Lebanon on this matter. There exist, however, many small groups in Lebanon; they do not agree with the above consensus but conduct their activities based on their own thinkings. Syria does not maintain cooperative relationship with them in

194

Secret

-5-

political field but sometimes have contacts with them in non-political areas.

Syria has had some talks with these groups on the question of 7 US hostages, but they said that they have nothing to do with the hostage taking. They, however, said that they would try to locate them, but no word is heard from them as of now.

(b) In the case of TWA hostage taking, Syria has followed the situation from its inception, and thus was able to lead the situation to settlement, but in the case of 7 US hostages, Syria does not know their whereabouts or who the captors are. The hostages are not taken by major groups in Lebanon but by individuals. Syria sometimes gets information about them, but it is always vague. Even if Syria comes to know their whereabouts, use of force may endanger the lives of the hostages. Therefore, Syria has to obtain the understanding of these groups in order to secure their safe release.

3. President Asad asked Ambassador Nakayama to convey to Prime Minister Nakasone that he would make utmost efforts to secure the release of the hostages, and that Syria would maintain close contact with Japan on this matter.

II. Foreign Minister Sharah of Syria (10 August 1985)

(Additional points to what President Asad stated)

1. Foreign Minister Sharah said that there is no change in the Syrian position as expressed to Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe at

the time of his visit to Syria; viz, Syria would make its utmost efforts to secure the release of the 7 US hostages held in Lebanon. He stated that since the time Syria received the request from Foreign Minister Abe, Syrian officials and security units stationed in Lebanon have been trying to gather information on the whereabouts of the hostages and who the captors are. However, the captors do not stay in one place, and it is difficult to locate them.

Syria does not know where and how the hostages are kept. The foreign press report that Syria will release the hostages during the Arab Summit meeting is totally groundless. The implication that the hostages are kept in the hands of Syria is contrary to the fact.

Foreign Minister Sharah stated that because of the present difficult situation in Lebanon, not much hope can be hinged upon Syrian efforts.

P Iran

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3. USSR/IRAN: CAUTIOUS RESPONSE TO IRANIAN GESTURES

In response to recent Iranian initiatives for better relations, the Soviets have apparently dropped an earlier insistence on across-the-board improvements of bilateral ties in favor of an incremental approach. Moscow has tentatively agreed to host an Iranian trade delegation in July and is evidently holding out the possibility of eventually discussing military aid as well.

* * *

After Gromyko met Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Ardebili in Moscow in April, the Soviets granted Iran overflight rights to bypass Iraqi threats against Iran-bound traffic; agreed to revive the Soviet-Iranian economic commission dormant since at least 1982; eased media criticism of Iran, possibly in response to similar action by Iran; and refrained from endorsing last month the "pro-Iraqi" mediation efforts of an Arab League delegation.

Moscow had earlier listed a number of conditions for better ties: a March press commentary specifically called for an increased embassy staff, a reduction in anti-Soviet propaganda and action, a halt to Afghan rebel aid, and a restoration of cultural ties. Most of these conditions have not been met. The Soviets seem to have been sufficiently encouraged by some Iranian movement this spring, however, to try a piecemeal approach to attract those Iranian leaders who believe that Iran's interests in the Gulf war require a better relationship with Moscow.

Still, Soviet moves have been slow and measured. Moscow has been aware of Iran's interest in reviving the joint economic commission since at least January, but evidently did not agree to a meeting until Ardebili's visit. Now the Soviets seem to be using delaying tactics to avoid fixing an agenda for the meeting

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If Moscow did agree to discuss military aid to Iran, it has since apparently sought to sidestep any substantive discussion of the subject at the July talks. Such aid may be discussed later if Moscow agrees to have Iranian Prime Minister Musavi visit Gromyko sometime after July. Iran appears anxious to have these follow-on talks, but the Soviets probably will put them off until an end to the Iran-Iraq conflict is in sight.

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