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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** OAKLEY, ROBERT: FILES

**Withdrawer**

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**File Folder** IRAN INITIATIVE

**FOIA**

M11-391

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
127200	MEMO	CHARLES ALLEN TO OAKLEY RE IRAN INITIATIVE <i>D 8/8/2007 F97-108/2 #76; PAR 11/15/2012 M11-391 #127200</i>	1	1/5/1987	B1 B3
127202	PAPER	RE NINE POINTS	1	10/8/1986	B1
127204	PAPER	RE SEVEN POINTS	1	ND	B1
127205	MEMCON	RE US-IRAN DIALOGUE <i>D 4/17/2006 NLSF97-108/2 #79</i>	2	5/27/1986	B1
127206	PAPER	RE IMPACT OF US AUTHORIZED ARMS SHIPMENTS TO IRAN <i>R 4/17/2006 NLSF97-108/2 #80</i>	2	12/31/1986	B1
127207	PAPER	RE IRAN <i>R 4/17/2006 NLSF97-108/2 #81</i>	4	12/31/1986	B1
127208	LETTER	A. RAPHEL TO MR. SECRETARY <i>PAR 8/15/2001 NLSF97-108/2 #82</i>	4	12/12/1986	B1
127209	MEMO	OAKLEY TO FRANK CARLUCCI RE UPDATE ON IRAN DEVELOPMENTS	2	1/2/1987	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** OAKLEY, ROBERT: Files

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**Date:** 11/30/00

Box 91845 *RAC Box 4*

Wills/F97-108/2

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Memo	Charles Allen to Oakley, re: Iran Initiative, 1 p.	1/5/87	P1/B1, <i>63</i>
2. Paper	<i>D 8/8/07 F97-108/2 #76</i> Nine Points, 1 p..	10/8/86	P1/B1
3. Paper	"Seven Points," 1 p.	n.d.	P1/B1
4. MemCon	Noth, Cave, Teicher with Iran, etc, re: U.S.- Iran Dialogue, 2 p.	n.d.	P1/B1
<del>5. Paper</del>	<del><i>D 4/17/06 F97-108/2 #79</i> re: Impact of U.S. Authorized Arms Shipments to Iran, 2 p.</del>	<del>12/31/86</del>	<del>P1/B1</del>
<del>6. Paper</del>	<del><i>R " " #80</i> re: Iran, 4 p.</del>	<del>12/31/86</del>	<del>P1/B1</del>
7. Letter	<i>R " " #81</i> A. Raphael to [Shultz], 4 p	12/12/[86]	P1/B1
8. Memo	<i>Palt. 8/15/01 F97-108/2 #82</i> Oakley to Frank Carlucci, re: Update on Iran Developments, 2 p.	1/2/86 (sic) [87]	P1/B1

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

E.O. 13526  
As Amended  
Sec. 3.5(c)

~~SECRET~~

The Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20505

127200

National Intelligence Council

NIC 00026-87  
5 January 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Ambassador Robert Oakley  
Special Assistant to the President  
Director Near East and South Asian Affairs

FROM: Charles E. Allen,  
National Intelligence Officer for Counterterrorism

SUBJECT: Iran Initiative

1. Attached are the seven points arrived at between the United States and Iranian representatives during the 19-20 September 1986 meeting in Washington. Also attached is a first draft of the nine points agreed to between Washington and Tehran during the meeting in Frankfurt, Germany, on 8-9 October 1985.

2. Apparently there were subsequent refinements to the nine points which were arrived at between Ollie North and the Iranians. The only two that George Cave and I are aware of are: (a) the US made it clear to the Iranians that, under no circumstances, would TOW missile launchers be supplied to Iran; and (b) if only one hostage was released by the captors following negotiations with Tehran, both sides would meet in Western Europe immediately to determine how to secure the release of additional hostages.

3. Unfortunately, there may have been other refinements to the nine points. We do not hold that information at the Agency but were told that a paper concerning the refinements was held by Ollie North.

[Redacted Signature]

Charles E. Allen

Attachments:  
As stated

DECL OADR

~~SECRET~~

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BY RW NARA DATE 11/15/12

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Urgent

1/4/87

Dick -

Both Dennis Ross & I have carefully reviewed the points on Iran which Peter gave to Dennis Saturday morning. We have made a number of specific suggestions for changes, several of which I consider to be very important. They are marked in red on the papers done by Peter.

In general, the talking points are too defensive, avoid tough questions rather than addressing them, do not admit we get surprised, do not seek to restore credibility and cooperation, and do not ask our Arab friends what they suggest for the future. You need to deal straight up with this issue, otherwise we will never restore a medium of credibility and cooperation/communication.

The paper on arms is very weak. As a matter of long-term interest, I am going to try and find out what we really did ship (all of it), what we know the Israelis shipped, & what we think they shipped & others shipped which we do not know directly. If you go only by the paper done by NSA, your present credibility will collapse, as well as eliciting a "here you go again" reaction vis-a-vis Washington.

Bah

P.S. What will you say to Israel about arms sales - past, present (if any) and future? What will you tell them about Iran?

*[Faint, illegible handwritten text]*

*[Faint, illegible handwritten text]*

*[Faint, illegible handwritten text]*

*[Faint handwritten text in a circle]*



Bob  
Oakley

Bob  
Oakley

2) -- We are presently considering how best to proceed with in future dealings with Iran and have not yet reached any firm conclusions. Your thoughts would be helpful in our deliberations. (For Saudi Arabia: What conclusions have you drawn from your contacts with Iran over the past couple of years on petroleum and other matters?)

1) -- Iran took our efforts to improve long-term relations and bring stability and peace to the region much as an opportunity to obtain arms. It played ~~down~~ ~~upon~~ the cynically upon the hostages issue.



Bob  
Oakley

Bob  
Oakley

(4) -- Substantial progress  
has been made over the  
past year in reducing  
Libyan and Syrian support of  
national terrorism. Close cooperation  
between moderate Arab and  
Western governments has  
~~been effective and must continue~~  
~~continue~~  
been effective in achieving  
this result, and must continue.

(3) Our public statements  
rejecting any such linkage accurately  
reflect our policy. We have a  
legal obligation to make the  
payment but we are deliberately  
drawing out the discussions so  
the Tunisians will understand  
that they can not blackmail us,  
~~so they will understand~~  
They must understand our  
determination to fight terrorism  
and to see Tunis stop supporting  
terrorists, no matter who the  
target might be.

# Bob Oakley

⑤ ~~②~~ - (For Saudi Arabia:

Do you have any  
suggestions as to how  
we or other Western  
governments can help  
you and other GCC govts  
prepare for possibly  
increased threats?

How do you see  
the war evolving,  
and what could we  
or other outside govts  
do to ~~help~~ be  
helpful? What is  
Iraq's position -

Bob  
Oakley

(A)

This fails to  
convince me, given  
the additional items  
reported by the press  
to have been shipped  
by the US (spare  
parts for radars, P  
missiles, etc.) and the  
shipments by Israel with  
our collusion or tacit  
approval. It will surely be  
seen by Hussein, Muबारک  
the Saudis as a transparent  
non-credible cover-up!

If there have been

Bob  
Oakley

improvements in  
Iran's air defenses,  
including radars, why  
have attacks on Kharg  
Island diminished?

~~Confidential~~

IMPACT OF U.S.-AUTHORIZED ARMS SHIPMENTS TO IRAN

Background

The U.S. authorized shipment of 2008 TOW missiles and 218 spare parts sets for Hawk missile batteries. Shipment of TOWs took place in September 1985 (508 missiles), February 1986 (1000 missiles), and November 1986 (500 missiles). The Hawk spare parts sets were delivered in May and June 1986.

The quantity of TOW missiles shipped to Iran has only a limited potential to affect Iran's conduct of the war. Iran has probably used at least some of these missiles since delivery, most likely in heavy fighting during the Fao offensive in February 1986, in various border clashes during the spring, in expelling the Iraqis from Mehran in July, and perhaps in December's "Karbala IV" offensive. Iran's operations during this period were probably not dependent upon its possession and use of TOWs.

The Hawk spare part kits <sup>have</sup> ~~do not appear to have~~ appreciably increased <sup>Iran's</sup> air defense capability. In any case, Iranian Hawk deployments are neither thick enough on the ground nor effective enough in themselves to increase its air defense threat. ~~Since mid-summer, Iraq's air force has waged an intensive air campaign against Iran's military and economic facilities. Those few sites defended by operable Hawk batteries, such as Kharg Island, have made no confirmed kills; anti-aircraft artillery has shot down the few Iraqi planes known. (For your information only - we also have seen reports suggesting that at least one Hawk missile site, near Tehran, has been armed with surface-to-air missiles other than Hawks).~~

The best indication of this is that Iraq has intensified their air campaign since the provision of our Hawk spare parts kits, and suffered very few losses.

Talking Points

--The U.S. authorized shipment to Iran of 2008 TOW missiles and 218 Hawk missile battery spare part kits.

--The TOWs were shipped in September 1985 (508 TOWs), February 1986 (1000 TOWs), and November 1986 (500).

--The quantity of TOWs shipped to Iran has only a limited potential to affect the war. Iran probably has used at least some of these missiles since September 1985, in heavy fighting last winter (at Fao), spring, and during the summer (at Mehran), and during the December "Karbala IV" offensive. We do not believe that Iran's use of its TOWs affected the outcome of these battles.

--The Hawk spare parts sets were delivered to Iran in May and July 1986.

--The Hawk spare parts ~~do not appear to have~~ <sup>not</sup> appreciably increased Iran's air defense capability. <sup>the provision of the spare parts kits</sup> Since ~~mid-summer~~, Iraq has <sup>intensified its use</sup> and successfully used its air force to strike Iranian military and economic targets, some of which are defended by Hawk missile batteries, without experiencing any aircraft loss we can attribute to Hawk surface-to-air missiles.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F97-108/2 #80

BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 4/17/06

Drafted:NEA/NGA:LPlascik  
12/31/86 x76111 x1574  
Clearances: NEA:MVCreekmore MVC  
NEA/NGA:APBurleigh  
INR/NESA:JMcAlpine  
INR?PMA:CJefferson

BY LAT, NARA, DATE 4/17/06

Bob,  
Here are the talking points  
with my changes. I thought  
they needed beefing up.

Dennis

CONFIDENTIAL

IRAN

(For Use in Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia)

Discussion and Basic Message to Convey

Despite problems which have arisen regarding U.S. policy toward the Iran-Iraq war and toward Iran generally, U.S. policy remains intact, is being pursued vigorously and is solidly based on U.S. pursuit of its regional interests. These interests overlap in important ways with those of Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Arab governments should keep their eye on U.S. actions and not be diverted by the unfolding revelations in Washington -- which we will handle according to our Constitutional arrangements.

Even if unsuccessful, our probe of Iran was motivated by concerns for regional stability -- concerns that our Arab friends share.

Your main objectives in discussing U.S. policy on Iran with the Jordanians, Saudis and Egyptians should be to ~~reinforce the theme of~~ constancy and consistency in U.S. policy toward the region, and to underscore that U.S. interests in ending the war as soon as possible are congruent with moderate Arab states' interests.

assure them of the future  
Our credibility and desire to consult with our friends,

Talking Points

-- U.S. policy on the Gulf war is unchanged: We seek the earliest possible end to the war, with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both Iran and Iraq intact.

-- We ~~do~~ <sup>will</sup> not supply U.S.-origin military equipment to either side, nor ~~do~~ we approve transfers from third parties. The limited shipments of arms to Iran were an exception to the policy, ~~for reasons which the President has noted. There will be no further shipments, however.~~

our  
- 1

~~There will be no further shipments not simply because of the failure of our Iraq has indicated its willingness to cooperate with constructive diplomatic efforts to end the war, while Iran has adamantly refused all such suggestions and proposals, from whatever source.~~

The President decided that a limited exception to Operation Staunch was necessary to make a probe of the Iranians; something he deemed to be risky, but something he deemed important as transition looms in Iran. The probe did not work out as we had hoped, and we have learned from it. There will be no further arms shipments.

Because Iran is recalcitrant, in that regard, the U.S. is vigorously pursuing "Operation Staunch," which is our attempt to discourage shipments of arms from any source to Iran. Despite the revelations of November and early December, we have been actively pressing Staunch on several governments -- importantly including Israel. ~~because we recognize damage done to our credibility, it has become~~

CONFIDENTIAL  
DECL: OADR

[What can be said about Israeli policy + practice?]

We know we have something to prove and as a result are pressing Staunch now with even greater vigor than before. (Refer to Derwinski note.)

Having said all this (and)

-- ~~(Despite our many problems with the Iranian government), the USG nevertheless recognizes Iran's great strategic importance. It was that recognition which led the President to authorize the limited transfer of arms to Iran which have been the source of so much controversy.~~

Iran that remains intact and is prepared to live in peace with its neighbors can be a source of stability and security in the region. That is in all our interests.

Though the U.S. has firmly decided that no further arms will be transferred to Iran, we are nonetheless mindful of the important role Iran can play in the region. However, Iran must both decide to end the war with Iraq and move to dissociate itself from the support of terrorism before substantial progress can be made in our bilateral relations.

*demonstrate its commitment to normalizing its relations with others in the region*

Related Issues: Talking Points (Contd):

TERRORISM:

-- USG policy on terrorism has not changed. We are well aware of the credibility problems we face as a result of what appears to have been our trading arms for hostages, but as a Government we are determined to correct that misimpression.

*That means it must end the war, dissociate itself from the use of terror, and stop trying to subvert its neighbors.*

-- (IF ASKED ONLY) We are also aware of the widespread impression that our recent discussions with Iranian banking officials at The Hague make it appear that we continue to negotiate for our hostages in Lebanon. On the contrary, there is no connection between these discussions and our hostages--despite allusion to such connection by some Iranian leaders. ~~We have to live up to our legal obligations, but in that context, we are determined to draw out the discussions--and return of Iranian monies--as long as possible.~~

POSSIBLE SPREAD OF THE GULF WAR

-- We have said many times that we would consider the expansion of the war to neutral Gulf states to be a major threat to our interests. We believe that Iran understands our position in this regard and acts accordingly.

-- The war is by nature unpredictable, however. As the tempo and pace of war-related activities increase, the possibilities of some sort of spillover also increase. We are prepared to <sup>work</sup> plan for such eventualities with our friends in the region *to deal with such eventualities.*

*work with*

*(5)*



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

-- We continue to state the importance we attach to freedom of navigation as well as to underscore our determination to maintain open access through the Strait of Hormuz. Attacks on non-belligerent shipping serving neutral ports and on economic installations and territory of the neutral Gulf states are of serious concern to the USG -- we have said so privately and publicly to the Iranians.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Drafted:NEA/NGA:LPiascik

12/31/86 x76111 x1574

Clearances: NEA:MVCreekmore MVC

NEA/NGA:APBurleigh

INR/NESA:JMcAlpine

INR?PMA:CJefferson

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

12/12

Mr. Secretary -

We are working closely with Mike Armacost to craft a strategy on future relations with Iran. As that continues, I want to share with you some thoughts on Iran drawing on my five years service in that country.

Flexibility in the Political Ethos:

Although the government of Iran is dedicated to Islamic radicalism, Persians are among the least ideological of people. Flexibility and continually changing alliances are the mark of survival in Persian politics. During the Shah's reign, it was common for the same family to have one cousin in the Parliament, another in the Tudeh party and another a Mullah. Cover all the bets.

This flexibility is illustrated by the fact that Iranian life centers around what they call "dowrehs", literally circles. Everyone belongs to several dowrehs - extended family, political party, religious sect, profession. Membership in dowrehs overlaps, so everyone knows what everyone else is doing, and allegiances are fluid. This common knowledge of important activities is why it was inevitable that the hostages for arms deal would be made public as soon as one Iranian faction thought it in its interest to do so.

As an example of the virtue of flexibility and relativity in allegiances, Iranians point with admiration to a general who, while serving under Shah Abbas in the 16th century, led a Persian army against Bahrain. After conquering the island, the general revolted against the Shah and declared Bahrain's independence. Shah Abbas sent another Army, conquered the island, and brought the general home in chains. He was publicly humiliated and castrated and his children were executed. Two years later, when a rival group under the Shah became too strong, the Shah brought the general back and made him Prime Minister. Not an unusual Persian maneuver.

This striking Persian trait means we should not try to characterize Iranians as firmly in any camp and we should avoid such labels as "moderate" or "radical".

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

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By CB NARA, Date 8/15/01

Perceptions of the U.S.:

Persian flexibility is also evident in Iran's approach to the U.S. Over 20,000 Iranian students are still studying in the United States, the great majority of them with government scholarships. Although less than the 30,000 or so under the Shah, it is still a significant number, perhaps the second or third largest foreign student population in the U.S. It may seem contradictory for a government which uses such venom when talking about the "Great Satan" to continue to send its youth here to study. But it is just another example of Iranian flexibility. The best technical education for young Iranians is in the States, so that's where they send them.

In a similar vein, Iranian Green Card holders, and Americans of Iranian birth, continuously travel to and from Iran visiting family and on business. They travel without interference from the government.

Iranians firmly believe in a Copernican world with Iran at its center.



FOIA(b)(1)

Iranians would be bewildered by a contention that if the U.S. does not talk to Iran, the latter would be isolated. Persians assume they are the keystone of the world order, and any nation that refuses to speak with them is merely practicing self-isolation.

Iranians are also highly suspicious of the U.S. and its intentions. They believe we have immense powers to interfere in Iran and it scares them. Mike hosted a lunch for scholars on Iran last week and a key theme was how Iranians welcomed the President's statement that the Iranian revolution is a fact of history. They believe that the U.S. has now indicated it is willing to accept the revolution and the new order in the country.

Iran and the Russians:

Persian animosity toward Russia is deeply rooted and strongly felt. There is an abiding mistrust of Russian intentions, and all Persian schoolchildren are taught about the various Russian invasions of their country. This animosity has been heightened since the Revolution because the historical antipathy has been reinforced by the religious antipathy toward communism. Consequently, Soviet attempts to seduce Iran fall on hostile ground. If any country was more concerned about the Islamic Revolution than the U.S., it was the USSR. The specter of a radical, militant Islamic state bordering its Islamic Central Asian republics must cause great worry and concern in Moscow.

Iran's ties with the West and estrangement from the Soviets are more pronounced than they were under the Shah. The percentage of Iranian trade with Western Europe and Japan is higher now than it was under the Shah while trade with the Soviet Union is less. The real Soviet threat to Iran will not come as long as there is a cohesive, unified Persian state. However, if the state begins to disintegrate after Khomeini dies, the Soviets will be tempted to move in as they have in the past. Even then they will be somewhat inhibited by the thought that if they move into northern Iran we may move into the south - a much more valuable piece of real estate with its oil fields.

Conclusions and Lessons:

Some lessons can be drawn from these assessments:

--Keep channels open - Iranians want as many channels open as possible to the outside world. This is especially true now that the maneuvering for the post-Khomeini era is in full swing. The Iranians do not want to use these channels for any specific purpose - unless, for example, someone is willing to sell them arms. Rather, they just want to know that once Khomeini goes, there will be a lot of telephone lines working out of Tehran and someone will answer the phone.

--We Have Little or no Influence on the Succession - We cannot really influence what comes after Khomeini. Our leverage is too limited and supplying arms just increases Persian disdain for us. The only purpose of opening channels is to be in place once Khomeini goes. The Soviets have their channels, so do the Europeans and the Japanese. We are the only one who does not. Our self-imposed isolation is contrary to our interests and argues for opening up a policy channel soon.

--Don't Focus on an anti-Russian Strategy - The Iranians are alert to the Russian threat and will not be seduced. The Russian threat becomes real if Iran starts to disintegrate. This argues for US actions which do not encourage instability in Iran.

--Don't Bargain with the Iranians Now - The Iranians continue to prove to us that when it comes to the bazaar, they are better rug merchants than we. They're major league and we're still playing minor league ball. For the first Reagan term, Iranians respected us, although they didn't like us. They knew, however, that we kept our word and that we would not compromise on issues critical to us. The real damage of arms for hostages, in terms of Iran's perception of the US, has been that we have proven that we are just like the Saudis, Omanis and others - we make deals on any issue. It will take a long time to erase that perception.

The lesson is we should be willing to listen and talk - for channels of communication are important - but we should be rock firm on our principles.

--Time and the Odds are with Us - Iran has historically looked to the West, not to the North. The revolution has given Iran even more reasons not to look north. Iran's economic and commercial ties are with the West and Japan and are increasing. Over time, I am convinced, Iran will continue to strengthen its ties to our friends. Eventually, they will also open up to the US. We will never have the same relationship as we had in the past, but our primary goal is obtainable - a secure Iran, firmly outside the Soviet orbit, which has moderated its behavior and abjured terrorism. It will take time, and the road will be bumpy, but the odds are with us. It will require great patience, and a willingness to listen but not to compromise. There are no quick fixes. In the interim, we must continue to reassure our friends of our support and commitments to them.

A. Raphel



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