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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name BURNS, WILLIAM: FILES *NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE, NSC* **Withdrawer** CAS 1/18/2012
File Folder EXCHANGES WITH IRAN (4) **FOIA**
Box Number *92155 PRC Box 4* M11-392
BYRNE
3

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
127670	DEMARCHE	ON GULF INCIDENT (ANNOTATED) D 11/26/2002 F970107/2 #194; UPHELD 11/21/2017 M393/1 #127670	1	ND	B1
127673	CABLE	ANKARA 10330 (261328Z) D 11/26/2002 F970107/2 #195; R 11/21/2017 M393/1 #127673	3	8/26/1987	B1
127676	CABLE	100951Z AUG 87 (ANKARA 09540) R 11/26/2002 NLSF970107/2 #196	3	8/10/1987	B1
127677	CABLE	STATE 246663 (091750Z) D 11/26/2002 F970107/2 #197; R 11/21/2017 M393/1 #127677	5	8/9/1987	B1
127680	MEMO	CHRISTOPHER ROSS FOR THE FILES RE IRANIAN RESPONSE TO US MESSAGE D 11/26/2002 F970107/2 #198; UPHELD 11/21/2017 M393/1 #127680	1	9/2/1987	B1
127682	LETTER	TRANSLATION OF LETTER FROM HANS-DIETRICH GENSCHER TO GEORGE D 11/26/2002 F970107/2 #199; R 11/21/2017 M393/1 #127682	2	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name BURNS, WILLIAM: FILES

Withdrawer

CAS 1/18/2012

File Folder EXCHANGES WITH IRAN (4)

FOIA

M11-392

Box Number 92155

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3

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
127684	DEMARCHE	SAME TEXT AS 127670 (W/O ANNOTATIONS) D 11/26/2002 F970107/2 #200; UPHELD 11/21/2017 M393/1 #127684	1	ND	B1
127686	MEMO	MICHAEL ARMACOST TO SECRETARY RE REPLY R 11/26/2002 NLSF970107/2 #201	1	8/7/1987	B1
127688	MEMCON	ARMACOST AND TURKISH FM KANDEMIR ON 7/28/87 AND 8/4/87 D 11/26/2002 F970107/2 #202; R 11/21/2017 M393/1 #127688	3	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: BURNS, WILLIAM J.: Files
Box: 92155
File Folder: Exchanges With Iran (4)

Archivist: loj/loj
FOIA ID: F97-107/2, Wills
Date: 12/18/2000

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. demarche	re Gulf Incident (with notations), 1p D 11/24/02 F97-107/2 #194	nd	P1/F1
2. cable	261328Z Aug 87 [Ankara 10330], 3p D #195	8/26/87	P1/F1
3. cable	100951Z Aug 87 [Ankara 09540], 3p D #196	8/10/87	P1/F1
4. cable	091750Z Sep 87 [State 246663], 5p D #197	8/9/87	P1/F1
5. memo	Christopher Ross for the Files, re Iranian response to US Message, 1p D #198	9/2/87	P1/F1
6. letter	translation of letter from Hans-Dietrich Genscher to George, 2p D #199	nd	P1/F1
7. demarche	same text as item #1 without notations, 1p D 200	nd	P1/F1
8. memo	Michael Armacost to Secretary, re reply, 1p D #201	8/7/87	P1/F1
9. memcon	Armacost and Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Kandemir on 7/28/87 and 8/4/87, 3p D #202	nd	P1/F1

RESTRICTIONS

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-5 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(5) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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PAUL STEVENS

<DIST>PRT: SIT
SIT: EOB WHSR_IN VAX

<PREC> IMMEDIATE<CLAS> UNCLASSIFIED<OSRI> RUEHDT<DTG> 222254Z SEP 87
<ORIG>FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
<TO>TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1383
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 2705

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL: U.S. LETTER ON INCIDENT
- WITH IRANIAN VESSEL

<TEXT>
UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 02804
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, UNSC, MOPS, US, IR
SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL: U.S. LETTER ON INCIDENT
- WITH IRANIAN VESSEL

1. ON AFTERNOON OF SEPTEMBER 22 USUN FORMALLY NOTIFIED
PRESIDENT OF SECURITY COUNCIL OF U.S. EXERCISE OF RIGHT
OF SELF-DEFENSE IN SEPTEMBER 21 INCIDENT WITH IRANIAN
VESSEL. TEXT OF LETTER BELOW IN PARA 2. NO SIGNS HAVE
APPEARED OF SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION ON THIS SUBJECT.

2. TEXT OF LETTER TO PRESIDENT OF SECURITY COUNCIL:
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS, I WISH, ON BEHALF OF MY GOVERNMENT, TO
REPORT THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS EXERCISED ITS INHERENT
RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW BY TAKING
DEFENSIVE ACTION AGAINST A NAVAL VESSEL OF THE ISLMAIC
REPUBLIC OF IRAN IN THE PERSIAN GULF. THIS IRANIAN
VESSEL WAS DISCOVERED LAYING MINES IN SHIPPING LANDES
USED BY U.S. AND OTHER VESSELS IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS
FIFTY MILES NORTHEAST OF BAHRAIN. THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT HAD PREVIOUSLY INFORMED THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT
THAT IT WOULD TAKE APPROPRIATE DEFENSIVE MEASURES AGAINST
SUCH PROVOCATE ACTIONS, WHICH PRESENT AN IMMEDIATE RISK
TO ALL SHIPS, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE UNITED STATES.
SIX MINES WERE LAID BEFORE THE UNITED STATES TOOK
MEASURES TO CAUSE THE IRANIAN CRAFT TO CEASE THIS HOSTILE
USE OF FORCE. TEN ADDITIONAL MINES WERE DISCOVERED ON
BOARD THE IRANIAN VESSEL. THE USS JARRETT IS NOW TOWING
THE IRANIAN LANDING CRAFT TO ANCHORAGE IN INTERNATIONAL
WATERS OUTSIDE THE AREA IN WHICH MINES WERE LAID. THE
UNITED STATES IS IN THE PROCESS OF FACILITATING THE
REPATRIATION OF THE IRANIAN SAILORS.

I ASK THAT YOU CIRCULATE THE TEXT OF THIS LETTER AS A
DOCUMENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

SIGNED BY:
HERBERT S. OKUN
AMBASSADOR
ACTING PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE

END TEXT.
3. BAGHDAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
WALTERS

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01<SSN> 2804<TOR> 870922191240 MSG000180645160

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 1/22 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.



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Department of State

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Powell

PAGE 01 OF 03 ANKARA 10330 261331Z C0

ACTION OFFICE SS-08
INFO SWO-01 SSO-01 SSS-01 SSI-01 CATC-01 /013

WESR HANDLING SLIP	
Carlucci	C
Powell	O
Green	C
Courtney	
Michael	C
Lebras	C
Sigler	
OAKLEY	C
COCKELL	C
RODMAN	C
NSC/S LEBRAS	C
REMARKS: SDO	C
C: Copy O: Original P: C/E: Copy Hand Delivered C	

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EXSEC _____ (S/S-1)
DEPEXSEC _____ DATE/TIM _____

REPEATED TO _____
BY _____ DATE/TIM _____

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET BY *RW* NLRR M3931 #127673
NARA DATE 11/21/17

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Department of State

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PAGE 02 OF 03 ANKARA 10330 261331Z
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1610

~~SECRET~~ ANKARA 10330

NODIS

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY MURPHY FROM AMBASSADOR

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, ZP, IR, TU
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FOR KANDEMIR

REF: (A) ANKARA 10218, (B) STATE 260408

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. MFA UNDERSECRETARY NUZHET KANDEMIR SUMMONED ME TO HIS OFFICE THIS MORNING, AUGUST 26. ACCORDING TO KANDEMIR, MR. MUAYYERI HANDED HIM YESTERDAY THE FOLLOWING REPLY TO MIKE ARMACOST'S MESSAGE:

TEXT: THE WORDING OF THE US REPLY IS UNACCEPTABLE TO US. THE WAY IT HAS BEEN DRAFTED SOUNDS ODD AND CONTAINS THREATENING ALLEGATIONS. WE CANNOT BE INTIMIDATED BY SUCH THREATS. IF US CONTINUE WITH THE SAME PRACTICES IN THE GULF AND SOMETHING HAPPENS WE WILL RECIPROCATE. THE ONE WHO WILL SUFFER WON'T BE IRAN, BUT THE US. END TEXT.

3. WHEN I SUGGESTED THAT THE IRANIAN REPLY SLAMS THE DOOR, KANDEMIR SAID THAT HE REMAINED CONVINCED THAT THE

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Department of State

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PAGE 03 OF 03 ANKARA 10330 261331Z

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IRANIANS WANTED TO AVOID THE CONFRONTATION WITH THE UNITED STATES AND THAT HE, KANDEMIR, STILL HOPED FOR AN "OPENING" IN THE IRANIAN POSITION. ACCORDING TO KANDEMIR, ONE OF THE PECULIARITIES OF THE IRANIAN REGIME, IS AN OBSESSION WITH THE MEANING OF WORDS. COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT NEEDED TO BE CRAFTED WITH THE UTMOST CARE. HE, KANDEMIR, ASCRIBES THE RELATIVE SUCCESS OF TURKISH DIPLOMATIC DEALINGS WITH IRAN TO TURKISH SKILL IN DEFUSING IRANIAN SENSITIVITIES WITHOUT YIELDING ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES.

4. COMMENT: KANDEMIR SEEMED TO ME SHOCKED AND DISAPPOINTED BY THE IRANIAN REPLY. I AM CONFIDENT THAT HE WILL PERSEVERE IN HIS PURSUIT OF AN IRANIAN "OPENING."
STRAUSZ-HUPE

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PAGE 01 OF 03 ANKARA 09540 100954Z C04/08 001333 NOD724
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BY CXS, NARA, DATE 4/26/02

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EXSEC _____ (S/S-1) _____
NEDEVECA _____ DATE/TIME _____

WEER HANDLING SLIP	TIME STAMP
Carlucci	WOODHULL ROOM 07:06:10 AM : 48 WHITE HOUSE
Powell	
Green <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
Courtney <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
Michael <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
Lebras	
Sigler	
Emarth <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
Cockell <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
Oakley <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
NCS file <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	LDR/TTY/FAX APPROVAL : _____
REMARKS:	
C: Copy O: Original F: FTI S: Should See C/H: Copy Hand Delivered C/T: Contacted Via Phone	

DATE/TIME _____
THE ADDRESSEE AND, IF NOT UNDER HIS AUTHORITY WHOM HE OWNS, IT MAY NOT BE DISCUSSED WITH THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT.
HE SHOULD HANDLE THE DOCUMENT AND WITH CURRENT DEPARTMENT
THE RECIPIENT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAINTAINING A RECORD OF THAT
7512, TEL. 647-2976.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Department of State

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PAGE 02 OF 03 ANKARA 09540 100954Z
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FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1248

~~SECRET~~ ANKARA 09540

NODIS

FOR UNDER SECRETARY ARMACOST FROM AMBASSADOR

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL; MOPS, ZP, IR, TU
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FOR KANDEMIR

REF: STATE 246663

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I GAVE MR. SANTUKER, CHEF DE CABINET TO MR. KANDEMIR, YOUR TELEPHONE NUMBER IN CUERNAVACA. I TOLD HIM THAT WE HAD RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE, STATE 246663, FOR TRANSMISSION TO MR. KANDEMIR. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD SO INFORM MR. KANDEMIR, AT PRESENT RESIDENT IN THE HOLIDAY VILLAGE IN DATCA, BY THE AEGEAN SEA, AND THAT HE, SANTUKER, WOULD CALL ME SHORTLY TO INFORM ME OF MR. KANDEMIR'S DECISION. SO HE DID. HE ADVISED ME THAT KANDEMIR KNEW OF THE MESSAGE AND STILL WISHED ME TO MEET WITH HIM AT 10:00 A.M. ON WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 12, AT THE MINISTRY. SANTUKER FURTHER REQUESTED ME TO MEET WITH MR. KANDEMIR UNACCOMPANIED. WHEN I OFFERED TO SUPPLY HIM WITH THE TEXT OF YOUR MESSAGE FOR TRANSMISSION TO KANDEMIR, HE DECLINED MY OFFER. I THEN TELEPHONED MR. KANDEMIR IF DATCA. HE TOLD ME

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Department of State

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PAGE 03 OF 03 ANKARA 09540 100954Z

C04/08 001333 NOD724

THAT HE HAD TALKED TO YOU AND THAT YOU HAD ALREADY ADVISED HIM OF THE CONTENTS OF YOUR MESSAGE SENT ME FOR TRANSMITTAL TO HIM. HE ASKED ME TO HOLD YOUR MESSAGE UNTIL OUR MEETING, NOW SCHEDULED FOR WEDNESDAY. HE ENJOINED UPON ME THE NEED FOR RIGOROUS CONFIDENTIALITY. STRAUZS-HUPE

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EYES ONLY. *Conlucci*

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INFO S-02 D-01 P-01 /004 A2 DKJ

-----09/1758Z

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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~~SECRET~~ BY *RW* NARA DATE *11/2/07*

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PAGE 02 OF 05 STATE 246663
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DRAFTED BY: P: CWSROSS
APPROVED BY: P: MHARMACOST

S/S: MLEVITSKY

S/S-0: DJONES

NSCS: CPOWELL

DESIRED DISTRIBUTION

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-----110723 091753Z /43

O 091750Z AUG 87 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ANKARA NIACT IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 246663

*This was cleared
by SecDef + Amintase,
and Carlucci + the
President - PDS*

NODIS
FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM ARMACOST

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, ZP, IR, TU
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FOR KANDEMIR

REF: ARMACOST-STRAUSZ HUPE TELCON

1. ~~SECRET~~- ENTIRE TEXT.
2. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM ME TO UNDER SECRETARY KANDEMIR AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE FOR TRANSMISSION TO HIS GOI INTERLOCUTOR.
3. BEGIN MESSAGE

WITH RESPECT TO THE MESSAGE FROM UNDER SECRETARY KANDEMIR OF THE TURKISH MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WISHES TO CONVEY THE FOLLOWING RESPONSE:

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Department of State

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PAGE 03 OF 05 STATE 246663

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-- THE IRANIAN PROPOSAL THAT THE UNITED STATES POSTPONE ITS ESCORT OF VESSELS AND WITHDRAW WARSHIPS FROM THE PERSIAN GULF AND THAT IRAN NO LONGER ATTACK ANY SHIPS IN THE GULF

SEEMS TO MISTAKE THE RESULTS OF CURRENT TENSIONS WITH THEIR CAUSE. THE INCREASED STRENGTH OF THE

U. S. NAVAL PRESENCE WITHIN THE GULF IS A DIRECT RESULT OF IRAN'S EFFORTS TO INTIMIDATE NON-BELLIGERENT GOVERNMENTS WITH WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS CLOSE AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND TO INTERFERE WITH FREEDOM OF NON-BELLIGERENT SHIPPING IN THE GULF AND THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ.

-- UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 598, WHICH WAS PASSED UNANIMOUSLY ON JULY 20, ADDRESSES THE FUNDAMENTAL SOURCE OF THOSE TENSIONS -- THE WAR BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ. THE UNITED STATES JOINS THE REST OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN URGING IRAN TO ACCEPT THE RESOLUTION AND TO WORK WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL TOWARD ITS FULL IMPLEMENTATION.

-- IN THE VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES, SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 598 PROVIDES THE MECHANISM BY WHICH TENSIONS IN THE GULF CAN BE REDUCED IN A MANNER THAT TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE INTERESTS OF ALL LITTORAL STATES, INCLUDING THOSE OF IRAN. IT PROVIDES A FRAMEWORK FOR A JUST AND RAPID END TO A WAR THAT HAS CAUSED UNTOLD SUFFERING TO THE BELLIGERENT NATIONS AND POSES GROWING DANGERS TO THE WIDER INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. IT ADDRESSES ISSUES OF SPECIAL INTEREST TO IRAN, SUCH AS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ORIGINS OF THE CONFLICT AND ASSISTANCE IN RECONSTRUCTION AFTER IT IS BROUGHT TO AN END.

-- THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT NOTES WITH SHOCK AND

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NO DISSEMINATION



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Department of State

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PAGE 04 OF 05 STATE 246663

C08/08 001372 NOD721

OUTRAGE THE EFFORTS OF THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT TO STIR POPULAR PASSIONS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES BY FALSELY ATTRIBUTING TO IT RESPONSIBILITY FOR RECENT EVENTS IN MECCA. THESE ACCUSATIONS ARE UTTERLY WITHOUT FOUNDATION. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ALSO NOTES OTHER STATEMENTS BY THE LEADERS OF IRAN THREATENING ATTACKS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, AS WELL AS FRIENDLY COUNTRIES. IF IRAN IS SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN SEEKING A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE WITH THE UNITED STATES ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE GULF, IT MUST CEASE SUCH STATEMENTS AND EXHORTATIONS IMMEDIATELY.

-- WHILE THE IRANIAN PROPOSAL DOES NOT, IN THE VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES, PROVIDE AN ACCEPTABLE BASIS FOR DEESCALATING CURRENT TENSIONS, IT IS UNDENIABLE THAT THE SITUATION IN THE GULF CONTAINS GROWING DANGERS. THE UNITED STATES, FOR ITS PART, SEEKS NO CONFLICT WITH IRAN. IF IT IS PROVOKED, HOWEVER, THE FULL MEASURE OF ITS POWER WILL BE BROUGHT TO BEAR AGAINST THOSE WHO CHALLENGE ITS INTERESTS OR HARM ITS CITIZENS.

-- THERE ARE WELL DOCUMENTED INSTANCES IN WHICH ELEMENTS SUCH AS THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS, RESPONSIVE TO THE

LEADERS OF IRAN, HAVE DELIBERATELY PLACED OR ATTEMPTED TO PLACE MINES IN THE PATH OF U.S. SHIPS IN THE GULF. THERE ARE OTHER RELIABLE REPORTS OF PREPARATIONS FOR OTHER FORMS OF ATTACK AGAINST U.S. SHIPS, KIDNAPPING U.S. CITIZENS AND HOLDING THEM HOSTAGE, AND PLANNING FOR OTHER KINDS OF TERRORIST ACTIONS AGAINST U.S. CITIZENS AND INSTALLATIONS. ALL SUCH ACTIONS ARE WHOLLY INCOMPATIBLE WITH ANY PROSPECT OF REDUCING TENSIONS AND MOVING TOWARD MORE NORMAL RELATIONS. THE CONTINUATION OF SUCH ACTIVITY, SPECIFICALLY INCLUDING MINING, IS CERTAIN TO PRODUCE A U.S. RESPONSE. THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN HAS ALREADY BEEN

WARNED THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL RESPOND IF IRAN'S NAVAL FORCES ENGAGE IN ACTIVITIES THAT APPEAR TO THREATEN U.S.

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Department of State

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OUTGOING

5

PAGE 05 OF 05 STATE 246663

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NAVAL VESSELS OR SHIPS THEY ARE ESCORTING. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WISHES TO REPEAT THAT THIS IS A VERY SERIOUS MATTER.

-- IT WOULD BE BETTER TO AVOID A CONFRONTATION THAT CAN SERVE NEITHER THE INTERESTS OF IRAN NOR THOSE OF THE UNITED STATES. THE OBJECTIVE OF THE UNITED STATES IS TO AVOID SUCH CONFRONTATION, REDUCE TENSION, AND MOVE TOWARD BETTER RELATIONS. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS COMMUNICATED THIS FIRM VIEW PREVIOUSLY TO THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT THROUGH THE SWISS GOVERNMENT, WHICH REPRESENTS U.S. INTERESTS IN TEHRAN. IF THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT WISHES TO COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY ANY FURTHER AUTHORITATIVE VIEWS ON THE ISSUES THAT CONFRONT THE TWO PARTIES, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WOULD BE PREPARED TO RECEIVE THEM AT AN EQUALLY AUTHORITATIVE LEVEL.

END MESSAGE. SHULTZ

~~SECRET~~

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

COURTESY TRANSLATION

127682 11

Dear George:

On his way home from his talks in New York, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Larijani came to see me today (Friday 8/28). He explained to me his government's interpretation of resolution 598 and promised that his government would thoroughly weigh the results achieved up to now within the next seven days. My collaborators will still today transmit the precise content of his exposition to the U.S. Embassy in Bonn.

I would like to inform you about a particular aspect of my talk with Larijani regarding the current situation and the development in the Persian Gulf which was raised in most restricted session.

Larijani brought up this subject and expressed his great concern about a further deterioration of the situation in the Gulf. He feared a further escalation if a military encounter of U.S. warships and Iranian ships were to cause casualties to the Iranians. This would without fail lead to consequences on the Iranian side. Then he added the remarkable hint that if the USA needed "face-saving measures", Iran would make an effort. He said Iran had done this also occasionally vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Larijani said that Teheran was "open to suggestions". He felt that the greatest U.S. concern seemed to be the security of the Gulf.

DECLASSIFIED

BY PLJ NARA DATE 11/21/17
NLR# M3931 #127682

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states including Saudi Arabia. As far as this
was concerned he considered it certainly possible to
think of giving guarantees and of working towards
an improvement of the political and economic relations.

This remark by Larijani shows that there is
concern in Teheran about the development of the
relations to the USA. Perhaps this offers a perspective
for further political steps.

Yours sincerely,
(sgd.) Hans-Dietrich Genscher
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Federal Republic of Germany

~~_____~~
~~_____~~
~~_____~~

Eyes Only NSC Oakley, Powell, Carlisle

SECRET - 2 1/15/77

Message from the Iranian Government

RO
close hold
ed

First Part

1) Two fundamental principles govern the policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Persian Gulf :

- A) to safeguard the security
- B) to maintain the freedom of navigation and keep the Strait of Hormuz open.

Due to the belief in these principles our country has, after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, invested huge resources for the realization of said principles, and has procured various materiel capable of preventing any move threatening the regional security and freedom of navigation.

Silkworm

2) The Islamic Republic of Iran is carefully watching all foreign movements, both military movements and commercial shipping in the region and, considering that she has the longest coasts along the Persian Gulf and Sea of Oman, she maintains the right to adopt every necessary measure for confronting any kind of tension or threat by any country and, while refuting any mine-laying or other actions leading to tension in the region, is determined to procure and place in any point of her soil which she deems suitable the military and non-military materiel necessary for the defense of her national interests as well as for safeguarding the regional security and freedom of navigation.

3) The actions and measures taken by the Islamic Republic of Iran for safeguarding the security in the region and defense of her national interests is in no way a threat against the regional countries and, to the contrary, can be used in assisting them and defending their interests. Furthermore, said measures have not

made and will not constitute any threat whatsoever against the peaceful plying of the commercial ships, and there is no room for any worry whatsoever for international shipping.

- 4) Although the Islamic Republic of Iran has no intention whatsoever to provoke and create tension in the Persian Gulf, she will confront with full power any suspicious, threatening, and provocative move by any foreign force (military vessels as well as merchant ships), and the colors (i.e. the nationality) of the flags of the ships and fleets will not produce the slightest change in her firm determination.
- 5) The unreasoned and unnecessary presence of the foreign fleets in this region, which since years is sensitive, can in no way be convincing justification for the continuation of this presence and its dangerous strengthening.
- 6) Strengthening of foreign military forces in the Persian Gulf not only will not help safeguard the security in the Persian Gulf region, but draws the region close to an explosive situation and creates many difficulties for the peaceful plying of commercial ships. Furthermore, strengthening military fleets in the Persian Gulf will provide a good excuse for some other countries which have always been watching for increasing their presence and influence in the Persian Gulf. USSR
- 7) The policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is based on the non-spread of the war to the Persian Gulf region, and she believes that if the regime of Iraq refrains from attacking the ships and marine installations in the Persian Gulf there will be no danger for freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf or for oil export from this region as has happened in recent weeks considering the pressures put on Iraq to refrain from attacks on marine targets.
- 8) Experience has shown that the change in the colors of the flags of the ships plying the Persian Gulf or escorting them have not

Symptom = Cause
Separate Cause for approval

promoted tranquility and safeguarding the security in this region, but, to the contrary, because of the sensitivity in and the conditions of the region and the adventurism of the Iraqi regime and its willingness to spread the scope of the war to the Persian Gulf, strengthening of the foreign fleets and escorting the ships have drawn the region nearer to the degree of inflammability and explosion resulting from the increase in the tension in the region.

Therefore, exerting pressure on the regime of Iraq to continue to refrain from attacking the marine targets in the Persian Gulf and the exit of the foreign forces can be a very good guarantee for safe-guarding the security in this region, the free export of oil, and for the freedom of international navigation.

- 9) The claim of and the attempt to safeguard so-called long-term interests and the support of the Arab friends in the region take the form of an opposition to the Islamic Republic of Iran and are in no way tolerable for the Islamic Republic of Iran. Furthermore, they are construed as a kind of justification for continuing the enmity. Continuation of this trend will, in addition to strengthening the enmity, bring about the strong reaction of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

- 10) According to the international law and traditions concerning the searching and detaining the ships suspected of carrying goods able to augment the military capability of the Iraqi regime, the Islamic Republic of Iran has the legal right to intercept and stop such ships, as this was the practice of some countries during the second World War. The Islamic Republic of Iran will definitely continue this practice too.

- 11) According to available information, some of the Kuwaiti ships which have been reflagged are owned by Iraq. This action, considering that it constitutes the carrying of oil from the neutral zone in favor of Irak, is in lieu of a kind of support of and cooperation with the regime of Iraq in the war, and

Not
True

contradicts neutrality. Therefore, detaining these ships is also the indisputable right of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Second Part

- 1) The Islamic Republic of Iran is carefully watching all the movements and efforts of each of the members of the security council, specifically those of its permanent members, and is perfectly aware of the position taken by each of its permanent and non-permanent members, and of the degree of the good will or ill will of each of them towards the Islamic Republic of Iran, and of the goals pursued by each of them.

- 2) The unjust approaches of the security council from the beginning of the Iraqi regime's attack on Iranian soil, and the lack of a fundamental change in this approach has caused the continuation of the negative opinion of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards the council's good will. As long as the unjust manner of the security council regarding the imposed war of Iraq, due to the efforts and enmity of some of its members towards the Islamic Republic of Iran, continues with the issuance of resolutions which embody a kind of thanking and encouraging the Iraqi regime for its continuation of adventurism, and as long as it ignores the root of the aggression, it will not only not help end the war but increase the tension in the region and aggravate the Islamic Republic of Iran's pessimism towards the actions of this council, and especially towards the efforts of some of its members.

- 3) The firm and unchangeable position of the Islamic Republic of Iran in face of the Iraqi-imposed war is, without having the slightest expansionist aims towards the Iraqi soil, based on the continuation of the struggle and defense until the materialization of the just rights and the condemnation and punishment of the aggressor, the Iraqi regime. It is clear that some countries' allegations to the effect of their endeavors and willingness towards ending the war, while manifestly assisting

and backing the aggressor, the Iraqi regime, cannot be considered sincere. Those which are really interested in ending the war can count on the efficiency of their endeavors if they walk along the path of realization of the above-mentioned conditions while observing neutrality in practice and in reality.

- 4) It seems that the efforts rendered by the security council are aimed at using the recent resolution as pressure against the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Islamic Republic of Iran emphasizes that : First : these types of pressures have never been effective against the Islamic Republic of Iran and she has so far resisted them and will continue to do so.
- Second : if by using these types of pressures hundreds of resolutions are issued against the Islamic Republic of Iran, they, certainly, not only will not help end the war but, on the contrary, the hostilities will intensify, and they will probably expand in scope.
- Third : every effort to increase the current pressure against the Islamic Republic of Iran by the security council will deal a strong blow to the efforts aimed at safeguarding peace and security in the region.

Third Part

- 1) The position of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the face of terrorism is clear, and she has always declared her opposition to the terroristic actions, specifically to those endangering the lives of innocent people. Of course, the Islamic Republic of Iran studies the roots of terrorism. She fundamentally differentiates between government-sponsored terrorism and blind terror, which she herself has always been exposed to, and the efforts made by the oppressed popular groups and nations for the realization of their definite legal rights.
- 2) The Islamic Republic of Iran, in spite of the lack of connection

with the hostage-taking problem, and rejecting any accusation in this regard has, through mediation and by using her spiritual influence in Lebanon, made many endeavors out of humanitarian considerations and because of some friendly countries' frequent requests, or has gathered information about the fate and release of the hostages in Lebanon which to date usually had positive results. She is also interested in continuing this humanitarian effort to the greatest extent possible.

Fourth Part

One of the principles of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is to protect her independence and reject any hegemony. The Islamic Republic of Iran, in spite of her interest in expanding her relations with the world's countries, emphasizes that a country which has unrightfully taken possession of the properties and assets of the Islamic Republic of Iran and has, since the victory of the Islamic Revolution, been pursuing the policy of aggression and hostility towards the Islamic Republic of Iran cannot expect to have healthy relations with her.

Bob
Oakley

1215

May 28

July 18

Aug 12

Sept 22

28

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**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT**

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SYSTEM II
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ACTION OFFICER: OAKLEY DUE: 12 AUG.

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| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo For <u>Carlucci / Powell</u> | <input type="checkbox"/> Appropriate Action |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo _____ | to _____ |

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext. 6900

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- INFORMATION Green Courtney Secretariat
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COMMENTS

Completed 8/8/87 no further action necessary per Danvers base

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Return to Secretariat

United States Department of State

Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Washington, D. C. 20520

August 7, 1987

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Mr. Secretary,

Here is a proposed reply to the Iranian message passed on to me via the Turkish MFA Under Secretary Kandemir. It is constructed in such a way as to resist their suggestion while opening the lines of communication. I have coordinated the response with Bob Oakley and have discussed it over the secure phone with Rich Armitage. Both think it strikes the right note. In order to avoid the interagency guerrilla warfare, it should probably be cleared by Frank and Cap and authorized by the President.

MA

Michael H. Armacost

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL: OADR

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BY CA NARA, DATE 11/26/02

United States Department of State

14

Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs

Washington, D.C. 20520

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Under Secretary Michael H. Armacost and Under Secretary of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Kandemir

DATE: July 28, 1987 and August 4, 1987

PLACE: Ambassador Strausz-Hupe's residence, Ankara, Turkey, and at the International Airport in Istanbul, Turkey.

Following a dinner at Ambassador Strausz-Hupe's residence on July 28, Kandemir took me aside and indicated that he would be travelling to Tehran the following day. He asked whether there were any messages we wished to convey. I informed him that we had recently communicated to the Iranians to allay any misperceptions as to our motives in pushing the United Nations Security Council resolution and agreeing to reflag Kuwaiti vessels. I told Kandemir that the Reagan Administration accepts the Iranian revolution as a political fact; that we hope for an eventual improvement in our relations with Tehran; that we see areas such as Afghanistan in which our interests currently converge; that Iranian policies on terrorism and the Gulf war obstruct active collaboration even in those areas; that we had not conceived of the UNSC resolution as anti-Iranian, and had specifically included elements of interest to them (e.g. committee to look into the origins of the war, anticipation of reconstruction requirements, language on chemical weapons, etc); that we did not consider our escort regime for U.S. flag vessels to be provocative, and that while we are not looking for a confrontation with Iran, we would strongly protect our interests if the Iranians challenged them.

He asked what sort of reaction we had evoked from the Iranians. I said that one of the problems of communicating indirectly was that we rarely got an immediate response, and we were never sure how authoritative comments were attributed to senior GOI officials. Kandemir indicated that if he heard anything interesting while in Tehran, he would let me know.

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DECL: OADR

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NLRRM393/1 #127688
BY RW NARA DATE 11/21/17

Subsequently he called me on August 3 in Islamabad and indicated a desire to see me during my brief transit at the Istanbul airport on August 4. A meeting was arranged. He informed me at that session of the following.

-- His interlocutor in Tehran had been Deputy Prime Minister Moayyeri, who is reported to be close to Musavi.

-- At some point in Kandemir's conversation with Moayyeri on July 29, he had reported his impression that the United States was not seeking a confrontation with Iran, but would defend it's interests; that the USG recognized that Iran was an important power in the region; that it foresaw the possibility of an eventual improvement of relations, despite current difficulties; and that current differences appeared to be compounded by misperceptions and misunderstandings due to inadequate communication between the two sides.

Following this conversation, Kandemir was called urgently at 1:00 a.m. on July 31 by Deputy Foreign Minister Behesti who said he wished to pass a message to the USG through Kandemir. The essence of the message was: "If the Americans agree to postpone the process of accompanying ships in the Persian Gulf for some period, and to take their warships outside the Strait of Hormuz, we will guarantee not to attack any ships -- Kuwaiti or others -- in the Gulf. The only guarantee we cannot give relates to mines. Nevertheless, we give a full guarantee against attacks on Gulf shipping, and this can be a first step" (presumably toward the escalation of current tension and an improvement in US-Iranian relations).

In response to my questions, Kandemir said it was his clear impression that the Iranians were talking about a "postponement" rather than "cancellation" of the Kuwaiti reflagging operation, and that when they referred to taking warships outside the Strait of Hormuz, they were talking about only those ships recently introduced rather than our entire fleet. He was rather sketchy on this last point, and I'm not sure he had probed for clarification.

Kandemir said the Iranians had indicated that they would await an answer from the U.S. to be transmitted by him.

I asked Kandemir what he thought the Iranians would do in the event the Iraqis resumed attacks on Gulf shipping, i.e. would their guarantee against any attacks on Kuwaiti or other tankers still apply? He did not know, but harbored doubts.

I told Kandemir that I obviously could not give him an answer without discussing the matter with higher authorities in Washington, but my initial reaction was extremely skeptical. The Iranians were seeking to reverse an element of American policy in which we had staked significant prestige. They evidently hoped to accomplish the exclusion of our fleet from the Gulf despite their presence there for forty years. They excluded from their guarantee the most reprehensible means of attacking ships -- the use of mines which were quite indiscriminating in their effects. I added that they could scarcely anticipate a defusing of current tensions with the United States in view of their outrageous allegations about U.S. involvement in the recent events in Saudi Arabia. Nonetheless, I told Kandemir I would consult with my colleagues and see whether we had any answer we wished him to transmit.

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IRANIAN PROPOSAL

-- The Turkish Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs passed a message from the Iranian Government to us through Mike Armacost this week.

-- They propose that if we postpone the escorting of Kuwaiti reflagged vessels and withdraw our warships outside the Strait of Hormuz, they will guarantee against attacks on Gulf shipping of Kuwait and other countries. They cannot, they say, offer a guarantee against mining. They characterize their proposal as a "first step."

-- The specifics of their proposal are not acceptable, but the fact they have communicated it is interesting. It may suggest a desire on their part to look for ways of de-escalating tension.

-- We think it is desirable that we respond in a way which resists the details of their proposal, yet invites the possible establishment of a more direct and authoritative means of communicating with them.

-- If we are headed for a potential confrontation, it is important that we be able to convey our views to them promptly, precisely, and authoratively.

-- Proposed response is attached.

REPLY TO IRANIAN MESSAGE VIA KANDEMIR

With respect to the message passed by the Government of Iran through Under Secretary Kandemir of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the United States Government wishes to convey the following response:

-- The Iranian proposal that the United States postpone its escort of vessels and withdraw warships from the Persian Gulf mistakes the results of current tensions with their cause. The increased strength of the U.S. Naval presence within the Gulf is a direct result of Iran's efforts to intimidate non-belligerent governments with which the U.S. has close and friendly relations and to interfere with freedom of non-belligerent shipping in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.

-- United Nations Security Council Resolution 598, which was passed unanimously on July 20, addresses the fundamental source of those tensions -- the Iran-Iraq conflict. We join with the rest of the international community in urging Iran to accept the resolution and to work with the Secretary General toward its full implementation.

-- In our view, the Security Council resolution provides the mechanism by which tensions in the Persian Gulf can be reduced in a manner that takes into account the interests of all littoral states, including Iran's. It provides a framework for a just and rapid end to a war that has caused untold suffering to the belligerent nations, and poses growing dangers to the wider international community. It addresses issues of special interest to Iran, such as responsibility for the origins of the conflict and assistance in reconstruction after it is ended.

-- We note with shock and outrage the efforts of the Iranian Government to stir popular passions against the United States by falsely attributing responsibility for recent events in Mecca to our country. These accusations are utterly without foundation. We also note other statements by the leaders of Iran threatening and exhorting its forces to attack the United States, as well as friendly countries. If Iran is seriously interested in seeking a constructive dialogue with the United States about developments in the Gulf, it must cease such statements and exhortations immediately.

-- While the Iranian proposal for the postponement of reflagging and withdrawal of our fleet from the Gulf does not, in our view, provide an acceptable basis for deescalating current tensions, it is undeniable that the situation in the Gulf contains growing dangers. For our part we seek no conflict with Iran. If we are provoked, however, the full measure of our power will be brought to bear against those who challenge our interests or harm our citizens.

-- There are well documented instances of those responsive to Iran's leaders, such as the Revolutionary Guards, deliberately placing or attempting to place mines in the path of U.S. ships. There are other reliable reports of preparations for other forms of attack against U.S. ships in the Gulf, kidnapping U.S. citizens and holding them hostage, and planning for other forms of terrorist actions against U.S. citizens and installations. All such actions are wholly incompatible with any prospect of reducing tensions and moving toward more normal relations. Continuation of such activity, specifically including mining, is certain to produce a U.S. response.

-- It would be better to avoid a confrontation which can serve neither the interest of Iran nor the United States. The absence of an authoritative channel of communications between us may exacerbate current misunderstandings. If the Iranian Government wishes to establish an authoritative channel, we would be prepared to join in creating such a channel. Our objective in establishing such a channel would be to avoid confrontation, reduce tension, and move toward more normal relations.