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SMF 8/14/2007

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FOIA

M2007-075

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| ID | Doc Type | Document Description | No of Pages | Doc Date | Restrictions |
|-------|----------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|------------|--------------|
| 40448 | MEMO | KEMP TO POINDEXTER RE IRAN <i>D 12/20/2012 M075/1; UPHELD 2/6/2017 M07-075 #40448</i> | 2 | 12/11/1984 | B1 |
| 40449 | LIST | ACTIVITIES <i>R 3/6/2013 M075/1</i> | 1 | ND | B1 |
| 40450 | PAPER | BRIEF <i>R 5/31/2012 M2007-075/1</i> | 2 | 12/1/1984 | B1 |
| 40451 | LETTER | FROM MAX MORRIS <i>D 2/6/2017 M075/1</i> | 2 | 2/10/1985 | B1 |

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نهضت مقاومت ملی ایران

National Movement of the Iranian Resistance 'NAMIR'

P.O. Box 313, London W2 4QX, UK. Telephone: 01-229 4029 Telex: 929476 APEX G.

Press Release

July 4, 1984

Dr. Shapour Bakhtiar, former Prime Minister of Iran, and now leader of the Paris based National Movement of the Iranian Resistance (NAMIR), left London this evening after three days of talks, during which he addressed the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Conservative Foreign Affairs Forum, and the Foreign Press Association. He also had numerous private meetings with Members of Parliament, journalists, and businessmen.

On his departure, Dr. Bakhtiar said: " We Iranians know that we must by our own efforts remove the cruel regime which Khomeini has imposed on our people, and I did not come to London to ask the West to do our job for us".

" I have been asked several times here whether I am willing to work with other Iranians in exile. I was imprisoned by the late Shah and I am utterly opposed to absolute monarchy, but I am working with the late Shah's son and with Mr. Amini towards constitutional government. When I was Prime Minister, I freed all political prisoners, including Mr. Rajavi, but I cannot now work with him because his record when he cooperated with Khomeini shows him to be neither a democrat nor a respecter of human rights".

" I do not ask the British people to support my movement as such. All I ask is that you help to bring democracy and human rights to Iran, and that you do not repeat the mistake of 1979 when the West helped to replace one despot with another".

MEHRDAD KHONSARI

MAX K. MORRIS

FLW
1/17/74
August 17th
Jacksonville
Dear Leg,

Here are some things recently received. I had a good visit with Mehrdad in Paris. He expects to come your way the week after Labor Day. I will be along, too, I hope.

Mehrdad says things are coming to a boil in his bailiwick. I hope so.

Best eye,
Max

The Strengths and Weaknesses

of the

Khomeini Regime

by

Mehrdad Khonsari

JULY 1984

The Strong Points

A- The Economy:

The only real source of income for the regime is the export of approximately two million barrels of crude oil per day, giving an annual income of more or less of 18 billion U.S. Dollars (at this time).

B- Social Conditions:

1- The regime draws its main strength from strong well organized Islamic cells. The essential duties performed these days by mosques and Islamic councils are the distribution of food-stuffs, and control of inhabitants in their localities to ensure their participation in political rallies and marches, as well as their attendance during Friday prayers. The mosque serves as an "intelligence gathering centre" and it encourages citizens to spy on one another.

2- Newly established foundations such as BONYAD-E-SHAHID (Martyrs foundation) or BONYADE JANG-ZADEGAN (Foundation of War-victims) are in close touch with government organizations and mosques in order to receive finance and monthly food coupons for their members.

3- "Ideological" units in government departments and the armed forces.

4- Employment of a small number of dissident Afghan and Iraqi mercenaries, who are under the absolute control of the regime.

5- Khomeini has promoted previously "deprived" elements with the intention of creating a new constituency in support of his regime. However, this has been mainly verbal and they have received little of practical significance.

6- The existence of a small group of Islamic fundamentalists. Though few in numbers, their performance has been disproportionate due to their dedication and organization.

7- Establishment of committees and organizations such as HEZBOL-LAH, SAROL-LAH, KHAHARAN-e ZEINAB, JONDAL-LAH, BAGHIYAL-LAH, MOBAREZE-BA-MONKERAT. These bodies together enforce overall control.

8- Use of sustained propaganda through radio and television as well as the use of the pulpit by mullahs, and resort to intimidation.

9- Existence of horrific prison conditions and the widespread use of torture.

Accordingly, the Islamic regime has so far been able to exert domestic control to carry out of its programmes (ie. parliamentary elections, marches, demonstrations and other "show" performances). It has also kept political

opposition below the surface.

C- International:

The regime has played upon East-West differences and international crises as a focus of unity. The employment of anti-American slogans and the establishment of close relations with Syria and Libya have generally enhanced its relations with the Eastern Bloc, but by its policy of assistance to Afghan elements opposed to the Soviet Union, and its ruthless suppression of all leftist groups inside the country, the regime has preserved some political relationship with the West. Most important, the War with Iraq has enlisted the patriotism of the people behind the regime; it keeps the professional army out of the cities, and it provides a ready made excuse for the real privations which the people are suffering.

The Weak Points

A. The Economy:

The problems in this sector confront : Agriculture, animal husbandry, cattle breeding, commerce, industry and banking.

1. Agriculture:

(a) Due to general anarchy, to the demands of the war and to unresolved question of land ownership, farming has been curtailed and most of the " GHANATS " (underground water canals) have dried up.

(b) In consequence, much of the farming community has left the land and gone to the cities in search of work.

(c) Due to unavailability of foreign exchange, there is an acute shortage of motor-pumps, tractors, combines, chemical fertilizers, high quality seeds, pesticides and spare parts. Any which is available is sold at exorbitant prices.

(d) There is a shortage of hay and clover. Prices are high and farmers are driven to sell their livestock to slaughter houses at uneconomical prices.

2. Commerce:

Commerce has become practically a monopoly of the state with those in higher echelons of the regime in control of most imports and exports. Most businessmen and shopkeepers are discontent. Goods are obtainable by coupons distributed by mosques. The Commerce law and the Agricultural land law is in abeyance. No businessman contemplates investment. Traditional exports such as carpets are reduced to a trickle due to stringent government measures concerning foreign exchange.

3. Industry:

The exile or murder of the majority of qualified managers along with engineers and technologists, the irregular manner of expropriating factories, coupled with discontent among the labour force, shortages of spare parts and primary products, and irresponsible and ignorant

interference by government representatives have decreased efficiency in most factories, resulting in closures and part time-working. Factories which depend on agriculture are of course badly afflicted by the state of that industry.

4. Banking and Taxation:

With the elimination of interest and the introduction of the system (proposed by former Islamic President Bani Sadr, and Hashemi Rafsanjani the speaker of Parliament) of KHOMS (religious wealth tax of one fifth of all holdings of every individual), and also due to a very high rate of inflation, people have withdrawn their deposits from the banks. As a result, the government has been forced to support the banks for public revenues.

B. Social Conditions

1. At least two million war refugees have lost their homes and belongings.
2. 200,000 have been made disabled due to the war.
3. More than one million families have at least one member who is a war casualty.
4. The burden of two million Afghan refugees and over one hundred thousand Iraqi refugees is being borne by the Iranian public.
5. Twenty five percent of the work force including several hundred thousand secondary school graduates, are unemployed.
6. Five provinces have become substantially paralyzed as the result of the war.
7. Soaring cost of living, shortages of food stuffs, lack of essential goods such as soap, vegetable oil, sanitary products, medicine, etc.
8. Collapse of centres of the arts, education, entertainment, and sports, and poor quality programmes on radio and television.
9. No increase of salary for government employees in the past five years (infact most salaries have been reduced, particularly for those engaged in overseas duties).
10. Increase in the number of drug users and addicts due to social and economical conditions.
11. Continuation of the " civil " war in the province of Kurdistan and disorder in other provinces, such as Baluchistan.
12. Migration of farmers to large cities. The population of Tehran has doubled since Khomeini came to power and social and health problems have as a result become very much worse.
13. Increase in the number of people who are on the "official payroll". This includes Pasdar, members of committees, JEHAD-E-SAZANDEGI, Islamic councils, BASSIJ and others. They are normally recruited for serving at the front and spying on their fellow countrymen.
14. Teaching of retrograde and medieval culture.
15. Lack of success in the over all implementation of Islamic social attitude.
16. The absence of coordination and harmony in the laws, the destruction of the judiciary, the contradiction between the concept of national sovereignty and

VELAYAT-E-FAGHIH (Khomeini's personal doctrine), the opposition of the Council of Guardian (SHORAY-E-NEGAHBAN) to the Islamic Parliament (Majlis), and the lack of understanding between the Ministry of Justice and Revolutionary Courts have all exacerbated the plight of the average man in Iranian society.

17. Khomeini's violations of human rights have sickened even those who supported him first.

C. Internal Differences the Regime:

Though internal differences were apparent to most close observers of the regime since its inception, they have now become visible to all.

1. NEHZAT-E-AZADI (The Freedom Movement) under the leadership of Mr. Mehdi Bazargan boycotted the elections. Mr. Bazargan continues to have supporters within the bazaar and among some of the middle class, though their numbers have decreased during recent years.

2. ANJOMAN-E-HOJATIEH (or the Hojatieh group) which is supported by a number of prominent AYATOLLAHS, has been against certain aspects of the regime's policies. They were active during the recent elections and due to the presence of their supporters in the Council of Guardians, they succeeded in cancelling election results in a number of cities including Shiraz and Isfahan.


3. In Isfahan there are important differences between followers of AYATOLLAH TAHERI and AYATOLLAH KHADEMI. In Shiraz the differences are between followers of AYATOLLAH DASTGHEIB and those of AYATOLLAH MAHALLATI. In Qum, AYATOLLAH GOLPAYEGANI and AYATOLLAH MAR'ASHI NAJAFI are in principle against AYATOLLAH MONTAZERI. AYATOLLAH SHIRAZI who last year enjoyed the support of the regime has been set aside. Despite being officially "disgraced" by the regime, AYATOLLAH SHARIATMADARI continues to be influential in Iran. In Tehran, AYATOLLAH LMAHDAVI-E-KANI is against KHAMENEI (the Islamic President) and Hashemi Rafsanjani (the speaker of parliament). Another leading cleric in Tehran, AYATOLLAH KHONSARI, is known to have increased his following due to his disapproval of the Khomeini system. AYATOLLAH TEHRANI, who studied for 14 years with Khomeini at Qom and who was a member of his inner circle, now broadcasts against him from Iraq.

4. In the armed forces Colonel SAYAD SHIRAZI (Commander of the Ground Forces) is known to have differences with Brigadier General ZAHIR-NEJAD (Commander of the Joint Chiefs). The former is a radical man and supports the continuation of the war with Iraq, while the latter is against extreme policies.

5. Within the SEPAH-E-PASDARAN (Revolutionary Guards) and the Revolutionary Volunteer organization (BASSIJ), there are major ideological differences. The Minister for Pasdaran, RAFIGH-DOUST, has differences with the Commander of PASDARAN.

D. International:

1. It is most unlikely that the Iraqis can be beaten, owing to their air superiority, to the sophisticated nature of their ground defences, to the help which they receive from both West and East, and to the fact that Iranians have no enthusiasm for war beyond their frontiers. It is however impossible to guarantee the security of the Persian Gulf while Khomeini remains in power.
2. Khomeini is ideologically dedicated to the export of Islamic fundamentalism and is seen throughout the region as a destabilising force.
3. Whilst some trade is still done with the outside world, Khomeini regards the 7th century as a golden age and there is no possibility of developing the huge potential of Iran whilst his regime remains in power.
4. The extent and brutality of Khomeini's violations of human rights have shocked the world, and have turned former supporters against him.
5. The United States, the Soviet Union, and France have now concluded that it is impossible to deal with Khomeini.
6. Support for the coalition of democratic resistance groups in exile led by Shapour Bakhtiar, with the support of the prestige of the Young Shah and Ali Amini, is growing fast, both within and outside Iran.



I Want to Overthrow Khomeini'

INTERVIEW: SHAHPUR BAKHTIAR

Shahpur Bakhtiar, 70, was prime minister of Iran during the closing days of the shah's regime. His civilian government was forced out of power after only 37 days when Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini took power in 1979. Since then Bakhtiar has lived in exile in Paris, where he heads the National Movement of the Iranian Resistance (NAMIR). He spoke with NEWSWEEK's Donna Foote in London recently about opposition to Khomeini and the Iran-Iraq war. Excerpts:

FOOTE: As an opposition leader living in exile, what are your goals for Iran?

BAKHTIAR: My goals have been very simple from the beginning. I want to overthrow Khomeini and replace his so-called Islamic Republic with a constitutional monarchy with freedom of speech, human rights and dignity for citizens.

Q: How do you intend to achieve that goal?

A: It will not be easy. Force will have to be applied against a system that relies on force.

Q: After the fall of the shah, how can you justify a constitutional monarchy?

A: I favor a constitutional monarchy for traditional reasons, and because of the geopolitical situation in Iran. Iran consists of various ethnic groups. The monarch in Iran can serve as a symbol of unity and independence for the entire country.

Q: As you see it, what powers would a monarch have?

A: He would have spiritual power as the guardian of the Constitution. He would not interfere in politics. He would not make policy. I am not for the restoration of something called a constitutional monarchy that would turn the clock back. There can be no turning the clock back. I am for a system of monarchy where the Constitution is respected to the letter.

Q: You predicted five years ago that Khomeini would fall. How has he managed to retain control in Iran?

A: By the gun. By terrorism. And by the revenue he receives from petroleum. He thrives on crisis and he frowns on stability. But he has reached a critical point. Five years ago he had great popularity and very little power. Now he has great power but little popularity.

Q: How strong is discontent within Iran?

A: When you have a reign of terror you can't protest in the streets and hold rallies. But there are fights on the long queues



Bakhtiar: 'I am ready to go back to Iran'

where people have to wait two hours for half a dozen eggs. We were a rich nation. Now we have rationing. Every Iranian is asking, "What has this regime done for me?" We have had 400,000 violent deaths in the past five years. Close to 1 million people are disabled as a consequence of the Iran-Iraq war. We have 4 million Iranians unemployed. We have 3 million homeless and 2 million who have fled abroad. Now the regime has begun to use thousands upon thousands of schoolchildren and teenagers as cannon fodder. Not a single family has escaped untouched by Khomeini's rule.

Q: Who are your supporters within Iran?

A: You can find them in the Army, in the bazaars, in the civil service, in the middle class and so on. They are the people who were intimidated by Khomeini. And they are the people who thought that the Islamic Republic would be something useful.

Q: Is there any possibility of forming a coalition with other opposition leaders?

A: We must distinguish between the people who have been involved in the crimes that have been committed by Khomeini. We cannot collaborate with them. But the young people who have been fanatics, or who have been indoctrinated, can possibly become democrats.

Q: What is your view of [former president] Abolhassan Bani Sadr, who is also now in exile?

A: He's living in Paris but politically he is dead.

Q: What is your assessment of the war in the Gulf?

A: It is catastrophic, horrible and endless.

Q: How do you view the Iranian position in the war?

A: Reports that Iran has half a million troops on the Iraqi border are ridiculous. There are fewer than half that many. The soldiers behind the lines are not in a good position to attack because they are not properly equipped and morale is bad. Soldiers have no wish to fight because they are no longer defending their country but are engaged in an expanding war that aims for Jerusalem via Baghdad.

Q: What happened to Iran's expected offensive this spring?

A: There is no ammunition, no air cover, and the Army is discontented. Weather conditions are not very easy for living, let alone fighting.

Q: What role have the superpowers played in the conflict?

A: Their role has been to sell arms to both sides. The war was not an inconvenient war as long as it was 50 miles north of the Gulf. Now that may be changing.

Q: Do you foresee an end to the hostilities?

A: I hope the war can be finished as soon as possible. At the same time, I know Khomeini won't allow that. He will do anything he can to continue the war because his government depends on this war. If the war ended tomorrow, he would be out of power.

Q: What would you like the Western nations to do?

A: The West must act. All help, political and economic, must stop. That's what I want. Without the collaboration of Western countries from the beginning, Khomeini would have left office long ago. I would like the West to see Khomeini as he is—a blood-thirsty terrorist who has disdain for human life. It is important that the West sees that Khomeini is dangerous not only for Iran but for all countries. It would be catastrophic if his so-called Islamic Republic were to be exported elsewhere.

Q: How can you be an effective opposition outside Iran?



A: Was Khomeini ineffective in Paris? I am quite ready to go back to Iran. But I must have international guarantees. Not Khomeini guarantees.

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NAMIR'S HOSTILE ACTIVITIES

AUGUST-DECEMBER 1984

1. Hijack of IRAN AIR planes by NAMIR supporters.
2. Rocket Attack on "Jondolah" Headquarters in Rezaieh.
3. Rocket Attack on "Jahad Sazandeghi" in Rezaieh.
4. Bomb attack at the "Yousef Abad Kalantari" in Tehran.
5. Sabotage activity against the Electricity plants on two separate occasions resulting in blackouts in the Province of Azarbaijan.
6. Bomb Attack on the Islamic Medical Building in Rezaieh.
7. Bomb Attack on 'Sherkat-e Taavon Farhanghian' in Rezaieh.
8. Bomb Attack on IRAN AIR building in Rezaieh.
9. Rocket Attack on the Bank Sepah in Rezaieh.
10. Rocket Attack on Bank Tejarat in Tabriz.
11. Bomb Attack on the BAHONAR COMMITTEE in Rezaieh.
12. Bomb Attack on Khoy Sugar Factory.
13. Explosion in two buildings opposite the Revolutionary Courts in Rezaieh.
14. Open engagement against Pasdaran in the village of Kahriz near Ghoschy.
15. Stopping of Traffic in the Rezaieh-Tehran Highway.

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BRIEF

DECEMBER 1984

Key impediments to political solidarity amongst the moderates are the divisions that exist at lower levels. At the top -ie. between the Shah, Bakhtiar and Amini- there has been total agreement on all major issues. It would be unrealistic to think that there are no rivalries, but all the leading figures are reasonably confident of their roles in the months to come.

General Domestic Environment

The situation in most town and cities (particularly in the major cities) is becoming more desperate- eg. chants of "Death to Khomeini" in the recent international football match at Amjadieh Stadium, where a number of Pasdar vehicles were destroyed is an example at hand.

The Government has failed to give any real service to the people and open hostility against the symbols of the new order (Islamic appearance for example) are quite common. In this regard, as witnessed by Hojat-ol-Eslam Shahabadi, the head of the Islamic Mosque in London and the representative of Grand Ayatollah Golpayegani, the level of insulting attitudes by the public against the religious clergy has reached historically unprecedented levels. Nothing that the regime does seems to create that air of confidence or relief that was to a great measure achieved when Khomeini announced his abortive 8-point plan almost two years ago. The recent announcement that the bazaar would be free to participate in international trade was greeted with general cynicism and ridicule by the bazaaris. No one actually believes that the regime would ever carry out that pledge, and most bazaaris contend that the regime would be very reluctant in opening a letter of credit of say US\$100,000 for any independent merchant out of fear that the money would be used to facilitate their escape from Iran.

Dissention amongst the Pasdaran has been increasing. Many privately indicate their desire to leave. They only refrain for two basic reasons: First, out of fear; and secondly because they would be forced by the state to repay the salaries which they have recieved. The level of hatred against the Pasdaran by all accounts is much higher than the level of resentment against the armed forces in the latter days of the Shah.

Within the clegy the level of dissention has been on the dramatic increase. Some very sacred Shiite rituals have in this process been broken to demonstrate this dissatisfaction. For example, according to Shiite rituals, Friday Mosque Prayers are not to be held within an area equivalent to 12kmx12km (2'FARSAKH'x2'FARSAKH'), but in the city of Meshad, Ayatollah Qomi in clear violation of this holy rule conducts Friday Prayers in his home, while the

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government sponsored Prayers are held at the Goharshad Mosque in central Meshad. The same has also been true in Isphahan, where two competing clerics (Khademi and Taheri) who have both supported Khomeini's line in the past have held separate prayers. Participation of people in such prayers is itself an indication of their lack of belief in what has been ordained for them. Also, there is an undercurrent movement at various Islamic schools condemning the action that was taken against Ayatollah Shariat-Madari, though the basic reason for its encouragement by leading clerics is self preservation rather than any sympathy for the demoted Ayatollah. According to the Brother of Ayatollah Doaii, the regimes former Amabssador in Baghdad and a prominent member of the present regime, himself a leading cleric in Yazd, the Friday Mosque is closed and guarded round the clock and is opened only on Fridays, where amongst heavy security, all participants in the Friday Prayers are thoroughly searched prior to their admission. Also the desecration of burial sites of leading members of the Islamic regime is guarded quite heavily since there have been insulting incidents on these sites (eg. the resting ground of Ayatollah Qodosi in Yazd). Ayatollah Montazeri has become under criticism for his written introduction to a book entitled "SHAHID-e JAVID" by Salehi Najaf Abadi which in effect contradicts certain orthodox Shiite beliefs in the powers of the Imams.

The situation in Iran is bad and more and more George Orwell's '1984' is becoming a reality for the majority of the people.

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