

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Near East and South Asia (NESA) Affairs
Directorate, NSC: Records

Folder Title: Exchanges with Iran (3 of 4)

Box: RAC Box 4

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digitized-textual-material>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/white-house-inventories>

Contact a reference archivist at: **reagan.library@nara.gov**

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/research-support/citation-guide>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name BURNS, WILLIAM: FILES *NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE, INC* **Withdrawer** CAS 1/18/2012
File Folder EXCHANGES WITH IRAN (3) **FOIA** M11-392
Box Number 92155 *RAC Box 4* **BYRNE**
2

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
127653	CABLE	132152Z OCT 87 (STATE 319026) R 11/26/2002 NLSF97-107/2 #186	2	10/13/1987	B1
127654	MEMO	MICHAEL ARMACOST FOR THE FILE D 11/26/2002 F97-107/2 #187; R 11/21/2017 M393/1 #127654	3	10/13/1987	B1
127656	CABLE	ANKARA 12749 (140949Z) D 11/26/2002 F97-107/2 #188; R 11/21/2017 M393/1 #127656	3	10/14/1987	B1
127659	CABLE	161911Z SEP 87 (STATE 289145) R 11/26/2002 NLSF97-107/2 #189	5	9/16/1987	B1
127660	MEMO	MELVYN LEVITSKY TO FRANK CARLUCCI RE RECENT EXCHANGES R 11/26/2002 NLSF97-107/2 #190	1	ND	B1
127662	MESSAGE	TO IRAN FROM US D 11/26/2002 F97-107/2 #191; UPHELD 11/21/2017 M393/1 #127662	2	ND	B1
127664	TALKIN GPOINTS	FOR SECRETARY MEETING WITH PEREZ DE CUELLAR ON GULF INCIDENT R 11/26/2002 NLSF97-107/2 #192	3	9/22/1987	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name BURNS, WILLIAM: FILES

Withdrawer

CAS 1/18/2012

File Folder EXCHANGES WITH IRAN (3)

FOIA

M11-392

Box Number 92155

BYRNE

2

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
127667	MESSAGE	DRAFT OF 127662 <i>D 11/26/2002 F97-107/2 #193; R 11/21/2017 M393/1 #127667</i>	4	9/22/1987	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: BURNS, WILLIAM J.: Files
Box: 92155
File Folder: Exchanges With Iran (3)

Archivist: loj/loj
FOIA ID: F97-107/2, Wills
Date: 11/28/2000

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. cable	132152Z Oct 87 [State 319026], 2p	10/13/87	P1/F1
2. memo	R 1/26/02 F97-107/2 #184 Michael H. Armacost for the files, 3p	10/13/87	P1/F1
3. cable	D ^ ^ ^ ^ #187 140949Z Oct 87 [Ankara 12749], 3p	10/14/87	P1/F1
4. cable	D ^ ^ ^ ^ #188 161911Z Sep 87 [State 289145], 5p	9/16/87	P1/F1
5. memo	R ^ ^ ^ ^ #189 Melvyn Levitsky to Frank Carlucci, re recent exchanges with the Government of Iran, 1p	nd	P1/F1
6. message	R ^ ^ ^ ^ #190 to Iran from US, 2p	nd	P1/F1
7. talking pts	D ^ ^ ^ ^ #191 for Secretary Meeting with Perez De Cuellar on Gulf Incident, 3p	9/22/87	P1/F1
8. message	R ^ ^ ^ ^ #192 draft of item #6, 4p	9/22/87	P1/F1
	D ^ ^ ^ ^ #193		

RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

QUOTE

THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN PRESENTS ITS COMPLIMENTS TO THE EMBASSY OF SWITZERLAND, THE U.S. INTERESTS PROTECTION SECTION, AND FURTHER TO NOTES NO. 34/2391 DATED 31.6.1366 (22.3.87) AND 520/7234 DATED 9.7.1366 (1.12.87)

AND 520/7542 DATED 16.7.1366 (10.10.87) HAS THE HONOUR TO ADVISE:

AT 3.00 P.M. ON MONDAY 27.7.1366 (19.10.87) FOUR AMERICAN WAR SHIPS FIRED AT AND DESTROYED RESHADAT OIL PLATFORM BELONGING TO THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN. AS A RESULT OF THIS AGGRESSIVE OPERATION A NUMBER OF NON-MILITARY PERSONNEL STATIONED ON THE OIL PLATFORM WERE HURT AND HEAVY FINANCIAL LOSS HAS BEEN INFLICTED ON THIS OIL-INDUSTRIAL CENTER.

THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN STRONGLY PROTESTS THIS AGGRESSIVE ACTION WHICH IS IN VIOLATION OF THE U.N. CHARTER SPECIFICALLY PARA 4 OF ARTICLE 2 INDICATION NON-RESORT TO THE THREAT AND USE OF FORCE AGAINST TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OR THE POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANY COUNTRY, AND IS AGAINST ARTICLE 1 OF THE ALGIERS DECLARATION INDICATING EXPLICIT COMMITMENT OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT REGARDING NON-INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF IRAN. ALL THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCES SHOW THAT THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT NOT ONLY HAS VIOLATED ITS ALLEGED NEUTRALITY, BUT ON THE SIDE AND IN THE SAME DIRECTION OF THE IRAQI WAR MONGER REGIME HAS ENTERED IN THE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN. THROUGH INTERVENTION AND DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILE MILITARY ACTIONS, IT HAS PLACED THE REGION ON THE THRESHOLD OF A FULL FLEDGED WAR.

DESPITE THE SELF PRESERVATION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN IN FRONT OF THE AMERICAN PROVOCATIVE ACTIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF, THE HOSTILE ACTIONS WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN THE FORM OF THE AGGRESSIVE ATTACK ON THE COMMERCIAL SHIP "IRAN AJR" AND THE IRANIAN FORCES' PATROL BOATS, AND THE RECENT EXAMPLE I.E. AGGRESSION ON THE I.R.I.'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY SHOW THAT THE POLICY ADOPTED BY THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT REGARDING THE REGION HAS CREATED TENSION AND INSECURITY WHICH IS IN CLEAR VIOLATION OF PARA 5 OF THE RESOLUTION 598 OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, AND IS REGARDED AS HOSTILITY AND ANIMOSITY AGAINST THE I.R.I. THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, NATURALLY, RESERVES FOR HERSELVE THE RIGHT OF ANY RESPONDING.

IN CASE OF CONTINUATION OF THE MORE HOSTILE ACTIONS BY THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN HOLDS IT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE GRAVE CONSEQUENCES, AND CONSIDERS THE RIGHT OF RECIPROCITY AND CLAIMING THE REPARATION AND INFLICTED LOSS CERTAIN FOR HERSELVE, AND WILL TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION SERIOUSLY AND CONTINUOUSLY.

THE OPPORTUNITY IS TAKEN TO RENEW THE ASSURANCES OF HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

UNQUOTE

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TO: *Bob Oakley*

FROM: ROBERT H. TUTTLE
Deputy Assistant to the President
Office of Presidential Personnel

COMMENT:

*Bob - I thought you
should see this material.*

*Also would you
please send me the latest
on Sam's transgressions as
I will be meeting with him
during his stay here in Wash.*

Bob

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY
OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Oct. 14, 1987

TO: Bob Oakley

FYI.

MHA

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS



~~SECRET~~

Department of State

S/S-0
OUTGOING

PAGE 02 OF 03 STATE 319026
ORIGIN NODS-00

C17/21 002269 NOD068

INFO LOG-00 /000 R

~~AS~~
EK
~~CR~~

DRAFTED BY: P: CWSROSS

APPROVED BY: P: CWSROSS

EUR/SE: TFRIEDMAN

S/S: BLPASCOE

S/SO: DADAMSON

DESIRED DISTRIBUTION

NOT FOR ADS

-----141624 132205Z /66

O 132152Z OCT 87 ZFF6

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY ANKARA NIACT IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 319026

NODIS

FOR CHARGE ROPE FROM ARMACOST

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, ZP, TU, IR

SUBJECT: MESSAGE FOR KANDEMIR

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WHEN KANDEMIR AND I SPOKE YESTERDAY, HE ASKED ME WHETHER I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR THE KUWAITIS TO MEET AT A SENIOR LEVEL WITH THE IRANIANS TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES FOR A REDUCTION OF TENSION. I SAID I WOULD NOT VENTURE AN OPINION ON THAT OFF THE TOP OF MY HEAD, BUT WOULD REFLECT ON THE MATTER, DISCUSS IT WITH MY COLLEAGUES, AND TRY TO GET BACK TO HIM.

3. I HAVE TRIED REPEATEDLY TO GET THROUGH TODAY TO NO AVAIL. IF KANDEMIR HAS NOT ALREADY LEFT, PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM ME.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F97-107/2 #186

BY CYS NARA, DATE 11/26/02

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

S/S-0
OUTGOING

Department of State

PAGE 03 OF 03 STATE 319026

C17/21 002269 NOD068

4. BEGIN TEXT.

ON FURTHER ~~CONSIDERATION~~ OF YOUR QUESTION OF YESTERDAY, I DO NOT BELIEVE IT IS USEFUL FOR THE USG TO STATE A VIEW ON KUWAITI IRANIAN RELATIONS.

WE HAVE NEVER ADVISED THE KUWAITIS ON THEIR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN.

WE KNOW THAT THERE IS CONTINUING BILATERAL COMMUNICATION, THOUGH THE POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP IS QUITE STRAINED SINCE THE SILKWORM ATTACKS ON KUWAITI TERRITORY IN EARLY SEPTEMBER.

THE IRANIAN FAILURE TO PROTECT THE KUWAITI EMBASSY AND ITS PERSONNEL IN TEHRAN HAS ALSO HAD A VERY NEGATIVE IMPACT IN KUWAIT.

IF THE IRANIANS ARE KEEN TO HAVE MEETINGS WITH KUWAITI OFFICIALS, A FIRST STEP IN BOLSTERING KUWAITI CONFIDENCE IN IRANIAN UNDERTAKINGS WOULD BE TO GUARANTEE THE PROTECTION OF KUWAITI OFFICIALS AND DIPLOMATIC PREMISES IN IRAN. SHULTZ

~~SECRET~~

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS

12 7654
United States Department of State

Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 13, 1987

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

I called Under Secretary Kandemir of the Turkish Foreign Ministry on October 12 to inquire about his conversations in Tehran last week. Kandemir indicated that he had held extensive discussions with senior Iranian officials (including Deputy Prime Minister Moayyeri) and had passed on my earlier comments that Iran's actions in the Gulf were producing a result it professed to abhor, i.e., an expansion of the U.S. naval presence.

Kandemir said the Iranians perceived differences between the declared objectives and the real aims of the United States in the Gulf. They understand our declared objectives to be: 1) free navigation in the Gulf; 2) free access to oil resources; and 3) the security of pro-American Gulf states. They claim to have no problem with these objectives. But Iran's leaders consider our real aims to be: 1) the prevention of an Iranian victory in the Iran-Iraq war; and 2) the containment of Iran.

They observed that it would be useful if we aimed at "peace arrangements" (i.e., moves to reduce tension in the Gulf), instead of seeking to prevent an Iranian victory. The adoption of such an approach by the U.S. Government would, in their judgment, help restructure the geopolitical balance in the area in a favorable direction for long-term U.S. interests and avert dangers of conflict in the Gulf. Conversely, they see a U.S. attempt to prevent an Iranian victory in the war as destined to lead to our progressive intervention in that conflict on Iraq's side. This can only breed greater tension in the Gulf and strife between the United States and Iran.

According to Kandemir, the Iranians claim that they have their principles. They don't demand that others admire them or adopt them, but they also insist that we should not expect them to give these principles up. The Iranians urged the United States to pursue its declared objectives, and to forego what they identify as our underlying aims.

The Iranians pointed to comments by Secretary of Defense Weinberger suggesting that the present regime should be changed as evidence of flagrant interference and as an indication of

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
DECL:OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M393/1 #127654
BY AW NARA DATE 11/21/87

2

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

-2-

our real policy agenda. Kandemir claimed that, throughout his discussions, the Iranians denied they wanted any confrontation with the United States. On the contrary, he perceived a desire on their part to avoid conflict. But this was accompanied by frequent assertions that, if attacked, the Iranians will feel obliged to respond.

With respect to the reflagged Kuwaiti vessels, Kandemir suggested the Iranians have come to recognize that reflagging may have been a byproduct of pressures they had imposed on Gulf states friendly to the United States. He indicated that the Iranians are prepared to offer guarantees against attacks to such Gulf countries if they adopt a more neutral attitude vis-a-vis Iran and Iraq. Kandemir obviously hopes that this possibility can be explored, and he asked for my views.

I commented that we obviously would welcome a reduction of the current level of tensions in the Gulf. We believe that the implementation of Security Council Resolution 598 offers the most promising means of achieving such a result, and that partial measures of the sort the Iranians are currently proposing could work at cross purposes with the Security Council effort. We are aware that the Iranians have sought to decouple the Gulf war from their ground campaign, and are convinced that such an effort will not provide a basis for ending the conflict.

I noted that, while the Iranians profess to see a distinction between our declared and real aims, we could say the same for them. They claim to want to reduce the current tensions with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, yet that objective is hardly fostered by conduct such as the Mecca incident, last week's naval maneuvers near Kuwaiti and Saudi oil platforms, and mining activities in heavily travelled Gulf channels.

Kandemir said that he had asked the Iranians whether or not they would find contacts with the U.S. Government useful as a means of exploring some of these issues directly. He said the Iranians responded by indicating that they had some contacts -- evidently, they were referring to the messages passed via the Swiss -- and stating they would be prepared to consider more direct exchanges if we were to adjust our policies.

Kandemir also indicated that the Iranians had reiterated to him the position they had expressed toward Resolution 598 in recent talks with the Secretary General. They had confirmed a willingness to talk further with the Secretary General, but

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

3

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

-3-

were apparently adamant about securing a judgment regarding the aggressor in the war before addressing the question of troop withdrawals. In response, I emphasized the Security Council would not accept a selective and conditional compliance with 598; that withdrawals were an integral part of the Resolution; that the permanent members had recently confirmed that Resolution 598 provides the sole basis for a just settlement; but that the Resolution does afford some flexibility in implementation. This would be the point of follow-up discussions by the Secretary General, and we hoped that he would receive instructions from the Security Council to commence his next round of activity later this week.

Kandemir asked whether I thought it would be useful for the Kuwaitis to meet at a senior level with the Iranians to explore possibilities for a reduction of tensions. I said I would not venture an opinion on that off the top of my head, but would reflect on the matter, discuss it with my colleagues and try to get back to him.

Michael H. Armacost

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

12768
S/S-0
INCOMING



~~SECRET~~

Department of State

PAGE 02 OF 04 ANKARA 12749 140951Z C11/11 002617 NOD080
ACTION NODS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 /000 W
-----165535 140952Z /12

O 140949Z OCT 87 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2700

ES
CR

~~SECRET~~ ANKARA 12749

NODIS

MA

FOR ~~UNDER~~SECRETARY ARMACOST FROM CHARGE

E. O. 12356: DECL: ~~OADR~~
TAGS: PREL, WOPS, ~~MARK IT TO~~ IR
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FOR KANDEMIR

REF: STATE 319026

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. I CALLED ON KANDEMIR SHORTLY AFTER HIS ARRIVAL IN THE OFFICE THIS MORNING (OCTOBER 14) TO DELIVER YOUR MESSAGE. HE WAS PLEASED TO HEAR FROM YOU AND TO KNOW YOU WERE TRYING TO GET THROUGH--HE HAD WAITED FOR A CALL LAST NIGHT.
3. BEFORE PASSING ON YOUR MESSAGE, I PROBED A BIT ON HIS TRIP TO TEHRAN AND HIS PLANS FOR FURTHER TRAVEL. HE DID NOT RESPOND MUCH ON THE FIRST SCORE, AND SINCE HE HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH YOU I DID NOT PRESS. HE SAID HE WILL GO TO KUWAIT TOMORROW AND THEN RETURN HERE. HE PLANS TO GO TO SAUDI ARABIA THEREAFTER AND TO RETURN AGAIN TO ANKARA. HE STILL HAS IN MIND BAGHDAD AFTER THAT BUT WAS MUCH LESS DEFINITE ABOUT IT THAN WHEN HE SAW SECRETARY HERRINGTON OCTOBER 5. HE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M393 li #127656
BY DW NARA DATE 11/21/17

~~SECRET~~

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS
NODIS

S/S-0
INCOMING

~~SECRET~~

Department of State



NODIS
NODIS
NODIS
NODIS

PAGE 03 OF 04 ANKARA 12749 140951Z C11/11 002617 NOD080

SAID THAT GOING IMMEDIATELY TO BAGHDAD AFTER TEHRAN COULD GIVE MISLEADING SIGNALS AND ADDED THAT THE IRAQIS HAD SAID AS MUCH IN ASKING THAT HE COME A BIT LATER.

4. HIS COMMENTS IN RESPONSE TO YOUR MESSAGE WERE THAT HIS AIM IN KUWAIT WILL BE TO PROMOTE DIALOGUE. HE COMMENTED VAGUELY ON THE DESIRABILITY OF GAINING IRANIAN GUARANTEES OF KUWAITI PREMISES AND PERSONNEL BUT FOCUSED ON THE SIMPLE DESIRABILITY OF HAVING LINES OF COMMUNICATION OPEN BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED WITH THE GULF WAR.

5. HE THEN WENT TO CONSIDERABLE PAINS TO STRESS THAT FACILITATION OF DIALOGUE IS INDEED THE PRINCIPAL AIM OF TURKISH DIPLOMACY AT THE MOMENT. RATHER THAN REVISIT THE IDEAS PRESENTED TO SECRETARY HERRINGTON, HE CHOSE TO STRESS THAT TURKEY SUPPORTS THE BROADER EFFORT TO GAIN IMPLEMENTATION OF RES. 598. IT SEEKS TO PROMOTE DIALOGUE AMONG CONCERNED GOVERNMENTS, HE SAID, ONLY IN A WAY THAT IS COMPLEMENTARY TO OUR POLICY AND FULLY SUPPORTIVE OF THE UNSYG'S EFFORTS. TURKEY SIMPLY WANTS TO BE OF ASSISTANCE, HE SAID. IT IS WILLING TO ASSIST BAGHDAD IN TALKING TO IRAN AND IS WILLING TO BE OF ASSISTANCE TO US, IN THE SAME WAY, WHENEVER WE MIGHT WISH.

6. I TOOK FROM THE STRONG EMPHASIS HE PUT ON THIS "COMPLEMENTARY" NATURE OF TURKISH EFFORTS, AND ON GOT SUPPORT FOR THE SYG AND OUR POLICY, THAT KANDEMIR WAS RESPONDING DIRECTLY TO COMMENTS FROM YOU. IF SO, IT APPEARS YOUR MESSAGE HAS GOTTEN ACROSS.

7. IN CLOSING, HE SENT YOU HIS VERY BEST REGARDS.
ROPE

~~SECRET~~

S/S-0
INCOMING

~~SECRET~~

Department of State



PAGE 04 OF 04 ANKARA 12749 140951Z

C11/11 002617 NOD080

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DECLASSIFIED

NLS

F97-107/2#809

BY CIS, NARA, DATE 11/26/02

PAGE 01 OF 05

PRT: OAKLEY SIT
SIT: EOB NSPWR VAX

NODIS

<PREC? IMMEDIATE <CLAS? SECRET <DTG? 161911Z SEP 87

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO RUFHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0000
 RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0000
 RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0000
 RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0000
 RUEHKKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 0000
 RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 0000
 RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 0000
 RUFHSK/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 0000
 RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 0000
 RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 0000
 RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE 0000
 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0000
 INFO RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0000
 RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 0000

NODIS

NODIS

~~SECRET~~ STATE 289145

NODIS

FOR AMBASSADORS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, IR, US

SUBJECT: USG PROPOSAL FOR DIRECT OFFICIAL CHANNEL WITH
IRAN

NODIS

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FRIENDS IN THE REGION HAVE QUERIED US ON RECENT PRESS
REPORTS OF PURPORTED MEETINGS BETWEEN U. S. AND IRANIAN
OFFICIALS IN GENEVA AND ELSEWHERE. THESE REPORTS HAVE NO
BASIS IN FACT. AS YOU DEEM APPROPRIATE, YOU MAY DRAW ON
THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN BRIEFING HOST GOVERNMENTS.

-- WE HAVE RECEIVED QUERIES FROM FRIENDS IN THE REGION ON

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 05

PRESS REPORTS OF ALLEGED MEETINGS BETWEEN U. S. AND IRANIAN OFFICIALS IN GENEVA AND ELSEWHERE IN RECENT TIMES. THESE REPORTS ARE WITHOUT FOUNDATION. TO ALLAY ANY MISUNDERSTANDING, WE WOULD LIKE TO OUTLINE THE NATURE OF OUR CONTACTS WITH THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT.

-- SINCE THE U. S. BROKE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH IRAN IN 1980, WE HAVE HAD OCCASION TO COMMUNICATE WITH ITS GOVERNMENT ON A VARIETY OF CURRENT ISSUES.

-- REGULAR CONTACT ON LEGAL ISSUES ARISING FROM THE ALGIERS ACCORDS OF 1981 HAS CONTINUED AT THE HAGUE. MESSAGES ON A VARIETY OF CURRENT POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC ISSUES HAVE BEEN SENT AND RECEIVED THROUGH THE GOOD OFFICES OF THIRD PARTIES, INCLUDING OUR PROTECTING POWERS, SWITZERLAND AND ALGERIA.

- FOLLOWING SUSPENSION OF THE DIRECT CONTACTS DESCRIBED IN THE TOWER COMMISSION REPORT, SECRETARY SHULTZ AUTHORIZED ONE DIRECT CONTACT IN FRANKFURT IN MID-DECEMBER 1986. THE U. S. GOVERNMENT HAS HAD NO OTHER DIRECT CONTACTS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN SINCE THEN.

- WHILE OUR PROTECTING POWERS AND OTHER THIRD PARTIES HAVE WILLINGLY AND FAITHFULLY HANDLED MESSAGES BETWEEN THE U. S. AND IRAN, EXCLUSIVE DEPENDENCE ON INDIRECT COMMUNICATIONS HAS PROVEN UNWIELDY AND INEFFICIENT,

ESPECIALLY IN TIMES OF TENSION.

FOR THIS REASON, WE HAVE PERIODICALLY INDICATED THROUGH THIRD PARTIES THAT WE WOULD BE WILLING TO ENGAGE IN AUTHORITATIVE DIRECT CONTACTS IF THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT SO WISHED.

- OUR CONTINUED WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE IN DIRECT CONTACTS, AS REFLECTED IN SECRETARY SHULTZ'S STATEMENTS ON "FACE THE NATION" SEPTEMBER 13, REFLECTS NO CHANGE IN OUR ATTITUDE TOWARD THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT OR IN OUR POLICY ON THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR AND THE PERSIAN GULF MORE GENERALLY.

- WE HAVE HAD NO INDICATION FROM THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT

NODIS

NODIS

NODIS

NODIS



~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 05

N
O
D
I
S

TO DATE THAT DIRECT COMMUNICATION WOULD BE WELCOME. IT IS POSSIBLE, HOWEVER, THAT IRANIAN OFFICIALS WILL CHOOSE TO COMMENT PUBLICLY ON OUR WILLINGNESS TO COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY, AS THEY HAVE ON OTHER POINTS IN OUR MESSAGES. IT IS TO PERMIT YOU TO PUT ANY SUCH STATEMENTS INTO THEIR PROPER CONTEXT THAT WE ARE ALERTING YOU TO THE FACTS.

3. FOR POSTS' BACKGROUND INFORMATION, THE FOLLOWING IS A VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT OF THE SECRETARY'S STATEMENTS ON CONTACTS WITH IRAN DURING AN INTERVIEW ON "FACE THE NATION" SEPTEMBER 13:

QUOTE: MS. STAHL: LET'S GO TO THE MIDDLE EAST, THE PERSIAN GULF. PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS GIVEN AN INTERVIEW TO U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT SAYING THAT HE WOULD BE WILLING, ASSUMING THAT THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR CAN COME TO AN END, TO SIT DOWN AND DISCUSS U. S. - IRAN RELATIONS WITH THE AYATOLLAH, WITH AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI. WHAT KIND OF A SIGNAL IS HE TRYING TO SEND> IS THIS SOMETHING THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO DO> DOES HE WANT TO SIT DOWN AND TALK TO THE AYATOLLAH> END QUOTE

QUOTE: SECRETARY SHULTZ: WE HAVE SENT MESSAGES TO THE IRANIANS, AND THEY HAVE SENT US MANY MESSAGES, THROUGH OUR COUNTRY THAT IS OUR SO CALLED PROTECTING POWER IN TEHERAN, AND THEIRS HERE. WE SEND MESSAGES BACK AND FORTH ALL THE TIME. AND I THINK THAT IT'S PROBABLY A GOOD THING IF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TWO COUNTRIES DIRECTLY COMMUNICATE WITH EACH OTHER FOR, AMONG OTHER THINGS, TO AVOID MISCALCULATION. THEY SHOULD HAVE IT CLEAR IN THEIR MIND THE STRENGTH OF OUR DETERMINATION AND NOT MAKE ANY MISCALCULATION ABOUT THAT, AND SO ON, END QUOTE.

QUOTE MS. STAHL: SO HAVE WE ASKED THEM FOR THESE TALKS AND THEY ARE REFUSING US> END QUOTE

QUOTE: SECRETARY SHULTZ: NO. THEY HAVE SENT US MESSAGES THROUGH THESE INDIRECT CHANNELS, AND WE HAVE SENT THEM MESSAGES. THAT GOES ON ALL THE TIME. AND IT'S IMPORTANT THAT THEY, FOR INSTANCE, KNOW WHAT WE ARE

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 05

DOING, WHY WE ARE DOING IT, AND THAT THEY SHOULDN'T KID THEMSELVES ABOUT THE STRENGTH OF OUR RESOLVE. THAT'S AN IMPORTANT KIND OF MESSAGE TO GET ACROSS. END QUOTE.

QUOTE: MS. STAHL: WOULD YOU LIKE TO GO TO TEHRAN AND TALK TO THEIR LEADERS> END QUOTE

QUOTE: SECRETARY SHULTZ: NO, NOT PARTICULARLY, THAT'S NOT THE POINT. THE POINT IS THAT COMMUNICATION BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES, UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES LIKE THIS, SHOULD BE DONE SO THAT IT IS CLEAR EXACTLY WHAT'S BEING COMMUNICATED, AND SO THE MORE DIRECT IT IS, PROBABLY THE BETTER. UNQUOTE.

QUOTE: MS. STAHL: YOU WANT TO HAVE DIRECT TALKS WITH

THEM> UNQUOTE

QUOTE: SECRETARY SHULTZ: WELL, WE ARE NOT PLEADING FOR DIRECT TALKS OR ANYTHING OF THAT KIND, BUT WE DO WANT TO COMMUNICATE WITH THEM AND DO COMMUNICATE WITH THEM -- %QUOTE

QUOTE MS. STAHL: YOU SAID INNER QUOTE DIRECTLY END INNER QUOTE. UNQUOTE

QUOTE: SECRETARY SHULTZ: --- TO TELL THEM EXACTLY WHAT OUR POSITION IS AND WHY, SO THEY DON'T HAVE ANY MISUNDERSTAND ABOUT IT. UNQUOTE.

QUOTE: MS. STAHL: IS THERE CONCERN THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE GONE IN AND USURPED OUR TRADITIONAL ROLE IN THAT REGION OF THE WORLD AS MEDIATOR> THEY ARE TALKING TO BOTH SIDES DIRECTLY. WE ARE NOT ANYMORE. ARE WE TRYING TO GET BACK IN THAT GAME. UNQUOTE

QUOTE: SECRETARY SHULTZ: NO NOT PARTICULARLY. WE HAVE A VERY STRONG POSITION IN THE GULF, AND I THINK THE GULF STATES ARE LOOKING AT US AS HAVING A STRONG PRINCIPLED POSITION AND STICKING WITH IT, AND THEY ARE BEGINNING TO WONDER WHERE IS THE SOVIET UNION -- THEY ARE GOING BACK AND FORTH AND THEY ARE BEING A LITTLE EQUIVOCAL HERE. BUT WE'LL SEE WHAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL ACCOMPLISHES IN TEHRAN AND BAGHDAD, AND THEN WE MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE TO

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 05 OF 05

FOLLOW THROUGH ON A VERY STRONG MANDATORY SANCTIONS
RESOLUTION. AND IF THE SITUATION CALLS FOR IT, WE ARE
GOING TO ADVOCATE IT, AND WE HOPE THE OTHERS WILL JOIN
US. UNQUOTE.

QUOTE: MS. STAHL: EVEN IF YOU FIND OUT IN YOUR TALKS
WITH MR. SHEVARDNADZE THAT THE SOVIETS WON'T GO ALONG
WITH IT, WE'LL STILL PUSH FOR IT> UNQUOTE

QUOTE: SECRETARY SHULTZ: WE WILL PUSH FOR IT IF IT'S
CALLED FOR. UNQUOTE SHULTZ

BT

*9145

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

Copy false - Bill Burns

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

IRAN

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. FRANK C. CARLUCCI
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: RECENT EXCHANGES WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN

Please find attached the texts of recent messages we have exchanged with the Government of Iran. With regard to the message of September 10, delivered by the Swiss Ambassador to Mike Armacost on September 15 (Tab A), we have checked the Swiss translation from the Farsi original and verified that it is accurate in substance. Our message of September 22 (Tab B) was delivered to the Swiss Ambassador in New York, and reached the Iranian Foreign Ministry on the next day, crossing with the Iranian message of September 22 (Tab C). The most recent Iranian message is at Tab D. It was provided to the Swiss in Tehran on October 1, with oral comments made by the Director General for Legal Affairs of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, and received by us on October 2.

Melvyn Levitsky
Executive Secretary

Attachments:
As stated.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
NLS 197-107/2 #190
BY CIS, NARA, DATE 11/26/02

Drafted:NEA/NGA: LPope
WANG 7042e 10/4/87 x9448
Cleared:NEA:APBurleigh
P:AEastham

3 August 1978
Sb.

First Part

1) Two fundamental principles govern the policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Persian Gulf :

A) to safeguard the security

B) to maintain the freedom of navigation and keep the Strait of Hormuz open.

Due to the belief in these principles our country has, after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, invested huge resources for the realization of said principles, and has procured various materiel capable of preventing any move threatening the regional security and freedom of navigation.

2) The Islamic Republic of Iran is carefully watching all foreign movements, both military movements and commercial shipping in the region and, considering that she has the longest coasts along the Persian Gulf and Sea of Oman, she maintains the right to adopt every necessary measure for confronting any kind of tension or threat by any country and, while refuting any mine-laying or other actions leading to tension in the region, is determined to procure and place in any point of her soil which she deems suitable the military and non-military materiel necessary for the defense of her national interests as well as for safeguarding the regional security and freedom of navigation.

3) The actions and measures taken by the Islamic Republic of Iran for safeguarding the security in the region and defense of her national interests is in no way a threat against the regional countries and, to the contrary, can be used in assisting them and defending their interests. Furthermore, said measures have not

and will not contribute to the escalation of the war or the peaceful plying of the commercial ships, and there is no room for any worry whatsoever for international shipping.

- 4) Although the Islamic Republic of Iran has no intention whatsoever to provoke and create tension in the Persian Gulf, she will confront with full power any suspicious, threatening, and provocative move by any foreign force (military vessels as well as merchant ships), and the colors (i.e. the nationality) of the flags of the ships and fleets will not produce the slightest change in her firm determination.
- 5) The unreasoned and unnecessary presence of the foreign fleets in this region, which since years is sensitive, can in no way be convincing justification for the continuation of this presence and its dangerous strengthening.
- 6) Strengthening of foreign military forces in the Persian Gulf not only will not help safeguard the security in the Persian Gulf region, but draws the region close to an explosive situation and creates many difficulties for the peaceful plying of commercial ships. Furthermore, strengthening military fleets in the Persian Gulf will provide a good excuse for some other countries which have always been watching for increasing their presence and influence in the Persian Gulf.
- 7) The policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is based on the non-spread of the war to the Persian Gulf region, and she believes that if the régime of Iraq refrains from attacking the ships and marine installations in the Persian Gulf there will be no danger for freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf or for oil export from this region as has happened in recent weeks considering the pressures put on Iraq to refrain from attacks on marine targets.
- 8) Experience has shown that the change in the colors of the flags of the ships plying the Persian Gulf or escorting them have not

region, but, to the contrary, because of the inflammability in and the conditions of the region and the support of the Iraqi regime and its willingness to spread the war to the Persian Gulf, strengthening of the foreign fleets and escorting the ships have drawn the region nearer to the degree of inflammability and explosion resulting from the increase in the tension in the region.

Therefore, exerting pressure on the regime of Iraq to continue to refrain from attacking the marine targets in the Persian Gulf and the exit of the foreign forces can be a very good guarantee for safe-guarding the security in this region, the free export of oil, and for the freedom of international navigation.

- 9) The claim of and the attempt to safeguard so-called long-term interests and the support of the Arab friends in the region take the form of an opposition to the Islamic Republic of Iran and are in no way tolerable for the Islamic Republic of Iran. Furthermore, they are construed as a kind of justification for continuing the enmity. Continuation of this trend will, in addition to strengthening the enmity, bring about the strong reaction of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
- 10) According to the international law and traditions concerning the searching and detaining the ships suspected of carrying goods able to augment the military capability of the Iraqi regime, the Islamic Republic of Iran has the legal right to intercept and stop such ships, as this was the practice of some countries during the second World War. The Islamic Republic of Iran will definitely continue this practice too.
- 11) According to available information, some of the Kuwaiti ships which have been reflagged are owned by Iraq. This action, considering that it constitutes the carrying of oil from the neutral zone in favor of Iraq, is in lieu of a kind of support of and cooperation with the regime of Iraq in the war, and

Second Part

- 1) The Islamic Republic of Iran is carefully watching all the movements and efforts of each of the members of the security council, specifically those of its permanent members, and is perfectly aware of the position taken by each of its permanent and non-permanent members, and of the degree of the good will or ill will of each of them towards the Islamic Republic of Iran, and of the goals pursued by each of them.

- 2) The unjust approaches of the security council from the beginning of the Iraqi regime's attack on Iranian soil, and the lack of a fundamental change in this approach has caused the continuation of the negative opinion of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards the council's good will. As long as the unjust manner of the security council regarding the imposed war of Iraq, due to the efforts and enmity of some of its members towards the Islamic Republic of Iran, continues with the issuance of resolutions which embody a kind of thanking and encouraging the Iraqi regime for its continuation of adventurism, and as long as it ignores the root of the aggression, it will not only not help end the war but increase the tension in the region and aggravate the Islamic Republic of Iran's pessimism towards the actions of this council, and especially towards the efforts of some of its members.

- 3) The firm and unchangeable position of the Islamic Republic of Iran in face of the Iraqi-imposed war is, without having the slightest expansionist aims towards the Iraqi soil, based on the continuation of the struggle and defense until the materialization of the just rights and the condemnation and punishment of the aggressor, the Iraqi regime. It is clear that some countries' allegations to the effect of their endeavors and willingness towards ending the war, while manifestly assisting

...the hostages... in this regard has, through her... humanitarian influence in Lebanon, made many... humanitarian considerations and because of some friendly countries' frequent requests, or has gathered information about the fate and release of the hostages in Lebanon which to date usually had positive results. She is also interested in continuing this humanitarian effort to the greatest extent possible.

Fourth Part

One of the principles of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is to protect her independence and reject any hegemony. The Islamic Republic of Iran, in spite of her interest in expanding her relations with the world's countries, emphasizes that a country which has unrightfully taken possession of the properties and assets of the Islamic Republic of Iran and has, since the victory of the Islamic Revolution, been pursuing the policy of aggression and hostility towards the Islamic Republic of Iran cannot expect to have healthy relations with her.

THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN HAS THE HONOR TO ADVISE THE EMBASSY OF SWITZERLAND AS THE U.S. INTERESTS PROTECTOR:

AS PER THE INFORMATION RECEIVED AT 23:35 ON 21.0.1987 A HELICOPTER OF THE US NAVY ATTACKED A CARGO SHIP OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN AT 26:27 DEGREES NORTHERN + 51:30 DEGREES EASTERN, RESULTING IN MARTYRDOM AND INJURY OF A NUMBER OF THE CREW ON THE SHIP.

- 1.- THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN CONSIDERS THIS ACTION OF THE US, WHICH HAS TAKEN PLACE IN THE INTERNATIONAL WATERS, AS CLEAR VIOLATION OF NAVIGATION SECURITY IN THE REGION, AND A STRONG THREAT AGAINST ALL THE RECENT DIPLOMATIC ACTIONS. WHILE STRONGLY PROTESTING THIS HOSTILE ACTION, SHE REMINDS THAT THIS ACTION HAS CAUSED FURTHER FLARING UP OF THE FLAMES OF HOSTILITY IN THE REGION.
- 2.- THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, WHILE REFUTING ALL THE LEVELLED ACCUSATIONS REGARDING MINE-LAYING BY THE SHIP 'IRAN AJR', IS UNAWARE OF THE FATE OF 34 CREW MEMBERS OF THE SAID SHIP WHO ARE FLOATING IN THE INTERNATIONAL WATERS, OR ARE IN THE HANDS OF AMERICAN MILITARY FORCES. SHE IS REQUESTING THE QUICK RETURNING OF ALL OF THE SAID PERSONS.
- 3.- THE US NAVY HAS PREVENTED THE RESCUE FORCES OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN FROM DRAWING NEAR TO THE HIT SHIP, AND HAS ELIMINATED THE POSSIBILITY FOR TAKING CARE OF THE WOUNDED OF THE EVENT. THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN IS REQUESTING THE QUICK LIFTING OF THE SURROUNDING OF THE SAID SHIP, AND EVACUATION OF THE REGION SO THAT IRANIAN FORCES CAN RESCUE THE PERSONS ABOARD IT.
- 4.- IT IS CLEAR THAT THE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR ALL MATERIAL, MORAL AND HUMAN DAMAGES INCURRED BY THE SHIP AND THE PERSONS ABOARD IS TO BE BORN BY THE US GOVERNMENT.
- 5.- THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS ACTION, AND ALL THE CONSEQUENCES ARISING OUT OF THE ENGAGEMENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF OR SEA OF OMAN IS WITH THE US GOVERNMENT.

THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN WHILE STRONGLY CONDEMNING THIS WICKED ACTION, AND STATING HER UNWILLINGNESS IN ENGAGEMENT IN THIS REGION, CONSIDERS HER LEGAL RIGHT TO DEFEND WITH WHATEVER MEANS POSSIBLE HER NATIONAL INTERESTS AND SOVEREIGNTY. IN THIS CONNECTION, SHE HAS ISSUED STRICT ORDERS TO HER MILITARY FORCES TO CONFRONT ANY PROVOCATIVE ACTION.

- 1) "IRAN AJR" was an unarmed trading vessel used to transport necessities. Even if, according to one interpretation, it could have been considered a military vessel, certain rules apply to civil as well as military ships. Shipping regulations are not those of the jungle.
- 2) Paragraph 5 of the Security Council's Resolution 598 demands that the states not do anything that might increase tensions in the region. It is known that this is specifically addressed to the presence of foreign naval forces in the Persian Gulf.

The U.S. Government, which publicized and represented this Resolution with great fervor, violated Paragraph 5 with its action, with the result that the region is in danger of exploding.

- 3) Apart from the opinion that the U.S. violated the obligations it undertook with the Resolution, the Government of Iran also is under the impression that the U.S. is planning a conspiracy against Iran to bring down the Government of Iran. This is an intervention in Iran's internal affairs and breaches Article 2 of the Declaration of Algiers.
- 4) In the entire situation the Government of Iran senses a contradiction to the American information it received through various channels according to which the U.S. insists that it is not endeavoring to heighten tensions and endorses better bilateral relations. The Government of Iran is under the

impression that possibly the U.S. authorities are not fully in control of the military authorities.

- 5) These rather legal points have been summarized with the aim to cause the U.S. to reflect: the people of Iran expect their Government, under the given circumstances, to at all times react sharply against the U.S., especially since they are under the impression that the already seven-year old war with Iraq was somehow instigated by motivation from the U.S. Government.

Message from the Iranian Government

Quote

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran presents its compliments to the Embassy of Switzerland, U.S. interests protection section in Tehran, and advises :

Pursuant to note No. 304/2391 dated September 21, 1987, concerning the attack by the U.S. helicopters on the logistic ship, Iran-Ajr, in free waters, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran makes clear the following points :

- 1) Increasing and expanded presence of the military fleet of the U.S. Government in the Persian Gulf and Oman Sea region has provided causes for more tension and graver situation in the region. This is a clear violation of paragraph 5 of the U.N. security council resolution 598 which the U.S. has hypocritically declared to support seriously.

The limitations caused by the U.S. Government actions to the free movements of the ships and planes in the region, some of which are considered as aggression to the I.R.I.'s territorial integrity, are clear violations of the international regulations and protocols. This can in no way be accepted by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

- 2) Considering the neutrality claim of the U.S. Government in the Iraqi imposed war on the Islamic Republic of Iran, the U.S. Government does not have any reason or motive to commit this indecent and terrible crime which is against the international principles, norms and traditions. In this connection, the agents of said Government have, in spite of all the internationally established procedures, treated the crew of the "Iran-Ajr" ship in an inhuman, undeserving manner, have subjected them for long times to moral and physical tortures and have even prevented them from rendering their religious

obligations. in the same context, they (the U.S. G. agents) violated further international and humanitarian regulations by instigating and encouraging the Iranian crew members of the "Iran-Ajr", held as hostages, to request asylum.

- 3) The American military authorities have prevented the I.R.I.'s authorities from access to the said ship, and from carrying out the rescue operations for it and the related crew. Furthermore, they have destroyed the said ship, an act which is also a clear violation of the international conventions' texts.
- 4) The U.S. navy has pursued another Iranian commercial ship, named "Iran-Takhti", while plying the free waters of the Oman Sea. This constitutes ignorance of the international regulations and has done despite the previous written reminders to the Swiss Embassy as the U.S. interests protector in Tehran, regarding the events related to the "Iran-Ajr".
- 5) In spite of the international commitments of the American Government under the U.N. charter, and especially those made in the Algiers declaration stating non-interference in Iranian internal affairs, the American military authorities have recently, pursuant to the creation of tension aimed at making the Persian Gulf region insecure, openly violated their international commitments through their presence in the said region. Further, they have spoken of a plan to overthrow the regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, while strongly protesting and condemning this sort of illegal and inhuman actions which are against the Governments' international commitments as per the U.N. charter and the Algiers declaration, reserves the right to reciprocate and claim reparation and compensation for the losses incurred.

Because the presence and strengthening of the foreign military forces, whether american or other, have caused an increase in tension and a threat to peace and security in the region, the Islamic Republic of Iran emphasizes the necessity that these forces leave the Persian Gulf region as soon as possible. Moreover, in case this important issue is disregarded and the creation of tension is continued in the region by any foreign military forces, the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran reserves its right for any appropriate action.

The opportunity is availed to renew the highest considerations.

Unquote

* * *

9/28

copies sent by
courier &

Howe &

Amity

<DIST>PRT: SIT
SIT: EOB WHSR IN VAX

<PREC> IMMEDIATE<CLAS> UNCLASSIFIED<OSRI> RUEHDT<DTG> 222254Z SEP 87
<ORIG>FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
<TO>TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1383
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 2705

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL: U.S. LETTER ON INCIDENT
- WITH IRANIAN VESSEL

<TEXT>

UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 02804

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, UNSC, MOPS, US, IR

SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL: U.S. LETTER ON INCIDENT

- WITH IRANIAN VESSEL

1. ON AFTERNOON OF SEPTEMBER 22 USUN FORMALLY NOTIFIED
PRESIDENT OF SECURITY COUNCIL OF U.S. EXERCISE OF RIGHT
OF SELF-DEFENSE IN SEPTEMBER 21 INCIDENT WITH IRANIAN
VESSEL. TEXT OF LETTER BELOW IN PARA 2. NO SIGNS HAVE
APPEARED OF SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION ON THIS SUBJECT.

2. TEXT OF LETTER TO PRESIDENT OF SECURITY COUNCIL:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS, I WISH, ON BEHALF OF MY GOVERNMENT, TO
REPORT THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS EXERCISED ITS INHERENT
RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW BY TAKING
DEFENSIVE ACTION AGAINST A NAVAL VESSEL OF THE ISLMAIC
REPUBLIC OF IRAN IN THE PERSIAN GULF. THIS IRANIAN
VESSEL WAS DISCOVERED LAYING MINES IN SHIPPING LANDES
USED BY U.S. AND OTHER VESSELS IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS
FIFTY MILES NORTHEAST OF BAHRAIN. THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT HAD PREVIOUSLY INFORMED THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT
THAT IT WOULD TAKE APPROPRIATE DEFENSIVE MEASURES AGAINST
SUCH PROVOCATE ACTIONS, WHICH PRESENT AN IMMEDIATE RISK
TO ALL SHIPS, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE UNITED STATES.
SIX MINES WERE LAID BEFORE THE UNITED STATES TOOK
MEASURES TO CAUSE THE IRANIAN CRAFT TO CEASE THIS HOSTILE
USE OF FORCE. TEN ADDITIONAL MINES WERE DISCOVERED ON
BOARD THE IRANIAN VESSEL. THE USS JARRETT IS NOW TOWING
THE IRANIAN LANDING CRAFT TO ANCHORAGE IN INTERNATIONAL
WATERS OUTSIDE THE AREA IN WHICH MINES WERE LAID. THE
UNITED STATES IS IN THE PROCESS OF FACILITATING THE
REPATRIATION OF THE IRANIAN SAILORS.

I ASK THAT YOU CIRCULATE THE TEXT OF THIS LETTER AS A
DOCUMENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

SIGNED BY:

HERBERT S. OKUN

AMBASSADOR

ACTING PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE

END TEXT.

3. BAGHDAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

WALTERS

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01<SSN> 2804<TOR> 870922191240 MSG000180645160

IN THE NAME OF GOD

THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN HAS THE HONOR TO ADVISE THE EMBASSY OF SWITZERLAND AS THE U.S. INTERESTS PROTECTOR:

AS PER THE INFORMATION RECEIVED AT 23:35 ON 21.9.1987 A HELICOPTER OF THE US NAVY ATTACKED A CARGO SHIP OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN AT 26:27 DEGREES NORTHERN + 51:30 DEGREES EASTERN. RESULTING IN MARTYRDOM AND INJURY OF A NUMBER OF THE CREW ON THE SHIP.

1.- THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN CONSTRUES THIS ACTION OF THE US, WHICH HAS TAKEN PLACE IN THE INTERNATIONAL WATERS, AS CLEAR VIOLATION OF NAVIGATION SECURITY IN THE REGION, AND A STRONG THREAT AGAINST ALL THE RECENT DIPLOMATIC ACTIONS. WHILE STRONGLY PROTESTING THIS HOSTILE ACTION, SHE REMINDS THAT THIS ACTION HAS CAUSED FURTHER FLARING UP OF THE FLAMES OF HOSTILITY IN THE REGION.

2.- THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, WHILE REFUTING ALL THE LEVELED ACCUSATIONS REGARDING MINE-LAYING BY THE SHIP 'IRAN AJR', IS UNAWARE OF THE FATE OF 30 CREW MEMBERS OF THE SAID SHIP WHO ARE FLOATING IN THE INTERNATIONAL WATERS, OR ARE IN THE HANDS OF AMERICAN MILITARY FORCES. SHE IS REQUESTING THE QUICK RETURNING OF ALL OF THE SAID PERSONS.

3.- THE US NAVY HAS PREVENTED THE RESCUE FORCES OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN FROM DRAWING NEAR TO THE HIT SHIP, AND HAS ELIMINATED THE POSSIBILITY FOR TAKING CARE OF THE WOUNDED OF THE EVENT. THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN IS REQUESTING THE QUICK LIFTING OF THE SURROUNDING OF THE SAID SHIP, AND EVACUATION OF THE REGION SO THAT IRANIAN FORCES CAN RESCUE THE PERSONS ABOARD IT.

4.- IT IS CLEAR THAT THE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR ALL MATERIAL, MORAL AND HUMAN DAMAGES INCURRED BY THE SHIP AND THE PERSONS ABOARD IS TO BE BORN BY THE US GOVERNMENT.

5.- THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS ACTION, AND ALL THE CONSEQUENCES ARISING OUT OF THE ENGAGEMENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF OR SEA OF OMAN IS WITH THE US GOVERNMENT.

THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN WHILE STRONGLY CONDEMNING THIS WICKED ACTION, AND STATING HER UNWILLINGNESS IN ENGAGEMENT IN THIS REGION, CONSIDERS HER LEGAL RIGHT TO DEFEND WITH WHATEVER MEANS POSSIBLE HER NATIONAL INTERESTS AND SOVEREIGNTY. IN THIS CONNECTION, SHE HAS ISSUED STRICT ORDERS TO HER MILITARY FORCES TO CONFRONT ANY PROVOCATIVE ACTION.

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 6 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

Ambr. Oakley

TALKING POINTS FOR SECRETARY MEETING WITH PEREZ DE CUELLAR
ON GULF INCIDENT

~~SECRET~~

- Iran clearly bears the responsibility for the consequences of its own hostile behavior.
- The action taken by US forces in this incident were within the rights of the United States under international law. Every state has, under Article 51 of the UN Charter, the right to use reasonable and proportionate force in self-defense, including the defense of its warships and other vessels flying its flag against actual or imminent attack.
- In particular, these mines were laid in international waters in order to specifically destroy vessels navigating in the area. Consequently, we and other states have the right to respond with the force necessary to terminate the threat. Various nations, including the US, have taken steps necessary to permit defense of their shipping in the Gulf.
- We do not seek a confrontation with Iran, or an escalation of this incident, but our forces will defend themselves if provoked. We have said this to Iran directly. The international community should make clear to Iran that such acts will not be tolerated.
- This discovery of mine laying by Iran in international waters highlights the dangers facing the entire international community caused by the refusal of Iran to definitively accept resolution 598 in its entirety.
- An incident such as this emphasizes the urgency of prompt United Nations Security Council action in implementing resolution 598 in all its parts.
- We see nothing in Iran's position that indicates its willingness to abide by resolution 598. This incident, and President Khamenei's speech this morning, reinforce our belief that there is no alternative to moving forward on drafting an enforcement resolution against the non-complying party, Iran.
- This unstable and volatile situation cannot be tolerated indefinitely. The Security Council has performed admirably thus far.
- We value the role you have played personally.

DECLASSIFIED / 26/05/05

NLS F97-107/2 #192

BY CW, NARA, DATE 11/26/02

- We are communicating with Iran formally through the Swiss as well as through your good offices. We are informing them that we do not wish to escalate this incident. We hope it can be contained, but we will act in self defense.
- We wish to return the Iranian detainees and the bodies of those killed. We are working through Oman on repatriation of the detainees, and are seeking means for a prompt and respectful return of the bodies.
- The Iranians should understand clearly that we will continue to respond if we are challenged or the safety of our forces is threatened.

Drafted: IO/UNP: AMFarsakh
9/22/87/# 2995Z x 7004

Cleared: IO/UNP: BJSchrage
IO: HLKirby
NEA/NGA: LPope
L/NEA: PNorton
P: GHelman
NEA: EDjerejian (Acting)

Amb. Oakley

107607

9

~~SECRET~~

The Government of the United States takes this opportunity, through the good offices of the Swiss Ambassador in Tehran, to communicate with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

As the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran is aware, a helicopter belonging to the United States was forced to fire upon an Iranian vessel on September 21. The Iranian vessel was in the process of laying mines in international waters of the Persian Gulf, and thus posed an immediate threat of danger to U.S. flag shipping as well as the vessels of other parties not directly involved in the Iran-Iraq conflict. The Government of the United States has previously warned the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran against taking actions that would interfere with the free passage of U.S. flag vessels. Such a warning was delivered to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran through the good offices of the Swiss Ambassador on May 28, 1987. A similar message was repeated to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on July 18, 1987. On August 12 the good offices of the Government of Turkey were used by the Government of the United States to transmit yet another message to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and in this message the subject of Iranian mine laying activities was

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M393/1 #127607

BY RW NARA DATE 11/21/7

~~SECRET~~

10

~~SECRET~~

-2-

directly addressed. Finally, on September 2, 1987 the Government of Switzerland passed another message from the Government of the United States to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran warning of the consequences of such mine laying. The actions of the Iranian vessel in laying mines in international waters on September 21 were taken despite repeated warnings, and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran must bear full responsibility for these actions.

The Government of the United States has presently detained twenty six members of the Iranian Navy. Four Iranian crewmen are wounded, and are being treated by American medical personnel. Two crewman are reported missing in action. Three crewmen have been killed, and their bodies are being treated with full respect. Oman has agreed to assist in arranging the expeditious return of the detained crewman, as well as the bodies of the deceased, to Iran.

The Government of the United States wishes to state that the action taken by U.S. military forces was defensive in nature and a limited act taken to meet a direct threat against U.S. interests and international navigation. The Government of

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3-

the United States has no desire to retaliate further against the actions of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, but wishes to point out that it will take all actions necessary to protect its interests and international navigation in the Persian Gulf.

~~SECRET~~

Drafted: NEA/NGA - MJMetrinko 2
#29924 9/22/87
Cleared: NEA/NGA - LPopa
P - AEastham
PM:RBeers
EUR/CE:KStocker

14

4
] 10/1