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File Folder USSR (5/7/81-5/31/81)

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F03-002/5

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188

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
169994	MEMO	R. ALLEN TO REAGAN (INCL. ATTACHED DRAFT MESSAGE)	2	5/7/1981	B1
169995	MEMO	SAME MEMO AND ATTACHMENT AS DOC #169994, W/DIFFERENT NOTATIONS	2	5/7/1981	B1
169996	REPORT	RE USSR/POLAND PAR 10/11/2010 CREST NLR-748-21-23-2-7	7	5/7/1981	B1
169997	REPORT	BACK COVER OF DOC #169996	1	5/7/1981	B1
169998	MINUTES	RE 4/30 MEETING OF ICCUSA	3	ND	B1
169999	MEMO	R. KIMMITT THROUGH R. SCHWEITZER TO R. ALLEN RE SOVIET ARMS SALES	1	5/13/1981	B1
170000	REPORT	RE SOVIET ARMS SALES (PAGE 4 OF REPORT)	1	3/12/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
170002	MEMO	RE INCIDENT	2	5/13/1981	B7(E)
170001	MEMO	R. PIPES TO R. ALLEN RE RECENT SOVIET MOVES	1	5/13/1981	B1

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


7 May 1981

Mr. Allen --

Attached are the items from last
night you wanted retyped for the (P).

The top one (Begin mood) was
used for an "In brief" item in the
PDB.

Frank



Frank
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**Strategic
Warning
Staff**

SPECIAL REPORT


U S S R - Poland :

A Time of Decision

7 MAY 1981

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Amidst signs that the carefully cultivated consensus among Soviet leaders over Poland may be evaporating, the Kremlin is probably now beginning the real work of defining its "final" response to the situation in Warsaw. The Soviets are now clearly aware of how little leverage they have over events in Poland, short of massive and costly military intervention. Should the Soviets elect to invade, indications of the massive mobilization and movement process should be evident more than a week, perhaps as many as three or four, before the Soviet forces crossed the frontier. (S/NF)

1. The first major cracks in the facade of unity among Soviet leaders over a Polish policy began to open in the aftermath of Moscow's "non-decision" that deferred intervention in late March while Warsaw was embroiled in the confrontation over the Bydgoszcz incident. In seeming contrast to President Brezhnev's fresh reaffirmation of confidence in the Poles at the Czech party congress on 7 April, senior ideologist Suslov in his similar address to the East German congress on 12 April failed to reiterate Brezhnev's position and indeed pointedly omitted all reference to Poland. On 18 April party information chief Zamyatin made a statement that the Polish Communists "will be able to defend the cause of socialism" on their own. On 23 April, in another seeming reversal, Suslov made a previously unannounced visit to Warsaw, apparently to impose his or the Soviet leadership's views on the Poles on how to safeguard the party against unacceptable change. The text of the communique published after the visit made clear, however, that the Polish leadership gave Suslov the message that they had no intention of changing their current course toward reform. The Soviets countered three days later, when the grave allegation of "revisionism" in the Polish party surfaced in a TASS dispatch from Warsaw, in probable reflection of Suslov's critique of the situation. Instead of picking up this complaint, however, the Soviet media have largely confined themselves to non-polemical reportage of events in Poland. Even the pale observation by TASS in advance of May Day that the Polish labor unions were adopting a "negative attitude" toward the festivities was not echoed in Moscow's actual coverage of the scaled-down observance in Warsaw. (C)

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
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2. The Kremlin must now think through the results of the Polish Central Committee Plenum, held 29-30 April, several days after Suslov's visit. Though the Plenum left reputed hardliners in place in the Warsaw politburo, specific mid-July dates were announced for the party congress that will almost certainly give final approval to such controversial reforms as limited tenure for leaders and secret balloting among multiple candidates for party office. (C)

3. Such developments suggest that while some prominent figures in the Soviet leadership have tried to go public with their belief that the last barricade of tolerance has been breached in Poland, a majority still contends that political alternatives are not yet exhausted in Warsaw. Soviet decision-makers are probably now all aware, however, that their previous assumptions about Poland were profoundly mistaken. Reporting from a variety of sources during late March and early April strongly suggested that both the Soviets and the Poles were expecting that the crisis would be abruptly resolved by imposing a martial law-style regime by Polish military and security forces. Neither the security organs nor the armed forces high command acting at the behest of a "stubborn core" of party loyalists stepped forward, however, to suppress the forces of political and social change. On the contrary, because of their reticence, Moscow may now be convinced that these institutions would disintegrate in the face of intervention, or even actively oppose the Soviets. (S/NF)

4. Apparently expecting a show of force by the Polish government--perhaps even a declaration of martial law--the Soviet leadership was prepared to provide military support to the Polish regime.



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5. As Polish leaders strive to preserve the interval of outward calm prevailing throughout the country, the Soviets are obliged to reconsider the entirety of their response to the Polish crisis. In this setting, a subtle shift may be taking

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
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place in the way in which the question is posed inside the Kremlin: rather than asking first whether the costs of intervening are manageable, some Soviet leaders may be giving greater attention to inquiring as to whether the costs of not intervening are manageable. This could lead to the emergence of a long-deferred internal debate not just over the Polish question but over an entire range of domestic and foreign issues of grave concern to the USSR--issues that were barely noted at the thoroughly ritualized Soviet party congress last February. (C)



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7. In sum, Moscow's real work of deciding how to resolve the Polish question may be starting just when its best opportunities for decisive action are receding into the past. The evident lack of current military preparations by the Soviet armed forces for a massive intervention in the near term certainly bolsters this impression. Before adopting what has historically been seen as the only sure solution--military intervention--the Soviets may first attempt a succession of political gestures and covert actions aimed at halting and reversing the Polish renewal. Moscow may already suspect,

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however, that the Polish regime and unions together have become astute enough to fend off such ploys. In any case, the more time the Soviets devote to futile efforts to trigger a crisis in Poland that would justify their intervention, the closer will loom the symbolically decisive Polish congress. In this context, the congress itself increasingly appears as a practical deadline for a military intervention. (C)

8. As Soviet allies inside Poland dwindle in number and importance, the necessity that military intervention be massive becomes more evident. Since the start of April, the Soviets have probably lost faith in the Polish military establishment's ability or willingness to participate in a forceful quashing of the Polish renewal. The Soviets may have also come to believe since that time that the Polish military may actively--perhaps even in an organized fashion--resist forceful attempts to impose Moscow's will on Poland. It seems likely, therefore, that new Soviet intervention plans would call for a massive array of force--a force large enough to overwhelm Polish armed resistance in a few days and reduce the possibility that a conflict might spread elsewhere. Soviet military activities over the last several months were almost certainly not geared to preparations for a force of this size. We believe that we would have military indicators of such a massive intervention more than a week or perhaps as many as three or four before troops were to actually cross the Polish frontier. (S/NF)

*Schwartz's
opinion*

101-18

*For version summarized for
the President, be sure to
include a parenthetical
note about the July Congress
and its importance.*

*Memo should not be longer
than 1 1/2 pages.*

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 8, 1981

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: FRED WETTERING *FW*


SUBJECT: Proposed Speech on Soviet Activities in the Third World

Your memorandum (Tab B) indicated that you would consider using material on Soviet activities in Africa in a commencement address you would give in May.

I have taken the liberty of redrafting some earlier thoughts in what I hope is acceptable speech form for your use or not as you see fit (Tab A).

Sorry it took longer than I had anticipated. This was due to (a) workload, and (b) the time it took to get some information declassified.

cc: Lilley



Fred --

This is very good stuff -- I believe I can use it. It needs a bit more lead in -- quoting some juicy Soviet sources on how SU helps LDCs generally. And then some specific boasting re Africa. Can you get your hands on such stuff promptly?

RVA 5/13/81

True
This is very good stuff -- I believe I can use it. It needs a bit more lead in -- quoting some juicy Soviet sources on how SU helps LDCs generally, and then some specific boasting re Africa. Can you get your hands on such stuff promptly?

THE COLD WAR AND THE THIRD WORLD:

EXAMINATION OF A CLICHE

A popular cliché among writers of certain political persuasions both at home and abroad is to blithely state that the Reagan Administration has introduced the cold war into the Third World, or, that the Reagan Administration regards the Third World only in East-West terms (a sort of code phrase for cold war). Various pundits have caricatured President Reagan, Secretary Haig, myself and other Administration figures as hardened cold warriors totally oblivious to the Third World except as it relates to the cold war.

I would like to take this occasion to examine these clichés and caricaturizations a bit closer.

First of all, it is necessary to restate Palmerston's Dictum that every nation state pursues its own national interests no matter what area is involved. What is germane here is how the United States and the Soviet Union define their national interests - do these definitions encompass the legitimate needs and aspirations of the Third World, or are they narrowly defined so as to sacrifice all others for exclusively selfish advantage. Rather than look at

words and pronouncements, let us follow a more analytical methodology and examine performances.

I propose to look at the continent of Africa, a key element of the Third World, for example.

From 1975 to 1980, the Soviet Union has contracted for and delivered over \$4 billion in arms to Sub-Saharan Africa, and about \$20 billion to North Africa. In recent years the Soviets have introduced the most sophisticated arms into Africa -- MIG 23 and MIG 25 jet fighters (to Algeria, Libya, Ethiopia), MI 24 attack helicopters (Ethiopia, Angola, Libya, Algeria), and MI 8 counterinsurgency helicopters (several), the latest state of the art surface to air missiles and supporting radars, missile patrol craft, the latest Soviet AK-74 assault rifle, a whole range of modern armored fighting vehicles. At the same time Soviet economic aid to Sub-Saharan Africa was something less than \$300 million - a ratio of greater than 12 to 1 in favor of arms.

Robert Heinlein, a perceptive and widely-read science fiction author, introduced in one of his books the concept of TANSTAAFL (pronounced tan-staffel). This means, "there ain't no such thing as a free lunch." And indeed, the Soviets have epitomized this concept, exacting heavy

payments for this military equipment. First, the standard Soviet practice after an initial "loss leader" is to charge full price for Soviet hardware and advisors with payment in hard currency. Fully 15% of foreign currency earnings of the Soviet Union come from arms sales to the Third World. But cash is only part of the Soviet price.

The Soviets have demanded and received strategic bases in Africa.

In Ethiopia, the Soviet naval base on Dahlak Island is garrisoned by a company of Soviet marine infantry. No Ethiopians are permitted on the island. The base plays an important role in replenishment and repair of the Soviet Indian Ocean fleet, including nuclear submarines. The Soviets have demanded and received air bases in Ethiopia and Angola for military aircraft surveillance flights over the Indian and Atlantic Oceans. These bases, of course, serve no African interest and are targetted directly against the United States armed forces.

The Soviets are currently pressing new military equipment clients for further bases (Congo, Madagascar, Seychelles, Mozambique).

In Mozambique, we recently saw the Soviets, working through Cuban proxies, force the government to act directly against its expressed policy and immediate interests. At Cuban direction several American Embassy officers were expelled, and foreign residents detained, which jeopardized several aid programs from Western countries desperately needed and wanted by the Mozambique Government.

The Soviets have required explicit support, including UN votes, from their clients which have clearly run against Third World interest. The votes on the Soviet rape of Afghanistan in various international fora reflect this. The Soviet Union has never been adverse to using heavy-handed threats and the leverage of arms sales to blackmail Third World states into a course of action.

A 20,000-man Cuban military force remains garrisoned upon the Angolans, and a 10,000-man Cuban force remains in Ethiopia. There are also over 4,000 Soviet military "advisors" in Sub-Saharan Africa. The host countries are required to pay for this dubious "support."

The cynical, selfish nature of the Soviet definition of its national interest in dealing with Third World countries was no more evident than in the Ogaden Desert.

In 1977, after arming and training Somali forces and coaching them in an irridentist invasion of Ethiopia, the Soviets then armed, trained and coached the Ethiopians even more extensively to repel the invasion. The Soviets coldly traded a position of influence over a country of 3 million for greater influence in a country of 35 million. The bitter struggle which the Soviets unleashed produced over 1 million refugees - a pitiful group towards which the Moscow Bloc has not contributed one cent in humanitarian assistance.

As far as the Soviets are concerned, there certainly is no free lunch.

Let me contrast this sorry litany of narrow Soviet advantage-seeking with the record of the Reagan Administration in just three brief months.

The Reagan Administration sent to Congress an aid package for Africa which asks for a 30% increase in funds for aid to Africa, despite national hardships and budget cuts being the order of the day.

Specifically, the Reagan Administration has proposed for Africa a combined total of \$837.5 million in non-military

assistance versus \$210.5 million in military assistance - a ratio of 4 to 1 in favor of nonmilitary assistance. I remind you that the ratio of USSR assistance is 12 to 1 in favor of military assistance.

In March, AID Director Peter MacPherson led a US delegation to Zimbabwe where he announced an Administration pledge of \$225 million in nonmilitary economic assistance to Zimbabwe over three years subject to Congressional approval. The Moscow Bloc, which was invited, did not show up or pledge a cent.

In April, UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick led a US delegation to a Geneva Conference on African Refugees, where she announced an Administration pledge of \$285 million in nonmilitary aid to refugees for FY 1982. Again, the Soviets were invited but did not show or pledge a cent.

This Administration had pledged to maintain its commitments to international lending institutions which render invaluable vital support to the Third World. We have announced our intention of joining the African Development Bank. The Soviets, of course, decline to contribute or participate in any such activity.

What conclusions can we draw from this evidence. I would suggest to you that in Africa, as in the rest of the Third World, the Soviet Union is on an unprecedented offensive of self-aggrandizement. Using the technique of massive arms sales as a lever they have striven with some success to gain tactical and strategic advantages over the Western democracies in the Third World. This campaign, which reached full flower in 1975, continues at record rates. Soviet arms sales to the Third World with all the accompanying baggage of Soviet manipulation and advantage-seeking, reached record levels in 1980.

Can the Reagan Administration be faulted if we call attention to this?

I submit that by offering increasing assistance to Third World nations desperately trying to resist Soviet-inspired subversion, aggression, or manipulation of neighboring states we can hardly be accused of starting a cold war in the Third World. We have merely begun a natural reaction -- a reaction long overdue -- to this Soviet offensive. Our responses which show a ratio of economic assistance fourfold greater than military assistance can scarcely be termed belligerent -- particularly when compared to the nature of Soviet Third World activity.

Some observers appear allergic to the truth when it comes to Soviet activities in the Third World. I hope I have established a perspective from which to view American responses in the Third World. Our responses will be those articulated by President Reagan in his Inauguration Address:

"To those neighbors and allies who share our freedom, we will strengthen our historical ties and assure them of our support and commitment. We will match loyalty with loyalty. We will strive for mutually beneficial relations.Our forbearance should never be misunderstood When action is required to preserve our national security we will act."

Thank you.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 15, 1981

DeVine

24

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR FRED WETTERING

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *rv*
SUBJECT: Soviet Activities in Africa

Today's Washington Post lead editorial makes the point that your recent memorandum made, namely, we should jump on the Soviets for their activities in Africa.

The more I think about it, the more I think your idea is a good one. If there is no time urgency to this, it could wait until as late as May, when I have a commencement address to give. Otherwise, we might find an outlet for it if the time requirement for it were immediate.

Perhaps one could deliver this as a section of the speech on development, which I would like to use as the theme for both commencement addresses that I am giving.

The Washington Post

AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

The Cynics

WITH DEPRESSING regularity, the nations of the world are asked to band together and act as a "community" to care for the least fortunate among them. A few years ago it was Cambodians and Vietnamese, victims of separate Indochina outrages, for whom international relief was sought. Now it is the turn of the several million Africans turned into refugees by a combination of war, civil strife and economic calamity. Many lived harsh lives before they were uprooted. Their situation now is scarcely imaginable.

At a meeting in Geneva the other day on African refugees, the United States offered \$235 million, more than half of what all the Western nations pledged. There are various ways to make this contribution look less generous than it is. It is said, for instance, that because the United States has more blacks, naturally it gives more. It is said that this country was looking to demonstrate that it is not neglectful of African refugees. It is said that the Reagan administration saw an opportunity to counter some of the bad publicity its Africa policy had other-

wise been receiving. We suggest it would be fairer to say that the United States gave generously and that it did so because this administration, like many of its predecessors, recognizes the country's humanitarian obligations. Why must the motives of the most forthcoming donors be picked at?

Why not, instead, examine the motives of those who share in the responsibility for generating the refugees but who accept none of the responsibility for tending to their misery? The Soviet Union and its clients are deeply and directly involved in the conflicts whose human flotsam is now strewn across Africa. They shunned Geneva. It is bad enough that Moscow and its clients do not respond with human feeling and pick up their share of what ought to be regarded as a common international burden. What makes it sting is the readiness of so many Third World nations to let them get away with it. The West, especially the United States, is expected to respond with compassion, if not with guilt. The Soviet Union hides behind its Marxist clichés and sends in more guns, which create more refugees.

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#1973 add-on

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JANET COLSON	<u>Jc</u>	11/1903	
BUD NANCE	<u>Jn</u>	11/1908	
DICK ALLEN	<u>Wa</u>	12/2239	
IRENE DERUS	<u>Ird</u>	12/0835	
JANET COLSON	<u>Jc</u>	13/0845	
BUD NANCE	<u>Bc</u>		
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I have kept
the original
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even tho it
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JANET COLSON

jc 11/1903

BUD NANCE

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DICK ALLEN

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IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

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INTERNAL NSC ROUTING

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GREGG	RUSSELL
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JOHNSON	SICK
KAMINSKY	STEARMAN
KEMP	STILWELL
KIMMITT	TREAT
KRAEMER	TYSON
LENZ	WETTERING
LEVINE	
ADMIN	

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*for our best
thanks
P*

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
10/28/15 (CDB)

RECEIVED 13 APR 81 18

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TO ALLEN

FROM WETTERING

DOCDATE 10 APR 81

KIMMITT

10 APR 81

SCHWEITZER

10 APR 81

KEYWORDS: USSR

AFRICA

ARMS SALES

EAST/WEST ECONOMICS

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS

SUBJECT: SOVIET RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROJECTING EAST - WEST CONFLICT INTO AFRICA

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 16 APR 81 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

ALLEN

BERTA

LENZ

HUBERMAN

DEAL

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(M /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) : ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

Lenz	S	4/15	any further action	4/16	
Wettering	3	4/17	for further action	4/18	
RA	K	5/8	La Division		
	C	5/13	noted by RVA w/ comment		WE 30 - GREGG

DISPATCH

WATCH FILE

(PA)

(C)



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

UNCLASSIFIED

31

S/S 8114654
with classified
attachments

May 8, 1981

UNCLASSIFIED
OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION(S)
10/26/85

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARD V. ALLEN
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: ICCUSA Meeting of April 30, 1981

Attached are the minutes of the April 30 meeting of
the Interagency Coordinating Committee on U.S.-Soviet Affairs
(ICCUSA).

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated.

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with classified attachments

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188

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i>	<i>No of</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i>
	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>
169998	MINUTES	3	ND	B1
	RE 4/30 MEETING OF ICCUSA			

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES
10/25/15 EOB

RECEIVED 09 MAY 81 09

TO ALLEN

FROM BREMER

DOC DATE 08 MAY 81

KEYWORDS: USSR GRAIN EMBARGO

TNF CSCE

~~BLOC CONTACT~~

SUBJECT: ICCUSA MTG ON APR 30

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE: STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

JENNINGS ✓

PIPES ✓

STEARMAN ✓

LENZ ✓

BAILEY ✓

RENTSCHLER

LORD ✓

COMMENTS

REF# 8114654

LOG

NSCIFID

(M / M)

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W/ATTCH FILE

(C) MB



DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
UNITED STATES CUSTOMS SERVICE
TRANSMITTAL AND ROUTING SLIP

SUBJECT OR FILE NO.

SUSPENSE DATE

9
36

- | | | | | | |
|--------------|-----------------|---------------|----------------|------------------------|-----------------|
| ACTION CODES | 1. ACTION | 4. CIRCULATE | 7. CORRECT | 10. INITIAL ATTACHMENT | 13. SEE ME |
| | 2. APPROVAL | 5. COMMENT | 8. FILE | 11. PER CONVERSATION | 14. SEE REMARKS |
| | 3. AS REQUESTED | 6. COORDINATE | 9. INFORMATION | 12. RETURN | 15. SIGNATURE |

TO	DESTINATION	ACTION CODE(S)	INITIALS	OUT DATE	TO	DESTINATION	ACTION CODE(S)	INITIALS	OUT DATE
1	John M. Walker, Jr.				5	<i>Ed</i> <i>File</i>			
2	Assistant Secretary Designate (Enforcement and Operations)				6				
3					7				
4					8				

REMARKS

The itinerary of Aeroflot flight #318 was direct to Moscow, scheduled to leave at 5:30 p.m. The search began at 5:10 p.m. and concluded at 7:40 p.m. The plane left thereafter.

The Soviet desk officer spoken to on May 12, 1981, by Meade Feild was Jerry Hamilton, State Department.

FROM	OFFICE AND ROOM NO.	PHONE	DATE
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170002	MEMO RE INCIDENT	2	5/13/1981	B7(E)

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>

169999 MEMO

1 5/13/1981 B1

R. KIMMITT THROUGH R. SCHWEITZER TO R.
ALLEN RE SOVIET ARMS SALES

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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170000	REPORT RE SOVIET ARMS SALES (PAGE 4 OF REPORT)	1	3/12/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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ID 8102706

41

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OF CLASSIFICATION ENCLOSURE
10/26/15 1500

RECEIVED 14 MAY 81 19

TO ALLEN

FROM KIMMITT

DOC DATE 13 MAY 81

SCHWEITZER

KEYWORDS: USSR

ARMS SALES

SUBJECT: SOVIET ARMS SALES

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

ALLEN

STEARMAN

PIPES

BAILEY

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(J /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

C 5/29

"RVA has seen"

RK, SC

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

PA

(C)

dsj

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170001	MEMO R. PIPES TO R. ALLEN RE RECENT SOVIET MOVES	1	5/13/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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#2705

43

JANET COLSON	<u>Jc</u>	14/1201	
BUD NANCE	<u>BK</u>	14/1315	
DICK ALLEN	<u>DA</u>	14/2010	
IRENE DERUS	<u>ID</u>	15/0643	
JANET COLSON	<u>Jc</u>	15/0910	
BUD NANCE	<u>BK</u>		
KAY			
CY TO VP		SHOW CC	
CY TO MEESE		SHOW CC	
CY TO BAKER		SHOW CC	
CY TO DEEVER		SHOW CC	
CY TO BRADY		SHOW CC	

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES
10/26/15 EDS
FROM PIPES

RECEIVED 13 MAY 81 20

DOC DATE 13 MAY 81

TO ALLEN

KEYWORDS: USSR NICARAGUA
SYRIA LEBANON
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

SUBJECT: REMARKS ON RECENT SOVIET MOVES

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION DUE: STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION	FOR COMMENT	FOR INFO
ALLEN		KEMP
		STEARMAN
		FONTAINE
		BAILEY

COMMENTS

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