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GEORGE WILL

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THE NEW

Books of The Times

By John Gross

AFGHANISTAN, THE GREAT GAME REVISITED. Edited by Rosanne Klass. 519 pages. Freedom House. Hard cover: \$29.95. Paperback: \$19.95.

IN February 1980 Leonid I. Brezhnev let it be known, through his friend Dr. Armand Hammer, that the Soviet Union was eager to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan. This was less than two months after it had begun pouring them in, and since then there have been frequent reports — each one greeted as a promising new development — that Moscow is eager to find a diplomatic solution to the fighting in Afghanistan as soon as possible.

The facts thus far tell a different story, and it seems reasonable to approach current Soviet moves toward a negotiated settlement with a certain amount of wariness. To the extent that they look more plausible than previous gestures of the same kind, however, it becomes doubly important to understand both the background and the true nature of what has been happening in Afghanistan; and far from being overtaken by events, the collection of essays and documents edited by Rosanne Klass, "Afghanistan, the Great Game Revisited," comes along at an unusually opportune time.

Until recently Afghanistan has occupied a lowly position on the American agenda. It is symptomatic that the first book on the country by an American scholar did not appear until 1965, and several of Miss Klass's contributors — notably the late Leon B. Poullada, who was Counselor for Economic Affairs in the United States Embassy in Kabul in the 1950's — complain of comparable neglect on the part of American foreign policy makers.

After World War II, for example, there was a consistent failure to support a pro-Western regime in Kabul, partly through indifference, partly for fear of offending Pakistan, which



Rosanne Klass

had a border dispute with Afghanistan. Eventually, in 1954, after his request for military aid had received a definitive rebuff from Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, the Afghan Prime Minister, Mohammad Daud, turned to the Soviet Union for help.

A second chance was thrown away after 1963, when the autocratic Daud was deposed and succeeded by a series of prime ministers who struggled to introduce democratic changes. Washington continued to neglect both the opportunities and the dangers that the situation in Afghanistan represented, and neither the restoration of Daud in 1973, at the instigation of the Afghan Communist Party, nor even the coup that brought the Communists themselves to power in 1978 were enough to set major alarm bells ringing.

The age of indifference came to an abrupt end in December 1979. "The Soviet invasion," President Carter

announced, "is a direct threat to U.S. national security" — which was true enough, although of course it represented an even more direct threat to the Afghans themselves. And "invasion" was something of a misnomer: it would have been more correct to speak of an escalation, since Soviet troops were already present in force in Afghanistan by the middle of 1979.

Behind these events lay a long history of Soviet penetration and beyond that an even longer history of Russian designs on the country. One of the most valuable aspects of "Afghanistan, the Great Game Revisited" is the historical perspective it provides and the continuity it establishes between the aims of czarist statesmen, casting their eyes toward the Indian Ocean, and those of their Soviet successors.

The greater part of the book, however, is devoted to the recent past and to current developments — and here, too, the contributors perform a badly needed job of enlightenment. Since 1979 Afghanistan may have become a familiar counter in political debate, but few of us have a clear idea of what is going on there and fewer still have registered its full implications.

To some degree this is no doubt because the facts are often obscure or confusing. But it also reflects a woefully inadequate response on the part of television, the press, religious leaders, intellectuals, spokesmen for human rights and the international community in general — something about which Rosanne Klass speaks with what is surely justifiable bitterness. There is nothing particularly obscure, after all, about the slaughter of nearly a million people.

The contributors Miss Klass has assembled are specialists, and they bring their expertise to bear on many different aspects of the war, among others, Soviet economic interests in Afghanistan, the internal divisions of the Afghan Communist Party, the impact of the fighting on Soviet Central Asia. There are grim accounts of the violation of human rights and of the forced Sovietization of Afghan culture; several contributors point out that the war is less expensive for the Russians than is often supposed since much of its cost is being paid for by the exploitation of Afghan natural resources.

The book also sets out to dispel the idea that the Afghan resistance is comparable in spirit with the

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
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
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DEAN R. KOONTZ

"Koontz has really hit his stride"

Recital: Mitsuko Shirai Sings

By BERNARD HOLLAND

MITSUKO SHIRAI, accompanied by her husband, Hartmut Hill, brought to Alice Tully Hall Sunday night a lieder program invested with unusual care and thoughtfulness. First there was the music itself — mostly from familiar composers but chosen with an ear for freshness.

The five wonderful Mendelssohn items argued strongly for wider exposure, while songs like "Freudvoll und leidvoll" spoke for Liszt's not always visible talent for intimate songfulness. The seven Wolf lieder wove

each accent, each pause for breath, was obviously the fruit of careful reflection on matters of musical and poetic grammar. Miss Shirai seemed often the beneficiary, though sometimes the victim, of this celebration. At her least compelling — in the young Mendelssohn group — she the feeling of passionate suppressing real passion hints of genuine achievement came in Liszt's "Himmelstempel" contralto.

ON MY MIND | A. M. Rosenthal

A. F. Johnson

The Great Game Goes On

Mikhail Gorbachev faces a challenge entirely worthy of his abilities as a master politician.

The task before him is to make sure that a withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, if it takes place, does not diminish full Soviet control of the country.

His predecessors spilled Soviet blood to invade Afghanistan. Mr. Gorbachev will build on what they achieved — Soviet domination of Afghanistan for the first time in history. He will struggle to keep Soviet control without more cost in Soviet lives. If he succeeds he will be a hero at home and in the world and still maintain Soviet power in South Asia.

You do not have to be a cynic or even particularly skeptical about Mr. Gorbachev to realize that this is his immediate goal. He already has established much of the political and military structure in Afghanistan necessary to achieve it. This will be left behind when Soviet troops march out.

He would fail in his duty as guardian of Soviet power if he did not at least try. He would be turning his back on what Moscow historically has believed are deep Russian interests in Afghanistan. He would be betraying the Soviet Army's sacrifices. He could not last long in power if he just gave up and walked away from Afghanistan.

For almost 200 years, Russian rulers, Czarist or Bolshevik, have tried to conquer Afghanistan. Kipling called it "the Great Game."

Now, control of Afghanistan puts the Soviet empire at the doors of the Indian subcontinent. Moscow need not invade Pakistan and India. All it has to do is knock firmly; it will be heard.

Afghanistan also puts Soviet power within tank distance of the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. From Af-

ghanistan, the Soviet Union can move deep into Iran. A true prize, Afghanistan, for a great imperial power.

But the Afghan resistance made Moscow pay a price: 10,000 Soviet lives, a wound that never was stanching, bitterness in the mouths of Soviet parents. Mr. Gorbachev is flexible enough to see that perhaps control can now be maintained without the Red Army and that in the future only Afghan blood need be shed.

Soviet troop withdrawal will leave behind a puppet Government whose ministries are laced with Soviet "advisers." This regime has international recognition. It also has a well-trained army, years of military supplies, and a

What Soviet pullout will leave behind.

Soviet-created air force. It has a powerful secret police with close ties to the K.G.B. It has the prospect of unending Soviet-bloc economic assistance.

The Afghan resistance will find itself alone, without the U.S. military assistance that has kept it fighting. It will be under pressure to join a Communist-dominated government. If it does not the world will shake its finger, call them naughty and turn away.

One million Afghans have died. Five million, a third of the nation, are in exile. The Afghans deserve an honorable peace. It is up to the United States, which profited from the stunning bravery of the Afghan resist-

ance, to struggle for it.

1. Moscow must agree to meet with the Afghan resistance. Three countries — the U.S., Pakistan, the Soviet Union — are determining the fate of a fourth. Something like this happened once before, in 1938, in Munich.

2. The U.S. should try to wiggle out of its incredible commitment to end aid to the resistance when the Russians begin to pull out, replacing it with a phased cutoff.

3. The withdrawal agreements should remove not just Soviet troops but the small army of "experts."

4. The powerful Soviet air and communication bases must be dismantled, not turned over to Kabul and the "experts."

5. Territory along the Soviet-Afghan frontier that has been annexed de facto by Moscow should be returned. So should the 10,000 Afghan children in the Soviet Union.

6. The secret police should be disbanded.

7. Afghanistan should be ruled not by the Kabul regime but by an interim government selected by a traditional council of elders in which Kabul would be a participant — along with resistance politicians and military leaders and representatives of Afghan clans and refugees. The permanent government should be chosen by an election in which the Communists can run, after the millions of refugees return.

This would mean a concession by the resistance, which loathes the Communists and wants them out or dead, preferably both. It would also mean the end of total Soviet domination.

It would be a new, more difficult challenge for Mr. Gorbachev — to show whether in the end he will choose peace for Afghanistan or is just playing another card in the game. □

Myths and Crocodile Tears



tween 1982 and 1986, from \$2.7 billion to \$5.6 billion — more than 60 percent of our 1986 trade deficit.

Intel Corporation has had a crackdown on Asian firms that allegedly do business in America. But Intel's erasable memory chips are only mem-

Afghanistan

November 1986

Background: The current situation in Afghanistan is a direct outgrowth of the Soviet invasion of December 1979, when the Soviet Union sent troops into the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, executed Marxist Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin, and installed the puppet regime of Babrak Karmal.

Although the Soviets ostensibly entered Afghanistan at the request of a friendly government to help put down an outside-sponsored insurgency, the imminent collapse of Amin's Marxist regime evidently prompted the invasion. Amin had been in power for less than 3 months; as deputy prime minister, he had seized control in September 1979 after reportedly killing his party rival, President and Prime Minister Noor Mohammed Taraki. Taraki himself had come to power in the bloody April 1978 coup that ended decades of rule by the Mohammadzai clan of the Durrani tribe. The Afghan resistance movement developed in response to attempts by the Taraki regime and its successors to impose its rule and a variety of Marxist-style "reforms" that ran counter to the deeply rooted traditions of the Afghan people.

Now in its 8th year, the resistance continues to deny to the Soviets the fruits of their attempted conquest. Despite improved counterinsurgency tactics and the presence of 116,000-118,000 Soviet troops, the Soviets have failed to establish the authority of the puppet Kabul government. Karmal's replacement in May 1986 by former Afghan secret police chief Najibullah and the intraparty bickering this has produced testify to the Soviet Union's continuing inability to establish a stable client regime.

Resistance developments: Although still troubled by internal divisions, the alliance of seven Afghan resistance parties formed in May 1985 has grown militarily more effective. Since the start of 1986, it has strengthened its presence within and outside Afghanistan by forming committees to implement health, education, agriculture, and commodity support projects for war-affected Afghans inside the country. These efforts counter Soviet attempts to force people out of the resistance-dominated countryside and have contributed toward the development of needed administrative skills. Visits by alliance delegations to the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the UN Human Rights Commission, and the UN General Assembly have helped to focus attention on the Afghan cause, while projecting the alliance as a representative political entity. In June 1986 President Reagan officially received a resistance delegation headed by the alliance spokesman.

UN efforts: Since January 1980, the UN General Assembly has overwhelmingly approved eight resolutions that call for a negotiated political settlement based on four principles:

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300 Eye St., N.E., # 209
Washington, D.C. 20002

10-7-86

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20002

Dear Mr. President:

Our hopes and prayers are with you as you represent the free people of the world in your meeting with the Soviet General Secretary this week. The people of Afghanistan are tragically aware of the true Soviet aim in the world. While we suffer from their bombs, napalm and treachery, we took heart from your promise upon your election that no territory would be lost to communism on your watch.

Recent signs have hinted that the Soviets may be seeking some accord on Afghanistan. Their current talks with the Chinese and other public pronouncements give weight to their fear. You have repeatedly stated that no agreement can possibly be reached concerning Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan without the agreement and participation of the legitimate representative of the Afghan people, the Mujahideen.

We will be watching the events in Iceland and all future meetings with the General Secretary with interest and trust in your leadership.

May God be with You,

Eshan Jan Areef

Eshan Jan Areef
On behalf of the Mujahideen
of Afghanistan

J. Milnor Roberts/H
Committee for a Free Afghanistan
Maj. Gen. J. Milnor Robert
AUS (Ret.) Chairman

- Complete withdrawal of Soviet troops;
- Restoration of an independent and nonaligned Afghanistan;
- Self-determination for the Afghan people; and
- Return of all of the refugees from Afghanistan with safety and honor.

To implement these principles, indirect negotiations between Pakistan and the Kabul regime have been underway in Geneva since June 1982 under the auspices of the UN Secretary General's personal representative; the seventh round of talks ended inconclusively in August 1986 when the Kabul authorities failed to provide a reasonable timetable for the withdrawal of all Soviet forces.

Soviet policy: The Soviets pursued their Afghanistan policy with renewed vigor in 1986, trying new tactics both on the battlefield and in their efforts to gain legitimacy for the puppet regime. Increased reliance on elite commando units and air mobility have been accompanied by hints of flexibility at the negotiating table and calls for renewed efforts toward national reconciliation. In July 1986, General Secretary Gorbachev announced plans to withdraw six regiments from Afghanistan. Concluded in October, the withdrawal turned out to be a sham; it had no effect on Soviet combat effectiveness inasmuch as most of the regiments withdrawn were either anti-aircraft or armored units of little use in a guerrilla war. Also, the Soviets had introduced two new motorized rifle regiments and several dozen tanks following Gorbachev's statement, for the sole purpose of withdrawing them in October.

At the same time, the Soviets and the Kabul regime have escalated cross-border sabotage and penetrations of Pakistani territory that were calculated in part to increase public unease in Pakistan. Through October 1986, there have been about 650 violations of Pakistani territory, a 150% increase over the total for 1985.

US policy: US opposition to the Soviet invasion remains strong. The US supports the UN-sponsored negotiations in Geneva and has indicated it is willing to lend political support in the context of a comprehensive settlement. In the absence of such a settlement, the US has made clear that, until all Soviet forces depart, it will support the Afghan cause.

The US has substantially expanded its efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to Afghans inside Afghanistan. In fiscal year 1987, the humanitarian assistance program for war-affected Afghans is budgeted at \$30 million, a 100% increase over fiscal year 1986. This program is in addition to the \$484 million spent since January 1980 to help the Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

C. Ghannadi

CARLUCCI...CONTINUED

world. And in my judgment, it's just a question of time. But one shouldn't go into those kinds of predictions.

GIBSON: Mr. Secretary, a pleasure to have you with us this morning. Always nice to have you here.

SECRETARY CARLUCCI: Thank you.

GIBSON: Thanks for coming and joining us this morning.

LOS ANGELES TIMES

14 APRIL 1988

Pg. II-7

Will Soviets Get Out to Get Back In?

To Avoid Losing the Peace, West Must Build Afghan Unity

By DANIEL PIPES

What are the Soviets up to in Afghanistan? Their willingness to withdraw forces can be interpreted two ways.

The optimists (which includes the Reagan Administration) believe that Mikhail S. Gorbachev must get out of the war in Afghanistan if he is to go forward with his plans for *perestroika*. According to them, the war is an inherited burden (a "bleeding wound") that must be cast off as quickly as possible.

The pessimists hold that Gorbachev's fine words and fresh spirit must be seen in the light of a 70-year history of unrelenting Soviet military ambition and territorial expansion. They are wary. Not knowing Gorbachev's motives, they want the United States to prepare for the worst. They fear that the Soviets (ostensible moves to leave the country notwithstanding) still plan to consolidate their control of Afghanistan. Pessimists suspect an application of that classic Russian dialectic—one step back, two steps forward.

The main reason, the pessimists point out, to doubt that the Soviets really intend to withdraw is that they have too much to lose by leaving Afghanistan. Even though Soviet forces have not been able to pacify the entire country, they nevertheless enjoy significant benefits there. They control several principal cities and are feverishly exploiting Afghanistan's extensive mineral and gas reserves. In addition, they control forward airfields that bring Soviet forces hundreds of miles closer to the Persian Gulf and potential hegemony over the huge oil and gas reserves there. Control over these would give the Soviet Union major leverage over the world economy.

Abandoning Afghanistan would exact more than a material price; the psychological cost for the Soviet state would be

immense. Moscow's place in the world, after all, depends on its being perceived as powerful—a defeat by rag-tag insurgents would badly erode its reputation. Also, there would be domestic consequences for Gorbachev, as Soviet military leaders will surely not accept a defeat in war with grace.

For all these reasons, abandoning the country will cost the Soviets dearly. Why, then, do they agree to withdraw their forces? Recent Soviet activities suggest that they are embarking on a new and more sophisticated strategy to achieve precisely the same goals they have fought for since 1979. Withdrawal may provide the most realistic and least costly means of doing this.

Moscow's problem lies in the worldwide agreement that the Red Army brutally and wrongly invaded Afghanistan. Afghans and Americans, as well as the Pakistani and Chinese leadership, all agree on this, as do many West Europeans and Muslims. There is no other issue in the world today that generates such wide anti-Soviet hostility. This consensus carries great weight; indeed, it is the single most important source of support for the Afghan *moujahedeen*, or resistance fighters. Without such massive backing, the *moujahedeen* would be a far weaker force.

From the Soviet point of view, the enemy's center of gravity lies in its far-reaching popularity. If Moscow can change public opinion, it can reduce the widespread opposition to Soviet troops in Afghanistan, undermine the pro-*moujahedeen* consensus and undercut the opponent. The battle for Afghanistan would effectively be over if Moscow could only mire the *moujahedeen* in the kind of controversy that faces the other forces fighting the Soviet bloc. In short, Moscow

needs to turn the *moujahedeen* into Contras.

How to do this? An answer can be found in the steps actually taken by the Soviets in recent months. Very cleverly, they have offered to undo what everyone objects to—the presence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan—while preparing the way for a more nuanced role. They have created the conditions for a scenario that will go something like this:

Moscow very rapidly withdraws its troops from Afghanistan, so that a majority of them are out by this summer (though, of course, military "advisers" and KGB agents will remain). This has two main consequences for the Soviets. First, they win good will internationally, erasing the years of obloquy that they have suffered. Indeed, there will undoubtedly be many observers who will seek to reward the Soviet authorities for taking this step. This will render future assistance to the *moujahedeen* very problematic.

Second, the withdrawal creates a power vacuum in Afghanistan that the pro-Soviet government in Kabul and the anti-Soviet *moujahedeen* scramble to fill. Worse, the long-tense relations among the seven resistance groups erupt into open discord and possibly into civil war. Anarchy follows, with murder and atrocities becoming common. Afghanistan comes to resemble Lebanon, lacking a central authority and torn by groups competing along ideological, religious, geographical and tribal lines.

Anarchy would irreparably sully the high reputation that the *moujahedeen* have sustained through eight years of valor in war. Their true toughness, even barbarism, will suddenly become apparent, leading to a quick dissolution of their wide backing.

Anarchy would also create an opening

Costello may shift BTI, RPVs, ADI, CDI, Standoff Weapons**COSTELLO BALKS AT NEW PROGRAM DUTIES, SEEKS HANDS-OFF MANAGEMENT ROLE**

DOD Undersecretary for Acquisition Robert Costello is protesting recent congressional moves to give added program management responsibilities to the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) and is looking at a major OSD management restructuring, according to informed DOD sources. Toward this end Costello is considering ways to move the daily control of Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPV), Balanced Technology Initiative (BTI), Air Defense Initiative (ADI), Joint Standoff Weapons and Conventional Defense Initiative (CDI) Technology Base out of OSD and back to the program managers, these sources say. In the case of BTI, Costello reportedly is eyeing a plan to shift funding authority to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).

Costello wants OSD to perform program oversight duties and get away from actual source selection and specific contract duties. Congress recently gave OSD funding authority in all five of the areas Costello wants to shift. An OSD source says the trend is continuing with Congress suggesting that OSD be given funding authority for Close Air Support (CAS) and the Army's Palletized Loading System (PLS). OSD officials charge that OSD's responsibilities are growing at a time when OSD staff size is limited.

Costello is opposed to the new congressional push to vest contract authority within OSD on philosophical grounds, sources say. Costello's view, these sources say, is that OSD's role should be limited to coordinating programs and should not involve day-to-day contract decisions.

As part of his overall strategy to rework OSD's management, Costello is considering shifting BTI funding management to DARPA. BTI was established in 1987 to provide additional support for the development of new technologies not funded under budget line items by the Services. The funding management has been handled by OSD, with DARPA executing about one-third of the programs and the Services the rest. However, there is resistance in Congress over DARPA assuming full control. One congressional source said, "There is real concern that any BTI funds would become DARPA funds and the essence of BTI programs would be lost." The source continued that some members of Congress believe DARPA has a poor track record in handling technology and with cooperating with the Services. He added that some members of Congress are concerned that DARPA's deputy directors do not work well with each other and the management control within the agency is at an all-time low.

SOVIETS... CONTINUED

for Soviet forces to return. At the minimum, Moscow could fall back on "the protection of Soviet personnel" line to justify renewed military action in Afghanistan. At best, it could get a legitimate Afghan group to request its aid. Alternately, the Soviets also seem to have prepared the way to split off the northern portion of Afghanistan and bring it under their direct control.

In any case, the Soviets would return to a brutalized country where the locals had shown themselves incapable of self-government. These conditions—so completely different from 1979—would win grudging acceptance internationally. If the choice is the Soviets or carnage, most observers would choose a Soviet *pax*. This is, after all, what permits the Syrians to operate in Lebanon or the Vietnamese in Cambodia without serious international opposition. In these conditions, it would be only a matter of time before Afghanistan fell wholly under Soviet control.

The Soviets would then have achieved politically what they had failed to win militarily.

The United States has a tradition of winning the war and losing the peace.

After both world wars, Americans washed their hands of conflict to get back to more pleasurable pursuits. In both cases, this quick loss of interest created terrible problems in subsequent decades. It is important to keep a close eye on Afghanistan to make sure that eight years of war are not in vain.

What can Washington do to prevent losing the peace? Much hinges on *moujahedeen* disunity. As long as there was a joint enemy, disunity was manageable. But it could have a lethal effect once most of the Red Army evacuates and Afghans are left to govern their own country. If Afghanistan is to regain its independence, the *moujahedeen* must unify to form a single authority that can govern the country. Until that happens, the Soviet forces will continue to threaten.

Therefore, the West should concentrate on helping to build Afghan unity. The composition and orientation of the government matters less than its ability to control Afghan territory. (The same applies to Iran: Bad as it is, the Khomeini government is far preferable to a breakdown of authority and the threat of a Soviet invasion.)

Keeping this in mind, Washington should work with others to establish a government in Kabul. Efforts devoted to getting

the seven *moujahedeen* groups to cooperate have so far had little success. And with the taste of power in their mouths, the Peshawar leaders are less likely than ever to work together.

New thinking is needed here. One idea is to pick just one *moujahedeen* group and build up its power and authority. This group alone would then receive all the outside world's financial aid and diplomatic backing. If arms continue to be supplied, it alone gets them. With luck and dexterity, concentrating resources in this fashion would lead to the emergence of a single authority capable of maintaining order in Afghanistan.

We have now entered the critical months of the war. The Geneva accord is important but it must not blind us to the complexities that follow. If the U.S. government does not act with care and imagination, 1 million deaths and the sufferings of 5 million refugees will have been for naught.

Daniel Pipes is director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia. He recently returned from Geneva, where he covered Afghan affairs as a U.S. delegate to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights.