

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library  
Digital Library Collections

---

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

---

**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, NSC:  
**Country File:**  
**Folder Title:** United Kingdom  
(11/01/1983-06/30/1984) [3 of 3]  
**Box:** RAC Box 20

---

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: [reagan.library@nara.gov](mailto:reagan.library@nara.gov)

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

**Withdrawer**

CAS 1/7/2009

**File Folder** UNITED KINGDOM VOL. V 11/1/83-6/30/84 (3)

**FOIA**

M08-193

**Box Number** 91331

COLLINGS

3

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
60683	NOTE	TO BUD <b>R 7/21/2000 NLSS98-002 #598</b>	1	1/5/1984	B1
60684	CABLE	131650Z <b>R 6/12/2002 NLSS98-002 #599</b>	1	12/13/1983	B1
60685	CABLE	122223Z DEC 83 <b>PAR 7/21/2000 NLSS98-002 #600</b>	7	12/12/1983	B1
60686	DRAFT	PARTIAL DRAFT OF 60685 <b>PAR 7/21/2000 NLSS98-002 #601</b>	1	ND	B1
60687	CABLE	241847Z <b>R 7/21/2000 NLSS98-002 #602</b>	3	10/24/1983	B1
60688	CABLE	242200Z <b>R 7/21/2000 NLSS98-002 #603</b>	2	10/24/1983	B1
60689	CABLE	250656Z <b>R 7/21/2000 NLSS98-002 #604</b>	2	10/25/1983	B1
60690	CHECKLIST	FROM THE SITUATION ROOM <b>R 7/21/2000 NLSS98-002 #605</b>	1	11/19/1983	B1
60691	MEMO	DONALD FORTIER TO ROBERT MCFARLANE RE MESSAGE TO THE BRITISH <b>D 7/21/2000 NLSS98-002 #606; R M08-193 1/16/2015</b>	1	11/3/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

**Withdrawer**

CAS 1/7/2009

**File Folder** UNITED KINGDOM VOL. V 11/1/83-6/30/84 (3)

**FOIA**

M08-193

**Box Number** 91331

COLLINGS

3

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
60692	DRAFT MESSAGE	MCFARLANE TO SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG (ATTACHMENT TO 60691) <b>D 7/21/2000 S98-002 #607 R 6/9/2010 M193/1</b>	2	ND	B1
60693	CABLE	071453Z NOV 83 (FINAL VERSION OF 60692) <b>D 7/21/2000 S98-002 #608 R 6/9/2010 M193/1</b>	2	11/7/1983	B1
60694	PROFILE SHEET	<b>R 7/21/2000 NLSS98-002 #609</b>	1	10/25/1983	B1
60695	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO THE PRESIDENT RE BRITAIN <b>R 7/21/2000 NLSS98-002 #610</b>	1	10/25/1983	B1
60696	MEMO	SOMMER TO MCFARLANE RE BRITAIN <b>R 7/21/2000 NLSS98-002 #611</b>	1	10/25/1983	B1
60697	CABLE	ROME 26714 (ADDITIONAL PAGE SENT BY DOS TO COMPLETE CABLE) <b>D 6/12/2002 S98-002 #612 PAR 6/9/2010 M193/1</b>	26	11/8/1983	B1
60698	CABLE	131856Z <b>R 6/12/2002 NLSS98-002 #613</b>	3	12/13/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

**Withdrawer**

CAS 1/7/2009

**File Folder** UNITED KINGDOM VOL. V 11/1/83-6/30/84 (3)

**FOIA**

M08-193

**Box Number** 91331

COLLINGS

3

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
60699	CABLE	STATE 310430 <i>D 6/12/2002 S98-002 #614 R 6/9/2010 M193/1</i>	7	10/31/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: RECORDS  
COUNTRY FILE

Archivist: cas/cas

File Folder: United Kingdom vol. V 11/1/83 - 6/30/84 [3 of 3]  
Box 91331

Date: September 7, 1998

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>1. note</del>	<del>to Bud 1 p. R 7/21/00 598-002 #598</del>	<del>1/5/84</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>2. cable</del>	<del>131650z 1 p. R 6/12/02 NL5598-002 #599</del>	<del>12/13/83</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>3. cable</del>	<del>122223z 7 p. P 7/21/00 598-002 #600</del>	<del>12/12/83</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>4. draft</del>	<del>partial draft of item #3 1 p. P u u #601</del>	<del>nd</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>5. cable</del>	<del>241847z 3 p. R u u #602</del>	<del>10/24/83</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>6. cable</del>	<del>242200z 2 p. R u u #603</del>	<del>10/24/83</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>7. cable</del>	<del>250656z 2 p. R u u #604</del>	<del>10/25/83</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>8. checklist</del>	<del>from situation room 1 p. R u u #605</del>	<del>11/19/83</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>9. memo</del>	<del>Donald Fortier to Robert McFarlane re message to the British 1 p. (7928) D 7/21/00 598-002 #606</del>	<del>11/3/83</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>10. draft message</del>	<del>McFarlane to Sir Robert Armstrong 2 p. (attachment to item #9) u u #607 R 6/9/10 M193 #60692</del>	<del>nd</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>11. cable</del>	<del>071453z 2 p. (final copy of item #10) D u u #608 R 6/9/10 M193 #60693</del>	<del>11/7/83</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>12. profile sheet</del>	<del>1 p. R 7/21/00 598-002 #609</del>	<del>10/25/83</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>13. memo</del>	<del>McFarlane to the President re Britain 1 p. (7671) R #610</del>	<del>10/25/83</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>14. memo</del>	<del>Sommer to McFarlane re Britain 1 p. R #611</del>	<del>10/25/83</del>	<del>P1</del>

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: RECORDS  
COUNTRY FILE

**Archivist:** cas/cas

**File Folder:** United Kingdom vol. V 11/1/83 - 6/30/84 [3 of 3]  
Box 91331

**Date:** September 7, 1998

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
✓ 15. cable	081312z 25 p. 26 p. D 6/12/82 NLSS98-002 #612 PAR 6/9/10 M193 #	11/8/83	P1 60697
<del>16. cable</del>	<del>131856z 3 p. R " " #613</del>	<del>12/13/83</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>17. cable</del>	<del>312133z 7 p. D " " #614 R 6/9/10 M193</del>	<del>10/31/83</del>	<del>P1</del> # 60699

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-5 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

RELEASED)

598-002 # 598

7/21/00

CAS

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON


John  
Good  
Mandy  
thanks  
1/5/89

Bud,

Geoff, Peter and I met  
with Sir Oliver for 30 min  
this afternoon. He wanted  
you to have PM's answers  
to Q's on Lebanon.

I told him that the President  
was resolute with regards  
to avoiding a premature  
withdrawal of USMNF. I told  
him I didn't think the Pres.  
would have any problem with  
PM's answers. We provided  
Sir Oliver a brief review of  
Mid-East strategy.

John



EXTRACT FROM TRANSCRIPT OF PRIME MINISTER'S INTERVIEW WITH  
SIR ALASTAIR BURNET: LEBANON

Q. Prime Minister, now that our allies seem to be having second thoughts about their troops, isn't it time to call it a day and withdraw from the Lebanon?

A. No, I don't think you make sudden decisions like that. For quite some time we've been trying to get an expanded role for United Nations forces. When I was in New York in September I spoke to Mr Perez de Cuellar about it and again our Ambassador in New York was active just before Christmas. He's active again now and the Foreign Office have called in representatives from Embassies in London. But before we leave I think we've got to make alternative arrangements, particularly in the Beirut area and the obvious thinking is to get a better role and an expanded role for the United Nations forces.

Q. Do you expect to have talks with the other Western Prime Ministers?

A. The Foreign Ministers do meet quite frequently and officials meet even more frequently. The point is I think we must act together and we can't just come out of the Beirut area and leave a vacuum there. You remember how terrible it was before the multi-national force went in and if there was terrible slaughter again, we should all feel very, very guilty indeed that we hadn't made proper alternative arrangements and I think most people would agree that that was the right way to go about it.

Q. But isn't there a risk that British troops will be slaughtered?

A. British troops are very, very highly thought of in Beirut. Well, I think you know that, you've seen it frequently and displayed it frequently on television. We have only a hundred and ten there. We couldn't go down to any lower number because they wouldn't have the number both to do the job and to defend themselves. They have protected Beirut. They go out and about on tours in scout cars. They're very widely welcomed by the Beirut people and they actually protect the building where the ceasefire talks constantly take place.



~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

*ADDITION*

PAGE 01 OF 01 COS LONDON 0001  
SIT513 AN007987

DTG: 131650Z DEC 83 PSN: 001508  
TOR: 347/1721Z

-----  
DISTRIBUTION: MCF JP SIT /006  
WHSR COMMENT: PLEASE ADVISE ON FURTHER DISSEM  
-----

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 598-002 #599

BY LDS, NARA, DATE 6/12/02

OP IMMED  
DE YDHND #0001 3471656  
O 131650Z DEC 83 ZFF 1 4 ZYH  
FM COS LONDON

TO THE WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

NUMBER 001  
EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE  
FROM AMBASSADOR PRICE

1. BUD: MANY THANKS FOR THE RECENT INFORMATION ON THE PRESIDENT'S EXCHANGE WITH PRIME MINISTER THATCHER ON GRENADA. WOULD YOU ALSO PROVIDE ME THE EXACT TIMES THESE EXCHANGES WERE SENT BY THE WHITE HOUSE AND YOUR ESTIMATE OF THEIR TIME OF RECEIPT BY THE P.M.
2. LEBANON RETALIATION. UNDERSTAND THERE WERE FOUR MESSAGES BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE P.M. ON THIS SUBJECT, TWO ON NOVEMBER 14 AND TWO ON NOVEMBER 18. IF POSSIBLE, I WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING COPIES INDICATING TIME OF TRANSMISSION AND RECEIPT.
3. U.S-ISRAELI SECURITY AGREEMENT. WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING COPY ON NSDD 111 OR OTHER RECENT DIRECTIVES DEALING WITH THE LEBANESE SITUATION AND ARAB-ISRAEL MATTERS. IT WOULD HELP IF I COULD GET COPIES OF THESE ROUTINELY FOR MY OWN BACKGROUND INFORMATION ONLY.

~~598-002 #599~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

THE WHITE HOUSE 9392

DTG: 122223Z DEC 83 PSN: 000140

END TEXT

543

CLASSIFIED IN PART

598-062 #600

~~SECRET~~

BY Cfs NARA, Date 7/21/60

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

OUTGOING

PAGE 01 OF 04 THE WHITE HOUSE 9391 DTG: 122223Z DEC 83 PSN: 000139  
SIT260 AN007741 TOR: 346/2157Z

-----  
DISTRIBUTION: JP RLPB /002  
-----

OP IMMED  
DE YEKADS #9391 3462157  
O 122223Z DEC 83 ZFF-1 ZFF-4 ZYH  
FM THE WHITE HOUSE

TO LONDON

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

DELIVER AT OPENING OF BUSINESS WH09391 SECTION 01 OF 02  
DECEMBER 12, 1983

EYES ONLY FOR THE AMBASSADOR

FROM: AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE

1. AS I PROMISED, QUOTED BELOW ARE THE CABLES FROM THE PRESIDENT  
TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER ON GRENADA.

2. BEGIN TEXT OF FIRST MESSAGE:

OCTOBER 24, 1983

DEAR MARGARET,

I HAVE FOLLOWED CLOSELY THE POLITICAL TURMOIL IN  
GRENADA IN RECENT DAYS. I KNOW THAT YOU SHARE MY CONCERN  
FOR THE IMPACT WHICH THE KILLING OF THE LEADERSHIP THERE HAS  
HAD ON OUR FRIENDS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, PARTICULARLY

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

OUTGOING

PAGE 02 OF 04 THE WHITE HOUSE 9391 DTG: 122223Z DEC 83 PSN: 000139

ON THE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS OF THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING CARIBBEAN STATES. THE PROSPECT THAT THE BLOOD-STAINED GROUP WHO APPEAR TO BE THE ONLY AUTHORITY ON THE ISLAND COULD PERPETUATE THEIR POWER ALSO RAISES QUESTIONS ABOUT THE WELFARE OF THE PEOPLE OF GRENADA THEMSELVES, AS WELL AS OUR OWN NATIONALS RESIDENT THERE.

THE MEMBERS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES (O ECS) HAVE RAISED SIMILAR CONCERNS WHICH ARE, OF COURSE, MAGNIFIED BY THEIR PROXIMITY TO AND LIMITED ABILITY TO DEFEND THEMSELVES AGAINST THE THREAT WHICH GRENADA NOW POSES. THEY HAVE A WELL FOUNDED FEAR OF AGGRESSION BY OR SUBVERSION FROM GRENADA, OR THE POSSIBILITY THAT THEIR OWN DEMOCRATICALLY-CONSTITUTED GOVERNMENTS MAY BE CHALLENGED BY SOME WHO MIGHT SEEK TO IMITATE THE EXAMPLE SET BY GENERAL AUSTIN AND THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY IF THIS SITUATION IS NOT RECTIFIED. THE NATIONS OF THE O ECS HAVE UNANIMOUSLY DECIDED TO PURSUE A COLLECTIVE SECURITY EFFORT TO RESTORE PEACE AND ORDER IN GRENADA AND HAVE FORMALLY REQUESTED UNITED STATES SUPPORT AND PARTICIPATION. I UNDERSTAND THAT A SIMILAR REQUEST WAS TO HAVE BEEN PRESENTED TO HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT.

I AM WRITING TO INFORM YOU THAT I AM GIVING SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THE O ECS REQUEST. ON SUNDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1983, I DISPATCHED A SPECIAL EMISSARY, AMBASSADOR FRANCIS MCNEIL, TO BRIDGETOWN TO CONFER WITH PRIME MINISTER ADAMS AND OTHER O ECS AND CARIBBEAN LEADERS REGARDING THEIR PLANS. I UNDERSTAND THAT THEY HAVE ALREADY ASSEMBLED FORCES IN BARBADOS FROM THE VARIOUS ISLAND NATIONS. AMBASSADOR MCNEIL HAS INFORMED PRIME MINISTER ADAMS THAT THE UNITED STATES FIRMLY ENDORSES THE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES OF THEIR PROPOSED OPERATION; NAMELY, TO RESTORE ORDER AND SECURITY SO AS TO PERMIT THE FORMATION OF A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD HOLD EARLY ELECTIONS.

WE BELIEVE THAT HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNOR GENERAL IN GRENADA COULD BE A KEY FIGURE IN THIS OPERATION, SINCE HE IS THE ONLY REMAINING VOICE OF LEGITIMACY ON THE ISLAND AND SHOULD BE THE

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04 THE WHITE HOUSE 9391 DTG: 122223Z DEC 83 PSN: 000139

ONE WHO DESIGNATES A NEW PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT. SUCH A GOVERNMENT COULD BE FORMED SHORTLY AFTER THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY FORCE LANDS IN GRENADA. IT IS ALSO IMPORTANT THAT FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS BE HELD AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE TO RE-ESTABLISH A TRULY DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT.

AMBASSADOR MCNEIL HAS ALSO CONSULTED WITH THE CARIBBEAN STATES ON THEIR INTENTION TO REQUEST AN EMERGENCY MEETING OF THE PERMANENT COUNCIL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, IN WHICH THEY WOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN SEEKING AN ENDORSEMENT OF THEIR COLLECTIVE SECURITY EFFORT.

I WELCOME YOUR THOUGHTS ON THESE MATTERS. I KNOW THAT YOU WOULD WANT TO BE KEPT INFORMED OF ANY ROLE THE UNITED STATES MAY DECIDE TO PLAY IN SUPPORT OF THE ISLAND NATIONS OF THE CARIBBEAN. I WILL, THEREFORE, UNDERTAKE TO INFORM YOU IN ADVANCE SHOULD OUR FORCES TAKE PART IN THE PROPOSED COLLECTIVE SECURITY FORCE, OR OF WHATEVER POLITICAL OR DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS WE PLAN TO PURSUE. IT IS OF SOME ASSURANCE TO KNOW THAT I CAN COUNT ON YOUR ADVICE AND SUPPORT ON THIS IMPORTANT ISSUE.

2. BEGIN TEXT OF SECOND MESSAGE:

DEAR MARGARET,

IN A MESSAGE TO YOU EARLIER TODAY, I EXPRESSED MY DESIRE TO KEEP YOU INFORMED OF THE UNITED STATES' RESPONSE TO A FORMAL REQUEST BY THE ORGANIZATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES (OECs) TO SUPPORT AND PARTICIPATE IN A COLLECTIVE SECURITY EFFORT TO RESTORE PEACE, ORDER, AND DEMOCRACY IN GRENADA. I HAVE DECIDED TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THIS REQUEST. I UNDERSTAND THAT BARBADOS AND JAMAICA HAVE ALSO RESPONDED FAVORABLY.

OUR FORCES WILL ESTABLISH THEMSELVES IN GRENADA. THE COLLECTIVE CARIBBEAN SECURITY FORCE WILL DISEMBARK ON GRENADA SHORTLY

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04 THE WHITE HOUSE 9391 DTG: 122223Z DEC 83 PSN: 000139

THEREAFTER. YOU WILL APPRECIATE THE SENSITIVITY OF THIS INFORMATION TO THE SECURITY OF THESE OPERATIONS AND THE SAFETY OF MILITARY PERSONNEL.

WE WILL INFORM YOU OF FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS AS THEY OCCUR. OTHER ALLIES WILL BE APPRISED OF OUR ACTIONS AFTER THEY ARE BEGUN.

I EXPECT THAT A NEW PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT WILL BE FORMED IN GRENADA SHORTLY AFTER THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY FORCE ARRIVES. WE HOPE THAT HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT WILL JOIN US BY EXTENDING SUPPORT TO GRENADA'S NEW LEADERS. THE UNITED KINGDOM CAN PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN STRENGTHENING THE NEW GOVERNMENT'S POSITION BY OFFERING POLITICAL SUPPORT AND BY PROVIDING A PROGRAM OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.

909

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03 THE WHITE HOUSE 9392 DTG: 122223Z DEC 83 PSN: 000140  
SIT261 AN007742 TOR: 346/2157Z

-----  
DISTRIBUTION: JP RLPH /002  
-----

OP IMMED  
DE YEKADS #9392 3462157  
O 122223Z DEC 83 ZFF-1 ZFF-4 ZYH  
FM THE WHITE HOUSE

TO [REDACTED] LONDON

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

DELIVER AT OPENING OF BUSINESS WH09391 FINAL SECTION OF 02

3. BEGIN TEXT OF THIRD MESSAGE:

DEAR MARGARET,

I APPRECIATE YOUR THOUGHTFUL MESSAGE ON GRENADA. I HAVE  
WEIGHED VERY CAREFULLY THE ISSUES YOU HAVE RAISED AND HAVE  
REACHED THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS.

I CONTINUE TO BE GREATLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE WELFARE OF OUR  
CITIZENS. THE VIOLENT EVENTS OF THE LAST FEW DAYS HAVE CAUSED A  
LARGE NUMBER OF THEM TO SEEK ANY POSSIBLE MEANS OF EVACUATION.  
GIVEN THE COMPOSITION OF THE GOVERNING MILITARY COUNCIL, AND  
ITS PROVEN BRUTALITY, WE ARE NOT SANGUINE THAT THE SITUATION  
WILL HOLD MUCH LONGER. I WELL APPRECIATE THE DANGERS INHERENT  
IN A MILITARY OPERATION TO ASSURE THE SAFETY OF THESE CITIZENS,  
BUT, ON BALANCE, I SEE THIS AS THE LESSER OF TWO RISKS. IN  
THIS REGARD YOU MAY BE SURE THAT WE WILL COMPLY FULLY WITH  
YOUR REQUEST THAT WE SAFEGUARD ALL BRITISH CITIZENS. SPECIAL  
CONSIDERATION HAS GONE INTO OUR OPERATIONAL PLANNING TO

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03 THE WHITE HOUSE 9392 DTG: 122223Z DEC 83 PSN: 000140

PROTECT THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

ON OCTOBER 23 I RECEIVED A FORMAL REQUEST IN WRITING FROM THE OECS ASKING FOR OUR SUPPORT FOR THEIR EFFORTS TO STABILIZE THE SITUATION IN GRENADA. JAMAICA AND BARBADOS HAVE GIVEN THEIR STRONG SUPPORT. QUITE FRANKLY, THIS REQUEST HAS WEIGHED HEAVILY IN MY CONSIDERATION ON WHETHER TO COMMIT US FORCES. WITH SO CLEAR AN EXPRESSION OF THE WILL OF THE NATIONS OF THE REGION I WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN EITHER TO THEM OR TO OTHERS WHO DEPEND UPON US WHY WE HAD NOT ACTED.

FINALLY, I HAVE ALSO WEIGHED U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS IN MY DECISION. AS YOU KNOW WE HAVE BEEN INCREASINGLY CONCERNED BY GRENADA'S RECENT DRIFT INTO THE SOVIET BLOC. THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS OF THE LAST FEW DAYS HAVE DONE NOTHING TO EASE OUR CONCERNS. TO THE CONTRARY, IT IS CLEAR THAT GRENADA HAS NOW BEEN TAKEN OVER BY A GROUP OF LEFTIST THUGS WHO WOULD LIKELY ALIGN THEMSELVES WITH CUBA AND THE SOVIET UNION TO AN EVEN GREATER DEGREE THAN DID THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT. THE ARRIVAL MONDAY IN GRENADA OF A HIGH LEVEL CUBAN DELEGATION HIGHLIGHTS THIS CONCERN. THE ALTERNATIVE TO DECISIVE ACTION ON OUR PART MAY WELL BE TO ALLOW THE IMPOSITION BY THE CUBANS OF A REGIME WHOSE ACTIONS WOULD BE EVEN MORE INIMICAL TO OUR INTERESTS. IN OUR VIEW, RELYING UPON ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SANCTIONS WOULD PROVIDE TIME FOR CUBA AND THE SOVIET UNION TO CONSOLIDATE THE POSITION OF THE NEW REGIME.

AGAIN, I APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS, I SHARE MANY OF YOUR CONCERNS, BUT BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE OUTWEIGHED BY THE FACTORS OUTLINED ABOVE. I WOULD HOPE THAT AS WE PROCEED, IN COOPERATION WITH THE OECS COUNTRIES, WE WOULD HAVE THE ACTIVE COOPERATION OF HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT AND, IN PARTICULAR, THAT THE GOVERNOR GENERAL WILL EXERCISE HIS CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS TO FORM AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD RESTORE DEMOCRACY TO GRENADA AND FACILITATE THE RAPID DEPARTURE OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES.



-P-

~~SECRET~~ - PRIVATE CHANNEL

From: WH

To: [REDACTED] London

CLASSIFIED IN PART  
598-002 #1601  
CAS 7/26/00

Deliver eyes only to the Ambassador  
from Ambassador de Fulani

1. As I promised quoted below are the  
cables for the President to ~~the~~ PM Thatcher  
on Grenada...

2.

3.

4.

Tranny, 12/12

Please have this  
message sent.

J

598-002 #602  
7/21/80  
OAS

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03 THE WHITE HOUSE 8192  
SIT860 AN005477

DTG: 241847Z OCT 83 PSN: 061666  
TOR: 297/1819Z

DISTRIBUTION: JP /001

OP IMMED  
DE WTE #8192 2971819  
O 241847Z OCT 83  
FM THE WHITE HOUSE

*Send to Charlie  
Price*

TO THE CABINET OFFICE

~~SECRET~~ VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS WH08192

OCTOBER 24, 1983

DEAR MARGARET,

I HAVE FOLLOWED CLOSELY THE POLITICAL TURMOIL IN GRENADA IN RECENT DAYS. I KNOW THAT YOU SHARE MY CONCERN FOR THE IMPACT WHICH THE KILLING OF THE LEADERSHIP THERE HAS HAD ON OUR FRIENDS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, PARTICULARLY ON THE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS OF THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING CARIBBEAN STATES. THE PROSPECT THAT THE BLOOD-STAINED GROUP WHO APPEAR TO BE THE ONLY AUTHORITY ON THE ISLAND COULD PERPETUATE THEIR POWER ALSO RAISES QUESTIONS ABOUT THE WELFARE OF THE PEOPLE OF GRENADA THEMSELVES, AS WELL AS OUR OWN NATIONALS RESIDENT THERE.

THE MEMBERS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES (OECs) HAVE RAISED SIMILAR CONCERNS WHICH ARE, OF COURSE, MAGNIFIED BY THEIR PROXIMITY TO AND LIMITED ABILITY TO DEFEND THEMSELVES AGAINST THE THREAT WHICH GRENADA NOW POSES. THEY HAVE A WELL FOUNDED FEAR OF AGGRESSION BY OR SUBVERSION FROM GRENADA, OR THE POSSIBILITY THAT THEIR OWN DEMOCRATICALLY-CONSTITUTED GOVERNMENTS MAY BE CHALLENGED BY SOME WHO MIGHT SEEK TO IMITATE THE EXAMPLE SET BY GENERAL AUSTIN AND THE

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03 THE WHITE HOUSE 8192 DTG: 241847Z OCT 83 PSN: 061666

PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY IF THIS SITUATION IS NOT RECTIFIED. THE NATIONS OF THE OECS HAVE UNANIMOUSLY DECIDED TO PURSUE A COLLECTIVE SECURITY EFFORT TO RESTORE PEACE AND ORDER IN GRENADA AND HAVE FORMALLY REQUESTED UNITED STATES SUPPORT AND PARTICIPATION. I UNDERSTAND THAT A SIMILAR REQUEST WAS TO HAVE BEEN PRESENTED TO HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT.

I AM WRITING TO INFORM YOU THAT I AM GIVING SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THE OECS REQUEST. ON SUNDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1983, I DISPATCHED A SPECIAL EMISSARY, AMBASSADOR FRANCIS MCNEIL, TO BRIDGETOWN TO CONFER WITH PRIME MINISTER ADAMS AND OTHER OECS AND CARIBBEAN LEADERS REGARDING THEIR PLANS. I UNDERSTAND THAT THEY HAVE ALREADY ASSEMBLED FORCES IN BARBADOS FROM THE VARIOUS ISLAND NATIONS. AMBASSADOR MCNEIL HAS INFORMED PRIME MINISTER ADAMS THAT THE UNITED STATES FIRMLY ENDORSES THE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES OF THEIR PROPOSED OPERATION, NAMELY, TO RESTORE ORDER AND SECURITY SO AS TO PERMIT THE FORMATION OF A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD HOLD EARLY ELECTIONS.

WE BELIEVE THAT HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNOR GENERAL IN GRENADA COULD BE A KEY FIGURE IN THIS OPERATION, SINCE HE IS THE ONLY REMAINING VOICE OF LEGITIMACY ON THE ISLAND AND SHOULD BE THE ONE WHO DESIGNATES A NEW PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT. SUCH A GOVERNMENT COULD BE FORMED SHORTLY AFTER THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY FORCE LANDS IN GRENADA. IT IS ALSO IMPORTANT THAT FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS BE HELD AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE TO RE-ESTABLISH A TRULY DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT.

AMBASSADOR MCNEIL HAS ALSO CONSULTED WITH THE CARIBBEAN STATES ON THEIR INTENTION TO REQUEST AN EMERGENCY MEETING OF THE PERMANENT COUNCIL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, IN WHICH THEY WOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN SEEKING AN ENDORSEMENT OF THEIR COLLECTIVE SECURITY EFFORT.

I WELCOME YOUR THOUGHTS ON THESE MATTERS. I KNOW THAT YOU WOULD WANT TO BE KEPT INFORMED OF ANY ROLE THE UNITED

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03 THE WHITE HOUSE 8192 DTG: 241847Z OCT 83 PSN: 061666

STATES MAY DECIDE TO PLAY IN SUPPORT OF THE ISLAND NATIONS OF THE CARIBBEAN. I WILL, THEREFORE, UNDERTAKE TO INFORM YOU IN ADVANCE SHOULD OUR FORCES TAKE PART IN THE PROPOSED COLLECTIVE SECURITY FORCE, OR OF WHATEVER POLITICAL OR DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS WE PLAN TO PURSUE. IT IS OF SOME ASSURANCE TO KNOW THAT I CAN COUNT ON YOUR ADVICE AND SUPPORT ON THIS IMPORTANT ISSUE.

WITH WARM REGARDS,

SINCERELY,

RON

0632

598-002 #1603  
7/21/00  
CAS

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 THE WHITE HOUSE 0000 DTG: 242200Z OCT 83 PSN: 061664  
SIT859 AN005476 TOR: 297/2216Z

-----  
DISTRIBUTION: JP /001  
-----

OP IMMED  
DE WTE #0000 2972216  
O 242200Z OCT 83  
FM THE WHITE HOUSE

TO THE CABINET OFFICE

~~SECRET~~ VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS WH08195

DEAR MARGARET,

IN A MESSAGE TO YOU EARLIER TODAY, I EXPRESSED MY DESIRE TO KEEP YOU INFORMED OF THE UNITED STATES' RESPONSE TO A FORMAL REQUEST BY THE ORGANIZATION OF EASTERN CARIBBEAN STATES (OECS) TO SUPPORT AND PARTICIPATE IN A COLLECTIVE SECURITY EFFORT TO RESTORE PEACE, ORDER, AND DEMOCRACY IN GRENADA. I HAVE DECIDED TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THIS REQUEST. I UNDERSTAND THAT BARBADOS AND JAMAICA HAVE ALSO RESPONDED FAVORABLY.

OUR FORCES WILL ESTABLISH THEMSELVES IN GRENADA. THE COLLECTIVE CARIBBEAN SECURITY FORCE WILL DISEMBARK ON GRENADA SHORTLY THEREAFTER. YOU WILL APPRECIATE THE SENSITIVITY OF THIS INFORMATION TO THE SECURITY OF THESE OPERATIONS AND THE SAFETY OF MILITARY PERSONNEL.

WE WILL INFORM YOU OF FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS AS THEY OCCUR. OTHER ALLIES WILL BE APPRISED OF OUR ACTIONS AFTER THEY ARE BEGUN.

I EXPECT THAT A NEW PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT WILL BE FORMED IN GRENADA SHORTLY AFTER THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY FORCE ARRIVES. WE

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 THE WHITE HOUSE 0000 DTG: 242200Z OCT 83 PSN: 061664

HOPE THAT HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT WILL JOIN US BY EXTENDING  
SUPPORT TO GRENADA'S NEW LEADERS. THE UNITED KINGDOM CAN PLAY AN  
IMPORTANT ROLE IN STRENGTHENING THE NEW GOVERNMENT'S POSITION BY  
OFFERING POLITICAL SUPPORT AND BY PROVIDING A PROGRAM OF ECONOMIC  
ASSISTANCE.

RON

0255

C/S 598-002<sup>#</sup> 604  
7/21/00

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03 THE WHITE HOUSE 8211 DTG: 250656Z OCT 83 PSN: 061662  
SIT858 AN005475 TOR: 298/0459Z

-----  
DISTRIBUTION: JP /001  
-----

OP IMMED  
DE WTE #8211 2980459  
O 250656Z OCT 83  
FM THE WHITE HOUSE

TO CABINET OFFICE

~~SECRET~~ VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS WH08211

DEAR MARGARET,

I APPRECIATE YOUR THOUGHTFUL MESSAGE ON GRENADA. I HAVE WEIGHED VERY CAREFULLY THE ISSUES YOU HAVE RAISED AND HAVE REACHED THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS.

I CONTINUE TO BE GREATLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE WELFARE OF OUR CITIZENS. THE VIOLENT EVENTS OF THE LAST FEW DAYS HAVE CAUSED A LARGE NUMBER OF THEM TO SEEK ANY POSSIBLE MEANS OF EVACUATION. GIVEN THE COMPOSITION OF THE GOVERNING MILITARY COUNCIL, AND ITS PROVEN BRUTALITY, WE ARE NOT SANGUINE THAT THE SITUATION WILL HOLD MUCH LONGER. I WELL APPRECIATE THE DANGERS INHERENT IN A MILITARY OPERATION TO ASSURE THE SAFETY OF THESE CITIZENS, BUT, ON BALANCE, I SEE THIS AS THE LESSER OF TWO RISKS. IN THIS REGARD YOU MAY BE SURE THAT WE WILL COMPLY FULLY WITH YOUR REQUEST THAT WE SAFEGUARD ALL BRITISH CITIZENS. SPECIAL CONSIDERATION HAS GONE INTO OUR OPERATIONAL PLANNING TO PROTECT THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

ON OCTOBER 23 I RECEIVED A FORMAL REQUEST IN WRITING FROM THE OECS ASKING FOR OUR SUPPORT FOR THEIR EFFORTS TO STABILIZE THE

~~SECRET~~

OUTGOING

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03 THE WHITE HOUSE 8211

DTG: 250656Z OCT 83 PSN: 061662

SITUATION IN GRENADA. JAMAICA AND BARBADOS HAVE GIVEN THEIR STRONG SUPPORT. QUITE FRANKLY, THIS REQUEST HAS WEIGHED HEAVILY IN MY CONSIDERATION ON WHETHER TO COMMIT US FORCES. WITH SO CLEAR AN EXPRESSION OF THE WILL OF THE NATIONS OF THE REGION I WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN EITHER TO THEM OR TO OTHERS WHO DEPEND UPON US WHY WE HAD NOT ACTED.

FINALLY, I HAVE ALSO WEIGHED U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS IN MY DECISION. AS YOU KNOW WE HAVE BEEN INCREASINGLY CONCERNED BY GRENADA'S RECENT DRIFT INTO THE SOVIET BLOC. THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS OF THE LAST FEW DAYS HAVE DONE NOTHING TO EASE OUR CONCERNS. TO THE CONTRARY, IT IS CLEAR THAT GRENADA HAS NOW BEEN TAKEN OVER BY A GROUP OF LEFTIST THUGS WHO WOULD LIKELY ALIGN THEMSELVES WITH CUBA AND THE SOVIET UNION TO AN EVEN GREATER DEGREE THAN DID THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT. THE ARRIVAL MONDAY IN GRENADA OF A HIGH LEVEL CUBAN DELEGATION HIGHLIGHTS THIS CONCERN. THE ALTERNATIVE TO DECISIVE ACTION ON OUR PART MAY WELL BE TO ALLOW THE IMPOSITION BY THE CUBANS OF A REGIME WHOSE ACTIONS WOULD BE EVEN MORE INIMICAL TO OUR INTERESTS. IN OUR VIEW, RELYING UPON ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SANCTIONS WOULD PROVIDE TIME FOR CUBA AND THE SOVIET UNION TO CONSOLIDATE THE POSITION OF THE NEW REGIME.

AGAIN, I APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS; I SHARE MANY OF YOUR CONCERNS, BUT BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE OUTWEIGHED BY THE FACTORS OUTLINED ABOVE. I WOULD HOPE THAT AS WE PROCEED, IN COOPERATION WITH THE OECS COUNTRIES, WE WOULD HAVE THE ACTIVE COOPERATION OF HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT AND, IN PARTICULAR, THAT THE GOVERNOR GENERAL WILL EXERCISE HIS CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS TO FORM AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD RESTORE DEMOCRACY TO GRENADA AND FACILITATE THE RAPID DEPARTURE OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES.

WARM REGARDS,  
RON

0522



~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON



SITUATION ROOM CHECKLIST

November 19, 1983

~~SECRET~~

British Concerns About Consultations on Lebanese Retaliation

According to Charge Price, the British are worried by the lack of consultations and notification by the French prior to their attacks in Lebanon and are concerned that this will have a spillover effect in U.S.-UK relations.

- o Thatcher's private secretary, Robin Cook, has told us that she is anxious to have word from Washington about our intentions in Lebanon.

Price believes that if we continue to consult fully with the British they are likely to remain in the MNF and in accord publicly with our goals in Lebanon. (S)

London 24974 NODIS, PSN 37480

*Bud,  
How do you  
want to answer  
Thatcher cable  
letter?*

SECRET  
CLASSIFIED BY London  
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

*per  
RR decision  
Joh*

DEK  
NLS 598-002 #1005  
BY AKS 7/21/00

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED 02 NOV 83 18

TO MCFARLANE

FROM FORTIER

DOCDATE 02 NOV 83

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By CS NARA, Date 10/2/98

KEYWORDS GREAT BRITAIN

GRENADA

MEDIA

SUBJECT MSG TO THE BRITISH RE PUBLIC RECRIMINATIONS DURING GRENADA CRISIS

-----  
ACTION FOR DECISION DUE 04 NOV 83 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID ( VL )

-----  
ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

FORTIER S 10/2 FOR FURTHER ACTION

MCFARLANE X 11/3 FOR DECISION

NOV 07 1983 McFarlane approved DF ✓  
NOV 07 1983 msg sent by stt room

DISPATCH ed Sitman NOV 07 1983

W/ATTCH FILE PA (C) MR

Armstrong

as  
Action dispatch

National Security Council  
The White House

RECEIVED

83 NOV 2 P 4: 56

System #

I

Package #

7928

RA

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	1	K	
John Poindexter			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
Executive Secretary			
Forher	2		A

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_

(Date/Time)

Run by Sommer.

Peter: Bud tasked Don to do this at a morning meeting.

National Security Council  
The White House

*ofjt*

RECEIVED

83 NOV 3 P 5: 55

System # I  
Package # 7928  
RA

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u>J</u>	
Wilma Hall	<u>3</u>	<u>W</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>4</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary			
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>		<u>File</u>
Situation Room	<u>5</u>		<u>Send via Cabinet</u>
Executive Secretary			<u>Print</u>

I = Information    **A = Action**    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS                      Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

*I recommend you go ahead and send this. I am also having a response to Thatcher's public proposal.*

National Security Council  
The White House

RECEIVED

System # I

83 NOV 3 P 5: 55 Package # 7928  
RA

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u>J</u>	
Wilma Hall	<u>3</u>	<u>WH</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>4</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary			
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>		<u>File</u>
Situation Room	<u>5</u>		<u>Send vid</u>
Executive Secretary			<u>Cabinet</u>
			<u>Print</u>

I = Information    **A = Action**    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS                      Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

*I recommend you go ahead and send this. I am also having a response to Thatcher's cable prepared.*

Lab 91

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

Novmeber 3, 1983

*Exactly right  
to me  
Thanks  
Don*

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: DONALD R. FORTIER *DF*

SUBJECT: Message to the British

I'm attaching the draft message to Sir Robert Armstrong which you requested. Mrs. Thatcher's public recriminations were not only politically quite unhelpful, but also unusually severe and even insulting. Moreover, I sense such remarks will only embolden-- rather than placate--the European disarmament forces whose political vigor we and the British both have an interest in containing. To visit such criticism upon us in the immediate aftermath of Beirut was, I think, particularly unseemly. The tone of the draft is quite firm. I think, though, that straight talk is not only called for but necessary for preventing further misunderstandings.

*PRS* Peter Sommer and Jack *PRS* Matlock reluctantly concur, but question whether the letter will reap the desired benefits. They strongly prefer that you convey the same points orally to Armstrong on the secure phone.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the attached message for transmission.

Approve *REM* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment  
Tab A Draft message

*Bud -*

*I have no serious problems with the idea of a phone call, but believe a signal of our profound displeasure is warranted. The UK's abstention on the UN condemnation of our action - even as we were withdrawing - also rankle.*

*Don*

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

BY *EW* NARA DATE *11/16/15*  
NLR # *MD8-193 #601A1*



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

November 7, 1983

7928

60692

DRAFT MESSAGE

Via Cabinet  
Line

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
TO: SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

While we genuinely regret that circumstances did not permit more timely consultations, I must tell you in all candor that the British Government's public reaction to our effort to restore democracy and order to Grenada has caused us profound disappointment. The Prime Minister's statement on 30 October that "Western democracies. . .do not use force to move into other people's countries" was unusually harsh. The infliction of such public criticism by one of our closest allies during a moment of national anguish over the tragedy in Beirut was doubly wounding.

In such circumstances it is only natural for thoughtful Americans to reflect on the dissimilarity between U.S. support for the U.K. during the Falklands War, support which we knowingly understood would make relationships with our hemispheric neighbors far more difficult, and the U.K.'s posture toward the U.S. when we determined that our national interests were jeopardized as a result of developments close to our own shores.

~~SECRET~~

(continued)

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M08-193 #60692

BY KML NARA DATE 6/10/10

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

We make a critical distinction between strong private differences and public recrimination. We deeply respect the careful and profoundly well-informed views of your government on a broad array of questions. But public differences only serve to diminish British-American solidarity which has served our mutual interests so well. Moreover, public disagreements create opportunities for our adversaries to exploit these differences and make it easier for countries such as Syria and others to miscalculate our resolve.

I send this message not to prolong our differences but out of the hope that frankness can clear the air on both sides. We sincerely hope now that you have had an opportunity to examine the threat to the safety of our citizens and the firm evidence concerning Soviet/Cuban objectives that you will be able to support us publicly.

Governor General Scoon and the regional states will be taking the lead in meeting our common objectives of restoring democracy and security. We hope to have the support of HMG in supporting this regional effort.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

7928

OUTGOING

60693

PAGE 01 OF 02 THE WHITE HOUSE 8511 DTG: 071453Z NOV 83 PSN: 016153  
SIT736 AN013066 TOR: 311/1517Z

-----  
DISTRIBUTION: MCF JP COMM RLPH SIT /006  
-----

OP IMMED  
DE WTE #8511 3111517  
O 071453Z NOV 83  
FM THE WHITE HOUSE

TO CABINET OFFICE

~~SECRET~~ VIA CABINET OFFICE CHANNELS WH08511

NOVEMBER 7, 1983

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

TO: SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

WHILE WE GENUINELY REGRET THAT CIRCUMSTANCES DID NOT PERMIT MORE TIMELY CONSULTATIONS, I MUST TELL YOU IN ALL CANDOR THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S PUBLIC REACTION TO OUR EFFORT TO RESTORE DEMOCRACY AND ORDER TO GRENADA HAS CAUSED US PROFOUND DISAPPOINTMENT. THE PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT ON 30 OCTOBER THAT "WESTERN DEMOCRACIES. . . DO NOT USE FORCE TO MOVE INTO OTHER PEOPLE'S COUNTRIES" WAS UNUSUALLY HARSH. THE INFLICTION OF SUCH PUBLIC CRITICISM BY ONE OF OUR CLOSEST ALLIES DURING A MOMENT OF NATIONAL ANGUISH OVER THE TRAGEDY IN BEIRUT WAS DOUBLY WOUNDING.

IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES IT IS ONLY NATURAL FOR THOUGHTFUL AMERICANS TO REFLECT ON THE DISSIMILARITY BETWEEN U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE U.K. DURING THE FALKLANDS WAR, SUPPORT WHICH WE KNOWINGLY

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M08-193 #60693

~~SECRET~~

BY KML NARA DATE 6/10/10

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

OUTGOING

PAGE 02 OF 02 THE WHITE HOUSE 8511

DTG: 071453Z NOV 83 PSN: 016153

UNDERSTOOD WOULD MAKE RELATIONSHIPS WITH OUR HEMISPHERIC NEIGHBORS FAR MORE DIFFICULT, AND THE U.K.'S POSTURE TOWARD THE U.S. WHEN WE DETERMINED THAT OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS WERE JEOPARDIZED AS A RESULT OF DEVELOPMENTS CLOSE TO OUR OWN SHORES.

WE MAKE A CRITICAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN STRONG PRIVATE DIFFERENCES AND PUBLIC RECRIMINATION. WE DEEPLY RESPECT THE CAREFUL AND PROFOUNDLY WELL-INFORMED VIEWS OF YOUR GOVERNMENT ON A BROAD ARRAY OF QUESTIONS. BUT PUBLIC DIFFERENCES ONLY SERVE TO DIMINISH BRITISH-AMERICAN SOLIDARITY WHICH HAS SERVED OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS SO WELL. MOREOVER, PUBLIC DISAGREEMENTS CREATE OPPORTUNITIES FOR OUR ADVERSARIES TO EXPLOIT THESE DIFFERENCES AND MAKE IT EASIER FOR COUNTRIES SUCH AS SYRIA AND OTHERS TO MISCALCULATE OUR RESOLVE.

I SEND THIS MESSAGE NOT TO PROLONG OUR DIFFERENCES BUT OUT OF THE HOPE THAT FRANKNESS CAN CLEAR THE AIR ON BOTH SIDES. WE SINCERELY HOPE NOW THAT YOU HAVE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXAMINE THE THREAT TO THE SAFETY OF OUR CITIZENS AND THE FIRM EVIDENCE CONCERNING SOVIET/CUBAN OBJECTIVES THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO SUPPORT US PUBLICLY.

GOVERNOR GENERAL SCOON AND THE REGIONAL STATES WILL BE TAKING THE LEAD IN MEETING OUR COMMON OBJECTIVES OF RESTORING DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY. WE HOPE TO HAVE THE SUPPORT OF HMG IN SUPPORTING THIS REGIONAL EFFORT.

BT

0414

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED 25 OCT 83 20

TO MCFARLANE FROM SOMMER

DOCDATE 25 OCT 83

*DEC*  
*598-002 #609*  
*GIS* *7/21/00*

KEYWORDS GREAT BRITAIN GRENADA THATCHER, MARGARET

SUBJECT: RECOMMENDED PRES PHONE CALL TO THATCHER

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR INFO DUE 26 OCT 83 STATUS IP FILES

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO  
MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID ( VL )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>PRES</i>	<i>IP 10/26</i>	<i>For Info</i>		<i>VP</i>
	<i>10/26</i>	<i>PRES NOTED</i>		<i>PS</i>

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ W/ATTCH FILE *PA* *VL* (C)

National Security Council  
The White House

845 <sup>ccc</sup>

RECEIVED

System #

I

Package#

7671

83 OCT 25 P 4: 42

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	1	JJ	
John Poindexter	2	JJ	
Bud McFarlane	3	M	A
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark			
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

I-Information    A-Action    R-Retain    D-Dispatch    N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP    Meese    Baker    Deaver    Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

ASAP  
(Date/Time)

Received SS

The President has seen \_\_\_\_\_

1983 OCT 26 PM 12: 23

October 26, 1983

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

7671

CONFIDENTIAL

RECOMMENDED PHONE CALL

TO: Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of England

DATE: October 26, 1983

RECOMMENDED BY: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RCM*

PURPOSE: To consult about the Grenada situation and its implications for our wider interests.

BACKGROUND: The British have been unhappy over what they consider lack of advance consultations with regard to Grenada. Mrs. Thatcher has made her unhappiness known to you in a phone call and by message. As we move into the next phase in Grenada it is crucial that Britain support us, particularly in regard to the establishment of an interim government. Britain's stance will also influence the position of European governments. A brief phone call should help smooth over differences and pay longer term dividends.

TOPICS OF DISCUSSION 1. Appreciated the opportunity to correspond and discuss personally Grenada. Understand your concerns. Governor General is safe.

2. Even though we disagreed with some of your Falklands position, we understood the broader imperative of standing behind a key Ally with fundamental interests at stake. We hope we can count on your support. We cannot let a fissure develop between us. If transatlantic differences emerge our enemies could exploit them.

3. In the case of Grenada, important U.S. and world interests are at stake. Also vitally concerned about the welfare of U.S. citizens. Moreover, had to honor a request for help and support from our Caribbean friends.

4. In the days ahead Britain's role will be critical as Grenada returns to democracy. We need your government's active cooperation in assisting an interim government. I have asked George Shultz to discuss our plans in detail on the margins of MNF Foreign Ministers Meeting in Paris later this week.

Date of Submission:

Action: *Call made*

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

Cc Vice President

*RELEASED  
SAB-002 AG10  
7/21/00  
CXS*

PRESERVATION COPY

## MEMORANDUM

CONFIDENTIAL

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

October 25, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

**SIGNED**FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *PS*

SUBJECT: Recommended Phone Call to Margaret Thatcher

I recognize that in dealing with the Grenada situation immediate relations with our European Allies must be secondary. However, after reviewing the exchange of correspondence between the President and Mrs. Thatcher I believe the President should again call her to protect our long term interests both in the Caribbean and Europe.

When I discussed this earlier in the day with John Poindexter and Bob Kimmitt, they both felt that in light of the President having already spoken and corresponded with Mrs. Thatcher a phone call was not necessary.

I recognize how burdened the President is, but I believe a phone call is well worth the few minutes it would take. As we move to some form of interim government in Grenada the British will have a crucial role to play. Moreover, on non-European issues the Europeans normally consult within the EC context and look to the EC country with the most direct interests -- in this case the U.K. -- in formulating their position. Furthermore, I believe there is a Commonwealth Conference coming up in the next few weeks where the U.K.'s role will be important. So let's call Mrs. Thatcher. In my view, we need the President's personal touch.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the recommended telephone call at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Tab I Recommended Phone Call

*DF* Fortier and Oliver North concur.

*(not walkable)*

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

598-002 # 661

7/21/00

CJS

~~SECRET~~

60697

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR MO8-193#60697

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

BY KML NARA DATE 6/10/10

PAGE 01 OF 03 ROME 6714  
SIT155 AN000263

DTG: 081312Z NOV 83 PSN: 019129  
TOR: 313/0338Z

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

-----  
DISTRIBUTION: <sup>MC</sup> JP VP SIT EOB /005  
WHSR COMMENT: NODIS CKLS  
-----

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

OP: IMMED  
UTS5410  
DE RUEHRO #6714/01 3121328  
O 081312Z NOV 83  
FM AMEMBASSY ROME  
  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5507

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 08 ROME 26714

NODIS  
DEPT PASS TO THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE AND TO AMEMBASSY LONDON  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, US, UK  
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY DAM'S MEETING NOVEMBER 7 WITH  
PRIME MINISTER THATCHER.

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. DEPUTY SECRETARY DAM MET NOVEMBER 7 WITH PRIME MINISTER THATCHER FOR A DISCUSSION WHICH COVERED GRENADA, INF ARMS CONTROL, THE MIDDLE EAST AND ARGENTINE CERTIFICATION. BRITISH PARTICIPANTS, IN ADDITION TO THATCHER, WERE FOREIGN SECRETARY SIR GEOFFREY HOWE, AND THATCHER'S PRIVATE SECRETARY, JOHN COLES. U.S. PARTICIPANTS, IN ADDITION TO DEPUTY SECRETARY, WERE ASSISTANT SECRETARY RICHARD BURT AND DCM EDWARD STREATOR.
3. GRENADA. [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~



WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03 ROME 6714

DTG: 081312Z NOV 83 PSN: 019129

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

[REDACTED]

BURT SAID THE MORNING NEWS ALSO REPORTED THE DISCOVERY OF A MASS GRAVE WHICH MAY CONTAIN THE MISSING POLITICAL PRISONERS AND PERHAPS THE BODY OF BISHOP. [REDACTED]

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

[REDACTED]

DEPSEC SAID THAT THE SITUATION IN GRENADA WAS SPECIAL.

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

4. THE U.S. WAS ANXIOUS, DAM SAID, TO LIMIT THE EXTENT OF THE PRECEDENT SET BY EVENTS IN GRENADA IN ORDER TO AVOID ENCOURAGING THE SOVIETS TO DO LIKEWISE. AT THE SAME TIME, SOME U.S. COMMENTATORS WILL SEE ADVANTAGE IN MAKING THE "COMANDANTES" IN NICARAGUA UNCERTAIN ABOUT U.S. INTENTIONS. WHILE SENATOR BAKER PRIVATELY WOULD OPPOSE A U.S. ACTION AGAINST NICARAGUA, HE WOULD NOT WANT TO RESTRAIN THE PRESIDENT PUBLICLY. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO REMEMBER, HOWEVER, THAT THE AMERICAN STUDENTS IN GRENADA CONSIDERED THEMSELVES IN DANGER, DEPSEC SAID. CONGRESSMEN FOLEY AND BARNES BOTH RECOGNIZED PUBLICLY THIS CONCERN IN STATEMENTS DURING THEIR CURRENT VISIT TO GRENADA. [REDACTED]

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

[REDACTED]

DAM RESPONDED THAT OUR CONSUL HAD SEEN SOME 400 STUDENTS, ALL OF WHOM WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THEIR SAFETY. SOME SMALL BOATS HAD PUT TO SEA AND ONLY SMALL PLANES WERE FLYING DURING THE WEEKEND PRIOR TO THE ACTION. ALSO, HE RECALLED THAT THERE WAS A "SHOOT-ON-SIGHT" CURFEW, WITH SHOPS OPEN ONLY A FEW HOURS DAILY AND LOOTING TAKING PLACE.


WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03 ROME 6714

DTG: 081312Z NOV 83 PSN: 019129

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

5. DAM STRESSED THAT ACTION WAS TAKEN FIRST BY THE  
OECS, AND THAT THE U.S. HAD RESPONDED TO A REQUEST FROM  
THEM AND THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.



N  
O  
D  
I  
S

DEPSEC SAID WE HAD LEARNED FROM ADAMS THAT  
THE GOVERNOR GENERAL HAD MADE A REQUEST FOR HELP. THE  
GOVERNOR GENERAL HAD BEEN RESCUED FROM HIS HOUSE,  
WHICH WAS SURROUNDED BY CUBAN TROOPS. BURT NOTED THERE  
WAS DEEP CONCERN ABOUT THE GOVERNOR GENERAL'S SECURITY;  
CONSIDERABLE SHOOTING SURROUNDED THE RESCUE OPERATION.  
DEPSEC NOTED THAT ONLY ON WEDNESDAY WAS THE GOVERNOR  
GENERAL'S REQUEST DISCLOSED. HE SAID THE U.S. BELIEVED  
IT HAD A VERY GOOD LEGAL CASE, BASED ON THE OECS REQUEST  
AND THAT OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

6.



DEPSEC RESPONDED THAT THE U.S.  
HAD A FORMAL REQUEST ON MONDAY, FOLLOWING A MORE GENERAL  
REQUEST ON FRIDAY. SPECIFICALLY, IT WAS AN ORAL REQUEST  
FROM THE OECS. ON TUESDAY, PRIME MINISTER CHARLES,  
CHAIRMAN OF THE OECS, CONFIRMED THE OECS POSITION.

BT

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03 ROME 6714  
SIT157 AN000265

DTG: 081312Z NOV 83 PSN: 019136  
TOR: 313/0340Z

-----  
DISTRIBUTION: JP EOB /001  
-----

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

OP IMMED  
STU4464  
DE RUEHRO #6714/02 3121329  
O 081312Z NOV 83  
FM AMEMBASSY ROME

N  
O  
D  
I  
S


TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5508

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 08 ROME 26714

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

NODIS  
DEPT PASS TO THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE AND TO AMEMBASSY LONDON  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, US, UK

N  
O  
D  
I  
S



WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03 ROME 6714

DTG: 081312Z NOV 83 PSN: 019136

N  
O  
D  
I  
S



N  
O  
D  
I  
S

7. DEPSEC REGRETTED THE DIFFICULTY THE PRIME MINISTER WAS PLACED IN. HE NOTED THAT THE DEPARTMENT HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE BRITISH EMBASSY BEFORE THE ACTION, THAT NEWSPAPERS WERE FULL OF STORIES ABOUT THE SITUATION THERE AND THAT WE HAD CONSULTED ONLY WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. BECAUSE OF THE DANGER OF PRESS LEAKS, THE WHOLE MATTER HAD BEEN VERY CLOSELY HELD IN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. HE RECALLED HOW MANY DIFFICULTIES HAD BEEN CREATED BY THE LEAK OF OUR EFFORTS TO PROTECT NIMERI.

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

8. DEPSEC SAID WE HAD NEVER HEARD ABOUT THE COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE GOVERNOR GENERAL TO THE PALACE ON SUNDAY, AND ASKED ABOUT THE MESSAGES RECEIVED FROM THE OEC'S.

N  
O  
D  
I  
S



DAM SAID THAT WE BECAME PARTICULARLY CONCERNED WHEN WE RECEIVED A REPORT FROM OUR CONSUL ABOUT TEENAGERS BRANDISHING GUNS AT THE AIRPORT WHICH LED OUR PLANE TO TAKE OFF AGAIN. MOREOVER, IT BECAME CLEAR FROM REPORTS WE HAD THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR ANY ON THE ISLAND TO MOVE WITH SAFETY.



~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03 ROME 6714

DTG: 081312Z NOV 83 PSN: 019136

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

N  
O  
D  
I  
S



~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03 ROME 6714  
SIT159 AN000267

DTG: 081312Z NOV 83 PSN: 019141  
TOR: 313/0342Z

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

-----  
DISTRIBUTION: JP EOB /001  
-----

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

OP IMMED  
UTS5414  
DE RUEHRO #6714/03 3121329  
O 081312Z NOV 83  
FM AMEMBASSY ROME


TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5509

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 08 ROME 26714

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

NODIS

N  
O  
D  
I  
S



WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03 ROME 6714

DTG: 081312Z NOV 83 PSN: 019141

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

[REDACTED]

DAM

AGREED, AND NOTED THAT WE WERE ENCOURAGED BY THE FACT THAT MOST STATES AROUND GRENADA ARE DEMOCRACIES THAT FUNCTION WELL. THE GOVERNOR GENERAL, HE UNDERSTOOD, WAS LOOKING FOR GOOD PEOPLE.

[REDACTED]

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

13. IN ANY CASE, DAM SAID, THE U. S. WANTS TO LEAVE GRENADA AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE RANGERS AND MARINES ALREADY HAD LEFT, THOUGH ABOUT 500 ENGINEERS HAD LANDED TO ASSIST IN RECONSTRUCTION. THE U. S. WAS GIVING 3.25 MILLION DOLLARS IN EMERGENCY INFRASTRUCTURE AID. MOREOVER, THERE WILL BE ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE, AND WE HOPE THAT ELECTIONS CAN BE HELD AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE ARE LOOKING TO THE GOVERNOR GENERAL AND TO THE OECS TO GET ON WITH THIS PROCESS AND WE DO NOT WANT TO TELL THEM HOW TO DO THE JOB. WE INTEND TO BE GUIDED BY THE PROPOSALS OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL AND THE OECS.

[REDACTED]

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

14. DEPSEC NOTED THAT 91 PERCENT OF GRENADIANS SUPPORTED THE ACTION. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE MINUTES OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE SHOWED THAT BISHOP WAS BEING ATTACKED BY LEFTISTS, WHO CLEARLY FEARED THAT THEY WERE BECOMING ALIENATED.

[REDACTED]

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03 ROME 6714

DTG: 081312Z NOV 83 PSN: 019141

N  
O  
D  
I  
S




N  
O  
D  
I  
S

HOWE SAID THAT

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

HE THOUGHT THE BRITISH COULD ASSIST WITH THE ELECTIONS IN GRENADA, AND DAM SAID HE THOUGHT THIS WOULD BE VERY USEFUL. BURT RECALLED THAT A BRITISH CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERT ALREADY WAS IN GRENADA AND HOWE SAID THAT THE BRITISH WERE HELPING WITH THE POLICE FORCE.

N  
O  
D  
I  
S





~~SECRET~~

11 of 23

NNN

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 01 ROME 26714 04 OF 08 081332Z  
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W

-----155260 081335Z /42

O 081312Z NOV 83  
FM AMEMBASSY ROME  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5510

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 04 OF 08 ROME 26714


NODIS

DEPT PASS TO THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE AND TO AMEMBASSY LONDON

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, US, UK

SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY DAM'S MEETING NOVEMBER 7 WITH



DAM THOUGHT HOWE'S POINT A VALID ONE, AND SAID THAT IT WAS  
THE U.S. DISPOSITION TO WITHDRAW.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 ROME 26714 04 OF 08 081332Z

~~SECRET~~

11 of 23

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 04  
SIT194

SECSTATE WASHDC 0308  
AN000301

DTG: 090302Z NOV 83 PSN: 019418  
TOR: 313/0516Z

-----  
DISTRIBUTION: JP /001  
-----

OP IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHC #0308/04 3130500  
O 090302Z NOV 83 ZFF5  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO WHCA IMMEDIATE IMMEDIATE

INFO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 9828

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 04 OF 07 STATE 320308 TOSEC 130042

NODIS



NODIS

NODIS

NODIS

NODIS

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 0308 DTG: 090302Z NOV 83 PSN: 019418

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

N  
O  
D  
I  
S



DAM

SAID THAT THE U. S. WOULD BE GLAD TO DISCUSS THAT GENERAL PROBLEM, AND HOWE NOTED THAT THE FRENCH ALSO HAVE IDEAS ON THIS SCORE.

22. IN RESPONSE TO THATCHER'S REQUEST FOR AN OFFICIAL LIST OF U. S. AND CIVILIAN LOSSES, DAM SAID THAT THE ONLY FIRM FIGURES COVERED U. S. CITIZENS; OF OUR FORCES, 18 HAD BEEN KILLED AND 85 WOUNDED; NO U. S. CIVILIANS WERE AMONG THE CASUALTIES. TWENTY PATIENTS HAD BEEN

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 0308 DTG: 090302Z NOV 83 PSN: 019418

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

LOST AT THE MENTAL HOSPITAL. APART FROM THAT, THERE WERE REPORTS THAT 50 OR 60 GRENADANS HAD BEEN KILLED.



DAM PROMISED TO PROVIDE THE TEXT OF THE FIVE TREATIES PLUS THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE MINUTES WHICH SHOWED THE DENOUEMENT OF THE DRAMA.

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

23. INF. DEPSEC SAID THAT THE US APPRECIATED MRS. THATCHER'S RESOLVE ON INF DEPLOYMENTS. HE CHARACTERIZED THE WESTERN POSITION IN GENEVA AS "SOUND", AND INDICATED THAT THE RECENT NPG DECISION NEEDED PUBLIC EMPHASIS. HE SAW THE ANDROPOV PROPOSAL AS OFFERING NOTHING NEW EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT IT TOOK INTO ACCOUNT ASIAN SYSTEMS AND PRESSED FOR A CEILING OF 140 WARHEADS. LOOKING AHEAD TO THE COMING BUNDESTAG DEBATE, HE SAID CONSIDERATION HAD BEEN GIVEN TO THE VALUE OF A FURTHER U.S. MOVE; IF SUCH A MOVE WERE MADE, IT SHOULD BE SIMPLE. IN THIS CONNECTION, IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO SPECIFY A NUMBER OF WARHEADS, SOMETHING BETWEEN ZERO AND 572. WHILE ZERO CLEARLY WOULD BE BEST, WE MIGHT ILLUSTRATIVELY ADVANCE A PROPOSAL FOR A LIMIT OF 270 WARHEADS. THIS WOULD BE MILITARILY VALID. THE WARHEADS COULD BE DIVIDED AMONG THE BASING NATIONS. IT WOULD ILLUSTRATE THAT WE ARE READY TO GO LOWER. MOREOVER, IT WOULD HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF NOT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT UK AND FRENCH SYSTEMS.

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

24. BURT SAID THAT THE APPROACH WOULD BE TOTALLY COMPATIBLE WITH THAT TAKEN TO DATE. IN EFFECT, IT WOULD ATTACH SPECIFIC NUMBERS TO GLOBAL EQUALITY, EXPRESSED IN WARHEADS. WE WOULD BE TALKING ABOUT 90 SS-20S, SO THE EQUIVALENT FOR US WOULD BE 270 WARHEADS, OF WHICH TWO-THIRDS, OR 180, WOULD BE DEPLOYED IN WESTERN EUROPE. THIS WOULD MAINTAIN THE SAME MIX AS AT PRESENT: 5:1; THAT IS, 36 PERSHING IIS AND THE REMAINDER IN GLCMS.

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 0308

DTG: 090302Z NOV 83 PSN: 019418

N  
O  
D  
I  
S



N  
O  
D  
I  
S

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 04  
SIT190

SECSTATE WASHDC 0308  
AN000297

DTG: 090302Z NOV 83 PSN: 019389  
TOR: 313/0520Z

NODIS

DISTRIBUTION: JP /001

NODIS

OP IMMED  
DE RUEHC #0308/05 3130500  
O 090302Z NOV 83 ZFF5  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO WHCA IMMEDIATE IMMEDIATE

INFO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 9829

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 05 OF 07 STATE 320308 TOSEC 130042

NODIS

NODIS

[REDACTED]

BURT SAID

THAT THE FIGURE IS WELL ABOVE THE FIRST TRANCHE OF  
PERSHING DEPLOYMENTS, SCHEDULED TO BE NINE IN THE FRG.

NODIS

26. DAM SAID THAT, IN VIEW OF THE LIKELY SOVIET  
INTENTION TO WALK OUT OF THE INF TALKS, THE ISSUE  
WAS WHETHER TO MAKE A FURTHER PROPOSAL NOW OR TO WAIT.

[REDACTED]

DAM SAID

IT PROBABLY WOULD BE BETTER IF THEY WALKED OUT AFTER  
A CONCRETE PROPOSAL HAD BEEN ADVANCED.

[REDACTED]

27. DAM INDICATED THAT THE US OPPOSED THE DANISH  
PROPOSAL FOR A FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING.

[REDACTED]

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 0308 DTG: 090302Z NOV 83 PSN: 019389

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

[REDACTED]

DAM, REITERATING US OPPOSITION TO A MEETING, SAID IT COULD BE AVOIDED BY REFUSING TO JOIN A CONSENSUS FAVORING IT. BURT SAID THAT A REPLY SHOULD BE GIVEN FAST AND IT SHOULD BE NEGATIVE. BULLARD NOTED THAT THE DANES EXPECTED NONE TO AGREE WITH THE PROPOSAL.

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

28. RETURNING TO THE ISSUE OF A NEW US INF PROPOSAL, DAM SAID THAT IT COULD INVOKE FURTHER PUBLIC DEMANDS FOR DELAYING DEPLOYMENTS. BURT ADDED THAT IT ALSO COULD NOT BE RULED OUT THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD COME FORWARD WITH SOMETHING NEW IN THE NEXT WEEKS.

[REDACTED]

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

[REDACTED]

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

DEPSEC REPLIED THAT THE PRESIDENT IS LEAVING FOR JAPAN, ACCOMPANIED BY THE SECRETARY. HOWEVER, THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE PLANNING WORK DONE WITH REGARD TO TARGETS AND WE ARE SEEKING FURTHER EVIDENCE IN THIS CONNECTION.

[REDACTED]

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04

SECSTATE WASHDC 0308

DTG: 090302Z NOV 83

PSN: 019389

N  
O  
D  
I  
S



N  
O  
D  
I  
S

DAM SAID THAT INTELLIGENCE WAS FOCUSING ON THE MUSSAWI GROUP AS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ATTACKS. FURTHER ATTACKS, HE SAID, WOULD INCREASE THE PRESSURE ON US TO MOVE AGAINST THEM. HOWE SAW THE NEED FOR A VERY SKILLFUL APPROACH AND DAM SAID THAT THE US WAS CONCIOUS OF THE POINTS HOWE WAS MAKING. HE EXPRESSED GRATITUDE FOR BRITISH STATEMENTS ABOUT THE MNF.

N  
O  
D  
I  
S



N  
O  
D  
I  
S

32. DAM SAID THAT THE GENEVA RECONCILIATION TALKS HAD RECESSED TO GIVE GEMAYEL THE OPPORTUNITY TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE US ABOUT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. THE NEXT ITEM ON

THE AGENDA IS OTHER FORCES. THE US BELIEVES THIS IS WRONG. ISRAEL MAY BE READY TO PUT THE ISRAELI-LEBANESE AGREEMENT IN ABEYANCE, BUT TO SAY THAT WE NEED TO GET ISRAEL OUT BEFORE DEALING WITH THE OTHER ISSUES IN CONNECTION WITH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT IS IMPOSSIBLE. HOWE SAID THAT, IF THERE WERE AGREEMENT ON A WITHDRAWAL PROGRAM, MAYBE IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO LEAVE THE ISRAELI-LEBANESE AGREEMENT ASIDE AND PRESS AHEAD WITH THE RECONCILIATION PROCESS.



WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04

SECSTATE WASHDC 0308

DTG: 090302Z NOV 83

PSN: 019389

N  
O  
D  
D  
I  
S

33. DAM SAID THAT GEMAYEL SEEMS TO WANT TO GO TO THE US.  
HE SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT TO EMPHASIZE THE NEED TO MOVE  
FORWARD AND TO MAKE CLEAR THAT SYRIANS CANNOT VETO A  
BT

N  
O  
D  
D  
I  
S

N  
O  
D  
D  
I  
S

N  
O  
D  
D  
I  
S

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 0308 DTG: 090302Z NOV 83 PSN: 019419  
SIT195 AN000302 TOR: 313/0512Z

-----  
DISTRIBUTION: JP /001  
-----

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

OP IMMED  
DE RUEHC #0308/06 3130500  
O 090302Z NOV 83 ZFF5  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC


N  
O  
D  
I  
S

TO WHCA IMMEDIATE IMMEDIATE  
INFO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 9830

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 06 OF 07 STATE 320308 TOSEC 130042

N  
O  
D  
I  
S


NODIS  
NON-SYRIAN CONTROLLED GOVERNMENT.



DAM SAID

THAT EAGLEBURGER'S TRIP WAS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE OCCASION  
TO DISCUSS BILATERAL AND WORLD ISSUES.

N  
O  
D  
I  
S



WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 0308

DTG: 090302Z NOV 83 PSN: 019419

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

[REDACTED]

DAM NOTED THAT

SYRIA WAS PREPARED TO USE TERRORISM TO SERVE ITS OBJECTIVES.

35.

[REDACTED]

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

DAM SAID THAT IT WAS HIS PERSONAL VIEW THAT THE SAUDIS CANNOT EXERCISE MUCH LEVERAGE ON SYRIA.

[REDACTED]

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

DAM NOTED HUSSEIN'S RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENT ON THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JORDANIAN PARLIAMENT.

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

37.

[REDACTED]

DAM SAID IN THIS REGARD THAT WE WERE PUTTING MORE EMPHASIS ON THE PEACE PROCESS.

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04 SECSTATE WASHDC 0308

DTG: 090302Z NOV 83 PSN: 019419

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

38.

[REDACTED]

DAM SAID THAT THE US WAS WORKING  
AT A PLANNING LLEVEL ON THIS ISSUE.

[REDACTED]

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

BURT SAID THAT THE US HAS HAD NONE  
OF THIS KIND OF PERSONNEL SINCE THEY WERE DECLARED  
ILLEGAL AFTER VIETNAM.

[REDACTED]

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

39. ARGENTINE CERTIFICATION.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03 ROME 6714  
SIT161 AN000269

DTG: 081312Z NOV 83 PSN: 019239  
TOR: 313/0405Z

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

-----  
DISTRIBUTION: JP EOB /001  
-----

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

OP IMMED  
UTS5420  
DE RUEHRO #6714/07 3121332  
O 081312Z NOV 83  
FM AMEMBASSY ROME

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5513

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 07 OF 08 ROME 26714

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

NODIS  
DEPT PASS TO THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE AND TO AMEMBASSY LONDON  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, US, UK

[REDACTED]

DAM NOTED

HUSSEIN'S RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENT ON THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT  
OF THE JORDANIAN PARLIAMENT.

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

37. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

DAM SAID

IN THIS REGARD THAT WE WERE PUTTING MORE EMPHASIS ON  
THE PEACE PROCESS.

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03 ROME 6714

DTG: 081312Z NOV 83 PSN: 019239

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

[REDACTED]

DAM SAID THAT THE US WAS WORKING  
AT A PLANNING LEVEL ON THIS ISSUE.

[REDACTED]

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

BURT SAID THAT THE US HAS HAD NONE  
OF THIS KIND OF PERSONNEL SINCE THEY WERE DECLARED  
ILLEGAL AFTER VIETNAM.

[REDACTED]

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

39. ARGENTINE CERTIFICATION.

[REDACTED]

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

[REDACTED]

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03 ROME 6714

DTG: 081312Z NOV 83 PSN: 019239

[REDACTED]

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

40. DAM SAID THAT THE US WOULD RESIST LANGUAGE GOING BEYOND LAST YEAR'S RESOLUTION. MOREOVER, WE WILL TAKE STEPS TO CONSULT CLOSELY ON THIS ISSUE AS IT EVOLVES. BURT SAID THAT THE US POSITION WAS TO FAVOR A RESOLUTION CONSISTENT WITH THAT OF LAST YEAR; IF IT IS NOT RADICALLY CHANGED, WE WILL SUPPORT IT.

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

41. ON CERTIFICATION, DAM SAID THAT THIS PROCEDURE DERIVES FROM CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS AND IT APPLIES TO VARIOUS COUNTRIES. WITH THE EMERGENCE OF A DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT IN ARGENTINA, IT IS A FOREGONE CONCLUSION THAT WE WILL CERTIFY. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

DEPSEC SAID THAT COOPERATION WITH ARGENTINA WAS DESIRABLE OVER THE LONG TERM FOR EVERYONE. CERTAINLY THE ARGENTINE MILITARY SHOULD HAVE RELATIONS WITH OTHER MILITARY. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

DAM SAID THAT THE US WAS NOT RUSHING INTO ARMS SALES. THE ARGENTINES MAY TRY TO BUY COMMERCIALY IN THE US, AND THE US GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE LESS INFLUENCE IN THAT SPHERE. [REDACTED]

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

[REDACTED]

BT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 ROME 6714  
SIT162 AN000270

DTG: 081312Z NOV 83 PSN: 019244  
TOR: 313/0406Z

-----  
DISTRIBUTION: JP EOB /001  
-----

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

OP IMMED  
STU4474  
DE RUEHRO #6714/08 3121333  
O 081312Z NOV 83  
FM AMEMBASSY ROME

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5514

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 08 OF 08 ROME 26714

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

NODIS  
DEPT PASS TO THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE AND TO AMEMBASSY LONDON  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, US, UK  
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY DAM'S MEETING NOVEMBER 7 WITH

42.

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

[REDACTED]

DAM SAID THAT US THINKING WAS LONG THE SAME LINES.  
WHILE THERE WERE ALL KINDS OF STORIES OUT OF WASHINGTON  
ABOUT SALES TO ARGENTINA, THIS MEANT ONLY THAT DISCUSSION  
WAS IN PROGRESS. HE AGREED THAT THE US AND UK SHOULD  
STAY IN TOUCH SO THAT THE BRITISH WOULD HAVE A CLEAR  
VIEW OF THE EMERGING US POSITION. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 ROME 6714

DTG: 081312Z NOV 83 PSN: 019244

N  
O  
D  
I  
S



N  
O  
D  
I  
S

44. DAM PROMISED TO REPORT IN DETAIL THE EVOLUTION OF  
US THINKING.

45. THIS CABLE HAS BEEN CLEARED BY DEPSEC DAM.  
RABB  
BT

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

N  
O  
D  
I  
S

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 236

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 01/03/84//003

SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:  
MESSAGE:

HCE455

OO RUEHC RUEHLD RUEHBU

DE RUEHC #3255 3471936

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

O 131856Z DEC 83 ZFF6

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 4627

INFO RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES IMMEDIATE 0705

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 353255

NODIS

FOR THE AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12356: DECL; OADR

TAGS: PARM, PREL, UK, AR

SUBJECT: BRIEFING MRS. THATCHER ON THE BUSH/ALFONSIN  
BILATERAL

REF: (A) LONDON 26693; (B) LONDON 26777

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN RESPONSE TO AMBASSADOR PRICE'S REQUEST FOR INFORMATION WITH WHICH TO BRIEF THE PRIME MINISTER, EMBASSY LONDON IS PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING ON SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS OF MEETING OF VICE PRESIDENT BUSH WITH PRESIDENT ALFONSIN.

3. GENERAL: VICE PRESIDENT BUSH AND PRESIDENT ALFONSIN MET FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE HOUR EVENING OF DECEMBER 10. CONVERSATION WAS CORDIAL AND CANDID, COVERING WIDE RANGE OF ISSUES OF MUTUAL INTEREST. BOTH WE AND ARGENTINES BELIEVE CONVERSATION REPRESENTED EXCELLENT BEGINNING OF BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN USG AND NEW GOVERNMENT IN ARGENTINA. DURING DISCUSSION, BOTH PRINCIPALS ANTICIPATED A PERIOD OF IMPROVED RELATIONS CHARACTERIZED BY COOPERATION ON A WIDE RANGE OF ISSUES.

4. FALKLANDS/MALVINAS: ALFONSIN NOTED THE IMPORTANCE OF BEGINNING IMPLEMENTATION OF UN RESOLUTION. HE SAID CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE UK AND ARGENTINA SHOULD BEGIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, EVEN IF AGREEMENT COULD NOT BE REACHED ON A COMPLETE AGENDA. HE ADDED THERE HAD TO BE AN END TO THE EXCLUSION ZONE AND THE FORTIFICATION OF THE ISLANDS BY THE BRITISH. IN RESPONSE, THE VICE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED

SENSITIVE

NLS 598-002#613

BY WDS NAF

6/12/02

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 237

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 01/03/84//003

SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

ASSERTED HIS BELIEF THAT THE UK WANTED TO MOVE FORWARD IN REBUILDING ITS RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA, THAT THE US DECISION TO CERTIFY ARGENTINA WAS NOT EASY FOR THE UK TO ACCEPT, AND THAT WE HOPED TO BE ABLE TO FACILITATE IMPROVED RELATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND ARGENTINA.

5. ARGENTINA'S NUCLEAR POLICY: THE VICE PRESIDENT RAISED THE MATTER OF ARGENTINA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND URGED ALFONSIN TO ADOPT A COMPLETE SAFEGUARDS REGIME.

THIS AREA WOULD MAKE BILATERAL COOPERATION ON NUCLEAR AND OTHER ISSUES MUCH EASIER TO ACHIEVE. ALFONSIN REITERATED HIS FIRM COMMITMENT THAT ARGENTINA WOULD NOT BUILD AN ATOMIC BOMB.

6. ECONOMIC PROBLEMS: VICE PRESIDENT SAID THE US WOULD BE AS HELPFUL AS POSSIBLE IN ASSISTING ARGENTINA IN ADDRESSING ITS "FINANCIAL PROBLEMS, ESPECIALLY THE DEBT PROBLEM. ALFONSIN RESPONDED THAT A REDUCTION IN THE MAGNITUDE OF THE DEBT WAS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO HIM. OTHERWISE ARGENTINA COULD NOT REALIZE ITS POTENTIAL. EXPORTS WERE THE KEY; ARGENTINA WOULD PAY ITS DEBTS, BUT NEEDED TO FIND NEW MARKETS TO EARN THE FOREIGN CURRENCY NEEDED FOR DEBT SERVICE. IN RESPONSE, THE VICE PRESIDENT NOTED THE US COMMITMENT TO FREE TRADE AND ASSURED ALFONSIN THAT US WOULD BE A GOOD TRADING PARTNER FOR ARGENTINA.

7. OTHER ISSUES COVERED DURING CONVERSATION BETWEEN TWO LEADERS INCLUDED CENTRAL AMERICA, PRESIDENT REAGAN'S POLICY ON ARMS REDUCTIONS, AND ARGENTINA'S SUCCESSFUL TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY.

8. COMMENT: DEPARTMENT WOULD BE VERY INTERESTED IN UK REACTION BUSH-ALFONSIN BILATERAL. WE ARE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN ASSESSMENT OF ALFONSIN'S COMMENTS ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF BEGINNING BILATERAL TALKS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, EVEN WITHOUT A COMPLETE AGENDA, AS WELL AS RELATED LONDON TIMES INTERVIEW (LONDON 22295) IN WHICH ALFONSIN PUBLICLY MENTIONS CALL ON MRS. THATCHER TO REDUCE 150 MILE EXCLUSION ZONE AND FREEZE CONSTRUCTION OF NEW AIRPORT IN CONNECTION WITH POSSIBLE INTERIOR SETTLEMENT BASED ON A LEASE BACK ARRANGEMENT. HOWE'S COMMENTS REFTEL (B) REGARDING PROPOSED TWO-TRACK POLICY FOR RESTORING RELATIONS WITH ARGENTINA ARE INTERESTING AND IT WOULD BE PARTICULARLY USEFUL TO HAVE THATCHER'S

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 238

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 01/03/84//003

SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:  
PERSONAL PROSPECTIVE ON APPROACH OUTLINED.  
DAM  
BT  
#3255  
NNNN

SENSITIVE

60699

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 705

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 01/03/84//003

SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATAGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:  
MESSAGE:

EHA299  
OO RUEADWW  
DE RUEHC #0430/01 3042153  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O P 312133Z OCT 83 ZFF6  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 2184  
RUEHWN/AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN IMMEDIATE 2098  
INFO RUEHKG/AMEMBASSY KINGSTON PRIORITY 0625  
RUEADWW/ WHITE HOUSE PRIORITY 9148  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 310430  
NODIS

E.O. 12356:DECL: OADR  
TAGS: UK, GJ, PREL  
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR WRIGHT'S MEETING WITH UNDER  
SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER ON GRENADA OCTOBER 29, 1983

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR WRIGHT, ACCOMPANIED BY MINISTER DEREK THOMAS AND PRIVATE SECRETARY PETER JENKINS MET WITH UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER TO INQUIRE ABOUT USG THINKING ON FUTURE POLITICAL AND MILITARY ACTIONS IN GRENADA PRIOR TO MONDAY'S CABINET MEETING IN LONDON. HE STRESSED THAT HMG HAD REACHED NO DECISIONS ON ITS ROLE, IF ANY, BUT THAT THE REQUESTS OF GOVERNOR GENERAL SCOON WOULD BE IMPORTANT IN DETERMINING BRITISH REACTION. HE ALSO ASKED ABOUT A POSSIBLE COMMONWEALTH ROLE IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT AND IN PEACEKEEPING. THE UNDER SECRETARY SAID THAT THE USG HAS NO FIRM OUTLINE OF PLANS AS YET, BUT HE AGREED TO GET AS PRECISE THOUGHTS AS POSSIBLE TO THE EMBASSY NO LATER THAN SUNDAY. HE PROMISED THE EMBASSY WOULD BE KEPT FULLY INFORMED ON A DAILY BASIS OF THE SITUATION IN GRENADA. HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE THE USG WILL PLACE ON THE IDEAS AND VIEWS OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL AND THE OECS WHEN CONSIDERING FUTURE PLANS. REGARDING A ROLE

FOR THE COMMONWEALTH, HE OBSERVED THAT THE U.S. WOULD HAVE TO DO MORE THINKING. HE STATED THAT WHILE THE U.S. WANTS TO WITHDRAW TROOPS ASAP, ALL THE INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL FOUND AND THE CUBAN TROOPS CAPTURED MAY REQUIRE US TO STAY LONGER THAN WE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED. THE

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M08-193 # 60699

BY KML NARA DATE 6/10/10

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 706

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 01/03/84/003

SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

AMBASSADOR INQUIRED IF THE USG THOUGHT IT COULD STOP MOVES IN EITHER THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL OR THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO HAVE THE UNGA DISCUSS GRENADA. THE BRITISH DO NOT FAVOR SUCH DISCUSSION AND BELIEVE AN SC VOTE ON A UNGA DISCUSSION WOULD NOT BE THE SAME AS THIS WEEK'S SC GRENADA RESOLUTION VOTE. WHEN QUERIED ABOUT U.S. PLANS IN LEBANON, EAGLEBURGER CITED THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH WHICH WARNED THAT THE U.S. WOULD MAKE THOSE WHO KILLED THE MARINES AWARE THAT THEY SHOULD NOT HAVE DONE IT. HE ASSURED THE AMBASSADOR THAT THE DEPARTMENT RECOGNIZES THE NEED TO DISCUSS SUCH PLANS WITH OUR FRIENDS BEFORE TAKING ACTION. ON THE U.S. SIDE IN ADDITION TO UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER WERE ARA ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOTLEY, EUR DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY RICHARD HAUSS EUR/NE C.K. STOCKER AND P SPEC ASST R.C. PERRY. END SUMMARY.

3. AMBASSADOR WRIGHT BEGAN BY THANKING UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER FOR FACILITATING THE GOVERNOR GENERAL'S COMMUNICATION WITH THE PALACE, FOR OBTAINING CLEARANCE FOR THE RAF PLANE WHICH TOOK CONSULAR OFFICERS TO GRENADA AND FOR THE HELP WHICH ADMIRAL HOWE HAD PROVIDED ON CLEARING UP RUMORS OF BRITISH HOSTAGES. IN RESPONSE EAGLEBURGER EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR HMG'S ABSTENTION ON THE SC RESOLUTION ON GRENADA. IT WAS NOT EASY TO ABSTAIN, HE ACKNOWLEDGED, IN LIGHT OF THE YES VOTES OF OTHER EUROPEANS WHO MIGHT HAVE ABSTAINED WITHOUT POLITICAL DIFFICULTY.

4. RECALLING THE SECRETARY'S MEETING IN PARIS EARLIER IN THE WEEK WITH THE FOREIGN SECRETARY, WRIGHT REITERATED THEIR AGREEMENT ON THE NEED FOR CLOSE CONSULTATIONS AND HOWE'S CONSTITUTIONAL POINT REGARDING THE GOVERNOR GENERAL'S ROLE WHICH HMG HOPES THE ADMINISTRATION UNDERSTANDS. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE BRITISH CABINET IS MEETING ON MONDAY MORNING TO DISCUSS WHAT ROLE, IF ANY, THE BRITISH WILL SEEK TO PLAY IN GRENADA REGARDING THE ESTABLISHING OF A CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND PEACEKEEPING. HMG HAS TAKEN NO DECISIONS ON THESE QUESTIONS AS YET. ITS THINKING IS BASED ON THE PREMISE THAT THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IS THE ONLY REMAINING CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY ACCEPTED BY EVERYONE. THEREFORE HE WILL BE CENTRAL TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CREDIBLE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT. HMG IMAGINES HE IS AWARE OF THIS AND THAT HE IS READY TO TAKE ACTION. NEVERTHELESS, HE WILL NEED HELP WHICH HMG

IS INCLINED TO PROVIDE AS FAR AS POSSIBLE. SINCE

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 707

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 01/03/84//003

SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

GRENADA IS PART OF THE COMMONWEALTH, HE PREDICTED THAT ORGANIZATION WILL PLAY A CONSIDERABLE ROLE WHEN PEACE COMES WHICH WOULD BE DESIRABLE IN GAINING ACCEPTANCE FOR THE NEW GOVERNMENT. THE COMMONWEALTH HAS A SECRETARIAT IN LONDON WHICH THE GOVERNOR GENERAL MAY WISH TO CALL ON. ACCORDING TO WRIGHT, THE BRITISH HAVE NO VIEW ON USING THIS ORGANIZATION. REGARDING A PEACEKEEPING FORCE, HMG WILL HAVE TO CONSIDER WHETHER THERE IS A ROLE FOR THE COMMONWEALTH AND, IF SO, WHICH MEMBERS MIGHT TAKE PART. THE AMBASSADOR STRESSED THAT HMG WILL BE STRONGLY INFLUENCED BY THE GOVERNOR GENERAL'S WISHES AND ALSO IS VERY INTERESTED IN USG THINKING.

5. SPEAKING PERSONALLY, UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER  
BT  
#0430  
NNNN

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 702

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 01/03/84//003

SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:  
MESSAGE:

EHA300

OO RUEADWW

DE RUEHC #0430/02 3042153

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

O P 312133Z OCT 83 ZFF6

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 2185

RUEHWN/AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN IMMEDIATE 2099

INFO RUEHKG/AMEMBASSY KINGSTON PRIORITY 0626

RUEADWW/ WHITE HOUSE PRIORITY 9149

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 STATE 310430

NODIS

ENUMERATED TWO FACTORS IN DEALING WITH THE BRITISH ON THIS ISSUE: (1) THE USG WILL KEEP HMG UP TO DATE ON A DAILY BASIS ON THE SITUATION IN GRENADA; (2) THE USG WILL BE DISCUSSING WITH HMG THE SORT OF LONG-RANGE AND LEGAL QUESTIONS WHICH THE AMBASSADOR HAD JUST RAISED. ,N U.S. THINKING, AS IN THE BRITISH VIEW, THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL AND HIS ATTITUDES WILL BE CRITICAL. WE ARE ONLY BEGINNING TO GET A SENSE OF WHERE HE IS COMING FROM. EAGLEBURGER HOPED THAT HMG WOULD UNDERSTAND THAT FOR THE U.S. THE OECS IS VERY IMPORTANT. WHEN CONSIDERING HOW TO DEAL WITH THE FUTURE, WE WILL WANT TO KEEP THOSE STATES INVOLVED AND LISTEN CLOSELY TO WHAT THEY SAY. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT WE WILL BE OPPOSED TO INVOLVEMENT OF A WIDER GROUP, BUT OECS WILL BE KEY. REGARDING THE LINK WITH THE COMMONWEALTH, THE USG NEEDS TO DO MORE THINKING. ON A PERSONAL LEVEL THE UNDER SECRETARY COMMENTED THAT U.S. ENTHUSIASM FOR ITS PARTICIPATION WOULD BE AFFECTED BY THE THOUGHT OF MRS. GHANDI HAVING ANYTHING TO DO WITH THE FUTURE OF GRENADA. HE ADDED THAT THE QUEEN'S INVOLVEMENT WAS ENTIRELY DIFFERENT FROM MRS. GHANDI'S. HE STRESSED THAT THE U.S. WANTS TO WITHDRAW MILITARY PERSONNEL AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, BUT THE ISLAND IS NOT YET CLEARED; MANY CUBANS REMAIN IN THE NORTHERN HALF. HE ASKED HMG TO BEAR IN MIND THAT THE U.S. MILITARY ON GRENADA HAVE AS THEIR FIRST CONCERN THEIR MILITARY GOALS. U.S. FORCES MAY BE THERE LONGER THAN WE WOULD WANT, WHICH WILL HAVE AN EFFECT ON POLITICAL ASPECTS. EAGLEBURGER UNDERSTOOD THE URGENCY OF GETTING AS PRECISE U.S. THOUGHTS AS POSSIBLE TO THE EMHASSY WELL IN TIME BEFORE THE CABINET MEETING ON MONDAY.

SENSITIVE



SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 703

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 01/03/84//003

SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATAGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

6. ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOTLEY STATED THAT WHILE THE PRESIDENT WANTS THE TROOPS OUT ASAP HE DOES NOT WANT TO HAVE TO SEND THEM BACK LATER. CONSEQUENTLY, FOR AN INTERMEDIATE PERIOD A FORCE LARGER THAN THAT PROVIDED BY THE PARTICIPATING CARIBBEAN NATIONS WILL BE NEEDED. LOGICALLY, THAT LEADS TO A COMMONWEALTH PRESENCE. THE ASSESSMENT OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL WILL BE A KEY ELEMENT. THE U.S. REPS ON THE GROUND WHO HAVE BEEN TALKING WITH SCOON HAVE FOUND HIM A LOGICAL, THOUGHTFUL MAN WITH HIS OWN IDEAS. FOR EXAMPLE, SCOON IS CONCERNED ABOUT BRINGING BISHOP'S MURDERERS TO JUSTICE AND ESTABLISHING TRUE SPOKESMEN IN THE U.N. HE HAS ASKED THE USG TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE WITH SOME DETAILED WORK ABOUT DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION, ETC. THE GOVERNOR IS ALREADY IN COMMUNICATION WITH HIS OECS COLLEAGUES.

7. WHEN AMBASSADOR WRIGHT REITERATED THAT THE CABINET HAD NOT YET DETERMINED WHETHER THERE IS A ROLE FOR THE UK IN THIS SITUATION, THE UNDER SECRETARY COMMENTED THAT U.S. ACTIONS HAD BEEN KEPT SECRET NOT ONLY FOR EFFICIENCY ,UT ALSO FROM A DESIRE NOT TO EMBARRASS HMG. HE COMMENTED THAT IN GRENADA THE U.S. HAD FOUND MUCH MORE INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL THAN HAD BEEN EXPECTED. IT WILL BE SHARED THROUGH REGULAR CHANNELS WITH HMG. BECAUSE WE WANT TO TALK TO CUBAN PRISONERS, THERE MAY BE DELAYS IN MOVING THEM OUT. THE OECS GOVERNMENTS HAD A BETTER GUT FEELING FOR HOW BAD THINGS WERE THAN THE U.S. DID.

8. THE AMBASSADOR RETURNED TO THE "STRANGE ORGANIZATION" CALLED THE COM?ONWEALTH SECRETARIAT AND ITS POSSIBLE USE IN PROVIDING CREDIBILITY TO A NEW GOVERNMENT. EAGLEBURGER OPINED THAT THE ISSUE OF DEALING WITH THE SECRETARIAT OUGHT TO BE TAKEN CARE OF, AFTER THE U.S. AND U.K. HAD REACHED A MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING ON THE SITUATION. MINISTER THOMAS POINTED OUT THAT BECAUSE GRENADA HAD BEEN AN ACTIVE MEMBER OF THE COMMONWEALTH, GOVERNOR GENERAL SCOON WOULD PROBABLY BE THINKING IN TERMS OF THAT INSTITUTION WHICH HE KNOWS, UNDERSTANDS AND TRUSTS. RAMPHAL, HE CHARACTERIZED, AS AN ACTIVE MAN WHO WOULD WANT TO GET INVOLVED. EAGLEBURGER COMMENTED THAT WE ARE IN CONTACT WITH VARIOUS COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENTS (E.G. AUSTRALIA) TO EXPLAIN THAT THE USG KNEW WHAT IT WAS DOING WHEN IT WENT IN.

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 704

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 01/03/84//003

SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

9. AMBASSADOR WRIGHT RAISE; THE POSSIBILITY THAT SOME COUNTRIES MAY TRY TO TAKE THE GRENADA QUESTION TO THE

UNGA EITHER THROUGH THE SC OR THROUGH A GA VOTE. HMG WOULD NOT WELCOME THIS. HE INQUIRED IF THE U.S. THOUGHT IT COULD STOP THIS ACTION. JUDGING FROM THE VOTE THIS WEEK, ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOTLEY THOUGHT WE COULD NOT. THOMAS SAID THE BRITISH BELIEVE THE VOTE ON A UNGA DISCUSSION WOULD BE DIFFERENT AND THE AMBASSADOR ADVISED THE U.S. NOT TO DESPAIR. THE UNDER SECRETARY REMARKED THAT IF SUCH A RESOLUTION REACHED THE GA, WE MIGHT TABLE SOME RESOLUTIONS OF OUR OWN REGARDING LIBYAN TROOPS IN CHAD, ETC. EAGLEBURGER ALSO NOTED THE ROLE OF ZIMBABWE IN SPONSORING THE RESOLUTION. THANKS TO WRIGHT'S INTERVENTION, EAGLEBURGER SAID HE HAD CHANGED HIS ADVICE  
BT  
#0430  
NNNN

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 701

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 01/03/84//003

SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:  
MESSAGE:

EHA301  
OO RUEADWW  
DE RUEHC #0430/03 3042153  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O P 312133Z OCT 83 ZFF6  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 2186  
RUEHWN/AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN IMMEDIATE 2100  
INFO RUEHKG/AMEMBASSY KINGSTON PRIORITY 0627  
RUEADWW/ WHITE HOUSE PRIORITY 9150  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 STATE 310430  
NODIS

TO THE SECRETARY ON CONTINUING AID TO ZIMBABWE. HE ASKED THE AMBASSADOR TO PASS THE MESSAGE THAT THE GOZ HAS MADE A SERIOUS ERROR REGARDING THE PART IT PLAYED ON THE GRENADA RESOLUTION.

10. AMBASSADOR WRIGHT MADE A STRONG REQUEST THAT THE U.S. TAKE NO SURPRISE ACTIONS IN LEBANON GIVEN THE PRESENCE OF UK TROOPS WHO MIGHT BECOME TARGETS AS A RESULT. HE ALSO ASKED ABOUT EAGLEBURGER'S UPCOMING TRIP TO ISRAEL. THE UNDER SECRETARY EXPLAINED THAT HIS TRIP TO ISRAEL WAS INTENDED TO BRING ABOUT MORE INTIMATE AND HIGHER LEVEL CONSULTATIONS THAN HAD TAKEN PLACE RECENTLY WITH THE GOI. HE EMPHASIZED THAT WRIGHT SHOULD NOT MISS THE LINE IN THE PRESIDENT'S MOST RECENT SPEECH THAT THE U.S. WILL MAKE THOSE WHO KILLED OUR MARINES AWARE THAT THEY SHOULD NOT HAVE DONE IT. HE ADDED THAT THE SPEECH IS NOT RELATED TO HIS TRAVEL TO ISRAEL. THE DEPARTMENT REALIZES, HE ASSERTED, THAT WE MUST DISCUSS WITH OUR FRIENDS ANYTHING WE ARE PLANNING TO DO TO CARRY OUT THE PRESIDENT'S WORDS. SHULTZ

BT  
#0430  
NNNN

SENSITIVE