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**Collection:** Powell, Colin L.: Files

**Folder Title:** Chron - Official II (July-December) 1988  
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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: POWELL, COLIN L.: Files

Archivist: kdb/lmo

File Folder: CHRON-OFFICIAL 1988 II (JUL-DEC) [9] ~~Box 92477~~ *LAL Box 1*

Date: June 7, 1996

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. cable	100643Z SEP 88	9/10/88	<del>P1</del> B1
<del>2. memo</del>	<del>for the Record from the National Military Command Center (partial)</del> <i>R 7/11/98 NLSF 95-085 #164</i>	<del>9/15/88</del>	<del>P1</del>
3. notes	from Ralph to Mike/Paul, re secure phones (2 copies, 2 pp total) <i>part. 11/01/01 F95-085 #167</i>	n.d.	<del>P1</del> B1
<del>4. profs note</del>	<del>Kay Zerwick to PAAL, re note from Powell</del> <i>R 7/11/98 NLSF 95-085 #164</i>	<del>9/30/88</del>	<del>P1</del>
5. memo	William R. Graham to the President, re White House Science Council report (2 pp)	9/28/88	P5 <i>CS 12/11/00</i>

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-5 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

28/9

Jim Keey, Dick Childress

?



THE WHITE HOUSE

9/24

Colin:

Is there somebody at State who  
considers these situations?

Maui

**THE HEARST NEWSPAPERS**  
**WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS**  
**1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N. W.**  
**WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006**  
**TELEPHONE (202) 298-6920**

**NATIONAL EDITOR**  
**SENIOR WASHINGTON REPRESENTATIVE**

**VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR**  
**THE HEARST CORPORATION**

September 21, 1988

Mr. Marlin Fitzwater  
Assistant to the President  
for Press Relations  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Marlin:

I am taking the liberty of enclosing a letter addressed to the President and Mrs. Reagan by the wife of the former deputy head of the South Vietnamese delegation to the peace talks in Paris in the early '70's. Both Phong and his wife were very good friends of mine when I covered the peace conference during the late '60's and early '70's. He was the chief South Vietnamese spokesman at the peace talks and an extremely strong supporter of the United States position at the peace talks. He was also a close personal friend of David Bruce who, when Ambassador in London, came to Paris to be best man at his wedding to Elizabeth.


Phong called me in Rome the day before he left Paris to return to Saigon and told me he had been summoned back by the President. I pleaded with him to ignore the summons, warning him that he might never get out of Saigon before the North Vietnamese took over. He said he realized that, but he felt that he had to respond to the President's summons.

He was one of the first of the pro-American South Vietnamese to be seized by the Communists. David Bruce did everything he possibly could to secure his release and appealed to the French government to intervene on his behalf. But the French Foreign Office took the position that French intervention would do more harm than good.

I do hope something can be done. I do hope some influence can be exerted on the Vietnamese government to let him leave the country and rejoin his wife and children in Paris.

With thanks for your consideration and good wishes,

Sincerely yours,



Joseph Kingsbury-Smith

JKS/gs  
Enclosure

123 Avenue Ledru Rollin  
75011 Paris

2nd September 1988

Mr President and Mrs Reagan,

I am writing to you as a woman and as the wife of Nguyen Xuan Phong. As Minister and diplomat, he served his country loyally, accepting missions of the highest importance in the service of his government and faithfully executing the instructions given to him.

As Deputy Head of the South Vietnamese Delegation to the Peace Talks, conducted in Paris over seven years, he worked, in particular with Dr Kissinger, seeking a resolution of the war in Vietnam. In April 1975 he was recalled to Saigon by his government for consultations. He is still there today.

Released in 1980 from a re-education camp following, in particular, the intervention of Amnesty International, he remains today a forgotten person, with no papers and unable to leave his country.

Mister President, I have cried now for almost fourteen years, but without shame, because Phong is an honorable man, who acquitted himself in his functions with distinction. His "sin" was his love for his people and his country. This is no sin in my book!

His support for the involvement of your country at governmental level, and the cost of this to your countrymen and their families, never left his mind.

Phong was steadfast because he is principled, loyal and honest. And he believed! Now, he is forgotten.

Is it too late, Mister President, to say how much my children and I miss him, need him and want to care for him.

Today, I am praying to my God that He might support you in your efforts to re-unite our family.

Yours very respectfully,

*E. Nam*

Elizabeth Nguyen

President and Mrs Reagan  
The White House  
Washington

### Attachment

Mr Nguyen Xuan Phong, 52 years of age, is from the province of Bentre, South Vietnam. He completed his formal studies at Paris, London and Oxford University, where he graduated in Economics and Political Science.

Mr Phong was a business executive before entering public service. Since 1965 he has successively served in various cabinets as Labor Minister, Secretary of State/Assistant to the Prime Minister, Social Welfare Minister and Minister for Returnees. .

Mr Phong's last assignment was as Deputy Leader of the Delegation of the Republic of Vietnam to the Paris Peace Talks.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

28/9

Ken Dubenstein,

Fy-1



September 28, 1988

CLP --

Senator Nunn dictated this note to Melba for FCC; FCC asked that it also be passed to you:

All conferees have signed the Conference Report reflecting our agreement. The House has signed on it and will take it up at 1400 and the Senate will take it up at 1600. Our staff has been told of your concern about \$100 million in MX and where it is coming from and they have worked it out. I think they all understand it now.

Our people are working with Jim Miller on this and will try to work it through the White House.

Florence



VIEW THE NOTE

E01

From: NSRMP --CPUA  
To: NSJAM --CPUA  
NSMB --CPUA  
NSFEG --CPUA  
NSDFP --CPUA

Date and time 09/27/88 10:21:16  
NSBIH --CPUA  
NSLRW --CPUA  
NSKWZ --CPUA

FROM: Robert M. Perito  
Subject: DOD Authorization Bill

BEFORE THIS IS ISSUED, CLEARANCE MUST BE OBTAINED FROM CLP AND DAWSON.

\*\*\* Forwarding note from NSARF --CPUA 09/27/88 10:17 \*\*\*  
To: NSRMP --CPUA -UNCLASSIFIED-

NOTE FROM: Alison B. Fortier  
SUBJECT: DOD Authorization Bill

Dave Addington says that the DOD Authorizers have not solved the 908 program problem. It's ok in the Appropriations bill but not in the authorization bill. Addington is working this issue with RHett Dawson. I am not read into this program. I know however that Dave has spoken to Colin about this. Dave would not want a statement  
PF1 Alternate PFs PF2 File NOTE PF3 Keep PF4 Erase PF5 Forward Note  
PF6 Reply PF7 Resend PF8 Print PF9 Help PF10 Next PF11 Previous PF12 Return

ABF

I TRIED TO CALL FCC  
ON THIS. He WAS OUT BUT  
I LEFT A CRYPTIC MESSAGE

Sent  
9/27

VIEW THE NOTE

E01

has spoken to Colin about this. Dave would not want a statement to go until the 908 problem has been worked out. Since CLP knows what the program is, I am sure he could make the judgment about when to go forward with the press statement which I'm sure FCC wants out soon. Maybe the best thing is for you to call Rhett and get him to contact New York on the statement. Thanks.

cc: ANDRICOS--VAXC      -UNCLASSIFIED-      FUNCHES --VAXC      -UNCLASSIFIED-  
NSPSS    --CPUA      -UNCLASSIFIED-      NSARF    --CPUA      -UNCLASSIFIED-

E N D O F N O T E

PF1 Alternate PFs   PF2 File NOTE      PF3 Keep   PF4 Erase   PF5 Forward Note  
PF6 Reply   PF7 Resend   PF8 Print   PF9 Help   PF10 Next   PF11 Previous   PF12 Return

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

12/9

ALAN KRANOWITZ,

FYI. P/s

RETURN.

Colin

LAW OFFICES OF  
O'MELVENY & MYERS

SEP 12 1988

555 13TH STREET, N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20004-1109

September 9, 1988

Dear Colin:

This is the letter that I told you I had prepared but never sent. I really enjoyed last evening.

Bill

Enclosure

*H. Clp*  
*2. Staff*

O'MELVENY & MYERS

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FACSIMILE (03) 234-1101

OUR FILE NUMBER

Lt. Gen. Colin L. Powell  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Colin:

I regret that things did not work out as I had hoped when you visited Congressman Ron Dellums to discuss the South Africa sanctions bill. I would like to relate the following to you.

(1) I had spoken to Ron, and he indicated that he was willing to put off the House vote on the bill until after the Republican Convention.

(2) He said that his condition would be that the White House agree that the President would accept the bill if it got out of both Houses before the end of the session.

(3) I told him that this was an impossible and unreasonable condition, and that one could never ask a constitutional officer to give up his constitutional duty to approve only those bills he believes necessary, expedient, and constitutional before he had seen the legislation in final form. I noted that if Senator Kennedy, for example, were to ask him to accept whatever changes the Senate would make (before Dellums had seen them), he certainly would not agree to that.

(4) Dellums agreed with my comments. We then had one of those vague conversations which often go on in Washington the result of which was the suggestion that the bill should be debated in the House. Dellums would make his closing speech and then would say that he was not going to ask for a vote on

the bill. However, he would indicate that he had received the commitment of the Speaker that the bill would be given one of the ten top HR numbers when the first session of the 101st Congress began. I pointed out that, if Dukakis were to win the election, Dellums ought not have a problem since Dukakis had committed himself on South Africa legislation. If Vice President Bush won, I was pretty sure that within 30 days after the inauguration it could be arranged for Dellums and other members of the Black Caucus to meet with President Bush and get a fair hearing on their position.

(5) Dellums said that this made a lot of sense and he thought it would be the best way to handle this matter. He did not want his pressing for the bill to upset the Namibian negotiations.

(6) I went out of my way to say to Dellums that, if a responsible person from the White House visited with him, he should recognize that a certain amount of respect and confidentiality must exist regardless of the outcome.

I passed the above conversations on to the legislative people in the White House. I am fairly sure that Ron Dellums would have gone along with such an approach but for the fact that Rep. Wolpe was so adamant.

Once again, I regret any inconvenience that this meeting may have caused you.

Sincerely,



William T. Coleman, Jr.

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

PRT: ~~BATJER~~ COCKELL DONLEY NEGROPONTE ONATE PAAL PERITO POWELL

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <DTG> 100643Z SEP 88



TO THE WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ 100643Z SEP 88 PRIVACY CHANNELS

FM SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CARLUCCI

TO THE WHITE HOUSE, EYES ONLY FOR NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR LTG. COLIN P OWELL

THANKS FOR YOUR HELP ON THE SATELLITE LAUNCH. THE CHINESE WERE EXTREMELY PLEASED. GREAT WORK. RICH AND WINSTON JOIN ME IN THANKING YOU.

DECL OADR

\*6014

*Handwritten notes:*  
WAC, Powell  
Dexter -  
Well-done!  
OP  
Sent 9/12/88

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
NLS F95-085 #165  
By h05, NARA, Date 7/19/00

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

4 Oct

Tony Dolan,

FROM ONE BLACK  
BOY TO ANOTHER. THIS IS  
AN EDITED SPEECH.

~



**M**y odyssey began on a winter's day in February 1954, when I entered City College at 16½—having just been graduated from Morris H.S. on Boston Road in the Bronx.

I went to college for a single reason: my parents expected it. I don't recall having had any great urge to get a higher education. I don't even remember consciously thinking the matter through. I just recall that my parents expected it of me. And in those days when your parents expected something, it was what you had to do. In my family, especially, you did what your parents expected of you.

The question of which college to attend was easily resolved: I applied to New York University and

---

*The President's National Security Adviser recalls how the College prepared him for a spectacular military career and an appointment as a key Presidential aide.*

---

CCNY. Notwithstanding my rather mediocre high school grades, I was accepted at both institutions. Making the final decision was tough, but one I was able to come to grips with readily—NYU cost \$750 a year; CCNY cost \$10. That was the end of that.

So, on that cold morning, I took the bus across the 155th Street bridge, rode up the hill, got off, met Raymond the Bagelman—a fixture on campus—and began my career as a CCNY student. What to study was a problem. My parents said engineering was the best field to choose. Back in the 1950's, in fact, engineering was the thing to do. So I applied to the School of Engineering and was accepted.

I quickly learned that I had no aptitude for engineering. After a fairly successful first semester—

---

*Lt. Gen. Powell is the National Security Adviser to the President of the United States.*

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# From CCNY to The White House

---

By COLIN L. POWELL '58

---

February to June of that year—I came out with a "B" average. But that summer, I took a course in mechanical drawing. One hot afternoon, the instructor asked me to visualize a cone intersecting a plane in space. It was at that point that I decided to drop out of engineering; it was the worst summer I had ever spent.

Earlier, in the spring, I had noticed a bunch of fellows wandering around Amsterdam and Convent Avenues in uniform. It was the local ROTC detachment. I had a certain interest in the military. My generation, after all, had essentially spent its elementary school years watching World War II and then, after a brief post-war hiatus, its teenage years watching and hearing about the Korean War. So if you were of that generation, the military had made a very indelible impression upon you. Thus the military held out a certain attraction for me. I was also attracted to a group within the ROTC known as the Pershing Rifles.

The Pershing Rifles were the ones who walked around with a little whipped cord on their shoulders, suggesting that they were a little more serious than the average ROTC cadet and possibly that they had made some sort of tentative commitment to military service as a career. That appealed to me. Thus, I joined ROTC that fall, immediately pledged Pershing Rifles and spent the next four years con-

centrating on ROTC, spending most of my time on Pershing Rifles activities and tolerating the academic demands of the College as best I could.

In 1958, with an average that barely crept above "C" (the only way it crept above "C" was four straight years of "A" in ROTC, which, thank goodness, counted on your academic record), I was graduated as a cadet colonel, a Pershing Rifles company commander and designated a "distinguished military graduate." As an incidental dividend I received a B.S. degree in geology for mastering the rock formations under Manhattan. At 21, therefore, I was on my way to the Army. What was most important was—and this was expected of me by my parents—that I had a job, even if it was in the military. In those days, you see, you went to school for the purpose of making yourself employable.

Today, I have several children who don't think that the end of college is necessarily the beginning of a productive work life. But we're sorting it out, each child at a time. In any case, my job as a second lieutenant paid \$60 a week, thereby meeting parental expectations common in those days that you would emerge from school in a position to support yourself. However, the most important thing that was expected of you by your parents was to do better than they had done. My parents, like so many parents

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

**TO:** General Powell  
**FROM:** KATHY OSBORNE

**DATE:** 10-3-88

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

**TO:** Rhett Dawson  
1988 SEP 29 PM 4:57  
**FROM:** KATHY OSBORNE  
**DATE:** 9-29-88

Help!!!!

*KATHY*  
*1. NOBEL PRIZE FOR HER LTR*  
*2. WAIT FOR PROPOSAL + PUT*  
*WITH THE SYSTEM. IT MAY NOT COME SINCE*  
*NOBEL IS FLYING IN THE IDEA*  
*WON'T BE MY VIEW.*  
*CL*


I need some help on this one. Mrs. Fluor goes back a long way however, I'm not sure I want RR to meet with her. Any thoughts? Who should get involved with this?

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Date: October 3, 1988

**TO:** KATHY OSBORNE  
**FROM:** KATHERINE D. LADD *KDL*  
Special Assistant to the President  
and Director of  
White House Secretariat

Rhett suggests that you work with NSC on this, with some input by Counsel at a certain point.



Marjorie L. Fluor  
1920 Heliotrope Dr  
Santa Ana, CA 92706

September 19, 1988

Ms. Kathy Osborne  
Secretary to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Kathy:

I am more than late in sending you the biography of Alfred Nobel, as promised sometime ago.

I am so very delayed in getting this to you, for I went into the hospital for a medical problem similar to that of Mrs Reagan, soon after I spoke with you. I was so undone when I came home from the hospital because of our hot weather, many activities had to be delayed.

However, I am now fine, Kathy, and looking forward to many years of fun and excitement. If the Lord is willing!

I received a letter from Mr. Frederick J. Ryan, Jr., with regard to the President attending the Los Angeles World Affairs Council on the 28 of October in Los Angeles. He said that he appreciated my interest in the scheduling of this event.

When we spoke about the Nobel Peace Prize you did mention that Mr. Ryan would be the person with whom I should correspond. Now I will feel more comfortable when I write to him.

I am still interested in trying to secure the Peace Prize for the President and the General Secretary for their endeavors to bring about world peace.

With this in mind, I should like to have an opportunity to meet privately, and briefly with the President and Mrs. Reagan when they are in Los Angeles on October 28, if that can be arranged.

→ I shall, in the near future, send a letter to the President from Mr. Tom Van Sant, a renowned sculptor. He has an interesting proposal for the erection of a monument, or display, in support of our first steps in arms reduction would allow it to be erected and celebrated prior to the end of this presidential term, if the process could be initiated soon.

Ms. Kathy Osborne  
September 19, 1988  
Page Two

Such a "peace monument" falls outside the jurisdiction of War Memorials Commission and the congressional approval process for war memorials. Such processes cause great delays. Instead, the President could request a site be designated on suitable property of the National Park Service.

The purpose is not to memorialize a treaty yet to be fully implemented. Nor does it speak to the Soviet record of strict treaty compliance. It does offer an opportunity for reaffirmation of commitment to arms reduction. It also offers a mutual effort, hopefully to be celebrated by the President and the General Secretary prior to the end of this presidential term.

A public celebration transmitted internationally would serve to remind the people of a peace-hungry world that progress in arms reduction has begun.

I am very excited about this proposal, Kathy! If it could be implemented I think we could enhance the possibility of the Nobel Peace Prize being awarded to the President and the General Secretary.

I will, if I may, be in touch about Tom Van Sant's proposal. And I thank you for anything you may be able to do in support of it.

With warm regards and appreciation,

*Marjorie*  
Marjorie L. Fluor

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 30, 1988

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: COLIN L. POWELL

CP

After our meetings in New York on Tuesday, I took a stroll down Lexington Avenue. A young man recognized me and walked up, introduced himself and said he had a letter for you and he was wondering how he could get a copy directly to you. He then handed me the letter and I continued on my walk. When I got back to the hotel I opened the letter and was so impressed by the young man's comments that I thought you would like to see his letter which is attached.

Attachment

Tab A - Letter from Robert Unger  
without Attachment

TAPB

LAW OFFICES  
KUPILLAS, UNGER & KUPILLAS

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TEL. NO. (516) 829-3508  
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JOHN H. KUPILLAS, JR.  
ROBERT M. UNGER  
JOHN H. KUPILLAS, SR.

DAVID SLOAN  
OF COUNSEL  
KATHLEEN A. O'SULLIVAN  
OFFICE MANAGER

September 22, 1988

CERTIFIED MAIL  
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

President Ronald Reagan  
The White House  
Washington, DC 20500

Dear President Reagan:

I am a thirty-four year old who graduated from school and entered the real world just as you entered the Presidency. At that juncture in time, the real world did not look very promising to me. I was earning only \$12,000.00 per year in New York, a State where the cost of living is outrageously high. The American dream of owning a home looked more like a nightmare with prohibitive double digit mortgage rates dominating the scene. With inflation running amok, prospects couldn't have looked too much worse to me.

The Liberals, (this word has become a misnomer because you are a true Liberal) through their standard bearer, Jimmy Carter, told us that the decline of America was virtually an ordained inevitability. I guess the ordained inevitability concept is the problem with these Liberals. They have forgotten that God has given man the free will to create his own destiny. Mr. President, you single handedly reminded Americans of this eternal truth. Just as you had responded to agent Bill Meikeljohns when he told you that nothing could be done about the inequities of studio contracts, you stated, "well, a way has to be figured to turn that around"; and turn that around, you certainly did. Most of all, you made Americans believe in themselves again.


On behalf of myself and countless others like me, born with no wealth other than our dreams, I can never thank you enough for the opportunity that you have renewed in this great land. I have enclosed a New York Times article which illustrates some of the results of your inspiration and leadership. I promise

September 22, 1988  
Page 2 . . . . .

to always carry that inspiration with me as I continue the fight to keep this nation on the road of attainment, not entitlement. In Ronald Reagan's America, I may very well become the first Jewish President of the United States.

By the way, Mr. President, do me a favor; on your way to your new home, make a stop in Dixon and put a couple of hundred million notches in that old log by Lowell Park beach.

Yours truly,



ROBERT M. UNGER

RMU/klu  
Encl: not attached  
to letter

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 28, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Fred Gottfurcht Phone Call

Fred Gottfurcht called me from Paris today to let me know he had been there since September 19th dealing with these Iranian interlocutors. According to Fred, the Iranians claim that four of the hostages are in Iran and could be released immediately. However, they say the remaining five will be in Iran by October 7 and all can be released at that time.

I again told Fred that I did not wish to be involved in this matter, and the White House most definitely should not be involved. I indicated to him that the channel he is using and the many other unofficial and occasionally well-meaning channels that exist are doing nothing but causing confusion. I again encouraged him to retire from these endeavors. He once again showed no inclination to do so. I ended the conversation by saying that the only thing I would be interested in is if he had the hostages in hand; otherwise, I do not wish there to be any linkage between his efforts and the White House, and I again encouraged him to retire from his endeavors.



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

30/9

PSS/ Mike Donley,

UNLESS I'M WRONG, NEITHER  
~~ME~~ ME NOR THE PRES. WERE  
ADVISED THAT U.S. MILITARY  
PERSONNEL WERE IN AN  
'EXCHANGE OF FIRE.

I READ IT IN WP  
ON Monday (or Tues.) &  
BRIEFED RR 10 MINS BEFORE  
HE GOT A SHOUTED QUESTION.

Was this reported upstairs  
AND I FORGOT? IF NOT,  
MAKE A NOTE THAT US  
TROOPS UNDER FIRE IS ALWAYS  
A PRESIDENTIAL MATTER.

CA

NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER  
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: EL SALVADORIAN 4TH BRIGADE ATTACKED BY GUERRILLA FORCES IN  
EL PARAISO, EL SALVADOR (S)

AS OF: 151800 EDT SEP 88

SOURCE: SOUTHCOM SITREP, 150345Z SEP 88

REC'D BY: NMCC/WHEM

TYPE OF REPORT: INITIAL: FOLLOW-UP: FINAL: XX


1. (U) REFERENCE INITIAL AND FINAL MFR, SAME SUBJECT, DATED 130500 AND 131300 EDT SEP 88.
2. (S) AT APPROXIMATELY 130210 EDT SEP 88, THE 4TH BRIGADE ESAF GARRISON IN EL PARAISO, EL SALVADOR WAS ATTACKED BY GUERRILLA FORCES USING MORTARS AND SMALL ARMS FIRE. WHEN THE ATTACK STARTED, FIVE AMERICAN PERSONNEL WERE PRESENT.
3. (S) THE FIVE U.S. PERSONNEL SPLIT INTO TWO GROUPS (TWO AND THREE EACH) AND PROCEEDED TO SEPARATE BUNKERS. THREE US PERSONNEL WERE IN THE BUNKER ON THE SIDE OF THE CAMP THAT RECEIVED THE BRUNT OF THE GUERRILLA ATTACK. THE THREE CAME UNDER DIRECT FIRE FROM ROCKET PROPELLED GRENADE LAUNCHERS (RPG-7) AND SMALL ARMS. THE OTHER TWO U.S. PERSONNEL WERE IN ANOTHER BUNKER THAT DID NOT COME UNDER DIRECT ATTACK.
4. (S) TO PROTECT THEMSELVES, THE GROUP OF THREE RETURNED FIRE WITH THEIR PERSONAL WEAPONS (TWO AR-15'S AND M-79 GRENADE LAUNCHER). THE M-79 FIRED ONLY ILLUMINATION ROUNDS. ACTIONS WERE CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE TO THE SITUATION. U.S. PERSONNEL WERE NOT SPECIFICALLY TARGETED.
5. (S) THE INITIAL ARMY OPERATIONS CENTER (AOC) VOICE REPORT (130345 EDT) RECEIVED BY THE NMCC ONLY SPECIFIED THREE U.S. PERSONNEL. A SUBSEQUENT SOUTHCOM VOICE REPORT (131225 EDT) INDICATED THAT U.S. ADVISORS WERE NOT INVOLVED IN THE CONFLICT. HOWEVER, A 132244Z SEP 88 COMUSMILGP SAN SALVADOR MESSAGE (NOTAL) INDICATES FIVE PERSONNEL WERE AT THE SCENE OF THE ATTACK WITH THREE DIRECTLY INVOLVED DUE TO THE PERSONAL THREAT.
6. (S) USMILGRP, SAN SALVADOR DOES NOT CONSIDER THE THREAT LEVEL TO U.S. PERSONNEL TO HAVE CHANGED. THE INCIDENT WAS NOT REPORTED TO USCINCSO THROUGH OPREP CHANNELS.
7. (U) THIS MEMORANDUM SERVES AS OFFICIAL NOTIFICATION IAW OI 3100.2.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS

F95-005 #166

NARA, DATE 7/1/92

  
J. M. BARR  
REAR ADMIRAL, US NAVY  
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR  
OPERATIONS (NMCC)

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY DDO (NMCC)  
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

30/9

Mike Donley,

OBE. Drop IT.

Forget IT.



Dukakis' campaign staff  
ng to [redacted]  
himself as the Campaign

said they had received  
a "few" STU-IIIs; he  
ts. NSA got involved  
sts, and issue the  
only authorized  
uthorized defense  
by a specific

o said the campaign  
andidate's daily  
et Service was the  
and he passed the  
quickly passed the buck

ed a directive to DOD  
staffs, obviously  
ands ready to arrange  
ized government  
ut feel is that the  
les. I agree with his  
ld by the campaign  
rvice protective  
problem. [redacted] also  
in a previous  
he wasn't specific.

rotecting Dukakis'  
issue UNCLASSIFIED  
hat all STU-III keys  
imply cause the  
displayed in the  
, NSA would adjust  
nstrate a need to  
only users are those

ammed to display  
"DUKAKIS CAMPAIGN" and "UNCLASSIFIED ONLY" in the STU-III window,  
much as ours transmit the words "WHITE HOUSE" and "TOP SECRET" to  
the display window of people who call us. Each key has the name  
of the sponsoring agency and the level of security clearance of  
it's holder embedded in it's memory by NSA. [redacted] also said it  
might be possible to to develop a set of keys that could only  
talk to each other, and not with government STU-IIIs. He wasn't  
sure, but said it could be examined.

Thanks, Ralph

DECLASSIFIED IN PART / RE/PASED  
NLS FCIS-085 #167  
By CJS Date 11/01/01

Mike/Paul:

AMIT THAKUR is the individual from Dukakis' campaign staff who made the request for STU-IIIs. According to [redacted] Exec to the DDI at NSA, Thakur identified himself as the Campaign Communications Director.

[redacted] was first contacted by AT&T, who said they had received a request directly from Thakur to purchase a "few" STU-IIIs; he believes they are looking for 4-6 instruments. NSA got involved because they approve all STU purchase requests, and issue the appropriate crypto keys to the users. The only authorized purchasers/users are government agencies, authorized defense contractors, or other individuals sponsored by a specific government agency.

AT&T put [redacted] in touch with Thakur, who said the campaign staff needed secure phones to protect the candidate's daily activities and schedule. [redacted] thought Secret Service was the most logical agency to sponsor the request, and he passed the request to them. However, Secret Service quickly passed the buck to WHCA, who then threw it to us.

Secretary Carlucci has apparently issued a directive to DOD agencies to be responsive to both campaign staffs, obviously within established guidelines. [redacted] NSA stands ready to arrange this transaction immediately once an authorized government sponsor is identified. Protect - [redacted] gut feel is that the request has nothing to do with daily schedules. I agree with his observation that any legitimate concerns held by the campaign staff should be made known to the Secret Service protective detail, who can deal appropriately with the problem. [redacted] also recalled a similar request from a candidate in a previous campaign, but said the request was denied; he wasn't specific.

If approved strictly on the issue of protecting Dukakis' daily schedules, etc., [redacted] said NSA would issue UNCLASSIFIED keys with the instruments. You'll recall that all STU-III keys afford the same degree of protection, but simply cause the holder's security authorization level to be displayed in the status window of other STU-IIIs. Of course, NSA would adjust this accordingly if Dukakis' staff can demonstrate a need to handle "classified" discussions, and if the only users are those with appropriate security clearances.

[redacted] also said the keys could be programmed to display "DUKAKIS CAMPAIGN" and "UNCLASSIFIED ONLY" in the STU-III window, much as ours transmit the words "WHITE HOUSE" and "TOP SECRET" to the display window of people who call us. Each key has the name of the sponsoring agency and the level of security clearance of it's holder embedded in it's memory by NSA. [redacted] also said it might be possible to develop a set of keys that could only talk to each other, and not with government STU-IIIs. He wasn't sure, but said it could be examined.

Thanks, Ralph

From: NSKWZ --CPUA

Date and time 09/30/88 11:52:55

To: PAAL --VAXC ~~-CONFIDENTIAL-~~

NOTE FROM: KAY ZERWICK

SUBJECT: Note from General Powell

I talked to Steve Solarz this morning. I asked him to call Lee Stokes. He said he would with respect to NCR. I also told him we were thinking about some kind of ceremony for Gandhi although it was too late to do a proclamation/legislation. We also talked about Plau. He suggested some other idea having to do with having the REAL advance alone. I don't even pretend to understand any of this but I told him we could go along with the Bill subject to trying to fix it in conference because there are some fundamental problems. He along with Fascell continue to think that the only problem is the present value of money problem of early funding.

cc: NSJAK --CPUA  
BURNS --VAXC

~~-CONFIDENTIAL-~~  
~~-CONFIDENTIAL-~~

NSABF --CPUA

~~-CONFIDENTIAL-~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 7-95-085 #168

BY dr NARA, DATE 7/10/92

EYES ONLY

30/9

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON



Secretary Cawucci;

Per CONVERSATION.

Colin



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 28, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM R. GRAHAM *WRG*  
SUBJECT: WHITE HOUSE SCIENCE COUNCIL --  
SDI TECHNICAL REPORT

I. WHSC REPORT

At my request, the White House Science Council (WHSC) undertook a year long study of the Strategic Defense Initiative program, in order to provide you with independent technical advice on SDI. The members of the WHSC SDI Task Force include some of the foremost strategic defense experts in the United States:

Chairman, Sol Buchsbaum, Bell Laboratories  
Edward Teller, Livermore National Laboratory  
and Hoover Institute  
Harold Agnew, GA Technologies  
Gregory Canavan, Los Alamos National Laboratory  
John Deutch, Massachusetts Institute  
of Technology  
Isadore Singer, Massachusetts Institute  
of Technology  
William Happer, Princeton University  
Edward Frieman, Scripps Institute of Oceanography  
Allen Peterson, Stanford University  
Gerold Yonas, Titan Corporation/Titan Technologies

Attached you will find a summary report of their findings. Their principal recommendation is that you approve the near-term deployment of mature technologies, while at the same time preserving the great promise associated with advanced research.

Elements of the academic community have charged that SDI has not been subjected to competent scientific review. Those charges are false. The technical and strategic merit of SDI has been intensively studied and validated by scientific contractors, Department of Defense scientific review boards, and government laboratories. This report by the White House Science Council is further confirmation of the scientific and technological merit of SDI objectives and progress to date.

## II. BUDGET REVIEW

Shortly, you will be reviewing the proposed DOD budget for FY 1990. That budget submission to Congress will be your last opportunity as President to persuade Congress of the merits of SDI, and the national security priority it deserves.

As that budget is being developed, costs associated with SDI are at issue. There is a school of thought that believes little new obligational authority can be made available for SDI and, as a result, funds for immediate deployment of mature technologies must come from SDI's already meager research budget. I am concerned that this thinking is shortsighted from a political, technological, programmatic, and strategic standpoint, and fails to respect the priority you have assigned SDI. I see no reason why the Defense Department's production and deployment responsibilities can only be funded at the expense of SDIO's research and development charter.

As the WHSC report makes clear, in five short years, we have made tremendous progress toward developing technologies to protect America and our allies against the threat of ballistic missile attack. Thanks to the genius of our scientists and engineers, and to the clarity of your vision, we are on the threshold of a future secure from nuclear blackmail. The question remains, however, how best to consolidate that progress in order to leave a clear and vital legacy for your successor. The thrust of this report is constructive and I support it. I would value the opportunity to discuss this with you further.

Attachment



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 9, 1988

Dear Mr. President:

The White House Science Council has been following the progress being made in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) ever since your memorable speech to the nation in March 1983. During the past year, at the request of Dr. William R. Graham, we have been assessing the technical feasibility of various deployment possibilities and associated development and testing programs. This report is a short summary of our conclusions regarding progress to date and options for the future.

PROGRESS TO DATE

There is no question in our minds that the approximately thirteen billion dollars invested in SDI to date has served the nation well. A sense of accomplishment has been rightly earned by all associated with the program, despite the obviously rocky road the program has travelled and vocal opposition to it. What leads us to this overall conclusion? Solid technical progress in just about every facet of SDI. For example:

-- Non-nuclear hit-to-kill capability has been demonstrated in several experiments conducted in space. This was made possible by advances in sensor and terminal guidance technologies.

-- We are gaining an understanding of both the potential and the problems still to be solved associated with directed energy weapon systems, such as laser and neutral particle beams. In particular, the more likely systems have been distinguished from the less likely ones and the work has been focused accordingly.

-- Evidence has accumulated that optical systems can replace radars needed for surveillance.

-- Information gained from space-based experiments has opened novel approaches for discriminating warheads from decoys.

-- The use of modern technology can lead to components and systems that are both small and cheap and thus greatly help resolve the problem of survivability. For example, small satellites can be built that are survivable.

-- We are of the view that a reliable, testable command and control system can be built and deployed especially for modest defense systems, despite the continuing controversy about the feasibility of full-sized command and control systems.

Based on these and related considerations we conclude that technology is in hand to develop, deploy and then improve a Limited Protection System (LPS).

#### SDI OPTIONS

We understand that the SDI program is presently being reexamined and perhaps redirected. We discuss below the technical pros and cons of various redirection options. However, we do believe that whatever course is chosen for the SDI program, in order to be viable, the program must, ultimately, meet your original objective, that is, emphasis on defense rather than offense.

The options discussed below range from reverting to "pure" research on SDI-related sciences and technology at one end of the spectrum, to maintaining the deployment timetable as originally proposed by the SDI organization, on the other.

#### Option 1

Under this option the program would reduce its size and scope and merely pursue research in generic defense technologies. Such a program would be least costly, it might afford some protection against a technological breakout by the Soviets, but it would lack focus and a clear objective. Thus, it would lose the discipline and the efficacy that can come only from having a clear objective. Defining an objective short of a deployment objective might help.

#### Option 2

In this option the program would set the deployment of an LPS as a near-term objective and would pursue a generic R&D program focused on expanding, in time, the LPS to a strategic defense system. There are three important variants under this option:

- a. LPS deployment at Grand Forks utilizing the existing facilities of the now abandoned SAFEGUARD program,
- b. deployment near Washington, D.C., and,
- c. deployment is at both the sites above, and perhaps more sites.

Any of the variations of LPS would afford some protection to the U.S. against a catastrophe, however implausible that catastrophe is. It would represent a concrete step toward deployment of a more ambitious, more capable system, thus providing valuable

experience, assuming that the LPS is configured as a flexible, evolving system.

The Grand Forks basing is likely to be less costly, because important elements of an LPS already exist there and would afford better coverage for an attack across the North Pole. The Washington, D.C. basing would afford some protection to the National Command Authority, and is expandable to cover the heavily populated east coast, although it would provide reduced coverage of the west coast. Proliferation of bases is needed to provide protection against sea-launched ballistic missiles that are launched close to our coasts.

As we said earlier, sufficient technology is in hand so that a decision to deploy (or not to deploy) an LPS can be made now. However, a detailed trade-off study is needed before elements of the LPS can be selected for engineering development.

### Option 3

In this option the program would set the deployment of an LPS and the simultaneous development of more capable surveillance systems as a near-term objective. This would be more costly than Option 2, but it could lead to more rapid development of a more capable system.

Sensors that can track buses and RVs are a necessary component of any strategic defense system and a long lead-time element of it. They would improve the efficacy of an LPS. Further development of sensors is important for SDI, as well as for other military and intelligence purposes.

### Option 4

In this option the SDI program would be maintained on its present course, i.e., Phase I deployment in the mid-1990s. This would call for more budgetary and other resources than appear to be available to the program, and would be a technically risky undertaking because of the sheer magnitude of the job -- the simultaneous development and deployment of several complex systems -- as well as present concerns over midcourse discrimination and the cost of the space-based interceptor.

### SUMMARY CONCLUSION

In summary, Option 1 -- research only -- carries with it the least risk, but also the least benefit, because the SDI program has matured to the point where the nation clearly would profit from pursuing elements closer to timely deployment in addition to pursuing further research.


Option 4 -- full Phase I deployment -- remains a technical objective, but not all elements of Phase I are at comparable levels of maturity. If present Phase I plans are maintained,

directed at a concurrent deployment of all elements, the schedule for first deployment would be dictated by the most time-consuming elements in the Phase I development process.

As between Options 2 and 3, we believe that the emphasis in Option 3 on early sensor deployment could be beneficial, but we believe that space-based sensor systems require further definition before deployment decisions are made.

The objective of earliest possible deployment at minimum risk is best satisfied by Option 2. We envisage Option 2 to be a program consisting of 1) deployment of LPS as a near-term objective and 2) an aggressive R&D program focused on expanding the LPS to a defense system capable of meeting your objective. The two parts would be balanced and mutually reinforcing, and neither would dominate the other. The research program would initially emphasize the development of better sensors, capable of tracking buses and reentry objects. The deployment of such sensors would greatly increase the capabilities and robustness of any LPS and possible follow-on systems. A vigorous R&D program would help ensure that the deployed LPS does not end up in a programmatic "cul-de-sac," and would provide the technology needed for an orderly evolution from the LPS to the first phase of a robust strategic defense system.

Very truly yours,



S. J. Buchsbaum  
Chairman

White House Science Council  
Panel on the Strategic Defense Initiative

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

28/9

BOB TUTTLE,

CAN YOU REPLY TO  
THIS FOR ME.

Colin

SEP 23 1988

William H. Peace, III  
P. O. Box 1942  
Raleigh, NC 27602  
(919) 733-3100  
September 22, 1988

General Colin Powell  
National Security Advisor  
The White House  
Washington, DC 20003

Dear General Powell:

I have had an ambassadorial candidacy since November of 1983. Since that time, I have received many letters of assurances from White House officials that an appropriate vacancy was being sought for me. I sincerely regret that the Reagan Administration was unable to fine a such an appointment for me. I would have served this administration with honor and with distinction. As this administration has been a strong advocate for "a color blind society", I am left to assume that I just did not work hard enough this time out. However, let me assure you, I will redouble my efforts should Vice President Bush win in the fall. I know everyone is enmeshed in the troughs of the campaign, including myself. I fully expect our team to win in November. So I thought this would be a good time to let you know that I am very hopeful of serving in the new George Bush Administration. I would like to be given consideration for one of the following four appointments.

- 1) an ambassadorial appointment, preferably to South Africa
- 2) U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
- 3) Chairman of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission
- 4) Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs

My credentials, qualifications and appropriate political support for appointment to high federal office were established under the Reagan administration. I have had an active ambassadorial candidacy since November of 1983. In September of 1986, I had a White House interview in connection with search for a black American to serve as the new U.S. Ambassador to South Africa.

What I would like to do is to prepare a "Capability Statement", in connection with each of the above listed positions and then get them into the hands of the appropriate Bush staffers. Thus, I would appreciate it very much if you would send me the names and addresses of those various Bush staffers, who are likely to influence nominations for the four positions which are of interest to me.

I would also like to know the name or names of Vice President Bush's advisor(s) for Africa or South Africa/Southern Africa affairs. South Africa/Southern Africa is my forte. As a matter of fact, I would like to join that team as I can bring to it a kind of expertise that no one else has. I am what I call a, "Post-Free South Africa Movement expert on U.S./South Africa relations". I don't care what kind of expertise one may have had before, but now if you cannot handle Randall Robinson and company you are, in effect, a "waste of time" expert on anything that has to do with U.S./South Africa relations.

Under the Reagan administration, foreign policy toward South Africa never went, or attempted to reach, beyond apartheid. Its policy toward South Africa was based on trying to get the South African government to voluntarily end apartheid. After it became evident to all, back in August of 1985, that the South Africa government had no intention of ending apartheid, administration policy of "constructive engagement" became dead in the water and was then usurped by the Congress, where it remains today. I can offer assistance to the Bush campaign in planning a policy toward South Africa that will get this vital area of U.S. foreign policy out to the hands of the Congress and back into those of the president of the United States where it rightfully belongs.

As we all know, the Free South Africa Movement is now calling the shots on U.S. foreign policy toward South Africa. I cannot see Bush's South Africa experts faring any better against Robinson and company than poor Chester Crocker and his experts.

As a black man, have always known that I had to be twice as good at the tasks that I performed just to be considered so I didn't come the Reagan Administration's table empty handed. I warned administration officials as early as May of 1984, that civil rights establishment was planning to launch an all out on U.S./South Africa relations and developed a proposal designed to thwart it before it began, but they were ignored. During the same period, I introduced to the White House, and selected members of the Congress and others including, Dr. Crocker to idea of sending a black American to serve as our Ambassador. I Campaigned vigorously for job, but some two years later Edward Perkins got the nod. He is now advocating "one man, one vote, black majority rule"; something that is totally unacceptable to white South Africa and something that no foreign government can implement or impose.

I am enclosing for you a copy of a very important project that I've sent to a couple of prominent South African business leaders, Anglo-American Corp. Director, Gavin Relly and Nigel Bruce, editor of the Financial Mail. I have maintained all along, that the only way to stop the liberal's assault on U.S./South Africa relations is to

page 3


bring to the States prominent black South Africa leaders, opposed to U.S. divestment and sanctions, to make their case directly to the American people, black Americans in particular, corporate America and the U.S. Congress.

I want to get as much support for this project as I can. If Mr. Bush does win in the fall, this project can be the vehicle through which control of U.S. policy toward South Africa can be returned to the president. It can stop the flood of sanctions bills coming out of the Congress.

After you have reviewed the enclosed materials, if you think that my assessment of the situation is correct and that the project has the potential for stopping the Free South Africa Movement, then please get a letter off to Gavin Relly and Nigel Bruce advising them of same.

I am also in the process of developing a position paper on "power-sharing" which illustrates how white South Africa can perhaps be enticed into accepting it; and thus guaranteeing the bringing into being of a pro-American, anti-Soviet, post-apartheid South Africa. I shall forward you a copy upon its completion.

Sincerely yours,



William H. Peace, III

Enclosures:

PS: Please note the copy of the very, very complimentary letter which I recently received from William F. Buckley, Jr. I hope that you too, would agree that I would be an excellent choice to serve as Chairman of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission.



WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY, JR.

Editor

September 9, 1988

Dear Mr. Peace:

Because of your evident expertise and good sense I am tempted to wish I wielded the power people sometimes attribute to me, but I am unlikely to have influence in the choice of a new Administration's Civil Rights Commission Chairman.

I wonder whether your proposed carrot-and-stick approach to power sharing in South Africa relies too heavily on the willingness of all parties to allow peaceful change, but I like your articles. I have forwarded them to NR's editors, although I have no idea whether they'll fit into the plans for coming issues.

Thanks for your news about Bill Rusher's column.

Yours cordially,

*Wm F Buckley Jr*

Wm. F. Buckley Jr.

Mr. William H. Peace III  
P.O. Box 1942  
Raleigh, NC 27602

/la

**WILLIAM H. PEACE, III**  
Biographical Sketch - September, 1988

William H. Peace, III is a native of Raleigh, North Carolina. He is a graduate of Shaw University and was an organizer of the 1960 student lunch counter sit-in demonstrations in Raleigh; and later, co-authored a book on the subject.

Peace worked with the New York City Department of Social Services from 1962 through March of 1967, then moved to Atlanta, Georgia where he served as Executive Director of the Southern Rural Project (a tri-state Office of Economic Opportunity funded community and economic development program), sponsored by the National Sharecropper's Fund.

In September of 1968, Peace became the first black instructor to join the faculty at Georgia Tech and in November of 1972 he was appointed by, the then Governor of Georgia, Jimmy Carter, to serve as Executive Director of the newly created, Georgia State Office Of Housing.

In recognition of his management skills, in September of 1977, Peace was awarded a Washington, DC based fellowship sponsored by the Joint Center for Political Studies. Upon completion of his fellowship in August of the following year, he organized the Consortium for the Development of the Rural Southeast and served as its Washington Representative.

From June of 1980 through June of 1982, Peace served as Housing Advisor to the government of Botswana. Upon his return to the USA, he served as a Washington, DC based third world management and staff development consultant.

Peace returned to his hometown of Raleigh in November of 1984 to serve as Executive Director of Mediation Service of Wake County, a dispute settlement center. Since October of 1985, Peace has been serving as Equal Employment Opportunity Officer for the North Carolina Employment Security Commission. He is also a freelance writer, specializing in U.S./South Africa/Southern Africa affairs.

There have been many awards, honors and notable events over the life of Peace's outstanding public service career, but none higher than that which occurred in early September of 1986. He was called onto the White House and interviewed in connection with the then search for a new U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of South Africa.

In March of this year, Peace was honored with a "Citation of Appreciation" by North Carolina Governor, Jim Martin for his work on the Governor's Council of Minority Executives. His ambition is to serve in high appointed office within the upcoming presidential administration of George Bush.

A BLACK SOUTH AFRICA/BLACK AMERICA COMMUNICATIONS PROJECT:

**A Proposal for Ending the Free South Africa Movement's  
Assault on the South African Business Community**

Submitted to: Gavin Relly  
Director  
Anglo/American Corporation  
44 Main Street  
Johannesburg, 2000  
South Africa

and

Nigel Bruce  
Editor  
Financial Mail  
P.O. Box 9959  
Johannesburg, 2000  
South Africa

Submitted by: William H. Peace, III  
P.O. Box 1942  
Raleigh, NC 27602  
August, 1988

**Articles by Mr. Peace in Support of:**

- 1) President Reagan's Policy Toward South Africa
- 2) President Reagan's Call for U.S. Aid to the Contras
- 3) President Reagan's Nomination of Judge Robert Bork to the United States Supreme Court

**The Long Running Ambassadorial Candidacy of  
Mr. William H. Peace, III Extending  
from November 30, 1983 to Date**

Letters From White House Officials Lauding Mr. Peace's  
Credentials and Qualifications to Serve in High Federal  
Appointed Office and Assurances that He Would be Considered