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**Collection:** Powell, Colin L.: Files

**Folder Title:** Chron - Official II (July-December) 1988  
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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: POWELL, COLIN L.: Files

Archivist: kdb/lmo

File Folder: CHRON OFFICIAL 1988 II (JUL-DEC) [1] ~~Box 92477~~

*ZAC Box 1*

Date: June 5, 1996

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>1. note</del>	<del>Robert B. Zoellick to Powell, re summary of evidence</del>	<del>7/5/88</del>	<del>P5</del> <i>25 2/11/00</i>
<del>2. note</del>	<del>Zoellick to Powell, re convict labor</del>	<del>7/6/88</del>	<del>P5</del>
<del>3. letter</del>	<del>John R. Bolton to Mark Sullivan III, re Soviet Union production (2 pp)</del>	<del>4/25/88</del>	<del>P5</del>
<del>4. letter</del>	<del>Sullivan to John, re use of forced labor (2 pp)</del>	<del>4/20/88</del>	<del>P5</del>
<del>5. memo</del>	<del>Francis A. Keating to Secretary Baker, re Federal Register notice prohibiting importation of Soviet goods made with convict labor (2 pp)</del>	<del>4/19/88</del>	<del>P5</del>
<del>6. questions</del>	<del>relating imports from the Soviet Union</del> <i>R 6/5/01 NLSF 95-085 #118</i>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P1 B1</del>
<del>7. profs note</del>	<del>Kay Zerwick to LEDSKY, re note from General Powell</del>	<del>7/5/88</del>	<del>R1 B1</del> <del>P5</del>
<del>8. profs note</del>	<del>Kay Zerwick to NSPEG, re note from General Powell</del> <i>R 7/1/92 NLSF 95-085 #119</i>	<del>7/5/88</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>9. profs note</del>	<del>Rudolf V. Perina to Nelson C. Ledsky, et al, re Soviet treatment of summit speeches</del>	<del>7/1/88</del>	<del>R1 B1</del> <del>P5</del>
<del>10. note</del>	<del>Powell to JDN, PSS, SID</del>	<del>3/7</del>	<del>P5</del> <i>25 12/16/00</i>
<del>11. letter</del>	<del>draft, Ronald Reagan to Lloyd Erskine Sandiford</del> <i>R 12/2/99 NLSF 95-085 #120</i>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>12. transmittal</del>	<del>re-attached</del> <i>R 12/2/99 NLSF 95-085 #121</i>	<del>1/1/89</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>13. cable</del>	<del>Ronald Reagan to Margaret Thatcher (2 pp)</del> <i>R 12/2/99 NLSF 95-085 #122</i>	<del>1/2/89</del>	<del>P1</del>
14. cable	130027Z JAN 89	1/13/89	R1 B1
15. cable	draft of item #14	n.d.	R1 B1
16. cable	111651Z JAN 89	1/11/89	R1 B1

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>47. cable</del>	<del>020245Z JAN 89 (2 pp)</del> R 12/2/99 NLSF95-085	<del>1/2/89</del> #126	<del>P1</del>

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<del>12. transmittal</del>	<del>re attached</del> <i>R 12/2/99 NLSF95-085 #121</i>	<del>1/1/89</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>13. cable</del>	<del>Ronald Reagan to Margaret Thatcher (2 pp)</del> <i>R 12/2/99 NLSF95-085 #122</i>	<del>1/2/89</del>	<del>P1</del>
14. cable	130027Z JAN 89 <i>P. 11/12/99 NLSF95-085 #123</i>	1/13/89	P1, F3
15. cable	draft of item #14 <i>P. 11/12/99 NLSF95-085 #124</i>	n.d.	P1, F3
16. cable	111651Z JAN 89 <i>P. 11/12/99 NLSF95-085 #125</i>	1/11/89	P1, F3

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

6 Jul  
0700

Steve Datzansky  
Nelson Ledsky

Pls review then  
let's discuss. I  
promised Jim Baker  
a 'decision' ~~by~~  
COB Thurs.

Copy provided  
to Whitehead

CP

[ ]

Department  
of the Treasury

to: Lt. Gen. Colin L. Powell

Asst. to the President  
for National Security  
Affairs

Executive Secretariat  
7/5/88

Re: Summary of Evidence -- Convict Labor

Secretary Baker asked me to send you the  
attached summaries of evidence.

The first three pages summarize general  
information; the remainder summarize the  
evidence on particular products (tea,  
chocolate, aluminum). Our proposed action  
would only be against tea and chocolate.

Attachment

*RBZ*  
Robert B. Zoellick  
Counselor to the Secretary  
and Executive Secretary  

---

room 3408  
phone 566-5901



**EVIDENCE OF CONVICT LABOR USED IN THE SOVIET UNION  
TO MAKE TEA, CHOCOLATE AND ALUMINUM PRODUCTS**

**I. STATUTE VIOLATED: 19 U.S.C. § 1307:**

All goods, wares, articles, and merchandise mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part in any foreign country by convict labor ... shall not be entitled to entry at any of the ports of the United States, and the importation thereof is hereby prohibited, and the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and directed to prescribe such regulations as may be necessary for the enforcement of this provision.

The statute has two elements: (1) That goods are being made with convict labor, and (2) that those goods are being imported into the United States.

**II. ALLEGED VIOLATOR: Importers of convict-labor made goods from the Soviet Socialist Republics ("Soviet Union").**

**III. EVIDENCE:**

Witnesses on the convict labor system in the Soviet Union will lay the foundation for each of the commodities for which we have specific evidence.

**A. NATAN SCHARANSKY, ISRAEL**

**Background:**

Natan Scharansky was born in Donetsk in 1948 and graduated from the Moscow Institute for Physics and Technology in 1972, and worked as a computer specialist for the Moscow Research Institute for Oil and Gas until 1976. In 1976 he was fired because of his activities in the Moscow Helsinki Watch Organization. In 1977 he was convicted of spying for the United States and sentenced to ten years in a labor camp and three years in prison. After being released from prison in 1986, Scharansky emigrated to Israel.

**Testimony:**

Scharansky spent nine years in Soviet prisons. He can testify about the extensive communications system among the convicts in the Soviet Union, which accounts for many ex-prisoners being aware of the different camps and the work done at these camps. He can also testify concerning the great dependence that Soviet industry has on the use of convict labor and how the Ministry of Internal Affairs coordinated the use of convict laborers for various factories.



**B. LUDMILLA ALEXEYEVA, BURKE, VIRGINIA**

**Background:**

Ludmilla Alexeyeva was a founding member of the Moscow Helsinki Monitoring Group. She emigrated to the United States in 1977 and currently serves as the Helsinki Group's Western Representative.

**Testimony:**

Ms. Alexeyeva recently published a study on Soviet forced labor for the AFL-CIO entitled Cruel and Usual Punishment. She will testify as to the Soviet convict labor system in general. She will also testify that the Soviet economy is a State-controlled economy in which costs and prices can be artificially set; and that convict labor gives the producer a price advantage.

**C. AVRAHAM SHIFRIN, ISRAEL**

**Background:**

Avraham Shifrin is a lawyer who was sentenced to death in 1953 for political reasons; a sentence later reduced to 25 years. He emigrated to Israel after serving ten years in a prison camp and four years in banishment. He runs the "Research Center for Prisons, Psychoprison, and Forced Labor Concentration Camps of the USSR."

**Testimony:**

Shifrin authored the book, "The First Guidebook to Prisons and Concentration Camps of the Soviet Union." He interviewed many ex-prisoners and is familiar with all phases of convict labor in the Soviet Union.

**Graphics:**

A map has been produced showing all the convict labor camps listed in Shifrin's book.

**D. IRINA RATUSHINSKAYA, EVANSTON, ILLINOIS**

**Background:**

Ms. Ratushinskaya was born in Odessa, Russia and studied physics and math at a university in Odessa.

**Testimony:**

Ms. Ratushinskaya was imprisoned in a convict labor camp from 1982-1986 and emigrated to the United States in April 1987. She will estimate the number of convict labor camps and the number of prisoners and explain the conditions, the production quota system

and payment of prisoners.



## TEA

I. SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE: A Soviet emigre, DR. EDVARD GUDAVA, will state that as a prisoner in Soviet Georgia during the period 1985 through 1987, he made wooden boxes in which to export tea, and observed other prisoners harvesting tea for export to the United States. Another Soviet emigre, RAIZA UVAROVA, Dr. Gudava's mother, saw prisoners harvesting tea when visiting her son at the prison camp. In addition, a report on Soviet forced labor written by Soviet emigre LUDMILLA ALEXEYEVA, includes tea as a product produced with convict labor. An unclassified 1982 CIA report for Senator Armstrong also listed tea as a product made with convict labor.

The Soviet Union produces approximately 150 million kilograms of tea a year, of which 130 million is from fields in the Republic of Georgia. DR. GUDAVA estimated that more than 5,000 laborers working out of five separate prison camps harvested tea leaves in Georgia, and that laborers from approximately 20 camps represent more than 50% of all workers utilized in the production of tea in Georgia.

Four companies have been identified as the importers of this Georgian tea, with nine importations since the beginning of 1986 of 308,161 pounds with a total value of \$92,126. DR. EDVARD GUDAVA, in late 1987, identified two retailers in Boston, Massachusetts, with cartons of Soviet tea for sale, labeled "Georgian tea, Soviet Union." The packaging of the tea in the United States is identical to the packaging of the tea in the Soviet Union. The tariff schedule item number which would be used for this product is 160.50.

## II. WITNESS STATEMENTS

### A. DR. EDVARD GUDAVA, BRIGHTON, MASSACHUSETTES

#### Background:

Dr. Edvard Gudava was born February 9, 1955 in Soviet Georgia. After studying medicine in Moscow, he became a physician in 1978.

#### Testimony:

Dr. Gudava was arrested in 1985 for hooliganism and was sentenced to four years in a Georgian prison camp near Tzulukidze, Georgia.

While in the prison camp, his job was to construct two types of tea boxes; those for internal Soviet use, and a higher quality type for the exportation of tea. He was told by the prison facility supervisor that the high quality tea boxes were used for the exportation of tea.



Gudava's camp was one of five camps within close proximity of each other and he estimates that the five camps had an aggregate of 7000 prisoners and 5000 were utilized for tea production. His camp had approximately 1500 prisoners of which half remained inside to construct the tea boxes and the other half he observed picked tea leaves for shipment to other factories in Georgia. Dr. Gudava estimates that the convict labor from the five camps contributes to approximately 50 percent of the production of tea in the Soviet Georgia area.

After Dr. Gudava's release from the camp in April 1987, and his emigration to the United States in September 1987, he saw Soviet tea for sale at the Coffee Connection in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Beriozka in Boston, Massachusetts. The packaging of the tea in the United States was identical to the packaging of the tea in the Soviet Union.

**B. RAIZA UVAROVA, BRIGHTON, MASSACHUSETTS**

**Background:**

Raiza Uvarova was born on April 18, 1930 in Tulla, near Moscow, and is the mother of Edvard and Tengiz Gudava. She attended college in Moscow and graduated with an engineering degree.

**Testimony:**

In 1985, due to to her son's imprisonment in Soviet Georgia, she started visiting the prison camp near Tsulukidze, Georgia. She initially walked into the convict labor camp in 1985 without permission and saw groups of prisoners harvesting tea. During her visits, she also could visually observe the surrounding camps, and she noted that there were four surrounding labor camps in 1985 and observed an additional camp under construction in 1987. At the time that Dr. Gudava was released from prison in April 1987, there were a total of five convict labor camps with a sixth under construction. There was also a factory outside the camps nearby that processed tea and utilized convict labor.

**C. TENGIZ GUDAVA, BRIGHTON, MASSACHUSETTS**

**Background:**

Tengiz Gudava was born November 28, 1953, in Soviet Georgia. He attended medical school in Moscow, but was expelled in 1975 for speaking out against the government.

**Testimony:**

The witness will state that while growing up in Soviet Georgia, it was common knowledge that prisoners processed and picked tea, and that there is a saying in the Soviet Union that "every dog knows prisoners pick tea." After he emigrated to the United



States in September 1987, he saw Soviet tea for sale in Boston, Massachusetts, and the packaging of the tea was identical to the packaging of the tea in the Soviet Union. The retailers were the Coffee Connection in Cambridge, Massachusetts and Beriozka in Boston, Massachusetts.

**D. CIA REPRESENTATIVE**

**Testimony:**

A representative from the CIA will testify that an unclassified CIA report was prepared in 1983 from documents, studies and source materials which analyzed Soviet goods imported into the United States and which identifies tea as a commodity produced with convict labor in the Soviet Union.

**E. LUDMILLA ALEXEYeva, BURKE, VIRGINIA**

**Background:**

Ludmilla Alexeyeva was a founding member of the Moscow Helsinki Monitoring Group. She emigrated to the United States in 1977 and currently serves as the Helsinki Group's Western Representative.

**Testimony:**

Ms. Alexeyeva recently published a study on Soviet forced labor for the AFL-CIO entitled Cruel and Usual Punishment.

She can testify that she included tea as a product produced with convict labor and that she identified Camp UI-123/35 in the Georgian Republic as a convict labor camp with approximately 1500 prisoners utilized in digging canals in tea plantations and harvesting tea leaves.

**F. KEN TEA LTD., NEW ROCHELLE, NEW YORK**

**Testimony:**

A representative of this company will testify that the company imported one shipment of tea from Soviet Georgia in 1986, totaling 1,598 pounds, with a value of \$2,475 and one shipment in 1987 totaling 1,212 pounds with a value of \$1,990. They sold Soviet Georgian tea to the Coffee Connection in Cambridge, Massachusetts, (where it was seen by the Gudava brothers).

**G. COFFEE CONNECTION, CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS**

**Testimony:**

A representative of this store can testify that records for 1986 and 1987 show purchases of Soviet Georgian tea from Ken Tea brokers, including one purchase of 55.12 pounds of Soviet

Georgian tea on May 13, 1987.

**H. TETLEY TEA CO., WILLIAMSPORT, PENNSYLVANIA**

**Testimony:**

A representative of this company will testify that the company imported three shipments of tea from Soviet Georgia in the calendar year 1986, totaling 101,500 pounds, with a value of \$33,930.

**I. NORTH AMERICAN CROP SERVICES, STANFORD, CONNECTICUT**

**Testimony:**

A representative of this company will testify that in 1986, the company imported three shipments of tea from Soviet Georgia totaling 136,033 pounds, with a value of \$33,718.

**J. A. HOLLIDAY & CO., NEW YORK, NEW YORK**

**Testimony:**

A representative of this company will testify that the company imported two shipments of tea from Soviet Georgia in the calendar year 1986, totaling 67,818 pounds, with a value of \$20,013.

**Note:** Witnesses from Tetley Tea Co., North American Crop Service and A. Holliday and Co. will testify that they were unaware that convict labor is used in the production of tea in the Soviet Union.



## CHOCOLATE

I. SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE: A Soviet emigre, IGOR GERASCENKO, will identify the chocolate factory Babayevskaya in Moscow as the factory in which he worked one day as a convict laborer in 1981 and produced chocolate candies. In 1987, he purchased identical chocolate candies in retail shops in Chicago, Illinois. He will state that convict labor is used in the production of chocolate in the Babayevskaya factory in the mixing of the cocoa and the baking, cutting and wrapping of the chocolate. Another emigre, Tatyana Osipova, learned of the use of prisoners at the Babayevskaya factory when she was in a special prison camp in Moscow in 1980.

A review of Customs' Automated Commercial System files for chocolate from the Soviet Union revealed two importations in 1986 totaling 17,254 pounds and one importation in 1987 totaling 17,960 pounds, worth approximately \$33,000. The applicable chocolate tariff number is 157.10.

## II. WITNESS STATEMENTS

### A. IGOR GERASCENKO, EVANSTON, ILLINOIS

#### Background:

Igor Gerascenko was born in Kiev in 1953 and graduated from the Polytechnic Institute with a degree in Physics in 1976. He emigrated to the U.S. in April 1987.

#### Testimony:

In December 1981, Gerascenko took part, with his wife in a five minute silent demonstration against Soviet human rights violations for which he appeared before a Soviet judge and received 10 days labor in a convict labor camp (MX-385/5). He was transported to a different factory each day and performed a different task in each factory. One of the factories in which he worked for one day was Babayevskaya, a chocolate factory in Moscow.

Gerascenko observed convict laborers mixing the cocoa, baking, cutting, and wrapping chocolate. He himself operated a bean grinding machine. Approximately 500 workers were in the factory. Approximately 20-40 convict laborers from his camp were sent to the factory each day and many more trucks from other camps arrived at the chocolate factory. Conversations with other convicts disclosed that they too went to the Babayevskaya plant.

In November 1987, Gerascenko purchased in Chicago Illinois one of the types of chocolate candy (Polar Bear) made at Babayevskaya. He has seen it for sale in other retail shops in Chicago and New

York.

**B. TATYANA OSIPOVA, BROOKLYN, NEW YORK, NEW YORK**

**Background:**

Tatyana Osipova was born in Kolomna, near Moscow, and was a computer operator and teacher of Russian languages. In 1976, she joined the Helsinki Watch accord group and began to write articles against political prisoners.

**Testimony:**

In January 1980, Osipova took part in a protest and was convicted of disturbing the peace. She was sentenced to 25 days in a special camp in Moscow. There were 35 other workers in this special camp. The prisoners worked in either the Babayevskaya chocolate factory or a cosmetics factory. The prisoners were permitted to converse with each other. Through conversations with other prisoners she learned that five to seven people went to the chocolate factory every day. Women were assigned only to cleaning duties, while the men were assigned to work in the entire chocolate production process. She refused to go on work details herself and was assigned to tasks in the camp. After serving the 25 day sentence, she was later convicted again and sent to prison in Moldavia, where she spent seven years. She emigrated to the United States in April, 1987.

**C. GEORGE RAZIN, RAZIN INTERNATIONAL INC., HOWELL, NEW JERSEY**

**Background:**

George Razin is the President of Razin International Inc.

**Testimony:**

Razin International has imported Russian chocolate of different types from the Babayevskaya factory in Moscow. One importation of chocolate in 1986 totalled 15,594 pounds, and was valued at \$14,306. One importation in 1987 totalled 17,960 pounds, and was valued at \$17,249. [Razin International has not imported the Polar Bear chocolate in the last three years.]



## ALUMINUM

I. SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE: SERGEI SOLNTSEV, a Soviet emigre, saw one convict labor camp in Krasnoturinsk at the Bogoslovsk refinery and witnessed discussions about the use of convict labor at that plant. He will also testify that convicts make wooden lockers for the workers at the Bratsk aluminum smelting plant in Siberia, and that a friend at the plant informed him that convict laborers repair machine parts for the plant.

In addition, an unclassified CIA report prepared in 1982 for Senator Armstrong which describes the Soviet forced labor system cites that bauxite is mined by forced labor in Arkalyk. There is no other industry in Arkalyk.

In 1986, over 21 million dollars (67 entries) of different aluminum products were imported from the Soviet Union. In 1987, over 22 million dollars (117 entries) of different aluminum products were imported from the Soviet Union. The tariff schedule item numbers include: 618.0650 (unwrought alloys of aluminum), 618.1000 (aluminum waste and scrap) and 870.6040 (melted-down waste and scrap), and 618.0200 (aluminum other than alloys of aluminum)

## II. WITNESS STATEMENTS

### A. SERGEI SOLNTSEV, LUFKIN, TEXAS

#### Background:

Sergei Sergeevich Solntsev was born on March 1, 1935, in Vinnitsa, Ukpiana which is near Kiev. He is an extractive metallurgist, a 1958 graduate of the Metallurgical Department of the Leningrad Mining Institute. He emigrated to the United States in 1978.

#### Testimony:

Solntsev worked for the Leningrad All-Union Research Institute of the Aluminum, Magnesium, and Electrode Industry (VANI) from 1958 until 1978. The first ten years, he worked as a junior and senior research fellow. In 1969 he was transferred to the Bratsk Aluminum Plant in Siberia, where he worked as a production engineer.

Solntsev is familiar with all the mines in the Soviet Union and has written a book on aluminum production. He has personally visited the following alumina refineries:

1. Bogoslovsk-Krasnoturinsk
2. Dniepr
3. Nikolaevo
4. Novoluznetsk
5. Kandalaksha
6. Volkov



7. Sumgait
8. Volgograd

The aluminum plant at Bratsk has approximately 10,000 workers, 500 of which were convict laborers. Thirty kilometers to the south of Bratsk is a prison camp named Vikhorevka. The convict laborers from Vikhorevka made wooden lockers for the laborers in the plant and replacement parts for the maintenance of the machinery in the plant. Solntsev's friend, Yuri, told him that the convict laborers came to the Bratsk plant via truck, and that equipment was transferred from the plant to the labor camp for repairs and then returned.

From 1975 through 1976, Solntsev worked on a special project named KRAS in Krasnoyarsk, Siberia. He saw convict laborers in their camp there, only 50 yards from the aluminum plant. In 1978, the administrators of the Krasnoyarsk plant requested that VAMI undertake a special project to determine how to use convict labor in the electric cells in the smelter. The objective of the project was to isolate the convict laborers into work shifts to keep them separate from the other laborers. Solntsev was present when security for transporting the prisoners from the camp to the plant was discussed.

Solntsev estimates that one-half of all maintenance and one-half of all operating people at the aluminum facilities are convict laborers.

#### B. CIA REPRESENTATIVE

##### Testimony:

A CIA report of 1982 states that convict labor is used in the production of bauxite at Arkalyk. There is no other industry in Arkalyk.

#### C. AVRAHAM SHIFRIN, ISRAEL

##### Background:

Avraham Shifrin is a lawyer who was sentenced to death in 1953 for political reasons; a sentence later reduced to 25 years. He emigrated to Israel after serving ten years in a prison camp and four years in banishment. He runs the "Research Center for Prisons, Psychoprisons, and Forced Labor Concentration Camps of the USSR."

##### Testimony:

Avraham Shifrin authored the book, "The First Guidebook to Prisons and Concentration Camps of the Soviet Union," and from his research for the book found instances of the use of aluminum industry, noted below.



1,000 prisoners are used in bauxite mining and construction in Boksitogorsk.

An electronics engineer who worked in Oneglag, a convict labor camp complex which serviced the "Boksitstroitrest" (Bauxite Construction Trust) and the "Onegspotsles" (Onega Special Lumber Company) was assigned to build tracks for the bauxite dredges.

At Kandalaksha there is a camp of approximately 1500 prisoners assigned to work in alumina, among other things.

**V. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE**

**A. Amalgamet, Inc., New York**

Customs records will show that this company imported through the Soviet Ministry of Trade 4,239,907 pounds of aluminum products from the Soviet Union in 1986, worth \$2,423,730; and 6,234,313 pounds of aluminum products in 1987, worth \$3,196,783.

**B. Philipp Brothers, Inc., New York, New York**

Customs records will show that this company imported through the Soviet Ministry of Trade 17,766,477 pounds of aluminum products from the Soviet Union in 1986, worth \$7,245,615; and 23,338,465 pounds of aluminum products in 1987 worth \$9,719,425.

**C. Hunter Douglas Metals, Inc., Homewood, Ill.**

Customs records will show that this company imported through the Soviet Ministry of Trade 7,038,466 pounds of aluminum products from the Soviet Union in 1986, worth \$1,893,281; and 6,085,950 pounds of aluminum products in 1987, worth \$3,518,686.

**D. Commercial Metals Co., Dallas, Texas**

Customs records will show that this company imported through the Soviet Ministry of Trade 11,309,054 pounds of aluminum products from the Soviet Union in 1986, worth \$4,420,479; and 117,673 pounds in 1987, worth \$74,473.

**E. C. Tennant Sons & Co., Minneapolis, Minnesota**

Customs records will show that this company imported through the Soviet Ministry of Trade 1,147,494 pounds of aluminum products from the Soviet Union in 1986, worth \$531,827.

**F. Stanley Metals Corp., New York, New York**

Customs records will show that this company imported through the Soviet Ministry of Trade 4,918,267 pounds of aluminum products from the Soviet Union in 1986, worth \$2,066,839; and imported 4,021,147 pounds of aluminum products in 1987 worth \$1,421,135.



**G. Pechiney World Trade (USA) Inc. Seacaus, N.J.**

Customs records will show that this company imported through the Soviet Ministry of Trade 2,204,232 pounds of aluminum products from the Soviet Union in 1986, worth \$1,258,197.

**H. Amalgamated Metal Corp., London, United Kingdom**

Customs records will show that this company imported through the Soviet Ministry of Trade 3,037,021 pounds of aluminum products from the Soviet Union in 1986, worth \$1,577,686; and imported 7,008,671 pounds of aluminum products in 1987, worth \$3,536,477.

**I. Doehler Jarvis Castings Company, Toledo, Ohio**

Customs records will show that this company imported through the Soviet Ministry of Trade 3,157,310 pounds of aluminum products from the Soviet Union in 1987, worth \$735,776.

**J. Mitsubishi International Corporation, New York, New York**

Customs records will show that this company imported through the Soviet Ministry of Trade 573,307 pounds of aluminum products from the Soviet Union in 1987, worth \$222,421.

**K. Minemet-Asoma Inc., Stamford, Connecticut**

Customs records will show that this company imported through the Soviet Ministry of Trade 2,309,381 pounds of aluminum products from the Soviet Union in 1987, worth \$906,382.

**L. Lorbec Metals, Ltd., Quebec, Canada**

Customs records will show that this company imported through the Soviet Ministry of Trade 2,448,852 pounds of aluminum products from the Soviet Union in 1987, worth \$1,248,540.

These companies have stated that they are unaware of the true origin of the imports within the Soviet Union. The Soviet Ministry of Trade does not disclose information that would allow us to trace the imports to specific plants or mines.



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

67

Steve Danzansky  
Nelson Ledsky

More.

copy promised  
to Whitehead

CP

July 6, 1988

RE: Convict Labor

Secretary Baker asked me to send you the attached additional documents pertaining to the convict labor issue:

- (1) exchange of letters between Treasury General Counsel Mark Sullivan and Assistant Attorney General (Civil Division) John Bolton; and
- (2) April 19, 1988 memo recommending action from Assistant Secretary (Enforcement) Frank Keating (now Acting Associate Attorney General) (without attachments, two of which you already have received).

Attachments

*RB*  
Robert B. Zoellick  
Counselor to the Secretary  
and Executive Secretary

---

room 3408  
phone 566-5901





U.S. Department of Justice

Civil Division

Office of the Assistant Attorney General

Washington, D.C. 20530

April 25, 1988

Honorable Mark Sullivan III  
General Counsel  
Department of the Treasury  
Washington, D.C. 20220

Dear Mark:

Your letter of April 20, 1988, requested our views on the likely effect of new evidence concerning the production of tea and chocolate in the Soviet Union in the enforcement of 19 U.S.C. § 1307 (1982).


As explained in your letter, in the second stage of the enforcement process under that statute, an importer must provide satisfactory evidence to the Customs Service that the products it wishes to import do not come within the ambit of section 1307. If the Customs Service determines that this evidence is not sufficient, the importer may file a protest and, upon denial of the protest, file a civil action in the Court of International Trade. It is likely that this action would be resolved by means of a de novo proceeding.

As any litigator would tell you, it is extremely difficult in the abstract to predict the probabilities of a successful defense. Obviously, the nature and the strength of the evidence possessed by the plaintiff-importer in the particular case are usually not known until after the civil action is instituted and discovery has been conducted.

Having said that, however, I want to stress that the plaintiff-importer would bear the burden of proof. Moreover, it is clear that the new evidence submitted with your letter is much more probative than the evidence previously available. Although the policy decision to invoke the first stage of section 1307's process is for the Department of the Treasury, I want to assure you that the Department of Justice is perfectly willing, and

indeed eager, to defend challenges to your efforts to prohibit the importation of goods made with convict, forced or indentured labor.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'J.R. Bolton', written in a cursive style.

John R. Bolton  
Assistant Attorney General





DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY  
WASHINGTON

April 20, 1988

GENERAL COUNSEL

Dear John:

Since early in this Administration, the Department of the Treasury has actively monitored evidence on the use of forced labor in the Soviet Union in connection with our responsibility under 19 U.S.C. § 1307 to prohibit importation of goods made with convict, forced or indentured labor. In early 1986, we requested the Justice Department's review of evidence then available to Treasury on the excludability from entry of certain classes of Soviet imports under the Customs regulations implementing section 1307. Deputy Assistant Attorney General Schiffer's response of April 17, 1986, assessed the litigation risks and concluded that a successful defense depended upon a number of variables and could not be predicted with a high degree of accuracy, particularly if a defense on the merits were necessary. The response concluded that the evidence presented to Justice at the time probably would not be sufficient to persuade the court that a particular shipment of merchandise was produced by the type of labor specified in the statute.

No action was taken in 1986, but the Department of the Treasury continued to seek evidence, this time through the Customs Service, to see if a case could be made that certain Soviet goods made with convict, forced or indentured labor were being imported into the United States. That subsequent investigation, which focused on Soviet tea, chocolate and aluminum, now is substantially complete, and we request that you review the attached evidentiary submission covering imports of Soviet tea and chocolate for sufficiency in light of the litigation risks involved. We will forward a submission on aluminum separately once the investigation on it is concluded.

Customs' regulations implementing 19 U.S.C. § 1307 are found at 19 C.F.R. §§ 12.42-12.45. If the Commissioner of Customs determines that information available "reasonably, but not conclusively indicates" that convict, forced or indentured labor goods are being or are likely to be imported into the United States, he immediately instructs the district directors to withhold release of merchandise in the classes he has specified. 19 C.F.R. § 12.42(e). At that time the Commissioner, with the approval of the Secretary, must publish a Federal Register Notice excluding the products from importation.

The second step in the process occurs when a particular shipment of goods within an excluded class is detained at the border. 19 C.F.R. § 12.43. The importer has three months to provide satisfactory evidence to Customs indicating that the products he wishes to import do not come within the ambit of section 1307. That evidence must contain a Certificate of Origin, signed by the foreign seller or owner, that certifies the quantity, description, place and date of exportation of the




merchandise and certifies that the merchandise was not made with forced labor. 19 C.F.R. § 12.43(a). In addition, the importer must submit a statement demonstrating that he has made every reasonable effort to determine the source of the merchandise and the circumstances of its production. 19 C.F.R. § 12.43(b). Based on this and other available evidence, the Commissioner determines whether the individual shipment may be entered. 19 C.F.R. § 12.43(c). If the goods are to remain excluded from entry, they may be re-exported or destroyed as abandoned property. 19 C.F.R. § 12.44.

The newly concluded investigation on tea and chocolate has produced evidence that appears superior in two respects to that last presented to your Department. First, witnesses have been identified who are willing to testify that they observed first-hand the use of convict labor to produce these goods in the Soviet Union in the relatively recent past. Second, witnesses are available who can identify specific Soviet imports seen in the United States as the same goods they observed to be manufactured with convict labor. This sort of direct evidence has not been available previously, and we request your views on the likely effect of this extra category of evidence in the event of a court challenge to an exclusion determination by the Commissioner in the second stage of the proceeding described above.

The attached summary of the evidence is divided into separate sections on tea and chocolate, as well as a separate section on witnesses who will testify generally as to the Soviet convict labor system. The Department of the Treasury would appreciate your opinion on the effect of the new evidence developed by the Customs Service.

I greatly appreciate your assistance in this matter.

Sincerely,



Mark Sullivan III  
General Counsel

The Honorable John R. Bolton  
Assistant Attorney General  
Civil Division  
Department of Justice  
Washington, D.C. 20530

Enclosures

cc: David M. Cohen, Esquire  
Director  
Commercial Litigation Branch  
Civil Division  
U.S. Department of Justice  
Washington, D.C. 20530





DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY  
WASHINGTON

APR 19 1988

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY BAKER

FROM: FRANCIS A. KEATING, II  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY (ENFORCEMENT)

SUBJECT: Federal Register Notice Prohibiting Importation  
of Soviet Goods made with Convict Labor

I. ACTION FORCING EVENT: Customs has submitted evidence that Soviet tea and chocolate manufactured with convict labor have been imported into the United States. Consequently, I recommend that you approve a Federal Register Notice withholding entry of those goods under Customs regulations implementing 19 U.S.C. § 1307.

II. ANALYSIS: Section 1307 prohibits the importation of "[a]ll goods, wares, articles, and merchandise mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part in any foreign country by convict labor." Customs regulations provide for the detention of merchandise in classes that the Commissioner "reasonably but not conclusively" finds are likely to be imported and are "within the purview of section 307." 19 C.F.R. § 12.42(e)-(g). Your approval is required for publication of a Federal Register notice of such action. 19 C.F.R. 12.42(f). The effect of publication is to shift to importers of articles within these classes the burden of coming forth with evidence to convince the Commissioner that their specific merchandise is not prohibited by section 307. 19 C.F.R. § 12.43. At Tab B is a list of previous exclusion orders issued under 19 U.S.C. § 1307.

My recommendation today is to invoke the first part of this process by approving a Federal Register Notice designating tea and chocolate as classes of Soviet imports that will be denied entry unless importers demonstrate that their merchandise is not made with convict labor. As noted above, the standard for this action is evidence that "reasonably but not conclusively indicates" that convict-made imports are likely, and Customs' submission has met that rather lenient standard with respect to tea and chocolate. Customs also presented evidence concerning aluminum and aluminum products, but it does not yet support Customs' recommendation of exclusion. Further evidence on aluminum is still being gathered.

	INITIATOR	REVIEWER	REVIEWER	REVIEWER	REVIEWER	SECRETARY
OFFICE CODE SURNAME		SULLIVAN	MEAGHER			
INITIALS/DATE	/	/	/	/	/	

Customs' evidence linking Soviet convict labor with tea, chocolate and aluminum product imports is set out at Tab C. Witnesses are available to testify both to the use of convict labor to produce tea and chocolate in the Soviet Union and to the presence of convict-made imports in the United States. Although there is evidence that aluminum and aluminum products are made with convict labor in the Soviet Union, there is no evidence that imports have been made from convict-labor sources. Soviet tea and chocolate imports since the beginning of 1986 total approximately \$125,126.

A provision in this year's Continuing Resolution prohibits "funding an activity or paying a salary to a government employee [that] would result in a decision, determination, rule or regulation, or policy that would prohibit the enforcement of" 19 U.S.C. § 1307. This provision does not compel Treasury to confirm Customs' findings, nor does it forbid an independent review of the evidence.

I am available to discuss this matter further at your convenience.

III. RECOMMENDATION: That you sign each of the three originals of the Federal Register Notice at Tab A, announcing the exclusion of Soviet tea and chocolate.

IV. DECISION:

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab A	Federal Register Notice (three originals)
Tab B	Previous Exclusion Notices under 19 U.S.C. § 1307
Tab C	Customs Evidentiary Submission
Tab 1	Tea
Tab 2	Chocolate
Tab 3	Aluminum Products



Questions Relating to Tea and Chocolate Imports  
From the Soviet Union

Statute

1. Is Customs evidence sufficient to invoke Section 1307 and to withstand possible legal challenges? Most of Customs evidence is circumstantial, hearsay and out of date.
2. Statute exempts goods which U.S. does not produce in sufficient quantity to meet domestic consumption. U.S. imports 100% of tea and cocoa (but not chocolate) requirements.
3. Intent of Section 1307 was to protect U.S. labor from unfair competition. Treasury is using Section 1307 to get at Soviet human rights abuses.

Tea

1. CIA agrees that some tea is produced by convict labor. It has no evidence to link such production to exports.
2. According to CIA figures, in 1986 Soviet Union produced 598,000 metric tons of tea, imported 110,000 tons and exported 3700 tons. Soviet tea exports could be re-exports or from non-convict cultivations.
3. According to Commerce Dept. figures U.S. has not imported any Soviet tea in 1987 or in 1988 (through April). Do we want to ban a product we are not importing? Only evidence seems to be a sale in Boston observed in 1987 by Dr. Gudava at the Coffee Connection. That retail business apparently purchased same in 1986 from a wholesale operation (Ken Tea LTD). There does not seem to be evidence of import of Coffee Connection Soviet tea in 1987-88. Only a display of previously imported tea.

Chocolate

1. CIA has been unable to confirm that convict labor is used in making Soviet chocolate.

Aluminum

1. Customs evidence for use of convict labor in making aluminum is similar to that for tea and chocolate yet Treasury has decided not to ban aluminum imports which in 1986 were worth \$21 million.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

5 Jul

ROMAN,

Rollie Evans called  
me on a "PERSONAL  
MATTER": TO DO E +  
N THIS FRIDAY. I  
SAID NO BECAUSE YOU'D  
HAVE KILLED ME.

CF



RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 7 LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

From: NSKWZ --CPUA  
To: NSFEG --CPUA

Date and time 07/05/88 18:29:56

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOTE FROM: KAY ZERWICK

Subject: Note from General Powell

\*\*\* Forwarding note from NSKWZ --CPUA

07/05/88 14:49 \*\*\*

To: LEDSKY --VAXC ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOTE FROM: KAY ZERWICK

SUBJECT: Note from General Powell

Is it appropriate for the President to write to PM Mulroney  
congratulating him on his performance as Chairman of the Toronto  
Economic Summit?

cc: NSMB --CPUA  
NSJDN --CPUA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NSSID --CPUA  
NSPSS --CPUA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLS

795-085 #119

BY

[Signature]

NARA, DATE

7/10/98



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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

3/17

JDN  
PSS  
SID

I'm RELUCTANT TO  
SIGN THIS IF DOD  
IS OFF THE FARM &  
FCC MAY BE ANSWERING  
THE LTR TO HIM QUITE  
DIFFERENTLY. Do I NEED  
TO RAISE WITH FCC  
& CLARIFY CURRENT  
ADMIN POSITION? IF SO  
LET ME HAVE TPs.  
Do you WANT TO DISCUSS?



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 30, 1988

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR COLIN L. POWELL

FROM: <sup>Im for</sup> STEPHEN I. DANZANSKY

SUBJECT: Untied Lending to Soviet Bloc Countries

Senator Sasser has written you (Tab II) urging your cooperation with an interagency task force he has asked Secretary Carlucci to chair seeking to curb financial flows to the Soviet Bloc countries.

Sasser and many of his colleagues have been persuaded that untied lending by Western financial institutions (mainly in Europe and Japan) are increasing the defense burden of the United States. They passed a 97-0 resolution asking the President to raise the issue at Toronto. The Senate Appropriations Committee has included language in its report on the Defense appropriations bill calling for consultations with our allies and a report by September 30.

The Administration has strongly opposed the idea of restricting capital flows over the three years of intermittent Congressional interest in the subject. Such controls would undercut sharply the role of the United States in international financial markets. Moreover, there is little chance that our allies would agree to match our controls. At a recent hearing, however, Carlucci responded to a question by opining that a West German commercial bank loan of \$2.1 billion announced in May would damage our security interests.

I chaired an interagency meeting on Wednesday, June 29, to review the issue and agree on next steps. Treasury, State, and CIA experts agree that the Senators are working with erroneous data and that their policy prescription is incorrect. Defense appears unmoved from its longstanding position favoring controls. I have asked Treasury to chair a working group (including State, DOD, and CIA) to pull together existing data, organizing it to address specific points raised by Sasser and his colleagues. When that data is available, in the next three weeks or so, my group will then examine policy implications.

Rudy Perina and Mike Andricos concur.


4/7

REL,

Pls review

THEN LET'S DISCUSS

SOON.

A handwritten signature or set of initials, possibly 'LJ', written in black ink. The letters are stylized and connected.



COUNCIL  
ON FOREIGN  
RELATIONS

ALTON FRYE  
Vice President  
Washington Director

7/1/88

General Powell:

There are 3  
enclosures, 1 on each of  
the issues we discussed.  
As we agreed, I am  
also sharing these with  
Howard Baker.

# COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

ALTON FRYE  
Vice President  
Washington Director

June 30, 1988

Lt. General Colin L. Powell  
The White House

Dear Colin:

I was encouraged to find in our meeting with Howard that we share similar perspectives on the current state of play. As we agreed, I am sending along concept papers which address the "two-and-a-half" decisions that seem most vital.

In trying to impart a new burst of energy to the negotiations, I think the President would want to know that there are concrete, sound solutions to the worrisome problems about which he has heard so much. I recall how positively he responded when we formulated the strategic build-down concept --- he called Bill Cohen right away to encourage him --- and that initiative helped move the negotiations by generating a comprehensive proposal and formulating the discount rules for bombers which have been one key to protecting U.S. interests in START.

START was more bogged down then than now and, without subjecting the President to mind-boggling technical detail, I should think he would be fortified to learn that there are some fresh ideas around to cope with mobile ICBMs, SLCMs, and the defense-offense relationship. As I imagine the messages for the President, they are

... We can manage the mobile ICBM problem by using a radio tether scheme to provide verifiability without increasing vulnerability.


... We can protect our option for a large number of conventional SLCMs while regulating the number of nuclear SLCMs by exploiting known technology to verify and enforce a barrier against changing warheads.

... We may be able to start the reductions process and improve chances for an eventual cooperative transition toward defenses by engaging the Soviets in a mutual monitoring arrangement that gives meaning to your proposal of open laboratories.

The attached analyses flesh out those messages. Obviously, each of these concepts can be refined further, and I would welcome a chance to respond to questions, objections, or suggestions for improvement.

Perhaps because I was a General Electric Fellow in graduate school when he was sounding the theme that "progress is our most important product", President Reagan always struck me as excited by inventiveness. Since I am convinced that he is in a far better position to make the remaining tough calls than his successor could possibly be, I hope you will find these ideas worth sharing with him to illustrate that we can invent our way through the obstacles remaining in START. I look forward to discussing them with you.

Cordially,





## SAILORS TO VERIFY AND ENFORCE SLCM RESTRAINTS

How can the United States and the Soviet Union deploy large forces of conventional SLCMs while precluding conversion of such missiles to nuclear delivery vehicles?

Given the kind of access to production facilities contemplated in the INF Treaty, existing technology could provide a solution. Let's call that solution a Secure Anti-Interference Locking Restraint (SAILOR).

As conceived and described below the SAILOR system

- would provide a barrier preventing conversion of conventionally armed SLCMs to nuclear armed SLCMs;*
- would permit unfettered operation of all SLCMs;*
- would bolster NTM by providing more reliable information regarding the scale of SLCM inventories on both sides;*
- would preserve the U.S. policy of neither confirming nor denying ("NCND") the presence of nuclear weapons on board its vessels; and*
- would avoid the necessity of onboard inspection of warships.*

To appreciate the way SAILOR might work, a few words on the context of SLCM deployments are in order.

\*\*\*

An attractive property of a SLCM is its ability to carry a variety of conventional, chemical and nuclear munitions. By definition, however, a strategic bargain that limited the number of nuclear armed SLCMs would oblige the parties to give up some of that flexibility. Full warhead interchangeability is not compatible with the objective of scaling back nuclear force levels.

After mating with their warheads, American SLCMs, and perhaps Soviet ones as well, are deployed in canisters. The canisters are then placed in launch tubes or storage racks aboard the vessels which would fire the missiles. Obviously, to service the missile or to change the warhead, one must open the canister, although doing so at sea is not customary. In essence the SAILOR mechanism would ensure that neither party could open the canister to change warheads without the knowledge of the other party, but it would not interfere with firing the missile in warfare (or in development and training operations).

Just as electronic locks can prevent the unauthorized detonation of a nuclear warhead, comparable devices could seal a canister containing a conventional-payload SLCM and preclude the installation of a nuclear weapon. In order to open such a lock a special code number must be inserted. If a would-be user makes a mistake in entering the code, the lock could permit a small number of further attempts, perhaps as few as two or three. Repeated efforts to tamper with the lock can cause the mechanism, if so designed, to disable the weapon on which it is mounted. Thus, the electronic SAILOR could make it impractical to tamper with a conventional warhead on a SLCM.

Note, however, that a SAILOR would be quite different in function from the electronic locks known as Permissive Action Links (PALs) on many nuclear weapons. A PAL is



integral to its nuclear weapon and the weapon cannot be fired unless the lock is released. A SAILOR would be an external seal on the SLCM canister which has no bearing on the operational utility of the missile; its sole purpose is to bar any change in the warhead.

The SAILOR should ensure that a serious attempt to open the canister without authorization would leave the missile itself inoperable, but would not trigger the warhead. Tamper-resistant seals developed for nuclear weapons, as well as more recent fiber optics techniques offer a number of serviceable approaches. There is no major technical obstacle to sealing a SLCM canister. (In fact, even for cruise missiles deployed without canisters, SAILOR technology should be workable, although problems of exposing technological intelligence might be more serious.)

## SAILOR INSTALLATION

In installing SAILORS on SLCM canisters one plausible course would be to follow the well-established 2-key procedures through which U.S. allies have jointly controlled many nuclear systems. In this case, one could employ a 24-digit coded lock for both Soviet and American SLCMs; an American inspector would hold half the code (12 digits) and a Soviet inspector the other half (12 digits). The potential combinations could be so numerous that no one could expect to pick such a lock, even without a limit on the number of tries.

Each country would mate its missile and warhead before placing it in its canister. This could be done prior to inspection of the canister by the other side, avoiding any significant loss of technical intelligence. Passive radiation detectors would enable inspectors to determine whether the canister contained a nuclear weapon. Thereafter, the inspection teams would install the seals and lock them with random numbers selected by each side without the other's knowledge. Any SLCMs not identified as conventionally-armed, would count against the ceiling on nuclear SLCMs.

Well and good, the lock is in place but what happens when someone tries to open the canister illegally? The functional destruction of the missile. For example, the sealing mechanism could contain a small explosive charge, powerful enough to propel a bolt an inch or so in diameter through the guidance mechanism of the SLCM. (Less drastic measures are, of course, conceivable; as with nuclear proliferation safeguards, the designer could simply configure the device to report at the next inspection that there has been tampering. That is a rather weak remedy, however, for a violation that could involve swift and major expansion of deployed nuclear forces.)

From a military standpoint, another consideration is critical. One must ensure that the SAILOR would not interfere with the operation of the missile, if it were actually fired. Perhaps the simplest method would be to build into the device a time delay of a few seconds before it disabled the missile -- long enough to permit the missile to clear the canister if fired, but not long enough to enable a change in the warhead.

For this approach to be acceptable, both Soviets and Americans would have to satisfy themselves that the SAILORS were truly effective. They would need to agree on a common design, or at least procedures for joint testing and evaluation of any system installed on either side. It would be prudent to establish a common pool of certified devices from which each side would draw randomly. And, of course, there would have to be periodic



# A RADIO TETHER TO VERIFY THE LEGALITY OF MOBILE MISSILES

Now that access to production sites for mobile ICBMs appears negotiable, a new approach to monitoring deployed mobiles may also be workable. The concept recognizes the difficult tradeoffs between enhancing verifiability and reducing vulnerability which any regime for mobiles must accommodate. It relies on cooperative verification arrangements to provide either confident assessment of the presence and legality of individual missiles or explicit evidence of illegality within an individual zone.

The elements and functions of the plan are as follows:

1.) Within each zone designated for deployment of mobile ICBMs the proprietor would install a central facility capable of communications via satellite with the inspecting nation and of local, line-of-sight communications with highly directional radios within the zone.

2.) On each missile leaving the production site the parties would install a unique identifying tag, a microprocessor and a compact radio, all affixed in a tamper-resistant manner. The radio would be a narrow-angle device limited to perhaps 30 miles range and capable of communicating *only* through the deploying country's own ground link. Coupled to the microprocessor, the radio would be able to report any tampering with itself, e.g. any attempt to remove it from the missile, as well as the missile's identification number and its location within the zone relative to the communications link.

3.) An inspecting nation would have access to the missile's radio only through the proprietor's communications center in that zone. Without communicating directly with the missile (and thus without being able to exploit the status-reporting radio for targeting purposes), the inspector could read out information relevant to verification by interrogating the missile's microprocessor through the host's satellite link.

4.) Each missile would be free to roam anywhere within the zone, provided that it was ready at all times to respond to the communications center in that zone. Assuming a 30-mile range, this would substantially expand the area within which the launcher could move, thus bolstering survivability. And, of course, if hostilities were to erupt, the missiles would be able to move outside the zones established for peacetime verification purposes.

5.) With a frequency to be negotiated (one zone per day, for instance) the inspector would be entitled to query the ground control center in any of the designated zones for access to data from the missile(s) under its control. Any interference with prompt communications (within one minute) through the downlink to the missile would constitute a violation.

The inspector could direct a query in a variety of ways. He could request the ground link to provide a read-out from a specified missile assigned to the zone (using its identification number) or from a missile located at specified coordinates, detected independently. The basic questions would be three:

- i.) Is this a legal missile?
- ii.) Are the radio's and microprocessor's tamper-resistant features intact?
- iii.) Where is the missile in relation to the ground station?



Inability to communicate with a missile known or required to be in the zone should justify a standstill for all missiles in the zone while on-site inspections are performed and, if necessary, repairs to the onboard radio or microprocessor are carried out. Periodically, and by prior notice, it would be useful to arrange a simultaneous universal query to confirm that all mobile ICBMs were deployed legally within the designated zones. Any missile found outside a designated zone or without the status-reporting package installed would be an overt violation of the agreement.

6.) In order to protect the system against spoofing the inspector should have the option to employ cryptographic access controls in communicating with the missile's microprocessor. Is that compatible with a scheme in which communications pass through a link controlled by the host country? It should be so if the inspector is able to encrypt initial input in the microprocessor at the time of installation. Each query to the missile in the field could then perturb the microprocessor data to generate feedback that only the inspector could interpret accurately. The circuitry and/or software should make it possible for the inspector to defeat efforts by the host to manipulate the transmission for deceptive purposes. The microprocessor could be capable of reporting any unauthorized attempts to interrogate it.

7.) There will be concern about the suggestion that the query include the missile's location. But remember that this arrangement would only permit a limited number of interrogations within any one time frame, never enough to have meaningful effects on targeting the larger force. Those controlling the ground stations could readily prevent wholesale access to more than one or a few missiles, except as scheduled. Yet locational data on the limited basis described here would enable the parties to gain confidence in the regime by correlating queries to individual missiles with other evidence to determine that only legal missiles are deployed.

Note that this scheme does not add significantly to the communications requirements already imposed by mobile missiles. The deploying government must maintain reliable communications with such systems anyway. The additional hardware for the "radio tether" to verify compliance with arms controls would involve only a few pounds of equipment, which would be jettisoned prior to any launch. Furthermore, the radio tether need have no relationship to the operational command and control system and no impact on the missile's operational capability.

Also note that only the central facility in each zone needs to be radiating regularly. The missile would orient itself toward the central antenna but could remain dormant until interrogated by the tower. If necessary and agreeable to the parties, a deploying state could expand the size of the zone by tethering missiles to more than one antenna, e.g. two transmitters 60 miles apart. There are important advantages, however, to tethering missiles to a single antenna and to separating zones sufficiently to minimize the possibility of deception through interlinking those antennas. For example, one would want to be able to synchronize clocks with the missile's microprocessor to make sure that the inspector is not receiving data from a missile which is in fact outside the permitted zone and responding through a distant relay.

An important detail concerns whether the package should be attached to the



checks of the reliability of SAILORS removed from weapons in the field.

Whenever canisters had to be opened for maintenance or repairs, inspectors from both sides would have to release the electronic lock. This would permit them to note the return of the missile for service and to confirm that the seals are intact. Perimeter monitoring of service facilities would ensure that unsealed missiles did not move into or out of designated locations. When a missile was repackaged for redeployment, the two sides would reinspect and reseal the canister, after confirming that no additional nuclear SLCM was being deployed.

There are, of course, certain problems with this scheme. It relies on the ability to locate and verify the relevant production, storage and maintenance facilities for SLCMs in order to preclude clandestine deployments. Given the advances in cooperative verification incorporated in the INF Treaty, this may be achievable through technical intelligence means augmented by negotiated rights to inspect suspect facilities. Critical to the scheme would be firm rules on several additional points:

SLCM canisters should be loaded or unloaded only in port and under observation (without requiring direct access to the vessel involved). Although difficult to detect, loading SLCMs at sea should be prohibited; to evade such a prohibition effectively a party would also have to maintain hidden production, storage, repair and transport facilities, all of which would be potentially discoverable indicators of violation. Drawn precisely, such rules should reduce the need for onboard inspections at sea, which both navies will find objectionable. In gauging the relative risks and/or sufficiency of observation at identified chokepoints (production and assembly facilities, storage and maintenance sites, in-port loading sequences), one must remember that without such cooperative arrangements we would face much greater uncertainty regarding the scale and composition of SLCM deployments.

Since the United States and the Soviet Union have already deployed many SLCMs, both conventional and nuclear of varying ranges, an initial inventory is also required. Because SLCMs are so small, that inventory cannot rely only upon the submission of an initial data base by each side. Physical inspection of at least a significant fraction of randomly selected ships would be desirable, but monitoring traffic into and out of maintenance and repair facilities would provide considerable opportunities to detect cheating. For missiles already deployed, it would be necessary to install SAILORS when they are off-loaded for normal maintenance.

### SAILORS AND THE NCND POLICY

Since the United States does not wish to change the so-called NCND policy -- "neither confirm nor deny" -- a scheme for sealing conventional SLCMs should not become a means for distinguishing nuclear-armed vessels from others.

To retain the NCND policy, all sea-launched cruise missiles, regardless of the type of warhead fitted to them, could use identical canisters with identical SAILORS. This is at most a minor inconvenience, but some additional precautions are needed to make sure that nuclear and conventional missiles remain indistinguishable during deployment.

The trick is to separate the initial confirmation of which canisters contain what kinds of warheads from the task of sealing and locking the canisters. For example, loaded



canisters could pass through a three-stage facility.

\* At stage one detection monitors would determine whether the missile contained a nuclear or conventional payload; here inspectors would maintain an overall count of the numbers of each type.

\* Stage two would be a holding room to serve as a kind of 'blind'; here the deploying country would be able to move the canisters around randomly and without observation to confuse identification of any one canister as conventional or nuclear.

\* In the third stage, canisters would enter a room in which inspectors from the two sides would install seals and locks, but those inspectors would have no radiation detectors or other equipment to check which canisters held nuclear SLCMs.

To be able to open the locks later, the inspectors at stage three would have to apply an identification number to each canister (correlated with the secret combination), but there would be no joint record matching the canister's identification number with warhead type. Only the weapon's owner would hold records relating the canister number to the specific warhead and missile production numbers, data it could obtain through the normal readouts used to monitor the weapon's status during deployment. When the missiles were returned for maintenance, they could pass through the three-stage control facility in reverse, with the unlocking procedures and personnel again being separated by a blind from those responsible for confirming inventories of nuclear and conventional SLCMs.

Particularly considering America's greater concentration of high-value targets near her coasts, limiting the long-term threat of Soviet nuclear SLCMs deserves high priority. At the same time the legitimate military interest in exploiting cruise missiles for conventional purposes would be well served by procedures giving both sides confidence that abundant SLCM deployments will not inevitably undermine efforts to contain the growth of strategic nuclear capabilities. By easing the intrinsic ambiguity of SLCM deployments, the SAILOR concept and related procedures would relieve the pressures against a robust force of conventional cruise missiles. Indeed, had this approach been conceived in time, it should have been possible to retain the option for conventionally-armed ground-launched cruise missiles which many were reluctant to sacrifice in the INF Treaty.

That Treaty and the emerging START provisions have opened new vistas for cooperative verification and control arrangements. These breakthroughs make realistic the kinds of innovations described here. In order to guarantee that an option meeting U.S. security interests is available in timely fashion, design and engineering of a SAILOR system should begin promptly.

June 30, 1988



## PRESERVING DEFENSE OPTIONS AND CONCLUDING START

The relationship between strategic offenses that already exist and strategic defenses that may someday come to be has caused more consternation than any other facet of the START negotiations. Yet recent changes in the Soviet position make possible an approach to the issue of strategic defense that meets President Reagan's requirements and provides the basis for a START agreement.

From their adamant insistence that research on exotic defenses was permissible only within the four corners of the laboratory, the Soviets have gradually moved to a more realistic acceptance that wideranging development and testing of the relevant technologies will proceed. They acknowledge that the ABM Treaty permits such activities at fixed sites on the ground, e.g. the large U.S. laser to be built at White Sands. Senior Soviets also admit that some development and testing may take place in space. For a variety of reasons, including their evident desire to close a deal with the Reagan administration and mounting confidence that, if necessary, they can counter any unilateral U.S. exploitation of defensive technologies, the Soviets seem more willing than before to bargain seriously on this subject.

This gives the President the opportunity to achieve both his goal of major reductions and his goal of pursuing SDI. He can do so by framing his response to recent Soviet concessions on the basis of principles he has already set forth:

- >> The United States does not seek to exploit SDI to gain strategic superiority.
- >> The United States seeks a cooperative transition to a new strategic regime in which defenses play an increasing role.
- >> The United States offers to arrange 'open laboratories' in which Soviets and Americans can observe each other's work on defensive technologies.
- >> The United States is willing to strengthen the ABM Treaty by pledging continued adherence for a reasonable period.
- >> The United States proposes that each side lay out for the other's inspection its planned development schedules for strategic defenses.

With these guidelines in mind, one can see a way to bridge the remaining gap between the two sides.

Without agreeing to specify which technologies are permitted in space and which are prohibited, the United States and the Soviet Union could identify defensive technologies of mutual concern to be tested jointly and/or under mutual observation. Each side would retain the right to conduct such tests on a national basis, but would commit itself to provide the other government an opportunity to examine specified payloads prior to launch and to monitor data collected during such tests.

This concept builds on verification precedents devised in the INF agreement, specifically the



arrangements for prelaunch inspection of missiles being destroyed by launching and for constraints on data transmissions during such launches. Furthermore, the plan does not involve the kind of wholesale, continuous access to sensitive facilities and accompanying loss of technical intelligence that a full "open laboratories" regime would entail. It would confine the transparency of both sides' programs to an enumerated set of space-based tests.

What would be required is 1.) sufficient display of payloads prior to final encapsulation in the launch shroud to confirm that the hardware is what it purports to be, e.g. a laser or mirror of stated dimensions; and 2.) the stationing of technicians at the appropriate ground facilities during data readout and analysis for specific experiments. Such inspections would not differ fundamentally from the scope of verification arrangements for the reductions process on offenses. Certainly these procedures would mark an unprecedented departure for both parties, but, comparatively speaking, they should be more advantageous to the United States, since they would provide a wider window on the less accessible activities of the Soviet Union.

It will take some persuading to get the Soviets to see the mutual benefits of this plan; many details would require negotiation. They are reluctant to do anything that smacks of legitimizing SDI and they will be suspicious of any compromise proposals put forward by the administration. Nevertheless, properly refined and presented, this approach would be a demonstrably fair and workable response to Soviet concerns.

The virtue of this approach is that it would enable the parties to specify the technologies to be monitored without prejudging whether they should be constrained. It imposes no prohibition or burden on full exploration of the SDI technologies, but it provides a basis for reaping the harvest of offensive reductions in the near term. It gives the Soviets their list without their limitations. It would lend credibility to the President's proposals for a cooperative transition and for open investigation of defensive technologies. In short, it creates a watching brief instead of a veto.

Coupled with the President's pledge of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for a number of years, this concept could bring Moscow to accept the START agreement for which he has worked so long. The Soviets recognize that concurrence in such a mutual monitoring scheme would strengthen the President's hand in requesting congressional support for SDI activities. Yet, for a combination of reasons, including the fact that such arrangements would provide both sides with early warning about potential defensive breakthroughs for which they would need to compensate, the Soviets could see the value of a trade-off between political leverage and strategic predictability.

Of critical importance to American security, expanded monitoring of this type would provide U.S. military planners with a more confident basis for tracking trends in Soviet technology and for shaping our own strategic programs. It would be a decisive cure for the ambiguities which concerned the JCS in last December's summit statement.

Clearly, even if offensive reductions begin neither country will continue them if it fears that the other is moving toward a unilateral breakout on defense. Thus, the President's initial instinct to stress the imperative of cooperation in any transition to primary reliance on defenses was sound. Defining a more precise predictability package of the type outlined here would protect future defense options by implementing the President's stated



policy.

Would Moscow agree that a mutual monitoring regime justifies acceptance of the pending offensive reductions? It might help persuade them if a preliminary approach involved a senior figure outside the Administration able to argue that such an arrangement would enjoy bipartisan support, whatever the outcome of the election. On the Soviet side it is possible that Velikov and Sagdeyev, scientists with access to the General Secretary, would make the case for such a transparency measure.

An important fact: Sagdeyev said privately during the Washington summit that it was not essential to solve this problem immediately, but that it needed to be addressed over the next three years or so. If that is the Soviet attitude, beginning negotiations of a mutual monitoring arrangement for specified defensive experiments might be enough to get Gorbachev to close the deal on START. There would be no need to rush the detailed formulation of the monitoring agreement, and work on it could proceed into the early phases of offensive reductions.

Someone once said that "science progresses by substituting the unimportant problems it can handle for the important ones it cannot." Diplomacy often moves forward with similar indirection. In view of the protracted frictions over strategic defense, it is certainly worth attempting to lubricate the process by initiating a technical negotiation focused on ways two wary governments can keep closer tabs on each other's experiments with exotic defenses.

July 1, 1988

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 5, 1988

Mr. President:

As we discussed this morning,  
attached is a redraft of the letter  
to the Prime Minister of Barbados  
concerning Dame Nita Barrow.

Colin L. Powell



Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your letter of February 10, 1988, concerning Barbados' candidacy for the Presidency of the Forty-Third Session of the United Nations General Assembly.

We have the highest regard for Dame Nita Barrow. She has served Barbados with distinction as your country's Permanent Representative to the United Nations and she has strong qualifications for serving as General Assembly President. I encourage your efforts to gain a regional consensus for Dame Nita. As has been our practice for over 25 years we will indicate our preference after we have heard the view of the regional grouping.

I can assure you that if Dame Nita is elected to the United Nations General Assembly Presidency, we will work closely with her during the forthcoming UNGA session.

Sincerely,

The Honorable  
Lloyd Erskine Sandiford  
Prime Minister of Barbados  
Bridgetown

DECLASSIFIED / Released  
NLS F95-085 #120  
BY amf, NARA, DATE 12/2/99

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 5, 1988

JDN  
PSS  
ABF  
BOB PASTORINO  
FYI  


MEMORANDUM FOR COLIN POWELL

THRU: ALAN KRANOWITZ *AKK*  
FROM: JIM DYER *JD*  
SUBJECT: Central American Congressional Trip

Congressman Tom DeLay (R-TX), and Robin Tallon (D-SC) are putting together a three day trip to Nicaragua over this weekend with the purpose of calling attention to the human rights situation in Nicaragua. This trip is a followup to a special order both will take on the House Floor tomorrow focusing on political prisoners, human rights and the situation in Nicaraguan prisons. It is also an integral part of the pro-Contra members strategy to raise visibility for the Contra cause in the House.

DeLay has asked the State Department to set up meetings with Borge, as well as leaders of the internal opposition in Nicaragua. He has also asked that an itinerary be drawn up enabling the members of Congress to fan out across Nicaragua to visit prisons where political prisoners are held. They want to literally bang on the prison doors and in a high visibility way attack the Sandinista human rights record.

To date, DeLay, Tallon, Bob Dornan and Beverly Byron have signed up. More members will also sign up this week. They have asked DOD for a plane to take them to Managua and DOD has set a C-9 aside to do so. However, they have no Congressional authorization to travel and it is unlikely Jim Wright will allow any of the committees to authorize the trip. This means they will ask us to authorize their travel. I will need your guidance on whether or not we will authorize their trip. A note of caution; should we fail to authorize the trip, we will aggravate an already difficult situation with our supporters in the House and in all probability reinforce their contention that we are not doing enough in the area of public diplomacy to aid the Contra's cause.



CP

We deeply regret the loss of life and are in the process of investigating the incident. It is important to note, however, that any commanding officer's primary obligation is to protect his crew and his ship. We have made this quite clear throughout the Persian Gulf mission and have acted accordingly. Not only was the USS VINCENNES tracking an aircraft, which refused to identify itself, it was also engaged in a surface action with Iranian units. The VINCENNES had about four minutes from the time it picked up the target and until it was declared hostile. This is a severe constraint. Given these facts, the USS VINCENNES took proper defensive action. Considering the information available to him, the commander acted with good judgment and followed his authorities.

Q: Any reaction to the threats against US hostages in Lebanon?

A: We hold the kidnapers responsible for the safety and well being of all the hostages. We call for their prompt and safe release.

Q: Has the US been in touch with Iran regarding these hostage threats?

A: No. However, we have made it repeatedly clear to Iran through both private and public communications in the past regarding their responsibility for the well-being of the hostages.

Q: Has the US contacted Iran over the incident?

A: On Sunday the US sent a message to Iran via the Swiss Embassy in Teheran which represents US interests. The message expresses our deep regret over the tragic loss of life, pledges US efforts to arrive at all the facts, and urges Iran to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict.

Q: Have we received a response from Iran?

A: Not that I am aware of.

Q: Will we approach Iran to help in the investigation?

A: I believe the investigation will center on the electronic data, logs, and interviews of the crew of the USS VINCENNES and any other factors that may come up. I envisage no contact with Iran on the matter.

Q: Have we contacted the Soviet Union or have we heard from the Soviet Union over this incident?

*checking?*  
A: There was no communication with the Soviet Union outside of the notice we sent to all governments notifying them of the incident. News reports from Moscow have been mixed, with TASS, for example, reporting the incident without comment, but noting the President's message of regret.



Q: The Soviets claim KAL was over their territory, whereas the Iranian Airbus was in international waters. Do you have any comment?

A: As the President and Admiral Crowe have stated, there are fundamental differences. In the KAL incident, there was no combat in progress. Secondly, no warning in any form or fashion, and it was at very high altitude.

Q: Will the US consider reparations?

A: This is premature since we still have an ongoing investigation. We will have to await the results of that investigation.

Q: Is there any change in US policy?

A: There is no change in policy. Our purpose is to protect US flagged ships and to protect the broader principle of freedom of navigation in the Gulf. We are constantly surveying and reviewing not only the rules under which we operate, but also the rules of engagement. This will be part of the present investigation. If we see something in our investigation that suggests that we can make it more safe and still protect ourselves, we will change it.

Q: Is it true that the USS VINCENNES interfered with civilian air traffic in the past?

A: I am not aware of this. I would refer you to DOD.

Q: Are there any meetings planned at the White House?

A: There are no meetings or briefings scheduled beyond the President's normal national security briefing in the morning.

Q: Will the Administration invoke the War Powers Act over this incident?

A: In our continuous efforts to keep the Congress informed, and consistent with the War Powers Resolution, letters explaining the incident were sent to the Hill yesterday. These will be available immediately after the briefing.

Q: Is it true that the Pentagon received an after action report from another US ship that the Iranian aircraft was actually ascending before it was hit?

A: I am only aware of the news reports. I would refer you to DOD. I would assume any such reports would be examined during the course of the investigation.

Q: Have we noticed any increase in terrorist acts that can be linked to the Gulf incident?

A: Yesterday a small bomb exploded about 1000 feet from the Embassy in Madrid causing no injuries or damage. However, I am not aware of any increased terrorism at this time.

Q: Have US Embassies upgraded their security measures?

A: We never discuss the specific steps we may or may not be taking on security concerns. However, our Embassies are taking appropriate precautionary measures.



Q: What is the status of the investigation?

A: I understand a DOD team departed for the Gulf yesterday. This team is headed by Rear Admiral William N. Fogarty. It is scheduled to complete the investigation within 15 days. As the President stated on Sunday DOD will conduct a full investigation. The team left Tampa Monday morning. Will arrive Bahrain later today.

Q: Who is on the team?

A: I don't have that. Ask DOD.

(FYI: DOD will probably not release this information since the team may grow after it arrives in the Gulf.)

Q: Will the team be available to the press?

A: That is up to DOD. Based on past practice, I do not believe investigative teams meet with the press. (DOD isn't planning on it.)

Q: Is it true that an Italian ship has confirmed that the airliner was outside its normal route?

A: I am aware of the news reports, but have nothing on this. I am sure this will be examined in the course of the DOD investigation.

Q: What is the alert status of our forces in the Gulf?

A: There is no change in our alert status. We remain vigilant and alert. We have not changed our operating tempo.

(FYI ONLY: One US ship may have left Abu Dhabi early.)

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

5 Jul

John Tuck,

This is a good  
event & worth  
considering. I can't  
tell whether HHB  
would want to devote  
the time to it.

Policywise - do it.

Time-wise - HHB's call.





THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 1, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN TUCK

FROM:

JAMES C. MCKINNEY *JCM*

SUBJECT:

Joint Chiefs of Staff and Commander in Chief's  
Conference

Annually the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CINC's meet at a location outside of the Washington, DC area and conduct a major war game in conjunction with the conference.

This year the conference will be held in Pensacola, Florida on 21 -25 August 1988. The war game normally lasts from 8:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. each day. After 3:00 p.m., the participants are free to enjoy many activities that are planned for all attendees. The evenings are normally filled with a social event.

Previous participants at the war game have been Caspar Weinberger, Elliot Richardson, Walter Cronkite, Congressmen Slattery and Skelton, plus many other distinguished Americans.

Senator Baker would be asked to play the role of the President.

PS - John -

DOD will accept HHB for less than the 5 days - But, if that is done, they need to line up an "alternate" to cover when HHB is not there. So - they need to know how much time HHB will give them - "over" -

(4)

~~Confidential~~

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

MODE

SECURE FAX 09

ADMIN FAX # \_\_\_\_\_

RECORD # \_\_\_\_\_

PAGES 2

DTG 010153Z Jan 88

RELEASER \_\_\_\_\_

FROM/LOCATION

1. General Powell / Jackie Murphy / Palm Springs

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. ALAN PETERSON /

2. \_\_\_\_\_  
3. TOR: 020157Z Jan 88 X3

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. \_\_\_\_\_  
2. \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

Please send this message out via Privacy Channel ASAP per General Powell. Also, please provide copies to Paul Stevens and Nelson Ledsky. Thanks and Happy New Year!

*Jackie*

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F95-085-121

~~Confidential~~

CLASSIFICATION

NARA, DATE 12/2/99



VIA PRIVACY CHANNEL

TO: PRIME MINISTER MARGARET THATCHER

FROM: PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN

SUBJECT: MOSCOW HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MARGARET:

BECAUSE YOUR OWN JUDGMENT IN MATTERS RELATING TO EAST-WEST ISSUES IS SO SOUND, AND BECAUSE I KNOW HOW CLOSELY YOU HAVE FOLLOWED EVENTS IN VIENNA, I ESPECIALLY VALUED YOUR LETTER OF DECEMBER 21 ON THE MOSCOW HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE.

GIVEN ALL THAT HAS OCCURRED OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS, I BELIEVE THE TIME HAS COME TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THE SOVIET REQUEST TO HOST A HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE IN 1991. TRUE, WE HAVE NOT GOTTEN ALL WE WANTED FROM THE SOVIETS, BUT WE HAVE MADE SUBSTANTIAL GAINS BEYOND WHAT YOU OR I COULD HAVE EXPECTED EVEN A YEAR AGO. MUCH PROGRESS HAS BEEN REGISTERED IN RESOLVING POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS CASES. EMIGRATION RATES ARE UP. JAMMING HAS CEASED. THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF REFORM HAS BEEN PROMISED TO THE WORLD BY GORBACHEV.

I BELIEVE WE MUST NOW LOOK TO HOW WE CAN BEST PRESERVE AND EXTEND OUR ADVANCES, AND IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THIS MEANS WE SHOULD AGREE NOW TO A MOSCOW CONFERENCE IN 1991 AS PART OF A PACKAGE OF CSCE FOLLOW-ON MEETINGS. LIKE YOU, I AM DETERMINED TO KEEP THE FAITH WITH THOSE WHO HAVE FOUGHT SO COURAGEOUSLY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE SOVIET UNION, AND TO DO WHAT WE CAN TO PREVENT SOVIET BACKSLIDING. THIS MEANS WE ARE PREPARED TO MONITOR CAREFULLY

DECLASSIFIED / Released  
NLS F95-085 #122

BY Amf, NARA, DATE 12/2/99

IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTUAL HUMAN RIGHTS REFORMS, INCLUDING THOSE GORBACHEV HAS PROMISED FOR 1989. I ALSO BELIEVE WE HAVE ESTABLISHED A PROCESS THAT WILL MAINTAIN CONTINUOUS PRESSURE ON THE SOVIETS AND ENCOURAGE FURTHER PROGRESS. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT IF THERE IS MAJOR BACKSLIDING OR A SIGNIFICANT REVERSAL OF PRESENT TRENDS, WE AND OTHER ALLIES AS WELL WOULD WISH TO REVIEW OUR PARTICIPATION IN MOSCOW IN 1991.

GIVEN THIS SITUATION, I HOPE YOU CAN JOIN WITH US IN ACCEPTING A MOSCOW CONFERENCE. IT WOULD BE OUR CURRENT PLAN TO SIGNAL OUR ACCEPTANCE ON TUESDAY, JANUARY 3. I WOULD WELCOME YOUR FURTHER VIEWS BEFORE WE TAKE THIS STEP.

SINCERELY,

RON

END TEXT.



IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

PRT: COMM SIGLER  
SIT: LEBRAS WHSR-OUT

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<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> SECRET

<DTG> 130027Z JAN 89

FM WHITE HOUSE

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS EYES ONLY

0000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE [REDACTED] FROM GEN.  
COLIN POWELL, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT.

DEAR [REDACTED]

THANKS FOR YOUR KIND WORDS. IT WAS A PLEASURE TO WORK WITH YOU.  
YOU ARE ONE OF THE TOP PROS. I APPRECIATED ALL THE SUPPORT YOU  
PROVIDED. ALL THE BEST IN YOUR NEW ASSIGNMENT.

WARMEST PERSONAL REGARDS,

COLIN

#0225

BT  
#123

F45-085 #123

LOI 7/19/00

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY TO ██████████ ██████████ ██████████ BACK CHANNEL/PRIVACY CHANNELS

Dear ██████████

Thanks for your kind words. It was a pleasure to work with you. You are one of the top pros. I appreciated all the support you provided. All the best in your new assignment.

Warmest personal regards,

  
Colin

| Pls return  
backup with  
out going.



~~SECRET~~

FOI F45-085 #124  
7/19/00



PRIORITY

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TAP

PAGE 01

PRT: POWELL

<PREC> PRIORITY <CLAS> SECRET <DTG> 111651Z JAN 89

[REDACTED]

TO THE WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ 111651Z JAN 89 PRIVACY CHANNELS

FM: [REDACTED]

TO: GENERAL COLIN L. POWELL, USA, ASSISTANT TO THE  
PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, NATIONAL SECURITY  
COUNCIL, WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: PERSONAL MESSAGE FOR GENERAL POWELL [REDACTED]

DEAR COLIN:

AS YOUR DAYS ON THE NSC COME TO A CLOSE AND YOU HEAD OFF  
FOR YOUR NEW COMMAND, I WANT TO ADD MY CONGRATULATIONS AND VERY  
BEST WISHES TO YOU, BOTH FOR THE NEW ASSIGNMENT AND FOR THE  
FINE RECORD OF SERVICE IN YOUR PRESENT JOB. I WILL REMEMBER  
AND APPRECIATE THE STRONG SUPPORT AND WISE COUNSEL YOU ALWAYS  
BROUGHT TO BEAR ON THE ISSUES WE DEALT WITH WHILE I WAS IN  
WASHINGTON. I AM NOW ENSCONCED [REDACTED] AND HOPE IF YOU COME  
THIS WAY TO SEE YOU ONCE AGAIN. WITH HIGHEST REGARDS, [REDACTED]

\*0491

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
NLS 195-085 #125  
By 105 NARA, Date 7/19/00

~~SECRET~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: DONLEY NEGROPONTE PERITO POWELL SIT STEVENS  
SIT: COO WHSR^HOTLINE

-----  
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 020245Z JAN 89

FM WHITE HOUSE

TO CABINET OFFICE LONDON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS

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PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN  
TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER.

SUBJECT: MOSCOW HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE

BEGIN TEXT

DEAR MARGARET:

BECAUSE YOUR OWN JUDGEMENT IN MATTERS RELATING TO EAST-WEST  
ISSUES IS SO SOUND, AND BECAUSE I KNOW HOW CLOSELY YOU HAVE  
FOLLOWED EVENTS IN VIENNA, I ESPECIALLY VALUED YOUR LETTER OF  
DECEMBER 21 ON THE MOSCOW HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE.

GIVEN ALL THAT HAS OCCURRED OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS, I  
BELIEVE THE TIME HAS COME TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THE SOVIET  
REQUEST TO HOST A HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE IN 1991. TRUE, WE HAVE  
NOT GOTTEN ALL WE WANTED FROM THE SOVIETS, BUT WE HAVE MADE  
SUBSTANTIAL GAINS BEYOND WHAT YOU OR I COULD HAVE EXPECTED EVEN A  
YEAR AGO. MUCH PROGRESS HAS BEEN REGISTERED IN RESOLVING  
POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS CASES. EMIGRATION RATES ARE UP. JAMMING  
HAS CEASED. THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF REFORM HAS BEEN PROMISED  
TO THE WORLD BY GORBACHEV.

I BELIEVE WE MUST NOW LOOK TO HOW WE CAN BEST PRESERVE AND

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F95-085 #126

BY smj, NARA, DATE 12/2/99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

EXTEND OUR ADVANCES, AND IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THIS MEANS WE SHOULD AGREE NOW TO A MOSCOW CONFERENCE IN 1991 AS PART OF A PACKAGE OF CSCE FOLLOW-ON MEETINGS. LIKE YOU, I AM DETERMINED TO KEEP THE FAITH WITH THOSE WHO HAVE FOUGHT SO COURAGEOUSLY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE SOVIET UNION, AND TO DO WHAT WE CAN TO PREVENT SOVIET BACKSLIDING. THIS MEANS WE ARE PREPARED TO MONITOR CAREFULLY IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTUAL HUMAN RIGHTS REFORMS, INCLUDING THOSE GORBACHEV HAS PROMISED FOR 1989. I ALSO BELIEVE WE HAVE ESTABLISHED A PROCESS THAT WILL MAINTAIN CONTINUOUS PRESSURE ON THE SOVIETS AND ENCOURAGE FURTHER PROGRESS. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT IF THERE IS MAJOR BACKSLIDING OR A SIGNIFICANT REVERSAL OF PRESENT TRENDS, WE AND OTHER ALLIES AS WELL WOULD WISH TO REVIEW OUR PARTICIPATION IN MOSCOW IN 1991.

GIVEN THIS SITUATION, I HOPE YOU CAN JOIN WITH US IN ACCEPTING A MOSCOW CONFERENCE. IT WOULD BE OUR CURRENT PLAN TO SIGNAL OUR ACCEPTANCE ON TUESDAY, JANUARY 3. I WOULD WELCOME YOUR FURTHER VIEWS BEFORE WE TAKE THIS STEP.

SINCERELY,

RON

END TEXT

\*0203

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~