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Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 10/27/2015

File Folder USSR (7/9/81-7/13/81)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 21

SKINNER

199

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
170090	MEMO	R. ALLEN TO REAGAN RE HAIG'S MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN	1	7/9/1981	B1
170091	MEMO	HAIG TO REAGAN RE 7/2/81 MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN	2	7/7/1981	B1
170092	MEMO	R. ALLEN TO REAGAN RE REPORT	1	7/10/1981	B1
	R	1/13/2012 CREST NLR-748-21-34-3-4			
170093	REPORT	RE SIBERIAN PIPELINE (INCL. COVER MEMO)	7	7/9/1981	B1
	PAR	10/8/2010 CREST NLR-748-21-34-4-3			
170094	CABLE	MOSCOW 9654	6	7/10/1981	B1
170095	MEMO	R. ALLEN TO REAGAN RE HAIG MEMO	1	7/10/1981	B1
170096	MEMO	HAIG TO REAGAN RE SECOND SOVIET DEMARCHE	2	7/7/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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170097	DEMARCHE	FROM DOBRYNIN	3	7/2/1981	B1
170098	MEMO	R. PIPES TO ALLEN RE HAIG'S MEMO TO PRESIDENT	1	7/7/1981	B1
170099	MEMO	R. ALLEN TO REAGAN RE MEMO FROM HAIG	1	7/13/1981	B1
170100	MEMO	HAIG TO REAGAN RE NEGOTIATIONS	2	7/7/1981	B1

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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DECLASSIFIED

July 7, 1981

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

ACTIONBy ROB NARA, Date 10/27/15

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: RICHARD PIPES ^{RP}

SUBJECT: Haig's Meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin

At Tab I is a self-explanatory memorandum to the President transmitting Secretary Haig's report on his meeting with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on July 2. Haig's memorandum is at Tab A. (S)

No comments from Stearman, Bailey, Lilley, Kemp and Gregg.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Your memorandum to the President
 Tab A Haig's memorandum to the President.

~~SECRET~~

Derivative from State
 Review July 6, 2001.

#4064

ED

81 JUL 8 P 1: 25

JANET COLSON

jc 81

BUD NANCE

[initials]

DICK ALLEN

DA 9/11/20

IRENE DERUS

id 9/13/48

JANET COLSON

jc

BUD NANCE

[initials]

KAY

[initials]

CY TO VP

[initials]

SHOW CC

CY TO MEESE

[initials]

SHOW CC

CY TO BAKER

[initials]

SHOW CC

CY TO DEEVER

[initials]

SHOW CC

CY TO BRADY

[initials]

SHOW CC

ED

81 JUL 7 P 3: 02

JANET COLSON
 BUD NANCE
 DICK ALLEN
 IRENE DERUS
 JANET COLSON
 BUD NANCE
 KAY
 CY TO VP
 CY TO MEESE
 CY TO BAKER
 CY TO DEEVER
 CY TO BRADY

je 7/1506

*To Secretariat
 for staffing
 je has copy*

SHOW CC _____
 SHOW CC _____
 SHOW CC _____
 SHOW CC _____
 SHOW CC _____

ACED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES
10/27/15 EOB

RECEIVED 07 JUL 81 15

7

TO PRES

FROM HAIG, A

DOCDATE 07 JUL 81

URGENT

KEYWORDS: USSR AFGHANISTAN DOBRYNIN, ANATOLY
POLAND CM
KAMPUCHEA

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF HAIG MTG W/ AMB DOBRYNIN ON 2 JUL

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR ALLEN DUE: 07 JUL 81 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION	FOR COMMENT	FOR INFO
PIPES	STEARMAN BAILEY - N.C. LILLEY	KEMP COLSON LENZ GREGG

COMMENTS *** PLEASE NOTE 3 HOUR TURNAROUND FOR CABINET LEVEL ***

REF# LOG NSCIFID (D /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
Allen	X 7/08	forward to Pres for info		ST, NB, JL, GC, DG
Pres	IP 7/10	for info		
	C 7/13	Noted by the Pres.		AT

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

(C)

PA

ce

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FROM:

Collection Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country File

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Box Number Box 21

Description of Material:

- memo, Richard Allen to RR re. CIA report on the Siberian Pipeline, 7/10/81, 1 pg., #170092

TO:

Collection: High Value

Series: _____

File Folder Title/Casefile #/NSC # _____

Box Number: _____

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MEMORANDUM

The President has seen 8

170092

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

July 10, 1981

OK
DZ

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Dide*

SUBJECT: CIA Report on the Siberian Pipeline

I strongly recommend the attached report for your weekend reading. I think you will find it worthwhile and helpful preparation for the June 13 meeting of the NSC.

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

SECRET
NLPR 112-748-21-31-37
BY CN NARA DATE 1/13/7

Historical File

11

A

14

B

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

9

170093


9 July 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: ✓ The President
 The Vice President
 Secretary of State
 Secretary of the Treasury
 Secretary of Defense
 Secretary of Commerce
 Secretary of Energy
 Director, Office of Management
 and Budget
 United States Trade Representative
 Assistant to the President for
 National Security Affairs
 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

FROM: William J. Casey

SUBJECT: Siberian Pipeline

The attached has been prepared for your information in connection with the NSC meeting this afternoon.



William J. Casey

PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY REVIEW OF NSC EQUITY IS REQUIRED

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR

BY CN NARA DATE 1/13/12

[Redacted]

25X1

Rvw 9 July 2001
Reason D9c.1

MORI/CDF

~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

25X1

8 July 1981

CIA MEMORANDUM ON SIBERIAN PIPELINE

The United States should attempt to dissuade the Europeans from consummating the agreement. At a minimum, the Allies should delay decision pending a joint study of their energy security in the changing economic and political environment of the 1980s. These are the basic arguments that can be made:

- The pipeline will improve future Soviet economic growth and facilitate a military buildup which the West (especially the US) will have to counter. (Tab A) This probably will be the most compelling argument to the Europeans.
- It would replace their current hard currency earnings from oil which seem likely to dry up during the second half of the 1980s. The Siberian pipeline would thus prevent a reduction of the hard currency they have to spend from the current level of \$24 billion to \$12 billion and enhance the Soviet ability to extend their influence over other countries.
- The Soviet gas will cover less than 3 percent of European energy requirements and is not needed to cover increases in European energy demand. Demand projections are being lowered greatly because of energy conservation and alternative, often cheaper supplies of gas and other energy sources will be available. The argument that the pipeline would increase the security and the price of energy supply by diversifying sources and reducing dependence on the insecure Persian Gulf is weak.
- The \$4 billion of annual Western exports for the pipeline would add less than 1/2 of 1 percent to the foreign trade of the Alliance. To the extent that these increments to Western energy and trade enable the Soviets to maintain or increase their military capability, the United States, carrying 54 percent of the COCOM defense burden, would bear the brunt of responding.
- The \$16 billion European investment would be better spent on alternative schemes to ensure Allied energy security. Some combination of American and Australian coal, Norwegian and British gas from the North Sea, and Western capability to produce synthetic gas can satisfy the Western European needs which the Siberian pipeline is intended to meet. (Tab B)

SECRET

Tab A

Impact of the Pipeline Project on
The Soviet Military Effort

25X1
12

- Soviets have increased defense spending in real terms at an average annual rate of 4-5 percent since late 1950s; military now consumes 12-14 percent of GNP.
- Economic growth is slowing and could drop to 2 percent or less by mid-decade. As a result, USSR will have increasing difficulty in maintaining pace of defense buildup. Military share of GNP could be a point or two higher in 1985 and three or four points higher in 1990 if past trends continue. More important, military could take as much as three-fourths of annual increment to GNP by end of the decade. (Figures A-1, A-2)
- Although the pipeline project would not eliminate economic problems (it would at best add a few tenths of a point to GNP growth), it could ease the strain considerably in key sectors and thus facilitate the military effort.
 - Hard currency earnings from the project could maintain the Soviets' import capacity in the face of declining oil revenues. This would permit them to continue to import large amounts of Western machinery and equipment. (Table A-1)
 - Technology transfer associated with the project will benefit domestic gas production--the key to meeting Soviet energy demands in the 1980s. It would enable the Soviets to purchase Western Arctic-design extraction and processing equipment, large-diameter pipe and compressors--items which the USSR cannot match in quality nor produce in the quantities required.
 - These aspects of the project will aid the military effort in two ways: some imported equipment financed by gas sales will likely be used in military systems; other imports will be directed to civilian uses, reducing pressure on the defense industries to switch to non-military products.
- Collapse of the pipeline deal could significantly increase Soviet long range economic problems and the difficulty of maintaining the current pace of their military programs.
 - Hard currency earnings could fall by \$10 billion or more by 1990, requiring major cuts in purchases of energy and of Western goods that cushion the defense effort.
 - Defense-related industries such as electronics, chemicals and machine-building could be especially hurt, because they use much of the machinery and equipment imports.

SECRET

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13

- Even without the 9,600 kilometers from Siberian gas fields to Western Europe, their five-year plan calls for them to build 15,000 kilometers of gas pipeline to meet their own energy needs. For them to produce in the USSR the equipment needed for these pipelines and domestic energy production, given likely trends in production of naval ships, ground force weapons, and aircraft engines, the Soviets would be forced to divert investment from other sectors and cope with important additional costs, delays, and stringencies. These could substantially increase the Soviets' overall economic problems and impose significant costs and difficulties in maintaining the pace of their military buildup.

These factors could induce the Soviets to at least reduce the growth of military spending (if not cut it in absolute terms).

- They would not necessarily result in a reduction in Soviet military capabilities. Soviet defense spending is now so high (Table A-3) that with reduced growth (or indeed with no growth at all) substantial modernization of the armed forces as a whole would continue.
- They could, however, require the Soviets to curtail or stretch out selected weapon programs and perhaps make them more forthcoming in arms control negotiations.

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Tab B

The Impact of the Pipeline on Western Europe

Although construction of the proposed pipeline would have a substantial impact on the Soviet economy and military potential, it would have little effect on Western Europe's economies but would make Western Europe somewhat more vulnerable to Soviet political pressure.

Specifically, purchases of Soviet gas through the pipeline:

- Would not be needed to cover increased energy demand;
- Would add to the problem, not to the solution, of energy supply security.
- Would probably be an expensive source of energy.

1. Will the Soviet gas be needed?

(a) Projections of European energy demand are being substantially lowered.

- Between 1978, when the pipeline plans were first seriously discussed, and this year, IEA's projections of West European energy demand in 1990 were lowered by almost 4 million b/d. (See attached table).
- IEA projection of total industrial nation energy demand was lowered by 16 million b/d.
- The amount of Soviet gas to be imported through the proposed pipeline -- .5 to .8 million b/d equivalent is only about one eighth to one fifth as large as the reduction in projected European energy demand.
- This may not be the end of the story; demand projections may continue to be lowered as information on the strength of market reactions to higher oil prices pours in.

(b) Many projections of European demand for natural gas also are being lowered.

- During the past 2 years, Shell, Phillips, and BP have lowered their 1990 forecasts by about the volume of the projected Soviet deliveries.

(c) Alternative energy sources are available;

- Recent and likely future U.S. withdrawals from LNG deals with Algeria and Nigeria will make available more LNG from these sources to Western Europe than is now projected in European plans. Indeed, Western Europe is the only alternative market for this gas. The amount of additional gas made available to Europe is about 2.3 billion cubic feet per day, or 50-75 percent of the additional Soviet gas. US needs can be met from domestic, Canadian, and Mexican sources.
- After 1990, more than enough Norwegian gas can be developed to offset the Soviet gas. A single gas structure, discovered and explored during the past 3 years, could produce at least two-thirds of the proposed Soviet deliveries by the early to mid-1990s.
- US coal supply will be ample to meet increases in European coal demand substantially larger than now planned. The necessary adjustments in European energy policies would not be particularly difficult. European investments in US coal infrastructure--for example, in building a large port capable of handling very large coal carriers--would make the coal cheaper. Loss of Soviet gas could be offset by some 40-60 million tons of coal imports, an increase of about one-third in current projections of West European coal imports.

2. Would the pipeline enhance or weaken European energy security?

(a) The European argument that the pipeline would increase the security of energy supply by diversifying sources and reducing dependence on the insecure Persian Gulf is weak, if not totally invalid.

-- Even if Soviet gas supplies were secure, they would not provide insurance against the contingencies of interruptions of Persian Gulf oil, because--

(1) Soviet gas would substitute for only a small part (less than 10 percent) of Persian Gulf supplies and;

(2) The supply of Soviet gas could not be expanded if the Persian Gulf or other foreign supplies were interrupted.

(b) Supplies of Soviet gas are themselves not reliable; they are subject to both technical and political risks.

-- The technical risks result from severe climatic conditions in the USSR and the near absence of spare Soviet pipeline capacity and gas storage; periodically the Soviets make large cuts in their exports to Western Europe to meet priority domestic needs (this point is well known to the Europeans).

-- Although in most likely circumstances Moscow would be loath to use its gas as a blunt weapon to pressure Western Europe, because it needs the gas revenue badly, it would be able to exert subtle political pressure.

-- Vulnerability to Soviet pressure would increase despite the fact that increases in imports of Soviet gas would about offset declines in imports of Soviet oil. For most of Western Europe, Soviet oil is a marginal and variable source of energy, for which alternatives can be quickly found. Soviet gas, however, would become part of the base load of European energy supply because of the high investment costs required.

(c) Although other sources of gas too are subject to technical and political risks, in a number of cases, these risks will probably decline;

-- Specifically, Algeria and Nigeria both will become highly dependent on a steady flow of gas revenues to cover their expenditures.

3. Is Soviet gas a source of cheap energy?

(a) Soviet gas, if priced at approximate parity with crude oil, is not cheap. US and Australian coal are substantially cheaper.

(b) If, as we believe, oil markets continue to be soft for several years, the bargaining position of gas importers will become stronger and stronger. Consequently, patient buyers are likely to get better terms.

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ATTACHMENT

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

RECEIVED

31-A

81 JUL 8 P 1: 25

JANET COLSON

JC 8/13/27

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

RA 9/19/08

IRENE DERUS

ijr 9/19/17

JANET COLSON

JC

BUD NANCE

KAY

CY TO VP

SHOW CC

CY TO MEESE

SHOW CC

CY TO BAKER

SHOW CC

CY TO DEEVER

SHOW CC

TO BRADY

SHOW CC

RVA:

You asked why this had been sent for staffing. Normally all memos to the President go to NSC staff for a review and a forwarding memo from you to the President. The above lets the NSC have a chance to review what the Secretary said and to raise related or alternative points (as Pipes does here). It also preserves the process of having memos to the President go via the NSC system. According to Darman, the President likes to have a staff review before he gets such things.

Janet

4065

RECEIVED

81 JUL 7 P 3: 03

JV 7/15/66

- JANET COLSON
- BUD NANCE
- DICK ALLEN
- IRENE DERUS
- JANET COLSON
- BUD NANCE
- KAY
- CY TO VP
- CY TO MEESE
- CY TO BAKER
- CY TO DEEVER
- CY TO BRADY

*To Secretariat
for Staffing
JV has copy*

SHOW CC _____

SHOW CC _____

SHOW CC _____

SHOW CC _____

SHOW CC _____

SHOW CC _____

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES
10/27/15 GDB

RECEIVED 07 JUL 81 15

TO PRES

FROM HAIG, A

DOCDATE 07 JUL 81

URGENT

KEYWORDS: USSR

CHINA P R

DOBRYNIN, ANATOLY

CM

SUBJECT: SECOND SOVIET DEMARCHE ON OUR RELATIONS W/ CHINA / PAPER DOBRYNIN
BROUGHT TO MTG W/ HAIG ON 2 JUL

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR ALLEN DUE: 07 JUL 81 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

PIPES

STEARMAN -N.C.

LILLEY N.C.

COLSON

GREGG N.C.

LENZ

COMMENTS *** PLEASE OBSERVE 3 HOUR TURNAROUND FOR CABINET LEVEL ***

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(D /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
Allen	X 7/8	forward to Pres		ST, DG, JL
Pres	IP 7/10	for info		
	C 7/13	noted by the Pres.		KP

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

PA

(C)A

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Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

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USSR (7/9/81-7/13/81)

FOIA

F03-002/5

SKINNER

Box Number

21

199

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
170099	MEMO R. ALLEN TO REAGAN RE MEMO FROM HAIG	1	7/13/1981	B1

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170100 MEMO	HAIG TO REAGAN RE NEGOTIATIONS	2	7/7/1981	B1

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