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
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# Soviet Military Policy Under Ustinov

State Dept. review  
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**A Research Paper**

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June 1981

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
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# Soviet Military Policy Under Ustinov



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## A Research Paper

*Information available as of 10 June 1981 has been used in the preparation of this report.*

This paper was prepared by [redacted] of the Policy and Doctrine Branch, Strategic Evaluation Division, Office of Strategic Research. It has been coordinated with the National Intelligence Officer for the USSR and Eastern Europe and the Office of Political Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and should be directed to the Chief, Strategic Evaluation Division, [redacted]

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
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**Soviet Military Policy Under Ustinov**



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**Overview**

Dmitriy F. Ustinov's appointment in 1976 as the USSR's first civilian Minister of Defense in more than 20 years aroused speculation in the West about possible changes in the structure and policies of the Soviet military establishment. Some observers predicted a takeover by technocrats and systems analysts. Others speculated that the new Defense Minister would confine himself to the administration and management of the armed forces and to weapons procurement, leaving operational tasks to the professional military. There was also speculation that he might advocate less defense spending, more concessions in the SALT negotiations, or other policies deemed adverse to military interests. Finally, some thought that Ustinov's background in the missile and space program might incline him to focus on strategic weapon systems, possibly at the expense of general purpose forces.




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In the five years since Ustinov's appointment, the thrust of his policies has not diverged noticeably from that of his predecessor or from what might have been expected if a professional military officer still headed the Ministry. Ustinov has upheld the interests of the professional military without deprecating Brezhnev's commitment to detente and arms control. He has also applied his management skills to the Defense Ministry without creating a class of civilian experts that would have autonomous input into military decisionmaking.



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
Most of the changes observed in the Soviet armed forces had apparently been set in motion before Ustinov's appointment, but the fact that they reached fruition under his stewardship indicates that they coincided with his policy preferences. (Indeed, his previous service in high-level defense-related posts would have afforded him a key role in planning many of those changes.) In addition, their evolution probably benefited from his managerial skills, his forceful style, and his influence in the Defense Council [redacted] 25X1

Ustinov's management expertise and political connections notwithstanding, one cannot judge his impact on Soviet military policy in isolation from the efforts of his senior professional military advisers—notably Chief of the General Staff Nikolay Ogarkov and Commander in Chief of the Warsaw Pact Viktor Kulikov—and from the international situation prevailing at the time of his selection as Defense Minister. Three conditions in particular—the continuing Soviet military buildup, Western retrenchment, and Moscow's perception that the global "correlation of forces" had shifted in favor of the Communist camp—contributed to a climate in which the military could become an increasingly important vehicle for expanding Soviet power and influence in the world arena [redacted] 25X1


His office, his close ties with the political leadership, and his extensive background in administering the Soviet defense industry seemingly place Ustinov in a position to put his own stamp on the Soviet military establishment. Our knowledge of the inner workings of the Soviet system is too imprecise, however, to permit more than an educated guess about his freedom of action within the party leadership or the military bureaucracy. It is not possible to pinpoint the extent to which a particular policy or operation reflects Ustinov's personal initiative or preference. In general, it is reasonably certain that he has approved, and perhaps helped formulate, current Soviet military policy and programs, and his own priorities seem to have given them impetus [redacted] 25X1

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
8

**Contents**

	<i>Page</i>
Overview	iii
Ustinov's Rise	1
Ustinov's Performance as Minister of Defense	2
Personnel Policies	2
[Redacted]	3 25X1
[Redacted]	3
[Redacted]	3
Strengthening Theaters of Military Operations	4
Pressure on Soviet Warsaw Pact Allies	4
Accelerating Tendency Toward Projection of Military Power	5
[Redacted]	5 25X1
Political Clout	6
Institutional Ties	6
Personal Politics	7
Party Control of the Military	7
Ustinov's Style	7
Ustinov as Diplomatic Troubleshooter	8
Ustinov's Future	9
Conclusions	9


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
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


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**Soviet Military Policy  
Under Ustinov**



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
**Ustinov's Rise**

Dmitriy F. Ustinov has a long record of service in high-level posts under leaders as diverse as Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev. As far back as January 1941, when he was only 32 years old, he was appointed People's Commissar for Armaments. Germany invaded the USSR six months later, and Ustinov, according to his biography in the *Soviet Military Encyclopedia*, "made an important contribution to the expansion of production of artillery and infantry armaments." He was named to the Communist Party's Central Committee in 1952 and became Minister of the Defense Industry the following year.



most likely candidate for the job, although the name of Dmitriy Polyanskiy, also a civilian, was mentioned too. After an awkward delay that suggested the appointment was contentious, First Deputy Minister of Defense Andrey Grechko obtained the defense portfolio.

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In 1957 Ustinov assumed broader responsibilities for the overall Soviet defense effort when he became chairman of the Military-Industrial Commission (*Voyenno-Promyshlennaya Kommissiya*, or VPK). The VPK is responsible chiefly for planning and overseeing major weapon development programs. It also monitors the production activities of the defense-industrial ministries and major defense enterprises. (When Ustinov left the post in 1963, his deputy and close colleague L. V. Smirnov became head of the VPK.)




By early 1965 Ustinov had become a candidate member of the Politburo, first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, and a member of the party Secretariat with specific responsibility for defense industry affairs. The Secretariat post carried authority over the VPK. (For a more detailed outline of Ustinov's career, see the appendix.)



The military leadership presumably would have preferred to maintain a professional officer in the post. Warsaw Pact Commander Yakubovskiy or Kulikov himself, both of whom were first deputy defense ministers, would have been the likely candidates. Yakubovskiy, however, was in precarious health (and in fact, died soon after Ustinov's appointment). There may also have been reluctance to make further changes in the Warsaw Pact high command, insofar as Yakubovskiy's chief of staff, Sergey M. Shtemenko, had just died.

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When Brezhnev replaced Khrushchev as party First Secretary in October 1964, rumors began to circulate that he favored Ustinov for Defense Minister. Within two months, it was reported that Ustinov was about to replace Defense Minister Rodion Malinovskiy. In early 1967, when Malinovskiy was seriously ill, Soviet officials again speculated that Ustinov would succeed him. Just prior to Malinovskiy's death in April 1967, a senior member of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs told a US Embassy official that the new Minister of Defense would be a civilian. Ustinov seemed the



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**Ustinov's Performance as Minister of Defense**

Ustinov's appointment as the first civilian Minister of Defense since the 1950s aroused speculation in the West about possible changes in the structure and policies of the Soviet military establishment. Some observers claimed that Ustinov's selection signaled a takeover of the Defense Ministry by technocrats and systems analysts, thus conjuring up a Soviet version of the Pentagon's "Whiz Kids." The fact that he had never held a field command or served in combat also engendered speculation that the new Defense Minister would leave operational tasks to the professional military. Still another line of speculation, reportedly shared by some Soviet military men, was that Ustinov might advocate less defense spending, more concessions in the SALT negotiations, or other policies deemed adverse to military interests. Finally, it was thought that his defense industry background might incline him to focus on strategic weapon systems, possibly at the expense of general purpose forces [redacted]

It is difficult to identify the extent to which developments in the Soviet Armed Forces during Ustinov's tenure can be attributed directly to the Minister of Defense. Nevertheless, we can point to several areas of activity in which Ustinov has been more active than his immediate predecessors and which reflect the style of management he exhibited earlier in supervising the defense industry. Although the ground for many of the changes was paved under his predecessors, Ustinov's own priorities and those of his closest colleagues seem to have provided new impetus. Even while dealing with these changes, which include improvements in command and control, force structure, and weapons systems, he has focused considerable attention on ensuring the political reliability, physical well-being, and morale of armed forces personnel [redacted]

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**Personnel Policies.** Some of Ustinov's earliest statements after his appointment seemed to downgrade the role of the political officer (*zampolit*) in the armed forces by calling for unity of command (*yedinonachal'nye*), a codeword for the unchallenged authority of the military commander. Subsequent speeches and actions, however, have stressed the continuing importance of political work and of party verification, a reference to a *zampolit's* obligation to report failures by line officers to follow orders or comply with regulations. On balance, Ustinov's tenure has been marked by efforts to smooth the relationship between the *zampolit* and the commander [redacted]

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On 19 December 1977, Ustinov sponsored a conference on ways to improve the living conditions of Soviet soldiers.<sup>3</sup> His initiative probably stemmed from an avowed conviction that "ensuring a high level of combat readiness . . . is directly connected with satisfying the everyday living needs of people." [redacted]

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<sup>3</sup> This was the second such conference ever held in the USSR; the first was in 1962 [redacted]

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

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Ustinov has publicly attacked violations of discipline at all levels of the armed forces and has recommended improving morale and discipline as a means of enhancing combat readiness. He has also underlined the need for "promotion of young, promising officers in command posts and political and technical positions." Recent vacancies in the high command, however, have occurred primarily as a result of death or old age



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**Strengthening Theaters of Military Operations.** A significant trend that appears to have accelerated during Ustinov's tenure as Minister of Defense has been the economic development of various areas that may have been organized as theaters of military operations (TVDs).<sup>4</sup> The effort has been aimed at enhancing the defensive as well as offensive potential of these regions in case of war. The northwestern USSR, for example, has seen the emplacement of industrial, transportation, and communications infrastructure that has definite military application and a campaign to promote the overall economic modernization of the strategic Kola Peninsula. A similar development drive (keynoted by the Baikal-Amur railroad project) is in progress in the Soviet Far East, where a high command encompassing at least three military districts was established in 1978. Another military-economic buildup is reportedly under way in the Balkans, which apparently form part of the southwestern theater of war.

**Pressure on Soviet Warsaw Pact Allies.** Although the USSR has bolstered considerably its military strength and combat readiness in the Far East, Soviet military policy under Ustinov, as under his predecessors, continues to center on Europe as its primary defense concern.

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<sup>4</sup> Soviet writings define a theater of military operations as "a definite piece of territory and the adjacent sea and airspace, in the confines of which military operations are assumed. In wartime a portion of the armed forces of a country (or coalition of countries) will act to decide strategic missions flowing from the general war plan. TVDs are usually a portion of a theater of war and include one or several strategic axes.

[Redacted]

In November 1976 Romanian Defense Minister Ion Coman visited Moscow at Ustinov's invitation for the first Soviet-Romanian military talks since the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, in which Bucharest refused to participate. Ustinov was host at a

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
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working dinner for the Romanian. The guest list suggests that Soviet military assistance and the coordination of operational planning were the main items of discussion.

selected speeches and articles containing copious references to "proletarian internationalism" has been recommended by Ogarkov and General of the Army Akhromeyev to Western officers as a guide to Soviet military doctrine. 25X1 25X1

The political significance of the visit was indicated when Brezhnev himself was host at a luncheon for Coman—an honor not normally accorded to an official of Coman's rank. In a speech published in *Red Star*, but, interestingly, not reproduced in the Romanian press, Coman declared that "the indestructible units of the Warsaw Pact . . . shoulder to shoulder in . . . steadfast brotherhood, protect the borders of the Socialist community as a whole and are highly valued by the Romanians." Such a statement would seem to contravene previous assertions that Romania's armed forces are obliged only to protect the country's own territory.

The years of Ustinov's service as Defense Minister have witnessed the increasing use of Soviet military aid and advisers as instruments of influence abroad, the signing of friendship treaties that incorporate a military dimension, and the growing physical projection of Soviet power through such measures as a large-scale airlift of military equipment to Ethiopia and show-the-flag visits by Soviet naval vessels to Third World ports. 25X1

While seeking closer integration among Warsaw Pact members within Europe, Ustinov has also sought the participation of Pact units in support of Soviet objectives worldwide. Such a policy is not new. As long ago as 1969, in the wake of armed clashes along the Ussuri River, the USSR sought to persuade its East European allies to contribute at least token military contingents to the Sino-Soviet border.

During Ustinov's tenure, Moscow has also stepped up its use of proxies in the Third World. More than 20,025X1 Cubans under the overall direction of Soviet Gen. V. I. Petrov (the "hero of the Ogaden") were instrumental in 1978 in turning the tide in Ethiopia's war with Somalia. In the meantime, the Cuban combat forces that arrived in Angola in 1975 have apparently settled in for an extended stay. 25X1

Grechko and especially Ustinov have achieved greater success in involving East European military advisers and technical specialists in aid missions to areas ranging from Africa to the Middle East to Southeast Asia. The use of East Germans in establishing and helping to run the internal security apparatus in Soviet client states in the Third World has been especially notable.

The USSR—either directly or through surrogates—has stepped up its military diplomacy throughout the world, venturing even into areas that used to be written off as US preserves. Moscow has furnished military equipment and training personnel to Peru, initiated an exchange of visits with Mexican defense officials, established ties with the Sandinista army in Nicaragua, and helped to coordinate deliveries of arms from Vietnam and Ethiopia via Cuba and Nicaragua to the insurgents in El Salvador. 25X1 25X1

**Accelerating Tendency Toward Projection of Military Power.** Ustinov's tenure has coincided with the USSR's increasing capability and inclination to broaden the mission of the armed forces to include not only defense of the homeland and Eastern Europe but also projection of military power worldwide under the rubrics of "proletarian internationalism" and the struggle against "imperialism." A book of Ustinov's

**Ustinov and Soviet Operations in Afghanistan**  
The invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 marked the first use since World War II of Soviet Ground Forces units in a capacity other than that of maintaining Communist rule in Eastern Europe. As such, it constitutes a major test of Ustinov's direction of the Soviet Armed Forces. 25X1

<sup>4</sup> Romania continues to resist conformity with Soviet policy, however. This resistance surfaced most recently in its opposition to the invasion of Afghanistan and its refusal to abide by a Warsaw Pact decision to increase defense expenditures.

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Ustinov has a record of political longevity on a par with those of Mikhail Suslov, Anastas Mikoyan, and Andrey Gromyko.<sup>7</sup> He has associated with the powerful for decades and evidently has a keen political sense. Ustinov's pronouncements, both before and after his appointment as Minister of Defense, have been marked by unstinting praise of the CPSU and reaffirmation of its leading role over the military.

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Equally fulsome has been Ustinov's lauding of Brezhnev personally as head of the party. He has consistently endorsed in public Brezhnev's commitment to detente and arms control. In 1973 he delivered the Lenin anniversary speech on behalf of the Soviet leadership. His endorsement of such major planks of Soviet foreign policy as equitable arms control arrangements and mutually beneficial relations with the United States placed him squarely within the foreign policy consensus forged by Brezhnev. Ustinov played a prominent role at the 1979 Vienna US-USSR summit at which the SALT II Treaty was signed.

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**Institutional Ties.** Ustinov's membership on the Politburo and the Defense Council places him among the powerful few in Moscow.

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In April 1979 Ryabov, Ustinov's successor on the Secretariat, was dropped from that body and transferred to the post of first deputy chairman of Gosplan. This transfer should have resulted in the appointment of another CPSU Secretary to provide party oversight of the defense industrial sector, but as of mid-1981 no replacement for Ryabov had been announced. This vacancy, coupled with Ustinov's long and intimate association with the defense industry, suggests that the

**Political Clout**

By most accounts, Ustinov is one of the most powerful men in the Kremlin. His influence rests on:

- His sheer longevity near the top echelons of power.
- The priority accorded to things military in the Soviet system.
- Institutional arrangements that facilitate military input into Soviet decisionmaking.
- His close relationships with important party leaders.
- The force of his own personality.

<sup>7</sup> Ustinov is reportedly a son-in-law of Andrey Zhdanov, who was a top-ranking Politburo member and head of the Leningrad party organization. Zhdanov gave his name to a movement, *zhdanovshchina*, in 1947-48 that sought the ideological purification of the CPSU and the eradication of "bourgeois" and "cosmopolitan" influence from Soviet society.

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Defense Minister may well retain significant clout in the defense industry

**Personal Politics.** By all indications, Ustinov has been careful to remain on good terms with most of his military and party colleagues.

**Party Control of the Military.** Ustinov has apparently not sought to parlay his political influence into advocacy of loosening party control over the military. On the contrary, his published statements not only provide a rationale for party domination over the military but claim that this control is likely to grow:

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
The most important [reasons for this] are: the complexity of the processes occurring in the world arena, and hence the unprecedentedly increased responsibility for correctly analyzing the military-political situation and taking timely and effective measures against aggression, from wherever it might proceed; the increasing dependence of the armed forces' combat might and combat readiness on the level of the country's socioeconomic and cultural development and its moral-political and spiritual potential; and the widening of international tasks in defending socialist gains.

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**Ustinov's Style**

Although Ustinov projects the image of a team player in his relations with his Politburo colleagues, his own personality seems far from submissive. A US observer of his behavior at the Soviet-American summit in Vienna in June 1979 noted that, in discussions with American representatives, Ustinov deferred to no one on the Soviet side but Brezhnev. Moreover, he was reported as "not hesitant to gently correct [Brezhnev] when he made an error or misspoke." Another American summit observer reported that Brezhnev would often introduce a topic for discussion, usually by reading briefly from a prepared text, and then turn to Ustinov to treat the topic in greater depth. A member of the official US delegation who attended the plenary sessions of the summit stated that Ustinov acted toward Brezhnev "almost as a peer"

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**Ustinov as Diplomatic Troubleshooter**

Both before and since his appointment as Minister of Defense, Ustinov has played the roles of troubleshooter and implementer of major decisions made by the political leadership. This role was evident at least as long ago as January 1966, when he traveled to Hanoi as part of a high-level delegation led by Aleksandr Shelepin. His mission was to help determine the level and type of Soviet assistance for the North Vietnamese in the face of direct US military involvement in Vietnam. Ustinov also received numerous foreign delegations, notably from Vietnam and Angola, to discuss Soviet military aid programs.

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When he was supervising the Soviet defense industry, Ustinov was depicted as a typical Stalinist plant manager, prodding and manipulating workers with a mixture of exhortation, threats, and invective in order to expedite production. Overcoming bureaucratic inertia has reportedly been one of his top priorities.

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Ustinov's diplomatic task in Finland was more difficult. In the summer of 1978 he visited Helsinki and floated a proposal for joint Soviet-Finnish army maneuvers. The proposal, strongly supported by the pro-Soviet wing of the Finnish Communist Party and rebuffed by virtually every other political group, far

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[Redacted]

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exceeded the provisions of the 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. [redacted]

Under strong opposition from Finnish President Urho Kekkonen, the pressure for joint maneuvers subsided, but Soviet interest in promoting closer collaboration with Finland in the military sphere persists. According to an article in *Red Star* dated 20 September 1978, Ogarkov and Finnish Commander in Chief Lauri Sutela initialed a program for military cooperation through 1979. The accord provided for the "exchange of visits by military leaders and ships, air forces, air force subunits, delegations from military training establishments, and other corresponding measures." 10

**Ustinov's Future**

Inevitably, questions arise about Ustinov's political future. His membership on the Politburo gives him automatic access to the ultimate sources of political power in the USSR [redacted]

Ustinov's influence presumably is enhanced further by the presence of handpicked staffers in many sensitive positions throughout the military-industrial network. Several of these people occupy posts that Ustinov vacated as he moved upward in the hierarchy. Another group of officeholders whose careers depend upon good relations with Ustinov are the oblast secretaries throughout the Soviet Union who are responsible for military-related production [redacted]

<sup>9</sup> The treaty stipulates that Finland will repulse any military action against the USSR across Finnish soil by Germany or its allies and that the signatories will hold consultations in case of a threat of such attack [redacted]

During the 1970s, rumors pointed to Ustinov as a possible replacement for Prime Minister Kosygin, but Kosygin was succeeded after his death in 1980 by Nikolay Tikhonov. President Tito of Yugoslavia commented to Henry Kissinger in October 1979 that Ustinov (whom he described as an extreme hardliner) was a strong contender to succeed Brezhnev as party General Secretary. Although Ustinov's chances of inheriting Brezhnev's mantle now appear doubtful, he is likely—if his health holds up—to play a prominent role in the succession maneuvering in the Kremlin. [redacted]

**Conclusions**

As Minister of Defense, Ustinov has not "civilianized" the Soviet military. He has followed in the footsteps of Marshal Grechko, his predecessor, in supporting the priority of military needs at the expense of the consumer economy and in trying to remedy disciplinary and morale problems through massive doses of political indoctrination. Soviet strategic programs have not undergone any identifiable shift during his tenure. Changes in command and control seem to have reflected Ustinov's managerial preferences [redacted]

Despite his position and wide-ranging influence, Ustinov is careful to pay tribute to the party's leading role over the military, not only in policymaking but also in such matters as strategy and doctrine. In this way Ustinov resembles Grechko, despite the substantial differences between the two men in background and personality. Their published statements contain virtually identical wording on most issues, notably on the leading role of the party over the military.

Ustinov's pieces are distinguished mainly by the mention of current topics such as Afghanistan, which would not have inspired concern during Grechko's tenure [redacted]

According to the Defense Minister's speeches and statements, party domination over the military is likely to increase, mainly because of the widening international role of Soviet armed forces in defending "socialist gains" and warding off aggression against "progressive" states and movements. Ustinov's membership on the Politburo, like that of Grechko before him, reinforces party control over the military even while enhancing military input into decisionmaking at the [redacted]

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uppermost level. Ustinov is a member in good standing of the collective leadership. Any possibility of his developing a personality cult has been limited by both the perception and the reality of his incorporation into the Brezhnev team. This set of circumstances deprives Ustinov of personal credit for Soviet military successes but may also spare him personal blame for major blunders. It is difficult, for example, to envisage the Afghan conflict being dubbed "Ustinov's war." Similarly, the Brezhnev regime's tendency to apply military solutions to political problems with China (through a military buildup in the Far East), with Poland (through a mobilization maneuver), and with Afghanistan cannot be attributed solely to Ustinov

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Finally, it should be stressed that although Ustinov's stewardship of the Defense Ministry has not differed markedly from Grechko's in the areas of administrative efficiency, management techniques, or cost-effectiveness measures, Soviet military policy itself has evolved in a more activist direction. Moscow's propaganda contends that the global "correlation of forces" has shifted in favor of the Communist camp. The Soviet armed forces are increasingly being used to exploit this avowed shift

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Ustinov was chosen to preside over the Ministry of Defense during a period when growing Soviet military capabilities, combined with Western reluctance to counter Soviet expansionism, created conditions for a forward military policy. During his incumbency, Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Laos, Cambodia, and Afghanistan have been drawn into the Soviet orbit, chiefly through the use of military force by the USSR or its Cuban and Vietnamese proxies. The outcome of the war in Afghanistan may rest substantially on the extent to which the Soviet armed forces overcome the inadequacies in morale, discipline, training, combat readiness, and use of new weapons to which Ustinov has devoted so much attention

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<sup>11</sup> Ustinov's pronouncements on China, however, have been comparatively harsher than those of many other Soviet leaders. He has been particularly vehement on the subject of Beijing's alleged collaboration with Washington and Tokyo in pursuit of hegemony in Asia.

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72

AM-POLAND-SOVIET

MOSCOW, June 1, REUTER -- THE OFFICIAL SOVIET NEWS AGENCY TASS SUGGESTED TODAY THAT THE POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY HAD BEEN UNDERMINED BY "REVISIONISTS" AND WAS LOSING CONTROL OVER EVENTS IN THE COUNTRY.

TASS CARRIED A SUMMARY OF A RECENT HARDLINE SPEECH AT A MEETING IN THE KATOWICE REGION OF POLAND, CHARGING THAT THE COMMUNIST PARTY HAD SPLIT INTO FACTIONS AND LACKED A STRATEGY TO OVERCOME THE COUNTRY'S PROBLEMS.

A LOCAL PARTY LEADER, NAMED AS S. QMCZAR, SAID THE PARTY FACED A "COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS" AND WOULD HAVE TO USE "ALL METHODS AVAILABLE" TO COMBAT IT.

THE REPORT, CARRYING THE STRONGEST AND MOST DIRECT ATTACK ON THE POLISH PARTY YET TO APPEAR IN THE SOVIET MEDIA, WAS BROADCAST ON THE MID-EVENING TELEVISION NEWS.

IT WAS CLEARLY SANCTIONED AT HIGH LEVEL AND REFLECTED THE OPINIONS OF THE KREMLIN LEADERSHIP.

THE LOCAL PARTY LEADER WAS QUOTED AS SAYING THE COMMUNIST PARTY PROGRAM, PUBLISHED EARLIER THIS MONTH FOR DISCUSSION AT JULY'S PARTY CONGRESS, CONTRADICTED MARXIST-LENINIST DOCTRINE IN PLACES AND DID NOT SHOW THE TRUE ESSENCE OF THE CRISIS IN POLAND.

MORE 1513 SS

R181R I3704)2ZQTRYRZOT

AM-POLAND-SOVIET 2 MOSCOW

"THE POLICY GUIDELINES SAID NOTHING ABOUT THE FACT THAT THE PRIMARY CAUSE OF THE EMERGENCE OF THE ANTI-SOCIALIST FORCES IN POLAND; OF REVISIONISM AND OPPORTUNISM IN THE POLISH UNITED WORKERS (COMMUNIST) PARTY IS PRIVATE PROPERTY, WHICH CORRUPTS THE WORKING CLASS, PEASANTRY AND INTELLIGENTSIA," TASS QUOTED HIM AS SAYING.

THE CHARGE OF "REVISIONISM," OR DEVIATION FROM THE ORTHODOX, SOVIET-STYLE MARXIST DOCTRINE, WAS LEVELED AT THE PRAGUE LEADERSHIP BEFORE THE INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA BY WARSAW PACT TROOPS IN 1968.

THE REPEATED USE OF THE TERM IN REFERENCE TO THE POLISH PARTY APPEARS TO REFLECT GROWING KREMLIN CONCERN THAT THE LEADERSHIP OF STANISLAW KANIA WILL NOT RESIST THE REFORM MOVEMENT, WHICH IS GROWING WITHIN THE PARTY'S RANKS.

MR QMCZAR WAS QUOTED AS SAYING THE STRIKES OF LAST SUMMER CAUGHT POLISH COMMUNISTS UNAWARES. "BUT THEN WE HAD A PARTY, WHILE NOW A SPLIT HAS OCCURED IN IT, FACTIONALIST GROUPINGS HAVE BEEN FORMED AND THE COMMUNISTS HAVE NO CLEARCUT CONCEPT OR STRATEGY FOR OVERCOMING THE CRISIS," HE REPORTEDLY SAID.

MORE 1515 SS

R182R I3716)LZQTRYRBYL

AM-POLAND-SOVIET 3 MOSCOW

THE REPORT OF THE SPEECH ALSO ECHOED RECENT RECENT SOVIET PRESS COMMENTARIES WHICH SUGGESTED THERE WAS A DANGER THAT PUBLIC ATTITUDES TO THE SOCIALIST AUTHORITIES WERE CHANGING BECAUSE OF THE CONFLICTS OF THE LAST YEAR.

TASS SAID THE PARTY MEETING CONDEMNED THE PROGRAM FOR A "FORMULATION REDUCING THE PARTY'S ROLE TO SIMPLY SERVING THE WORKING CLASS. A MARXIST-LENINIST PARTY IS DUTYBOUND TO FORM THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE WORKING CLASS AND DIRECT IT."

REUTER 1517 SS



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3 JUN 1981 32

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

June 3, 1981

FOR: RICHARD ALLEN

FROM: JACK STEIN 

Newspaper reports indicate that United States officials are now meeting with Soviets to discuss grain sales. This may be an opportunity to negotiate the freedom of Anatoly Shehransky.



RECEIVED

81 JUN 4 P 1: 44

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BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

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