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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

DLB 10/23/2006

File Folder UNITED KINGDOM (05/24/1981) [TOO LATE TO FILE] (2 OF 2)

FOIA

F02-071/1

Box Number 20

COLLINS

68

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
29230	PAPER	EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS R 7/31/2008 NLRRF02-071/1	2	ND	B1
29232	PAPER	U.S. OBJECTIVES AND TACTICS - EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS R 7/31/2008 NLRRF02-071/1	3	ND	B1
29233	PAPER	OTHER ISSUES R 7/31/2008 NLRRF02-071/1	1	ND	B1
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29243	MEMO	DUPLICATE OF #27971; ROBERT MCFARLANE TO THE PRESIDENT, RE: PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF THE US/UK AGREEMENT.....	1	5/29/1984	B1
29236	PAPER	DUPLICATE OF #27976; SIGNED COPY OF THE AMENDMENT TO THE AGREEMENT..... R 7/31/2008 NLRRF02-071/1	4	ND	B1
29238	PAPER	DUPLICATE OF #27972; AMENDMENT TO THE AGREEMENT..... R 7/31/2008 NLRRF02-071/1	4	ND	B1
29239	LETTER	DUPLICATE OF #27973; DONALD HODEL, CASPAR WEINBERGER TO THE PRESIDENT	2	5/23/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
29240	PAPER	DUPLICATE OF #27974; AMENDMENT TOT EH TECHNICAL ANNEX TO THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE US/UK	4	ND	B1
29241	PAPER	DUPLICATE OF #27975; SUPPLEMENTAL TECHNICAL ANNEX TO THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE US/UK	3	ND	B1
29242	MEMO	DUPLICATE OF #29970; BOB LINHARD/BOB HELM TO ROBERT MCFARLANE, RE: PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE US/UK AGREEMENT.....	1	5/24/1984	B1

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EAST-WEST ECONOMIC
ISSUES

NLRR FOZ-07.1, #29230

BY CI NARA DATE 7/31/08EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONSIntroduction: Robert C. McFarlane

- o Since public disagreement with our Summit partners surfaced at Versailles two years ago on East-West economic relations generally, and on the Soviet gas pipeline to Europe specifically, we have made steady if slow progress in forging a consensus for a comprehensive and prudent economic relationship with the East.

- o This consensus has emerged largely as a result of work we and our allies agreed in late 1982 to undertake in specialized fora -- the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the International Energy Agency (IEA), the Coordinating Committee (COCOM), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). While work in these fora is continuing, solid progress has already been recorded in each organization:

- o The key elements of the emerging multilateral "prudent" approach to East-West economic relations are:
 - no subsidization of the Soviet economy through preferential trading terms or financing;

 - avoidance of dependence on the Soviet Union as an energy supplier, with particular attention to natural gas;

- more effective multilateral export controls on Western goods or technology that could increase Warsaw Pact military capabilities; and

 - maintenance of trade with the East on the basis of a balance of advantages.
- o While many of our objectives on East-West economic relations have been met, there is considerably more that has to be done. Bob Morris will provide our objectives on this score and what you can expect to hear from the other leaders.

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29232

Presenter: Robert J. Morris

U.S. Objectives and Tactics

- o As Bud noted, we have come a long way on East-West over the past two years. More work needs to be done, but we must bear in mind that this is a particularly sensitive issue with our Summit partners, who continue to believe East-West economic ties are beneficial both economically and politically.

- o Your approach on East-West economies this year should be similar to our line last year at Williamsburg. You will want to note progress made in the specialized fora, and encourage further work in them.

- o We are particularly anxious for work to proceed in the International Energy Agency to encourage development of indigenous energy sources, such as the Troll Gas Field in Norway, in place of additional European imports of Soviet energy.

- o In addition, we will want to press the Summit leaders to speed up resolution of sticking points in the COCOM list review, where some of the Allies have objected to our proposals to control exports of certain computers and related equipment and technology.

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NLRR F07-071/1 #29232
BY CW NARA DATE 7/31/08

- o Finally, we will want to press forward on a NATO study on what basic industries are most critical to Soviet military capabilities and an OECD study on barter deals between East and West, which we believe are undesirable.

Positions of Summit Partners

- o We do not expect any initiatives by our partners on East-West economics at London. In fact, our partners have little enthusiasm for a review of this subject, but will not oppose your leadership in noting the work already underway and encouraging efforts to broaden the consensus forged during the past two years.
- o The British and Germans, however, could raise the general issue of extraterritoriality, which has an East-West element. As Allen mentioned, all Summit countries continue to object to our assertion of jurisdiction over foreign shipments of goods or technology that originated in the U.S. or is the product of U.S. technology under license.

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- 3 -

- o While desiring a broader consensus on an overall approach on how to deal economically with the East, other Summit countries will be hesitant to discuss specific measures that could affect their lucrative and traditional trading relationships with Eastern Europe and the USSR. In general, they are more concerned with improving and making more effective the existing trade control system, than in expanding the controls themselves.
- o This said, there is a much greater willingness on the part of most of our allies to take this issue seriously than was true two years ago.
- o Our objective from the beginning was to bring about a sea-change in allied attitudes. This is happening, thanks to your leadership. It is a task which must continue for the years ahead. The allies are now aware of that and are prepared to work with us, even if not always with enthusiasm or in lock step.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OTHER ISSUES

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29233

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OTHER ISSUES

Introduction: Robert C. McFarlane

- o In addition to the usual areas of Summit discussion such as trade, economic outlook, and so on, we expect the Summit Heads to continue a tradition of raising other economic-related issues of personal or national importance.

- o While these discussions will not occupy much of the Summit's already crowded agenda, Allen Wallis will give you a flavor of the topics we anticipate various leaders will bring up.

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NLRR FOZ-0711 # 29233

BY CJ NARADATE 7/31/08

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Presenter: W. Allen Wallis

Discussion of Other Issues

- o Based on the recent Sherpa meetings and information from our Embassies in Summit countries, we want to brief you on three other issues which may be important at London:
- o They are possible Australian participation in the annual economic summits; extraterritoriality; and North/South relations.
- o Let me now give you a snapshot of each issue.

AUSTRALIAN PARTICIPATION IN ECONOMIC SUMMITS

- o Australian PM Hawke has expressed to us and others his strong interest in Australian participation in future summits.
- o There are both pros and cons to this:
 - Australian participation would provide a much-needed expansion of the Asia/Pacific dimension of the Summit.

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NLRR F07-0711 #29735

BY Cvt NARADATE 7/31/08

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- 2 -

- However, any expansion of Summit participation risks opening the gates to many more, and the value of these meetings as informal discussions among leaders of the main countries considerably diminished.

- o I have told Hawke that we would be interested in Australian participation if Australia were to be the only added participant.

- o There is virtually no support among other Summit countries to enlarge the group.

- o We have committed to Hawke to raise the question at London.

- o Unless you wish to do so personally, perhaps Secretary Shultz could discuss it informally with other Foreign Ministers, making the case in favor of Australia alone, but agreeing to abide by the views of the others.

EXTRATERRITORIALITY

- o The British and Canadians, among other Summit countries, strongly oppose our application of U.S. law outside of our borders, which they view as intruding on their sovereignty.

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- o They are most disturbed when they think the U.S. is attempting to control activities in their territory in accordance with U.S. interests and without regard to their own distinct interests. The flap over the Soviet gas pipeline is one example.

- o We are well aware of the deeply held views of other governments regarding extraterritorial assertions of U.S. legal jurisdiction.

- o You should respond to any criticism on this issue by noting that we are dedicated to finding means to bridge our differences in this area and are hopeful that in the end we can enjoy greater cooperation.

- o You can point to constructive outcome of your approach to the unitary tax issue and to our efforts in OECD and with many of our partners bilaterally to find better ways to consult and manage these problems in a pragmatic way.

NORTH/SOUTH

- o At our last Sherpa meeting, France, the EC and Canada urged that the Heads should consider what position the Summit

should take on proposals for pursuing the formal North/South dialogue.

- o You will recall that at Versailles we agreed on a strategy for handling LDC pressure for Global Negotiations.
- o Our strategy involved getting commitments from the LDC's that Global Negotiations, carried out in the UN, would not encroach upon, or interfere with, the competence and work programs of the specialized fora such as GATT and IMF.
- o That agreement with our Summit partners has held for two years.
- o Meantime, the pressure for GN's has diminished, with several LDC's doubtful that they would be worthwhile.
- o Nevertheless, activity on this has recently picked up in New York and some Summit countries. These countries want to curry political favor with the LDC's, many of whom have started to chaffe under the restraint of the Versailles agreement.
- o Mrs. Gandhi has also sent an emissary to Summit capitals to argue that the Summit should endorse her proposal for an international conference on Trade, Finance and Development.

- o Mrs. Thatcher's line was that we don't lack for fora and, rather than creating new ones, we should work on practical solutions to real problems.

- o Your position should be the same. You should point out that the bulk of our regular Summit agenda is addressed to the substance of the North/South problem; that there is no need to abandon or compromise our own consensus at Versailles to protect the integrity of the operational agencies and that, to the extent we need to be seen to be meeting LDC concerns about the process of dialogue, we should concentrate on improving the vehicle for its conduct in the UN system, specifically the UNCTAD.

- o We have made several proposals for reforming UNCTAD, to which many of our OECD partners have responded positively. We should continue that exercise, not re-open the whole Global Negotiations debate, either among ourselves or with the LDC's.

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LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
PRESIDENTIAL BRIEFING
LONDON ECONOMIC SUMMIT

May 29, 1984

The Vice President

George P. Shultz, Secretary of State

Donald T. Regan, Secretary of the Treasury

Edwin Meese, Counsellor to the President

James A. Baker, Chief of Staff and Assistant to the President

Michael K. Deaver, Deputy Chief of Staff and Assistant to the President

Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Richard G. Darman, Assistant to the President and Deputy to the Chief of Staff

Craig L. Fuller, Assistant to the President for Cabinet Affairs

Michael A. McManus, Assistant to the President and Deputy to the Deputy Chief of Staff

Larry M. Speakes, Assistant to the President and Principal Deputy Press Secretary

John A. Svahn, Assistant to the President for Policy Development

W. Allen Wallis, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

Beryl W. Sprinkel, Under Secretary of Treasury for Monetary Affairs

James M. Beggs, Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

William Henkel, Deputy Assistant to the President and Director of Presidential Advance

Robert M. Kimmitt, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Executive Secretary, National Security Council

Richard Burt, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs

James M. Rentschler, U.S. Ambassador to Malta

M. Marlin Fitzwater, Special Assistant to the President and Deputy Press Secretary for Foreign Affairs

William F. Martin, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Senior Director for Coordination

Robert B. Sims, Special Assistant to the President and Deputy Press Secretary for Foreign Affairs

Douglas W. McMinn, Staff Member, National Security Council

Robert J. Morris, Deputy to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs

Gilbert Rye, Staff Member, National Security Council

SYSTEM II PROFILE

~~SECRET~~

ID 8490627

RECEIVED 25 MAY 84 17

TO MCFARLANE

FROM LINHARD

dlb 10/23/06

DOCDATE 24 MAY 84

HELM

24 MAY 84

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN

NUCLEAR MATTERS

SUBJECT PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO US / UK NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENT

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR SIG

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (B / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)


TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

I am pleased to transmit to the Congress, pursuant to Section 123d. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the text of an amendment to the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes of July 3, 1958, as amended, and my written approval, authorization, and determination concerning the agreement. The joint unclassified letter submitted to me by the Secretaries of Energy and Defense which provides a summary position on the Amendment is also enclosed. A classified letter and attachments are being transmitted directly to the appropriate Congressional committees.

The Amendment extends for ten years (until December 31, 1994) provisions which permit the transfer of nonnuclear parts, source, by-product, special nuclear materials, and other material and technology for nuclear weapons and military reactors.

In my judgment, the proposed Amendment meets all statutory requirements. The United Kingdom intends to continue to maintain viable nuclear forces. In light of our previous close cooperation and the fact that the United Kingdom has committed its nuclear forces to NATO, I have concluded that it is in our interest to continue to assist them in maintaining a credible nuclear force.

I have approved the Amendment, authorized its execution, and urge that the Congress give it favorable consideration.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Ronald Reagan". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned in the lower right quadrant of the page.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

June 6, 1984.

DECLASSIFIED / (RELEASED)

SYSTEM II
90627

29 230

NLRR FOZ-0711 # 29736

BY CJ NARADATE 7/31/08

AMENDMENT TO THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF
GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
FOR COOPERATION ON THE USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY
FOR MUTUAL DEFENSE PURPOSES

The Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland,

Desiring to amend in certain respects the Agreement for
Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense
Purposes, signed at Washington on the third day of July, 1958,
as amended (herein referred to as the "Agreement");

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

Article II of the Agreement is amended by:

(a) adding ", sensitive nuclear technology, and controlled
nuclear information" after "classified information" in
paragraph A;

(b) revising paragraph B to read:

"B. In addition to the cooperation provided for in
paragraph A of this Article each Party will exchange with
the other Party other classified information concerning
atomic weapons, sensitive nuclear technology, and
controlled nuclear information, including special nuclear
materials properties and production or processing
technology, when, after consultation with the other Party,
the communicating Party determines that the communication
of such information is necessary to improve the recipient's
atomic weapon design, development and fabrication
capability."

ARTICLE 2

Article III bis of the Agreement is amended by:

(a) substituting "1994" for "1984" throughout the Article;

- (b) relettering paragraphs C and D as paragraphs D and E, respectively, and inserting the following new paragraph C:

"C. The Government of the United States shall transfer enriched uranium, and shall provide enrichment and other uranium services to the Government of the United Kingdom, for military purposes, in such quantities, at such times prior to December 31, 1994, and on such terms and conditions as may be agreed."

ARTICLE 3

Paragraph D of Article V of the Agreement is amended to read:

"D. Nothing in this Agreement shall preclude the communication or exchange of classified information, sensitive nuclear technology, or controlled nuclear information, which may be transmissible under other arrangements between the Parties."

ARTICLE 4

Article VI of the Agreement is amended by:

- (a) relettering paragraphs B and C as paragraphs D and E, respectively, and inserting the following new paragraphs B and C:

"B. Sensitive nuclear technology and controlled nuclear information transferred pursuant to this Agreement shall be accorded at least the same level of protection by the recipient party as that accorded to such information by the transferring Party. The Parties shall consult with each other regarding the appropriate protections for such information.

"C. Adequate physical security shall be maintained with respect to any source material, special nuclear material and equipment transferred pursuant to the Agreement, and with respect to any special nuclear material used in or produced through the use of any material or reactor so transferred. Such protection shall be commensurate with the importance of the material or equipment involved."

- (b) adding ", sensitive nuclear technology, and controlled nuclear information," after "Classified information" in the paragraph relettered as paragraph D;
- (c) adding "sensitive nuclear technology, and controlled nuclear information," after "Classified information," in the paragraph relettered as paragraph E.

ARTICLE 5

Article VII of the Agreement is amended by:

- (a) adding ", sensitive nuclear technology, and controlled nuclear information," after "shall communicate classified information";
- (b) adding ", sensitive nuclear technology, and controlled nuclear information," after "communication of classified information" in paragraph B.

ARTICLE 6

Article IX of the Agreement is amended by substituting "paragraphs A, B, C or D" for "paragraphs A, B or C" in subparagraph 1 of paragraph B.

ARTICLE 7

Article XI of the Agreement is amended by relettering paragraphs C, D, E, F, G, I and J as paragraphs E, F, G, H, I, J and K, respectively, and inserting the following new paragraphs C and D:

"C. 'Sensitive nuclear technology' means any information (including information incorporated in a production or utilization facility or important component part thereof) which is not available to the public and which is important to the design, construction, fabrication, operation or maintenance of a uranium enrichment or nuclear fuel reprocessing facility or a facility for the production of heavy water, but shall not include information designated as Restricted Data by the Government of the United States."

"D. 'Controlled nuclear information' means information protected by the Government of the United States from unauthorized dissemination pursuant to sections 57.b. or 148 of the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended."

ARTICLE 8

Article XII of the Agreement is amended by substituting "Party" for "to take effect on December 31, 1969, or thereafter on one year's notice to take effect at the end of any succeeding term of five years".


ARTICLE 9

This Amendment shall enter into force on the date on which each Government shall have received from the other Government written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for the entry into force of this Amendment.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Amendment.

DONE at Washington, in duplicate, this 5th day of June, 1984.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:



FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN
AND NORTHERN IRELAND:



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 31, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY

SUBJECT: Proposed Amendment to the U.S.-U.K. Agreement for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes

I have reviewed and concur in the positions taken in your joint letter to me recommending approval of a proposed amendment to the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes. I note from your joint recommendation that the United Kingdom is participating with the United States pursuant to an international agreement by making substantial and material contributions to the mutual defense and security. The proposed Amendment will permit cooperation which will further improve our mutual defense posture and be in support of NATO.

I hereby:

- approve the proposed Amendment to the 1958 Agreement;
- determine that performance of the proposed Amendment will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security; and
- approve the program outlined in this Amendment and determine that such program will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security; and
- authorize the execution of the proposed Amendment for the Government of the United States in a manner specified by the Secretary of State.

Ronald Reagan

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Hereby submitted for your consideration and approval is a proposed Amendment to the 1958 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes.

The Amendment will extend, under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, those provisions of the 1958 Agreement, as amended, which provide for the transfer of materials, equipment, and technology for research on, development of, or use in nuclear weapons or in military reactors. Further information on the materials and equipment to be transferred, or authorized for transfer, by the United States during the effective period of this Amendment (i.e., from January 1, 1985, through December 31, 1994) are covered in a supplementary classified letter. Article III bis, which provided for exchange of materials and equipment, terminates on December 31, 1984, and an amendment is required to extend its provisions. Consonant with your correspondence with Mrs. Thatcher, we have determined that these materials and equipment can be made available, subject to our capability to satisfy the needs of the U.S. defense programs.

As is required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the United Kingdom, by participating with the United States pursuant to an international arrangement, is making substantial and material contributions to the mutual defense and security. The United Kingdom's nuclear forces are virtually all committed to NATO.

We recommend that you:

- a. approve the program outlined in the proposed Amendment to the 1958 Agreement;
- b. determine that cooperation under the proposed Amendment will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security; and

c. authorize the execution of the proposed Amendment for the Government of the United States in a manner specified by the Secretary of State.


The Department of State concurs in the foregoing recommendations.



DONALD PAUL HODEL
Secretary of Energy

Enclosure MAY 10 1984

Respectfully,



CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
Secretary of Defense

23 MAY 1984

RECEIVED 25 MAY 84 17

TO MCFARLANE

FROM LINHARD

10/23/04

DOCDATE 24 MAY 84

HELM

24 MAY 84

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN

NUCLEAR MATTERS

SUBJECT. PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO US / UK NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENT

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR SIG

DUE.

STATUS X

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

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ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Pres</i>	<i>P</i> 5/29	<i>signature</i>		<i>UP</i>
	<i>C</i> MAY 31 1984	<i>Pres sgd</i>		<i>RL, RN</i>

DISPATCH

ed Executive Clerk of

MAY 31 1984

W/ATTCH

FILE

(C)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 31, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY

SUBJECT: Proposed Amendment to the U.S.-U.K. Agreement
for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy
for Mutual Defense Purposes

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- authorize the execution of the proposed Amendment for the Government of the United States in a manner specified by the Secretary of State.

Ronald Reagan

System # II 27

Package # 90627

11/25 P 3: 50

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	<u>1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane	<u>4</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<u>A</u>
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: Sey Stern (Date/Time)

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

DLB 10/23/2006

File Folder

UNITED KINGDOM (05/24/1981) [TOO LATE TO FILE] (2 OF 2)

FOIA

F02-071/1
COLLINS

Box Number

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
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29243 MEMO

1 5/29/1984 B1

DUPLICATE OF #27971; ROBERT MCFARLANE TO
THE PRESIDENT, RE: PROPOSED AMENDMENT
OT THE US/UK AGREEMENT.....

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]**
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]**
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

29

B

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

30

To the Congress of the United States

I am pleased to transmit to the Congress, pursuant to Section 123.d of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the text of an amendment to the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes of July 3, 1953, as amended (Enclosure 1), and my written approval, authorization, and determination concerning the agreement (Enclosure 2). The joint classified and unclassified letters submitted to me by the Secretaries of Energy and Defense which provide a summary position on the Amendment are at Enclosure 3.

The Amendment extends for ten years (until December 31, 1994) provisions which permit the transfer of nonnuclear parts, source, by-product, special nuclear materials, and other material and technology for nuclear weapons and military reactors.

In my judgment, the proposed Amendment meets all statutory requirements. The United Kingdom intends to continue to maintain viable nuclear forces. In light of our previous close cooperation and the fact that the United Kingdom has committed its nuclear forces to NATO, I have concluded that it is in our interest to continue to assist them in maintaining a credible nuclear force.

I have approved the Amendment, authorized its execution, and urge that the Congress give it favorable consideration.

Attachments:

Enclosures as cited above

31 C

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UNCLASSIFIED
LETTER

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Hereby submitted for your consideration and approval is a proposed Amendment to the 1958 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes.

The Amendment will extend, under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, those provisions of the 1958 Agreement, as amended, which provide for the transfer of materials, equipment, and technology for research on, development of, or use in nuclear weapons or in military reactors. Further information on the materials and equipment to be transferred, or authorized for transfer, by the United States during the effective period of this Amendment (i.e., from January 1, 1985, through December 31, 1994) are covered in a supplementary classified letter. Article III bis, which provided for exchange of materials and equipment, terminates on December 31, 1984, and an amendment is required to extend its provisions. Consonant with your correspondence with Mrs. Thatcher, we have determined that these materials and equipment can be made available, subject to our capability to satisfy the needs of the U.S. defense programs.

As is required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the United Kingdom, by participating with the United States pursuant to an international arrangement, is making substantial and material contributions to the mutual defense and security. The United Kingdom's nuclear forces are virtually all committed to NATO.

We recommend that you:

- a. approve the program outlined in the proposed Amendment to the 1958 Agreement;
- b. determine that cooperation under the proposed Amendment will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security; and

c. authorize the execution of the proposed Amendment for the Government of the United States in a manner specified by the Secretary of State.


The Department of State concurs in the foregoing recommendations.



DONALD PAUL HODEL
Secretary of Energy

Enclosure MAY 10 1984

Respectfully,



CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
Secretary of Defense

23 MAY 1984

DECLASSIFIED / ~~RECLASSIFIED~~
29238

NLRR (02-07-1) # ~~27976~~

BY CV NARA DATE 7/31/08

29238

AMENDMENT TO THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF
GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
FOR COOPERATION IN THE USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY
FOR MUTUAL DEFENSE PURPOSES

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland;

Desiring to amend in certain respects the Agreement for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes, signed at Washington on the third day of July, 1958, as amended (herein referred to as the "Agreement");

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

Article II of the Agreement is amended by:

- (a) adding ", sensitive nuclear technology, and controlled nuclear information" after "classified information" in paragraph A;
- (b) revising paragraph B to read:

"B. In addition to the cooperation provided for in paragraph A of this Article each Party will exchange with the other Party other classified information concerning atomic weapons, sensitive nuclear technology, and controlled nuclear information, including special nuclear materials properties and production or processing technology, when, after consultation with the other Party, the communicating Party determines that the communication of such information is necessary to improve the recipient's atomic weapon design, development and fabrication capability."

ARTICLE 2

Article III bis of the Agreement is amended by:

- (a) substituting "1994" for "1984" throughout the Article;

- (b) relettering paragraphs C and D as paragraphs D and E, respectively, and inserting the following new paragraph C:

"C. The Government of the United States shall transfer enriched uranium, and shall provide enrichment and other uranium services to the Government of the United Kingdom, for military purposes, in such quantities, at such times prior to December 31, 1994, and on such terms and conditions as may be agreed."

ARTICLE 3

Paragraph D of Article V of the Agreement is amended to read:

"D. Nothing in this Agreement shall preclude the communication or exchange of classified information, sensitive nuclear technology, or controlled nuclear information, which may be transmissible under other arrangements between the Parties."

ARTICLE 4

Article VI of the Agreement is amended by:

- (a) relettering paragraphs B and C as paragraphs D and E, respectively, and inserting the following new paragraphs B and C:

"B. Sensitive nuclear technology and controlled nuclear information transferred pursuant to this Agreement shall be accorded at least the same level of protection by the recipient party as that accorded to such information by the transferring Party. The Parties shall consult with each other regarding the appropriate protections for such information.

"C. Adequate physical security shall be maintained with respect to any source material, special nuclear material and equipment transferred pursuant to the Agreement, and with respect to any special nuclear material used in or produced through the use of any material or reactor so transferred. Such protection shall be commensurate with the importance of the material or equipment involved."

- (b) adding ", sensitive nuclear technology, and controlled nuclear information," after "Classified information" in the paragraph relettered as paragraph D;
- (c) adding "sensitive nuclear technology, and controlled nuclear information," after "Classified information," in the paragraph relettered as paragraph E.

ARTICLE 5

Article VII of the Agreement is amended by:

- (a) adding ", sensitive nuclear technology, and controlled nuclear information," after "shall communicate classified information";
- (b) adding ", sensitive nuclear technology, and controlled nuclear information," after "communication of classified information" in paragraph B.

ARTICLE 6

Article IX of the Agreement is amended by substituting "paragraphs A, B, C or D" for "paragraphs A, B or C" in subparagraph 1 of paragraph B.

ARTICLE 7

Article XI of the Agreement is amended by relettering paragraphs C, D, E, F, G, I and J as paragraphs E, F, G, H, I, J and K, respectively, and inserting the following new paragraphs C and D:

"C. 'Sensitive nuclear technology' means any information (including information incorporated in a production or utilization facility or important component part thereof) which is not available to the public and which is important to the design, construction, fabrication, operation or maintenance of a uranium enrichment or nuclear fuel reprocessing facility or a facility for the production of heavy water, but shall not include information designated as Restricted Data by the Government of the United States."

"D. 'Controlled nuclear information' means information protected by the Government of the United States from unauthorized dissemination pursuant to sections 57.b. or 148 of the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended."

ARTICLE 8

Article XII of the Agreement is amended by substituting "Party" for "to take effect on December 31, 1969, or thereafter on one year's notice to take effect at the end of any succeeding term of five years".

ARTICLE 9

This Amendment shall enter into force on the date on which each Government shall have received from the other Government written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for the entry into force of this Amendment.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Amendment.

DONE at Washington, in duplicate, this _____ day
of _____, 19__.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN
AND NORTHERN IRELAND:

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29239	LETTER DUPLICATE OF #27973; DONALD HODEL, CASPAR WEINBERGER TO THE PRESIDENT	2	5/23/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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29240	PAPER DUPLICATE OF #27974; AMENDMENT TOT EH TECHNICAL ANNEX TO THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE US/UK	4	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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29241	PAPER DUPLICATE OF #27975; SUPPLEMENTAL TECHNICAL ANNEX TO THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE US/UK	3	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL



To: BOB KIMMITT

JON HOWE CAN SIGN THIS WITH
THE BRITISH ON WED. IF WE 50
CAN GET THE PRESIDENT'S
APPROVAL BACK TO STATE BY
COB TUESDAY, MAY 29.

(RH)

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29242	MEMO DUPLICATE OF #29970; BOB LINHARD/BOB HELM TO ROBERT MCFARLANE, RE: PROPOSED AMENDMENT TOT EH US/UK AGREEMENT.....	1	5/24/1984	B1

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