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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

CAS 8/31/2011

File Folder UNITED KINGDOM 7/1/84 - 1/4/85 (1)

FOIA

M11-401

Box Number 91333

COLLINGS

1

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
117905	CABLE	172342Z R 9/24/2002 NLSS98-002 #615	6	11/17/1984	B1
117906	MEMO	PETER TO SOMMER TO ROBERT MCFARLANE RE THE LAKER DISPUTE	1	11/13/1984	B1
117907	BACKGROUND PAPER	RE LAKER CASE (ATTACHMENT TO 11906) PAR 7/21/2000 S98-002 #616	2	ND	B1
117908	CABLE	131847Z D 6/12/2002 S98-002 #617	7	11/13/1984	B1
117909	CABLE	181839Z D 6/12/2002 S98-002 #618	6	11/18/1984	B1
117910	TALKING POINTS	RE LAKER CASE R 9/24/2002 S98-002 #619	4	11/18/1984	B1
117911	MEMO	SOMMER TO JOHN POINDEXTER RE THE LAKER CASE R 7/21/2000 S98-002 #620	1	11/19/1984	B1
117912	PAPER	RE THE LAKER CASE (ATTACHMENT TO 117906) PAR 7/21/2000 S98-002 #621	2	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

File Folder UNITED KINGDOM 7/1/84 - 1/4/85 (1)

CAS 8/31/2011

Box Number 91333

FOIA

M11-401

COLLINGS

1

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
117913	CABLE	271657Z R 9/24/2002 S98-002 #622	1	11/27/1984	B1
117914	CABLE	151928Z R 6/12/2002 S98-002 #623	2	8/15/1984	B1
117915	MEMO	DAVID LAUX TO MCFARLANE RE BRITISH-CHINESE AGREEMENT RE HONG KONG R 7/21/2000 S98-002 #624	1	9/24/1984	B1
117916	STATEMENT	ATTACHMENT TO 117915) R 7/21/2000 S98-002 #625	1	ND	B1
117917	MEMO	SOMMER TO MCFARLANE RE BRITISH AMBASSADOR PAR 7/21/2000 S98-002 #626; UPHELD 5/24/2017 M401 #117917	1	10/18/1984	B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: RECORDS
COUNTRY FILE

Archivist: cas/cas

File Folder: United Kingdom vol. VI 7/1/84 - 1/4/85 [1 of 2]
Box 91333 *20*

Date: September 9, 1998

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. cable	172342z 6 p.	11/17/84	P1
2. memo	<i>R 9/24/02 NLSS98-002 #615</i> Peter Sommer to Robert McFarlane re the Laker Dispute 1 p. (8377)	11/13/84	P1, P5
3. background paper	re Laker case 2 p. (attachment to item #2) <i>P 7/21/00 598-002 #616</i>	nd	P1
4. cable	131847z 7 p. <i>D 6/12/02 NLSS98-002 #617</i>	11/13/84	P1
5. cable	181839z 6 p. <i>D " " #618</i>	11/18/84	P1
6. talking points	re Laker case 4 p.	11/18/84	P1
7. memo	<i>R 9/24/02 NLSS98-002 #619</i> Sommer to John Poindexter re the Laker case 1 p. (8328)	11/9/84	P1
8. paper	<i>R 7/21/00 598-002 #620</i> the Laker case 2 p. (attachment to item #2)	nd	P1
9. cable	271657z 1 p.	11/27/84	P1
10. cable	<i>R 9/24/02 NLSS98-002 #622</i> 151928z 2 p.	8/15/84	P1
11. memo	<i>R 6/12/02 NLSS98-002 #623</i> David Laux to McFarlane re British-Chinese agreement re Hong Kong 1 p. (7126)	9/24/84	P1
12. statement	<i>R 7/21/00 598-002 #624</i> 1 p. (attachment to item #11)	nd	P1
13. memo	<i>R 7/21/00 " #625</i> Sommer to McFarlane re British ambassador 1 p. (6929)	10/18/84	P1

P 7/21/00 " #626

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

RECEIVED 04 JAN 85 17

TO MCFARLANE

FROM SOMMER

DOCDATE 04 JAN 85

E AS

10/8/98

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN

STRATEGIC DEFENSE

SUBJECT: MCFARLANE VISIT TO LONDON

ACTION: OBE PER KIMMITT

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

SOMMER

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (HW HW)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

National Security Council
The White House

JDE

System # I

Package # 0089

4 P2 05

1503

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>☞</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>		<u>N</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~
ACTION

January 4, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *Peter*

SUBJECT: Your January 9 Trip to London

I have gotten you on Mrs. Thatcher's schedule from 10:15 a.m. to approximately 12 noon on Wednesday, January 9. This includes a one hour private meeting on SDI, plus an expanded session for about 45 minutes on Geneva.

Attached is a draft message confirming your visit and setting in motion the particulars.

RECOMMENDATION

Following your review of the draft message (Tab A) that you authorize Kimmitt to sign the Tab I memo forwarding it to Hill for dispatch.

OBE, per discussion

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

PAS for Jack Matlock, *Submed* Ron Lehman, *not available* Karna Small, and Paul Thompson *PAS for* concur.

Attachments:

- Tab I Memo to Hill
- Tab A Draft Message

By *CS*

10/8/85

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0089

SECRET

By *CAS*

ED

10/8/98

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: McFarlane's Visit to London (S)

After consulting with the Department, the NSC staff has worked directly with Embassy London in arranging McFarlane's London stop which is primarily for the purpose of briefing Mrs. Thatcher on SDI. Please dispatch the Tab A message to London, confirming the arrangements as we understand them. (S)

Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Draft Message

cc: COL R. J. Affourtit
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

NODIS

FROM: SECSTATE

TO: AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

INFO: US MISSION GENEVA

~~SECRET~~

TAGS: OVIP

CS

10/8/98

SUBJECT: Visit of National Security Advisor McFarlane

1. ENTIRE TEXT ~~SECRET~~.
2. In response to Mrs. Thatcher's request at the December 22 Camp David meeting for a special briefing on SDI, the President and Secretary Shultz have asked National Security Advisor McFarlane to stop in London on January 9, 1985 on his way back to Washington from Geneva. Pursuant to Seitz - Sommer telcon, NSC staff understands that McFarlane will brief Mrs. Thatcher from 10:15 a.m. to 11:15 a.m. on January 9.
3. Given Mrs. Thatcher's special request and highly classified nature of briefing, McFarlane prefers that his meeting with Mrs. Thatcher be private. We understand this is Mrs. Thatcher's preference as well.
4. We also understand that Mrs. Thatcher would like a first hand report on the Geneva talks immediately following the SDI briefing and arrangements have been made for McFarlane to brief her and other senior officials from 11:15 a.m. to approximately 12 noon. We further understand that both Howe and Heseltine will be out of town.
5. McFarlane will arrive in London from Geneva at approximately 6:00 p.m. on Tuesday, January 8 by special mission aircraft. Please keep evening of January 8 free. He will be accompanied by his wife Jonny and NSC Staffers Ron Lehman, Karna Small, Paul Thompson and Wilma Hall. McFarlane and party plan to depart London for Washington late afternoon January 9.
6. McFarlane's party needs following reservations: one double and four singles.
7. Action requested: Please confirm schedule and lodging arrangements. Reply should be addressed to McFarlane party, attention Paul Thompson at US Mission Geneva. Please make Department (with caption pass to NSC) info addressee on all messages concerning McFarlane visit. Thompson will be in direct contact with Embassy concerning specifics of arrival and departure plans.

RECEIVED 03 JAN 85 19

TO KIMMITT

FROM SOMMER

DOCDATE 03 JAN 85

By ^W CAS

¹⁹⁸⁷ 10/8/98

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN

MEDIA

THATCHER, MARGARET

SUBJECT: PROPOSED RESPONSE TO BBC QUESTIONS RE PM THATCHER

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE

DUE: 06 JAN 85 STATUS X FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

KIMMITT

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (CT *Q1*)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Sommer</i>	<i>S 1/4</i>	<i>For further action</i>	<i>1/6</i>	<i>PS</i>
	<i>C 1/8</i>	<i>OBE per Kimmitt</i>		<i>PS</i>
	<i>- 1/9</i>	<i>Noted by Kimmitt</i>		<i>PS</i>

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

new (C)

National Security Council
The White House

System # I

Package # _____

85 JAN 5 P 2: 03

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Tom Shull	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	<u>3</u>	<u>K</u>	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
<u>Peter Sommer</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>A</u>

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Did Sims make all revisions that were needed?
To Bob: Yes he did.

Peter Sommer 1/7/85

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

NOTED

January 4, 1984

PRESIDENTIAL INTERVIEW WITH BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION

DATE: January 7, 1984
LOCATION: Map Room
TIME: 4:15 P.M. (15 minutes)

FROM: LARRY SPEAKES *S*

I. PURPOSE

Interview for a BBC radio series on Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.

II. BACKGROUND

Early this year is the tenth anniversary of Prime Minister Thatcher's leadership of the Conservative Party. Later in the year she will become the Prime Minister with the longest continuous post-war service in the job. Interviews are being arranged by BBC with a number of foreign statesmen who have had frequent contact with her. Questions they say they will ask the President are attached, with proposed responses. However, we suggest the President draw on his personal meeting with Mrs. Thatcher for anecdotes to use in response to BBC's questions.

III. PARTICIPANTS

Hugo Young, Program Presenter
Anne Sloman, Editor, Special Current Affairs

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House photo only

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

BBC Correspondents enter Map Room
After brief introductions, the interview begins

ATTACHMENT: BBC questions and suggested talking points

BBC QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS
FOR THATCHER DOCUMENTARY INTERVIEW

1. Margaret Thatcher was the first head of government to come to Washington after you became President in February 1981. Everyone saw this as a symbol of your closeness. Was it?

-- Symbolic of our warm personal relationship, and the longstanding and extraordinary close relationship between the United States and Great Britain.

-- Had known Mrs. Thatcher for some time before coming to office. Given personal relationship and the relationship between our two countries, thought it was fitting that she be ~~the~~ one of the first heads of government to come to Washington after I became President. (For the President's information - Mrs. Thatcher was not the first head of state to visit after he came into office -- Prime Minister Seaga of Jamaica and President Chun of South Korea paid official visits and there were several private meetings before Mrs. Thatcher's visit.)

2. Knew of her reputation before you met her? Did reality match that reputation? Any surprises?

-- She's proved to be just what I expected:
firm, fair and tenacious. Always enjoy my meetings with her and value our discussions.

-- Impressed with how well informed she is on such a wide

range of issues. Surprising that one person can be so knowledgeable on so many subjects.

3. Do you feel you have a special relationship with her?

-- Yes. We are kindred souls who share many of the same basic values and objectives.

-- She and I often instinctively take the same line. For example, without consulting in advance, she took much the same approach in her meeting with Gorbachev that I did in my session with Gromyko.

4. You met her in different circumstances -- large gatherings like the economic summits, sometimes one to one. Is she different in large and small groups?

-- Absolutely not. This is one of her great strengths. She is the same whether in a large or small group.

5. How would you describe/assess her skills as a negotiator?

-- Fortunately, we have not had to face each other as adversaries at the negotiating table. But from what I know, I would say she is a skillful negotiator. Firmness and singlemindedness of purpose such as hers are outstanding traits for any negotiator to possess. She has those traits.

6. How would you describe her skills/powers as an ally?

-- As an ally, she is both loyal and consistent. Our close relationship with the United Kingdom is longstanding, but Mrs. Thatcher adds a special dimension to this relationship. America could not ask for a better friend.

7. Statesmanship is a very male-dominated world. What difference does it make that she is a woman?

-- None. Her strength is that she is always herself. She knows who she is and where she is going. She is simply Mrs. Thatcher, Prime Minister of Great Britain. She has already made her mark in that capacity. I believe she will be regarded by historians of the future as one of Britain's great leaders -- that will be because of her leadership and accomplishments, not because she is a woman.

8. You two are going to dominate the Western World for the next few years, after both being re-elected by massive majorities. Do you think this represents a permanent victory for what is loosely called Reaganism/Thatcherism? What do you have in common? Have similarities been exaggerated?

-- I can't agree that she and I are going to dominate the Western World. We are leaders of great countries with a common heritage, but we are also part of a large coalition of democratic nations which are not about to be dominated by anyone.

-- And I'm not sure that our reelection represents a permanent victory. I would hope so, because I believe in our policies. But in democratic countries there are no permanent victories. We wouldn't want it that way.

-- There are differences of emphasis in some of our

national policies, but our similarities have not been exaggerated. Mrs. Thatcher and I share common objectives, and that's good for both our countries.

National Security Council
The White House

JIF

System #

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Package #

0056
1501

3 P4: 2

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	1	U	
Bob Kimmitt	2	K	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
<i>Sommer</i>	3		A

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

Peter: Please check #3 answer with Matlock.

Also, on #1, check with Deaver to ensure she was first; do we know that he knew her "for some time" before coming to office? Done Peter *Sommer* 11/4/85

B88 - Matlock concurs with #3. She and the President spoke at Camp David about knowing each other before coming to office. She was not the first to visit. I have corrected by page, since *she was in an impact memo.* Peter

Ellen Jones 7560

85 JAN 7 P 5: 20

National Security Council
The White House

x UBP
I

System #

Package #

I
0056

7 PART 16

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>		<u>N</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Bob Kimmitt

(2)

uary

John Poindexter

Tom Shull

Wilma Hall

Bud McFarlane

Bob Kimmitt

NSC Secretariat

Situation Room

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by

(Date/Time)

TO Carol Cleveland
NSC/S

I answered (hand-written)

Kimmitt's question on

~~Friday~~ Thursday, January 4.

For some reason, it came

back to me today. Please

send to Kimmitt with an
explanation. ^{8:30} ~~with~~ Sunday 1/7/84

(We just received this
Monday afternoon.)

1-7-84

Bob -

Don't know what happened
on this one - It was Friday, Jan
4 that he sent it through because
I did research with Presidential
Diaries and returned to Peter Friday
afternoon. Ob then came in this office
late in the afternoon; from there I
don't know what happened -

Carol.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

By *CS*

10/8/98

ACTION

January 3, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *Peter*

SUBJECT: Replies to BBC Questions

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the self-explanatory Tab I memo to Bob Sims.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

OBE RMK 1/7/85

Attachments:

- Tab I Memo to Sims
- Tab A Suggested Answers
- Tab B Sims' Memo

*Thanks, Peter.
We covered
this in
separate
correspondence.*

Bob 1/7/85

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
 By CAS NARA, Date 10/18/98
Guidelines, August 28, 1997

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

January 3, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT SIMS

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Replies to BBC Question

We agree that the President will want to answer the BBC questions about Mrs. Thatcher in his own words, but, as you requested, have provided some suggested answers (Tab A). Our suggested answers are tagged in numerical order to the questions.

Attachments:

- Tab A Suggested Answers
- Tab B Your Incoming Memo

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 Declassify: OADR

SUGGESTED ANSWERS

1. It was symbolic not only of our warm personal relationship, but also of the longstanding and extraordinary close relationship between the United States and Great Britain. I had, of course, known Mrs. Thatcher for some time before coming to office and given our personal relationship and the relationship between our two countries, it was fitting that she was *among* the first heads of government to come to Washington after I became President.
2. In my experience reality has always matched her reputation in a very positive sense. She is firm, fair and tenacious. I always enjoy my meetings with her and value our discussions. In a sense, there have been no major surprises. I am always impressed with how well informed she is on such a wide range of issues. In a sense, it is surprising that one person can be so knowledgeable on so many subjects.
3. Yes I do feel I have a special relationship with her. We are kindred souls who share many of the same basic values and objectives. I am struck that she often takes the same line that I do. For example, without consulting in advance, she took more or less the same approach in her meeting with Gorbachev, that I did in my session with Gromyko.
4. Absolutely not. This is one of her great strengths. She is the same whether in a large or small group.
5. Fortunately, we have not had to face each other in adversary negotiating roles. But from what I know and have observed, she is a skillful negotiator because of her firmness and singlemindedness of purpose.
6. As an Ally she is both loyal and consistent. Our close relationship with the United Kingdom is longstanding, but Mrs. Thatcher and her well known resolve add a special dimension to this relationship. America could not ask for a better friend.
7. In Mrs. Thatcher's case it makes no difference. Her strength is that she is always herself. She knows who she is and where she is going. In the sense in which you have asked the question, it makes no difference that she is a woman. She is simply Mrs. Thatcher, Prime Minister of Great Britain.
8. Well, I can't endorse that she and I are going to dominate the Western world or that our reelection represents a permanent victory. In democratic countries there are no such things as permanent victories and we wouldn't want it that way. Our reelections do, however, clearly signal that the people of our countries support the policies and programs that we are working so diligently to implement. There are obviously differences of emphasis in some of our national policies but in general terms I think it a great strength that Mrs. Thatcher and I share so many common objectives.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 26, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR BOB KIMMITT

SUBJECT: BBC Radio January 7, 1985 Interview with the President
Regarding Mrs. Thatcher

FROM: BOB SIMS

Attached is a set of questions BBC will be asking the President in this interview.

Although I believe the President will want to answer these questions in his own words, I would appreciate suggested talking points to use in the briefing paper, which I should submit Friday, January 4.

cc:
Peter Sommer ✓

President Reagan Questions

1. Margaret Thatcher was the first head of government to come to Washington after you became President in February 1981. Everyone saw this as a symbol of your closeness. Was it?
2. Knew of her reputation before you met her? Did reality match that reputation? Any surprises?
3. Do you feel you have a special relationship with her?
4. You meet her in different circumstances - large gatherings like the economic summits, sometimes one to one. Is she different in large and small groups?
5. How would you describe/assess her skills as a negotiator?
6. How would you describe her skills/power as an ally?
7. Statesmanship is a very male-dominated world. What difference does it make that she is a woman?
8. You two are going to dominate the Western World for the next few years, after both being re-elected by massive majorities. Do you think this represents a permanent victory for what is loosely called Reaganism/Thatcherism? What do you have in common? Have similarities been exaggerated?

Kenneth —

Sommer

Thompson
Fielding

~~SECRET~~

Department of State

S/S-0
OUTGOING



PAGE 01 OF 07 STATE 342488

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-----19/1354Z

ORIGIN OFFICE EUR-01

INFO SWO-01 SSO-01 SSS-01 SSI-01 S-02 D-01 P-01 E-01 EB-01

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P EYES ONLY ARMACOST; EUR EYES ONLY BURT; EB EYES ONLY MCCORMACK

S, D, P, E, EUR, EB, L, NSC, S/S FAMILY ADDED PER BMCKINLEY, S/S, 11/19/84

S/S PASS NSC VIA COURIER

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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PAGE 02 OF 07 STATE 342488
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C13/14 003761 NOD201

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NODIS
----- FOR AMB, UNDERSEC WALLIS & LEG ADV ROBINSON

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: EAIR, ESTC, UK, PREL
SUBJECT: LAKER CASE - MEETING WITH PM THATCHER

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. FOLLOWING ARE TALKING POINTS FOR UNDERSEC WALLIS AND AMB TO USE WITH PRIME MINISTER THATCHER IN 11/18 MEETING.
3. BEGIN TEXT OF TALKING POINTS FOR WAW WITH MT

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NLS 598-002 #615

BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 9/24/02

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PAGE 03 OF 07 STATE 342488

C13/14 003761 NOD201

-- NOVEMBER 18, 1984

(1) -- THANK YOU FOR SEEING ME ON SUCH SHORT NOTICE. THE PRESIDENT ASKED ME TO DELIVER TO YOU PERSONALLY HIS DECISION CONCERNING THE LAKER CASE. IN FACT, I CAME OVER ON THURSDAY NIGHT, BEFORE THE DECISION WAS MADE, BECAUSE THE PRESIDENT WANTED A PERSONAL EMISSARY, WHATEVER THE OUTCOME.

(2) -- AFTER EXTENSIVE DELIBERATION, THE PRESIDENT DECIDED ON FRIDAY TO INSTRUCT THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT NOT TO SEEK ANY INDICTMENTS OF UK CARRIERS OR INDIVIDUALS IN CONNECTION WITH THE LAKER CASE. IN THIS REGARD, I WOULD STRESS THAT THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION AGAINST INDICTMENT IS UNCONDITIONAL.

(3) -- SINCE THE PRESIDENT WAS SO CONCERNED ABOUT THE MATTER, THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE DEPUTY SECRETARY, THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL MET WITH THE PRESIDENT AND OTHER ADVISERS ON THIS ISSUE. I UNDERSTAND FROM SECRETARY SHULTZ THAT THIS WAS AN EXTREMELY DIFFICULT DECISION FOR THE PRESIDENT. AS YOU KNOW, THE PRESIDENT IS A LAW-AND-ORDER MAN AND HE BELIEVES STRONGLY IN ECONOMIC COMPETITION. HE THEREFORE SUPPORTS STRONGLY THE STRICT ENFORCEMENT OF OUR CRIMINAL ANTITRUST LAWS.

(4) -- THE INDICTMENTS THE PRESIDENT INSTRUCTED JUSTICE NOT TO PURSUE WERE BASED ON TWO TYPES OF ANTICOMPETITIVE ACTIVITY:

- THE FIRST INDICTMENT WOULD HAVE BEEN AGAINST
- BRITISH AIRWAYS AND THREE FORMER BA OFFICIALS FOR

- CONSPIRING WITH LAKER AIRWAYS TO FIX THE FARES
- CHARGED IN 1981 AND EARLY 1982 ON FLIGHTS BETWEEN

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PAGE 04 OF 07 STATE 342488

C13/14 003761 NOD201

-- VARIOUS U.S. CITIES AND LONDON.

-- THE SECOND INDICTMENT WOULD HAVE BEEN AGAINST
-- BA AND PAN AMERICAN FOR CONSPIRING TO REDUCE THE
-- NUMBER OF FLIGHTS BETWEEN LONDON AND VARIOUS U.S.
-- CITIES FOR WINTER 80/81 AND 81/82 TRAFFIC SEASONS.

BOTH OF THESE OFFENSES ARE CONSIDERED PER SE CRIMINAL VIOLATIONS OF U.S. ANTITRUST LAW.

(5) -- THERE ARE SEVERAL REASONS WHY THE PRESIDENT FOUND THE DECISION ESPECIALLY DIFFICULT:

-- THE ALLEGATIONS INVOLVE DELIBERATE, KNOWING,
-- REPEATED VIOLATIONS OF FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENTS OF
-- THE U.S. ANTITRUST LAWS. IN OUR VIEW, THE FACTS
-- ARE CLEAR.

-- THERE IS NO VALID BASIS FOR ARGUING THAT THIS
-- CASE IS NOT WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE
-- U.S. I NOTE THAT BOTH THE PRICE-FIXING AND
-- CAPACITY AGREEMENTS WERE IMPLEMENTED IN THE U.S.
-- BRITISH COURTS SAID QUITE CLEARLY THAT THE
-- EXERCISE OF U.S. ANTITRUST JURISDICTION OVER
-- BRITISH AIR CARRIERS REGARDING THEIR BUSINESS IN

-- THE UNITED STATES INVOLVES NO INVASION OF
-- SOVEREIGNTY. EVEN THE HOUSE OF LORDS CONFIRMED
-- THIS CONCLUSION, AND THEY ARE NOT SOFT ON ISSUES
-- OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY.

-- THE COMPANIES INVOLVED MUST BE MADE TO
-- UNDERSTAND THAT THEY ARE REQUIRED TO COMPLY WITH
-- THE ANTITRUST LAWS REGARDING THEIR BUSINESS IN THE

-- US AND WITH ANY PROCEDURES, SUCH AS BERMUDA II,
-- WHICH WE HAVE AGREED BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS.

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PAGE 05 OF 07 STATE 342488

C13/14 003761 NOD201

-- BERMUDA II ITSELF CALLS FOR CARRIERS TO FILE
-- PRICING AGREEMENTS WITH THE AERONAUTICAL
-- AUTHORITIES OF BOTH COUNTRIES, A REQUIREMENT
-- NOT MET IN THIS CASE. FURTHER, THE RECORD IS
-- CLEAR THAT, WHEN IT ENTERED BERMUDA II, HMG
-- UNDERSTOOD THAT THE US HAD EXPRESSLY DECLINED
-- TO WAIVE ENFORCEMENT OF ITS ANTITRUST LAWS.

-- FINALLY, THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT HAD ALREADY
-- DECIDED NOT TO SEEK INDICTMENTS OF BA AND LAKER
-- FOR CONSPIRING SECRETLY TO FIX PRICES AT THE 1982
-- IATA MEETING I; HOLLYWOOD, FLORIDA BECAUSE OF THE
-- INVOLVEMENT OF BRITISH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. THIS
-- ILLEGAL PRICE FIXING INCIDENT IN WHICH BRITISH
-- GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WERE INVOLVED ON U.S.
-- TERRITORY SERIOUSLY CONCERNED U.S. OFFICIALS.
-- U.S. AUTHORITIES HAD EXPRESSLY DECLINED TO ALLOW
-- LAKER TO PARTICIPATE IN THE IATA MEETING IN
-- FLORIDA AND BRITISH OFFICIALS HAD REPRESENTED THAT
-- THEY WERE ATTENDING SOLELY FOR OTHER REASONS.

(6) -- IN SPITE OF THESE FACTS, THE PRESIDENT DECIDED
AGAINST INDICTMENTS BECAUSE OF THE VERY SPECIAL
IMPORTANCE THE PRESIDENT PLACES ON THE US-UK
RELATIONSHIP, AND ON HIS PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH YOU.

(7) -- DECISION NOT TO SEEK INDICTMENTS MAY BE SUBJECTED
TO CONSIDERABLE PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL CRITICISM.

(8) -- THIS IS NOT AN EASY POLITICAL STEP. ANTITRUST
LAWS, SUCH AS THE SHERMAN ACT, ARE VERY IMPORTANT IN

MAINTAINING OPEN AND COMPETITIVE MARKETS FOR U.S.
COMMERCE AND HAVE A SPECIAL STATUS AMONG IMPORTANT U.S.
STATUTES. INDEED, I AM TOLD THAT THIS IS THE FIRST
TIME IN HIS ADMINISTRATION THAT A POSSIBLE CRIMINAL
INDICTMENT HAS BEEN BROUGHT BEFORE THE PRESIDENT FOR A

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PAGE 06 OF 07 STATE 342488
DECISION.

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(9) -- IN DOING THIS, THE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED GREAT TRUST THAT WE WILL ACHIEVE A BILATERAL AVIATION REGIME WITH THE U.K. THAT WILL ADVANCE THE COMPETITION POLICY THAT BOTH YOU AND HE ENDORSE. THE PRESIDENT IS AWARE THAT DELEGATIONS FROM OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE BEEN MEETING TO DISCUSS FUTURE ARRANGEMENTS. THE PRESIDENT HOPES THAT YOU AND HE WILL MUTUALLY ASSURE THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS WILL SUCCEED AND THAT THE NEGOTIATORS WILL COMPLETE THEIR TASK SOON.

(10) -- FOR ITS PART, THE UNITED STATES NEEDS TO BE ABLE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT ITS ACT OF EXTREME RESTRAINT HAS ADVANCED THE INTERESTS WHICH STRICT LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THIS CASE WOULD HAVE SERVED. THE UNITED STATES NEEDS:

-- SUBSTANTIAL FLEXIBILITY IN PRICING, AKIN TO
-- WHAT IS KNOWN AS "DUAL DISAPPROVAL";

-- A RELAXATION OF RESTRICTIONS ON CAPACITY, WITH
-- REGARD TO BOTH FREQUENCIES AND DESIGNATIONS OF
-- CARRIERS;

-- ENFORCEMENT OF FULL DISCLOSURE OF ANY PRICE
-- COORDINATION TALKS AMONG THE CARRIERS. IN
-- ACCORDANCE WITH BERMUDA II;

-- A COMMITMENT FROM HMG NOT TO INVOKE ITS
-- BLOCKING STATUTE AGAINST U.S. GOVERNMENT

-- ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS IN THE EVENT OF FUTURE
-- VIOLATIONS BY U.K. CARRIERS, AS WELL AS A
-- COMMITMENT TO TO IMPRESS UPON ITS CARRIERS THE
-- NEED TO COMPLY WITH US ANTITRUST LAW IN THE
-- FUTURE.

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PAGE 07 OF 07 STATE 342488

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(NOTE: NO MENTION IS TO BE MADE OF PRIVATE SUITS BY US. IF THIS SUBJECT IS RAISED, RESPONSE SHOULD BE ALONG FOLLOWING LINES: THE PRESIDENT HAS OBVIOUSLY JUST TAKEN A MAJOR DECISION. I CAN TELL YOU ON A PRIVATE BASIS THAT THERE WERE DIFFERING VIEWS ABOUT THIS WITHIN OUR GOVERNMENT. THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION CLEARLY AFFECTS THE POLITICAL SETTING FOR SEEKING TREBLE DAMAGE LEGISLATION AND WE ARE CURRENTLY ASSESSING THAT MATTER.)

(11)-- OUR DELEGATIONS HAD BEEN SCHEDULED TO MEET IN LONDON THIS MONDAY, NOVEMBER 19, TO RESUME TALKS, BUT IN LIGHT OF THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION, WE SUGGEST THAT THE TALKS BE POSTPONED UNTIL MONDAY, NOVEMBER 26.

(12)-- BECAUSE OF THE SENSITIVITY OF THIS DECISION IN THE U.S. AND BECAUSE OF U.S. RULES GOVERNING GRAND JURY INVESTIGATIONS, WE REQUEST THAT YOU NOT REVEAL THIS INFORMATION TO ANYONE OTHER THAN NECESSARY BRITISH OFFICIALS AND THAT THERE BE NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF ANY SORT UNTIL ONE COMES FROM WASHINGTON. IN PARTICULAR, WE REQUEST THAT YOUR OFFICIALS NOT REVEAL THE DECISION TO BRITISH AIRWAYS OR ITS OFFICIALS BEFORE THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT DOES SO IN WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK.

(13)-- ONCE AGAIN, THANK YOU FOR SEEING ME ON SUCH SHORT NOTICE. SHULTZ

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RECEIVED 13 NOV 84 19

TO MCFARLANE

FROM SOMMER

DOCDATE 13 NOV 84

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10/8/98

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN

AVIATION

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND PAPER & CURRENT STATUS OF THE LAKER DISPUTE

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE: 16 NOV 84 STATUS IX FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

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DISPATCH			W/ATTCH	FILE PA

PA [Signature]

National Security Council
The White House

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System # I
Package # 8377

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>J</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>4</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>I</u>
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>		<u>N</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

LAKER CASE -
For Fielding mtg
(See also recent Prescable at
TulB)

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
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
~~SECRET~~

THE LAKER CASE



Civil aviation questions, and in particular pricing and routing between the U.S. and the UK, have often erupted into problems.



The British position is that the Bermuda 2 agreement, which regulated air transportation between the U.S. and the UK, supersedes the Sherman Act and therefore the exclusive remedy is action under Bermuda 2. The U.S. position is that the Sherman Act remains in place under Bermuda 2 and requires the airlines to comply with U.S. domestic laws.



There are a number of overtones related to the Laker case. Britain has long opposed--even prior to the pipeline controversy--the application of U.S. law to British territory. There is a general feeling among the British (including the Prime Minister) that cases like this one encroach on British sovereignty.



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7/21/00

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On a personal note, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] to me there is a fine line between normal business discussions and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] It is also ironic [REDACTED] a company from the other country in the world closest to us on air transportation policy. Besides the United States, and possibly Canada, Great Britain is the only other country that would have accepted the emergence of a Laker Airlines.

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Bob,

Ken Dam has asked
that we pass a
copy of this cable
to F. Fielding. It
will be a C.I. for
the morning book.
Ron

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National Security Council
The White House

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>R</u>
Bob Kimmitt	<u>1</u>	<u>R</u>	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Tom Shull	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Put in Baker file.

① DOT now agrees that
Mon, Nov. 26 can
stay in + they will be ready
to meet on that date.

② Press guidance.

DOS disagrees w/ DOT's
release.
Can we mediate?

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Nov 16, 1984

RMK:

Re attached talking points for MT re LAKER CASE

I called Fred Fielding as instructed and asked that they have comments to you by 12N tomorrow.

I also called Paul McGrath, who said he had been in touch w/his office and had had his office read the talking points to him over the open line. I asked if he was aware that they were classified SUPER SENSITIVE, he ignored me. He said he had just had two comments.

pg 3 -- Delete Completely last tick

pg4 -- First Tick, delete set date for resumption of talks.

That was all he had to say.

Both office mentioned that they had been instructed by Liz ~~VerVelle~~(SP) to get in touch w/her w/comments by 10:30AM. I asked both offices for comments to you.

That is all.

KMS

* see penciled areas on your copy attached-

KMS

Sent to MCF

Copy ~~for~~ passed to Fielding

any further dissem
on Kimmitt's copy

~~SECRET~~

Department of State

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PAGE 01 OF 07 LONDON 25261 00 OF 03 181849Z C08/08 003479 NOD206

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ACTION OFFICE E-01

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INFO SS-04 D-01 L-01 NSC-01 /008 A2 RSA

S/S PASS NSC VIA COURIER, EYES ONLY MCFARLANE, KIMMITT, & FIELDING

NIACT ALERTS: S/S - J. COVEY; D - G. EDSON; L - D. SMALL; ALL AT 14:10

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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CAS 10/1/98

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November 18, 1984

~~SUPER SENSITIVE~~
8431405

-- Thank you for seeing me on such short notice. The President asked me to deliver to you personally his decision concerning the Laker Case. In fact, I came over on Thursday night, before the decision was made, because the President wanted a personal emissary, whatever the outcome.

-- After extensive deliberation, the President decided on Friday to instruct the Justice Department not to seek any indictments of UK carriers or individuals in connection with the Laker Case. In this regard, I would stress that the President's decision against indictment is unconditional.

-- Since the President was so concerned about the matter, the Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary both met with the President and other advisers on this issue. Secretary Shultz told me that this was an extremely difficult decision for the President. As you know, the President is a law-and-order man and he believes strongly in economic competition. He therefore supports strongly the strict enforcement of our criminal antitrust laws.

-- One of the President's aides remarked to me that he has never seen the President more concerned in reaching a decision.

-- There are several reasons why the President found the decision especially difficult:

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NLS 598-002 #619
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 9/24/02

- The allegations involve deliberate, knowing, repeated violations of fundamental requirements of the US antitrust laws. In our view the facts are clear.

- There is no valid argument that this case is not within the jurisdiction of the US. Indeed, the House of Lords confirmed this conclusion. I note further that both the capacity and the price-fixing agreements were implemented in the US.

- Moreover, Bermuda II calls for carriers to file pricing agreements with the Aeronautical Authorities of both countries, a requirement that was not met in this case. Further, the record is clear that when it entered Bermuda II HMG understood that the US had expressly declined to waive enforcement of its antitrust laws.

- In spite of these facts, the President decided against indictments because of the very special importance the President places on the US-UK relationship, and on his personal relationship with you.

- The President has decided not to seek indictments even though he may be subjected to considerable public and Congressional criticism. This is not an easy political step. Indeed, I am told that this is the first time in his Administration that a possible criminal indictment has been brought before the President for a decision.

- For the future, the President trusts that we will be able to achieve a bilateral aviation regime that will advance the competition policy that you and he both endorse. The President is aware that delegations from our governments have been meeting to discuss future arrangements. The President hopes that you and he will mutually assure that these negotiations will succeed and that the negotiators will complete their task soon.

- For its part, the US ~~seeks:~~ ^{wants.}

Z change

(1) Substantial flexibility in pricing, akin to what is known as "dual disapproval";

(2) A relaxation of restrictions on capacity, with regard to both frequencies and designations of carriers;

(3) The full disclosure of any price coordination talks; and

(4) A commitment from HMG not to invoke its blocking statute. *against U.S. enforcement...*

[-- We recognize that the UK also will wish certain accommodations including good faith US efforts to seek amendments affecting private suits.]

Per DAT

-- Our delegations had been scheduled to meet in London this Monday, November 19, to resume talks, but in light of the President's decision, we suggest that the talks be postponed. ~~(until Monday, November 26)~~

DoJ.

-- Because of the sensitivity of this decision in the US and because of US rules governing grand jury investigations, we request that you not reveal this information to anyone other than necessary British officials and that there be no public announcement of any sort until one comes from Washington. In particular, we request that your officials not reveal the decision to British Airways or its officials before the Justice Department completes that task in Washington next week.

-- Once again, thank you for seeing me without sufficient notice.

NOTE: Under Secretary Wallis has an appointment with the Prime Minister Sunday morning at 10:30. He will be accompanied by Ambassador Price. No copy of these talking points or any other paper will be left.

RECEIVED 10 NOV 84 09

TO POINDEXTER

FROM SOMMER

DOCDATE 09 NOV 84

DECLASSIFIED

White House Confidential, August 28, 1997

CAS

10/1/94

KEYWORDS: AVIATION

GREAT BRITAIN

SUBJECT: BACKGROUND ON LAKER CASE

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE: 12 NOV 84 STATUS IX FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

POINDEXTER

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COMMENTS

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FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO THE WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ 271657Z NOV 84 PRIVACY CHANNEL

FROM: AMBASSADOR PRICE, EMBASSY LONDON 016

TO: BUD MCFARLANE, NSC, WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: NOV. 19 LETTER FROM P.M. THATCHER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

WE RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS THIS AFTERNOON TO DELIVER THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER ON CIVIL AVIATION TO THE PRIME MINISTER AS SET FORTH IN STATE 349602. WE HAVE NOT RECEIVED A COPY OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S LETTER OF NOVEMBER 19 TO THE PRESIDENT ON THIS SUBJECT. THEREFORE, OUR GLASS IS ONLY HALF-FULL.

AS YOU ARE AWARE, I HAVE PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED THE NEED FOR SUCH INFORMATION WITH THE PRESIDENT AND HE INDICATED HIS APPROVAL THAT IT BE PROVIDED. IN THE PAST, YOU HAVE SENT COPIES OF CABINET CHANNEL MESSAGES TO ME VIA THIS ROUTE. IF THIS PROCEDURE COULD BE FOLLOWED IN THE FUTURE IT WOULD BE APPRECIATED.
DECL OADR.

That's too much.

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NLS

598-002#622

BY

LOS

NARA DATE

9/24/02

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8328

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 9, 1984

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INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *PS*

SUBJECT: The Laker Case

At Tab A, for your background, is a paper on the Laker case. After reading it, I hope the following recommendation makes sense. In London, if pressed, you should:

- Underscore that you have only general and limited knowledge about the case.
- Emphasize that the NSC is not directly involved and underline that we take great care not to inject ourselves in the judicial process, which you understand is at a particularly delicate stage.
- If the British insist, express a willingness to hear their views.

Attachment

TAB A Paper on Laker Case

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Declassify on: OADR

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N 598-0027620
BY CAS
7/21/00

THE LAKER CASE

Civil aviation questions, and in particular pricing and routing between the U.S. and the UK, have often erupted into problems. [REDACTED]

~~REDACTED~~

RE

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~ACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

RE

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

The British position is that the Bermuda 2 agreement, which regulated air transportation between the U.S. and the UK, supersedes the Sherman Act and therefore the exclusive remedy is action under Bermuda 2. The U.S. position is that the Sherman Act remains in place under Bermuda 2 and requires the airlines to comply with U.S. domestic laws. [REDACTED]

~~REDACTED~~

RE

There are a number of overtones related to the Laker case. Britain has long opposed--even prior to the pipeline controversy--the application of U.S. law to British territory. There is a general feeling among the British (including the Prime Minister) that cases like this one encroach on British sovereignty. [REDACTED]

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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CS SQK-002 #021/1207 7/21/00

On a personal note. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] To me there is a fine

line between normal business discussions and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] It is also ironic [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] a company from the other country in the world closest to us on air transportation policy. Besides the United States, and possibly Canada, Great Britain is the only other country that would have accepted the emergence of a Laker Airlines.

RECEIVED 03 OCT 84 16

TO SHULTZ, G

FROM AMEMBASSY LONDON

DOCDATE 15 AUG 84

By CTS 10/8/98

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN

LEGAL ISSUES

PRUSHINOWSKI, JOSEF

SUBJECT: CABLE RE EXTRADITION OF PRUSHINOWSKI

ACTION: NOTED BY MCFARLANE DUE: STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (CM CM)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

National Security Council
The White House

System # I
Package # 7459

84 AUG 20 A 8:42

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Bob Kimmitt			
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>I</u>
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	<u>3</u>		
Bud McFarlane	<u>4</u>	<u>m</u>	<u>I</u>
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>[initials]</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Admiral: this message expands
on the extradiction matter.

Bud, you might hear about this. [initials]

84 AUG 16 P 6: 54

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 241858
E. O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: CJAN, UK
SUBJECT: EXTRADITION OF JOSEF PRUSHINOWSKI

1. SUMMARY: DEPARTMENT IS ABOUT TO SURRENDER JOSEF PRUSHINOWSKI FOR EXTRADITION TO THE U.K. WHERE HE FACES FRAUD CHARGES. PRUSHINOWSKI HAS MOUNTED A VIGOROUS OPPOSITION TO EXTRADITION, WHICH HAS INCLUDED REPRESENTATIONS BY TWO SENATORS, SEVERAL RABBIS IN THE U.S. AND THE U.K. AND A FEDERAL JUDGE ATTESTING TO THE PROPOSITIONS THAT PRUSHINOWSKI EATS ONLY GLATT KOSHER FOOD, THAT IN BRITISH PRISONS HE WILL BE DENIED HIS RELIGIOUSLY PRESCRIBED DIET, AND THAT HIS HEALTH WILL SUFFER MATERIALLY AS A RESULT. DEPARTMENT PLANS TO SURRENDER PRUSHINOWSKI WITHOUT RPT WITHOUT CONDITIONS. HOWEVER, EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO APPROACH U.K. AT APPROPRIATE LEVEL AND INDICATE THAT WE WOULD GREATLY APPRECIATE IT IF HMG WOULD TAKE PRUSHINOWSKI'S RELIGIOUS REQUIREMENTS INTO ACCOUNT. EMBASSY TALKING POINTS ARE IN PARA 5 BELOW. AS PRESENTLY PLANNED, PRUSHINOWSKI SHOULD ARRIVE U.K. ON THURSDAY, AUGUST 16. EMBASSY SHOULD REFER ANY PRESS INQUIRIES TO THE DEPARTMENT. CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE FOR USE BY DEPARTMENT PRESS SPOKESMAN IS REPORTED FYI IN PARA 6. END SUMMARY.

2. ON MARCH 22, 1982, THE U.K. REQUESTED PRUSHINOWSKI'S EXTRADITION. ON FEBRUARY 11, 1983, A FORMAL COMPLAINT SEEKING PRUSHINOWSKI'S EXTRADITION TO THE U.K. WAS FILED IN THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA. PRUSHINOWSKI WAS CHARGED BY THE U.K. WITH FIVE COUNTS OF OBTAINING PROPERTY BY DECEPTION, FIVE COUNTS OF PROCURING THE EXECUTION OF A VALUABLE SECURITY BY DECEPTION, AND ONE COUNT OF ATTEMPTING TO OBTAIN PROPERTY BY DECEPTION. ON OCTOBER 21, 1983, THE DISTRICT COURT FOUND PRUSHINOWSKI EXTRADITABLE ON ALL OFFENSES AND CERTIFIED HIS EXTRADITABILITY. PRUSHINOWSKI SOUGHT HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW OF THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER. THIS WAS DENIED AT THE DISTRICT COURT LEVEL ON FEBRUARY 7, 1984, AND THE DENIAL WAS AFFIRMED ON MAY 24, 1984, BY A U.S. COURT OF APPEALS. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, PRUSHINOWSKI'S COUNSEL INFORMED THE DEPARTMENT THAT HE WOULD NOT SEEK FURTHER JUDICIAL REVIEW.

3. SINCE THE CASE WAS FINALLY CERTIFIED BY THE COURTS TO

THE SECRETARY ON JUNE 21, 1984 THE DEPARTMENT HAS RECEIVED A NUMBER OF COMMUNICATIONS FROM SENATORS BOSCHWITZ AND JEPSEN, SEVERAL RABBIS IN THE U.S. AND THE U.K. AND A FEDERAL JUDGE REQUESTING THE DEPARTMENT TO DENY OR CONDITION PRUSHINOWSKI'S EXTRADITION TO THE U.K. WHILE SOME HAVE BASED THEIR PLEAS IN PART ON PRUSHINOWSKI'S WILLINGNESS TO MAKE RESTITUTION. IN ESSENCE THESE REQUESTS HAVE ALL BEEN BASED ON THE PROPOSITIONS THAT PRUSHINOWSKI IS A DEVOUT ORTHODOX HASIDIC JEW WHOSE STRICT DIET IS A CENTRAL FEATURE OF HIS RELIGIOUS BELIEFS, THAT HE WOULD BE DENIED THE OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE THAT DIET WERE HE TO BE DETAINED IN A BRITISH PRISON, AND THAT, BECAUSE HE WOULD ADHERE TO HIS DIET HIS HEALTH WOULD SUFFER DRASTICALLY BECAUSE HE WOULD NOT EAT NON-KOSHER FOOD.

4. THE DEPARTMENT HAS CONSIDERED THESE REPRESENTATIONS CAREFULLY. IN PARTICULAR THE DEPARTMENT HAS NOTED THAT: (A) AS REFLECTED IN THE DECEMBER 7, 1983 AFFIDAVIT OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY THOMAS (OF THE BRITISH PRISON SYSTEM), IT IS THE POLICY OF THE BRITISH PRISON SYSTEM TO BE MINDFUL OF THE RELIGIOUS AND DIETARY REQUIREMENTS OF INMATES; (B) PRUSHINOWSKI'S DIETARY REQUIREMENTS ARE SO STRICT THAT THEY MAY NOT BE SATISFIED BY THE FOOD PROVIDED BY BRITISH PRISONS AND (C) AS PRUSHINOWSKI'S AMERICAN ATTORNEY HAS POINTED OUT, PRUSHINOWSKI'S DIETARY REQUIREMENTS HAVE ALSO NOT BEEN SATISFIED BY THE FOOD PROVIDED IN AMERICAN PRISONS. WHILE WE ARE SYMPATHETIC TO PRUSHINOWSKI'S DESIRE TO OBSERVE HIS GLATT KOSHER DIET, WE DO NOT FIND THIS HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATION SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY A DENIAL OF HIS EXTRADITION TO THE U.K. WE

WOULD GREATLY APPRECIATE IT. HOWEVER, IF THE U.K. WOULD EXERCISE ITS DISCRETION TO DO WHAT IT CAN TO FACILITATE PRUSHINOWSKI'S RECEIPT OF THE DIET HE SEEKS. TOWARDS THIS

END, EMBASSY IS INSTRUCTED TO MAKE POINTS IN PARA 5 BELOW TO APPROPRIATE BRITISH OFFICIAL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

5. TALKING POINTS:

-- ON AUGUST 15, DEPUTY SECRETARY DAM SIGNED THE WARRANT SURRENDERING JOSEF PRUSHINOWSKI FOR EXTRADITION TO THE U.K. ON FRAUD CHARGES:

-- ARRANGEMENTS ARE NOW BEING MADE FOR PRUSHINOWSKI TO BE TRANSPORTED TO THE U.K. IN THE CUSTODY OF TWO U.S. MARSHALS;

-- WHILE THE UNITED STATES HAS NOT ATTACHED CONDITIONS TO PRUSHINOWSKI'S SURRENDER TO THE U.K., WE SINCERELY REQUEST THAT THE U.K. AUTHORITIES TAKE THE MEASURES AVAILABLE TO THEM TO FACILITATE PROVISION OF APPROPRIATE KOSHER FOOD TO HIM;
BT

DECLASSIFIED
NLS 598-002#623
BY NOT NARA, DATE 6/12/02

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 02 OF 02 STATE 241858

-- IN PARTICULAR, IN KEEPING WITH THE STATEMENTS SET FORTH IN ASSISTANT SECRETARY THOMAS' AFFIDAVIT OF DECEMBER 7, 1983, THE USG REQUESTS THAT PRUSHINOWSKI BE LOCATED IN A PRISON WHERE HIS DIETARY REQUIREMENTS CAN BE MET AND THAT HE BE ALLOWED TO HAVE KOSHER FOOD BROUGHT IN DURING HIS DETENTION AS AN UNCONVICTED PRISONER, AND THAT, IF HE IS CONVICTED, HE BE LOCATED IN A PRISON WHERE THE MOST FAVORABLE SATISFACTION OF HIS DIETARY REQUIREMENTS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED;

-- THE DEPARTMENT EXPRESSES APPRECIATION FOR THE U.K. CONSIDERATION OF THESE REQUESTS, WHICH WE UNDERSTAND TO BE CONSISTENT WITH GENERAL U.K. PRACTICE.

6. EMBASSY SHOULD DIRECT ANY PRESS INQUIRIES TO THE DEPARTMENT. FYI: FOLLOWING ARE CONTINGENCY Q'S AND A'S PREPARED FOR USE BY DEPARTMENT PRESS OFFICER;

A-Q: IS IT TRUE THAT THE DEPARTMENT HAS EXTRADITED AN ORTHODOX HASSIDIC JEW TO THE U.K. EVEN THOUGH IMPRISONMENT IN THE U.K. WILL JEOPARDIZE HIS LIFE?

A: ON AUGUST 15, THE DEPUTY SECRETARY SIGNED A WARRANT SURRENDERING JOSEF PRUSHINOWSKI FOR EXTRADITION TO THE U.K. TO STAND TRIAL ON A NUMBER OF CHARGES ALLEGING FRAUD. PRUSHINOWSKI HAD BEEN FOUND EXTRADITABLE BY A FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT AND THE FINDING OF EXTRADITABILITY HAD BEEN UPHOLD BY A UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS. MR. PRUSHINOWSKI IS AN ORTHODOX HASSIDIC JEW WHO ADHERES TO AN EXCEPTIONALLY STRICT KOSHER DIET AS PART OF HIS RELIGIOUS BELIEFS. WE UNDERSTAND THAT UNDER BRITISH PRISON REGULATIONS, HE WILL BE ABLE TO OBTAIN FOOD SATISFYING HIS DIETARY REQUIREMENTS (BY CATERING FROM OUTSIDE THE DETENTION FACILITIES) AS AN UNCONVICTED PRISONER IN THE U.K., ALTHOUGH HIS STRICT DIET MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE TO HIM AS A CONVICTED PRISONER, SHOULD HE BE CONVICTED.

F-Q: BUT SHOULDN'T THE DEPARTMENT HAVE DENIED EXTRADITION IF THERE WAS A RISK THAT, AS A CONVICTED PRISONER, HE WOULD BE DENIED THE KIND OF FOOD THAT HIS RELIGIOUS BELIEFS REQUIRE HIM TO EAT?

A: I THINK YOUR QUESTION REQUIRES AN ANSWER IN SEVERAL

PARTS: (1) THE BRITISH PRISON AUTHORITIES MAKE REASONABLE EFFORTS TO PROVIDE A DIET THAT SATISFIES A PRISONER'S RELIGIOUS PRINCIPLES; (2) IT MAY WELL BE THAT THE DIET PROVIDED WILL NOT BE FULLY SATISFACTORY TO MR. PRUSHINOWSKI. HOWEVER, AS HIS ATTORNEY HAS INDICATED TO US, THE DIET PROVIDED MR. PRUSHINOWSKI IN FEDERAL PRISON WAS NOT FULLY SATISFACTORY TO HIM. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN APPROPRIATE FOR US TO HOLD THE BRITISH PENAL SYSTEM TO A HIGHER STANDARD THAN OURS; AND (3) FURTHERMORE, AND HERE I AM NOT SPEAKING ABOUT MR. PRUSHINOWSKI, BUT GENERALLY, IT WOULD AFTER ALL BE UNACCEPTABLE IF A PERSON WERE ABLE TO AVOID PUNISHMENT FOR HIS CRIMES BY VIRTUE OF HIS RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION.

G-Q: DID ISRAEL ALSO SEEK HIS EXTRADITION?

A: YES. HOWEVER, THE ISRAELI REQUEST WAS RECEIVED MUCH LATER THAN THE U.K. REQUEST AND THE U.K. REQUEST WAS ACCORDED PRIORITY.

H-Q: WHO MADE THE SURRENDER DECISION?

A: THE DEPUTY SECRETARY MADE THE DECISION, PURSUANT TO A LONG-STANDING DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY FROM THE SECRETARY.

I-Q: DID THE U.S. ATTACH ANY CONDITIONS TO THE EXTRADITION?

A: NO. HOWEVER, AS I EXPLAINED EARLIER, BRITISH PRISON REGULATIONS PERMIT AN UNCONVICTED PRISONER TO HAVE FOOD OF HIS CHOICE BROUGHT IN FROM THE OUTSIDE. WE ARE SPECIFICALLY ASKING THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES TO FOLLOW THAT PRACTICE IN THIS CASE, AND TO MAKE ALL EFFORTS CONSISTENT WITH THEIR REGULATIONS TO PROVIDE MR. PRUSHINOWSKI WITH A SUITABLE DIET SHOULD HE BE CONVICTED.

SHULTZ
BT

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NSC/S PROFILE

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ID 8407126

RECEIVED 24 SEP 84 11

DOCDATE 24 SEP 84

TO MCFARLANE FROM LAUX

By CL5 10/8/98

KEYWORDS: CHINA P R
HONG KONG

GREAT BRITAIN

SUBJECT: BRITISH - CHINESE AGREEMENT RE HONG KONG

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION DUE: STATUS IX FILES PA

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO
MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

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	SEP 24 1984	Mcfarlane noted		LX

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MEMORANDUM

7126

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 24, 1984

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

RCM HAS SEEN

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM:

DAVID N. LAUX *DL*

SUBJECT:

Status Report on the British-Chinese Agreement on Hong Kong

The British and Chinese intend to make public on September 25 or 26 the Agreement on the future of Hong Kong. The British have made a copy of the text available to our State Department over the weekend and State will provide us a copy today. The initial State reaction to the Agreement is that it is a pretty good one, and that the British did a reasonably good job of negotiating it.

The British have asked the U.S. Government to make a statement commenting on the Agreement in a way which will be helpful in maintaining American investor confidence in Hong Kong. State concocted a statement which, unfortunately, before it was coordinated with us, was given informally to the British and also to our Embassy in Beijing and the Consulate in Hong Kong. However, State has accepted our edits -- which were mainly designed to prevent the comment from being too effusive -- and the revised statement is being cabled to London, Beijing and Hong Kong today.

The whole package is being delivered to Secretary Shultz today. After his approval, the U.S. statement is scheduled to be made in Shultz's name by the State public affairs spokesman at their noon briefing on Wednesday, September 26, 1984.

Attached is a copy of the final statement.

Gaston Sigur ^{6's} concurs.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

NS 598-002 #1624
BY CJS 7/22/00

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

STATEMENT ON THE UK-PRC
AGREEMENT ON THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG

The U.S. Government welcomes the successful conclusion of two years of negotiations between the United Kingdom and the People's Republic of China over the future of Hong Kong.

The U.S. has a strong interest in the continued stability and prosperity of Hong Kong and believes the agreement will provide a solid foundation for Hong Kong's enduring future progress. In this regard, we have noted statements by both sides indicating that Hong Kong's way of life will be guaranteed for fifty years from 1997 and that systems existing in Hong Kong will continue in the Special Administrative Region.

We expect the American business communities, both in the United States and Hong Kong, will see in this agreement good reason for sustained confidence in the future of Hong Kong as an attractive and thriving commercial center.

The U.S. will provide any assistance it can, in close cooperation with the United Kingdom and the People's Republic of China, to maintain Hong Kong's appropriate participation in international bodies.

~~SECRET~~

NLS 598-002 #625
BY OAS 7/21/00

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED 19 OCT 84 15

TO MCFARLANE FROM SOMMER

DOCDATE 18 OCT 84

By *CAS*

28 1987
10/8/87

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN

AM

WRIGHT, OLIVER

SUBJECT: AMB WRIGHT REQUEST FOR MTG

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 22 OCT 84 STATUS X FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE ✓

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (DW *CT*)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	<i>C</i> OCT 20 1984	<i>Mcfarlane approved</i>		<i>Sommer</i>

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National Security Council
The White House

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Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>J</u>	
Bob Kimmitt			
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u>J</u>	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane	<u>3</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>		<u>N</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

National Security Council
The White House

System # 11

Package # 0925

1406

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>8</u>	
Bob Kimmitt			
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u>T</u>	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane		<u>M</u>	<u>f</u>
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>		<u>N</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

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(Date/Time)

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION

October 18, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *PRS*

SUBJECT: British Ambassador Requests An Appointment: Laker Case

Sir Oliver Wright has asked to meet with you to discuss civil aviation in general and the Laker case in particular. He hopes to see you early next week.

There are a number of general civil aviation questions involving routing,

~~CTED~~
~~REDACTED~~
~~RE~~
~~REDACTED~~

~~CTED~~

While not adamantly opposed, State (EUR/NE) and Justice believe, and I agree, that it would not be appropriate for you to meet with Wright at this time.

Moreover, normal US-UK consultations -- at which the British will present their views

Thus, the timing is also not right.

In sum, there does not appear to be sufficient national security reasons to inject ourselves into the judicial process, though before this issue runs its course, I am sure that you will have to meet with Wright and that we will see a Thatchergram to the President.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize me to tell the British Embassy that for scheduling reasons you cannot meet with Wright ~~until after the election~~. This accords with what Wilma (or one of the front office secretaries) has already told the British Embassy.

Paul Thompson and Richard *PRS* Devine concur.

Approve *PC H* Disapprove _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

PRS 598-002 #1626
7/21/00
CS