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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. outline	re: Mideast peace process (1p)	3/24/87	P-1, P-5
2. outline	re: Mideast peace process (1pp)	3/23/87	P-1, P-5
3. talking points	re: comments on DR paper (1p)	n.d.	P-1, P-5
4. outline	re: Mideast peace process (1p)	3/20/87	P-1, P-5
5. cable	from AmEmbassy Cairo to Sec. of State re: March 17 meeting (2pp)	3/18/87	P-1
6. cable	from AmEmbassy Amman to Sc. of State re: peace process: Mrch 16-17 discussions (5pp)	3/17/87	P-1, P-5
7. cable	from AmEmbassy Amman to Sec. of State re: interntional conference (1pp)	3/18/87	P-1
8. note	from Frank to George re: US aid (1p)	3/16/87	P-1, P-5
9. memo	from Robert Oakley to Frank Carlucci re: Middle East peace (1p)	3/14/87	P-1
10. memo	from F. Carlucci to George Shultz re: Middle East peace (1p)	3/16/87	P-1, P-5
11. memo	re: aid for Jordan (1p)	n.d.	P-1, P-5
12. memo	re: Middle East peace process (5pp)	n.d.	P-1, P-5
13. talking points	re: Middle East peace process (2pp)	n.d.	P-1
14. outline	re: Mideast peace process (1p)	n.d.	P-1, P-5
15. notes	re: Mideast peace process (1p)	n.d.	P-1
COLLECTION: ROSS, DENNIS B.: Files			ggc
FILE FOLDER: Hill, Charlie - Meeting Folder: D. Ross [2 of 3]			3/6/95

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
16. note	re: signs of change (2pp)	n.d.	P-1
17. memo	re: peace process (2pp)	4/1/87	P-1, P-5
18. memo	re: game plan trip (3pp)	n.d.	P-1, P-5
19. memo	re: motivations (8pp)	n.d.	P-1, P-5
20. memo	re: Jordan & Isreal (1p)	11/4/87	P-1
COLLECTION:			
ROSS, DENNIS B.: Files			ggc
FILE FOLDER:			
Hill, Charlie - Meeting Folder: D. Ross [2 of 3]			3/6/95

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Handwritten notes: "H.P. ... [unclear]" and "Rose, ... [unclear]"

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 1-10 LISTED ON THE WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.



הממשלה

33

Jerusalem, September 2, 1982

At a special meeting of the Cabinet today the following resolution was adopted:

The positions conveyed to the Prime Minister of Israel on behalf of the President of the United States consist of partial quotations from the Camp David Agreement or are nowhere mentioned in that Agreement or contradict it entirely.

The following are the major ~~positions~~ positions of the Government of the United States:

1. Jerusalem

"Participation by the Palestinian inhabitants of East Jerusalem in the election for the West Bank-Gaza authority"

No mention whatsoever is made in the Camp David Agreement to such a voting right. The single meaning of such a vote is the repartition of Jerusalem into two authorities, the one - of the State of Israel and the other - of the Administrative Council of the autonomy Jerusalem is nowhere mentioned in the Camp David Agreement. With respect to the capital of Israel letters were forwarded and attached to that Agreement. In his letter to the President of the United States, Mr. Jimmy Carter, the Prime Minister of Israel, Mr. Menachem Begin, stated that "Jerusalem is one city, indivisible, the Capital of the State of Israel." Thus shall it remain for all generations to come.

2. Security

"Progressive Palestinian responsibility for internal security based on capability and performance".

In the Camp David Agreement it is stated:

"A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations.



מזכירות הממשלה

- 2 -

The agreement will also include arrangements for assuring internal and external security and public order."

It is, therefore, clear that in the Camp David Agreement no distinction is made between internal security and external security. There can be no doubt that were internal security not to be the responsibility of Israel the terrorist organization called PLO - even after its defeat by the IDF in Lebanon - would act to perpetrate constant bloodshed, shedding the blood of Jews and Arabs alike. For the citizens of Israel this is a question of life and death.

3. "A real settlement freeze"

In the Camp David Agreement no mention whatsoever is made of such a freeze. At Camp David the Prime Minister agreed that new settlements could not be established (though population would be added to existing ones) during the period of the negotiations for the signing of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel (three months being explicitly stated). This commitment was carried out in full. That three months period terminated on December 17, 1978. Since then many settlements have been established in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District without evicting a single person from his land, village or town.

Such settlement is a Jewish inalienable right and an integral part of our national security. Therefore, there shall be no settlement freeze. We shall continue to establish them in accordance with our natural right. President Reagan announced at the time that "the settlements are not illegal." A double negative makes a positive, meaning that the settlements are legal. We shall act, therefore, in accordance with our natural right and the law, and we shall not deviate from the principle that these vital settlements will not lead to any eviction.



מונירות חמטלה

- 3 -

4. The definition of full autonomy

"The definition of full autonomy as giving the Palestinian inhabitants real authority over themselves, the land and its resources, subject to fair safeguards on water."

Such a definition is nowhere mentioned in the Camp David Agreement, which states:

"In order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants (our emphasis), etc"

In the lengthy discussion at Camp David it was made absolutely clear that the autonomy applies not to the territory but to the inhabitants.

5. Ties with Jordan

*SOCIAL*  
"Economic, commercial and cultural ties between the West Bank, Gaza and Jordan."

In all the clauses of the Camp David Agreement there is no reference whatsoever to such ties.

6. Israeli Sovereignty

There is nothing in the Camp David Agreement that precludes the application of Israeli sovereignty over Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District following the transitional period which begins with the establishment and inauguration of the self-governing authority (~~the~~ administrative council). This was also stated by ~~an~~ official spokesman of the Government of the United States.

7. Palestinian state

The Government of the United States commits itself not to support the establishment of a Palestinian state in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District.



מוכירות הממשלה

- 4 -

Regrettably, the visible reality proves this to be an illusion. Were the American plan to be implemented there would be nothing to prevent King Hussein from inviting his new-found friend, Yasser Arafat, to come to Nablus and hand the rule over to him. Thus would be a Palestinian state come into being which would conclude a pact with Soviet Russia and arm itself with every kind of modern weaponry. If the PLO could do this in Lebanon, establishing a state within a state, how much more so will the terrorists do so ruling over Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District. Then, a joint front would be established of that "Palestinian State" with Jordan and Iraq behind her, Saudi Arabia to the South and Syria ~~to~~ to the North. All these countries, together with ~~the~~ other Arab states would, after a while, launch an onslaught against Israel to destroy her.

It is inconceivable that Israel will ever agree to such an "arrangement" whose consequences <sup>are</sup> ~~would be~~ inevitable.

\* \* \* \*

Since the positions of the Government of the United States seriously deviate from the Camp David Agreement, contradict it and could create a serious danger to Israel, its security and its future, the Government of Israel has resolved that on the basis of these positions it will not enter into any negotiations with any party.

The Government of Israel is ready to renew the autonomy negotiations forthwith with the Governments of the United States and Egypt, signatories to the Camp David Agreement, and with other states and elements invited at Camp David to participate in the negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on the establishment of full autonomy for the Arab inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District, in total conformity with the Camp David Accords.



Hill, Charles [2062]  
Ross, Dennis

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

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Beyond the profound importance of shared values, and the many forms of cooperation that constitute the moral and strategic basis of the unique American-Israeli relationship, there is a third element that defines our partnership: a shared commitment to the pursuit of peace in the Middle East.

Next year will be the fortieth anniversary of the creation of the State of Israel. It has been a challenging forty years. Time and again, Israel has fought for its survival. It has struggled to convince its Arab neighbors for recognition as a sovereign state. Yet the hope of peace and security that inspired Israel's creation has only been partially realized. War and strife have brought great suffering to both Israelis and Arabs.

These years have also witnessed substantial progress toward Arab-Israeli peace, either through formal negotiations or steady, quiet diplomacy. Review with me for a moment what has been accomplished in the pursuit of peace in recent years.

-- First and foremost, Israel and Egypt live in peace. The peace treaty has proved far more durable than any of its critics could have imagined; and it has provided the framework for Egyptians and Israelis to resolve problems at the negotiating table. Last September, for example, they agreed on a process of arbitration to resolve the Taba border dispute and agreed on a basket of measures to improve the bilateral relationship in general.

- Last summer, King Hassan of Morocco--then head of the Arab League and of the OIC's Jerusalem Committee--hosted Israel's then-Prime Minister Shimon Peres. This was an act of statesmanship that reflected Morocco's commitment to peace and reconciliation, and was indicative of the atmosphere growing in favor of such direct contacts.
  
- Finally, King Hussein of Jordan--a man whose record of moderation and pragmatism cannot be doubted--has openly proclaimed his determination to move into negotiations with Israel. For Jordan, the issue is no longer whether peace is desirable, but how it can be achieved.
  
- More broadly, an environment of negotiations has been created during years of quiet diplomacy. After the 1973 war, an international conference was convened in Geneva which paved the way for the disengagement agreements between Israel and Egypt, and Israel and Syria. Building upon this momentum, the negotiations at Camp David produced the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty. The process of peace-making in which we are now engaged is anchored in the efforts begun then.

Neither the United States nor Israel can afford to rest on their accomplishments. Drift and the appearance of stalemate will strengthen the forces of radicalism and fundamentalism. It will

narrow the choices available to moderate regimes and put them increasingly on the defensive. Satisfaction with the status quo, characterized the period before the 1973 war; we must not fall victim to that kind of complacency and the illusions that it produced.

We want to strengthen those prepared to make peace and create a process that makes that possible. That's what we have been working to do over the last few years. We have been guided by several assumptions:

- That peace cannot be imposed; it can only be negotiated.
- That such negotiations must be bilateral and direct.
- That all possible vehicles for getting to such negotiations must be explored.

In this spirit, we have been exploring with our friends whether it is possible to structure an international conference that would produce such negotiations; that would not impose its views on the parties or veto any agreements reached by them; and that would not introduce further disruptive elements into the region.

In recent weeks, this process of exploration has produced what we believe to be significant progress. The progress did not guarantee success, but it offered hope that serious, bilateral negotiations could be initiated. Many questions would have to be resolved before we would be able to get to the point where a conference could be convened and provide the opening to such negotiations.

These questions include what, if any, role the Soviets might have; who would represent the Palestinians; whether the Syrians could or would go along with this approach; and other questions relating to how the negotiations would unfold. Perhaps, we wouldn't be able to resolve these questions to our satisfaction. If so, we would drop the effort. But why drop the effort before knowing that. Indeed, to preempt the process at this point--when there is no other one on the horizon--would mean losing a potentially significant opportunity to move closer to the reality of peace, with unfortunately no alternative available or within reach.

We know that pursuing this effort is not necessarily easy for the parties involved -- or for those who try to help them. We know also and appreciate how any such effort may trigger debate. It has certainly had that effect recently in Israel. We are not blind to that debate or the issues that are involved in it, but it is not our place to meddle in this debate.

It is not for the United States to decide Israel's course and Israel's future. That is for Israelis to decide. For our part, we are prepared to continue our efforts with the Government of Israel.

Peace is our objective, and we know it is Israel's also. We will do all we can to promote it. I can think of few tasks that are more noble or are more worthy to be associated with than working to achieve a genuine peace between Israel and her neighbors. I can pledge to you that I will do all I can to get us closer to that goal.

DROSS

Final version

as cleared

by Mr. Armacost

THE PEACE PROCESS

Beyond the profound importance of shared values and the many forms of cooperation that constitute the moral and strategic basis of the unique American-Israeli relationship, there is a third element that defines our partnership: a shared commitment to the pursuit of peace in the Middle East.

Next year will be the fortieth anniversary of the creation of the State of Israel. It has been a challenging forty years. Time and again, Israel has fought for its survival. It has struggled to achieve recognition as a sovereign state, and to secure the peace which all Israelis desire. War and strife have brought great suffering to both Israelis and Arabs.

But, these years have also witnessed substantial progress toward Arab-Israeli peace, through formal negotiations and steady, quiet diplomacy. Review with me for a moment what has been accomplished in the pursuit of peace in recent years.

-- After the 1973 war, an international conference was convened in Geneva which paved the way for the disengagement agreements between Israel and Egypt, and Israel and Syria.

-- This formal negotiating process, coupled with intensive

diplomatic activity behind the scenes, resulted in the Camp David Accords in 1978 and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty in 1979.

-- Israel and Egypt now live in peace. Their treaty has proved far more durable than any of its critics could have imagined; and it has provided the framework for Egyptians and Israelis to resolve problems at the negotiating table. Last September, for example, they agreed on a process of arbitration to resolve the Taba border dispute and agreed on measures to improve the bilateral relationship in general.

-- While completing the implementation of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, the U.S. continued efforts to expand the peace process, initially through the autonomy negotiations. On September 1, 1982, President Reagan announced his "Fresh Start" initiative for Middle East peace, which was anchored in the diplomatic progress achieved until then and designed to give new impetus to peacemaking efforts.

-- Since 1982, we have been engaged in intensive, quiet diplomacy to try to arrange negotiations between Israel and its other neighbors. One result of these efforts is that King Hussein of Jordan - a man whose record of moderation and pragmatism cannot be doubted - has openly proclaimed his



determination to move into negotiations with Israel. For Jordan, the issue is no longer whether peace is desirable, but how it can be achieved.

-- Another example of progress occurred last summer, when King Hassan of Morocco hosted Israel's then-Prime Minister Shimon Peres. This was an act of statesmanship that reflected Morocco's commitment to peace and reconciliation, and was indicative of the growing trend in favor of such direct contacts.

-- The U.S. has also embarked on a program to improve the quality of Palestinian life in the West Bank and Gaza. This program draws sustenance from the diplomatic activity in the peace process and contributes to creating an atmosphere in which negotiations can take place.

-- Yet, despite the progress that has been made, neither the United States nor Israel can afford to rest on its accomplishments. Our commitment to Arab-Israeli peace remains firm. We will persevere actively and willingly in our efforts to facilitate face to face negotiations between the parties -- the sine qua non for any successful accommodation. Fortunately, the governments of Israel, Jordan and Egypt are all committed to the importance of an active peace process; all

have asked that we remain engaged.

Significant developments have recently occurred. These have been the subject of intense debate both here and in Israel. We have neither the interest nor the desire to become involved in Israel's debate. Almost anything said by American officials is susceptible to misinterpretation as siding with one side or another in that debate. But there are American interests at stake in the peace process, and we have our own views on the issues.

Let me review where we are.

-- The United States has consistently maintained that the only reliable way to achieve peace is through face to face negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The soundness of this conviction has been borne out by experience and the impressive results I noted earlier. As we pursued this objective of reaching face to face negotiations in recent years, our Arab friends told us that - although they understood negotiations would need to be held bilaterally and directly - they required an international conference in which to launch the process.

-- As you know, the U.S. has been skeptical about a conference;

however, consistent with our pledge of four decades to leave no path to peace unexplored, we agreed to see whether a conference could be structured that would:

-- Lead promptly and directly to face to face negotiations.

-- Not interfere in the face to face negotiations.

-- Not impose its will on the negotiations or veto agreements.

-- Discussions on these and other fundamental issues were conducted over a period of two years with representatives of the parties. We all worked hard to narrow gaps, reach understandings, and pin down agreement on a formula to take us through a conference directly to face to face negotiations in a manner which met the requirements of all parties.

-- Through many months of persistent and patient efforts, significant progress was achieved. While serious issues remain to be resolved, there are reasons to hope that understandings can be achieved on the following:

-- Negotiations will take place in bilateral geographical committees.

-- The conference will not impose solutions or veto agreements reached bilaterally.

-- Palestinian representatives will participate in the negotiations in a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.

-- All participants in the negotiations will be expected to accept UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and to renounce violence and terrorism.

-- There are no substantive preconditions to the negotiations.

-- In accordance with the normal rules of diplomacy, each party will enjoy the right to remove itself from the negotiations if the rules of procedure are not observed.

In translating this into tangible progress toward negotiations, we recognize that difficult political choices will be required. Indeed, what has been required of all parties is not a firm "yes" or "no" to some pre-arranged formula for negotiations; no such formula exists. Crucial issues remain. Which Palestinians will participate in the negotiations together with Jordan? Can the Soviet Union prove itself able and willing to play a constructive role? Will

Syria accept this approach or try to play a spoiler role? These and other questions relating to the negotiations need to be explored and resolved before a conference could actually be convened.

Nevertheless the significant progress made to date leads us to believe that a unique opportunity exists to move towards a conference that would lead to immediate bilateral negotiations without dictating their outcome. As such, the continuation of this process has our full support. The parties now need to decide whether to continue the search for a negotiating formula on the strength of what has been achieved to date and the promise of what can still be accomplished.

As the parties make that decision, I want to reiterate two fundamental aspects of American policy:

Our policy has as its objective peace through face to face negotiations.

Our policy does call for exploiting what may be an historic opportunity to move ahead toward negotiations between Israel and its neighbors.

Now I recognize that, as astute observers, you are all

asking yourselves: "What's the punch line?" and "How can he be saying this after what happened last week in Israel?" The answer, my friends, will be reserved for the same quiet channels of diplomacy the U.S. has utilized so effectively up to now to help get us to where we are. I have no intention of negotiating in public speeches, and hope our partners will continue to respect the confidentiality of our exchanges, which is so critical in dealing with these sensitive issues. But I can say that the U.S. will persist in our efforts to reach a peaceful settlement in the Middle East, a settlement which will enhance the prosperity and security of Israel and its neighbors. I call upon our friends to continue with us in this effort, and not lose a chance to negotiate a genuine, just and enduring peace.

June 3

Mineral  
--- Soap ---  
--- Alcohol ---  
--- Fuel

--- Merry to Hussaini