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**Collection:** Near East and South Asia (NESA) Affairs  
Directorate, NSC: Records

**Folder Title:** Iran-Iraq 1987

**Box:** RAC Box 4

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE,  
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**File Folder:** Iran-Iraq 1987 Box 91983

**Date:** January 6, 1998

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. report	re Iraq (w/notations), 1p D, 6/7/00 NLSF96-121 #59	12/6/86	P1
<del>2. cable</del>	<del>071647Z JUL 87 (w/notations), 7p R, 6/7/00 NLSF96-121 #60</del>	<del>7/7/87</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>3. cable</del>	<del>162041Z JUL 87 (w/notations), 3p " " " #61</del>	<del>7/6/87</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>4. cable</del>	<del>031255Z JUL 87 (w/notations), 1p " " " #62</del>	<del>6/3/87</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>5. cable</del>	<del>161611Z MAY 87 (w/notations), 2p " " " #63</del>	<del>5/16/87</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>6. cable</del>	<del>150118Z MAY 87 (w/notations), 2p " " " #64</del>	<del>5/15/87</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>7. cable</del>	<del>011734Z MAY 87 (w/notations), 3p " " " #65</del>	<del>5/1/87</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>8. cable</del>	<del>260011Z MAR 87 (w/notations), 1p " " " #66</del>	<del>3/26/87</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>9. cable</del>	<del>251802Z FEB 87 (w/notations), 1p " " " #67</del>	<del>2/25/87</del>	<del>P1</del>
10. memo	from Robert B. Oakley, re Iran-Iraq War (w/notations), 1p P 2/17/06 F96-121 #68	2/4/87	<del>P1</del> <b>B3</b>
<del>11. cable</del>	<del>300101Z JAN 87 (w/notations), 4p R, 6/7/00 NLSF96-121 #69</del>	<del>1/31/87</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>12. cable</del>	<del>300539Z JAN 87 (w/notations), 3p " " " #70</del>	<del>1/30/87</del>	<del>P1</del>
13. memo	Dennis Ross to Frank C. Carlucci, re Iran-Iraq Peace Initiative and Other Options (w/notations), 1p	1/21/87	P1 P5
<del>14. cable</del>	<del>111451Z JAN 87 (w/notations), 2p R, 6/7/00 NLSF96-121 #71</del>	<del>1/11/87</del>	<del>P1</del>

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-5 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

<DIST>SIT: EOB VAX

<PREC> IMMEDIATE<CLAS> UNCLASSIFIED<OSRI> RUEHDT<DTG> 170105Z JUL 87

<ORIG>FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

<TO>TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0484

INFO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 2545

RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: IRAN/IRAQ: REVISED DRAFT RESOLUTION

*Iran-Iraq*

<TEXT>

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 02017

E.O. 12356: NA

TAGS: PREL, UNSC, IR, IZ

SUBJECT: IRAN/IRAQ: REVISED DRAFT RESOLUTION

1. TEXT FOLLOWS OF DRAFT RESOLUTION AS AGREED TO BY PERMANENT MEMBERS JULY 16:

BEGIN TEXT:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,  
REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTION 582 (1986),  
DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT, DESPITE ITS CALLS FOR A  
CEASE-FIRE, THE CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ CONTINUES  
UNABATED, WITH FURTHER HEAVY LOSS OF HUMAN LIFE AND  
MATERIAL DESTRUCTION,  
DEPLORING THE INITIATION AND CONTINUATION OF THE  
CONFLICT,  
DEPLORING ALSO THE BOMBING OF PURELY CIVILIAN POPULATION  
CENTERS, ATTACKS ON NEUTRAL SHIPPING OR CIVILIAN  
AIRCRAFT, THE VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN  
LAW AND OTHER LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, AND, IN  
PARTICULAR, THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONTRARY TO  
OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE 1925 GENEVA PROTOCOL,  
DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT FURTHER ESCALATION AND WIDENING OF  
THE CONFLICT MAY TAKE PLACE,  
DETERMINED TO BRING TO AN END ALL MILITARY ACTIONS  
BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ,  
CONVINCED THAT A COMPREHENSIVE, JUST, HONORABLE AND  
DURABLE SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE ACHIEVED BETWEEN IRAN AND  
IRAQ,  
RECALLING THE PROVISIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER  
AND IN PARTICULAR THE OBLIGATION OF ALL MEMBER STATES TO  
SETTLE THEIR INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES BY PEACEFUL MEANS IN  
SUCH A MANNER THAT INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY AND  
JUSTICE ARE NOT ENDANGERED,  
DETERMINING THAT THERE EXISTS A BREACH OF THE PEACE AS  
REGARDS THE CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ,  
ACTING UNDER ARTICLES 39 AND 40 OF THE CHARTER OF THE  
UNITED NATIONS,  
1) DEMANDS THAT, AS A FIRST STEP TOWARDS A NEGOTIATED  
SETTLEMENT, IRAN AND IRAQ OBSERVE AN IMMEDIATE  
CEASE-FIRE, DISCONTINUE ALL MILITARY ACTIONS ON LAND, AT  
SEA AND IN THE AIR, AND WITHDRAW ALL FORCES TO THE  
INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES WITHOUT DELAY.  
2) REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO DISPATCH A TEAM OF  
UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS TO VERIFY, CONFIRM AND  
SUPERVISE THE CEASE-FIRE AND WITHDRAWAL AND FURTHER  
REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO MAKE THE NECESSARY  
ARRANGEMENTS IN CONSULTATION WITH THE PARTIES AND TO  
SUBMIT A REPORT THEREON TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL.  
3) URGES THAT PRISONERS OF WAR BE RELEASED AND

*Text as  
agreed to by  
UNSC.*

REPATRIATED WITHOUT DELAY AFTER THE CESSATION OF ACTIVE HOSTILITIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION OF 12 AUGUST 1949.

4) CALLS UPON IRAN AND IRAQ TO COOPERATE WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN IMPLEMENTING THIS RESOLUTION AND IN MEDIATION EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A COMPREHENSIVE, JUST AND HONORABLE SETTLEMENT, ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES, OF ALL OUTSTANDING ISSUES, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES CONTAINED IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

5) CALLS UPON ALL OTHER STATES TO EXERCISE THE UTMOST RESTRAINT AND TO REFRAIN FROM ANY ACT WHICH MAY LEAD TO FURTHER ESCALATION AND WIDENING OF THE CONFLICT, AND THUS TO FACILITATE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION.

6) REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO EXPLORE, IN CONSULTATION WITH IRAN AND IRAQ, THE QUESTION OF ENTRUSTING AN IMPARTIAL BODY WITH INQUIRING INTO RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONFLICT AND TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

7) RECOGNIZES THE MAGNITUDE OF THE DAMAGE INFLICTED DURING THE CONFLICT AND THE NEED FOR RECONSTRUCTION  
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 02017  
E.O. 12356: NA

TAGS: PREL, UNSC, IR, IZ

SUBJECT: IRAN/IRAQ: REVISED DRAFT RESOLUTION  
EFFORTS, WITH APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE, ONCE THE CONFLICT IS ENDED AND, IN THIS REGARD, REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO ASSIGN A TEAM OF EXPERTS TO STUDY THE QUESTION OF RECONSTRUCTION AND TO REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

8) FURTHER REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO EXAMINE IN CONSULTATION WITH IRAN AND IRAQ AND WITH OTHER STATES OF THE REGION, MEASURES TO ENHANCE THE SECURITY AND STABILITY OF THE REGION.

9) REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO KEEP THE SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMED ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION.

10) DECIDES TO MEET AGAIN AS NECESSARY TO CONSIDER FURTHER STEPS TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH THIS RESOLUTION.  
END TEXT.

2. BAGHDAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

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<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02<SSN> 2017<TOR> 870716212418 MSG000174777858  
<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02<SSN> 2017<TOR> 870716212451 MSG000174777890

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Iraq-Iran  
war

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AN004436

NSC: BEMIS CHLD COBB WAC DANZ DOBR ERMA KELL OAKL PAAL RODM ROSS STK  
<DIST>SIT: EOB VAX

<PREC> ROUTINE <CLAS> SECRET <OSRI> RUFHGV <DTG> 071647Z JUL 87  
FM USMISSION GENEVA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1489

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: MURPHY-POLYAKOV EXCHANGE ON IRAN-IRAQ WAR, JULY 6  
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 06 GENEVA 07372  
NODIS

DEPT PASS MOSCOW, BAGHDAD, LONDON, PARIS. BEIJING,  
TOKYO, USUN NEW YORK

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, UR, IZ, IR, UNSC

SUBJECT: MURPHY-POLYAKOV EXCHANGE ON IRAN-IRAQ WAR. JULY 6

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. FOLLOWING REPORTS JULY 6 EXCHANGE BETWEEN ASSISTANT SECRETARY MURPHY AND AMBASSADOR POLYAKOV ON THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR.
3. A/S MURPHY MADE THE FOLLOWING PRESENTATION:
  - DESPITE THE RELATIVE LULL IN THE GROUND WAR, THE WAR IN THE GULF HAS BECOME MUCH MORE ACTIVE AND SERIOUS SINCE SEPTEMBER 1986.
  - SINCE THAT TIME, IRAN HAS TRIED TO PUT SPECIAL PRESSURE ON KUWAIT TO PULL BACK IN ITS COMMITMENTS TO -- AND SUPPORT FOR -- IRAQ.
  - TEHRAN APPARENTLY MISCALCULATED KUWAIT'S LIKELY RESPONSES. RATHER THAN ACCOMMODATING WITH IRAN, KUWAIT HAS PURSUED A VIGOROUS LINE -- UNDERSCORING ITS SUPPORT FOR IRAQ AND ASKING FOR OUTSIDE SUPPORT AND PROTECTION.
  - THE U. S. WAS IN THE FINAL STAGES OF REREGISTERING ELEVEN KUWAITI TANKERS WHICH WILL THEN HAVE THE PROTECTION OF THE U. S. NAVY.
  - WE ARE DOING THIS TO SUPPORT A FRIENDLY STATE -- KUWAIT -- AGAINST IRANIAN INTIMIDATION. SUCCESSFUL INTIMIDATION OR COERCION BY IRAN WILL BUILD IRANIAN WEIGHT IN THE REGION AND THE APPEAL OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION MORE GENERALLY.
  - WE ARE EXPANDING OUR MILITARY UNITS IN THE REGION TO PROTECT OUR SHIPS AND THE REREGISTERED TANKERS. BUT OUR AIM IS TO DETER, NOT TO PROVOKE, IRAN; THE U. S. HAD TRIED, BOTH IN TERMS OF PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND PRIVATELY THROUGH THE U. S. PROTECTIVE POWER IN IRAN, TO GET THAT MESSAGE UNDERSTOOD IN TEHRAN.
  - WHILE WE WILL BE READY TO PROTECT OURSELVES SHOULD IRAN SEEK A CONFRONTATION, WE THINK IRAN SHARES OUR DESIRE TO AVOID A CONFRONTATION. WE BELIEVE THE IRANIAN LEADERSHIP HAS NOT ONLY HEARD BUT UNDERSTANDS OUR MESSAGE THAT WE SHARE AN INTEREST IN PRUDENT ACTIONS AND AVOIDING AND PREVENTING HOSTILITIES.
  - HOWEVER, SHOULD THERE BE A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE U. S. AND IRAN, WE ASSUME AND TRUST THAT THE USSR WOULD DO NOTHING TO COMPLICATE THE MATTER.
  - WE KNOW OF YOUR CHARTER ARRANGEMENTS WITH KUWAIT AS WELL AS YOUR INCREASED NAVAL PRESENCE WITHIN THE GULF. WE ARE AWARE OF YOUR STATEMENT THAT THE USSR WOULD TAKE

STRONG STEPS IN RESPONSE TO FURTHER IRANIAN ATTACKS ON SOVIET MERCHANT VESSELS.

-- MEANWHILE, WE ARE VERY PLEASED AT THE DIRECTION OF THE U. S. -SOVIET DISCUSSIONS TOGETHER IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

-- WE BELIEVE THE TIME HAS COME FOR THE COUNCIL TO TAKE A FIRM STAND ON THE WAR. THIS WAS OF COURSE THE BURDEN OF AMBASSADOR WALTERS' DISCUSSION IN MOSCOW. THE USSR KNEW OF THE U. S. VIEW THAT THERE MUST BE VIGOROUS ENFORCEMENT OF THE RESOLUTION, AND WE TAKE SUPPORT OF THIS RESOLUTION AS A MEASURE OF THE PRACTICAL -- AS

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OPPOSED TO RHETORICAL -- INTEREST THAT ANY COUNTRY HAS IN ENDING THE WAR.

--AMBASSADOR WALTERS OUTLINED HIS VIEW OF THE NUMBERS OF UNSC STATES LIKELY TO SUPPORT THE FIRST RESOLUTION AND HIS STRATEGY FOR FURTHER STEPS SHOULD THE PRC ABSTAIN FROM THE FIRST RESOLUTION. THE U. S. AND USSR BOTH HAD GROUNDS TO ASSUME THE PRC WOULD HAVE MORE DIFFICULTY WITH THE 2ND RESOLUTION BUT THE FIRST WOULD CARRY WITHOUT DIFFICULT, EVEN IF THE PRC ABSTAINED.

--THE U. S. AND USSR FREQUENTLY NOTED TO EACH OTHER THAT THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR IS ONE REGIONAL ISSUE ON WHICH WE HAVE PARALLEL INTERESTS. I HOPE WE CAN BUILD ON OUR COOPERATION TO DATE AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 06 GENEVA 07372

NODIS

DEPT PASS MOSCOW, BAGHDAD, LONDON, PARIS, BEIJING, TOKYO, USUN NEW YORK

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, UR, IZ, IR, UNSC

SUBJECT: MURPHY-POLYAKOV EXCHANGE ON IRAN-IRAQ WAR, JULY 6

--SINCE THE 2ND RESOLUTION WILL BE THE EFFECTIVE ONE, ASSUMING THE FIRST RESOLUTION IS NOT ACCEPTED BY IRAN, I WOULD LIKE TO REVISIT A THEME WE DISCUSSED LAST YEAR.

--AS NOTED LAST YEAR, THAT ISSUE IS THE CONTINUING FLOW OF ARMS AND MATERIEL FROM SOURCES IN EASTERN EUROPEAN TO IRAN. WE THINK THIS IS A MOST UNHELPFUL EFFORT. WE HOPE AND ASKED AGAIN THAT MOSCOW HELP END THIS SUPPLY LINK.

--IT WOULD BE ALSO USEFUL IF THE USSR COULD USE INFLUENCE ON NORTH KOREA TO RESTRICT ARMS SALES TO IRAN. LAST YEAR, THE USSR SIMPLY NOTED THAT IRAQ HAD MADE APPEALS TO NORTH KOREA. THESE EFFORTS BY BAGHDAD WOULD BE GREATLY STRENGTHENED AND MADE MORE EFFECTIVE BY SOVIET EFFORTS WITH NORTH KOREA.

--U. S. EFFORTS -- THROUGH OPERATION STAUNCH -- ARE VIGOROUS. IF ANYTHING, THEY HAVE BECOME MORE VIGOROUS SINCE BEFORE THE ILL-FATED IRAN INITIATIVE. THE PRESIDENT HAS STATED THAT THIS POLICY WAS AN ABERRATION FROM U. S. POLICY AND THAT IT WAS A MISTAKE. WE WILL NOT PROVIDE THE IRANIANS ARMS AND WE ARE ENERGETICALLY TRYING TO STAUNCH THE FLOW OF ARMS TO THEM FROM OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES. THE U. S. WAS CONVINCED THAT THAT EFFORT CERTAINLY COMPLICATED AND MADE MORE EXPENSIVE IRAN'S PROCUREMENT EFFORTS.

--WE ARE AWARE THAT THERE ARE ARMS SUPPLIES FROM WESTERN SOURCES TO IRAN. WHEN WE FIND OUT ABOUT THEM WE ACTIVELY TRY TO STOP THEM. YOU SHOULD DO THE SAME WITH YOUR FRIENDS.

--CONSIDERING THE LANGUAGE WHICH HAS BEEN AGREED UPON

FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, WE THINK SUCH A CONTINUING FLOW OF ARMS FROM EAST OR WEST WAS UNACCEPTABLE.

--WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IRAN WILL STOP ITS WAR EFFORT ANY TIME SOON. BUT, THAT SAID, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS NEVER BEEN MORE GALVANIZED AS IT NOW IS -- AND WE ALL MUST ACT TO SUPPORT THAT MOOD. PRESSURE MUST CONTINUE -- UNTIL THE TIME IRAN RECOGNIZES THAT IT IS NOT GOING TO WIN THE WAR AND THAT ITS OWN INTERESTS REQUIRE THAT THE WAR END. OBVIOUSLY, ONCE THE WAR IS OVER, U. S. MILITARY NEEDS AND REQUIREMENTS WILL BE REDUCED.

--THE REALIZATION THAT IT CANNOT WIN WILL ONLY COME SLOWLY IN IRAN, BUT GIVEN THE STAKES INVOLVED FOR US BOTH IN THE REGION, IT IS AN EFFORT WE HAVE TO SUSTAIN.

--I REITERATE OUR VIEW -- WHICH I THINK YOU SHARE -- THAT THE WAR IS BAD FOR BOTH OF OUR INTERESTS. IT IS THIS BASIC FACT WHICH ENABLES US TO COOPERATE AS WE HAVE TO DATE.

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--WITH RESPECT TO THE MILITARY SITUATION, THE U. S. SAW THE GROUND WAR AS CURRENTLY IN A LULL AND WAS PICKING UP NO INDICATIONS OF A MAJOR IRANIAN OFFENSIVE IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

--THE IRANIAN OFFENSIVE AGAINST BASRA IN JANUARY AND FEBRUARY WAS BOTH VERY COSTLY TO IRAN AND ULTIMATELY UNSUCCESSFUL.

--SINCE THE SIEGE OF BASRA, THE IRAQIS HAVE APPEARED MORE CONFIDENT OF THEIR ABILITY TO WITHSTAND FUTURE IRANIAN PROBES AND IRANIAN OFFENSIVES -- AND THEY HAVE DONE SO THIS SPRING IN THE CENTRAL AND NORTHERN SECTORS.

--THE U. S. HAS SOMETIMES WORRIED IN THE PAST OVER IRAQI OVER-CONFIDENCE, BUT SAW NO EVIDENCE OF THAT AT PRESENT.

--THE INTERNAL STRUCTURE IN IRAQ APPEARED STABLE. WE ARE UNAWARE OF PRESSURE INSIDE THE GOVERNMENT OR BATH PARTY NOW SUCH AS EXISTED A YEAR AGO.

--INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN REMAIN SOMETHING OF A MYSTERY TO US. KHOMEINI WAS REPORTEDLY VERY ILL BUT APPEARED TO BE IN FIRM CONTROL OF AT LEAST THE BROAD POLITICAL PROCESSES -- AND CERTAINLY IS ABLE TO MEDIATE BETWEEN FACTIONS.

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 06 GENEVA 07372

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E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, UR, IZ, IR, UNSC

SUBJECT: MURPHY-POLYAKOV EXCHANGE ON IRAN-IRAQ WAR, JULY 6

--U. S. RELATIONS WITH IRAN ARE MARGINAL -- AND FULL OF FRICTION -- COMPLICATED BY MANY IRANIAN POLICIES AND ACTIONS AGAINST AMERICAN INTERESTS.

--THESE INCLUDE THE WAR WITH IRAQ, CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR AND ORCHESTRATION OF TERRORIST ACTS AND HOSTAGE-HOLDING AS WELL AS SUBVERSION AND SABOTAGE AGAINST THE GULF STATES.

--AS FAR AS WE CAN TELL, THE IRANIAN LEADERSHIP REMAINS FIRMLY DETERMINED TO PURSUE THE WAR UNTIL VICTORY ON IRANIAN TERMS. THOSE TERMS APPEAR TO INCLUDE THE REPLACEMENT OF THE CURRENT POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF IRAQ.

--WE WERE STRUCK BY KHOMEINI'S PUBLIC CRITICISM LAST MAY OF THE "PEACE PARTY." WE DON'T KNOW WHAT IRANIAN

GROUP OR GROUPS HE WAS REFERRING TO.

--WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN SOVIET VIEWS ON THE ABOVE POINTS.

ALEKSANDR ZOTOV INTERJECTED TO NOTE THAT THE U. S. IRANIAN INITIATIVE WAS PREDICATED ON THE EXISTENCE OF MODERATES THAT THE U. S. HOPED TO ENCOURAGE, INCLUDING AN IRANIAN PEACE PARTY AND ANTI-KHOMEINI FORCES. THE U. S. NOW WAS SAYING THAT IT KNEW NOTHING OF ANY IRANIAN PEACE PARTY. HOW COULD THESE TWO CONTRADICTORY POINTS BE RECONCILED? AMBASSADOR MURPHY REJOINED THAT LT. COL. NORTH'S CREDENTIALS AS AN IRANIAN EXPERT WERE IN CONSIDERABLE DISREPUTE. ZOTOV ASKED WHETHER NORTH HAD, IN THE IRAN INITIATIVE, MISCALCULATED. MURPHY ANSWERED THAT THIS WOULD BE A VERY POLITE TERM FOR IT.

RETURNING TO HIS PREPARED POINTS, AMBASSADOR MURPHY STATED:

--THE U. S. WAS NOT AWARE OF HIGH-LEVEL QUESTIONING OF THE WAR POLICY. WAS THE USSR?

--FINALLY, BOTH IRAN AND IRAQ HAVE FINANCIAL PROBLEMS, BUT THEY BOTH SEEM TO HAVE WEATHERED THE GREAT STRESSES OF 1986. BOTH HAVE INCREASED OIL PRODUCTION NOW. INCOME IN 1987 SHOULD BE SUBSTANTIALLY HIGHER THAN IN 1986.

4. IN RESPONSE TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY MURPHY'S PRESENTATION, POLYAKOV ASSERTED A COMMONALITY OF US AND SOVIET INTERESTS AND VIEWS ON THE QUESTION OF THE GULF

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WAR. THE CONTINUATION OF THE WAR WAS AS MUCH A PROBLEM FOR THE SOVIET UNION AS FOR THE US; THEY TOO APPRECIATE THE DANGER OF THE WAR SPREADING TO INVOLVE OTHER STATES IN THE REGION; AND THEY AGREE WITH US THAT CONTINUATION OF THE WAR CONTRIBUTES DIRECTLY TO OTHER TENSIONS IN THE REGION. THE SOVIET SIDE, HE SAID, WANTED TO WORK CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH THE US IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL TO ACHIEVE A CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTION, AS WELL AS EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO ENFORCE IT. THEY BELIEVE THAT A CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTION IS NOW ACHIEVABLE AND THAT RECENT COOPERATION AMONG THE FIVE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES INDICATES THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER COOPERATIVE EFFORTS IN THE NEXT STAGE. FOLLOWING THE 1ST RESOLUTION, THE QUESTION OF THE 2ND RESOLUTION OF "PRACTICAL MEASURES" WILL ARISE. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, HE NOTED, HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE PARTICIPATION OF SOVIET EXPERTS WHEN WORK BEGINS ON THE SECOND RESOLUTION, AND IS WILLING TO WORK CONSTRUCTIVELY ON FURTHER MEASURES.

5. POLYAKOV THEN TOOK ISSUE WITH STATEMENTS BY US OFFICIALS SUGGESTING THAT THE SOVIET UNION SOUGHT TO USE THE GULF WAR TO INCREASE ITS PRESENCE IN THE AREA. THERE HAS BEEN NOTHING IN SOVIET BEHAVIOR TO SUPPORT THIS CHARGE, HE ARGUED. THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN WORKING IN EARNEST TO ACHIEVE A CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND HAS A STRONG NATIONAL INTEREST IN BRINGING THE WAR TO AN EARLY END. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AGREED TO THE KUWAITI REQUEST TO USE SOVIET TANKERS, CONSIDERING THAT THIS WOULD HELP KUWAIT RESIST IRANIAN PRESSURE TO DROP ITS SUPPORT FOR IRAQ. CONTRARY TO US ALLEGATIONS, THE AGREEMENT WITH KUWAIT DID NOT LEAD TO AN INCREASE IN THE SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE AREA. THERE WERE THREE NAVAL SHIPS

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 04 OF 06 GENEVA 07372

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DEPT PASS MOSCOW, BAGHDAD, LONDON, PARIS, BEIJING, TOKYO, USUN NEW YORK

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, UR, IZ, IR, UNSC

SUBJECT: MURPHY-POLYAKOV EXCHANGE ON IRAN-IRAQ WAR. JULY 6  
THERE BEFORE AND THERE ARE THREE SHIPS THERE NOW. THE SHIPS ARE NOT ESCORTING THE SOVIET TANKERS. BUT REMAIN IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS.

6. THE FACT OF THE MATTER IS THAT VARIOUS ARAB COUNTRIES FROM TIME TO TIME REQUEST SOVIET COOPERATION. THE US, SAID POLYAKOV, SEEMS TO CONCLUDE THAT ANY POSITIVE SOVIET RESPONSE TO SUCH REQUESTS IS AUTOMATICALLY A THREAT TO US INTERESTS. HE RECALLED A STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR CHARGING THE SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION OF EGYPT'S LONG-STANDING DEBT PROBLEM WITH THE SOVIET UNION WAS A THREAT TO US INTERESTS (SIC). THE SOVIET SIDE, HE CONCLUDED, RECOGNIZES US INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND PERSIAN GULF AND CANNOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE US SIDE CANNOT SEE THAT THE SOVIET UNION ALSO HAS INTERESTS THERE.

7. POLYAKOV THEN EXPLAINED THE INTENTION OF THE RECENT SOVIET GOVERNMENT STATEMENT ON THE GULF WAR (PUBLISHED JULY 4), PROPOSING AMONG OTHER THINGS THAT ALL NATIONS NOT BELONGING TO THE REGION REMOVE THEIR MILITARY VESSELS FROM THE GULF. THE SOVIET SIDE, HE SAID, WAS FULLY PREPARED TO REMOVE ALL THE SOVIET SHIPS CURRENTLY IN THE GULF. THIS PROPOSAL, HE CLAIMED, WAS DESIGNED TO COMPLEMENT, AND NOT DETRACT FROM, THE GENERAL EFFORT TO ACHIEVE A CEASE-FIRE. THE MAIN THRUST OF THE STATEMENT WAS ITS RECOGNITION THAT THE SITUATION CONTINUES TO BE VERY TENSE AND WE MUST PURSUE EVERY EFFORT TO SEEK SOLUTIONS BY PRACTICAL, CONCRETE MEANS.

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AS PART OF THIS PRACTICAL EFFORT, SOVIET OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN MEETING FREQUENTLY WITH IRANIAN AND IRAQI REPRESENTATIVES AT VARIOUS LEVELS, INSISTING ON EVERY OCCASION THAT THE WAR BE BROUGHT TO A SPEEDY END. UNFORTUNATELY, HE SAID, IRAN HAS AT ALL LEVELS CONSISTENTLY REITERATED ITS INTENTION TO PURSUE THE WAR TO VICTORY. KHOMEINI'S PUBLIC REFERENCE TO A "PEACE PARTY" INDICATES THAT THERE MUST BE A GROUP OF SOME SORT THAT ADVOCATES AN EARLY END TO THE WAR, BUT THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO IDENTIFY ANY SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALS THAT MIGHT BE INVOLVED. POLYAKOV SPECULATED THAT THE SO-CALLED "PEACE PARTY" MIGHT NOT BE A FORMAL ORGANIZATION, BUT RATHER A TERM FOR AN OPINION TREND IN IRAN.

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8. SOVIET EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A CEASE-FIRE, POLYAKOV CONTINUED, PROCEED FROM THE ASSUMPTION THAT AN IRANIAN VICTORY WOULD CREATE A SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT SITUATION IN THE ENTIRE REGION AND BEYOND. THERE WOULD BE A RAPID SPREAD OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM, WITH UNPREDICTABLE RESULTS. THE SOVIETS ARE ALSO SEEKING AT EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO STEM THE FLOW OF ARMS TO IRAN, HE CLAIMED, AND HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE THEY HAVE TO A CERTAIN EXTENT SUCCEED, FOR EXAMPLE WITH LIBYA. HOWEVER, IRAN SEEMS TO RELY ON THE BLACK MARKET FOR THE BULK OF ITS ARMS SUPPLIES AND THE SOVIETS THUS

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CALCULATE THAT IRAN IS NOT SERIOUSLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A SECOND RESOLUTION IN THE UNSC CALLING FOR AN ARMS EMBARGO BECAUSE THIS WILL NOT TOUCH THEIR BLACK MARKET SOURCES. EVEN ISRAEL SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN SUPPLYING IRAN. BY CONTRAST, THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT APPEARED COMMITTED TO PURSUING A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT TO THE WAR. MEANWHILE IRAQ STILL POSSESSED MILITARY CAPABILITIES; THE DEGREE TO WHICH IRAQ WOULD USE THEM DEPENDED ON THE CAPABILITIES OF THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP.

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9. IN SUM, POLYAKOV CONCLUDED, THE SOVIET UNION STANDS READY TO PURSUE ANY DISCUSSIONS WITH THE US OR OTHERS AIMED AT ELIMINATING TENSIONS IN THIS REGION. ALTHOUGH HOSTILITIES HAVE ABATED RECENTLY IN THE GULF, LARGE-SCALE FIGHTING CAN RESUME AT ANY TIME. THE SOVIETS FURTHER BELIEVE THAT THE GULF WAR CANNOT BE SEPARATED FROM THE QUESTION OF AN OVERALL MIDEAST SETTLEMENT OR EVEN FROM THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN. (HE NOTED IN HIS CONNECTION RECENT PRESS REPORTS THAT THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE ("DUSHMANI") HAD BEGUN TO RETRANSFER STINGERS TO IRAN.)

10. IN A GIVE-AND-TAKE FOLLOWING THE FORMAL PRESENTATIONS, THE SOVIET DELEGATION MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- (TURDEYEV) ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM IS AN IDEOLOGICAL  
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 05 OF 06 GENEVA 07372

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DEPT PASS MOSCOW, BAGHDAD. LONDON. PARIS, BEIJING, TOKYO, USUN NEW YORK

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, UR, IZ, IR, UNSC

SUBJECT: MURPHY-POLYAKOV EXCHANGE ON IRAN-IRAQ WAR, JULY 6 PLATFORM THAT PROJECTS SUCCESS ON A LONG-TERM BASIS, AND IS NOT DEPENDENT ON THE PREDOMINANCE OF ONE GROUP OR ANOTHER IN IRANIAN SOCIETY. IN ORDER TO RESTRICT THE SPREAD OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM, WE MUST CREATE THE PROPER ATMOSPHERE AROUND ITS SOURCE. WITHOUT A RESOLUTION OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT THERE CAN BE NO EFFECTIVE RESTRICTION OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM.

-- IF, AS THE US CLAIMS, 15 TO 20 PERCENT OF IRANIAN ARMS SUPPLIES ARE COMING FROM EASTERN EUROPE, THIS MUST BE THROUGH THE BLACK MARKET, BECAUSE THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAS MADE KNOWN TO BOTH EASTERN EUROPE AND THE DPRK THAT IT DISAPPROVES OF ANY SOVIET ARMS OR

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SOVIET ARMS PRODUCED UNDER LICENSE BEING TRANSSHIPPED TO IRAN.

-- IF KHOMEINI DESIGNATES HIS SUCCESSOR, THE TRANSITION WILL BE SMOOTH, AT LEAST IN ITS INITIAL PHASES. IF THE SUCCESSOR IS NOT NAMED BY KHOMEINI, THERE WILL BE TURMOIL. THE SOVIET SIDE KNOWS OF VARIOUS GROUPINGS AND FACTIONS WHICH MIGHT PROVIDE A SUCCESSOR TO KHOMEINI, BUT HAS NO IDEA WHO MIGHT PREVAIL.

-- THE FIRST RESOLUTION ON THE GULF WAR IN THE UNSC WILL BE ADOPTED WITHOUT DIFFICULTY AND IT IS THEREFORE DIFFICULT TO SEE WHAT THE POINT WOULD BE IN SENDING FOREIGN MINISTERS TO THE DELIBERATIONS AT THIS POINT. IT WOULD SEEM MORE APPROPRIATE TO USE THEIR WEIGHT DURING THE DELIBERATIONS ON A SECOND RESOLUTION. THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS IN SECURITY COUNCIL DELIBERATIONS IS A VERY RARE OCCURRENCE AND CARRIES HEAVY POLITICAL WEIGHT. IF THE FIRST RESOLUTION DID

NOT PRODUCE RESULTS, IT MIGHT PROVE TO BE A COSTLY EXPENDITURE OF POLITICAL CAPITAL FOR THE FOREIGN MINISTERS TO HAVE ALREADY BEEN DEPLOYED IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. WOULD THE US PROPOSE SENDING THE FOREIGN MINISTERS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL A SECOND TIME FOR THE SECOND RESOLUTION?

11. IN RESPONSE, THE US DELEGATION MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- THE GULF WAR CAN AND SHOULD BE SEPARATED, BOTH ANALYTICALLY AND PRACTICALLY, FROM THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT.

-- SOVIET SPOKESMEN HAVE ALLEGED THAT THE US IS TRYING TO EMBARGO BOTH IRAN AND IRAQ. THIS IS NOT TRUE. THE US WILL PLACE THE BURDEN ON THE PARTY THAT REFUSES TO ACCEPT A COMPREHENSIVE CEASE-FIRE AND IS FULLY CONFIDENT THAT IRAQ WILL ACCEPT IT.

-- THE WAR SEEMS TO BE IMPOSING HEAVY DOMESTIC COSTS IN IRAN AND THERE ARE UNDOUBTEDLY SOME IN IRAN WHO SHARE THE VIEW THAT THE WAR SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO AN END. TO THE EXTENT THAT THAT SENTIMENT CAN BE EXPANDED, WE CAN COMPLICATE MATTERS FOR THE KHOMEINI REGIME, NOT ONLY IN ITS CONDUCT OF THE WAR BUT IN ITS DOMESTIC SUPPORT. FOR THIS REASON, THE US SEES A CONNECTION BETWEEN AN ARMS EMBARGO AND THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL SCENE IN IRAN.

-- ACCORDING TO US INFORMATION EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES SUPPLY IRAN WITH 15-20 PERCENT OF IRAN'S ARMS NEEDS. THESE MAY BE ARRANGED THROUGH SECRET CONTRACTS BUT SUCH SECRET DEALS DO NOT IN OUR TERMINOLOGY QUALIFY AS BLACK MARKET, AS THE SOVIET SIDE SEEMS TO IMPLY.

-- THE USG BELIEVES THAT THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL DELIBERATIONS ON THE FIRST RESOLUTION WOULD GIVE A VITAL BOOST TO MOMENTUM FOR THE SECOND RESOLUTION. IT WOULD DEMONSTRATE OUR SERIOUSNESS TO BRING THE WAR TO AN END. OUR THINKING AT THIS POINT EXTENDS ONLY THROUGH THE FIRST RESOLUTION. WHETHER THE FOREIGN MINISTERS WOULD BE SUMMONED TO SUPPORT THE SECOND RESOLUTION WOULD BE DETERMINED BY WHAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL WAS ABLE TO ACHIEVE IN HIS CONSULTATIONS AFTER THE FIRST RESOLUTION. THE FIRST RESOLUTION WILL BE AN HISTORIC EVENT IN THE UN SINCE IT WILL BE THE SC'S FIRST DEMAND FOR A CEASE-FIRE TO BE ISSUED WITHOUT PRIOR CERTAINTY OF ITS ACCEPTANCE BY THE PARTIES. ALTHOUGH WE TAKE THE SOVIET POINT ABOUT NOT SQUANDERING POLITICAL ASSETS, WE BELIEVE THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS WOULD BE

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 06 OF 06 GENEVA 07372  
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DEPT PASS MOSCOW, BAGHDAD, LONDON, PARIS, BEIJING,  
TOKYO, USUN NEW YORK

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, UR, IZ, IR, UNSC

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SUBJECT: MURPHY-POLYAKOV EXCHANGE ON IRAN-IRAQ WAR, JULY 6  
APPROPRIATE AT THIS POINT. PETRONE

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<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 06 .SSN> 7372 <TOR> 870707164552 MSG000173983552  
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SUBJECT: U.S.-SOVIET REGIONAL EXPERT EXCHANGES ON THE  
- IRAN-IRAQ WAR

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 07322

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DEPT SUGGEST PASS: MOSCOW, USUN NEW YORK, ROME, BONN,  
BAGHDAD, LONDON, PARIS, TOKYO AND BEIJING

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, UR, IA, IZ, UNSC

SUBJECT: U.S.-SOVIET REGIONAL EXPERT EXCHANGES ON THE  
- IRAN-IRAQ WAR

1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. IN THE INITIAL MEETING WITH THE POLYAKOV DELEGATION JULY 6, WE DISCUSSED BOTH THE GULF WAR AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE-SEEKING PROCESS. ON BOTH, THE SOVIETS SEEMED EAGER FOR GIVE-AND-TAKE SESSIONS. THEIR PRESENTATIONS WERE LESS STYLIZED AND MEMBERS OF THE

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NLS F96-121 #61  
BY dlb NARA, DATE 6/8/00

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SOVIET DELEGATION FELT FREE TO LEAP INTO THE DISCUSSIONS, A NOTABLE DEPARTURE FROM OUR PREVIOUS MEETINGS. POLYAKOV AND THE OTHER MEMBERS OF HIS DELEGATION ALSO WERE CLEARLY MORE INTERESTED IN TALKING ABOUT THE PEACE

PROCESS THAN THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR. TO ENSURE WE COVERED THE GULF WAR, WE DEALT WITH THAT FIRST. (REPORT ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS DISCUSSION WILL BE SENT BY SEPTEL.)

3. I OUTLINED OUR BASIC APPROACH TO THE WAR; THE REASONS FOR REFLAGGING, PARTICULARLY GIVEN THE IMPORTANCE OF RESPONDING TO A FRIENDLY STATE'S REQUEST AND THE NEED TO RESIST IRANIAN INTIMIDATION; THE DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES OF SUCCESSFUL IRANIAN COERCION NOT ONLY IN THE GULF BUT THE REGION AS A WHOLE; OUR DESIRE TO DETER, NOT PROVOKE THE IRANIANS; AND OUR CONVICTION THAT IT IS TIME FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO TAKE A FIRM STAND ON THE WAR AND BE WILLING TO ADOPT ENFORCEMENT MEASURES. I REFERRED TO DICK WALTERS' MISSION AND HIS TALKS IN MOSCOW AND EMPHASIZED THAT WE WERE INTERESTED IN PRACTICAL, NOT SIMPLY RHETORICAL STEPS.

4. IN LIGHT OF THAT AND IN LIGHT OF OUR EFFORT TO GET AGREEMENT ON ENFORCEMENT MEASURES, I RAISED THE ISSUE OF SOVIET-ORIGIN ARMS GOING TO IRAN. I PRESSED FOR AN END TO THE EAST EUROPEAN LINK AND URGED THE SOVIETS TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE WITH THE NORTH KOREANS TO CUT OFF SUPPLIES.

5. I SAID THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAD NEVER BEEN SO GALVANIZED AND THAT NOW WAS THE TIME TO PRESS THE IRANIANS TO GIVE UP THEIR WAR EFFORT. WHILE NOT HAVING ILLUSIONS ABOUT AN EARLY END TO THE WAR, WE FELT IT IMPERATIVE TO MAKE IT AS DIFFICULT AS POSSIBLE FOR THE IRANIANS TO PROSECUTE THE WAR. I CONCLUDED WITH SOME THOUGHTS ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN IRAN AND IRAQ AND ASKED FOR SOVIET ASSESSMENTS.

6. POLYAKOV RAISED SEVERAL POINTS IN RESPONSE:

--THE SOVIETS ARE WORKING HARD TO END THE WAR, BUT, REGRETTABLY, CANNOT PREDICT WHEN IT WILL END.

--THEY ARE COORDINATING WITH US ON THE UN RESOLUTION, AND HAVE NO OBJECTION TO OUR EXPERTS GETTING TOGETHER TO FORGE AGREEMENT ON ENFORCEMENT MEASURES.

--THE SOVIETS DO NOT SEEK TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE CONFLICT TO BUILD THEIR POSITION IN THE AREA, AND RECOGNIZE OUR INTERESTS. WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE THEIRS.

--THEY FAVOR PULLING ALL FOREIGN FORCES OUT OF THE GULF, INCLUDING THEIR OWN, AND BELIEVE THERE SHOULD BE AGREEMENT ON FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION. (POLYAKOV CALLED ATTENTION TO THE SOVIET STATEMENT RELEASED BY TASS, BUT CERTAINLY DID NOT SUGGEST THAT IT WAS THE RESULT OF ANY PARTICULAR ANXIETY ABOUT RISING TENSIONS, AS U.S. MEDIA HAS INTERPRETED IT.

7. BEYOND THIS, POLYAKOV EMPHASIZED THAT THE SOVIETS IN THEIR CONTACTS WITH THE IRANIANS AND IRAQIS HAVE PUSHED FOR THE END OF WAR. IN ALL THEIR MEETINGS WITH

THE IRANIANS, HOWEVER, THEY HEAR ONLY THAT THE IRANIANS WILL PURSUE THE WAR UNTIL VICTORY; "THEY HAVE NO OTHER RECIPE." POLYAKOV ADDED THAT THE SOVIETS HAVEN'T IDENTIFIED A PEACE PARTY IN IRAN, BUT BELIEVE THAT THE "CHAMPIONS OF PEACE" (UNNAMED) ARE GROWING. HE ALSO NOTED THAT HE THOUGHT SUCCESSION TO KHOMEINI WOULD BE MESSY IN IRAN. FINALLY, HE SAID THAT THEY WERE DOING ALL THEY COULD TO STOP THE ARMS SHIPMENTS TO THE IRANIANS.

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 GENEVA 07322

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DEPT SUGGEST PASS: MOSCOW, USUN NEW YORK, ROME, BONN, BAGHDAD, LONDON, PARIS, TOKYO AND BEIJING

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, UR, IA, IZ, UNSC

SUBJECT: U.S.-SOVIET REGIONAL EXPERT EXCHANGES ON THE THEY HAD HAD SUCCESS IN STOPPING ARMS GOING FROM LIBYA, AND FELT THE IRANIANS WERE GETTING MOST OF THEIR ARMS FROM THE BLACK MARKET. WE CHALLENGED THIS POINT SAYING THAT WE BELIEVED THE EAST EUROPEANS AND NORTH KOREANS MIGHT BE SELLING ARMS SECRETLY AND, IF SO, THIS SHOULD NOT BE CHARACTERIZED AS "BLACK MARKET" DEALS.

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8. COMMENT: OUR READING OF THE SOVIET REMARKS IN THIS SESSION IS THAT THEY ADDED ONLY marginally TO AMBASSADOR WALTERS' CONVERSATIONS IN MOSCOW LAST WEEK. THEY GAVE THE DISTINCT IMPRESSION OF RELUCTANCE TO COMMIT SHEVARDNADZE TO SECURITY COUNCIL DELIBERATIONS ON THE FIRST RESOLUTION, BUT THEY WERE POSITIVE ON THE IDEA OF SENDING EXPERTS TO AUGMENT THE SOVIET DELEGATION DURING DEBATE ON THE SECOND RESOLUTION AND INDICATED THE POSSIBILITY OF SHEVARDNADZE'S PARTICIPATION, AS WELL, DURING THIS PHASE. THEIR OPTIMISM ON THE PROSPECTS FOR A SUCCESSFUL VOTE ON THE FIRST RESOLUTION WAS UNQUALIFIED. ONE OTHER POINT WORTH NOTING IS THAT POLYAKOV ET AL DID NOT EXPLICITLY RAISE THE SOVIET IOZP PROPOSAL OR CALL FOR ANY PARTIAL CEASE-FIRE IN THE GULF. RATHER, IN PASSING, HE REFERRED TO THE VALUE OF GETTING ALL FOREIGN FORCES OUT OF THE GULF AND THE IMPORTANCE OF FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION.

9. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PETRONE

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SECTION: 01 OF 02

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PAGE 01

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NSC: WAC OAKL RODM ROSS  
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EXDIS

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<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> SECRET <OSRI> RUEHDO <DTG> 031255Z JUN 87  
FM AMEMBASSY DOHA  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3731  
INFO RUEHWW/GULF WAR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE  
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0381

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: IRAN TO SUBMIT SEVEN POINTS PROPOSAL TO UN  
SECRETARY GENERAL TO GUARANTEE SECURITY IN THE GULF

<TEXT>  
~~SECRET~~ DOHA 01274

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, IR, IZ, QA  
SUBJECT: IRAN TO SUBMIT SEVEN POINTS PROPOSAL TO UN  
SECRETARY GENERAL TO GUARANTEE SECURITY IN THE GULF  
REF: DOHA 1267 (NOTAL)

EXDIS

1. - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. DURING MY MEETING ON JUNE 3, WITH MINSTATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SHAYKH AHMAD BIN SEIF, I ASKED HIM TO GIVE ME A READ-OUT OF IRAN'S FORMIN, DR. VELAYATI'S VISIT TO DOHA (JUNE 1-2.)
3. SHAYKH AHMAD PULLED OUT A TYPEWRITTEN PAGE IN ARABIC AND SAID-- "I HAVE THIS TO GIVE YOU. THIS IS THE SEVEN POINTS PROPOSAL WHICH VELAYATI SAID HE WOULD SOON SUBMIT TO THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL IN ORDER TO SAFEGUARD SECURITY IN THE GULF."
4. SHAYKH AHMAD ADDED THAT HE WOULD BE TAKING THESE PROPOSALS TO THE NEXT GCC MEETING, SCHEDULED FOR JUNE 6, IN JEDDAH.
5. I ASKED HIM IF HIS GOVERNMENT WILL ENDORSE THIS 7-POINTS PROPOSAL. HE ANSWERED THAT THIS WILL BE A TOPIC OF DISCUSSION WITH THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL.
6. HERE ARE THE POINTS:
  - 1. NOT TO ATTACK CIVILIAN OBJECTIVES;
  - 2. NOT TO ATTACK PASSENGER PLANES;
  - 3. NOT TO USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS;
  - 4. NOT TO ATTACK COMMERCIAL SHIPPING;
  - 5. NOT TO ATTACK PORTS AND CIVILIAN FACILITIES;
  - 6. EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS;
  - 7. CONTINUING CONSULTATIONS WITH UN SECRETARY GENERAL FOR THE PURPOSE OF REACHING A SOLUTION TO THE WAR.
7. I OBSERVED THAT THIS PROPOSAL WOULD BE TOUGH FOR THE IRAQIS TO ACCEPT BECAUSE IT WILL LIMIT THE WAR TO THE BATTLEFIELD. ALSO, I NOTED THAT THE PROPOSAL WAS NOT SUFFICIENT FOR ENDING THE WAR. SHAYKH AHMAD AGREED AND REMARKED THAT THE AIM OF THE IRANIAN PROPOSAL WAS TO AVOID SPILLOVER OF THE WAR OUTSIDE IRAQ AND IRAN.
8. COMMENT: THESE SEVEN POINTS REPRESENT THE PROPOSAL THE AMIR HAD MENTIONED TO ME ON JUNE 2. (REFTEL, PARA 8).
9. BAGHDAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. GHOUGASSIAN

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<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 1274 <TOR> 870603172222 MSG000171048141

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BY dlb, NARA, DATE 6/8/00

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NSC: CHLD COBB WAC ERMA KELL OAKL PAAL RODM ROSS  
<DIST>PRT: SIT  
SIT: EOB VAX NSJHO

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> CONFIDENTIAL <OSRI> RUEHDT <DTG> 161611Z MAY 87  
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9621  
INFO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 2449

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: UN: MAY 15 MEETING OF SECURITY COUNCIL  
-- PERMANENT MEMBERS' AMBASSADORS ON IRAN/IRAQ WAR

<TEXT>  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 01364  
EXDIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, UNSC, IR, IZ  
SUBJECT: UN: MAY 15 MEETING OF SECURITY COUNCIL  
-- PERMANENT MEMBERS' AMBASSADORS ON IRAN/IRAQ WAR  
REF: USUN 1299 (EXDIS)

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

>BEGIN SUMMARY>

2. SUMMARY. AT MAY 15 AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL MEETING OF FIVE PERMANENT SC MEMBERS, SOVIETS INDICATED THEY COULD JOIN U. S., UK AND FRANCE IN SUPPORTING DRAFT SC RESOLUTION ON IRAN/IRAQ WAR AND WERE PREPARED TO BEGIN DISCUSSION OF MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT SUCH RESOLUTION. CHINESE INDICATED THEIR INSTRUCTIONS STILL CALLED FOR OBTAINING SYG'S REACTION TO RESOLUTION BEFORE PRC GOVERNMENT REACHED DECISION ON IT. THEY AGREED TO MEET WITH SYG WEEK OF MAY 25. END SUMMARY.

>END SUMMARY>

3. AT MAY 15 AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL MEETING OF THE FIVE PERMANENT SC MEMBERS HOSTED BY FRENCH CHARGE, SOVIET PERM REP BELONOGOV SAID HE WAS IN RECEIPT OF INSTRUCTIONS TO SUPPORT AND CO-SPONSOR DRAFT SC RESOLUTION ON IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT. HE WAS ALSO READY TO PARTICIPATE IN DISCUSSIONS BY THE FIVE OF CONCRETE STEPS WHICH MIGHT BE TAKEN TO IMPLEMENT ANY NEW SC DECISION WITH REGARD TO THE WAR.

4. ELABORATING ON HIS INSTRUCTIONS, BELONOGOV SAID THAT SOVIET UNION WAS READY TO COOPERATE CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH THE OTHER PERMANENT MEMBERS IN ORDER TO ERADICATE ALL EXISTING CONFLICT SITUATIONS. THE USSR ATTACHES IMPORTANCE TO INCREASED INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO END THE IRNA/IRAQ WAR AND, IN THIS CONTEXT, APPROVES THE CONTINUATION OF COORDINATED EFFORTS BY THE FIVE PERMANENT SC MEMBERS.

5. FRENCH CHARGE THEN RECONFIRMED THAT FOUR OF THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS NOW HAD INSTRUCTIONS TO SUPPORT THE DRAFT AND TO BEGIN WORK ON HOW TO IMPLEMENT IT. HE ASKED PRC PERM REP FOR HIS COMMENTS. CHINESE PERM REP LI SAID THAT CHINESE INSTRUCTIONS WERE CLEAR AND REMAINED THE SAME: (A) ASK THE SYG FOR COMMENTS ON THE RESOLUTION; (B) SEEK NEW INSTRUCTIONS; (C) PRESENT THE DRAFT RESOLUTION TO NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS FOR THEIR COMMENT AND THEN (D) BEGIN WORK ON IMPLEMENTING THE RESOLUTION.

6. AMBASSADOR WALTERS AND OTHER THREE REPRESENTATIVES AGREED TO CHINESE SUGGESTION THAT THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS MEET WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE LATTER'S RETURN FROM EAST ASIA WEEK OF MAY 25. AMBASSADOR WALTERS ARGUED, HOWEVER, THAT IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO DISCUSS THE RESOLUTION WITH THE NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL UNTIL THE FIVE COMPLETED WORK ON FOLLOW-UP MECHANISMS, INCLUDING PROCEDURES FOR ENFORCING THE RESOLUTION. UK AND SOVIET AMBASSADORS SUPPORTED U. S. POSITION. CHINESE PERM REP

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THEN SAID HE WOULD REPORT VIEWS OF OTHER PERMANENT MEMBERS, AWAIT POSSIBLE NEW INSTRUCTIONS AND, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SC PRESIDENT, ATTEMPT TO SCHEDULE MEETING OF THE FIVE WITH SYG AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

7. CHINESE PERM REP LI THEN ELABORATED PRC APPROACH IN THE SC TO THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT. THE PRC GOAL WAS TO GIVE IMPETUS TO THE MEDIATION EFFORTS OF THE SYG BY INTRODUCING INTO ANY FUTURE SC RESOLUTION NEW ELEMENTS WHICH WOULD INCREASE THE INCENTIVE FOR COOPERATION ON PART OF BOTH IRAN AND IRAQ. THE PRC HOPED THAT ANY NEW SC RESOLUTION WOULD PROVE ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES. THE PRC BELIEVED THAT EVEN IF ONE PARTY INITIALLY HAD A NEGATIVE REACTION TO THE RESOLUTION, THAT PARTY SHOULD BE GIVEN TIME TO CHANGE ITS MIND BEFORE ANY PUNITIVE MEASURES WERE TAKEN AGAINST IT. THE PRC DID NOT OPPOSE DISCUSSION OF FOLLOW-UP MEASURES, INCLUDING AN ARMS EMBARGO BUT BELIEVED THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD BE VERY CAREFUL BEFORE ADOPTING SUCH MEASURES BECAUSE THEY COULD PRODUCE A VERY SERIOUS OVER-REACTION BY ONE OR BOTH PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT.

8. AMBASSADORS CONCLUDED THE MEETING BY DIRECTING THEIR RESPECTIVE POLITICAL COUNSELORS TO PRODUCE TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH SYG WEEK OF MAY 25.

9. COMMENT: POSITIVE SOVIET INSTRUCTIONS ON DRAFT SC RESOLUTION, PRC PERM REP'S WILLINGNESS TO SEEK NEW INSTRUCTIONS AND EXPECTED FAVORABLE REACTION OF SYG  
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 01364  
EXDIS

INCREASE THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE FIVE WILL TURN TO THE MOST DIFFICULT TASK -- CONSIDERATION OF MEASURES TO ENFORCE A CEASE-FIRE ORDER -- BEFORE THE END OF THE MONTH. END COMMENT.

10. DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO PASS THIS MESSAGE AS WELL AS REFTELS TO BEIJING, LONDON, PARIS AND MOSCOW.

11. BAGHDAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.  
WALTERS

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02 <SSN> 1364 <TOR> 870516181550 MSG000169496150  
<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02 <SSN> 1364 <TOR> 870516181628 MSG000169496188

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*Iran -*  
*Iraq War*

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DISTRIBUTION:

NSPWR \*NOMAIL\* IRAN IRAQ SOVIET  
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NSSRT IRAN IRAQ  
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NSCLP EXDIS  
NSHGS SOVIET  
NSMEN SOVIET  
NSMKS FRANCE

IMMEDIATE

DTG: 150118Z MAY 87

SIT: EOB VAX  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9594

FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

1341

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SUBJECT: SC PERMANENT MEMBERS' CONSIDERATION OF IRAN/IRAQ  
--- WAR: CHINESE MAY 14 STATEMENT TO THE SC

\*\*\* START OF TEXT \*\*\*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ USUN NEW YORK 01341

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, UNSC, IR, IZ

SUBJECT: SC PERMANENT MEMBERS' CONSIDERATION OF IRAN/IRAQ  
--- WAR: CHINESE MAY 14 STATEMENT TO THE SC

REF: USUN 1299 (EXDIS/NOTAL)

1.  - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. DURING SECURITY COUNCIL CONSULTATIONS MAY 14, CHINESE PERMREP LI, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SC PRESIDENT FOR MAY BUT SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF PERMANENT MEMBERS, MADE BRIEF ORAL STATEMENT ON STATUS OF PERMANENT MEMBERS' EFFORTS TO DEVELOP FOR THE COUNCIL'S CONSIDERATION A NEW INITIATIVE AIMED AT ENDING THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR.
3. STATEMENT, WHICH FOLLOWED SUGGESTIONS MADE BY PERMREPS OF FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS AT THEIR LAST MEETING (REFTEL), INDICATED THAT THE FIVE HAD AGREED TO BUILD ON SC RES 582 AND TO DEVELOP NEW ELEMENTS TO END THE HOSTILITIES. STATEMENT ALSO HINTED THAT ANY NEW DRAFT WOULD BE AN ORDER THAT WOULD REQUIRE ENFORCEMENT. TEXT FOLLOWS IN PARA 6.
4. FOLLOWING HIS STATEMENT, SC PRESIDENT THEN IMMEDIATELY TURNED TO CONSIDERATION OF OTHER BUSINESS OF COUNCIL UNRELATED TO IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT. NO OTHER COUNCIL MEMBER COMMENTED ON THE STATEMENT. AFTER THE

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BY *dlb*, NARA, DATE 10/8/00

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CONSULTATIONS ENDED, USUN OFFICER PASSED COPY OF STATEMENT TO IRAQI MISSION POLITICAL COUNSELOR.

5. COMMENT: CHINESE PERMREP'S STATEMENT REPRESENTS FIRST TIME THAT NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS OF COUNCIL HAVE

BEEN INFORMED OFFICIALLY OF THE WORK OF THE FIVE. IT APPEARS TO HAVE BOUGHT FOR THE FIVE ADDITIONAL TIME TO DEVELOP A COMMON APPROACH BEFORE SOME OF THE NON-ALIGNED DEMAND ANOTHER FULL-FLEDGED DEBATE ON THE WAR. USUN RECOMMENDS THAT POSTS USE THE STATEMENT IF AND WHEN THEY ARE ASKED ABOUT WHAT THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS ARE DOING ABOUT THE WAR.

6. TEXT OF SC PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT FOLLOWS:

"I HAVE BEEN AUTHORIZED BY CHINA, FRANCE, THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND UNITED STATES TO SHARE WITH ALL OF YOU THE THOUGHTS WE, THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, HAVE BEEN SHARING AMONGST OURSELVES.

OUR DECISION TO BEGIN EXCHANGING THESE THOUGHTS WAS THE RESULT OF OUR RECOGNITION THAT THE CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ IS A MATTER OF GREAT CONCERN TO THE COUNCIL WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY. WE ALSO WERE MOTIVATED BY THE REQUEST OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO EXPLORE WAYS AND MEANS OF ENDING THE TRAGIC CONFLICT.

WE HAVE ACHIEVED A SUBSTANTIAL MEASURE OF COMMON GROUND. THIS INCLUDES AGREEMENT TO BUILD ON SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 582 BY DEVELOPING NEW ELEMENTS IN ORDER TO ENRICH THAT RESOLUTION IN A MANNER THAT WILL INCREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE COUNCIL IN ENDING THE HOSTILITIES AND IN PROVIDING A BASIS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE, PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE OUTSTANDING DIFFERENCES. WE HOPE THAT OUR EFFORT WILL FACILITATE AGREEMENT BY THE COUNCIL TO TAKE DECISIONS THAT WILL BE CARRIED OUT. IT IS OUR INTENTION TO INFORM THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL OF THE EXACT NATURE OF OUR PROPOSAL AS SOON AS WE HAVE COMPLETED OUR TASK.

I TRUST THIS GIVES YOU ALL A FAIR MEASURE OF UNDERSTANDING OF OUR EFFORTS AND WHY WE HAVE UNDERTAKEN THEM. YOU MAY REST ASSURED WE ARE ALL PURSUING COMMON GOALS AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE."

END TEXT.

7. BAGHDAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

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SECTION: 01 OF 01

\*\* END OF TEXT \*\*

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
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NSC: CHLD WAC ERMA KELL OAKL PAAL RODM ROSS STK  
<DIST>SIT: EOB VAX

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> CONFIDENTIAL <OSRI> RUEHDT <DTG> 011734Z MAY 87  
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9364

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: UN: APRIL 30 MEETING OF SECURITY COUNCIL  
-- PERMANENT MEMBERS' AMBASSADORS ON IRAN/IRAQ WAR

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, UNSC, IR, IZ  
SUBJECT: UN: APRIL 30 MEETING OF SECURITY COUNCIL  
-- PERMANENT MEMBERS' AMBASSADORS ON IRAN/IRAQ WAR  
REF: USUN 1150  
>BEGIN SUMMARY>

1. SUMMARY: AMBASSADORS REPRESENTING THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL REACHED AD REFERENDUM AGREEMENT ON A NEW DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE IRAN/IRAQ WAR. (TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION IN PARA 12 BELOW). END SUMMARY.

>END SUMMARY>  
2. FRENCH PERM REP BLANC HOSTED MEETING APRIL 30 OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF SECURITY COUNCIL TO CONSIDER LATEST DRAFT OF AN SC RESOLUTION WHICH FOR THE FIRST TIME WOULD ORDER AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE IN THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT. ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE SOVIET PERM REP BELONOGOV, CHINESE PERM REP LI, UK ACTING PERM REP BIRCH, U.S. ACTING PERM REP OKUN AND THEIR RESPECTIVE POLITICAL COUNSELORS.

3. AMBASSADORS QUICKLY REACHED AGREEMENT ON THE THREE ELEMENTS OF THE RESOLUTION ON WHICH COUNSELORS HAD BEEN UNABLE TO ACHIEVE CONSENSUS AT THEIR LAST MEETING (REFTEL). THEY THEN DECIDED TO SEEK INSTRUCTIONS IMMEDIATELY FROM CAPITALS AND TO WITHHOLD FROM ALL OTHER DELEGATIONS THE FACT THAT TENTATIVE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED. ON ASSUMPTION THAT THEY WOULD OBTAIN APPROVAL OF RESOLUTION FROM CAPITALS, THEY ALSO AGREED TO MEET AGAIN NO LATER THAN END OF NEXT WEEK IN ORDER TO REACH CONSENSUS ON WHAT ACTIONS TO TAKE IN CASE (A) BOTH IRAN AND IRAQ COMPLY WITH THE RESOLUTION OR (B) EITHER OR BOTH REJECT IT. IN ADDITION, THEY AGREED TO CONSIDER INFORMING THE SYG THAT THEY HAD A DRAFT RESOLUTION READY FOR TABLING IN ORDER TO SPUR HIM TO MAKE A NEW BEHIND THE SCENES EFFORT TO PERSUADE IRAN AND IRAQ TO HALT THE FIGHTING.

4. THREE KEY ELEMENTS ON WHICH AMBASSADORS REACHED AGREEMENT AT APRIL 30 MEETING WERE: (A) HOW TO MAKE RESOLUTION BINDING, (B) HOW TO PHRASE OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH ON COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONFLICT, AND (C) HOW TO IMPLY THAT THE SC WOULD TAKE FURTHER ACTION IN CASE OF NON-COMPLIANCE.

5. AMBASSADORS REACHED AGREEMENT ON ELEMENT (A) AFTER CHINESE SUDDENLY ACCEPTED TWO SPECIFIC REFERENCES TO PARAGRAPHS IN CHAPTER VII OF UN CHARTER AND UK IN TURN DROPPED ITS INSISTENCE THAT CHAPTER VII AS SUCH BE MENTIONED.

6. WITH REGARD TO ELEMENT (B), ALL FIVE AMBASSADORS QUICKLY AGREED TO DROP THE PHRASE "THE INITIATION OF" FROM OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 5 IN ORDER TO LEAVE THE ROLE OF THE INVESTIGATIVE BODY DELIBERATELY VAGUE BUT SUFFICIENTLY TEMPTING TO IRAN.

7. U.S. POSITION ON ELEMENT (C) WAS ACCEPTED BY OTHER FOUR DELEGATIONS AFTER U.S. AGREED TO A REFERENCE TO "FURTHER STEPS" RATHER THAN "MEASURES" AS A WAY OF

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SIGNALING ENFORCEMENT ACTION BY THE COUNCIL.

8. COMMENT: IF RESOLUTION IS APPROVED IN CAPITALS AND PASSED BY SECURITY COUNCIL, IT WOULD MARK FIRST TIME THAT SECURITY COUNCIL ORDERED A HALT TO A CONFLICT WITHOUT KNOWING IN ADVANCE THAT BOTH PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT WOULD ACCEPT THE ORDER.

9. WHAT MADE TODAY'S AGREEMENT POSSIBLE WAS, ABOVE ALL, THE SUDDEN CHINESE WILLINGNESS -- AFTER THREE MONTHS OF STRONG RESISTANCE -- TO ACCEPT LANGUAGE WHICH COULD LEAD TO CHAPTER VII SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN IF IT FAILS TO COMPLY WITH THE RESOLUTION. IT APPEARS THAT A MAJOR REASON FOR THE CHINESE SWITCH IS THEIR REALIZATION THAT THE SC, UNDER THEIR PRESIDENCY IN MAY, WILL HAVE TO CONSIDER THE SYG'S REPORT ON THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS BY BOTH SIDES AND THAT THIS COULD LEAD TO A NEW OMNIBUS RESOLUTION ON THE WAR DICTATED BY THE NONALIGNED RATHER THAN THE BIG FIVE. THE CHINESE SEEM MORE COMFORTABLE WITH CONCERTED ACTION BY THE PERMANENT MEMBERS.

10. IN ARGUING FOR ABSOLUTE SECRECY WITH REGARD TO TODAY'S TENTATIVE AGREEMENT, OTHER FOUR AMBASSADORS TURNED ALMOST IN UNISON AND LOOKED DIRECTLY AT AMBASSADOR OKUN AND IMMERMANN. THE OTHER FOUR CONTINUE TO SUSPECT THAT U.S. IS MORE INTERESTED IN SATISFYING IRAQIS THAN IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON A RESOLUTION. USUN  
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 01177  
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BELIEVES THAT THE DRAFT RESOLUTION CONTAINS ALL OF THE ELEMENTS WHICH IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTRY AND AMBASSADOR KITTANI HAVE URGED ON US OVER THE LAST FOUR MONTHS. THEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT WE MAY BE ON THE VERGE OF AN UNPRECEDENTED DECISION BY THE COUNCIL VERY MUCH IN IRAQ'S INTEREST, USUN STRONGLY URGES THAT THIS DRAFT NOT/NOT BE SHARED WITH IRAQIS UNTIL USG CONVEYS ITS POSITION ON IT TO THE OTHER FOUR PERMANENT MEMBERS.

11. USUN THEREFORE WOULD APPRECIATE PROMPT RECEIPT OF INSTRUCTIONS.

12. TEXT OF PROPOSED DRAFT RESOLUTION:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,  
REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTION 582 (1986),  
DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT, DESPITE ITS CALLS FOR A  
CEASE-FIRE, THE CONFLICT CONTINUES UNABATED, WITH  
FURTHER HEAVY LOSS OF HUMAN LIFE AND MATERIAL  
DESTRUCTION,  
EQUALLY CONCERNED THAT FURTHER ESCALATION AND WIDENING  
OF THE CONFLICT MAY TAKE PLACE,  
DETERMINED TO BRING TO AN END ALL MILITARY ACTIONS  
BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ,  
RECALLING THE OBLIGATION OF ALL MEMBER STATES TO SETTLE  
THEIR INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES BY PEACEFUL MEANS IN SUCH A  
MANNER THAT INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY AND JUSTICE

ARE NOT ENDANGERED,  
DETERMINING THAT THE CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ  
CONSTITUTES A BREACH OF THE PEACE,  
ACTING UNDER ARTICLES 39 AND 40,

1. DEMANDS THAT, AS A FIRST STEP TOWARDS NEGOTIATIONS,  
IRAN AND IRAQ OBSERVE AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE,  
DISCONTINUE ALL MILITARY ACTIONS, AND WITHDRAW ALL  
FORCES TO THE INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES  
WITHOUT DELAY.

2. URGES THAT A COMPREHENSIVE EXCHANGE OF  
PRISONERS-OF-WAR BE COMPLETED WITHIN A SHORT PERIOD  
AFTER THE CEASE-FIRE IN COOPERATION WITH THE  
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS.

3. CALLS UPON IRAN AND IRAQ TO COOPERATE WITH THE  
SECRETARY-GENERAL IN MEDIATION EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A  
COMPREHENSIVE, JUST AND HONORABLE SETTLEMENT, ACCEPTABLE  
TO BOTH SIDES, OF ALL OUTSTANDING ISSUES, IN ACCORDANCE  
WITH THE PRINCIPLES CONTAINED IN THE CHARTER OF THE

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
SECRETARIAT

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UNITED NATIONS.

4. CALLS UPON ALL OTHER STATES TO EXERCISE THE UTMOST RESTRAINT AND TO REFRAIN FROM ANY ACT WHICH MAY LEAD TO FURTHER ESCALATION AND WIDENING OF THE CONFLICT, AND THUS TO FACILITATE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION.

5. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO EXPLORE, IN CONSULTATION WITH IRAN AND IRAQ, THE QUESTION OF ENTRUSTING AN IMPARTIAL BODY WITH INQUIRING INTO RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONFLICT AND TO REPORT TO THE COUNCIL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

6. RECOGNIZES THE MAGNITUDE OF THE DAMAGE INFLICTED DURING THE CONFLICT AND THE NEED FOR RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS, WITH APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE, ONCE THE CONFLICT IS ENDED.

7. FURTHER REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO EXAMINE, IN CONSULTATION WITH IRAN AND IRAQ AND WITH OTHER STATES OF THE REGION, MEASURES TO ENHANCE THE SECURITY AND STABILITY OF THE REGION.

8. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO KEEP THE COUNCIL INFORMED ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION.

9. DECIDES TO MEET AGAIN AS NECESSARY TO CONSIDER FURTHER STEPS TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH THIS RESOLUTION.

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END TEXT,

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<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 03 <SSN> 1177 <TOR> 870501211723 MSG000168211043

<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03 <SSN> 1177 <TOR> 870501211855 MSG000168211135

<SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03 <SSN> 1177 <TOR> 870501211908 MSG000168211148

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PAGE 01

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SIT: EOB VAX NSJHO

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<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> SECRET <OSRI> RUEHC # <DTG> 260011Z MAR 87  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 1452  
INFO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 4364

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: IRAN/IRAQWAR: US DEMARCHE TO CHINA  
<TEXT>

~~SECRET~~ STATE 088996

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E. O. 12356: CL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MASS, MARR, CH, US IR, IZ  
SUBJECT: IRAN/IRAQWAR: US DEMARCHE TO CHINA

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. UNDER SECRETARY ARMACOST, DURING A MARCH 23 MEETING ON HIS RECENT DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW (SEPTEL), RAISED CHINA'S SUPPLY OF WEAPONS TO IRAN, PARTICULARLY CHINESE MISSILES (SILKWORM/ HAIYING-2), WITH PRC AMBASSADOR HAN XU. NOTING THAT THE SECRETARY HAD RAISED THE ISSUE OF CHINESE WEAPONS TO IRAN DURING HIS EARLY MARCH VISIT TO BEIJING, THE UNDER SECRETARY SAID THAT SOME OF THESE SHORE-LAUNCHED MISSILES HAVE RECENTLY BEEN DEPLOYED AND TESTED IN BANDAR ABBAS NEAR THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ, A DEVELOPMENT WHICH POSES A THREAT TO SHIPPING IN THE GULF MUCH BEYOND IRAN'S PREVIOUS CAPABILITIES. ARMACOST SAID THAT USE OF THESE MISSILES COULD BECOME A SERIOUS PROBLEM IN THE SINO-US BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. ARMACOST URGED THAT THE CHINESE REEXAMINE AND END THEIR ARMS SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN.
3. HAN REPLIED THAT CHINA REMAINS DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE CONTINUATION OF THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR AND HOPES FOR AN EARLY, NEGOTIATED END TO THE CONFLICT; CHINA IS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE PROBLEM OF INTERNATIONAL PASSAGE; AND, CHINA "NEVER SELLS WEAPONS TO IRAN" AND "WOULD NEVER CHANGE ITS CONSISTENT STAND." HAN RECALLED THAT THE SUBJECT ALSO CAME UP DURING THE SECRETARY'S MARCH 2 MEETING WITH PREMIER ZHAO ZIYANG IN BEIJING; THE PREMIER RESPONDED, "WE DID NOT DO IN THE PAST WHAT WE SHOULD NOT DO AND AFTER WHAT HAPPENED TO YOUR COUNTRY, WE WILL NOT DO IN THE FUTURE WHAT WE SHOULD NOT DO." ||
4. THE DISCUSSION ENDED WITH THE PRC AMBASSADOR UNDERTAKING TO CONVEY OUR MESSAGE TO BEIJING. SHULTZ

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 8996 <TOR> 870326125555 MSG000165070554

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BY dlb, NARA, DATE 6/8/00

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<D ST-SIT: EOB VAX

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> SECRET <OSRI> RUEHC # <DTG> 251802Z FEB 87  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUFHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0000  
INFO RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUFHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0000

<SUBJ> SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL DECISION: PRESSING FOR U.N.  
ACTION ON THE GULF WAR

~~SECRET~~ STATE 054487

EXDIS FOR AMBASSADORS

E.O.-12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, UNSC, IR, IZ

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL DECISION: PRESSING FOR U.N.  
ACTION ON THE GULF WAR

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE PRESIDENT HAS DETERMINED THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL PRESS FOR SUPPORT FROM THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL FOR A RESOLUTION DEMANDING A CEASE-FIRE IN THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, A WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES TO THE BORDERS AS OF AUGUST 1980, AND RELATED ACTIONS TO END THE WAR, ALL WITHIN A REASONABLE, WELL-DEFINED TIMETABLE. WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF SUCH A RESOLUTION, WE ARE PREPARED TO INCLUDE PROPOSALS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A U.N. INVESTIGATIVE MECHANISM OF SOME SORT, TO INVESTIGATE THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR AS WELL AS THE CREATION OF AN ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION FUND FOR BOTH COUNTRIES.

3. THE U.N., WHICH AS A MATTER OF POLICY DOES NOT TRANSFER MUNITIONS LIST ITEMS TO EITHER PARTY TO THE CONFLICT, WOULD SUPPORT MANDATORY ACTION BY THE UNSC UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE UN CHARTER TO PLACE A FORMAL ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST EITHER PARTY THAT REFUSES TO ABIDE BY A UNSC RESOLUTION CAST IN THE ABOVE TERMS. THE PRESIDENT WILL SHORTLY ISSUE A PUBLIC STATEMENT RENEWING THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO DISCOURAGE THE FLOW OF WEAPONS FROM ALL SOURCES TO IRAN, THE INTRANSIGENT PARTY IN THE CONFLICT. AS HE DID IN HIS JANUARY 23 STATEMENT ON THE GULF WAR, THE PRESIDENT WILL ALSO RESTATE U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE SELF-DEFENSE OF OUR FRIENDS IN THE GULF REGION.

4. ACTION ADDRESSEES (EXCEPT BAGHDAD AND USUN): PLEASE APPROACH HOST GOVERNMENTS OF ALL PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AT A SENIOR LEVEL TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- ON JANUARY 23, AT A TIME WHEN FIGHTING BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ WAS ESPECIALLY INTENSE, PRESIDENT REAGAN ISSUED A STATEMENT REITERATING DEEP U.S. CONCERN AT THE SUFFERING AND INSTABILITY BROUGHT BY THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR. --EVEN EARLIER IN JANUARY, THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE

PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, SPURRED BY THE IRANIAN THREAT TO BASRA AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S CALL FOR MORE EFFECTIVE ACTION BY THE COUNCIL, BEGAN TO CONSIDER SERIOUSLY ADOPTING A STRONG RESOLUTION ORDERING A CEASE-FIRE, TIED TO AN EARLY WITHDRAWAL TO PRE-WAR BOUNDARIES.

-- SINCE THAT TIME, IRAQ HAS BLOCKED THE IRANIAN ATTACK EAST OF BASRA, PUSHING IT BACK TO SOME DEGREE. AS A RESULT THE SENSE OF URGENCY FOR SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION SEEMS TO HAVE FADED. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS RELAXATION IS

A SERIOUS ERROR. FIGHTING IS CONTINUING ON THE GROUND, IN THE AIR, AND AT SEA. MANY MILITARY ANALYSTS EXPECT RENEWED IRANIAN ATTACKS IN THE RELATIVELY NEAR FUTURE. -- CLEARLY, THE BEST HOPE FOR SECURITY IN THE GULF REGION LIES IN AN IMMEDIATE END TO THE CONFLICT. PRESIDENT REAGAN PLANS TO ISSUE A NEW STATEMENT SHORTLY CALLING FOR AN IMMEDIATE SETTLEMENT OF THE WAR AND REAFFIRMING HIS BACKING FOR OPERATION STAUNCH, THE U.S. EFFORT TO INHIBIT ARMS RESUPPLY TO IRAN--THE RECALCITRANT PARTY IN THE WAR. WE WOULD WELCOME SIMILAR STATEMENTS FROM THE CAPITALS OF THE UNSC PERMANENT MEMBERS.

-- MOREOVER, WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS TIME FOR THE UNSC TO TAKE FORMAL, EFFECTIVE ACTION TO SEEK A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT AND PERSUADE IRAN TO CHANGE ITS POLICY ON THE WAR. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS FREQUENTLY CALLED FOR A NEGOTIATED END TO THE FIGHTING, BUT IRAN HAS SO FAR REFUSED TO JOIN IRAQ IN WORKING TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS. -- WE ARE APPROACHING ALL THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UNSC TO URGE THAT THEY SUPPORT A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION DEMANDING A CEASE-FIRE IN THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, A WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES TO THE BORDERS AS OF AUGUST 1980, AND RELATED ACTIONS TO END THE WAR, WITHIN A REASONABLE, WELL-DEFINED TIMETABLE. WE ARE PREPARED, IN PRINCIPLE, TO INCLUDE IN THE RESOLUTION PROPOSALS TO ESTABLISH A U.N. INVESTIATIVE MECHANISM TO STUDY THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR AS WELL AS CALL FOR A POST-WAR ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION FUND FOR BOTH COUNTRIES.

--FOR SUCH A RESOLUTION TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY BY THE BELLIGERENTS, ESPECIALLY IRAN, THEY MUST BE MADE TO UNDERSTAND CLEARLY THAT THE COUNCIL IS PREPARED TO BACK UP THE RESOLUTION WITH SEVERE SANCTIONS AGAINST ANY PARTY THAT FAILS TO HEED IT. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT AN ARMS EMBARGO WOULD BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE SANCTION.

--WE RECOGNIZE THE PROBLEMS OF ENFORCEMENT, BUT ARE CONFIDENT THAT WITH THE COOPERATION OF THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL THESE CAN BE SUBSTANTIALLY OVERCOME. THE PRESIDENT HAS REDOUBLED OUR EFFORTS ON STAUNCH. WE THEREFORE BELIEVE THAT AN ARMS EMBARGO SHOULD BE AN INTEGRAL PART OF EARLY ACTION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE UN CHARTER.

-- GOOD EARLY PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE AMONG THE FIVE PERMANENT COUNCIL MEMBERS IN NEW YORK IN STUDYING THIS ISSUE. WE NOW ASK THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT TAKE THIS PROPOSAL FOR AN SC RESOLUTION UNDER CONSIDERATION AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS. WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE MUST NOT WAIT FOR ANOTHER BLOODLETTING, WHICH COULD HAVE FARREACHING CONSEQUENCES, BEFORE WE TAKE EFFECTIVE ACTION. WE, THE MAJOR POWERS, MUST ACT TO REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH A TRAGEDY, WHICH COULD BE PROFOUNDLY DESTABILIZING IN THE REGION.

5. FOR BAGHDAD AND USUN: DRAWING ON THE ABOVE TALKING POINTS AS APPROPRIATE, PLEASE LET THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT KNOW THAT WE ARE APPROACHING THE PERMANENT MEMBERS TO PRESS FOR AN EFFECTIVE UNSC RESOLUTION. PLEASE SOLICIT IRAQI COMMENTS ON THE TERMS WHICH WE ARE PROPOSING FOR SUCH A RESOLUTION. USUN AT ITS DISCRETION MAY ALSO INFORM THE SECRETARIAT AS WELL AS DELEGATIONS OF OTHER PERMANENT SC MEMBERS OF OUR APPROACH TO THEIR GOVERNMENTS.  
6. MOSCOW AND BAGHDAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. SHULTZ

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 4487 <TOR> 870225170813 HSG000162580091

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NLS F96-121 #67

BY dlb, NARA, DATE 6/8/00

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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I-I war

February 4, 1987

MEMORANDUM

TO:

[REDACTED]

FOIA(b) (3)

Central Intelligence Agency  
NIO/NESA

FROM:

Robert B. Oakley *RO*

SUBJECT:

Impact of U.S. Arms Transfers on  
Iran-Iraq War

I would appreciate it if you would convene a meeting as soon as possible to survey the intelligence community's views on the impact of recent U.S. arms transfers to Iran on Iranian capabilities and on the course of the Iran-Iraq war. Please provide a written report of the discussion, with your assessment of its implications. I received from Paul Pope last week a useful analysis of the probable impact of TOW missiles upon the Basra/Fish Lake/Kerbala V battle and there is an interesting article on Page 11 of the DIA Intelligence Summary of Feb 3 on I-HAWK missiles. Many thanks.

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NLS F96-121 #58

By Amf, NARA, Date 2/17/06

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NSWJB

*Iran - Iraq War*

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SUBJECT: IRAN/IRAQ WAR: JANUARY 28 MEETING OF FIVE SC  
 - PERMANENT MEMBERS

\*\*\* START OF TEXT \*\*\*

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 00251  
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
 TAGS: PREL, UNSC, IR, IZ  
 SUBJECT: IRAN/IRAQ WAR: JANUARY 28 MEETING OF FIVE SC  
 - PERMANENT MEMBERS

REF: (A) STATE 022241, (B) USUN 00197

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. UK PERM REP HOSTED AFTERNOON JANUARY 28 MEETING OF PERM REPS AND POLITICAL COUNSELLORS OF FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF SECURITY COUNCIL TO CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS ON HOW TO DEAL MORE DECISIVELY WITH THE IRAN/IRAQ CONFLICT. U.S. WAS REPRESENTED BY AMBASSADOR WALTERS AND POLITICAL MIN COUNS IMMERMEN.
3. UK PERM REP THOMSON OPENED MEETING BY SUMARIZING WHAT HE THOUGHT WAS THE CONSENSUS REACHED AT THE JANUARY 24 MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL. HE UNDERSTOOD

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 1996-121 #169  
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 BY *dlk* NARA, DATE 6/8/00

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THAT THE FIVE PERM REPS WERE PREPARED TO RECOMMEND TO THEIR GOVERNMENTS THAT (A) THE SECURITY COUNCIL ORDER A CEASE FIRE IN PLACE AND (B) BEFORE THE COUNCIL ACTED, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO WORK OUT AN AGREED PACKAGE OF MEASURES THAT THE COUNCIL OR INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS WOULD

TAKE IF EITHER OR BOTH PARTIES REFUSED TO COMPLY WITH THE SC DECISION. THOMSON ADDED THAT IT WAS PRUDENT TO ASSUME THAT THE UK WAS WILLING TO FOLLOW THIS SCENARIO. SOVIET PERM REP BELONOGOV SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS "READY TO TAKE UP ITS RESPONSIBILITIES". THE CHINESE AND FRENCH PERM REPS SAID THAT WHILE THEY HAD REPORTED THE JANUARY 24 MEETING, THEY STILL HAD NO REACTION FROM THEIR GOVERNMENTS.

4. AMBASSADOR WALTERS SAID THAT THE USC WAS SYMPATHETIC TO THIS APPROACH. HE POINTED OUT, HOWEVER, THAT A CEASE FIRE IN PLACE WAS ONLY A FIRST STEP AND NOT AN END ALL AND BE ALL. IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO POINT THE WAY TO OTHER STEPS, SUCH AS A WITHDRAWAL TO INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES AND TO NEGOTIATIONS. THE SOVIET AND FRENCH PERM REPS AGREED THAT IN CALLING FOR A CEASE FIRE, THE COUNCIL SHOULD MENTION NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH WOULD PRESUME A WITHDRAWAL OF THE BORDERS AS WELL AS A SETTLEMENT OF OTHER DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PARTIES.

5. UK PERM REP THEN CIRCULATED A DRAFT RESOLUTION CALLING FOR A CEASE FIRE IN PLACE (TEXT PARA 6). HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE UK MISSION HAD PREPARED THE DRAFT AS A SUMMARY OF THE THINKING UP TO THIS POINT OF THE FIVE PERM REPS. HE SAID THAT THE DRAFT HAD NO PARTICULAR STANDING WITH THE UK GOVERNMENT. HE ASKED THAT ALL FIVE REPRESENTATIVES SOLICIT THE REACTIONS OF THEIR GOVERNMENTS TO THE DRAFT AND THAT THESE REACTIONS BE EXAMINED AT A FURTHER MEETING SOMETIME NEXT WEEK.

6. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION ("DEMANDS" WAS USED IN 1967 SC RESOLUTION CALLING FOR HALT TO SIX DAY WAR WHILE "DECIDES" WAS USED IN 1973 RESOLUTION CALLING FOR CEASE FIRE IN YOM KIPPUR WAR.):

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

- RECALLING ITS RESOLUTIONS 582 (1986) AND 588 (1986) IN WHICH, INTER ALIA, IT CALLED UPON IRAN AND IRAQ TO OBSERVE AN IMMEDIATE CEASE FIRE, A CESSATION OF ALL HOSTILITIES ON LAND, AT SEA AND IN THE AIR, AND WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FORCES TO THE INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES WITHOUT DELAY,

- INDIGNANT THAT, DESPITE ITS CALLS FOR A CEASE FIRE AND THE EFFORTS OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO GIVE EFFECT TO RESOLUTION 582 (1986), THE CONFLICT HAS INTENSIFIED AND THE HEAVY LOSSES OF HUMAN LIVES AND MATERIAL DESTRUCTION CONTINUE UNABATED,

- ALARMED THAT YET FURTHER ESCALATION AND WIDENING OF THE CONFLICT MAY TAKE PLACE WITH GRAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY,

- DETERMINED TO BRING TO AN END ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ,

- 1. (DECIDES) (DEMANDS) THAT THE GOVERNMENTS OF IRAN AND IRAQ SHOULD, AS A FIRST STEP TOWARDS NEGOTIATION, CEASE FIRE IN PLACE AND DISCONTINUE ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES AT .....HOURS GMT ON .....1987;

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, UNSC, IR, IZ

SUBJECT: IRAN/IRAQ WAR: JANUARY 28 MEETING OF FIVE SC

- 2. CALLS UPON THE GOVERNMENTS OF IRAN AND IRAQ  
- (A) IMMEDIATELY TO REPORT TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL THEIR UNCONDITIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE COUNCIL'S DEMAND FOR A CEASE FIRE;  
- (B) FULLY TO COOPERATE WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL IN ENABLING HIM TO KEEP THE COUNCIL PROMPTLY AND CURRENTLY INFORMED;  
- (C) FULLY TO COOPERATE WITH THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION AND OBSERVERS IN IMPLEMENTING THE CEASE FIRE, INCLUDING FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND ADEQUATE COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES;  
- 3. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO KEEP THE COUNCIL PROMPTLY AND CURRENTLY INFORMED OF THE SITUATION.  
END TEXT.

7. AMBASSADOR WALTERS COMMENTED THAT THERE SHOULD BE SOME PHRASE IN THE RESOLUTION THAT MAKES IT CLEAR THAT A CEASE FIRE IN PLACE IS ONLY THE FIRST STEP AND THAT OTHER ACTIONS WILL HAVE TO BE TAKEN BY THE BELLIGERENTS. OTHER FOUR PERM REPS NOTED THAT FIRST PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH CALLED FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FORCES TO INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES. ALL FOUR THOUGHT THAT THE INCLUSION OF THE PHRASE "AS A FIRST STEP TOWARDS NEGOTIATIONS" IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 1 SHOULD MEET THE USG'S CONCERNS. THE UK REP IN PARTICULAR SAID THAT THE LANGUAGE OF THE OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS OF THE RESOLUTION SHOULD BE AS TERSE AND UNAMBIGUOUS AS POSSIBLE IN DEMANDING A CEASE FIRE IN PLACE. OTHERWISE, ONE OR BOTH PARTIES MIGHT BE ABLE TO RESPOND AMBIGUOUSLY OR TO CONDITION THEIR RESPONSE TO ONE OR ANOTHER ASPECT OF THE RESOLUTION.

8. TURNING THE DISCUSSION TO THE SECOND STEP IN THE PROCESS, UK PERM REP THEN SAID IT WAS NECESSARY TO ELICIT REACTIONS URGENTLY FROM THE FIVE GOVERNMENTS ON WHAT THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT IN THE WAY OF SANCTIONS IN CASE ONE OR BOTH PARTIES REFUSED TO COMPLY WITH THE CALL FOR A CEASE FIRE. HE PROPOSED, AND ALL AGREED, THAT THE FIVE POLITICAL COUNSELLORS WOULD DRAW UP TWO LISTS. ONE WOULD INDICATE WHAT MIGHT BE DONE IF THERE WAS NONCOMPLIANCE AND THE OTHER WOULD INDICATE WHAT ADDITIONAL STEPS THE COUNCIL WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER IF THERE WAS AGREEMENT ON A CEASE FIRE.

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9. UK PERM REP ADDED THAT WITH REGARD TO POSSIBLE MEASURES IN CASE OF NONCOMPLIANCE, IT WOULD, OF COURSE, BE NECESSARY TO FACE UP TO WHETHER THE PERMANENT MEMBERS WERE READY TO AGREE ON CHAPTER 7 SANCTIONS. THESE MIGHT INCLUDE AN ARMS EMBARGO, FINANCIAL MEASURES OR SUSPENSION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. HE SUGGESTED THAT IN DRAWING UP THE LIST, NO PARTICULAR MEASURE BE FAVORED AND NONE BE EXCLUDED. IT WAS UP TO OUR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS TO DECIDE WHAT THEY COULD LIVE WITH. POLITICAL COUNSELLORS AGREED TO MEET AT USUN MORNING OF JANUARY 30 TO BEGIN THIS TASK. (WE PLAN TO DRAW HEAVILY ON STATE'S 22241 IN SHAPING THE DISCUSSION OF WHAT SC WOULD HAVE TO FACE IN CASE OF NONCOMPLIANCE).

10. BAGHDAD AND MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.  
WALTERS

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SECTION: 01 OF 02  
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\*\* END OF TEXT \*\*

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*Iraq Iron War*

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SUBJECT: UNSC: CONSULTATIONS ON GULF WAR

\*\*\* START OF TEXT \*\*\*

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~~SECRET~~ STATE 025604

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, UNSC, IZ, IR

SUBJECT: UNSC: CONSULTATIONS ON GULF WAR

REF: A) USUN 197; B) STATE 22241; C) USUN 152

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE ON U.S. POLICY IS BEING PROVIDED TO MISSION FOR USE DURING ONGOING CONSULTATIONS AMONG SC PERMREPS, UN SECRETARIAT, AND OTHER PARTIES AS MISSION BELIEVES APPROPRIATE CONCERNING ACTIONS SC MIGHT TAKE TO HELP BRING ABOUT CEASEFIRE AND TERMINATION OF IRAN-IRAQ CONFLICT:

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(A) WE CONSIDER THE FIVE-POWER PROCESS NOW UNDERWAY ON THIS ISSUE TO BE A SERIOUS ONE AND STRONGLY SUPPORT THE PACKAGE APPROACH BEING FOLLOWED SO FAR IN DISCUSSIONS AMONG SYG AND FIVE PERMANENT SC MEMBER STATES. WHILE IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO JUDGE PROSPECTS FOR AGREEMENT ON AN

ACCEPTABLE SC RES, WHICH WE RECOGNIZE MAY BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE, U.S. SIDE SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO WORK INTENSIVELY TOWARD THAT OBJECTIVE AND SHOULD STRESS THROUGHOUT THE PROCESS THE NEED FOR A CONCRETE, REALISTIC APPROACH LEADING TO GENUINELY EFFECTIVE SC ACTION. WE SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WE WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO SETTLE FOR THE KIND OF HOLLOW TEXT WHICH TOO OFTEN EMERGES ON SUCH ISSUES AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO A MEANINGFUL RESOLUTION.

(B) PROPOSAL FOR IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE IN PLACE SHOULD BE SEEN AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF SC PACKAGE, INCLUDING WITHDRAWAL TO PREWAR OR MUTUALLY AGREED BOUNDARIES. IT WOULD BE DESTABILIZING TO GULF AREA SHOULD THE WAR BE SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY ON THE BASIS OF A CEASEFIRE IN PLACE THAT COULD BE SEEN AS AN IRANIAN VICTORY, EVEN IN THE UNLIKELY CIRCUMSTANCES THAT IRAQ WOULD GO ALONG WITH SUCH A CEASEFIRE. THUS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MAKING CLEAR THAT A CEASEFIRE IS ONLY THE FIRST STEP IN A PROCESS LEADING TO TERRITORIAL STATUS QUO ANTE.

(C) EMBARGO AND OTHER SANCTIONS: WE ARE INCLINED TO FAVOR SOME FORM OF MANDATORY ARMS EMBARGO UNDER CHAPTER SEVEN OF THE UN CHARTER IF NECESSARY TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH A UNSC-ORDERED CEASEFIRE AND WITHDRAWAL. WE WOULD ALSO BE WILLING IN PRINCIPLE TO CONSIDER OTHER AGREED INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS, SUCH AS A POSSIBLE EMBARGO ON THE PURCHASE OF OIL FROM THE OFFENDING STATE. SUCH A PROPOSAL WOULD REQUIRE STUDY OF ITS ECONOMIC AND STRATEGIC RAMIFICATIONS, WHICH WE WILL UNDERTAKE IN THE EVENT THAT OTHER UNSC MEMBERS FIND THE IDEA WORTHY OF SERIOUS CONSIDERATION.

(D) WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO ESTABLISHMENT OF AD HOC BODY TO INVESTIGATE THE QUESTION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR STARTING THE WAR. WE WOULD WANT TO LOOK CAREFULLY AT ITS TERMS OF REFERENCE, HOWEVER, TO ASSURE IT IS NOT DIVERTED TOWARD ANTI-US OR ANTI-WESTERN PROPOGANDA OBJECTIVES. THE RELATED QUESTION OF REPARATIONS IS PRIMARILY AN ISSUE FOR THE TWO PARTIES TO ADDRESS BETWEEN THEMSELVES. WE PERCEIVE NO PROBLEMS IN INCLUDING REFERENCE TO REPARATIONS QUESTION IN AN SC RESOLUTION BUT WOULD WANT TO ASSURE THAT THIS ISSUE IS HANDLED IN SUCH A WAY THAT IT NOT BECOME A POTENTIAL STICKING POINT FOR IRAQ THAT WOULD THREATEN TO UNDO PROSPECTS FOR A CEASEFIRE AND FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS. (FYI ONLY: IN THE PAST, SOME OF THE GULF ARAB STATES -- SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES -- HAVE STATED A WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER A REPARATIONS PACKAGE, WHICH HAS LONG BEEN ONE OF THE IRANIAN "DEMANDS" PRECONDITIONING AN AGREEMENT TO END THE WAR. WE DO NOT KNOW -- AND DO NOT BELIEVE THE TIME IS



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OPPORTUNE TO INQUIRE -- WHETHER THESE STATES CONTINUE TO BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER REPARATIONS IN PRINCIPLE. END FYI)  
(E) WE HAVE REPEATEDLY CONDEMNED USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN THE WAR AND WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO A REFERENCE TO CW IN ANY SC RESOLUTION.

(F) WE HAVE DOUBTS THAT A UN ARRANGEMENT TO PROTECT GULF SHIPPING WOULD BE FEASIBLE, OR USEFUL IF IT WERE FEASIBLE. THE OBJECTIVE OF ANY SC RESOLUTION SHOULD BE TO END THE FIGHTING, MAKING SPECIAL PROTECTION FOR GULF SHIPPING UNNECESSARY. (FYI: AN INTERNATIONAL NAVAL

FORCE, IN OUR VIEW, COULD SERVE TO LEGITIMIZE A GREATER SOVIET PRESENCE IN THE GULF REGION AND THUS RUNS CONTRARY TO US STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES. END FYI) OBVIOUSLY, ANY INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING PROTECTION ARRANGEMENT WOULD RAISE COMPLEX QUESTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON WHICH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WOULD HAVE GREAT DIFFICULTY AGREEING. SHULTZ

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SECTION: 01 OF 01

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*Iran-Iraq  
War*

PAGE 01

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TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS IMMEDIATE

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON THE GULF WAR

UNCLAS STATE 022225

E. O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL , GB, AR

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON THE GULF WAR

1. THE PRESIDENT RELEASED JANURAY 23 THE FOLLOWING  
STATEMENT ON THE IRAN IRAQ WAR.

2. (BEGIN TEXT)

THE CURRENT IRANIAN ASSAULT ON IRAQI FORCES NEAR BASRA IS  
A REMINDER OF THE TERRIBLE SUFFERING AND LOSS WHICH THE  
IRAN-IRAQ WAR HAS BROUGHT TO THE PEOPLES OF THE GULF  
REGION. THE CONTINUATION OF THIS BLOODY STRUGGLE REMAINS  
A SUBJECT OF DEEP CONCERN TO THE UNITED STATES AND TO THE  
ENTIRE WORLD. IT IS A WAR THAT THREATENS NOT ONLY  
AMERICAN STRATEGIC INTERESTS, BUT ALSO THE STABILITY AND  
SECURITY OF OUR FRIENDS IN THE REGION.

AS I HAVE EMPHASIZED MANY TIMES, WE ARE DETERMINED TO  
HELP BRING THE WAR TO THE PROMPTEST POSSIBLE NEGOTIATED  
END, WITHOUT VICTOR OR VANQUISHED, LEAVING INTACT THE  
SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF BOTH IRAN AND  
IRAQ. WE CANNOT BUT CONDEMN IRANIAN SEIZURE AND  
OCCUPATION OF IRAQI TERRITORY, AND WE AGAIN TO CALL UPON  
THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN TO JOIN THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ IN  
SEEKING A RAPID NEGOTIATED SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT.  
WE SHARE THE CONCERN OF OUR FRIENDS IN THE GULF REGION  
THAT THE WAR COULD SPILL OVER AND THREATEN THEIR  
SECURITY. WE WOULD REGARD ANY SUCH EXPANSION OF THE WAR  
AS A MAJOR THREAT TO OUR INTERESTS, AS WELL AS TO THOSE  
OF OUR FRIENDS IN THE REGION. WE REMAIN DETERMINED TO  
ENSURE THE FREE FLOW OF OIL THROUGH THE STRAIT OF  
HORMUZ. WE ALSO REMAIN STRONGLY COMMITTED TO SUPPORTING  
THE INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE OF OUR FRIENDS  
IN THE GULF, WITH WHOM WE HAVE DEEP AND LONG-STANDING  
TIES. (END TEXT) SHULTZ

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01<SSN> 2225<TOR> 870126122027 MSG000159970826

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φ - IRAN/IRAQ

PAGE 01 OF 02

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8785  
INFO RUEHWW/GULF WAR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: MURPHY MISSION: DISCUSSION WITH KING  
- HUSSEIN AND PM RIFA'I ON THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 00424  
EXDIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, IR, IZ, JO, U. S.  
SUBJECT: MURPHY MISSION: DISCUSSION WITH KING  
- HUSSEIN AND PM RIFA'I ON THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR  
REF: AMMAN 282

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

>BEGIN SUMMARY>

2. SUMMARY:

KING HUSSEIN SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE IRAQIS WERE CONFIDENT AND SURE OF THEMSELVES AFTER THE UM AL-RASSAS FIGHTING, HE HAD CAUTIONED SADDAM HUSSEIN NOT TO RELAX HIS VIGILANCE AS A NEW OFFENSIVE IS PROBABLE BEFORE THE KUWAIT ISLAMIC CONFERENCE. THE KING, PRIME MINISTER RIFA'I AND ROYAL DIWAN CHIEF KASEM ALL SAID THAT JORDAN'S INFORMATION ON THE LATEST FIGHTING IS STILL SKETCHY. HUSSEIN SAID THAT DURING HIS JANUARY 7-8 VISIT TO BAGHDAD, HE HAD FOUND IRAQIS SHOCKED AND DISAPPOINTED WITH THE U. S. - IRAN INITIATIVE; HE SAID IRAQ WILL LOOK AT FUTURE RELATIONS WITH A GREAT DEAL MORE CAUTION. HUSSEIN URGED THE U. S. TO CONTINUE DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS WITH IRAQ, BUT SAID THAT THE IRAQIS ARE BUSY NOW WITH A NEW OFFENSIVE, SO THE TIME IS NOT RIGHT FOR MURPHY TO VISIT. END SUMMARY.

>END SUMMARY>

3. WHILE WAITING FOR THE MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN TO BEGIN ON JANUARY 10, AND LATER AT THE OUTSET OF THE MEETING WITH THE KING, ASSISTANT SECRETARY MURPHY AND HIS ACCOMPANYING PARTY HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR.

4. KASEM MENTIONED THAT HE HAD JUST SPOKEN TO THE IRAQIS ON THE PHONE; THEY EXPRESSED THEIR HOPE THAT THE MILITARY PICTURE WOULD BE MUCH BETTER BY THE END OF THE DAY, AS PITCHED FIGHTING IS STILL GOING ON. RIFA'I ADDED THAT HE HAD FOUND THE IRAQIS CONFIDENT AND SURE OF THEMSELVES AFTER THE UM AL-RASSAS FIGHTING, ALTHOUGH THEY HAD BEEN IMPRESSED WITH THE SHREWDNESS OF IRANIAN STRATEGY TO SEPARATE IRAQI FORCES IN THE SOUTH FROM THOSE IN THE NORTH, THEN TO SWING THE UM AL-RASSAS UNITS SOUTHWARDS TO LINK UP WITH IRANIAN FORCES THERE. HE SAID THE IRANIANS USED TOP NOTCH TROOPS, BUT THE IRAQIS KILLED 75-80 PERCENT OF THEM, "A REAL MASSACRE".

ALTHOUGH THE IRANIANS HAD BEEN ABLE TO SECURE BRIDGEHEADS, IRAQI AIRFORCE AND ARTILLERY PREVENTED THE MOVEMENT FORWARD OF ADDITIONAL TROOPS TO EXPLOIT THE BRIDGEHEADS. IN ANOTHER ASIDE, RIFA'I NOTED THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN STILL HAS NOT COMMITTED HIMSELF ON ATTENDING THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE SUMMIT IN KUWAIT.

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NARA, DATE 6/8/00

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SECRETARIAT

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EXDIS

5. AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MEETING WITH THE KING, MURPHY OPENED BY ASKING ABOUT THE RESULTS OF HUSSEIN'S VISIT TO BAGHDAD. THE KING SAID THE MOOD IS OF GREAT DISAPPOINTMENT WITH THE U.S. AND SHOCK AT THE U.S. INITIATIVE WITH IRAN. IRAQ WILL LOOK AT FUTURE RELATIONS WITH A GREAT DEAL MORE CAUTION. MURPHY SAID OBVIOUSLY IRAQ WILL NEED TIME TO WATCH U.S. ACTIONS ON OPERATION STAUNCH. WE ARE PURSUING THE OPERATION WITH ALL POTENTIAL SUPPLIERS, INCLUDING ISRAEL.

EXDIS

6. HUSSEIN ADVISED THE U.S. TO CONTINUE DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS WITH IRAQ. IT WOULD BE USEFUL, IF MURPHY OR ANY OTHER U.S. SENIOR OFFICIAL IS IN THE AREA, TO STOP BY BAGHDAD; HOWEVER, THE IRAQIS ARE BUSY NOW WITH THE NEW OFFENSIVE, SO IT WOULD NOT BE AN APPROPRIATE TIME FOR MURPHY TO VISIT. HUSSEIN SAID HE HAD FOUND THAT THE IRAQIS BELIEVED THERE WOULD BE TIME BEFORE ANOTHER ATTACK, SO HE HAD WARNED THEM THAT THE IRANIANS WOULD TRY TO ATTACK AGAIN BEFORE THE KUWAIT ISLAMIC CONFERENCE.

EXDIS

7. HUSSEIN MENTIONED THAT THE IRAQIS WERE ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE DISPOSITION OF IRANIAN ASSETS, INCLUDING WEAPONS, IN THE U.S. MURPHY EXPLAINED THAT THE MONEY IN QUESTION HAD BEEN UNDER DISCUSSION FOR FOUR YEARS AT THE HAGUE TRIBUNALS; ABOUT USD 300 MILLION IN 1982 HAS GROWN TO USD 500 MILLION. IN AUGUST, THE TRIBUNAL DECIDED THAT THESE MONIES SHOULD BE RETURNED TO IRAN. LEGALLY, THE U.S. HAS NO POWER TO RETAIN THESE FUNDS; POLITICALLY, HOWEVER, SECRET SECTION 02 OF 02 AMMAN 00424  
EXDIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, IR, IZ, JO, U. S.  
SUBJECT: MURPHY MISSION: DISCUSSION WITH KING THE U. S. WILL GO SLOW ON THEIR RETURN. REGARDING ARMS, NO ARMS WILL BE RELEASED TO IRAN. FURTHERMORE, THE WEAPONS AND SPARES IN STORAGE HAD DETERIORATED BADLY OVER TIME.

EXDIS

8. COMMENT: WITH REGARD TO AMBASSADOR NEWTON'S SUGGESTION THAT MURPHY SHOULD STOP OFF IN BAGHDAD, IN LIGHT OF KING HUSSEIN'S REMARKS THAT NOW WOULD NOT BE THE TIME, GIVEN EVENTS IN IRAQ, MURPHY HAS DECIDED AGAINST A BAGHDAD STOP.  
9. ASSISTANT SECRETARY MURPHY HAS CLEARED THIS CABLE.  
BOEKER

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02<SSN> 0424<TOR> 870112212455 MSG000158793895  
<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02<SSN> 0424<TOR> 870112212520 MSG000158793920

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

## RESPONDING TO UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S PROPOSALS ON IRAN-IRAQ WAR

### BACKGROUND

-- Secretary General proposed 1/17:

- (1) would be useful to hold ministerial-level SC meeting on war;
- (2) agenda for this meeting or preceding SC meetings might include following seven points:
  - (a) create ad hoc body to investigate who was responsible for starting war
  - (b) examine feasibility of providing international protection for merchant shipping in Gulf
  - (c) consider dangers of continued use chemical warfare
  - (d) explore willingness SC members and others to end supply weapons to both belligerents
  - (e) explore ways bringing about truce/return to status quo ante (following consideration a-d)
  - (f) question of reparations
  - (g) harmonize bilateral policies SG members with SC actions

-- SYG travels to Kuwait 1/23 to attend OIC; returns to New York via North Africa early February.

### REACTION

- Ministerial-level meeting only useful with extensive preparation.
- Seven points heavily slanted toward Iranian agenda.
- Point two (shipping) would give Soviets opening in Gulf--dangerous precedent requiring full-scale review U.S. policy.
- France, PRC, USSR unlikely see much merit in point four (blocking arms transfers to both belligerents).
- No agenda/discussion will be worthwhile unless both Iran and Iraq, and non-belligerents in Gulf, accept it as realistic basis for peace.

ELEMENTS OF RESPONSE

- State draft response with Armacost on 1/21:
  - consult with UK and France first;
  - inform Secretary General prepared to consider proposals seriously, but crucial that he first test waters at OIC and report back;