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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: ROSS, DENNIS: Files

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File Folder: Chron File June 1988 Box 91594 9

Date: May 29, 1998

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo	Robert Oakley to Colin Powell re Soviet Jewish Emigration 1 p. (4727)	6/25/88	P1
	<i>A 5/18/00 NLSF94-038/3 #156</i>		
2. memo	Nelson Ledsky to Powell re above 2 p. (4692)	6/24/88	P1, P5 B1
3. memo	Oakley to Powell re Israel 2 p. (90552)	6/23/88	P1, P5 B1
4. memo	Oakley to Powell re draft response to Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres' letter to the President 1 p. (4290)	6/21/88	P1
	<i>A 5/18/00 NLSF94-038/3 #157</i>		
5. memo	Powell to the President re draft response 1 p.	n.d.	P1
	<i>A 5/18/00 NLSF94-038/3 #158</i>		
6. draft letter	the President to Peres 1 p.	n.d.	P1
	<i>A 5/18/00 NLSF94-038/3 #159</i>		
7. letter	Peres to Reagan 1 p.	6/17/88	P1
	<i>A 5/18/00 NLSF94-038/3 #160</i>		
8. draft letter	President to Peres 1 p.	n.d.	P1
	<i>A 5/18/00 NLSF94-038/3 #161</i>		
9. draft letter	to Senators Dole and Metzenbaum 2 p.	6/16/88	P1
	<i>A 5/18/00 NLSF94-038/3 #162</i>		
10. draft letter	to Dole and Metzenbaum 2 p.	n.d.	P1
	<i>A 5/18/00 NLSF94-038/3 #163</i>		
11. themes	for Craig Fuller 1 p.	6/15/88	P5 <i>12/15/00</i>

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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FILE INDEX FOR CHRON FILES FOR JUNE 1988 FOR DENNIS ROSS

<u>NO.</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
1	Themes for Craig Fuller	June 15, 1988
2	Stevens Memo re: Israel's Possible Violation of Arms Export Control Act by Misuse of Teargas on West Bank and in Gaza	June 16, 1988
3	NSC Revised Version of Congressional Ltr re: F-18s	June 16, 1988
4	Powell Memo re: Directed Offsets for Israel and Rabin Visit	June 23, 1988
5	Powell Memo re: Soviet Jewish Emigration	June 25, 1988
6	Stevens Memo re: VP Remarks: World Affairs Council, San Francisco, June 29	June 28, 1988
7	Suggested New Introduction re: defense reform	June 1988

SUGGESTED NEW INTRODUCTION

I want to talk today about a topic that we all must take very seriously. That topic is defense reform. If you are serious about the national security of the United States, then you have to be serious about defense reform.

The American people have a right to ask how their tax dollars are being spent for defense. They have every right -- indeed a duty -- to demand that their hard-earned tax-dollars are well spent to strengthen the US, to deter war, and to preserve and promote peace.

We cannot tolerate waste. And we must not tolerate corruption in the weapons acquisition or any other process.* The current defense procurement scandal involving some in the Pentagon, defense industries, and Congress requires decisive action.

While being decisive, however, our action must be thoughtful and well-considered. We must draw the right lessons from the current scandal. We are, after all, dealing with the security of the United States.

Our security will not be served by demagoguery. Nor will our security be served by ill-considered reforms that leave us no choice but to put amateurs in jobs that require professionals. That will produce greater waste and inefficiency, and weaken our defense in the process.

* Possible insert here on what legal action we'll take, and a question for the defense companies on the steps they will take in response to the scandal.

Defense reform requires an overhaul of the weapons acquisition process: what weapons we buy, why we buy them, how much we pay for them, and do they work.

The military services, defense corporations, and the Congress are all intimately involved in this process. The Packard Commission on Defense Management -- a blue-ribbon, bipartisan commission -- took a hard, detached look at this process and the military, defense industry, and congressional role in it. The Commission made sweeping recommendations.

Those recommendations were good; they made sense. And the unfortunate, but simple fact is that this Administration has not moved aggressively enough to implement the Packard Commission proposals.

One of my top priorities as President will be the top to bottom implementation of the Packard Commission proposals. I will appoint a Secretary of Defense committed to carrying them out. Dave Packard will be our management consultant. He'll help us staff the Defense Department with first-rate managers. We need people who know the business of defense, and who have the highest ethical standards. Dave Packard's motto is to get the best people and hold them accountable, and he's going to help us do that.


That's an important start on the road to reform but additional steps will be necessary.

Insert Examples

- including Packard Commission proposals made, but not implemented.

- new legislation on revolving door, shaped so as to make it possible for professionals -- not people who need on-th-job training -- to work in DOD

- new congressional compact, new bipartisan understanding on acquisition process, bases - (possible idea on replacing bases with low-cost housing).

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506June 28, 1988 ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS

FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY ^{ROB}SUBJECT: Vice Presidential Remarks: World Affairs
Council, San Francisco, California
Wednesday, June 29, 1988

Attached at Tab I is a memo from you to Josh Gilder forwarding the NSC changes to the remarks for the World Affairs Council (Tab A).

Peter ~~R~~odman concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memo at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Stevens Memo to Gilder
Tab A Draft Remarks

MEMORANDUM FOR JOSH GILDER

FROM: PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS

SUBJECT: Vice Presidential Remarks: World Affairs Council
San Francisco, California, Wednesday,
June 29, 1988

Attached are the NSC changes to the Vice Presidential remarks in California.

Attachment
Tab A Draft Remarks

**OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
STAFFING MEMORANDUM**



DATE: 6/27/88 **ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY:** 3:00 pm TODAY

SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: World Affairs Council, San Francisco, California, Wednesday, June 29, 1988.

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
FULLER	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	BRADY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
GREENLEAF	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	IRASTORZA	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BATES	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	KELLER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
COLLAMORE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	McNTYRE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DETHON	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<u>ATWATER</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
FITZGERALD	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<u>AILES</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
GRAY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<u>TEETER</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
GREGG (2 cc's)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<u>TATE</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HART	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<u>PINKERTON</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
PORTER ROSE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<u>GILDER</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

REMARKS:

Please submit any comments on the attached to Josh Gilder, with an info copy to my office, no later than 3:00 p.m. TODAY. Thanks.

RESPONSE:

Return to: Thomas J. Collamore
Staff Secretary
Room 276
456-7045

PROPOSED REMARKS FOR
VICE PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH
WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 29, 1988

6/27, a.m.
Gilder
~~_____~~ ~~_____~~

((Acknowledgements))

((Possible joke: People have asked me if I'm worried about being so far behind in the polls. Well, I was worried, but then I learned that Sam Donaldson was being assigned to cover the Dukakis campaign. So I think we should see things turn around pretty soon.))

((Introduction))

I'd like to begin with three stories, three episodes from my experience as Vice President, which like snapshots in an album, tell a larger story, in this case, the story of our vision of American foreign policy, its management and its purpose.

The first takes place Vienna, Austria, in 1983, the last stop in a trip that had taken me to the capitals of Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Romania, behind what we used to so descriptively call the "iron curtain." In a speech before

the Vienna Foreign Policy council, I spoke of the unnatural division of Europe, of the wall that cuts like a scar through the heart of that continent, representing a continuing violence not only to the people held captive behind it, but to all norms of human decency.

I said that we could "accept no legal division of Europe," that we would make no accommodation with such a profound moral wrong. To those who spoke of "real politik," we answered that the truest form of political realism is based on an abiding faith in the American ideals of freedom and democracy, and that to foresake those ideals is to forsake America's purpose -- it is to foresake America itself. We would continue, I said, to hold all parties to the commitments of the Yalta accords, specifying free elections and self-determination for all the nations of Europe, East and West. The headlines the next day screamed, "^{TASS labels} ~~TASS Labels~~ Bush Speech Libelous" -- so I knew I must have done something right.

Picture two: Later that same year, Frankfurt (CK), West Germany. My motorcade is attacked by demonstrators protesting the planned deployment of Pershing INF missiles in

Europe. Luckily, no one was hurt, and we got away with only a few broken windows and some shaken staff members. It was not so certain at the time that the NATO alliance would escape equally intact.

In response to the unilateral escalation posed by the introduction of Soviet SS-20s in Eastern Europe, the allies had agreed on a two-^Y~~tack~~_A policy of negotiations backed up by deployment, but the Soviet reponse had been simply to stall the negotiations while exerting all the political leverage at their command to split the alliance and prevent us from deploying. It seemed that hardly a week went by without a major demonstration mobilized in some European capital against the American missiles. The Greens in Germany, the Labor Party in England, various parties in the Low Countries and Denmark, as well as some in this country, exerted tremendous polical pressure for a "freeze" that would have locked in the Soviet advantage and almost certainly doomed the INF negotiations to absolute futility. X

Where more subtle forms of pressure didn't work, the Soviets were not above outright threats and intimidation. I remember Andrei Gromyko, on a visit to Italy about this time, threatening, quote, "another Pompei," if the Italians deployed the American missiles. The allusion was obvious. X

Governments
were
not
wavering

The Soviet game plan seemed to be working: ~~many~~ ^{feeling tremendous heat, needed} European governments, ~~less and less sure they could withstand~~ [^] the political fallout of deployment, ~~began to waver.~~ [?] Their ~~reck bottom consideration -- they had~~ to be convinced of America's reliability, that we were committed to deployment and prepared to carry it out. They couldn't afford to take the chance that we might, as we did in 1978 (CK) in the case of the neutron bomb, pull the rug out from under them. That was the job I was in Europe to do.

((Some quote, description of meetings with European leaders)))

When we returned, the headline in the Washington Post proclaimed, "Bush Does It" -- the allies were assured, deployment would go ahead, on schedule.

Picture three: San Salvador, 1984 (CK), the residence of provisional President Monge (CK), the sounds of war audible in the distance. From the balcony of his heavily guarded home, one could see the mountains, just 50 miles from the city, where the Salvadoran army had recently engaged the guerillas in heavy fighting.

Shortly before, in two elections, the people of El Salvador had braved communist bullets and death threats to come to the polls in record numbers and vote overwhelmingly for democracy -- now that democracy was in grave jeopardy. The communist Sandanista government in Nicaragua, with the help of the Cubans, was stepping up their supply of arms to the communists in El Salvador. As left-wing terrorism intensified, the right wing reponded with resurgence of death-squad activity, and because it seemed that some members of the military might be implicated, Congress threatened to cut off all aid to the fragile new democracy.

Without U.S. aid, the fate of El Salvador was clear -- a brief, bloody interegnum of mounting violence on the left and right, before the torn and battered country fell into the permanent grip of the Soviet-Cuban camp, another Nicargua on the American mainland.

In President Monge's (CK) house, I spoke to the leaders of the government and military, in no uncertain terms told them they had to get their own house in order, that either the death squads ceased, or American aid would. It was their choice.

((Vice President's quote or description from San Salvador meetings))

Reassured of America's commitment, the democratic forces in El Salvador were strengthened, the violent right was in large measure suppressed, and Congress passed aid. One of the most important battles for freedom in Central America had been won.

I've described these three episodes because running through each of them is a constant theme -- the necessity of American might and resolve. They are three case histories in the annals of peace through strength, illustrations of how America in the last eight years has dramatically turned around in our favor what has sometimes been called "the correlation of forces," so that today the freedom that was once in retreat around the world is now on the advance.

We should never forget the crisis of confidence created by American weakness in the late 70s. A vacillating foreign policy that seemed to have lost its moral bearings won the contempt of our enemies and friends alike. As Congress consistently sacrificed our military preparedness for domestic spending programs, our armed forces became dangerously weak. I won't recite the by now familiar litany of planes that couldn't fly for want of spare parts, ships that couldn't leave port for want of fuel, the morale among our service men ^{and women} that seemed to have bottomed out.

While the Soviets continued their military buildup, surpassing us in many critical areas, crucial weapons systems in this country were cancelled, or put on hold. Arms control negotiations did little to slow the Soviet escalation -- some said it only codified the present imbalance. After years of

negotiations, SALT II was ~~thrown out by a Democratic Congress~~ ^{withdrawn from the Senate by a Democratic} ~~President after the invasion of Afghanistan because our relations with the Soviet Union had grown so out of balance.~~ ^{President after the invasion of Afghanistan because our relations with the Soviet} ~~because it was so unfavorable to U.S. interests.~~ ^{Union had grown so out of balance.}

As America withdrew from the world, tyranny advanced.

The Soviets saw their opportunity and they seized it: in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, ^{CAMBODIA} Yemen, Ethiopia, and Angola. Our response -- to talk of withdrawing American troops from South Korea. It seemed as if America was wilfully ¹abdicating its role global power and protector of the free world. x

That abdication, that withdrawal of American power, didn't make the world safer, but more dangerous. It didn't bring peace, but a spread of regional conflicts around the globe. It didn't slow the arms race, only led the Soviets to believe they could win it.

1981? We came into office in 1981 with a mandate to rebuild x American strength and we did; through an intensive effort, we made up for the years of neglect and began to rebuild our military. We sped up the production lines on major new weapons systems such as the B1 bomber, and we made it clear

that the only position we would negotiate from was from a position of strength.

Yes, our military buildup was costly, but how much greater would have been the cost if we had allowed the neglect of our armed forces to continue -- cost not measured in dollars but in the permanent crippling of American might. It should not be forgotten that we faced a crisis situation when we came into office in 1980¹ -- we had to act quickly and decisively. X

It is in this light that I want to take a moment to discuss the procurement scandals besetting Congress and the Pentagon. When the accusations were first made public last week, I expressed my thoughts in no uncertain terms: This is worse, by far, than a common case of corruption. If the charges are true, these men have done more than steal from the public treasury, they have undermined America's security and broken faith with the American people. They have also done millions of patriotic and dedicated men and women who are in our nation's defense industry a serious disservice. Should these cases come to court under a Bush administration, I can assure you that they will be prosecuted to the full extent of the law, and, if guilty, we will throw the book at them. A Bush administration will not tolerate lawlessness, in the Congress, in the Pentagon, or on the streets.

The defense industry has a responsibility here, as well. If they want to continue doing business with the United States government, they must clean house -- they must hold their own representatives to the highest ethical standards.

Beyond the cases of individual misconduct, we must ask the question: are there problems built into the procurement process that make it open to abuse. This and related problems of efficiency were addressed by the Packard Commission on Defense Management. As head of the President's deregulatory task force, I have actively ~~p~~ursued many of the recommendations that concerned regulation. I will be the first to admit, however, that this administration has not moved aggressively enough on the Packard commission proposals. The overriding need to quickly restore our defenses delayed efforts to make needed changes in the way we buy and manage our defense resources. X

One of my top priorities as President will be the top to bottom implementation of the Packard commission proposals. I will appoint a Secretary of Defense committed to carrying them out. In Defense and elsewhere, my management philosophy can be summed up by Dave Packard's short-hand: get the best people and hold them accountable.

Partnership with
Congress - which
must bear
Part Responsibility

Its clear, too, that we need a new compact with Congress on defense spending -- a two year defense budget that would eliminate much of the waste due to uncertainty and constantly changing appropriations levels and allow us to efficiently plan ahead.

We must also be honest -- old-fashioned pork-barrel politics in the procurement process causes huge waste: some of the worst comes from obsolete military bases kept open at a cost of billions, even though their military value is zero. ((Insert on Army bill? Should we make a proposal to turn these bases federal prisons for drug offenders?))

Public
housing!!!

We must also resist the temptation to add new layers of bureaucracy and oversight. As a former businessman, I can say that there is too much bureaucracy, overhead and paperwork as it is -- we need a slimmed down, entrepreneurial management at Defense that can make command decisions and knows how to spend strategically.

The greatest tragedy would be if the misconduct of a ^{a number} few individuals ^{who've betrayed the public trust} were to be used to undermine the consensus on rebuilding American strength -- for that strength has not only made the world a safer place for freedom, it has opened up new possibilities that few dared ever to hope for 8 years ago.

Today we watch with guarded optimism the changes being talked about in the Soviet Union. Yes, much is still just that, talk, but in a totalitarian society talk can be truly revolutionary. The steel door has opened a crack and the fresh air of freedom is beginning to seep through -- will that door slam shut again, as it has in the past, or open up to a new age of hope, a new age in which peace is predicated upon its only true and lasting basis, the mutual interests and interdependence of free societies.?

We can't know that now -- but we can know that the promise of glasnost, of perestroika, didn't take place in a vacuum, but in the context of reinvigorated American strength. During the late seventies, at the ebb tide of American power it must have seemed to the Soviets that they could win the world competition, but that dream must have rapidly faded as we pulled out of the malaise economy of the seventies and into the entrepreneurial growth economy of the eighties, as we rebuilt our military and met Soviet aggression and subversion around the world with a renewed resolve to support those fighting for their freedom and the cause of human liberty. ✕

insert

*

It is this support that ^{is} ~~enabled~~ ^{has enabled} the Afghan Resistance to force the Soviet ^{USA to pull its} army out of Afghanistan. The USSR advertises its withdrawal as stemming from a new outlook on regional disputes. Perhaps this will be so, but only if strong support for freedom around the world is sustained by the next Administration. Where our support and our leadership has been strong -- as in Afghanistan and the Gulf and Salvador -- our allies join us, as do regional states, and the cause of freedom triumphs. Where is is not -- look at Nicaragua -- the opposite is true.

With SDI, we focused the competition on our great strength, and the Soviets' great weakness, technology. Even though the Soviets have been working on a strategic defenses for ^{decades} ~~(some 15 years)~~ and have spent 10 times the amount we have, it was clear to them that if they couldn't convince us to abandon our program -- as they tried to do at ^{Reykjavik} ~~Reykjavik~~ -- they would never win the technological competition.

My point is that it was eight years of American strength that confronted the Soviet Union with the true costs of ^g ~~a~~gression and the necessity of reform. Put briefly, it was Ronald Reagan that made ^{Mikhail} ~~Michael~~ Gorbachev possible. That is why the Moscow summit was such a fitting capstone to the President's career, for the hope of that summit was built on eight years of moral determination and hard work rebuilding American might.

(Conclusion: reprise of Vienna, INF, Central American stories, importance of peace through strength.)

more than that!

x

y

x

y

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(Conclusion: reprise of Vienna, INF, Central American stories, importance of peace through strength.)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4727

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

5

June 25, 1988

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR COLIN L. POWELL

FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY ~~PO~~

SUBJECT: Soviet Jewish Emigration

As discussed at Thursday's ODSM, I agree with Nelson that the complicated issue needs to be addressed. However, the situation is neither as alarming or urgent as his memo makes it out. Nor is there enough clarity in the views and intentions of Israel and USSR or the American Jewish community for the Administration to make informed decisions.

Tom Pickering has already talked to Shamir, pointing out the potential problems for US-Israeli relations and in the process confirming our judgment that the Israeli Cabinet acted precipitously in response to public pressure in an election year, reacting to last month's emigration figures rather than having reached prior agreement with the USSR or even within the Israeli government as to precisely what is intended. The USSR has also made it clear that no decisions have been reached and it is not prepared to accept the maximal interpretation of the Israeli announcement. Dennis Ross met Thursday afternoon in New York with the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations and found strong support for the Israeli announcement but also great misunderstanding over what it would mean in practice, i.e., who could come to the U.S., who could not and what procedures would be used. When Dennis pointed out the gaps in their understanding, they recognized that more careful study is needed.

I have asked Dennis to work with Lisa Jameson (they began Friday) and with State (e.g., NEA, RP, CA, HA, etc.) to ascertain the information needed to formulate an Administration response. Once they are satisfied that we have the necessary information, and have been able to formulate clear ideas on what actions to take, there should indeed be an interagency meeting; a PRG would be appropriate.

Attachment
Tab I Ledsy Memo #4692

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F74-038/3 #156

BY Amf NARA, DATE 5/18/00

~~SECRET~~

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4290

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 21, 1988

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR COLIN L. POWELL

FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY *ROB*

SUBJECT: Draft Response to Israeli Foreign Minister
Shimon Peres' Letter to the President of
June 2, 1988

Attached at Tab I is a memo from you to the President forwarding a reply to Shimon Peres' letter to the President (Tab II). Peres' letter thanked the President for a warm welcome and meaningful discussions during his visit in Washington. He also noted Jews in the Soviet Union and the peoples of the Middle East looked to the Summit with hope and anticipation. In light of the Israeli cabinet decision on Jewish emigration -- designed to counteract the high drop-out rate in those going to Israel -- we have added a point emphasizing "freedom of choice" to the State draft. The NSC concurs with the State Department response.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memo at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Prepared by: Dennis B. Ross

Attachments

Tab I Powell Memo to President
Tab A Presidential Memo to Peres
Tab II Levitsky Memo dtd 6/16/88
w/attachments

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F94-038/3 #157

BY Amf, NARA, DATE 5/18/00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: COLIN L. POWELL

SUBJECT: Draft Response to Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres' Letter to the President of June 2, 1988

Issue

Whether you should sign a reply to Shimon Peres' letter.

Discussion

Shimon Peres appreciated the warm welcome he had received here in Washington and noted that the peoples of the Middle East looked to the Moscow Summit to bring new hope for a solution of the conflict in the region. In his letter, he also called attention to the hundreds of thousands of Soviet Jews who looked to your efforts on their behalf as a source of inspiration and hope. Your response briefly describes your efforts on Soviet Jewry and human rights at the Summit and reaffirms our continuing commitment to the Middle East peace process. (It also notes our continuing commitment to "freedom of choice" on the question of where Jewish emigrants go when exiting the Soviet Union.)

Recommendation

OK No That you sign the letter to Shimon Peres at Tab A.

Attachment

- Tab A Letter to Shimon Peres
- Tab B Levitsky Memo dtd 6/16/88 w/ attachments

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Minister:

I appreciated receiving your kind letter following my return from the Moscow Summit. As always when we meet with the Soviets, we expressed our concerns about the plight of Soviet Jewry. I am encouraged that the level of emigration has risen and that the Soviets are taking some steps towards allowing greater freedom of expression. However, we all recognize that much more needs to be done. General Secretary Gorbachev and I also discussed ideas on how best to proceed in the search for a durable and just Middle East peace. I know that Secretary Shultz has reviewed the results of those discussions with you.

Please be assured that we shall continue to use every opportunity to press the Soviets to adopt a constructive approach on the peace process and on basic human rights for Soviet Jewry and other peoples. As you know, we remain committed to the principle of "freedom of choice" with regard to the destination of Jewish emigrants from the Soviet Union.

With best regards.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Shimon Peres
Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel

DECLASSIFIED/Released
NLS F94-038/3 #159
BY smf NARA, DATE 5/18/02



4290 A/O 8817508

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ June 16, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR COLIN L. POWELL
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Draft Response to Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres' Letter to the President of June 2, 1988.

A draft response to Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres' letter to the President of June 2, 1988 is attached.

Melvyn Levitsky
Melvyn Levitsky
Executive Secretary

Attachment: As stated.

DECLASSIFIED
By CAS

5/29/98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: OADR

8817508

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

AO/1149

June 2, 1988

Dear Mr. President:

I have been asked by Mr. Shimon Peres, Vice Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs, to transmit to you the following message:

"Dear Mr. President,

I am writing to you out of a sense of deep appreciation for your warm welcome and for the meaningful discussion we had during my visit to Washington. In the course of our talks, I had yet another opportunity to witness your dedication to the cause of global peace, especially in the troubled region of the Middle East. Peace has been the theme of your administration, and you, Mr. President, will surely be recorded in the annals of history as one of the greatest builders of world peace and stability.

The peoples of the Middle East are turning their eyes to the summit meeting this week, with the belief that it will bring new hope for the solution of the long-standing conflict.

Hundreds of thousands of Jews in the Soviet Union also look upon you as their ray of hope, their torch of liberty. They, too, will follow with prayer your talks this week. The attainment of your goals may be the difference for them between continued darkness and the opportunity to fulfill their religious and cultural heritage.


With best wishes.

Sincerely,

(sd)

Shimon Peres"

Sincerely,



Oded Eran
Charge d'Affaires ad interim

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED/Released
NLS F94-038/3 *160
BY omf NARA, DATE 5/18/00



S/S 8817508

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 3, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Paul Schott Stevens
National Security Council Staff

SUBJECT: Alerting NSCS on Presidential
Correspondence

Enclosed is the original of a letter to President Reagan from Israeli Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Shimon Perez which is transmitted for your information.

This correspondence was received in the Information Management Section of the Executive Secretariat on June 3, 1988. A copy has been assigned to the appropriate bureau for action.

Director, S/S-I
Information Management Section
Executive Secretariat
647-3836


Suggested Response

Dear Mr. Minister:

I appreciated receiving your kind letter ^{following} ~~on the eve of my~~
~~return from~~ ~~departure for~~ the Moscow Summit. As always when we meet with
the Soviets, we expressed our concerns about the plight of
Soviet Jewry. I am encouraged that the level of emigration has
risen and that the Soviets are taking some steps towards
allowing greater freedom of expression. However, we all
recognize that much more needs to be done. Secretary General
Gorbachev and I also discussed ideas on how best to proceed in
the search for a durable and just Middle East peace. I know
that Secretary Shultz has reviewed the results of those
discussions with you. Please be assured that we shall continue
to use every opportunity to press the Soviets to adopt a
constructive approach on the peace process and on basic human
rights for Soviet Jewry and other peoples.

With best regards,

Sincerely,


Ronald Reagan

His Excellency

Shimon Peres,

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Israel.

DECLASSIFIED/Released
NLS F94-028/3 *161

BY Smf, NARA, DATE 5/18/00

DRAFT

3 June 16, 1988
(6:00 p.m.)

NSC REVISED VERSION

Dear Senator _____,

I appreciated the opportunity to meet with you and Senator Dole to discuss a number of important issues. While we had a good general discussion, I did want to get back to you on the sale of F-18's to Kuwait. You expressed some concerns about this sale and I'd like to respond to these concerns.

Two general points should be made at the outset: First, we've had a policy toward the Gulf that has been working and the Kuwaitis are a central part of it. They've stood up to the pressure of Iranian intimidation and have helped us sustain our presence and operations in the Gulf. Their A-4 aircraft are old and need to be replaced and, liking our Navy aircraft, they have turned to us for F-18's. They have a need and it's in our interest to bolster Kuwait so it strengthens relations with us and preserves its ability to maintain its independence and withstand pressure from either Iran or Iraq.

Second, we regard the sale as an integrated package. Like any aircraft, the F-18 is a platform. It acquires its combat capability when fitted with munitions. The F-18's air-to-ground and air-to-sea capabilities are provided by Maverick and Harpoon missiles. Deny the Mavericks/Harpoons to the Kuwaitis, and there is little reason for the Kuwaitis to buy this expensive plane. This situation is not analogous to the Maverick sale proposed for Saudi Arabia last year. In that instance, Saudi Arabia already had a large number of Mavericks on hand and was requesting additional, more advanced missiles. Therefore, the Maverick request could be treated separately from the other unrelated arms requests without seriously jeopardizing Saudi Arabia's overall defensive capabilities. This is not true for the present case. Deleting the Mavericks and/or Harpoons from the package will eliminate major defensive capabilities that Kuwait needs and selected the F-18 to fulfill.

By denying the Maverick, we'll increase the probability that the Kuwaitis will simply buy an alternative aircraft, the MIG-29, the MIRAGE 2000, or the Tornados. If possible "transferability" to one of Israel's neighbors is a major concern, the threat in this regard is much greater with any one of these aircraft. Indeed, not only are there no controls over such transferability in these cases, but Israel's neighbors have (and thus fly and maintain) these aircraft. (Syria and Iraq have MIG-29s; Iraq has MIRAGE 2000s; the Saudis have Tornados.) None will have the F-18. They will lack both the equipment compatible with F-18's and the specially trained ground personnel needed to operate and maintain it. Moreover, an attempt to transfer or base the F-18 outside of Kuwait without our permission would jeopardize Kuwait's overall defense relationship with us, as well as the support system needed for the F-18.

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NLS F94-038/3 4/6 2

BY smf, NARA, DATE 5/18/00

DRAFT

2

Let me say an additional word on the question of basing. The Kuwaitis will base the 40 F-18's at Taba Air Base on the outskirts of Kuwait City. Based in Kuwait, the F-18's simply don't have the range to operate combat missions against Israel. They would require aerial refueling, and we don't plan to sell the tankers or provide the special training the Kuwaitis would need to refuel their aircraft in the air.

The bottom line is that it is hard to see how selling F-18's to Kuwait poses a threat to Israel. While not materially changing the net threat Israel faces, the sale does support our Gulf policy and preserves Kuwait's ability to steer an independent, moderate course in the area. That is very clearly in US interests.

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

B

S/S #

CAS S



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C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~UNTIL CLEARED~~

MESSAGE NO. 028326 CLASSIFICATION Confidential No. Pages 2
FROM: BODINE DEA/APP 76563 4224
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION F-18 LETTER to Dole / Metzbaum

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
<u>NSCS</u>	<u>Bob Oakley</u>	<u>395-6900</u>	<u>315</u>
DEA/APP	<u>Skip Guehn</u>	<u>695-5223</u>	<u>4D765</u>

FOR: CLEARANCE INFORMATION PER REQUEST COMMENT

REMARKS: URGENT - call for pick-up
due COB today to Secretary.

S/S Officer: [Signature]

Confidential

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(UNCL. CLEARED)

Robert Dole/ Howard M. Metzenbaum
U.S. Senate
Washington, D.C.

Dear Senator.....:

I appreciated the opportunity to meet with you and Senator (other) last Tuesday afternoon, June 15, to review a number of outstanding issues. Concerning the sale of F-18 aircraft to Kuwait, I would like to ~~clarify~~ ^{reiterate} the Administration's position on several points raised at our meeting.

Basing: Kuwait will base the 40 F-18s at Jaba Air Base on the outskirts of Kuwait City. We have no indications or reason to believe that it would base them outside of Kuwaiti territory. Kuwait wants the F-18 and associated weapons systems as its front-line defense against the land, sea, and air threats it faces. Basing it elsewhere would defeat the primary reason for purchasing the aircraft and leave Kuwait vulnerable to attack. At the same time, the F-18 requires unique support and maintenance equipment and personnel. Since the F-18 has not been sold elsewhere in the region, such support infrastructure would not be available outside Kuwait. ✓

^{is} Kuwait, which signed a GSOMIA in 1976, has never based its air assets outside the country, nor has it relinquished control of U.S.-origin equipment to a third party. It is aware of our restrictions on third-country transfer and has never violated the undertaking contained in all Letters of Offer and Acceptance that equipment sold is for self-defense and collective regional self-defense purposes only. Kuwait is a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council, a formal grouping of the six Gulf Arab states and, as a member of that organization, does accept collective self-defense responsibilities, as defined and sanctioned by the UN Charter. The U.S. has been a consistent supporter of the GCC and its efforts to enhance the defensive capabilities of its members. We see the sale of the F-18 as an integral element of that effort.

Mavericks/Harpoons: As you are aware, the F-18 sale includes 200 AGM-65D Mavericks, 100 AGM-65G Mavericks, and 40 AGM-84D-1 Harpoons. The D model Mavericks (as well as the earlier A and B models which are no longer in production) and the Harpoons have previously been approved for sale to the region. The G model Mavericks have not been previously requested by countries in the region, but do not contain new technology.

Confidential

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 194-03813 #163

BY AMF NARA, DATE 5/18/00

The F-18 is a multi-purpose aircraft, suitable for air-to-air combat and ground support operations. This is an important consideration for a small state with a talented, but limited manpower pool. Kuwait faces an immediate and long-term surface threat, as well as an air threat. The Mavericks and Harpoons in the small quantities requested are appropriate to Kuwait's legitimate need to provide a credible defense against any potential intruder. The numbers of missiles requested are insufficient for sustained offensive use. To delete the Mavericks and/or Harpoons from the sale and strip the F-18 of its defensive capability against tanks, small boats, and other surface threats of the kind employed by the Gulf war antagonists is, in essence and effect, to deny the Kuwaitis the aircraft.

Let me reaffirm what I told you ~~Tuesday~~ ^{Wednesday}--the Administration considers this sale important to U.S. policy interests in the Persian Gulf. It is a statement of the success of our policy in the Gulf over the past 18 months; it is a statement of the growing strength of our bilateral relationship with Kuwait and the mutual commitment to the relationship over the long term; and it is a statement of Kuwait's willingness actively to share the burden with us and with the other members of the GCC in the defense of the Gulf--as we have been urging them to do. I hope you and your colleagues will support the Administration and Kuwait in this request in its entirety;

Sincerely,

GPS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

2

June 16, 1988

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS

FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY *RO*

SUBJECT: Israel's Possible Violation of Arms Export
Control Act by Misuse of Teargas on the West
Bank and in Gaza

Attached at Tab I is a memo from you to Sally Kelley forwarding NSC's approval of State's draft response to Mr. Abdeen Jabara (Tab II).

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memo at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Stevens Memo to Kelley
Tab A Draft State Response

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

4222

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM: PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS

SUBJECT: Israel's Possible Violation of Arms Export
Control Act by Misuse of Teargas on the West
Bank and in Gaza

The NSC concurs with the attached draft response to the letter from Mr. Abdeen Jabara, American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee.

Attachment
Tab A Draft State Response

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8813051

Date June 7, 1988

FOR: Mr. Paul Schott Stevens
Executive Secretary
National Security Council
The White House

REFERENCE:

To: President Reagan

From: Mr. Abdeen Jabara, American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee

Date: April 12, 1988

Subject: Israel's possible violation of Arms Export Control Act
by misuse of teargas on the West Bank and in Gaza

WH Referral Dated: April 26, 1988

NSC ID# (if any): 559613

_____ The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State.

ACTION TAKEN:

- A draft reply is attached.
- _____ A draft reply will be forwarded.
- _____ A translation is attached.
- _____ An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
- _____ We believe no response is necessary for the reason cited below.
- _____ The Department of State has no objection to the proposed travel.
- _____ Other (see remarks).

REMARKS:

Richard J. Sadrey
Director
Secretariat Staff

Dear Mr. Jabara:

In response to your letter to President Reagan of April 12, 1988, I enclose a reply by Teresita Schaffer, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, to a similar inquiry you made of Secretary of State Shultz. I understand that you have met with Assistant Secretary of State Murphy regarding this matter, and I trust that your concerns are being addressed satisfactorily in those discussions.

Sincerely,



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

April 20, 1988

Mr. Abdeen Jabara
President, American-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Committee
4201 Connecticut Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008

Dear Mr. Jabara:

I am responding on behalf of Secretary Shultz to your letter of April 12, regarding Israeli use of tear gas and alleged violations of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA).

The Department of State for many years has approved export licenses for tear gas to be used by the Israeli Defense Forces. The tear gas which has been licensed is commonly used by the U.S. military and by U.S. civilian police forces. We recognize that Israel has the responsibility to maintain order in the occupied territories and have urged that this be accomplished with non-lethal means. In this regard, we consider tear gas, properly used, to be an appropriate, non-lethal means to deal with violent demonstrators.

Israeli purchases of tear gas are not governed by Section 4 of the AECA, which only applies to defense articles sold or leased by the U.S. government. Israel buys tear gas commercially from private manufacturers and exporters. These purchases are licensed by the Office of Munitions Control of the Department of State.

We too have seen occasional reports of tear gas canisters or projectiles landing inside enclosed buildings, but the practice does not appear to be widespread. Nor have we seen evidence to support the allegation that thirty deaths are directly attributable to tear gas inhalation.

We have brought our concerns about excessive force against Palestinian demonstrators to the attention of the highest levels of the Israeli Government, while making clear at the same time that we oppose violence and disorder. Israeli authorities have assured us they would do everything possible to avoid further casualties. We will continue to make our views known.

We continue to believe that only a political solution, acceptable to all parties to the conflict, can lead to the full restoration of peace and so desperately needed by the inhabitants of the region. It is our intention to pursue this goal to the extent of our abilities.

Sincerely,



Teresita Schaffer
Acting Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

T H E W H I T E H O U S E O F F I C E

REFERRAL

APRIL 26, 1988

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:

DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF:
WHITE HOUSE STAFF MEMBER

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 559613

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED APRIL 12, 1988

TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN

FROM: MR. ABDEEN JABARA
PRESIDENT
AMERICAN-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
COMMITTEE
SUITE 500
4201 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON DC 20008SUBJECT: EXPRESSES CONCERN ON INFORMATION RECEIVED
CONCERNING APPARENT VIOLATIONS OF THE ARMS
EXPORT CONTROL ACT 22 U.S.C., SEC. 2751 ET
SEQ., BY THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL IN ITS
IMPROPER AND LETHAL USE OF AMERICAN MADE TEAR
GAS AGAINST PALESTINIANSPROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE
(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE, 20500SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

TA 003

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: APRIL 13, 1988

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: MR. ABDEEN JABARA

SUBJECT: EXPRESSES CONCERN ON INFORMATION RECEIVED
CONCERNING APPARENT VIOLATIONS OF THE ARMS
EXPORT CONTROL ACT 22 U.S.C., SEC. 2751 ET
SEQ., BY THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL IN ITS *

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION	
		ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
LINAS KOJELIS		ORG	88/04/13		88/4/14
<i>Plucky Beserra</i>		A	88/04/15		88/04/21
<i>NSC/OAKLEY</i>		D	88/04/21		88/04/22
<i>JOW</i>		D	88/04/26		/ /
			/ /		/ /
			/ /		/ /

COMMENTS: * IMPROPER AND LETHAL USE OF AMERICAN MADE
TEAR GAS AGAINST PALESTINIANS

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: _____
PL MAIL USER CODES: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

- *****
- | | | | |
|--------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---|
| *ACTION CODES: | *DISPOSITION | *OUTGOING | * |
| * | * | *CORRESPONDENCE: | * |
| *A-APPROPRIATE ACTION | *A-ANSWERED | *TYPE RESP=INITIALS | * |
| *C-COMMENT/RECOM | *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL | * OF SIGNER | * |
| *D-DRAFT RESPONSE | *C-COMPLETED | * CODE = A | * |
| *F-FURNISH FACT SHEET | *S-SUSPENDED | *COMPLETED = DATE OF | * |
| *I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC* | | * OUTGOING | * |
| *R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY * | | | * |
| *S-FOR-SIGNATURE | | | * |
| *I-INTERIM REPLY | | | * |
- *****

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.



**American-Arab
Anti-Discrimination
Committee**

4201 Connecticut Ave., NW
Suite 500
Washington, DC 20008
(202) 244-2990
Telex: 856419 (ADC WSHDC)
Telefax: (202) 244-3196

Alex Odeh
(1944-1985)

James Abourezk, National Chairman

[Abdeen Jabara, President]

ADC National Advisory Committee
(Partial List)

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Rep. George Crockett (D-MI)
Rep. Walter Fauntroy (D-DC)
Rep. Mary Rose Oakar (D-OH)
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Ghada Talhami
Archbishop Joseph Tawil
Abdulla Warrayat
Joe Yusuf

April 12, 1988

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

The American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee has received information concerning apparent violations of the Arms Export Control Act 22 U.S.C. Sec. 2751 et seq., by the Government of Israel in its improper and lethal use of American made tear gas against Palestinians in the Occupied Territories of Gaza and the West Bank.

Pursuant to Section 2752(b) of the Act, under your direction, the Secretary of State has the responsibility of supervising and directing the sales and exports of arms to foreign countries. Such responsibility also includes "determining whether there shall be a sale to a country".

Further, Section 2753(c)(1)(B) prohibits sales to any country that uses defense articles exported under this Act, if such use is "in substantial violation (either in terms of quantities or terms of gravity of the consequences regardless of the quantity involved) of any agreement entered into pursuant to any such Act by using such articles or services for a purpose not authorized under section 2754 ...".

It is our understanding that the Israeli government, by virtue of its clear misuse of the exported American tear gas outside its borders in the Occupied Territories, against a civilian population, has violated Section 2754 of the Act

which authorizes the use of American defense articles "solely for internal security, for legitimate self-defense" and other limited purposes consistent with the Charter of the United Nations.

Based upon information and belief, Israel has been using tear gas manufactured and sold from the United States in violation of the clear instructions provided on the canisters. These instructions, pursuant to U.S. law state, "WARNING: May start fires. Must not be fired directly at persons as death or injury may result. For outdoor use only."

The Israeli military has clearly ignored such warnings as has been evidenced by first hand accounts of persons subjected to the gas and by the numerous print and electronic media reports of gassings in hospitals, houses of worship, schools, homes and other indoor spaces. In at least one case, a man was killed when he was directly fired upon by an Israeli soldier with a tear gas gun. As the enclosed report and articles indicate, at least thirty deaths have occurred as a result of the Israeli misuse of the tear gas. In addition, more than eighty intrauterine fetal deaths are suspected to have been caused by the tear gas in Gaza alone.


As you are aware, since tear gas may only be sold to Israel pursuant to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 CFR Sections 120 et seq., American distributors must obtain licenses from the Department of State Office of Munitions Control. In light of the reckless disregard for human life exhibited by the Israeli tear gassings, we request your ordering the Department of State to impose an immediate suspension of any and all export licenses to American exporters of tear gas to Israel.

Section 2753(c)(1)(B)(2) of the Act, states, "The President shall report to the Congress promptly upon the receipt of information that a violation described in paragraph (1) of this subsection may have occurred." Thus upon receipt of such information contained herein, we respectfully call upon you to make such a reporting to Congress at this time. Further, it is urged that you make a

finding that Israel in this case has violated the Act and thereby is ineligible to purchase or have delivered to it any further shipments of tear gas from any and all U. S. sources until and unless proper and binding assurances have been received by you that no further violation will occur.

Awaiting your prompt and favorable response to this urgent humanitarian request, I am

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'Abdeen Jabara', written over the typed name and title.

Abdeen Jabara
President

Enclosures: as stated

HAND DELIVERED

CS tear gas a form of chemical warfare?

By Donald E. Wagner

ON February 9, I visited Dabaisha refugee camp near Bethlehem in the Israeli occupied West Bank. A nine-year-old boy, who had narrowly escaped being kidnapped by militant Israeli settlers near his home the previous day, brought me a used tear gas canister which had been shot into Dabaisha during the weekend. I was then taken to the home of a young mother of 24 who was seven months pregnant until 9 February. A tear gas canister was shot into her home during the dinner hour. The next day she lost the baby. We walked up to the house to pay a condolence visit and her sister said: "She is not here. She had to go to the hospital this morning for an operation."

The tear gas canister was a silver cylinder, approximately one and a half inches in width and six inches in length. As I examined it, a fine black powder fell from the three holes at its base. I could feel the powder affect my eyes and sting a cut on my face.

Written on the canister was the following text: "MK 11. 560CS" in bold letters. Immediately below was written "150-yard Long Range Projectile," followed by the emblem of Federal Laboratories (a knight in armour clutching a spear). Below the emblem, in smaller letters were the following instructions: "To be used by trained personnel only. WARNING: May start fires. Must not be fired directly at persons as death or injury may result. For outdoor use only. FEDERAL LABORATORIES, INC. Saltzburg, Pennsylvania 15681, USA." The concluding line on the canister was equally instructive: "Made in the USA 123456789 MFG 1988."

The next day I visited an Israeli professor of chemistry at the Hebrew University who analyzed the tear gas. He noted that Israel had been using two types of tear gas but generally employed the CN variety, which is used throughout the world in over 95 per cent of the crowd control incidents. The CN variety carries the chemical formula "bis(2-chloroacetophenone)." This type comes in liquid form and while potent as an immobilising measure, its effects wear off within three to four hours. Exposing the victim to clean air and washing with an ammonia-water solution reduces the effects. It is not lethal.

Since January 1988, and possibly before, Israel has been using

the CS type of tear gas in the occupied territories. Canisters are available in refugee camps, villages and cities throughout the West Bank, Jerusalem and Gaza.

"Made in the USA
123456789 MFG
1988."

The CS type carries the chemical formula "ortho-benzylidene-malonite". It comes in a solid black powder form and can be activated in a variety of ways: Dropped from helicopters, shot from tear gas guns, or ignited by hand and thrown or dropped. CS is lethal when consumed in intense doses, particularly within enclosed areas. Infants, elderly persons, and those suffering from heart, respiratory or related ailments are particularly subject to death or serious complications. There is no known antidote for the CS powder, which enters the respiratory system and lodges in the blood cells, fatty tissue, and mucus membranes. Also, the fine black powder can stick to the skin and cause burning welts on the body. It sticks to clothing, walls, and carpeting and will remain there for days. The long term effects, and whether it is carcinogenic, are not known.

Particularly distressing is the effect of CS tear gas on pregnant women and the unborn foetus. According to physicians at one hospital in Gaza, whom I interviewed in January, over 35 deaths of foetuses had occurred in the last three months of pregnancy in their hospital alone, all from tear-gassing. One should bear in mind that this is one hospital which serves one sector of Gaza, and many cases from the refugee camps do not reach the hospital. Doctors say that most cases are not reported, as mothers are fearful of military retaliation at hospitals and simply recover at home. The same applies throughout the West Bank. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) has begun an epidemiological study and believes intra-uterine foetal death is a widespread and serious phenomenon in the uprising.

Dr. Jennifer Leaning, of Harvard medical school, visited the occupied territories in early February 1988 with a delegation from Physicians for Human Rights, a U.S.-based medical and human rights organisation. At a press conference in Jerusalem, on February 11, she noted that there

is no question that the CS type of tear gas can be lethal, especially when fired into rooms averaging 10'x 15'x 15', which is being done. The literature and research on tear gas does not deal with the question of intra-uterine foetal deaths.

It is not clear what causes abortions after mothers are exposed to high concentrations of tear gas (research is inadequate on all deaths and other medical complications caused by tear gas). It is probable that the gas affects the oxygen supply and blood circulation to the foetus. It is also possible that the chemical breakdown within the blood system causes death from toxins (as with cyanide.) Additional research must be done immediately and blood samples must be analysed within a few hours of the abortion. Obviously, the physicians serving the Palestinian population are so overtaxed with the brutalities from all aspects of Israeli practices that they are unable to focus on the analysis necessary to provide answers. Physicians have contacted Israeli officials and the American manufacturer of CS tear gas, requesting information on the treatment of victims. As of mid-February they have not received a single response to their appeals.

In the light of the above evidence, the question must now be raised as to whether Israel is employing a form of chemical warfare against the Palestinian civilian population in the occupied West Bank and Gaza. Urgently needed is up to date information on the use of CS tear gas in other situations of unrest, and its status under international law. Further medical analysis is needed at once in the occupied territories to ensure accurate data on death from tear-gassing and intra-uterine foetal death. Careful investigation of the medical, legal, and chemical aspects of CS tear gas must proceed at once. Finally, human rights and legislative bodies in the United States need to assess whether the shipment of CS tear gas to Israel in January 1988 is in violation of the Congressional Arms Export Control Act (1977) or other legislation which should limit or prevent such shipment.

The Rev. Donald Wagner is currently on sabbatical from his position as Director of the Palestine Human Rights Campaign, USA. The article is reprinted from the London-based Middle East International.

PALESTINIAN CASUALTIES OF THE ISRAELI MILITARY'S USE OF TEAR GAS MADE IN THE U.S.A.

DEATHS

3/19	Ula Abu Sharifa, 5 mos.	Gaza
3/18	Ali Mohammad Abu Hajjar, 70	Jabalya Ref Camp
3/17	Juma' Ibrahim al-Turki, 55	al-Amari Ref Camp
3/16	Salim al-Yahia, 63	Tulkarm Ref Camp
3/13	Yahia Khamis al-Moghrabi, 2 mos.	Zeitoun, Gaza
3/9	Sanaar Samir Ebeid, 40	Khan Yunis Ref Camp
3/8	Yusef Hassuna, 3 mos.	Deir Balah Ref Camp
3/8	Shereen Mun'em Elayan, 4 mos.	Deir Balah Ref Camp
3/7	Salah Eddin al-Nakeeb, 33	Askar Ref Camp
3/3	Khitam Sabri Aaram, 10	Rafah, Gaza
3/2	Suleiman Abdul Ghanni Taher	Baka Sharqiyeh
2/26	Fouad Sha'awawi, 48	Hebron
2/21	Ahmad Sadek Abu Salheia, 55	Nablus
2/17	Rana Mahmud Adwan, 3 mos.	Rafah Ref Camp, Gaza
2/14	Mohammad Mahmud al-Ra'i, 62	Gaza City, Gaza
2/1	Abd Yusef Salaah, 70	Suwani, Jerusalem
1/24	Fatmeh Suleimann, 55	Beit Safifa, Bethlehem
1/16	Amna Darwish, 72	Gaza City, Gaza
1/16	Haytham Shakiru, 7 mos.	Qalqilya
1/16	Abdul Fatah Masqawi, 2 mos.	Qalqilya
1/14	Khaled Moh'd Shahin, 75 days	Gaza City, Gaza
1/14	Imad Hamdi Abu Asi, 15 days	Gaza City, Gaza
1/13	Fayruz Ahmed Shobaki, 11	Deir Amr Ref Camp
1/12	Samer Ali Jumaa, <1 year	Deir Amr Ref Camp
1/11	Amira A'skar, 35, 40 days pregnant	Jabalya Ref Camp
1/10	Wijdan Faris, 36, 9 mos pregnant	Khan Yunis, Gaza
1/2	Miriam Abu Awdllh Abu Zaher, 82	Jabalya Ref Camp
1/2	Khalid al-Qidri, 24 days	Khan Yunis, Gaza
1/1	Ra'ed Obeid, 3 mos.	Jabalya Ref Camp, Gaza
12/23	Amal Abdul Wahad Qacisa, 2 days	Jabalya Ref Camp
12/18	Khalil Mahsiri, 70	el-Birch, Ramallah
12/12	Fatmeh al-Qidri, 4 days	Khan Yunis, Gaza

Intrauterine Fetal Mortality

This table does not include information on intrauterine fetal deaths among women in the last trimester of pregnancy who have been exposed to high concentration of tear gas. While the exact number of these deaths is unknown (many occur when people are under curfew and cannot obtain medical aid; these deaths remain unreported) physicians estimate that in Gaza alone, as of the end of February, there had been at least 80 fetal deaths. On the night of March 7-8 alone, 11 fetal deaths were reported among women in four Gaza refugee camps. While hard epidemiological evidence is lacking, some significant connection between the tear gas and the stillbirths seems clear. UNRWA has started an epidemiological study of women who have miscarried in late pregnancy after tear gas exposure. One Gaza doctor reported having death with 7 cases of intrauterine fetal death in one day. As of February 17, one Gaza hospital had records of over 40 cases. Informed estimates place the number of fetal deaths well over a hundred.

Reports are that at Israeli-run Shifa Hospital in Gaza, operations on women whose babies have died in utero are scheduled for between midnight and 4 am to avoid publicity. On one recent night alone there were six operations: five stillborn deliveries (not full term) and one baby born alive but three months prematurely.

Tear gas is promoted as a non-lethal alternative to shooting. This is clearly not the case with regard to the various kinds, quantities and concentrations of tear gas the Israelis are currently using.

At the end of December we received reports that the Israelis had exhausted their supplies of tear gas. That report received indirect confirmation January 13 in Gaza, when visiting American Congressman Dymally picked up a tear gas canister marked Made in USA 1988. The canister has since been brought to the United States.

Tear Gas Fired Into Closed Spaces

Ibrahim Hassan Sadeq Qa'abi and Samia Hassan Musa Ibrahim report that border guards broke into their home on the night of December 10, beat their daughters, and sprayed tear gas inside the house. Overcome by the gas, Samia fainted and was taken to the hospital.

There are reports of a new tear gas in use since approximately March 3, when 300 schoolgirls were treated and 1 died in Gaza, after the intensive tear gassing of 3 schools. On March 5, 15 girls required treatment after their school in Gaza was tear gassed. Three hundred people required treatment for tear gas in Gaza City March 6; 250 schoolgirls required treatment for tear gas in Gaza on March 14. On the night of March 7-8, 11 women in late pregnancy are known to have miscarried in Jabalya, Shatti, Deir Balah and Beit Hanoun (Gaza). Five late term miscarriages were reported in Gaza City and Jabalya on the night of March 14-15.

The army crowded 23 people into one room of a house in Jabalya March 16 and lobbed 5 tear gas canisters into it; the people were taken to the hospital.

Attacks on Hospitals

On January 29, Ittihad hospital where many wounded have been taken was reported tear gassed.


Shifa hospital in Gaza was attacked late at night March 2. Soldiers destroyed the admissions room, tear gassed the hospital and beat hospital workers.

The army tear gassed and invaded UNRWA Swedish hospital (Gaza) on March 14, assaulting hospital workers, including doctors. Eighteen women and children had to be treated following the attack.

Other Uses

On December 18 the Army tear gassed a spontaneous demonstration near Al-Aqsa Mosque, a 70 year old man died from the effects of tear gas.

The Washington Post reported on March 31, 1988 that the Israeli Army reported a total of 45 Palestinian injuries in the West Bank, 30 by gunshot wounds and 15 by tear gas or beatings in demonstrations on March 30.

 June 15, 1988

THEMES FOR CRAIG FULLER

- Newspaper reports of Dukakis' speech play up themes of "continuity," no surprise or sudden shifts in doctrine, and conventional, not nuclear modernization.
- Continuity and "no surprises" reflect his attempt to reassure the Europeans and to show he's in the mainstream and responsible.
- The same is true of his call for making choices in defense spending and putting his emphasis on conventional forces. (It also drives his call for conventional arms control talks requiring larger Soviet reductions in de-stabilizing conventional arms (e.g., tanks and artillery) in Europe.)
- Dukakis made clear his opposition to strategic modernization, opposing both Midgetman and MX; he opposed SDI as well, calling not for a strategic defense initiative, but a conventional defense initiative (CDI).
- I haven't seen his notion of a CDI spelled out in any detail. Beyond being a slogan, it's hard to know what it means.
- While he favors a vague CDI and attacks space-based defense, he seems unaware that SDI is more than only space-based technologies or systems. The development of Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missiles (ATBMs) has been intensified as a result of our commitment to SDI. With the ominous proliferation of ballistic missiles in a tinderbox like the Middle East, ATBMs are becoming not just important, but critical.
- To that end, we are working with Israel on ATBMs, committing ourselves to provide a major share of the funding.
- It's fine to talk about CDI, but how about dealing with the real world and real world threats that we and our friends, like Israel, will face in the 1990's.
- How can one forego strategic defense when the threats still exist?
- The Soviets are neither slowing their strategic modernization nor their research and development into strategic defense.
- We shouldn't be in the business of unilaterally disarming ourselves. That will neither foster US-Soviet stability nor preserve our broader security.