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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: BURNS, WILLIAM J.: Files

Archivist: kdb

File Folder: Gulf War [1] Box 91852

Date: January 12, 1998

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>1. file index</del>	<del>for folder (1p, partial) R 8/30/00 NLSF 96-122 #20</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P1</del>
2. chart [25½"x22"]	re Iran-Iraq War (w/notations) [folded into 12 sections, front and back, of approx. 8½"x 11" each] R 7/8/02 996-122 #21	9/88	P1
3. memo (90067)	Dennis Ross to Colin L. Powell, re 1/21 PRG meeting (w/notations), 3p P, 6/8/00 NLSF 96-122 #22	1/21/87	P1
4. memo (0438)	Ross to Frank C. Carlucci, re Iran-Iraq Peace Initiative and Other Options (w/notations), 1p	1/21/87	P1 P5
<del>5. memo (90067)</del>	<del>Ross to Powell, re Policy Review Group Meeting re Iran-Iraq War, 1/21/87, 4:00pm (w/notations), 2p R, 6/8/00 NLSF 96-122 #23</del>	<del>1/21/87</del>	<del>P1</del>
6. talking points	for 1/21/87 PRG meeting, 2p " " " #24	n.d.	P1
<del>7. briefing paper (90195)</del>	<del>re Iran-Iraq Situation, (w/notations), 1p " " " #25</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P1</del>
8. memo (0950)	Oakley to Carlucci, re UN Security Council Consultations on Iran-Iraq (w/notations), 1p	2/11/87	P1 P5
<del>9. memo</del>	<del>Oakley to Robert Pelletreau, re attached paper (w/notations), 1p R, 6/8/00 NLSF 96-122 #26</del>	<del>2/19/87</del>	<del>P1</del>

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- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
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- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].
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- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
10. strategy paper	Thoughts on Agenda for 2/23 GCPEG Meeting, 1p	n.d.	P1 P5
<del>11. memo (1158)</del>	<del>Oakley to Carlucci (w/notations), 1p K. 6/8/00 NLSF96-122 #27</del>	<del>2/23/87</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>12. memo</del>	<del>to the Secretaries of State, Treasury, Defense, et al., 1p (draft w/edit) " " " #28</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>13. cable</del>	<del>same text as item #16 (w/notations), 3p " " " #29</del>	<del>2/19/87</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>14. memo</del>	<del>corrected copy of item #12 (w/notation), 1p " " " #30</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>15. memo (1281)</del>	<del>Oakley to Carlucci, re Presidential Statement on Iran-Iraq War (w/notations), 2p " " " #31</del>	<del>2/25/87</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>16. cable</del>	<del>251802Z FEB 87 (w/notations), 1p " " " #32</del>	<del>2/25/87</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>17. memo (90266)</del>	<del>Oakley to Carlucci, re 3/23/87 NSPG meeting on Gulf Policy (w/notations), 1p " " " #33</del>	<del>3/19/87</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>18. sched. memo</del>	<del>from Carlucci, re same topic as item #17, 3p " " " #34</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>19. talking points</del>	<del>Opening Remarks for the President, 1p " " " #35</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>20. talking points</del>	<del>shortened version of item #19 (copy of 3-x-5 card), 1p " " #36</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>21. talking points</del>	<del>for Carlucci, 3p " " #37</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P1</del>

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FILE INDEX FOR GULF WAR

FILE INDEX FOR WILLIAM J. BURNS

<u>NO.</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
1	Powell Memo re: Jan 21 PRG Mtg on Iran-Iraq	Jan 21, 1987
2	Carlucci Memo re: Iran-Iraq Peace Initiative	Jan 21, 1987
3	Powell Memo re: PRG, Iran-Iraq War	Jan 21, 1987
4	Powell Memo re: Presidential Statement on Iran-Iraq War	Jan 22, 1987
5	Talking Paper re: Iran-Iraq Situation	Jan 22, 1987
6	Carlucci Memo re: UN Security Council	Feb 11, 1987
7	Pelletreau Memo re: Thoughts for 2/23 GCPRG	Feb 19, 1987
8	Carlucci Memo re: Operation Staunch	Feb 23, 1987
9	Carlucci Memo re: Statement of Iran-Iraq War	Feb 25, 1987
10	Cable: Pressing for UN Action	Feb 25, 1987
11	Carlucci Memo re: NSPG, Monday, March 23	Mar 19, 1987
12	Carlucci Memo re: CIA Analysis of US-Soviet	Mar 20, 1987
13	Photo Op w/Arab League	Undated
14	Carlucci Memo re: Arab League Delegation	Apr 27, 1987
15	Carlucci Memo re: Murphy Mission	May 1, 1987
16	Photo Op w/Arab League, Friday, May 8	May 6, 1987
17	Cable: re: June Trip to Arabian Peninsula & Iraq	Jun 30, 1988
18	Responses by President re: Al-Qabas	Undated
19	Powell Memo re: What if Iran-Iraq War Ends	Jul 20, 1988

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# The Iran-Iraq War: A Reference Aid (U)

Defense Research Reference Series



Defense Intelligence Agency

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NLS F96-122 #21  
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~~(C)~~ Substantive analytical support was provided by DB-8C2 analysts: CPT Thomas Baker, USA; LT Ann Marie Wyztka and LT John Kittle, USN, and 1Lt Joann McDonnell, USAF. Mr Bryan Ross, DB-8C4, provided political analysis; information on Gulf oil production and exports was provided by Mr. Edward Badin, DB-4F; information on arms trade was provided by Mr. Ernest Ledet, DB-5E; and demographic data was provided by Ms. Helen Lehder, DB-5C. Word processing support was provided by Ms. Trina D. Banks.

~~(U)~~ This study has been fully coordinated with the Directorates for Imagery Exploitation, Estimates, and Current Intelligence. Questions and comments concerning this publication should be referred in writing to the Defense Intelligence Agency (ATTN: DB-8C2), Washington, D.C. 20340-0001. Request for additional copies should be forwarded through command approval channels, as appropriate, to DIA (ATTN: RTS-2E), in accordance with DIA Manual 59-1, *Intelligence Dissemination/Reference Series*.

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



**The Iran-Iraq War: A Reference Aid (U)**  
**Defense Research Reference Series**  
**DDB-2600-5954-88**

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
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Iraqi Corps Boundary — XXX —

Approximate Iranian Sector Boundary - - - - -

Areas Retaken by Iraq-1988



**The Ground War (U)**  
**Patterns Prior to 1988**

- Iran chose terrain and weather conditions that favored its infantry forces over Iraq's armored forces and denied Iraq use of its airpower.
- Iranian Revolutionary Guards probed for weak points along Iraq's defensive lines, concentrating on corps or division boundaries.
- The main Iranian attack was conducted by large numbers of Revolutionary Guards and Basij ("volunteers").

**Iraq's 1988 Initiatives (U)**

- The Iraqis used extensive planning, terrain models, and deception before attacks to retake lost territory.
- The main Iraqi attack was preceded by heavy air and artillery preparation, and the integrated use of chemical weapons.
- Iraq used highly trained, well-equipped troops in attacks against well-defined objectives.
- Iranian ground forces put up only minimal resistance, then withdrew and abandoned military

artillery forces.

- Iraq's forward line of defenders was overrun.
- Iraq then counterattacked, usually fairly rapidly, stopping the Iranian advance, retaking some-of the lost territory.
- The Iraqis were not willing to take the necessary casualties to push Iran's highly motivated troops from all occupied territory.
- Both sides suffered heavy casualties, with the ratio normally about 2- or 3-to-1 against Iran.

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
### Major Instances of Chemical Weapons Use in the War<sup>1</sup> (U)

User	Date	Area of Use	Type	Results
Iraq	Jul 1982	Mandali and Basra	CS	Little effect/shift in wind.
Iraq	Aug 1983	Hajj Umran	Mustard	Little effect/poor employment.
Iraq	Oct-Nov 1983	Penjwin	Mustard	2,000-3,000 Iranian casualties; stopped the Iranian advance.
Iraq	Feb-Mar 1984	Majnun Islands	Mustard	2,500 Iranian casualties; a factor in stopping the Iranians, but not a major one.
Iraq	Mar 1984	Basra	Tabun	58 Iranian casualties; no effect on the battle.
Iraq	Mar 1985	Hawizeh Marshes	Mustard/Tabun	2,000-3,000 Iranian casualties; not a decisive factor in stopping the Iranians.
Iraq	Feb 1986	Al Faw	Mustard	8,000 Iranian casualties; one factor in stopping the Iranian advance.
Iraq	Dec 1986	Khorramshahr	Mustard	Probably some Iranian casualties in rear areas; not a decisive factor in the battle.
Iran	Apr 1987	East of Basra	Phosgene	Few Iraqi casualties; probable psychological effect on Iraqi military.
Iran/Iraq	1987	Mehran/Sumar	Mustard/nerve	Iraq employed mustard and nerve agents; Iran used mustard; little effect on either side.
Iraq/Iran	Mar 1988	Halabja	Mustard/nerve/cyanide	Iraq probably used mustard and possibly nerve gas; Iran may have used cyanide; heavy civilian casualties.
Iraq	Apr-Jul 1988	Al Faw/ East of Basra/ Majnun Islands- Hawizeh Marshes/ Dehloran	Mustard/nerve	Iraqi doctrine evolved to incorporate chemical weapons as a normal integrated part of offensive operations, contributing to Iraq's success.

<sup>1</sup>The use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war, a regular and recurring event, represented the first major use of chemical warfare since World War I. Although chemical weapons did not prove decisive or provide a strategic advantage to either belligerent, they were tactically effective in some instances. The Iraqis have fairly large stockpiles of blister and nerve agents and used them when on both the offense and defense. Iran made only very sporadic use of chemicals because of limited production, training, and delivery capabilities.

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equipment.

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### Estimated Force Balance (U)

Iraq	
Ground Forces	
Regulars	1,150,000
Irregulars	100,000
Tanks	5,500
APCs	4,750
Artillery (over 100-mm)	2,800
MRLs	310
SCUD launchers	22
SAM launchers <sup>1</sup>	660
Air defense artillery	7,550
Operational fighters	575

Iran	
Ground Forces <sup>2</sup>	
Regulars	275,000
Irregulars <sup>3</sup>	275,000
Tanks	625
APCs	1,050
Artillery (over 100-mm)	875
MRLs	100
SCUD launchers	3
SAM launchers <sup>1</sup>	300
Air defense artillery	1,600
Operational fighters	63-67

<sup>1</sup> Does not include man-portable SAMs.  
<sup>2</sup> Represents early 1988 estimates; figures at the time of the ceasefire probably significantly lower, but may rise with the reconstitution of some units.  
<sup>3</sup> Includes Revolutionary Guards and Basij ("volunteers").

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### Air Forces (U)

	Iranian Fighters	
	Inventory	Operational
F-4	62	29-34
F-5	63	18-22
F-14	64	16-18
<b>Total</b>	<b>189</b>	<b>63-74</b>

### Iraqi Fighters and Bombers

	Inventory		Operational
	Inventory	Operational	
BADGER	8	5	
BLINDER	9	6	
FOXBAT	33	25	
FLOGGER	119	86	
FULCRUM	35	24	
FROGFOOT	46	37	
FISHBED	272	176	
FITTER	177	121	
Mirage F-1	54	43	
FRESCO	35	15	
Hunter	12	6	
<b>Total</b>	<b>800</b>	<b>544</b>	

### Background

(S/NF) The war between Iran and Iraq is based on long historical enmity involving political, religious, and ethnic differences. Animosity can be traced back at least to the 16th and 17th centuries, when Safavid Persians fought the Ottoman Turks. In modern times, conflicts have manifested themselves in border disputes between Persian Iran and Arab Iraq, mainly over the dividing line in the Shatt al-Arab waterway and border enclaves. Other sources of dispute involve Iranian and Iraqi support for Kurdish dissidents in both countries. These disputes have existed under a variety of governments in both nations. A personal dimension to the enmity was added by a provision of the 1975 Algiers Accord, signed by both countries, which called for Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to place the exiled Iranian cleric, Ayatollah Khomeini, under house arrest in Iran. In 1978, after a request from the Shah of Iran, Saddam Hussein expelled Khomeini to France, where the Ayatollah headquartered his campaign to overthrow the Shah.

(S/NF) Khomeini established an Islamic Republic in Iran in 1979, and it soon became apparent that his brand of Islamic fundamentalism was diametrically opposed to the secular socialist state in Iraq, ruled by Saddam Hussein and his Baath Party. Tensions heightened early in 1980, and the Iranians began artillery bombardments of Iraq and intrusions of Iraqi air space in April. Artillery duels continued throughout the summer, becoming intense in

September. On 16 September, Iran described the conflict as a full-scale war and Hussein renounced the 1975 Algiers Accord. Border clashes escalated, naval encounters occurred in the northern Gulf, and Iraqi ground forces seized Iranian border posts in preparation for an invasion. Finally, on 22 September, Iraq launched a full-scale invasion using armored, mechanized infantry, mountain infantry, and regular infantry forces to cross the border, while the Iraqi Air Force attacked Iran's airfields and Air Force.

(S/NF) Iraq's attack was partly the result of its perception of an opportunity to reassert control over the Shatt al-Arab and to achieve a dominant position in the Gulf at the expense of a weakened Iran, as the Shah's forces had been decimated by revolutionary purges. Saddam Hussein expected the Iranian people to overthrow the oppressive Khomeini regime, or at least that the Arab population in Khuzestan would welcome the Iraqi forces. In fact, Iraq's advancing forces halted their attack after 3 weeks and waited for the new revolution, which never came. The delay enabled Iran to mobilize and, during the next 2 years, to drive the Iraqis back to the international border. From 1982 to 1987, the conflict became essentially a war of attrition, with battles and exchanges of territory taking place all along the border. In 1988, Iraq's shift to offensive tactics and its dominance in the War of the Cities, together with Iran's crumbling morale, led to Tehran's acceptance of UN Resolution 598 and a ceasefire.

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### Comparison of Military Forces (U)

#### Iran

- As armored vehicles deteriorated, ground forces evolved from mechanized to mostly light infantry with emphasis on Revolutionary Guards.
- Innovative tactics, particularly with the use of combat engineers.
- Shortages of key equipment and spares; poor maintenance.
- Inconsistent supply of military material.
- Poor air support; shortage of operational aircraft.

#### Iraq

- Highly mechanized ground force.
- Conservative tactics.
- Unwilling to use equipment advantage when high casualties were involved; emphasis on survivability of aircraft and pilots versus low-level air strikes.
- Remained essentially on the defensive from the first weeks of the war until April-July 1988, when it assumed the offensive.
- Reliable arms suppliers.
- High percentage of operational equipment.
- Technological progress in areas of missile systems, chemical weapons, and air tactics.

**1980**  
 Sep-Oct Iraq invades Iran, but halts its offensive awaiting the overthrow of Khomeini.

**1981**  
 Jan Iranian counterattack at Susangerd fails.  
 Feb-Sep Stalemate: Iran prepares for future offensives.  
 Sep Iran wins at Abadan.  
 Nov-Dec Iran wins at Bostan.

**1982**  
 Mar Iran wins at Dezful.  
 May Iran wins at Khorramshahr.  
 Jul Iraqi defenses hold, and the Iraqis defeat Iran at the Battle of Basra.  
 Nov Iran fails again at Al Amarah.

**1983**  
 Feb and Apr Five limited Iranian offensives:  
 Jul Al Amarah  
 Aug Hajj Umran  
 Oct Mehran  
 Penjwin  
 Results: minor changes in territory and heavy Iranian casualties.



**1984**  
 Feb Iran launches an offensive along the southern border and occupies the Majnun Islands.  
 Mar The tanker war begins in the Persian Gulf — continues into 1988.  
 Oct A limited Iranian attack in the central border area produces no territorial gains.



**1985**  
 Mar Iran conducts an offensive in the Hawizeh Marshes, occupying more Iraqi territory.  
 Apr-Mar Iraqi aircraft bomb Iranian cities; Iran fires SCUD missiles at Baghdad.  
 Aug Iraq begins an air campaign against Kharg Island.

**1986**  
 Feb Iran launches an offensive against Al Faw Peninsula and occupies it.  
 May-Oct Iraq's Air Force conducts intensive bombing of Iranian economic targets; Iranian oil exports drop under 1 million barrels per day. Iran responds with SCUD attacks.

**1987**  
 Jan-Feb Iran launches an offensive toward Basra, occupying more Iraqi territory. Iran launches 11 SCUDs against Baghdad.  
 Feb-May Iran tests the SILKWORM missile; mines damage ships in Kuwaiti waters.  
 Fall Tanker attacks intensify; Iraq uses air-launched SILKWORMs.

**1988**  
 Feb-Apr The war of the cities intensifies with SCUD attacks by both sides; Iraq uses an extended-range SCUD, capable of hitting Tehran.  
 Mar Iran occupies Iraqi territory east of the Darbandi-Khan reservoir.  
 Apr-Jul Iraq assumes the offense and recaptures all Iranian-occupied territory: Al Faw, territory east of Basra, Majnun Islands-Hawizeh Marshes, Mawat, Penjwin, Halabja, Hajj Umran.  
 Jul Iran accepts UN Resolution 598. In pre-ceasefire posturing, Iraqi raids result in large numbers of personnel and equipment captured.  
 Aug Both sides agree to a 20 August 1988 ceasefire.





Iranian SILKWORM Sites

Iranian SILKWORM Support Facility

Major Incident

Standard Traffic Route

Percentage of Population

Shia Sunni

Additional SILKWORM construction activity has been noted at three other sites in the Kuestak area and on Abu Musa Island.

### 1987-1988 Persian Gulf Incidents (U)

- USS Stark attack — 17 May 1987.**  
Iraqi F-1 hits USS Stark with 2 Exocet missiles, 37 killed.
- Mines in Kuwaiti waters — May-June 1987.**  
Four ships hit mines in Kuwait's Al Ahmadi channel; Iran is responsible.
- Bridgeton strikes a mine — 24 July 1987.**  
First US reflagged tanker hits a mine; Iran is responsible.
- Minfield is discovered in Gulf of Oman — 10 August 1987.**  
Iranian auxiliary lays as many as 24 mines near Khor Fakkan anchorage; subsequently, a tanker is damaged and a supply ship sinks.
- Iran Ajr is caught laying mines — 21-22 September 1987.**  
US Navy seizes and sinks Iran Ajr after it has laid nine mines off Bahrain.
- US helicopters sink Iranian small boats — 8 October 1987.**  
US Army helicopters sink one Boghammer and two whalers after they fire at US helicopters.

### The War in the Gulf (U) Platforms/Weapons Used

Iran	
Platform	Weapons
F-4 fighter	Maverick missile, Standard missile, iron bombs
AB-212 helicopter	AS-12 missile
SH-3 helicopter	Maverick missile
Destroyer	Standard missile
Frigate	Sea Killer missile, 4.5-in gun, machinegun
Boghammer	Multiple rocket launcher
	Rocket-propelled grenade
	Recoilless rifle
	Machinegun
Iraq	
Platform	Weapons
Super Etendard fighter	Exocet missile
Super Frelon helicopter	Exocet missile
Mirage F-1EQ5 fighter	Exocet missile
B-6D/BADGER bomber	C-601/SILKWORM

7. **SILKWORM missile hits the *Sea Isle City* — 16 October 1987.**  
Iranian SILKWORM fired from Al Faw Peninsula hits reflagged tanker *Sea Isle City* in Kuwaiti waters.
8. **US Navy destroys an Iranian oil platform — 19 October 1987.**  
In retaliation for the 16 October SILKWORM attack, US Navy destroyers shell Rashadat oil platform.
9. **US Navy frigate strikes a mine — 14 April 1988.**  
USS *Samuel B. Roberts* is damaged by a mine, northeast of Qatar; Iran is held responsible.
10. **US Navy destroys Iranian oil platforms, engages Iranian Navy — 18 April 1988.**  
In retaliation for the mining incident, the US Navy destroys Sassan and Sirri oil platforms; after hostile Iranian naval action, the US Navy sinks/disables three Iranian naval combatants and three small boats.
11. **US Navy mistakenly shoots down Iranian airliner — 3 July 1988.**  
In a case of mistaken identity, the USS *Vincennes* downs Iranian airbus over the Strait of Hormuz.

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### Background on SILKWORM Missiles (U)

#### Iran

- First received in 1986 from China.
- Captured Iraqi sites and equipment near Al Faw in 1986.
- Firings in 1987: 10 from Al Faw area; 1 test firing from Qeshm Island.
- Lost Al Faw sites, as Iraq recaptured the peninsula in April 1988.

#### Iraq

- First received in 1982 from China.
- System deployed to Umm Qasr area.
- Firings in 1987: 10 — all air-launched version from B-6D/BADGERS attacking ships in the Persian Gulf.

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UNCLASSIFIED



(U) Destroyed Iranian Oil Platform

### Iranian Naval Assets (U)

#### Regular Navy

- 3 Destroyers
- 3 Frigates
- 10 Missile patrol boats
- 49 Patrol craft
- 14 Hovercraft
- 24 Amphibious craft
- 14 Auxiliaries

#### Estimated Personnel Strength:

20,000

#### Revolutionary Guard Navy

- 3 Chaho patrol boats
- 35-45 Boghammer speedboats
- 2 Mini-submarines
- Several hundred small boats



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
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SECRET/NOFORN/WNINTEL/NOCONTRACT

### Arms Sales, 1980-1987 (U)

(Millions of Dollars)





## The Iran-Iraq War: A Reference Aid (U)

### SUMMARY

This document is designed as a quick reference aid with background material on the Iran-Iraq war, including basic data on the ground war, chemical attacks, SCUD missile strikes, and the war in the Persian Gulf.

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~



DRAFT 2 (1/21, 1840)

PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON IRAN-IRAQ WAR

The continuation of the senseless struggle between Iran and Iraq remains a subject of deep concern to the United States and to the entire civilized world. It is a war that is imposing appalling costs on both countries, taking a monstrous toll in human life. And it is a war that threatens not only American strategic interests, but also the stability and security of our friends in the region.

As I have emphasized many times, we are determined to help bring the war to the promptest possible negotiated end, without victor or vanquished, leaving intact the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both Iran and Iraq. We cannot but condemn Iranian seizure and occupation of Iraqi territory, and we continue to call upon the Government of Iran to join the Government of Iraq in seeking a rapid negotiated solution to the conflict.

We would regard an expansion of the war as a major threat to our interests and to those of our friends in the region. We remain determined to ensure the free flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. We also remain strongly committed to supporting the individual and collective self-defense of our friends in the Gulf.

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II  
90067 Add-On

January 21, 1987

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR COLIN L. POWELL

FROM: DENNIS ROSS

SUBJECT: January 21 PRG Meeting on Iran-Iraq War

The meeting produced agreement on a number of public, diplomatic, and military options that should be pursued, or at least considered pending approval.

Public and Diplomatic Options

- A Presidential statement should be issued in the next day or so on the war. It should call for an end to this bloody, senseless war, condemn the current Iranian invasion of Iraq, reaffirm that an expansion of the war is seen by us as a threat to our interests and the interests of our friends in the region. (NSC will draft statement and get State concurrence.)
- Simultaneously, with the issuance of our statement, consultations will begin with the Perm Reps at the UN to see if other major powers, including the Soviets, are prepared to issue comparable statements. (This option is designed to build collective, international pressure on the Iranians; State will begin the consultation process if it is decided to pursue this approach.)
- Consultations with British and French will go forward to determine if the holding of a Foreign Ministers meeting on the war in the UNSC makes sense after the UN Secretary General completes his discussions at the Islamic Summit.
- Consider inviting Shaikh Zaid of the UAE, current head of the GCC, to White House as a way of demonstrating level of concern, commitment and support for our friends in the Gulf. (State follow-up on this.)

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

F96-02 # 22  
dlb, NARA, Date 6/8/00

Military Options

- Redeploy MIDEASTFOR (our naval forces in the Gulf) to the more northern areas in the Gulf; have the LA SALLE, command ship of the force which is currently in the Bab el-Mandab, return to the Gulf and join the remainder of MIDEASTFOR. Redeployment to the north can be done immediately. The LA SALLE will take 4-5 days to join the rest of the forces. (JCS will follow-up.)
- In conjunction with the move of MIDEASTFOR, offer a joint naval exercise (basically, joint steaming) to the Saudis. Offer through Bandar and let him know about the Presidential statement. The statement and the move of MIDEASTFOR to the north respond to Fahd's requests. The offer to have Saudi ships join ours in the north is a reminder that the Saudis should also be contributing to regional defense. (JCS-DOD tasking.)
- To demonstrate that we are prepared to be responsive very quickly, also offer the Saudis the rapid deployment of an F-15 TacAir Squadron to Dhahran. Depending on the level of their fears, the Saudis may decline the offer--but the offer itself will be reassuring about the level of our commitment and willingness and ability to act. (DOD follow-up.)
- Have Cutler, our Ambassador in Riyadh, go to the Saudis and inquire about their plans for AWACS orbits during the upcoming Islamic Summit in Kuwait. Given Iranian threats (made both directly and through the Syrians against holding the Summit in Kuwait), augmenting security during the time of the Summit will be very important. (State will follow-up.)
- Consult with the British and French about the possibility of trilateral or bilateral naval exercises in the Gulf. (The British have 3 ships in the Gulf of Oman, the French, 1; State and JCS will follow-up.)
- JCS will look at the availability time-lines, and pros and cons of moving a carrier to the North Arabian Sea. (JCS feels the KENNEDY and VINCENT, both currently in the Med, are not good options; the KITTY HAWK coming from the Pacific could take, if all things go well, 10½ days to get there. Islamic Summit goes on for 10 days.)
- DOD and JCS will assess the pros and cons of selling "Fire-finder Radars" to the Iraqis. (Availability and training time are problems, but the political payoffs,

particularly among moderate Arabs would be high since this is the one item the Iraqis have requested both directly and through King Hussein from us. [REDACTED]

~~REDACTED~~

~~CTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

RESPONDING TO UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S PROPOSALS ON IRAN-IRAQ WAR

BACKGROUND

-- Secretary General proposed 1/17:

- (1) would be useful to hold ministerial-level SC meeting on war;
- (2) agenda for this meeting or preceding SC meetings might include following seven points:
  - (a) create ad hoc body to investigate who was responsible for starting war
  - (b) examine feasibility of providing international protection for merchant shipping in Gulf
  - (c) consider dangers of continued use chemical warfare
  - (d) explore willingness SC members and others to end supply weapons to both belligerents
  - (e) explore ways bringing about truce/return to status quo ante (following consideration a-d)
  - (f) question of reparations
  - (g) harmonize bilateral policies SG members with SC actions

-- SYG travels to Kuwait 1/23 to attend OIC; returns to New York via North Africa early February.

REACTION

- Ministerial-level meeting only useful with extensive preparation.
- Seven points heavily slanted toward Iranian agenda.
- Point two (shipping) would give Soviets opening in Gulf--dangerous precedent requiring full-scale review U.S. policy.
- France, PRC, USSR unlikely see much merit in point four (blocking arms transfers to both belligerents).
- No agenda/discussion will be worthwhile unless both Iran and Iraq, and non-belligerents in Gulf, accept it as realistic basis for peace.

ELEMENTS OF RESPONSE

- State draft response with Armacost on 1/21:
  - consult with UK and France first;
  - inform Secretary General prepared to consider proposals seriously, but crucial that he first test waters at OIC and report back;

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 4 LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SYSTEM II  
90067

3

January 21, 1987

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR COLIN L. POWELL

FROM: DENNIS ROSS *DR*

SUBJECT: Policy Review Group Meeting --  
Iran-Iraq War: U.S. Options,  
January 21, 1987, 4:00 p.m.

Background

There is a general inter-agency consensus on the need to do something to deter or forestall an Iranian victory and to shore up our position with our Arab friends in the Gulf. In that regard, the fears and nervousness of our Gulf friends create an opportunity to restore our credibility if we look responsive. Now is not the time to be seen as temporizing, even as we act to remind our friends and the Iraqis that Iraq's problems in the war are not a function of equipment needs but rather of their inability to use the forces they have effectively.

In the meeting today, we need to consider what steps to take in the next few days and what additional steps may be needed if the situation worsens. Near and longer term steps include a White House statement, diplomatic initiatives, and a variety of military deployments, exercises, arms transfers, etc.

1. White House Statement. There is general support for a statement that calls for an end to the war, deplors the Iranian invasion and reaffirms that any expansion of the war would be seen as posing a threat to U.S. interests. Clarification is needed, however, on the precise timing of the statement and whether any such statement should be linked to the specific announcement of a peace initiative to end the Iran-Iraq war.

2. Diplomatic Initiatives. There does not seem to be great enthusiasm for launching a new peace initiative per se. While such an initiative is seen as desirable, few believe that it can go anywhere, given Iranian attitudes. One option would be to have a Foreign Ministers meeting under the auspices of the UN Security Council. The British and French prefer to wait until

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Declassify on: OADR

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NLS #96-122# 23

BY *dlh* NARA, DATE 6/8/02



the Secretary General returns from his discussions at the Islamic conference before going ahead with this option. The virtue of this approach is that it would permit the President to announce with some fanfare that he is sending the Secretary of State to attend the Foreign Ministers meeting of the Security Council, with the aim of finding a solution to the Iran-Iraq war. The downside of this option is that it would appear to be an empty gesture since previous UN Security Council initiatives on the war have gone nowhere. On top of this, this option would also necessarily inject the Soviets in any such discussions, something we may not want to pursue at this time.

Another option might be to pursue quiet diplomacy with the Paks, Turks, and maybe the Japanese to have them probe the Iranians on a ceasefire and negotiations to end the war. Again, it might go nowhere and wouldn't be public. Nevertheless, it may make sense to be probing possible mediators that have entre with the Iranian leadership.

Other diplomatic options could be geared less to peace initiatives and more toward creating broader international pressure to get the Iranians to draw a halt to their offensive and to the war. Coordination with Europeans, the Indians and others might be considered. The meeting, today, ought to crystallize all our diplomatic options, and get State to provide a number of alternatives.

3. Military arms supplies, exercises, deployments. There is considerable support for an increase in naval presence, joint exercises to include a Tac Air deployment, possible emergency authorization to permit GCC delivery of U.S. munitions to the Iraqis, etc. The option of offering a military advisory team to the Iraqis may also have broad support, though State may express some skepticism about the Iraqi willingness to accept it.

The inter-agency consensus may break down on the issue of how far to tilt toward the Iraqis, with DOD prepared to go further than others in pushing limited equipment sales like the TPQ-37 radars. While the meeting should aim to determine the immediate military steps we will take now and others that we will take if the situation worsens, it probably is not the place to try to resolve the issue of the "tilt".

The broader question of our neutrality and policy toward the region as a whole might be better addressed in an NSPG. The time is right for a reassessment, and any Presidential statement might make more sense after an NSPG is held and announced.

Attachment

Tab A Talking Points

January 22, 1987

4

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR COLIN L. POWELL

FROM: DENNIS ROSS <sup>DR</sup>

SUBJECT: Presidential Statement on Iran-Iraq War

Attached is a revised draft Presidential statement on the war, which has been cleared by State (Dick Murphy and Mike Armacost).

RECOMMENDATION

That you review draft and discuss with Mr. Carlucci.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment

Tab I Draft Presidential Statement

DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON IRAN-IRAQ WAR

The current Iranian assault on Iraqi forces near Basra is a reminder of the terrible suffering and loss which the Iran-Iraq war has brought to the peoples of the Gulf region. The continuation of this bloody struggle remains a subject of deep concern to the United States and to the entire world. It is a war that threatens not only American strategic interests, but also the stability and security of our friends in the region.

As I have emphasized many times, we are determined to help bring the war to the promptest possible negotiated end, without victor or vanquished, leaving intact the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both Iran and Iraq. We cannot but condemn Iranian seizure and occupation of Iraqi territory, and we again call upon the Government of Iran to join the Government of Iraq in seeking a rapid negotiated solution to the conflict. As one means of trying to persuade Iran's leaders to enter negotiations, we are working actively to discourage the transfer of weapons to Iran from any source.

We share the concern of our friends in the Gulf region that the war could spill over and threaten their security. We would regard any such expansion of the war as a major threat to our interests as well as to those of our friends in the region. We remain determined to ensure the free flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. We also remain strongly committed to supporting the individual and collective self-defense of our friends in the Gulf, with whom we have deep and longstanding ties.

Burns

# NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

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87 FEB 28 P12: 12

SYSTEM II  
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SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: \_\_\_\_\_

ACTION OFFICER:                     \*\*FOR RECORD PURPOSES\*\*                     DUE:                     

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| <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo For Carlucci / Powell | <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo Green to Dolan |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Prepare Memo _____                 | to _____   |

### CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS\*

PHONE\* to action officer at ext. \_\_\_\_\_

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- INFORMATION  Green  Pearson  Secretariat
- Rodman  Cockell  \_\_\_\_\_
- Carlucci (advance)  Powell (advance)  \_\_\_\_\_

### COMMENTS

Return to Secretariat

DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON IRAN-IRAQ WAR

The current Iranian assault on Iraqi forces near Basra is a reminder of the terrible suffering and loss which the Iran-Iraq war has brought to the peoples of the Gulf region. The continuation of this bloody struggle remains a subject of deep concern to the United States and to the entire world. It is a war that threatens not only American strategic interests, but also the stability and security of our friends in the region.

As I have emphasized many times, we are determined to help bring the war to the promptest possible negotiated end, without victor or vanquished, leaving intact the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both Iran and Iraq. We cannot but condemn Iranian seizure and occupation of Iraqi territory, and we again call upon the Government of Iran to join the Government of Iraq in seeking a rapid negotiated solution to the conflict.

We share the concern of our friends in the Gulf region that the war could spill over and threaten their security. We would regard any such expansion of the war as a major threat to our interests as well as to those of our friends in the region. We remain determined to ensure the free flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. We also remain strongly committed to supporting the individual and collective self-defense of our friends in the Gulf, with whom we have deep and longstanding ties.

1/22/87, 1000

~~SECRET~~

TALKING POINTS

- Recent Iranian advances on Basra front pose both risks and opportunities for us. All agree on dangers of Iranian victory. But we also have chance to begin to restore credibility with friends in Gulf--if we respond quickly and effectively.
- Now is not time to be seen as temporizing, although we must continue to remind our Gulf friends that they must continue to bear primary burden of self-defense.
- Important that we review together situation on ground and diplomatic/military options available to us. Essential that we set in motion a coherent response.
- Should look today at range of diplomatic options, including UNSYG's proposals, consultations with other mediators, messages of reassurance to King Fahd and Gulf leaders, and a possible White House statement reaffirming our position on ending the war.
- Also need consider short- and medium-term military options, including augmentation of U.S. naval pressure in and near the Gulf, use of emergency authority to meet GCC equipment needs and more support/advice for Iraq.

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BY dlb NARA, DATE 6/8/00

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-2-

- At this point, like to ask Dick Kerr to provide us an update on the fighting.
  
- [Later, depending on the discussion, might conclude by noting an NSPG should be held soon to reassess our broader policy toward the war and the Gulf.]

~~SECRET~~

IRAN-IRAQ SITUATION 5

Diplomatic Moves

-- Issue Presidential statement after consultation with Perm Reps at UN. Efforts will be made to get Perm Rep Heads of State to make similar statements, including Soviet Union. (Attached)

-- Consider inviting Sheik Zaid, Head of United Arab Emirates and Gulf Cooperation Council to Washington for an official visit.

Military Presence Options

a. Do Now:

-- Move four ships of Mid-East Force further north into the Gulf.

-- Flagship LaSalle to join Mid-East Force in 4-5 days.

-- Offer Saudis an opportunity to conduct a Passing Exercise with Mid-East Force.

-- Ask UK (3 ships) and France (1 ship) to sortie with Mid-East Force.

-- Offer Saudis a U. S. F-15 squadron for a deployment training exercise in the Kingdom.

-- Ask Saudis to consider shifting AWACS coverage to cover the site of Islamic Conference in Kuwait.

b. Other Options Being Examined

-- Deploy KITTY HAWK from Western Pacific to North Arabian Sea (10 1/2 days).


-- Examine pros and cons of selling TPQ-37 Counterfire Radars to Iraq.

-- Offer to Iraq, through Jordan, technical and tactical military advice.

MFR:  
I BRIEFED TO RR, VP,  
DR, FC AT 1040, 22 JAN 81.  
RR READ AND ACKNOWLEDGED.

Declassify on OADR

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BY dlb NARA, DATE 6/6/00

  
22 JAN 81



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

7

WB  
Chron

February 19, 1987

SECRET

TO: Robert Pelletreau  
FROM: Robert Oakley

Attached are a few general ideas that you might find useful in preparing an agenda for Monday's meeting. We ought to try to pull together the elements of a broader strategy, as well as review progress of contingency talks.

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BY db, NARA, DATE 6/8/1990

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 23, 1987

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR FRANK C. CARLUCCI

FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY *RO*

SUBJECT: Operation Staunch

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to participants in the February 12 NSPG, reiterating the President's commitment to Operation Staunch. It will serve as a useful reminder as the Administration seeks to re-energize the effort.

The Presidential statement on the Iran-Iraq war and the threat to the Gulf that State has drafted underscores the importance of Staunch. (Advance copy for your information at Tab II; State will send over formal draft tonight.) We will also stress to UNSC Permanent Members this week the President's commitment to Staunch and the need to consider a U.N.-backed arms embargo against Iran if it continues to refuse a ceasefire and a negotiated settlement. (Draft cable FYI at Tab III; final version to follow from State).

Steve Danzansky and Bob Dean concur. *SD*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment

- Tab I Memo to Participants
- Tab II Draft Presidential Statement
- Tab III Draft Cable

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NLS F96-122 # 27

BY dh NARA, DATE 6/8/00

DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT

On January 23, while the Iranian assault against Iraqi forces was especially intense, I reiterated the deep concern of the United States at the suffering and instability which the Iran-Iraq war has brought to the Gulf region. Since that time, although Iraq has stopped the Iranian attack east of Basra and pushed it back somewhat, the fighting in this tragic conflict has continued on the ground, in the air, and at sea.

Clearly, the peoples of the region cannot rest secure until there is a negotiated end to the conflict. We have frequently called on Iran's leaders to join in working toward a negotiated settlement, as the Iraqis have repeatedly offered to do. Regrettably, the Iranian government has so far proved unresponsive in the face of all efforts to encourage reason and restraint in its war policy. It has also persisted in its efforts to subvert its neighbors through terrorism and intimidation.

We continue to work for a settlement that will preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both Iran and Iraq. To help bring Iran into negotiations toward that goal, we will continue with our vigorous efforts to persuade the international community not to provide weapons to Iran for the prosecution of the war. Secretary Shultz has recently named Under Secretary-designate Ed Derwinski to be responsible for this government-wide effort. He and his mission have my full confidence and backing.

As I emphasized in January, this conflict threatens America's strategic interests, as well as the stability and security of all our friends in the region. We remain strongly committed to supporting the self-defense of our friends in the region, and recently moved naval forces in the Persian Gulf to underpin that commitment. We also remain strongly committed to ensuring the free flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. Finally, we are determined to help bring the war to the earliest possible negotiated end. With that goal in mind we believe ~~the international community should call for an~~ *There should be* ~~immediate cessation of hostilities,~~ *negotiation, withdrawal to borders,* and be prepared, in the appropriate forum and through the appropriate mechanisms, to impose an arms embargo on either or both participants in the war should either refuse to heed this call.

NEA/NGA:GLBerry;APBurleigh 2/21/87 version

Wang 1841Z

Clearances:

NSC:ROakley;DRoss (this version includes NSC proposed language)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
 THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
 THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
 THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE  
 THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
 THE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Operation Staunch (S)

The President was very pleased to hear at the February 12 National Security Planning Group Meeting on the Middle East that you and your staffs are vigorously pursuing Operation Staunch. He urges that you continue your efforts, which are a crucial part of our general strategy for helping to bring the Iran-Iraq war to the earliest possible negotiated end. It will be important for our credibility in approaching foreign governments for the State Department to provide an assessment of what is being done to prohibit the export of weapons or spare parts to Iran from this country. The Justice and Treasury Departments should provide State with a comprehensive review of our efforts by March 31, 1987. (S)

cc: Vice President  
 Chairman, JCS

SECRET

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 BY dh, NARA, DATE 6/8/00

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NSC:

NEA: MVCREEKMORE; EDJEREJIAN  
IO: NSSMITH; INR: MIABRAMOWITZ  
PM: PHUGHES  
S/S: S/S-0:

IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD, BEIJING IMMEDIATE, LONDON IMMEDIATE, MOSCOW  
IMMEDIATE, PARIS IMMEDIATE, USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE  
IMMEDIATE BONN, ROME IMMEDIATE, TOKYO IMMEDIATE

EXDIS FOR AMBASSADORS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, UNSC, IR, IZ

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL DECISION: PRESSING FOR U.N.  
ACTION ON THE GULF WAR

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

1. THE PRESIDENT HAS DETERMINED THAT THE UNITED STATES  
WILL PRESS FOR SUPPORT FROM THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE  
UN SECURITY COUNCIL FOR A RESOLUTION DEMANDING A  
CEASE-FIRE IN THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, A WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES  
TO THE BORDERS AS OF AUGUST 1980, AND RELATED ACTIONS TO  
END THE WAR, ALL WITHIN A REASONABLE, WELL-DEFINED  
TIMETABLE. WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF SUCH A RESOLUTION, WE  
ARE PREPARED TO INCLUDE PROPOSALS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT  
OF A U.N. INVESTIGATIVE MECHANISM OF SOME SORT, TO  
INVESTIGATE THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR AS WELL AS THE CREATION  
OF AN ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION FUND FOR BOTH COUNTRIES.

3. THE U.S., WHICH AS A MATTER OF POLICY DOES NOT  
TRANSFER MUNITIONS LIST ITEMS TO EITHER PARTY TO THE  
CONFLICT, WOULD SUPPORT MANDATORY ACTION BY THE UNSC  
UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE UN CHARTER TO PLACE A FORMAL  
ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST EITHER PARTY THAT REFUSES TO ABIDE  
BY A UNSC RESOLUTION CAST IN THE ABOVE TERMS. THE

MHA

GLBA

APB

MVC/ED

ZK; GS

NSS; MIA

MGK; CTR

PH

NSC:

S/S:

S/S-0:

DECLASSIFIED

F96-122 #29

NLS

BY

dlb

NARA, DATE

6/8/08

SECRET

PRESIDENT WILL SHORTLY ISSUE A PUBLIC STATEMENT RENEWING THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO DISCOURAGE THE FLOW OF WEAPONS FROM ALL SOURCES TO IRAN, THE INTRANSIGENT PARTY IN THE CONFLICT. AS HE DID IN HIS JANUARY 23 STATEMENT ON THE GULF WAR, THE PRESIDENT WILL ALSO RESTATE U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE SELF-DEFENSE OF OUR FRIENDS IN THE GULF REGION.

4. ACTION ADDRESSEES (EXCEPT BAGHDAD AND USUN): PLEASE APPROACH HOST GOVERNMENTS OF ALL PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AT A SENIOR LEVEL TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- ON JANUARY 23, AT A TIME WHEN FIGHTING BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ WAS ESPECIALLY INTENSE, PRESIDENT REAGAN ISSUED A STATEMENT REITERATING DEEP U.S. CONCERN AT THE SUFFERING AND INSTABILITY BROUGHT BY THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR.

--EVEN EARLIER IN JANUARY, THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, SPURRED BY THE IRANIAN THREAT TO BASRA AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S CALL FOR MORE EFFECTIVE ACTION BY THE COUNCIL, BEGAN TO CONSIDER SERIOUSLY ADOPTING A STRONG RESOLUTION ORDERING A CEASE-FIRE, TIED TO AN EARLY WITHDRAWAL TO PRE-WAR BOUNDARIES.

-- SINCE THAT TIME, IRAQ HAS BLOCKED THE IRANIAN ATTACK EAST OF BASRA, PUSHING IT BACK TO SOME DEGREE. AS A RESULT THE SENSE OF URGENCY FOR SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION SEEMS TO HAVE FADED. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS RELAXATION IS A SERIOUS ERROR. FIGHTING IS CONTINUING ON THE GROUND, IN THE AIR, AND AT SEA. MANY MILITARY ANALYSTS EXPECT RENewed IRANIAN ATTACKS IN THE RELATIVELY NEAR FUTURE.

-- CLEARLY, THE BEST HOPE FOR SECURITY IN THE GULF REGION LIES IN AN IMMEDIATE END TO THE CONFLICT. PRESIDENT REAGAN PLANS TO ISSUE A NEW STATEMENT SHORTLY CALLING FOR AN IMMEDIATE SETTLEMENT OF THE WAR AND REAFFIRMING HIS BACKING FOR OPERATION STAUNCH, THE U.S. EFFORT TO INHIBIT ARMS RESUPPLY TO IRAN--THE RECALCITRANT PARTY IN THE WAR. WE WOULD WELCOME SIMILAR STATEMENTS FROM THE CAPITALS OF THE UNSC PERMANENT MEMBERS.

-- MOREOVER, WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS TIME FOR THE UNSC TO TAKE FORMAL, EFFECTIVE ACTION TO SEEK A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT AND PERSUADE IRAN TO CHANGE ITS POLICY ON THE WAR. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS FREQUENTLY CALLED FOR A NEGOTIATED END TO THE FIGHTING, BUT IRAN HAS SO FAR REFUSED TO JOIN IRAQ IN WORKING TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS.

-- WE ARE APPROACHING ALL THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UNSC TO URGE THAT THEY SUPPORT A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION DEMANDING A CEASE-FIRE IN THE TRAN-IRAQ WAR, A WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES TO THE BORDERS AS OF AUGUST 1980, AND RELATED ACTIONS TO END THE WAR, WITHIN A REASONABLE, WELL-DEFINED TIMETABLE. WE ARE PREPARED, IN PRINCIPLE, TO INCLUDE IN THE RESOLUTION PROPOSALS TO ESTABLISH A U.N. INVESTIATIVE MECHANISM TO STUDY THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR AS WELL AS CALL FOR A POST-WAR ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION FUND FOR BOTH COUNTRIES.

--FOR SUCH A RESOLUTION TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY BY THE BELLIGERENTS, ESPECIALLY IRAN, THEY MUST BE MADE TO UNDERSTAND CLEARLY THAT THE COUNCIL IS PREPARED TO BACK UP THE RESOLUTION WITH SEVERE SANCTIONS AGAINST ANY PARTY THAT FAILS TO HEED IT. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT AN ARMS EMBARGO WOULD BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE SANCTION.

--WE RECOGNIZE THE PROBLEMS OF ENFORCEMENT, BUT ARE CONFIDENT THAT WITH THE COOPERATION OF THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL THESE CAN BE SUBSTANTIALLY OVERCOME. THE PRESIDENT HAS REDOUBLED OUR EFFORTS ON STAINCH. WE THEREFORE BELIEVE THAT AN ARMS EMBARGO SHOULD BE AN INTEGRAL PART OF EARLY ACTION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE UN CHARTER.

-- GOOD EARLY PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE AMONG THE FIVE PERMANENT COUNCIL MEMBERS IN NEW YORK IN STUDYING THIS ISSUE. WE NOW ASK THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT TAKE THIS PROPOSAL FOR AN SC RESOLUTION UNDER CONSIDERATION AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS. WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE MUST NOT WAIT FOR ANOTHER BLOODLETTING, WHICH COULD HAVE FARREACHING CONSEQUENCES, BEFORE WE TAKE EFFECTIVE ACTION. WE, THE MAJOR POWERS, MUST ACT TO REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH A TRAGEDY, WHICH COULD BE PROFOUNDLY DESTABILIZING IN THE REGION.

5. FOR BAGHDAD AND USUN: DRAWING ON THE ABOVE TALKING POINTS AS APPROPRIATE, PLEASE LET THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT KNOW THAT WE ARE APPROACHING THE PERMANENT MEMBERS TO PRESS FOR AN EFFECTIVE UNSC RESOLUTION. PLEASE SOLICIT IRAQI COMMENTS ON THE TERMS WHICH WE ARE PROPOSING FOR SUCH A RESOLUTION. USUN AT ITS DISCRETION MAY ALSO INFORM THE SECRETARIAT AS WELL AS DELEGATIONS OF OTHER PERMANENT SC MEMBERS OF OUR APPROACH TO THEIR GOVERNMENTS.

1. MOSCOW AND BAGHDAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. YYY/Y YYY  
YYY/Y



~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

1158

*Corrected copy*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE  
THE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Operation Staunch (S)

The President was very pleased to hear at the February 12 National Security Planning Group Meeting on the Middle East that you and your staffs are vigorously pursuing Operation Staunch. He urges that you continue your efforts, which are a crucial part of our general strategy for helping to bring the Iran-Iraq war to the earliest possible negotiated end. It will be important for our credibility in approaching foreign governments for the State Department to provide an assessment of what is being done to prohibit the export of weapons or spare parts to Iran from this country. The Justice and Treasury Departments should provide State with a comprehensive review of our efforts by March 31, 1987. (S)

cc: Vice President  
Chairman, JCS

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F96 722 #30

BY dlb, NARA, DATE 6/8/00

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508  
February 25, 1987

9

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR FRANK C. CARLUCCI

FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY *RO*

SUBJECT: Presidential Statement on Iran-Iraq War

State's proposed Presidential statement (Tab A) is an important part of our current strategy for bolstering our friends in the Gulf. Building on the President's statement of January 23, and responding to the President's request at the February 12 NSPG to do more for Iraq, the attached draft underscores our commitment to Operation Staunch. It also makes clear our determination to push for a broader internationally-sanctioned arms embargo if Iran continues to refuse a ceasefire and a negotiated settlement. It states our opposition to Iran's use of terrorism and subversion and our support for the Gulf states and freedom of navigation in the Gulf.

As part of our diplomatic strategy, State sent out a cable yesterday pressing UNSC permanent members to support a resolution with teeth in it -- demanding a ceasefire and a negotiated end to the war, backed up by the threat of a formal UN arms embargo against whichever belligerent refuses to cooperate. Meanwhile, contingency planning talks with a member of Gulf countries are moving ahead smoothly. Our next set of discussions will focus primarily on threats for neutral shipping in the Gulf, an increasingly serious problem in light of improved Iranian targetting capability -- especially against Kuwaiti vessels -- and the establishment of SILKWORM missile sites on the Iranian side of the Strait of Hormuz. The memo for participants in last week's NSPG on the Middle East, urging a renewal commitment for Staunch, is another part of the strategy.

It is very important that we issue the attached statement today, before the Tower Commission report is issued. Any delay will only undercut our interest in requiring the initiative, and deepen the perception that our actions are simply reactive.

RECOMMENDATION

That you review the statement (Tab A) with the President and instruct that it be issued today.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 996-122 #31

BY dlb NARA, DATE 6/8/00

DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT

*draft  
N N statement*

On January 23, while the Iranian assault against Iraqi forces was especially intense, I reiterated the deep concern of the United States at the suffering and instability which the Iran-Iraq war has brought to the Gulf region. Since that time, although Iraq has stopped the Iranian attack east of Basra and pushed it back somewhat, the fighting in this tragic conflict has continued on the ground, in the air, and at sea.

Clearly, the peoples of the region cannot rest secure until there is a negotiated end to the conflict. We have frequently called on Iran's leaders to join in working toward a negotiated settlement, as the Iraqis have repeatedly offered to do. Regrettably, the Iranian government has so far proved unresponsive in the face of all efforts to encourage reason and restraint in its war policy. It has also persisted in its efforts to subvert its neighbors through terrorism and intimidation.

We continue to work for a settlement that will preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both Iran and Iraq. Toward that end, I have asked Secretary of State Shultz to take the lead in helping to bring Iran into negotiations. Secretary Shultz [~~in turn~~] has recently named Under Secretary-designate Ed Derwinski to be responsible for our Operation Staunch.

*This effort has my full support.*

*on international effort*

SECRET

-2-  

Attachment

Tab A - Proposed Presidential Statement

SECRET

SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
SECRETARIAT

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PAGE 01

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RUENDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0000  
INFO RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUFNFO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 0000  
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0000

<SUBJ> SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL DECISION: PRESSING FOR U.N.  
ACTION ON THE GULF WAR

~~SECRET~~ STATE 054487  
EXDIS FOR AMBASSADORS  
E.O.-12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, UNSC, IR, IZ  
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL DECISION: PRESSING FOR U.N.  
ACTION ON THE GULF WAR

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THE PRESIDENT HAS DETERMINED THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL PRESS FOR SUPPORT FROM THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL FOR A RESOLUTION DEMANDING A CEASE-FIRE IN THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, A WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES TO THE BORDERS AS OF AUGUST 1980, AND RELATED ACTIONS TO END THE WAR, ALL WITHIN A REASONABLE, WELL-DEFINED TIMETABLE. WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF SUCH A RESOLUTION, WE ARE PREPARED TO INCLUDE PROPOSALS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A U.N. INVESTIGATIVE MECHANISM OF SOME SORT, TO INVESTIGATE THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR AS WELL AS THE CREATION OF AN ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION FUND FOR BOTH COUNTRIES.
3. THE U.S., MUCH AS A MATTER OF POLICY DOES NOT TRANSFER MUNITIONS LIST ITEMS TO EITHER PARTY TO THE CONFLICT, WOULD SUPPORT MANDATORY ACTION BY THE UNSC UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE UN CHARTER TO PLACE A FORMAL ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST EITHER PARTY THAT REFUSES TO ABIDE BY A UNSC RESOLUTION CAST IN THE ABOVE TERMS. THE PRESIDENT WILL SHORTLY ISSUE A PUBLIC STATEMENT RENEWING THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO DISCOURAGE THE FLOW OF WEAPONS FROM ALL SOURCES TO IRAN, THE INTRANSIGENT PARTY IN THE CONFLICT. AS HE DID IN HIS JANUARY 23 STATEMENT ON THE GULF WAR, THE PRESIDENT WILL ALSO RESTATE U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE SELF-DEFENSE OF OUR FRIENDS IN THE GULF REGION.
4. ACTION ADDRESSEES (EXCEPT BAGHDAD AND USUN): PLEASE APPROACH HOST GOVERNMENTS OF ALL PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AT A SENIOR LEVEL TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:  
-- ON JANUARY 23, AT A TIME WHEN FIGHTING BETWEEN IRAH AND IRAQ WAS ESPECIALLY INTENSE, PRESIDENT REAGAN ISSUED A STATEMENT REITERATING DEEP U.S. CONCERN AT THE SUFFERING AND INSTABILITY BROUGHT BY THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR.  
--EVEN EARLIER IN JANUARY, THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE

PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, SPURRED BY THE IRANIAN THREAT TO BASRA AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S CALL FOR MORE EFFECTIVE ACTION BY THE COUNCIL, BEGAN TO CONSIDER SERIOUSLY ADOPTING A STRONG RESOLUTION ORDERING A CEASE-FIRE, TIED TO AN EARLY WITHDRAWAL TO PRE-WAR BOUNDARIES.

-- SINCE THAT TIME, IRAQ HAS BLOCKED THE IRANIAN ATTACK EAST OF BASRA, PUSHING IT BACK TO SOME DEGREE. AS A RESULT THE SENSE OF URGENCY FOR SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION SEEMS TO HAVE FADED. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS RELAXATION IS

A SERIOUS ERROR. FIGHTING IS CONTINUING ON THE GROUND, IN THE AIR, AND AT SEA. MANY MILITARY ANALYSTS EXPECT RENEWED IRANIAN ATTACKS IN THE RELATIVELY NEAR FUTURE.  
-- CLEARLY, THE BEST HOPE FOR SECURITY IN THE GULF REGION LIES IN AN IMMEDIATE END TO THE CONFLICT. PRESIDENT REAGAN PLANS TO ISSUE A NEW STATEMENT SHORTLY CALLING FOR AN IMMEDIATE SETTLEMENT OF THE WAR AND REAFFIRMING HIS BACKING FOR OPERATION STAUDCH, THE U.S. EFFORT TO INHIBIT ARMS RESUPPLY TO IRAN--THE RECALCITRANT PARTY IN THE WAR. WE WOULD WELCOME SIMILAR STATEMENTS FROM THE CAPITALS OF THE UNSC PERMANENT MEMBERS.

-- MOREOVER, WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS TIME FOR THE UNSC TO TAKE FORMAL, EFFECTIVE ACTION TO SEEK A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT AND PERSUADE IRAN TO CHANGE ITS POLICY ON THE WAR. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS FREQUENTLY CALLED FOR A NEGOTIATED END TO THE FIGHTING, BUT IRAN HAS SO FAR REFUSED TO JOIN IRAQ IN WORKING TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS.  
-- WE ARE APPROACHING ALL THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UNSC TO URGE THAT THEY SUPPORT A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION DEMANDING A CEASE-FIRE IN THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, A WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES TO THE BORDERS AS OF AUGUST 1980, AND RELATED ACTIONS TO END THE WAR, WITHIN A REASONABLE, WELL-DEFINED TIMETABLE. WE ARE PREPARED, IN PRINCIPLE, TO INCLUDE IN THE RESOLUTION PROPOSALS TO ESTABLISH A U.N. INVESTIGATIVE MECHANISM TO STUDY THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR AS WELL AS CALL FOR A POST-WAR ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION FUND FOR BOTH COUNTRIES.

--FOR SUCH A RESOLUTION TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY BY THE BELLIGERENTS, ESPECIALLY IRAN, THEY MUST BE MADE TO UNDERSTAND CLEARLY THAT THE COUNCIL IS PREPARED TO BACK UP THE RESOLUTION WITH SEVERE SANCTIONS AGAINST ANY PARTY THAT FAILS TO HEED IT. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT AN ARMS EMBARGO WOULD BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE SANCTION.

--WE RECOGNIZE THE PROBLEMS OF ENFORCEMENT, BUT ARE CONFIDENT THAT WITH THE COOPERATION OF THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL THESE CAN BE SUBSTANTIALLY OVERCOME. THE PRESIDENT HAS REDOUBLED OUR EFFORTS ON STAUDCH. WE THEREFORE BELIEVE THAT AN ARMS EMBARGO SHOULD BE AN INTEGRAL PART OF EARLY ACTION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE UN CHARTER.

-- GOOD EARLY PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE AMONG THE FIVE PERMANENT COUNCIL MEMBERS IN NEW YORK IN STUDYING THIS ISSUE. WE NOW ASK THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT TAKE THIS PROPOSAL FOR AN SC RESOLUTION UNDER CONSIDERATION AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS. WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE MUST NOT WAIT FOR ANOTHER BLOODLETTING, WHICH COULD HAVE FARREACHING CONSEQUENCES, BEFORE WE TAKE EFFECTIVE ACTION. WE, THE MAJOR POWERS, MUST ACT TO REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH A TRAGEDY, WHICH COULD BE PROFOUNDLY DESTABILIZING IN THE

REGION.

5. FOR BAGHDAD AND USUN: DRAWING ON THE ABOVE TALKING POINTS AS APPROPRIATE, PLEASE LET THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT KNOW THAT WE ARE APPROACHING THE PERMANENT MEMBERS TO PRESS FOR AN EFFECTIVE UNSC RESOLUTION. PLEASE SOLICIT IRAQI COMMENTS ON THE TERMS WHICH WE ARE PROPOSING FOR SUCH A RESOLUTION. USUN AT ITS DISCRETION MAY ALSO INFORM THE SECRETARIAT AS WELL AS DELEGATIONS OF OTHER PERMANENT SC MEMBERS OF OUR APPROACH TO THEIR GOVERNMENTS.
6. MOSCOW AND BAGHDAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. SHULTZ

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 4487 <TOR> 870225170813 MSG000162500091

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F96 722 # 32

BY dlb, NARA, DATE 6/8/00

SECRET

March 19, 1987

*11*

*wB  
Chron*

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR FRANK C. CARLUCCI

FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY

SUBJECT: NSPG on Gulf Policy: Monday, March 23, 1987,  
2:00 - 3:00 p.m., Situation Room

Attached is a memorandum and brief opening remarks for the President, and talking points for your use in launching the discussion. We are on the right track in our Gulf policy, although we continue to face difficult problems. The purpose of this meeting is to review our recent diplomatic and military efforts, reinforce the interagency consensus that now underpins our approach to the Iran-Iraq war and Gulf security, and help keep us on track in the weeks ahead.

Bill Cockell concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
  - Tab A Agenda
  - Tab B List of Participants
  - Tab C Opening Remarks for the President
- Tab II Talking Points for Mr. Carlucci

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F96 722 #33  
BY dlb, NARA, DATE 6/8/00

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP

DATE: March 23, 1987  
LOCATION: Situation Room  
TIME: 2:00 - 3:00 p.m.  
  
FROM: FRANK C. CARLUCCI

I. PURPOSE

To review status of our efforts to end Iran-Iraq war and bolster security of our friends in the Gulf.

II. BACKGROUND

Since last month's NSPG meeting on the Middle East, we have continued to move steadily and surely in pursuit of our main objectives in the Gulf: (1) increased efforts to bring the Iran-Iraq war to an early negotiated end; (2) helping our friends in the Gulf defend themselves; (3) ensuring continued free flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz; and (4) preventing expansion of Soviet influence. This meeting provides a good opportunity to review diplomatic and military efforts, hear a report of Admiral Crowe's trip to the Gulf, and discuss how best to keep our policy on track now that it is paying off.

Iran-Iraq War

The Iraqis have at least temporarily stabilized their southern front and won a breathing space while the Iranians regroup. Your public statement on February 25 condemning Iranian seizure of Iraqi territory and calling for an early negotiated end to the war has been well-received in Baghdad, as have our efforts in the Security Council. We have also been doing what we can to bolster Iraq, within the limits of our policy against supplying weapons. For example, the Exim Bank is considering restoration of short-term credit insurance for Iraq, which would help the Iraqis shore up their financial position. Meanwhile, we have re-energized Operation Staunch, as you instructed.

SECRET

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BY dlb, NARA, DATE 1/8/00

Our efforts to produce a U.N. Security Council resolution with teeth in it have met with resistance from other permanent members. Nevertheless, we will continue to push at the U.N. and elsewhere for concerted international action to end the war, in hopes that we can reinforce bilateral actions (such as Operation Staunch), show Iraq and other Gulf States where we stand, and lay the groundwork for future action if an opening for negotiations develops. John Whitehead and Dick Murphy are planning trips to Baghdad and other Gulf states next month to underscore our commitment to stand firm vs. Iran, end the war, and help our friends.

#### Bolstering the Gulf States and Protection of Shipping

The Gulf states have been shaken for several months by Iranian battlefield successes against Iraq, increased Iranian attacks against neutral shipping in the Gulf (particularly Kuwaiti vessels), and continuing Iranian intimidation through terrorism and subversion. At the same time, the Iran/Contra affair has undercut trust in us and reinforced suspicion that we were bent on cultivating non-Arab powers in the Middle East (Israel and Iran) at the expense of moderate Arabs. As a result, some Gulf states have been exploring the value of closer relationships with the Europeans and the Soviets, hedging their bets on reliance upon the U.S.

We are taking a number of measures to reassure the Gulf Arabs of our reliability and commitment to their self-defense, following on your February 25 statement. We have responded positively to Kuwait's request to protect its shipping in the Gulf, making clear that we believe that this should eliminate the need for Soviet involvement (which had been tentatively agreed before we responded). Bill Crowe reinforced this point in his talks in Kuwait last week. Meanwhile, we are continuing contingency planning talks on a range of threat scenarios with Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia. We are also consulting the British on ways in which we can work together to enhance Gulf security.

Iranian deployment of the Chinese-origin "Silkworm" surface-to-surface missile at the Strait of Hormuz is potentially a very serious threat to free world shipping. The Silkworm is capable of sinking tankers across the entire width of the Strait of Hormuz at its narrowest point. We have protested vigorously to Iran and asked a number of other governments to join us in warning Iran against any attempt to block free passage through the Strait. We are prepared to act militarily should this become necessary.



Our package of limited arms sales to Gulf states is moving along fairly smoothly on the Hill. We have taken pains to emphasize to Congress that these sales are in no way "compensation" for the Iran affair, nor are they an effort to take advantage of strains in the U.S.-Israeli relationship. They are simply a signal of our continuing, long-standing commitment to the self-defense of friends with legitimate needs. We will need to continue intensive consultations with Congress to ensure that misunderstandings on this score are kept to a minimum.

III. PARTICIPANTS

List at Tab B.

IV. PRESS PLAN

No press plan.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

I suggest that you open the meeting with a few remarks on the importance of moving ahead steadily and consistently in our Gulf policy, drawing on the talking points at Tab C. I will then review the agenda for the meeting and begin the discussion.

Attachments

Tab A	Agenda
Tab B	List of Participants
Tab C	Opening Statement (Presidential)

SECRET

OPENING REMARKS FOR THE PRESIDENT

- Pleased that we have put our policy back on track in Gulf.
  
- Series of actions taken on Gulf issues since last NSPG already showing that we have a coherent policy and are pursuing it consistently.
  
- Still face real threats from Iranians and Soviets, both of whom trying to take advantage of our past problems.
  
- Need to be patient and stay on firm, steady, active course. That's best way--only way--to reassure our friends and help end Iran-Iraq war.
  
- Want to hear about Crowe's visit.

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F96 122 #35  
BY dlk NARA, DATE 6/8/00

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OPENING REMARKS FOR THE PRESIDENT FOR THE  
NSPG ON GULF POLICY, MARCH 23, 1987, 2:00 P.M.

- PLEASED POLICY BACK ON TRACK IN GULF.  
ACTIONS ALREADY SHOWING COHERENT POLICY...  
PURSUING IT CONSISTENTLY.
  
- STILL FACE REAL THREATS FROM IRANIANS AND  
SOVIETS, BOTH OF WHOM TRYING TAKE  
ADVANTAGE OF OUR PAST PROBLEMS.
  
- NEED TO BE PATIENT AND STAY ON FIRM,  
STEADY, ACTIVE COURSE.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 196-122 #36

BY AK, NARA, DATE 6/8/00

SECRET

TALKING POINTS FOR CARLUCCI

- As President said, we are back on right track in Gulf.  
Purpose of this meeting is to review our diplomatic and military efforts and maintain consistent, coherent approach.  
Eager to hear first hand from Crowe.
  
- Our response over past couple months has been steady, cohesive and effective, not flashy:
  - o Presidential statements well-received in Gulf, followed by concrete actions.
  - o Stronger U.S. behind-the-scene efforts at UN Security Council helpful.
  - o Naval movements, contingency planning talks, Bill Crowe's trip reassured friends.
  - o Offer naval protection for Kuwaiti shipping.
  - o Warning to Iran on Silkworm.
  - o Gulf arms sales moving toward Congressional approval.
  - o Reaffirmation of Operation Staunch being watched closely to see effect (e.g., on PRC).
  
- Still face difficult problems in Gulf:
  - o Friends intimidated by Iran's battlefield successes, continued use terror and subversion.

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NLS 99b 722 #37  
BY dlb NARA, DATE 6/18/02

- o Increase in Iranian attacks on neutral shipping, especially Kuwaiti vessels but also Saudi ships (first time in six months).
- o Silkworm missiles at Strait of Hormuz potential threat to shipping, free flow oil.
- o Soviets obviously eager to exploit our recent troubles and expand their presence, influence--military, economic (oil), and political.

-- Need continue pull together, keep up good work in weeks ahead. What do you see as next steps? (FYI: These include:

- o Next round contingency planning talks with Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain.
- o Consult with British on protection of Gulf shipping.
- o Work out details of arrangement with Kuwait.
- o Keep security assistance package on track on Hill.
- o Continue UNSC consultations on ending Iran-Iraq war.
- o Operation Staunch.
- o Bolster Iraq economically and diplomatically.
- o Whitehead/Murphy trip to Baghdad, Gulf states.

End FYI).

-- Like to ask Dick Kerr to lead off with intelligence assessment, including summary of problems which we need to overcome.

-- Points to Bring Out During Discussion:

- o Where do we stand on Staunch (Shultz and PRC)? What more can we do ourselves? and with others?
- o Any new ideas on how to energize UNSC and/or make our position more visible?
- o What are prospects for U.S.-U.K. cooperation in protection of shipping? Will other Gulf states need/request protection?
- o What should Whitehead/Murphy aim to achieve?
- o Military planning for Silkworm. How have Allies reacted to our request that they reinforce our warning to Iran over Silkworms?

-- Summary: Review next steps noted above. Make pitch for continued close coordination, and for continued series of inter-related, realistic actions.

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.