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(2 of 2)

[Too Late to File]

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: RECORDS
COUNTRY FILE

Archivist: cas/cas

File Folder: United Kingdom vol. VI 7/1/84 - 1/4/85 [2 of 2]
Box 91333

Date: October 9, 1998

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. cable	052023z 2 p. <i>Part. 5/28/01 598 002 # 627</i>	9/5/84	P1
2. memo	Kenneth DeGraffenreid to Robert Kimmitt re travel to united Kingdom 1 p. (6591)	9/4/84	P1
3. draft cable	<i>R</i> partial 1 p. <i>#628</i>	n.d	P6
4. letter	Reagan to Charles Price 1 p. (5564) <i>R 7/21/00 598-002 # 629</i>	7/31/84	P1
5. memo	Robert McFarlane to the President re reply to Ambassador Price 1 p. <i>u # 630</i>	7/27/84	P1
6. memo	Peter Sommer to McFarlane re reply to Ambassador Price 1 p. <i>u # 631</i>	7/25/84	P1
7. letter	Price to Reagan 1 p.	7/11/84	P1, P5
8. letter	original of item #6 1 p.	7/11/84	P1, P5

RESTRICTION CODES

Residential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- 1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- 2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- 3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- 4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- 5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- 6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CO

ID 8406591

RECEIVED 05 SEP 84 19

TO KIMMITT

FROM DE GRAFFENREID

DOCDATE 04 SEP 84

W: CFS

ED 28 1997
10/8/98

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN

INTELLIGENCE

Scotland

SUBJECT: DEGRAFFENREID TRAVEL TO UNITED KINGDOM

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES PA

PA
Admin

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

KIMMITT

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (LF 07)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

C 9/5 KE - 1H noted 10

9/5 cable sent by WHSR

~~9/6 originals not returned to NSC/S~~

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE *[Signature]*

National Security Council The White House

System # I

ED

Package # 6591

1327

SEP 5 AM: 31

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>T</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>R</u>	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>		<u></u>
Situation Room	<u>3</u>	<u>Sent 19 488750</u>	<u>D</u>

I = Information
A = Action
R = Retain
D = Dispatch
N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

9/5
- no folder
- Kim with approved
- cable sent
- pls elast

Kals

6591
OUTGOING

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 THE WHITE HOUSE 6887 DTG: 052023Z SEP 84 PSN: 068761
SIT417 AN003916 TOR: 249/2006Z

DISTRIBUTION: KIMM RLPB /002

OP IMMED
DE YEKADS #6887 2492006
O 052023Z SEP 84 ZFF-4 ZYH
FM THE WHITE HOUSE

TO 

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS WH06887

SUBJ: TRAVEL NOTIFICATION

1. MR. KENNETH E. DEGRAFFENREID, 335-36-7140, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS AND SENIOR DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS WILL BE ON OFFICIAL TRAVEL TO LONDON, UK AND EDZELL, SCOTLAND DURING THE PERIOD 6-11 SEP 84. WHILE IN LONDON, MR. DEGRAFFENREID WILL BE A CONFERENCE PARTICIPANT AT THE ROYAL UNITED STATES INSTITUTE FROM 6-9 SEP FOLLOWED BY A VISIT TO THE US NAVY SECURITY GROUP ACTIVITY, EDZELL, SCOTLAND FROM 9-11 SEP. LODGING IN LONDON WILL BE AT THE ROYAL HORSEGUARDS, WHITEHALL COURT AND IN SCOTLAND AT THE HOLIDAY INN, ABERDEEN AIRPORT.

2. MR. DEGRAFFENREID'S ITINERARY IS AS FOLLOWS:

ARRIVE	DEPART	AIRLINES	DESTINATION
0800 SEP 6	1530 SEP 9	WA NO. 32	LONDON/GATWICK
1650 SEP 9	0700 SEP 11	BA NO. 5614	ABERDEEN
0825 SEP 11	1340 SEP 11	BA NO. 5601	LONDON/HEATHROW
1630 SEP 11	TERM	WA NO. 33	WASH DC

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS 598-002-#627
By AS, NARA, Date 3/78/01

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OUTGOING

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 THE WHITE HOUSE 6887 DTG: 052023Z SEP 84 PSN: 068761

3. ANY ASSISTANCE YOU COULD RENDER MR. DEGRAFFENREID, SHOULD HE REQUIRE, WOULD BE APPRECIATED.

DECL: OADR

218

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL/COMINT~~

September 4, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: KENNETH E. deGRAFFENREID *Kd*

SUBJECT: Travel to United Kingdom

Attached is my itinerary for travel to London (for private intelligence conference) and Edzell, Scotland (1-day visit to US Navy Security Group Activity).

Would appreciate a back-channel to Embassy London advising them of this trip as a heads up courtesy. Thanks.

Attachment
Tab I Itinerary

*OK.**RMK**9/5/84*

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS 598-002 #628

BY *CAS*, NARA, DATE *3/28/01*

~~CONFIDENTIAL/COMINT~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DRAFT CABLE

FROM: THE WHITE HOUSE

TO: AMERICAN EMBASSY, LONDON UK

SUBJ: TRAVEL NOTIFICATION

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 TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS AND ^{Senior} DIRECTOR
 OF INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS WILL BE ON OFFICIAL TRAVEL TO LONDON, UK
 AND EDZELL, SCOTLAND DURING THE PERIOD 6-11 SEP 84. WHILE IN LONDON,
 MR. deGRAFFENREID WILL BE A CONFERENCE PARTICIPANT AT THE ROYAL
 UNITED SERVICES INSTITUTE FROM 6-9 SEP FOLLOWED BY A VISIT TO
 THE US NAVY SECURITY GROUP ACTIVITY, EDZELL, SCOTLAND FROM
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 WHITEHALL COURT AND IN SCOTLAND AT THE HOLIDAY INN, ABERDEEN
 PORT.

MR. deGRAFFENREID'S ITINERARY IS AS FOLLOWS:

ARRIVE	DEPART	AIRLINES	DESTINATION
0800 SEP 6	1530 SEP 9	WA #32	LONDON/GATWICK
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0825 SEP 11	1340 SEP 11	BA #5601	LONDON/HEATHROW
1630 SEP 11	TERM	WA #33	WASH DC

3. ANY ASSISTANCE YOU COULD RENDER MR. deGRAFFENREID, SHOULD HE REQUIRE, WOULD BE APPRECIATED.

By CIS 10/8/98

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECEIVED 18 JUL 84 18

TO PRESIDENT

FROM PRICE, CHARLES H

DOCDATE 11 JUL 84

CAS 10/8/98

KEYWORDS GREAT BRITAIN

MEDIA

THATCHER, MARGARET

SUBJECT: AMB PRICE FWDS CY OF ECONOMIST ARTICLE CRITICIZING THATCHER

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 20 JUL 84 STATUS S FILES *PA*

FOR ACTION
SOMMER

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
FORTIER
MATLOCK
SMALL

COMMENTS

REF# 232942

LOG

NSCIFID

(JF)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>M. McFarlane</i>	<i>X 7/26</i>	<i>Fwd Proc for Sig</i>	<i>7/27</i>	
<i>Pres</i>	<i>P 7/28</i>	<i>signature</i>		
<i>STATE</i>	<i>JUL 31 1984 AUG 17 1984</i>	<i>Pres sgd ltr for dispatch</i>		<i>PS</i>

DISPATCH

BTM 8/17

(W/ATTCH)

FILE *PA* *etc*

National Security Council
The White House

System # I
Package # 5564

84 AUG 17 P 6: 50

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson			
Bob Kimmitt			
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	<u>H</u>	<u>D ASAP</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

THRU STATE SECRETARIAT; ~~NO~~ SEAL
envelop - NO COPY TO STATE. DO NOT
LDX

National Security Council
The White House

System # I
Package # 5564

0 JUL 26 AM 11: 14

1270

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>X</u>		
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	<u>3</u>		
Bud McFarlane	<u>4</u>	<u>m</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>A</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Original of Tab I with Tabs A & B passed
to Dick Darman 7/28 pm.

84 JUL 26 P 2: 14

REFERRAL

DATE: 17 AUG 84

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHARLE HILL

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, STATE

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: AMB CHARLES H PRICE

SOURCE. PRESIDENT

DATE: 31 JUL 84

KEYWORDS GREAT BRITAIN

MEDIA

THATCHER, MARGARET

SUBJ: PRESIDENTIAL LTR TO AMB PRICE -- CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH TO AMB PRICE ASAP BY POUCH.

SEALED ENVELOPE; DO NOT OPEN.

THANK YOU.

DUE DATE: 18 AUG 84

COMMENTS ORIGINAL LTR RETURNED TODAY FROM PRESIDENT



FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED
OF CLASSIFICATION

CAS 10/8/98

DI ED 1997

The Honorable Charles H. Price, II
U.S. Ambassador to the United Kingdom
United Kingdom
London

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5564

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 31, 1984

Dear Charlie:

Thank you for sending me the Economist article concerning Mrs. Thatcher's foreign policy management style. I also appreciate receiving your candid and thoughtful personal views.

I must admit that the Economist article, in some ways, reminded me of U.S. media criticism of my policies. Margaret's perseverance and persuasiveness, in my view, have always been among her greatest strengths. At the same time, I am sure you are right in saying that she must be alert to not being isolated in her own Cabinet.

Thank you for keeping me informed about the situation in the U.K.

Sincerely, *Ron*

P.S. Nancy sends her love & from both of us to Carol.

The Honorable Charles H. Price, II
U.S. Ambassador to the United Kingdom
United Kingdom
London

CAS 598-002 #629
7/21/00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

Herself

Margaret Thatcher as foreign policy maker

The reduction in Britain's EEC budget bill is more than anybody in Britain or the rest of Europe would have thought possible five years ago. That much is a tribute to the unusual kind of prime minister that Mrs Margaret Thatcher is.


Yet the whole of this latest bout of British budget bargaining in Europe puts a question-mark over Mrs Thatcher as a foreign policy maker. She knows she wanted more and thought she could get more. Her bargaining power went when she lost control of her party over withholding payments to Brussels; so her supporters in Britain are left disappointed, her opponents to make capital from her discomfiture. A modest budget benefit for Britain, but the ceiling on EEC spending breached, the farm policy trimmed not reformed. This has gained her little in the rest of Europe.

More than instinct, but less than finesse

In the compromise she made at Fontainebleau—and notably in the skilful pre-emptive concession she made on figures (see page 47)—Britain's European partners have seen that Mrs Thatcher's reputation for pragmatic reasonableness at the end of the day is deserved. Outweighing that, however, they see a perennial bluffer whose bluff can be called, a kneejerker whose knee can be stroked; and somebody who has soured European politics through months and years at a time when world events badly required it to be sweet, all for a deal that could (such things are always easier in retrospect) have been struck much earlier.

The rest of Mrs Thatcher's foreign policy record is a budget affair. She can be accused of it, rightly, over Hongkong, where her premature lurch into the breach helped not a bit. And but for Lord Carrington's and Lord Harlech's well-timed persuasion, she probably would have been accused of it over Zimbabwe.

The book is not all written. In common with all sufferers from Downingstreetitis, Mrs Thatcher has



similarly mixed one. Her relationship with the United States is not what conservative common ground and personal liking for the present president suggest. Uneven response, impatience mixed with courtship, simple lack of knowledge have reduced Mrs Thatcher's influence over economic and foreign policy in Washington. Unconsulted over Grenada (and badly briefed by her own advisers) she allowed the heat of the moment to boil her reaction out of all proportion, thereby offending an America whose massive secret arms supply helped win her the Falklands war. Smiles are back in fashion, but fundamental sympathy and trust for her in Washington have gone, probably for good.

Her conversion to being a good European itself dates from her assessment in opposition that post-Nixon, post-Vietnam America was a jumpy, if essential, ally that could not always be relied upon. Yet Mrs Thatcher has patently failed to convince anybody that she is really a "good European" either. Her east European policy is, equally, not coherent. She discarded her iron lady's clothing last autumn, she has visited Hungary. The door to Moscow has been ajar since she mentioned Russian sacrifices during Hitler's war. But she cannot easily walk through it without undermining Mr Reagan—and all she stands for herself. As for a Thatcher foreign policy in the world beyond Europe and America—to compare with, say, President Mitterrand's in Africa—i does not seem to exist.

There is plenty of sound instinct in Mrs Thatcher. On timing and strategic sense there is little. She can be accused of failure, rightly or wrongly, over the Euro-caught the foreign policy bug, but only recently. She has one thoughtful long-range adviser, but her attempt to equip Downing Street with its own foreign policy centre falls between every stool: a suitable idea in the hands of unsuitable people. And, as in so much else, Mrs Thatcher's central strength in foreign policy making is her central weakness: herself.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DISTRIBUTION RECORD

Log Number 5564

Date AUG 17 1984

UNCLASSIFIED U
OF CLASSIFIED

CAS 11/19/96

Subject: SEALED PRESIDENTIAL ENVELOPE

DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET SECRET CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

_____ Amb. McFarlane	_____ Ms. Dornan	_____ Mr. R. Lehman	_____ Mr. Pollock	_____ Mr. Teicher
_____ Adm. Poindexter	_____ Cmdr. Dur	_____ Mr. Levine	_____ Mr. Raymond	_____ Cmdr. Thompson
_____ Sit. Room	_____ Mr. Fontaine	_____ Col. Lilac	_____ Ms. Reger	_____ Mr. Tyson
_____ Mr. Beal	_____ Mr. Fortier	_____ Ltc. Linhard	_____ Mr. Robinson	_____ Mr. Wettering
_____ Ltc. Childress	_____ Mr. Helm	_____ Mr. Martin	_____ Gen. Russell	_____ Exec. Secretary
_____ Ltc. Cox	_____ Mr. Kemp	_____ Mr. Matlock	_____ Col. Rye	_____ NSC Secretariat
_____ Mr. De Graffenreid	_____ Mr. Kraemer	_____ Mr. Menges	_____ Cpt. Shull	_____ NSC Registry
_____ Ms. Dobriansky	_____ Mr. Laux	_____ Mr. McMinn	_____ Mr. Sigur	_____ NSC Admin.
	_____ Mr. C. Lehman	_____ Ltc. North	_____ Mr. Sommer	_____ NSC MSG Center

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	# CYS	Date	Time	Received/Signed For By:
THE VICE PRESIDENT				
THE SECRETARY OF STATE Exec sec/Room 7241	<u>ORIGINAL</u>			
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY Main Bldg/Room 3422				
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE The Pentagon				
DIRECTOR, ACDA Room 5933/Dept. of State				
CHAIRMAN US START DELEGATION C/o ACDA, 5933 State				
CHAIRMAN US INF DELEGATION C/o ACDA, 5933 State				
DIRECTOR, CIA Langley, Va/or Pickup				
CHAIRMAN, JCS The Pentagon				
DIRECTOR, OMB Room 252 OEOB				
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO UNITED NATIONS Room 6333, State Dept.				
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE 14th & Const. Ave. NW, Room 5851				
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY GA257, Forrestal Bldg				
DIRECTOR, AID Room 5942, Dept. of State				
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Dept. of Justice, Room 5119				
DIRECTOR, OSTP Room 360, OEOB				
DIRECTOR, USIA 400 C Street, S.W.				
THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR 18th & E. Street NW				
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE Independence & 14th SW				
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE Room 209 Winder Bldg 17 & F St NW				
THE DIRECTOR, FEMA 500 C Street,				
DIRECTOR, DMSPA Room 3E813, Pentagon				

DATE, TIME & SIGN THIS RECEIPT & RETURN TO: BT MERCHANT, SITUATION ROOM, WHITE HOUSE

MSG FROM: NSWGH --CPUA TO: NSFEG --CPUA
To: NSFEG --CPUA

07/31/84 12:16:11

~~SECRET~~

NOTE FROM: WILMA HALL

SUBJECT: Items back from the President

1270

5564

10/8/98
CLASSIFIED
By CAS
10/8/98
Sommer/Reply to Amb Price -- RR signed ltr to
Amb Price w/handwritten note: "P.S. Nancy sends
her love & from both of us to Carol."
CANNOT BE DISPATCHED UNTIL RETURN TO WASHINGTON --
The response to an unclassified incoming letter
was classified CONFIDENTIAL !

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RJR
has seen
+ acted
upon

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

5564

July 27, 1984

CONFIDENTIAL

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *rcm*
SUBJECT: Reply to Ambassador Price

Charlie Price has sent you an Economist article highly critical of Mrs. Thatcher's foreign policy management style. Charlie also adds his own candid, personal view that her management style, i.e., her disregard of the views of others, is becoming progressively worse.

Your reply thanks Charlie for his candid views and notes that at least some of the Economics allegations remind you of U.S. media criticism of yourself.

RECOMMENDATION

OK No That you sign the reply to Ambassador Price.

URR _____

Attachments

- Tab A Reply to Ambassador Price
- Tab B Price's Incoming

598-002 #630
CAS 7/2/84

CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

July 25, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

SIGNED

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *Peter*

SUBJECT: Reply to Ambassador Price

Charlie Price has written the President to draw his attention to a critical Economist article about Mrs. Thatcher's foreign policy management style. Price also adds his own private, candid views about her management style.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Tab I memo to the President forwarding for signature a suggested reply to Price.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

JM
Jack Matlock concurs.

Attachments

- Tab I Memo to President
- Tab A Suggested Reply
- Tab B Price's Incoming

D
N 598-002 #631
EV *CAS*
7/21/00

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 7 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: JULY 18, 1984

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE CHARLES H. PRICE II

SUBJECT: UNOPENED

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY (STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION	
	ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
ROBERT C. MCFARLANE	ORG	84/07/18		/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /		/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /		/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /		/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /		/ /
REFERRAL NOTE:		/ /		/ /

COMMENTS: ORIGINAL TO LORETTA BRAXTON

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA: S INDIVIDUAL CODES: _____

MI MAIL USER CODES: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

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*****
*ACTION CODES:          *DISPOSITION CODES:      *OUTGOING                *
*                      *                      * CORRESPONDENCE:       *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION  *A-ANSWERED                *TYPE RESP=INITIALS    *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM       *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL      *           OF SIGNER  *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE      *C-COMPLETED              *           CODE = A     *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET  *S-SUSPENDED              *COMPLETED = DATE OF  *
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*                      *           OUTGOING   *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *                      *                      *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE       *                      *                      *
*X-INTERIM REPLY       *                      *                      *
*****

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REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
 (ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT. 2590
 KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
 LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
 MANAGEMENT.

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 8 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

Herself

Margaret Thatcher as foreign policy maker

The reduction in Britain's EEC budget bill is more than anybody in Britain or the rest of Europe would have thought possible five years ago. That much is a tribute to the unusual kind of prime minister that Mrs Margaret Thatcher is.


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The book is not all written. In common with all sufferers from Downingstreetitis, Mrs Thatcher has



similarly mixed one. Her relationship with the United States is not what conservative common ground and personal liking for the present president suggest. Uneven response, impatience mixed with courtship, simple lack of knowledge have reduced Mrs Thatcher's influence over economic and foreign policy in Washington. Unconsulted over Grenada (and badly briefed by her own advisers) she allowed the heat of the moment to boil her reaction out of all proportion, thereby offending an America whose massive secret arms supply helped win her the Falklands war. Smiles are back in fashion, but fundamental sympathy and trust for her in Washington have gone, probably for good.

Her conversion to being a good European itself dates from her assessment in opposition that post-Nixon, post-Vietnam America was a jumpy, if essential, ally that could not always be relied upon. Yet Mrs Thatcher has patently failed to convince anybody that she is really a "good European" either. Her east European policy is, equally, not coherent. She discarded her iron lady's clothing last autumn, she has visited Hungary. The door to Moscow has been ajar since she mentioned Russian sacrifices during Hitler's war. But she cannot easily walk through it without undermining Mr Reagan—and all she stands for herself. As for a Thatcher foreign policy in the world beyond Europe and America—to compare with, say, President Mitterrand's in Africa—it does not seem to exist.

There is plenty of sound instinct in Mrs Thatcher. Of timing and strategic sense there is little. She can be accused of failure, rightly or wrongly, over the Euro-caught the foreign policy bug, but only recently. She has one thoughtful long-range adviser, but her attempt to equip Downing Street with its own foreign policy centre falls between every stool: a suitable idea in the hands of unsuitable people. And, as in so much else, Mrs Thatcher's central strength in foreign policy making is her central weakness: herself.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DISTRIBUTION RECORD

Log Number 5564

Date to 1/8/90 AUG 17 1984

Subject: SEALED PRESIDENTIAL ENVELOPE

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TO MCFARLANE

FROM WRIGHT, O

DOC DATE 06 JUL 84

KEYWORDS GREAT BRITAIN

EC

SUBJECT: EC HEADS OF GOVT PAPER PRESENTED BY PM THATCHER AT EUROPEAN COUNCIL
MTG 25 & 26 JUN

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE: 13 JUL 84 STATUS S

FILES

PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

SOMMER

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COMMENTS

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DISPATCH

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W/ATTCH FILE

A.
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National Security Council
The White House

System # I
Package # 5320

84 JUL 10 P 4: 10

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y			
Bob Kimmitt	1	K	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
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NSC Secretariat	2		Staff
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Action Sommer
Cont WISS
Info McFarlane

- 10. 1271 5320 Sommer/Reply to Sir Oliver Wright
7/30 - RCM signed Tab I ltr to Wright;
ltr dispatched from S/B
- ✓ 11. 1273 5365 Sommer/Reply to Archbishop Iakovos
7/30 - RCM signed Tab I ltr to Iakovos;
ltr dispatched from S/B
- ✓ 12. 1273 5425 Cobb/Presl Ltr to Mother-in-Law of
Assassinated General Dalla Chiesa
7/30 - RCM signed Tab I Memo to Pres;
Memo w/Tab A: Ltr to Mrs Carraro
forwarded "Via Darman"
- ✓ 13. 1270 5564 Sommer/Reply to Amb Price
7/28 - RCM signed; original memo to Pres
with Tabs A & B passed to Darman
- ✓ 14. 1273 5575 Sommer/New German Ambassador
ADD-ON 7/30 - RCM notes "OK"; pls provide a copy
to W. Hall for followup action
- ✓ 15. 1268 5578 Matlock/Ltr from Wm Taylor of CSIS
7/30 - RCM signed Tab I Ltr to Taylor;
dispatched from S/B
- ✓ 16. 1270 5585 Dobriansky/Polish Church Private
Agricultural Plan
7/28 - RCM signed Tab I Memo to Pres;
original w/Tab A passed to Darman
- ✓ 17. 1268 5642 Matlock/Ltr from Terry Pearce and
Tom Green
7/30 - RCM signed Tab I; ltr dispatched
from Santa Barbara
Pls provide copy of pkg to W. Hall
- ✓ 18. ?? 5707 McFarlane memo to Michael Deaver/
1269 President's Attendance at the B-1B Roll-out
7/28 - RCM discussed with Deaver: RR
attendance not approved.

. cc NSJMD

10. 1271 5320

Sommer/Reply to Sir Oliver Wright
7/30 - RCM signed Tab I ltr to Wright;
ltr dispatched from S/B

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

JUL 30 1984

Dear Sir Oliver,

Thank you for providing me a copy of the paper entitled "Europe--The Future" that Mrs. Thatcher sent to other European Community Heads of Government as a contribution to discussion at the European Council's June meeting in Fontainbleau.

I understand that Ken Dam has already conveyed to you our pleasure at the outcome of the Fontainbleau meeting. I would like to add I was struck by both the paper's emphasis that the European Community and the Alliance cannot rest on the achievements of the post-war period and by its upbeat assessment of the future.

A strengthened Europe is clearly in U.S. interests. We look forward to Europe playing an increased role in our common efforts to promote peace and prosperity.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

SIGNED

Ambassador Oliver Wright
British Embassy
Washington, D.C.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

July 26, 1984

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *Peter*

SUBJECT: Reply to Sir Oliver Wright

British Ambassador, Sir Oliver Wright, has forwarded you under a covering letter a copy of a British paper on Europe's future that Mrs. Thatcher circulated to other EC Heads of Government prior to the recent Fontainbleau meeting (Tab II).

Wright also provided a copy to Ken Dam who has replied with regard to the specifics of the Fontainbleau meeting. I thought a more general reply from you would also be useful.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Tab I reply to Sir Oliver Wright.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Dave Wigg concurs.

Attachments

- Tab I Reply to Wright
- Tab II Wright's Incoming



JUL 10 AM: 48

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D. C.
TELEPHONE: (202) 462-1340

FROM THE AMBASSADOR

6 July 1984

The Honorable
Robert C McFarlane
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
WASHINGTON DC

Dear Bob,

I thought you would be interested to see the enclosed paper which was sent by the British Prime Minister to other European Community Heads of Government as a contribution to discussion at the recent European Council meeting at Fontainebleau. It sets out clearly and fully the aspirations of the British Government for the future development of the European Community and will be an important element in the work on this which was set in hand at that meeting.

It is often said on this side of the Atlantic that Europe has lost direction and become inward-looking; and that it is preoccupied with budgetary issues and not sufficiently committed to the development of a stronger, more outward-looking Community. I think the outcome of the Fontainebleau meeting - and indeed the British paper itself - demonstrates how wrong these views are. The agreement reached at Fontainebleau has brought to a successful conclusion a damaging internal row about Community finances, and has opened the way to the re-launching of the European Community which was called for at the Stuttgart European Council in 1983. The paper clearly demonstrates Britain's determination to make a constructive and imaginative contribution towards this relaunching. It sets out practical ideas for strengthening the Community internally and, every bit as important, it suggests ways in which the Community could play a more effective role internationally as part of the overall Western effort.

Yours truly,

Oliver Wright

EUROPE - THE FUTURE

THE ATTACHED PAPER WAS GIVEN TO
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

BY THE PRIME MINISTER

AS A CONTRIBUTION TO DISCUSSION

AT THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL

HELD AT FONTAINEBLEAU ON 25/26 JUNE 1984

EUROPE - THE FUTURE

INTRODUCTION

1. At the European Council in Stuttgart an ambitious programme was decided, involving a review of almost every aspect of the Community's activities. The negotiation has not been easy; and that is not surprising. There will continue to be arguments over priorities and the allocation of resources. That would be true even in a full-fledged federation. The Community progresses by the process of argument and discussion necessary to resolve its differences.

2. The Community is now close to agreement on the issues determining the course of its future development. Some progress has been made towards financing Community activity in the longer term and establishing a fairer balance of contributions. Some steps have been taken towards limiting the future costs of the agricultural regime. The Ten have agreed to work on a series of new policies to promote the economic, social and political growth on which their future well being depends. The negotiations remain to be completed. Their completion will enable the Community to concentrate on longer term objectives, and on responding to the needs and aspirations of its 270 million inhabitants.

3. This means giving greater depth to the Community in both its internal and external activities. The European Community, which has the largest share of international trade in the world and the immense benefit of the ingenuity of its peoples, and of the diversity of its economies, has only just begun to take advantage of its great potential. The Common Market is a means to an end, described in the Treaty itself as, "a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living".

4. The Community's energies must also be turned outwards so that we can:

- (i) create the sense of common purpose and momentum needed to hold together a Community of 12;
- (ii) defend our collective interests in an increasingly troubled world;
- (iii) fulfil our international responsibility to the causes of freedom, democracy, prosperity and peace;

5. If the European Community is to be effective in the world, it must also be effective in the national life of each of its Member States.

Strengthening the Community

6. If the problems of growth, outdated industrial structures and unemployment which affect us all are to be tackled effectively, we must create the genuine common market in goods and services which is envisaged in the Treaty of Rome and will be crucial to our ability to meet the US and Japanese technological challenge. Only by a sustained effort to remove remaining obstacles to intra-Community trade can we enable the citizens of Europe to benefit from the dynamic effects of a fully integrated common market with immense purchasing power. The success of the United States in job creation shows what can be achieved when internal barriers to business and trade come down. We must create the conditions in which European businessmen too can build on their strengths and create prosperity and jobs. This means action to harmonise standards and prevent their deliberate use as barriers to intra-Community trade; more rapid and better coordinated customs procedures; a major effort to improve mutual recognition of professional qualifications; and liberalising trade in services, including banking, insurance and transportation of goods and people. If we do not give our service and manufacturing industries the full benefit of what is potentially the largest single market in the industrialised world, they will never be fully competitive at international level, and will be unable to create much needed jobs within the Community.

7. At the same time we must do more, and work harder, to make actions undertaken within the Community relevant to the lives of our people. A sustained effort will be required further to simplify and speed up customs and other formalities affecting the ease with which our citizens can travel across intra-Community borders. We should aim, for example, to allow European citizens to travel as freely and cheaply as the inhabitants of the United States. Important steps could be taken in that direction by increased competition and the de-regulation of air services.

8. The Common Agricultural Policy has succeeded in the objective of providing Europe with a strong agricultural base. Remarkable increases in productivity have been achieved. The preservation of the best elements of that policy requires a continuing effort to correct the distortions which manifest themselves in the form of massive and costly surpluses of certain products, imposing high storage costs and the need to dispose of them in ways which complicate trading relations with our OECD partners and are impossible to defend to our own citizens and tax payers. An important and courageous effort has been made to control surpluses in the dairy sector. A sustained, multi-year effort will be required to achieve a better balance between production and demand, thereby releasing resources for other purposes.

9. For in the next decade equal priority must be given to creating the right conditions for the development of a vigorous, efficient and cost effective industrial sector able to compete with the United States, Japan and the newly industrialised countries. To this end, we need to examine urgently whether more can be achieved, or can be achieved more economically, by action on a Community basis rather than nationally. Better cooperation on research and development will help avoid duplication and waste. In some cases Governments can cooperate directly to encourage industrial activity at European levels - as in the case of Airbus, ESPRIT and JET. The Commission has suggested that the Community now look at possible programmes in telecommunications and biotechnology. We should examine these and similar proposals carefully to see whether they will be more effective at the Community level. In doing so, we should give high priority to facilitating collaboration at the industrial level. Member Governments must act to limit the administrative and legal impediments to risk-sharing and investment, in order to allow European firms to compete and cooperate in a way which will enhance their ability to match the performance of their competitors.

10. Creating the right conditions for economic growth without due regard for the wider interests of our environment and of our consumers is not acceptable. The peoples of Europe must feel

/that

that the Community improves the quality of their lives. Many environmental problems require action going beyond the capabilities of individual Member States. They have to be tackled on the basis of serious analysis of the scientific evidence and with due regard to industrial costs and efficiency. This is an area in which the Community has an important role to play. The United Kingdom has already suggested that decisions should be taken urgently to bring about the elimination of lead in petrol. It is also time for a programme of research aimed at finding solutions to the problems caused by acid rain, and for controls on trans-frontier shipments of hazardous waste to continue to be developed.

11. At the cultural level, we should examine whether Governments cannot do more to encourage the learning of other Community languages. The European Foundation could play a useful role in this and in developing professional exchanges. Full access to each others' satellite broadcasting systems would help the process of cultural interchange in an eminently practical way of direct concern to mass audiences.

12. This process will require political direction. We should agree in the European Council that each Member Government should examine its priorities and policies in sectors covered by the Treaties in order to see in each case whether greater progress

could be made by a cooperative approach at the Community level.

A flexible Europe

13. The European Communities, with their corpus of institutional and legal structures, and their own resources, are and must remain the framework within which Community law applies. Action undertaken in the Community framework must continue to be on a basis of equal rights and equal obligations. But a certain flexibility of approach may be necessary in the coming decade, when the Community will have become larger, its membership more diverse, and in some areas of technological development, the industrial structures and interests of Member States more varied. For such practical reasons, it may sometimes make sense for participation in new ventures to be optional. This should not lead to rigid distinctions between different groups of participants. That would be particularly disillusioning for our new members who expect to be joining a democratic and homogeneous Community. Where ventures are launched by Member States with limited participation, it should be open to others to join in as and when they are able to do so. The possibility for action financed by the Community or with Community law as its legal base should be examined before it is decided to proceed on a more limited basis. The progress of all such work relevant to European integration should be monitored and open for discussion in a suitable high-level forum.

Europe in the World

14. It must be our objective to aim beyond the Common Commercial Policy through Political Cooperation towards a common approach to external affairs. Such a policy can only be achieved progressively: it must nevertheless be the aim before us.

15. The Community and its Member States already have at their disposal many of the elements for a common external policy. It is linked to other Western European countries through the EEC/EFTA agreements. The Lomé Convention binds the Community in a contractual relationship covering aid and trade with 64 developing countries. The Common Commercial Policy governs its trade relations with the rest of the world. The Community takes common action in international economic organisations. There is the network of Association and Cooperation agreements both with individual countries and with groups such as ASEAN and the Andean Pact. The growth of Political Cooperation enables the members of the Community increasingly to adopt common positions on world problems and to vote together in non-economic international bodies. Our aim for the future should be to bring about a greater coherence between these different elements. In that way a common external policy could be progressively achieved.

16. The US will remain central to European security and the

management of East-West relations, and no less so in the management of the problems of the world economy and trade. Our task must be to ensure that Europe plays no less central a role in all those respects. By common action of the Community and the Ten, Europe must impress on the US that unilateral American action, eg on technology transfers, extra-territoriality, unitary taxation and, above all, protection for US industries will put the success of Alliance consultation and coordination at risk. Equally we must be ready in Europe to make progress towards the liberalisation of our trading practices, and to play a full part in strengthening the GATT trading system. Mechanisms for consultation and coordination between the Allies are already in place. What we need is the will on both sides to use them to get results: bilaterally, within the Alliance, and on behalf of the Community and its Member States.

17. Europe is more than Western Europe alone. By the end of this century we could see the Soviet Union with increasingly serious economic difficulties and growing problems in Eastern Europe. At that stage more than ever, a coherent and persuasive West European voice will need to be heard on the management of East-West relations. Europeans have their own interest in economic relations with the Soviet Union and East European countries, illustrated by the level and intensity of their political contacts with them. They should reflect on the special

status this gives them, and on the scope it offers for a more coordinated approach on wider questions, eg the encouragement of a more differentiated economic and social development in Eastern Europe. Steps of this kind will strengthen the European political entity and enable it to act more effectively in relation to the major international issues which legitimately concern it.

18. The Community must also use its weight to influence the other major industrialised economies to shoulder their share of responsibility for the world economy: the United States by paying more attention to the international consequences of its domestic economic policies, and Japan by integrating its financial markets into the world economy and raising the level of its manufactured imports to one comparable with other industrial democracies. The Community must act jointly with these major trading partners to promote the further liberalization of international trade and to extend the open trading system, including a well-prepared new GATT trade round. This would bring the many varieties of developing countries more effectively into the world trading system, and persuade the more advanced among them to take more responsibility for its good management. Our performance so far in encouraging development in the Lomé countries, in South-East Asia, in Latin America, and in many other countries through our food aid and non-associates programmes is commendable. But there

is room for better coordination between Member States, the Community and other donors to secure maximum political as well as developmental effectiveness from our aid.

19. In Political Cooperation, the Ten need to act with more vigour and greater purpose. Cooperation should not just be a matter of making declarations in the face of increasingly complex challenges. The Ten have the weight and must show more political will to act together: concentrate their efforts where their leverage is greatest and their interests most directly touched e.g. in the Middle East and Africa; and recognise that influence does not last if not backed by the necessary resources. Member States must take more seriously their solemn commitments to consult and take account of partners' views and work for common positions. The objective should be the progressive attainment of a common external policy.

Defence and Security

20. Our objective must be to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance and improve European defence cooperation.

21. Europe already carries a heavy defence burden within the Alliance - although some of its members take a greater share of that burden than others. It contributes to security both on this Continent and in the wider world by a variety of political and economic as well as military instruments. This contribution is

far greater than is understood in the United States. If such views are not corrected, the temptation will grow for America, under pressure from the Congress, to look more toward interests outside Europe. Yet the US strategic commitment to Europe will remain an irreplaceable guarantee of Western security. If we wish to preserve it and ensure that our views continue to be given due weight by future US Administrations, the European Allies must find answers to some difficult questions: Are we able to take on a larger share of the responsibility for our defence? How should we respond to renewed public questioning of defence policy? Or the need to develop new technologies at a time of rising costs and resource constraints? The answers make it evident that such problems have to be tackled jointly.

22. Most work to coordinate European positions on this so far has been done in the NATO framework, particularly in the Eurogroup and the IEPG (which has the merit of including France), and there is still more that could be done to exploit the potential of these groupings. We must continue to work for the implementation of the Genscher/Colombo Solemn Declaration of 19 June 1983 which provides a helpful reaffirmation of the Community's political and economic objectives. But if we want early progress - and an early chance to demonstrate our seriousness - we must be willing to look at new openings including those offered by the WEU.

23. Procedure and new organisations are no substitute for content and action to solve existing problems. We have to be prepared to make efforts before we can pool them. Progress demands in particular that we focus on the resource allocation and defence industrial aspects of the problem. We should be able to achieve better value for money by common procurement and collaborative manufacturing projects, recognising (as past experience has always shown) that this process will give rise to very real political problems and difficulties for which there are no facile solutions. Individual projects are probably best organised on a case-by-case basis between those member countries with the capacity and wish to undertake them, making use of the framework of the IEPG. But the general prospects for them could be greatly improved by progress towards a more integrated European industrial and technological base, and by strengthening the Community's internal market. These are areas of proper Community concern which need our urgent attention.

Organisation and Institutions

24. There are several areas in which specific improvements can be made. With regard to the Community:

- (a) The Commission's role is central to the functioning of the Community. It is crucial that it should attract, and that Member States should appoint, individuals of the

highest calibre with a clear recognition of the tasks to be done. After enlargement the Commission still needs to be able to provide real jobs for people of the best quality. A Commission of 17 is liable to be too large for efficiency or to provide all members with serious portfolios.

(b) The Presidency also plays a key role in the management of the Community's business. Its effectiveness would be enhanced by greater cooperation between the Presidency in office and the preceding and succeeding Presidencies.

(c) An early European Council should consider adopting a new procedure under which each year the European Council would adopt a brief and succinct statement of priorities, with specific timings and targets, which would form the basis of the Community's activities for the following 12 months.

(d) When the Commission reviews its legislative proposals each year, there should be a thorough weeding out of hopelessly blocked items and unnecessary cases of obstruction brought to the notice of the Council.

(e) The voting provisions of the Treaty must be fully honoured. Unanimity must be respected in all cases where the Treaty so provides. The same applies for majority

voting. At the same time, Member States must be able to continue to insist where a very important national interest is at stake on discussion continuing until agreement is reached. But they should be required in each case to set out their reasons fully.

(f) The European Council should eschew the role of Court of Appeal from the Council. Its true and irreplaceable task is to provide strategic direction and political impetus for all areas of Community work and Member States' cooperation. For this, it might be enough for it to meet no more than twice a year, perhaps for two full days. Alternatively, one of the three annual meetings might be conducted on a more informal "Gymnich-type" framework without advisers. The primary responsibility for preparing European Councils should rest, as it does now, with Foreign Ministers.

(g) In a grouping of democratic European states the directly elected European Parliament must reflect with increasing responsibility the preoccupations and priorities of our peoples. Through the various procedures set out in the Solemn Declaration of June 1983, the Council and Member States need to work out ways of keeping the Parliament better informed, responding to its suggestions and bringing it to work in greater harmony with the main decision making

institutions of the Community.

(h) Once the post-Stuttgart negotiation has been completed it should be possible for Member Governments to take common action to present the Community to their peoples in a more favourable light. It is important that people should receive an objective picture of the present state of European integration. It would be desirable for Foreign Ministers, at an early informal meeting, to discuss this question and, if possible, to agree on some common themes for Governments to put forward in their presentation of the Community and of the issues under discussion in it.

Conclusions

25. The European Community and the Alliance jointly have brought an unprecedented period of peace and prosperity to the peoples of Europe. We cannot rest on the achievements of the post-war generation. Over the next decade Europe will face new economic and social challenges, and a continuing threat to her security.

26. Periodic expressions of pessimism about the future of the Community have never turned out to be justified. Europe needs to advance its internal development. The progress that has been made towards "an ever-closer union of the peoples of Europe" of which the Treaty of Rome speaks in its first paragraph is

unlikely to be reversed.

27. The objectives now must be to:

- strengthen democracy and reinforce political stability in Europe. This means bringing to a successful conclusion the accession negotiations with Portugal and Spain;
- develop a dynamic society in which industry thrives and activities which create wealth are encouraged. To do so, we must complete the internal market, particularly in the services sector;
- strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance and the contribution Europe makes to its own security;
- promote policies which will improve the quality as well as the standard of life in the Community;
- with due regard for the needs of economic and industrial efficiency, do more to promote the improvement and protection of the environment;
- agree urgently on certain organisational changes;
- adopt policies which will guarantee the relevance of the Community to the problems, particularly unemployment, which

affect our societies;

- take the necessary steps to strengthen the voice of the Community and make its influence felt in the world;

- heighten the consciousness among our citizens of what unites us.

RECEIVED 10 JUL 84 17

TO MCFARLANE FROM WRIGHT, OLIVER DOCDATE 06 JUL 84

SOMMER 26 JUL 84

MCFARLANE 30 JUL 84

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN EC

SUBJECT. EC HEADS OF GOVT PAPER PRESENTED BY PM THATCHER AT EUROPEAN COUNCIL
MTG 25 & 26 JUN

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION DUE: 13 JUL 84 STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
SOMMER	WIGG	MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF#	LOG	NSCIFID	(CT HW)
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ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	C 8/14	Original let'd to NSC/S		

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

PA (2)

National Security Council
The White House

GF

2

System #

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Package #

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26 P 2: 02

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	1	<i>[Handwritten mark]</i>	
Bob Kimmitt			
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull	2	<i>[Handwritten initials]</i>	
Wilma Hall	3		
Bud McFarlane	4	<i>[Handwritten initials]</i>	
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	5		<i>[Handwritten mark]</i>
Situation Room			

I = Information **A = Action** R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

Tom - see tab I

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 30, 1984

Dear Sir Oliver,

Thank you for providing me a copy of the paper entitled "Europe--The Future" that Mrs. Thatcher sent to other European Community Heads of Government as a contribution to discussion at the European Council's June meeting in Fontainbleau.

I understand that Ken Dam has already conveyed to you our pleasure at the outcome of the Fontainbleau meeting. I would like to add I was struck by both the paper's emphasis that the European Community and the Alliance cannot rest on the achievements of the post-war period and by its upbeat assessment of the future.

A strengthened Europe is clearly in U.S. interests. We look forward to Europe playing an increased role in our common efforts to promote peace and prosperity.

With best regards,

Sincerely,



Robert C. McFarlane

Ambassador Oliver Wright
British Embassy
3100 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

July 26, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

SIGNED

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *Peter*

SUBJECT: Reply to Sir Oliver Wright

British Ambassador, Sir Oliver Wright, has forwarded you under a covering letter a copy of a British paper on Europe's future that Mrs. Thatcher circulated to other EC Heads of Government prior to the recent Fontainbleau meeting (Tab II).

Wright also provided a copy to Ken Dam who has replied with regard to the specifics of the Fontainbleau meeting. I thought a more general reply from you would also be useful.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Tab I reply to Sir Oliver Wright.

Approve ✓ Disapprove _____

Dave Wigg concurs.

Attachments

- Tab I Reply to Wright
- Tab II Wright's Incoming



JUL 10 AM 11:48

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D. C.
TELEPHONE: (202) 462-1340

FROM THE AMBASSADOR

6 July 1984

The Honorable
Robert C McFarlane
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
WASHINGTON DC

Dear Bob,

I thought you would be interested to see the enclosed paper which was sent by the British Prime Minister to other European Community Heads of Government as a contribution to discussion at the recent European Council meeting at Fontainebleau. It sets out clearly and fully the aspirations of the British Government for the future development of the European Community and will be an important element in the work on this which was set in hand at that meeting.

It is often said on this side of the Atlantic that Europe has lost direction and become inward-looking; and that it is preoccupied with budgetary issues and not sufficiently committed to the development of a stronger, more outward-looking Community. I think the outcome of the Fontainebleau meeting - and indeed the British paper itself - demonstrates how wrong these views are. The agreement reached at Fontainebleau has brought to a successful conclusion a damaging internal row about Community finances, and has opened the way to the re-launching of the European Community which was called for at the Stuttgart European Council in 1983. The paper clearly demonstrates Britain's determination to make a constructive and imaginative contribution towards this relaunching. It sets out practical ideas for strengthening the Community internally and, every bit as important, it suggests ways in which the Community could play a more effective role internationally as part of the overall Western effort.

Oliver Wright

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5320



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How are you,

Oliver Wright