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Folder Title: IN-HIS 1-9 Libya Game 04/28/1986 (1 of 2)

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Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name SITUATION SUPPORT STAFF, WHITE HOUSE: RECORDS

Withdrawer

9/13/2007

MJD

File Folder

IN-HIS (INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY) 1-9: LIBYA GAME

FOIA

04/28/1986 (1)

F05-112

Box Number

92482 RAC BOX 1

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ID Doc Type	DOCI	ument Description		No of Pages	DOC Date	Restrictions
42116 MEMO		IEY MCDANIEL TO		1	9/11/1985	B1
		RLANE RE CMC G	AMING			
	R	10/4/2016	M404/1			
42117 HANDWRITTEN NOTES	RE LI	BYA GAME		10	ND	B1
	D	11/5/2012	M404/1		1	
42118 MEMO	RONALD ST. MARTIN TO POINDEXTER RE LIBYA) JOHN	5	4/28/1986	B1
	D	11/5/2012	M404/1			
42119 LIST	OF PA	RTICIPANTS		1	4/28/1986	B1 B3
	PAR	9/26/2017	M404/1			
42120 MAP	RE LII	BYA		. 1	ND	B1
	PAR	9/26/2017	M404/1			
42121 CHART	RE SE	NERIOS		1	ND	B1
	D	11/5/2012	M404/1			
42122 PAPER	RE SE	NARIO A		3	ND	B1
	D	11/5/2012	M404/1			
42123 PAPER	RE SE	NARIO B (PAGE 7)		1	ND	B1
	D	11/5/2012	M404/1			
42124 PAPER		NARIO C (PAGE 11))	1	ND	B1
	R	10/4/2016	M404/1			

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

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04/28/1986 (1)

FOIA

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ID Doc Type	Doo	cument Descriptio	n	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
42125 PAPER	RE S	ENARIO D (PAGE 1	13)	1	ND	B1
	R	10/4/2016	M404/1			
42126 PAPERS	RE S	ENARIO A AND TE	CAMS	3	ND	B1
	R	10/4/2016	M404/1			
42127 PAPERS	RE S	ENARIO B AND TE	AMS	3	ND	B1
	D	11/5/2012	M404/1			
42128 PAPER -	RE S	ENARIO C (PAGE 1	0)	1	ND	B1
	R	10/4/2016	M404/1			
42129 PAPER	SAM	E AS # 42122		3	ND	B1
	D	11/5/2012	M404/1			
42130 PAPER	RE S	ENARIO C (PAGE 1	2)	1	ND	B1
	R	10/4/2016	M404/1			
42131 PAPER	RE S	ENARIO C (PAGE 1	0)	1	ND	B1
	R	10/4/2016	M404/1			
42132 PAPER	SAM	E AS # 42123		. 1	ND	B1
	D	11/5/2012	M404/1			
42133 PAPERS	SAM	S AS 42126		3	ND	B1
	R	10/5/2016	M404/1			
42134 PAPERS	SAM	E AS # 42127		3	ND	B1
	D	11/5/2012	M404/1			

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			31		
ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restr	rictions
42135 FORM	REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS	1	4/25/1986	B1	В3
42136 PROF NOTE	FROM ROD MCDANIEL	1	4/25/1986	B1	В3

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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42116

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SYSTEM 11 90904

CONELDENTIAL

September 11, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

RODNEY MCDANIEL Jud

SUBJECT:

Future CMC Gaming/Simulation Efforts

Having successfully conducted our first Crisis Simulation, the Philippine game on 27 August, I am now trying to put together a program covering the next six months. I feel that we can accomplish three separate games over that time with a high degree of credibility. I have listed our three candidates below for your approval. Our game plan would be similiar to the way we conducted the Philippine game, we would submit the list of players for your approval and involve the staff people responsible for the country/region involved. The game candidates are in order of priority:

- Geopolitical Openings in the Third World. Our focus here would be on specific opportunities in terms of benefits, risks, and feasibility (given resources and leverage but would be required to exploit).
- Iran-Iraq, focusing on the next 12 months.
- Greece-Turkey. Attempting to explore different positions of both governments and understand how they might impact on our policy.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the six month plan as outlined.

Approve ____ Disapprove ____

Don Fortier concurs.

NLRR MHOHIT 4216

NARA DATE 10 10 114

CONFIDENTIAL Declassify on: OADR

CONFIDENTIAL

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RE LIBYA GAME

8 ND **B**1

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04/28/1986 (1) TOALBO

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42118 MEMO 5 4/28/1986 B1

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
NSC GAME PARTICIPANTS CORDELL HULL CONFERENCE ROOM 208 0830-1230, APRIL 28, 1986

135210 E. O. 12700 Sec. 3.5c

LIBYA SUMMIT

- RADM Thomas Brooks, Deputy Director for Support, DIA
- Vincent M. Cannistraro, Director, Intelligence Programs, NSC 2.
- Roger Dankert, Libya Desk Officer, Bureau of Near Eastern and 3. South Asian Affairs, Department of State
- Fritz Ermarth, NIO/USSR, CIA 4.
- 5. Col. Waldo Freeman, JCS
- Frederick Hof, International Security Affairs, DoD 6.
- Ralph Hughes, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, 7. Department of State
- 8.
- 9. Rodney B. McDaniel, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Executive Secretary, NSC
- FOIA(b) (3) Director, Soviet Analysis, DDI-CIA 10.
- 11. Elaine L. Morton, Director for Crisis Policy Analysis, Crisis Managment Center, NSC
- 12. Oliver L. North, Deputy Director for Political Military Affairs, NSC
- 13. Robert B. Oakley, Director for Office of Counterterrorism and Emergency Planning, Department of State
- 14. Ambassador Robert H. Pelletreau, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense/NESA Affairs
- 15. Arnold L. Raphel, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for NESA Affairs
- 16. NESA-DDI/CIA
- 17. Peter W. Rodman, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Foreign Policy)
- 18. RADM David N. Rogers, JCS
- 19. Michael Schneider, Director for Programs, USIA
- 20. James R. Stark, Director, Political-Military Affairs, NSC
- 21. Ronald C. St.Martin, Director/CMC-NSC, Game Director
- 22. Howard R. Teicher, Director, Near East & South Asian Affairs, NSC
- 23. Francis "Bing" West, NSC Consultant, Game Control

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E. O. 1352 (As Amended Sec. 3.3 b(1)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

ALREMADAL, #42120

BY HW MARA DATE 9/26/7

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04/28/1986 (1) TOALBO

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42122 PAPER 3 ND B1

RE SENARIO A

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42123 PAPER 1 ND B1

RE SENARIO B (PAGE 7)

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SCENARIO C: TERRORISM W/O A SMOKING GUN.

On 25 May, on a crowded beach near the US naval base at Rota, Spain, two Arab men in cheap suits calmly pick their way among the bathers. As they approach an American family, they jerk out pistols and began firing wildly, striking a four year-old girl and her father, a US Navy pilot. They rush to the body of the pilot, draw knives and multilate him. They then use the family's beach blanket to wipe the blood from their knives, put away their weapons and stride, untouched by a stunned crowd, to their car.

The next day, Qadhafi announces he had nothing to do with the murder. His wife says she can understand the "universal hatred for American pilots," but feels sorrow for the family. U.S. and Spanish investigators believe it will be weeks, if ever, before they can identify the killers or their sponsors. There are few clues. The description of one of the murders, however, closely fits that of a Palestinian trained in a terrorist camp in Libya.

SCENARIO C - CHARGE TO LIBYAN TEAM

1. Qadhafi wishes to project the image that (a) he can hurt Americans and (b) protect his ambitions and rule. Can he do so by artful dodging or are these mutually exclusive goals? Can he hide his signature in anti-American attacks? If he does, what does he gain?

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-13-

SCENARIO D: - QADHAFI DESISTS IN TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST AMERICANS

It is I July or I August 1986. All evidence indicates that Qadhafi has concluded that President Reagan is as good as his word. Despite public bluster, Qadhafi has taken serious steps to prevent any Libyan association with attacks against Americans, although terrorism in general has increased.

SCENARIO D - CHARGE TO BLUE TEAM

- 1. The US promised to strike Libya again, if Qadhafi sponsored anti-American terrorism. The US did not indicate any sort of modus vivendi, even if Qadaffi did not sponsor such terrorism. Broadly speaking, what course will US policy and energies follow if Qadhafi does desist?
- 2. If Qadhafi stays in power and if the media attention remains fairly high, does the President or the US lose some power? Obviously, if the Qadhafi reign ends, the President and the US gain power. If Qadhafi remains, he can cultivate the image of the man who defied America. As of April 1986, the issue is personalized between the President and Qadhafi. This confers stature on Qadhafi if he survives. How can the issue be depersonalized or removed from the Presidency, and should it? (E.g., an Assistant Secretary of State deals with the thorny matters of southern Africa). Should someone be placed in an analogous role relative to Qadhafi?

More generally, when and how to lower the attention level and the association with the Presidency?

BY

SECKET

BLUE TEAM

SCENARIO A: WHAT NEXT?

- 1. Q. under pressure at home. Unknown whether he will consolidate power.
- 2. Most likely, US will experience several small incidents with ambiguous evidence, including attacks independent of Q.
- 3. Prudent US planning must assume further attacks by Q.
- 4. Q. nonplussed by unpredictable US millitary response of 14 April.
- 5. Q. wants to continue terrorism w/o provoking another US strike.
- 6. US preparing for long tit-for-tat campaign, with focus toward bringing Europeans on board.
- 7. Prepare public for long-haul in order to have realistic expectations.
- 8. US cannot count on Q's removal. So phrase US goals in modest ways; e.g., limit Libyan terrorism, rather than end it.
- 9. If Q. persists, US should persist, esp. persuading allies to join in economic pressure.
- 10. No military tit-for-tat. Large responses should be planned. But not linked to large public expectations.
- 11. Military response focused on toppling Q. But don't promise this publicly.
- 12. A scale of objectives is more realistic than an all-or-nothing frame of reference. So US planning should be robust.

NLRRM40911#42124

BY RW NARA DATE 10 14 16

GREEN TEAM

SCENARIO A WHAT NEXT?

- US Public and Congress: Supportive of successful actions but 1. impatient over long term.
- W. Europe: Base of support; Alliance must unify against terr 2.
- Soviets: Few acceptable military options but big propaganda Terrorism: Major upswing in unlinkable terrorist acts 3.
- 4.
- Arabs: Public reaction stays negative want hostility over 5.
- Oil Companies: European nationals in Libya getting nervous 6.
- Worldwide: Tendency to disbelieve official US statements 7.
- US must consult Allies before acting again 8.
- 9. US must explain available evidence more fully

LIBYAN TEAM

SCENARIO A - WHAT NEXT?

- 1. Support for terrorism: Indirect. Let groundswell of third parties do it in Arab world. Only small probability of direct Libyan attack on US interests. Long-term planning for renewed Libyan-US attacks later on.
- 2. Relations with Soviets: Greater Soviet access; no base rights; Soviets will be cautious, Libyans disappointed.
- 3. Relations with Europeans: Q. running scared; will pull in horns. Will punish UK for symbolic value.
- 4. At home: Short-medium term, opposition weakened. Professional military disenchanted with Q. Exiles can't support US openly. Short-term weakness; long-term benefit.
- 5. Public Diplomacy: On "third world" lines -- Libya against US and NATO.

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42127 PAPERS 3 ND B1

RE SENARIO B AND TEAMS

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SCENARIO C: TERRORISM W/O A SMOKING GUN.

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The next day, Qadhafi announces he had nothing to do with the murder. His wife says she can understand the "universal hatred for American pilots," but feels sorrow for the family. U.S. and Spanish investigators believe it will be weeks, if ever, before they can identify the killers or their sponsors. There are few clues. The description of one of the murders, however, closely fits that of a Palestinian trained in a terrorist camp in Libya.

SCENARIO C - CHARGE TO THE BLUE TEAM

- What should the US Executive Branch do in the short term, between 26 and 31 May? E.g., should this be treated as the break point at which terrorists are legally treated as murderers? Should the President propose legislation and ask for Congressional hearings, the purpose being the creation of an agency which will track such murderers, identify them, issue outstanding warrants and prepare extradition procedures? Once on the US list, a terrorist even if a government official would know that for the rest of his life, if he leaves the country granting him safe harbor, the US is planning to trap and to extradite him.
- If the Executive Branch has no such cards it wants to play, how should the murder at Rota be handled? Should the US public be told that there is no statue of time limitations upon a US military response? Or is that unrealistic? E.g., could the US strike three months later at Qadhafi if the evidence by then were 80% that he was implicated? The deaths of 240 Marines in Beirut, without any subsequent US action, seems to indicate that there is no such thing either (a) as treating terrorists as murders and keeping investigations open for years with the unyielding purpose of extradition or (b) as treating state-sponsored terrorist acts as behavior so unacceptable that it may cause US military action months later, when the evidence of implication is beyond reasonable doubt. So the question for Blue is: What is its course of actions if, in September, there is evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that DECLASSIFIED implicates Qadhafi?



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42129 PAPER 3 ND B1

SAME AS # 42122

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-12-

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SCENARIO C - CHARGE TO GREEN TEAM

Estimate US public, Congressional, West European and Arab reactions if a US strike occurs months after a terrorist incident.

> DECLASSIFIED NLRR 144/1 442130 BY RW NARA DATE POLY



SCENARIO C: TERRORISM W/O A SMOKING GUN.

On 25 May, on a crowded beach near the US naval base at Rota, Spain, two Arab men in cheap suits calmly pick their way among the bathers. As they approach an American family, they jerk out pistols and began firing wildly, striking a four year-old girl and her father, a US Navy pilot. They rush to the body of the pilot, draw knives and multilate him. They then use the family's beach blanket to wipe the blood from their knives, put away their weapons and stride, untouched by a stunned crowd, to their car.

The next day, Qadhafi announces he had nothing to do with the murder. His wife says she can understand the "universal hatred for American pilots," but feels sorrow for the family. U.S. and Spanish investigators believe it will be weeks, if ever, before they can identify the killers or their sponsors. There are few clues. The description of one of the murders, however, closely fits that of a Palestinian trained in a terrorist camp in Libya.

SCENARIO C - CHARGE TO THE BLUE TEAM

- 1. What should the US Executive Branch do in the short term, between 26 and 31 May? E.g., should this be treated as the break point at which terrorists are legally treated as murderers? Should the President propose legislation and ask for Congressional hearings, the purpose being the creation of an agency which will track such murderers, identify them, issue outstanding warrants and prepare extradition procedures? Once on the US list, a terrorist even if a government official would know that for the rest of his life, if he leaves the country granting him safe harbor, the US is planning to trap and to extradite him.
- If the Executive Branch has no such cards it wants to play, how should the murder at Rota be handled? Should the US public be told that there is no statue of time limitations upon a US military response? Or is that unrealistic? E.g., could the US strike three months later at Qadhafi if the evidence by then were 80% that he was implicated? The deaths of 240 Marines in Beirut, without any subsequent US action, seems to indicate that there is no such thing either (a) as treating terrorists as murders and keeping investigations open for years with the unyielding purpose of extradition or (b) as treating state-sponsored terrorist acts as behavior so unacceptable that it may cause US military action months later, when the evidence of implication is beyond reasonable doubt. So the question for Blue is: What is its course of actions if, in September, there is evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that implicates Qadhafi?

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BLUE TEAM

SCENARIO A: WHAT NEXT?

- 1. Q. under pressure at home. Unknown whether he will consolidate power.
- 2. Most likely, US will experience several small incidents with ambiguous evidence, including attacks independent of Q.
- 3. Prudent US planning must assume further attacks by Q.
- 4. Q. nonplussed by unpredictable US millitary response of 14 April.
- 5. Q. wants to continue terrorism w/o provoking another US strike.
- 6. US preparing for long tit-for-tat campaign, with focus toward bringing Europeans on board.
- 7. Prepare public for long-haul in order to have realistic expectations.
- 8. US cannot count on Q's removal. So phrase US goals in modest ways; e.g., limit Libyan terrorism, rather than end it.
- 9. If Q. persists, US should persist, esp. persuading allies to join in economic pressure.
- 10. No military tit-for-tat. Large responses should be planned. But not linked to large public expectations.
- 11. Military response focused on toppling Q. But don't promise this publicly.
- 12. A scale of objectives is more realistic than an all-or-nothing frame of reference. So US planning should be <u>robust</u>.

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BY LW NARA DATE 10/4/16

LIBYAN TEAM

SCENARIO A - WHAT NEXT?

- 1. Support for terrorism: Indirect. Let groundswell of third parties do it in Arab world. Only small probability of direct Libyan attack on US interests. Long-term planning for renewed Libyan-US attacks later on.
- Relations with Soviets: Greater Soviet access; no base rights;
 Soviets will be cautious, Libyans disappointed.
- 3. Relations with Europeans: Q. running scared; will pull in horns. Will punish UK for symbolic value.
- 4. At home: Short-medium term, opposition weakened. Professional military disenchanted with Q. Exiles can't support US openly. Short-term weakness; long-term benefit.
- 5. Public Diplomacy: On "third world" lines -- Libya against US and NATO.

GREEN TEAM

SCENARIO A WHAT NEXT?

- US Public and Congress: Supportive of successful actions but impatient over long term.
- W. Europe: Base of support; Alliance must unify against terr 2.
- Soviets: Few acceptable military options but big propaganda Terrorism: Major upswing in unlinkable terrorist acts 3.
- 4.
- Arabs: Public reaction stays negative want hostility over 5.
- 6. Oil Companies: European nationals in Libya getting nervous
- Worldwide: Tendency to disbelieve official US statements US must consult Allies before acting again 7.
- 8.
- US must explain available evidence more fully 9.

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