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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: RECORDS
COUNTRY FILE

Archivist: cas/cas

File Folder: United Kingdom vol. V 11/1/83 - 6/30/84 [1 of 3]
Box 91331

Date: September 7, 1998

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. cable	2017567 1 p. R 7/2/00 598-002 #547	6/20/84	P1
2. memcon	re Britain 4 p. D 6/12/02 NL5598-002 #548	5/29/84	P1
3. memo	Charles Hill to Robert McFarlane re request for meeting with Lady Maitland 1 p. R " " #549	6/5/84	P1
4. memo	original of item #3 1 p. R " " #550	6/5/84	P1
5. memo	Tyrus Cobb to John Poindexter re meeting with David Hamay 1 p. R 7/2/00 598-002 #551	6/4/84	P1
6. talking points	attachment to item #5 2 p. R " " #552	nd	P1
7. profile sheet	re Britain 1 p. R 9/1/06 598-002 #553	5/19/84	P1
8. memo	McFarlane to Secretary Hodel 2 p. (3743) R " " #554	5/17/84	P1
9. memo	William Martin and Roger Robinson to McFarlane 1 p. R " " #555	5/9/84	P1
10. memo	Martin and Robinson to McFarlane p.1 only (3072) R " " #556	4/13/84	P1
11. memo	for Secretary Shultz 2 p. (3072) R " " #557	nd	P1
12. profile sheet	re Britain 1 p. R " " #558	4/13/84	P1
13. memo	p. 1 only of item #11 1 p. R " " #559	nd	P1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: RECORDS
COUNTRY FILE

Archivist: cas/cas

File Folder: United Kingdom vol. V 11/1/83 - 6/30/84 [1 of 3]
Box 91331

Date: September 7, 1998

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
14. memo	Martin and Robinson to McFarlane 2 p. with annotations (complete memo of item #10)	4/13/84	P1
15. cable	R 9/1/06 598-002 #560 191725Z 2 p.	4/19/84	P1
16. cable	D 6/12/02 NLSS98-002 #561 291836Z 3 p.	2/29/84	P1
17. profile sheet	re Britain 1 p.	4/17/84	P1
18. memo	R 7/21/00 598-002 #563 Peter Sommer to McFarlane re meeting 1 p.	4/17/84	P1
19. bio	P 7/21/00 " #564 1 p.	5/1/79	P1, F3
20. memo	D " " #565 Sommer to McFarlane re Wilson's request to meet with the President 1 p. (1829)	3/5/84	P1
21. memo	R " " #566 Charles Hill to McFarlane re request 1 p.	3/3/84	P1
22. memo	R 6/12/02 NLSS98-002 #567 Sommer to McFarlane re your meeting with Amb. Price 1 p. (1420)	3/6/84	P1
23. memo	R 7/21/00 598-002 #568 from McFarlane re visit of British opposition leader Neil Kinnock 2 p. (713)	2/11/84	P1
24. talking points	R " " #569 attachment to item #23 2 p.	nd	P1
25. briefing paper	R " " #570 re visit 2 p.	nd	P1
	R 6/12/02 NLSS98-002 #571		

RESTRICTION CODES

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Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: RECORDS
COUNTRY FILE

Archivist: cas/cas

File Folder: United Kingdom vol. V 11/1/83 - 6/30/84 [1 of 3]
Box 91331

Date: September 7, 1998

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
26. bio	2 p. D 7/21/00 598-002 # 572	1/26/84	P1
27. cable	291836Z 2 p. R u u #573	2/29/84	P1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
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NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8404961

RECEIVED 21 JUN 84 17

TO KIMMITT

FROM SOMMER

DOCDATE 21 JUN 84

KEYWORDS GREAT BRITAIN

MAITLAND, OLGA

SUBJECT: REPLY TO LADY OLGA

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 23 JUN 84 STATUS X FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

KIMMITT

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (DW)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
X	6/23	has sgcd ltr		
X	6/23	KimmitT Sgcd memo		PS RK
C	6/23	See ltr State for Dept		

DISPATCH

4X B 6/23

W/ATTCH FILE

OPA RK

National Security Council
The White House

System # I
Package # 4961

84 JUN 23 11:45

SEQUENCE TO HAS SEEN DISPOSITION

Dep. Exec. Sec'y			
Bob Kimmitt	1	K	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	2		D/CDX
Situation Room			

JUN 23 1984

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other Sommer

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

National Security Council
The White House

System # I
Package # 4961

1219

SEQUENCE TO HAS SEEN DISPOSITION

Dep. Exec. Sec'y	1		
Bob Kimmitt	2	K	
John Poindexter	3		A
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt	4	K	
NSC Secretariat	5		D/Darman
Situation Room			

JUN 21 12:18

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

John: I think Embassy London makes a good point (Roger Harrison is a former Ford NSC staffer, and probably the best person in our Embassy). Recommend I take to Darman.

OK

6.22.84

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Dick Darman:

Embassy London has asked for a modification to a letter sent by the President to Lady Olga Maitland on June 10, 1984.

The proposed redo is next under, with the original letter below it.

Bob Kinnitt

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506


June 22, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Letter to Lady Olga Maitland

As recommended by Embassy London (London 13907), the President's June 10, 1984 letter to Lady Olga Maitland has been revised. The final version is attached for dispatch.

Attachment


Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 10, 1984

Dear Lady Olga:

I am writing this on Air Force One somewhere over the Atlantic as we leave England and the Summit meetings.


Ambassador Price has passed to me the letter of support which you so kindly presented to him during my recent visit to London. Thank you very much for your generous words. Ambassador Price and Ed Meese have also told me of the good and tireless work you are doing to ensure that the voice of the majority is heard on issues of defense and disarmament in Britain.

It is very heartening to me to realize that NATO and our policies of collective defense have supporters in Europe willing to devote so much time and effort to the cause of peace. I know that what you and your organization are doing requires not only considerable energy, but sometimes considerable courage as well. Your efforts are recognized and appreciated here, as I know they are in your own country.

I share your view about those misguided, possibly well-intentioned people who let themselves be used by those who would destroy our freedom. They are free to demonstrate as an expression of their views, but if they succeed in their cause they will have destroyed the very freedom that granted them the right to protest.

Thank you again for your letter. Please convey my thanks to your associates, and keep up the good work.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Ronald Reagan". The signature is written in a cursive, slightly slanted style.

Lady Olga Maitland
Women and Families for Defence
1 Lincoln's Inn Fields
London WC2

R

Sommer

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 10, 1984

Dear Lady Olga:

I am writing this on Air Force One somewhere over the Atlantic as we leave England and the Summit meeting.

Thank you very much for your letter and your generous words. I am most grateful and I share your strong feeling about the responsibility of our two peoples to maintain our close ties. Regardless of what the press might say, the Summit served to strengthen these ties.

Protest

I share your view, also, about those misguided, possibly well-intentioned people who let themselves be used by those who would destroy our freedom. They are free to demonstrate as an expression of their views, but if they succeed in their cause they will have destroyed the very freedom that granted them the right to protest.

Thank you again for your letter. ~~and~~ Please convey my thanks to your associates, *and keep up the good work.*

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

Lady Olga Maitland
Women and Families for Defence
1 Lincoln's Inn Fields
London WC2

AWH ROBO

EMAN

NSC/S

Okay for
dispatch.
Jennifer

4961

6.22.84

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Dick Darman:

Embassy London has asked for a modification to a letter sent by the President to Lady Olga Maitland on June 10, 1984.

The proposed redo is next under, with the original letter below it.

Bob Kinnitt

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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I share your view about those misguided, possibly well-intentioned people who let themselves be used by those who would destroy our freedom. They are free to demonstrate as an expression of their views, but if they succeed in their cause they will have destroyed the very freedom that granted them the right to protest.

Thank you again for your letter. Please convey my thanks to your associates, and keep up the good work.

Sincerely,

Lady Olga Maitland
Women and Families for Defence
1 Lincoln's Inn Fields
London WC2

Summer

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 10, 1984

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Thank you again for your letter. ~~and~~ Please convey my thanks to your associates, *and keep up the good work.*

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

Lady Olga Maitland
Women and Families for Defence
1 Lincoln's Inn Fields
London WC2

AWH ROBO

FINALE

NSC/S

Okay for
dispatch.
Jennifer

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

June 21, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *PRS*

SIGNED

SUBJECT: Reply to Lady Olga

Roger Harrison called to express concern about the President's reply to Lady Olga (Tab II). He felt it was too defensive, given that Lady Olga would likely release it publicly. Moreover, the current letter does not add the personal flavor of Price and Meese's involvement. I asked that Embassy London send in a suggested revised letter, which they have now done (Tab III).

In checking out who originated the reply to Lady Olga -- which I never saw -- I discovered that the President had personally dictated it on the plane coming home. Nonetheless, I think Embassy London has a point and that we should do a revised letter. Pending our decision, Embassy London is holding the President's current reply.

RECOMMENDATION

That you arrange for the revised reply -- which combines the original and London's draft -- to be signed and dated June 10.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I	-	Revised Letter
Tab II	-	Current Letter
Tab III	-	London's Draft

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 01
EOB308

LONDON 3907
AN005050

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R 201756Z JUN 84
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8730
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LONDON 13907

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP (REAGAN, RONALD)
SUBJECT: LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO LADY OLGA MAITLAND
REF: STATE 178024

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE.
3. GIVEN THE FACT THAT LADY OLGA MAITLAND PROBABLY WILL PUBLISH THE PRESIDENT'S REPLY TO HER LETTER OF SUPPORT FOR NATO (REFTEL), WE BELIEVE THAT RESPONSE SHOULD FOCUS LESS ON THE PROTEST MOVEMENT AND MORE ON THE WORK OF OUR SUPPORTERS IN ENUNCIATING THE VIEWS OF THE MAJORITY.
4. ACCORDINGLY, EMBASSY SUGGESTS LETTER TEXT IN PARA 5 BELOW AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR REFTEL TEXT.

5. BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR LADY OLGA:
- *TP* AMBASSADOR PRICE HAS PASSED TO ME THE LETTER OF SUPPORT WHICH YOU SO KINDLY PRESENTED TO HIM DURING MY RECENT VISIT TO LONDON. THE AMBASSADOR AND ED MEESE HAVE ALSO TOLD ME OF THE GOOD AND TIRELESS WORK YOU ARE DOING TO ENSURE THAT THE VOICE OF THE MAJORITY IS HEARD ON ISSUES OF DEFENSE AND DISARMAMENT IN BRITAIN.
- *TP* IT IS VERY HEARTENING TO ME TO REALIZE THAT NATO AND OUR POLICIES OF COLLECTIVE DEFENSE HAVE SUPPORTERS IN EUROPE WILLING TO DEVOTE SO MUCH ~~WORK AND DEDICATION~~ **TIME AND EFFORT** TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE. I KNOW THAT WHAT YOU AND YOUR ORGANIZATION ARE DOING REQUIRES NOT ONLY CONSIDERABLE ENERGY, BUT SOMETIMES CONSIDERABLE COURAGE AS WELL. **WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT YOUR EFFORTS ARE RECOGNIZED AND APPRECIATED HERE, AS I KNOW THEY ARE IN YOUR OWN COUNTRY.**
- THANKS TO GROUPS LIKE "WOMEN AND FAMILIES FOR DEFENSE", THE MOMENTUM IN THE PUBLIC DEBATE IS VERY MUCH TOWARD DETERRENCE, DEFENSE, AND MULTILATERAL DISARMAMENT. PLEASE KEEP UP THE GOOD WORK.
- YOURS TRULY,
- RONALD REAGAN. END TEXT PRICE
BT

Thank you very much for your letter and your generous work.

TP, am waiting here on Air Force One somewhere over the Atlantic as we leave England and the Summit meetings.

Insert ->

DB
NS
S98-002 #1547
CAS
7/21/00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4961

6.22.84 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Dick Darman:

Embassy London has asked for a modification to a letter sent by the President to Lady Olga Maitland on June 10, 1984.

The proposed redo is next under, with the original letter below it.

Bob Kinnitt

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

C

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

84 JUL 23 AM 54

URGENT!

84 JUL 23 AM 52

MESSAGE NO. 229 CLASSIFICATION NUCLAS PAGES 2

FROM Robert Kinnitt
(NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION

TO (AGENCY) DELIVER TO: DEPT/ROOM NO. EXTENSION

B

Checks Hall

REMARKS

ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW

NSC# 496

RECEIVED 08 JUN 84 13

TO KIMMITT

FROM HILL, C

DOCDATE 06 JUN 84

By *CKS*

10/8/84

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN

BUSH, G

HOWE, GEOFFREY

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF VP 29 MAY MTG W/ FOMIN HOWE

ACTION:	FOR RECORD PURPOSES	DUE:	STATUS C	FILES PA
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FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

SOMMER

FORTIER

MATLOCK

COMMENTS

REF# 8416170

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W/ATTCH FILE (C)

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 2 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ID 8404542

RECEIVED 06 JUN 84 09

TO MCFARLANE FROM HILL, C

DOCDATE 05 JUN 84

By CAS 10/1/94

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN

MAILTAND, OLGA

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR APPT W/ SENIOR WH STAFF TO PARTICIPATE IN MTG W/
LADY MAITLAND

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 06 JUN 84 STATUS S FILES WH ?/14

FOR ACTION
SOMMER

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
FORTIER
MATLOCK

COMMENTS

REF# 8416323 LOG 8403105 NSCIFID (CL)

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DISPATCH Accom'd to Sommer / Sent to Sotroon W/ATTCH FILE H. (C)

4542

To Situation Pm.

Pls Daycom to
Peter Sommer

SOMMER

✓ in London.

Daycome to

Sommer in

London

Nse/S

closed today -

file

~~CONF~~

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

MODE

PAGES 1

IMMEDIATE

84 JUN 6

SECURE FAX # _____

RELEASER DP

PRIORITY

NON-SECURE FAX # _____

DTG 061950Z

ROUTINE

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM TTY # _____

FROM/LOCATION/

1. AMB. Matlock

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. PETER SOMMER / LONDON TOR: 062018Z

2. _____

3. _____

4. _____

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

2. _____

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

Please Adjust Lines to 69 characters.
TKS.
COLLEC/TRIP/REL

OF CL. SSI

DATE

CAS 10/8/98

~~CONF~~

CLASSIFICATION



S/S 8416323

4542

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

84 JUN 5 June 5 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSESubject: Request for Senior White House Advisor to Participate
in Meeting with Lady Olga Maitland


Last month, our Embassy in London transmitted a request to meet the President from Lady Olga Maitland. Lady Olga wishes to present a letter of support for the President's policies in her capacity as founder and leading figure in Women and Families for Defense, an organization dedicated to promoting public support for a strong nuclear deterrent and multilateralism in arms control (London 8191). Due to his schedule, the President was unable to meet with her. Assistant Secretary Burt agreed to see her in his stead on Saturday, June 9 (State 114126). Lady Olga has continued to press for the presence of a senior White House official, such as Mr. Baker, when she presents her letter of support in London. Foreign Minister Howe has asked that the USG be as forthcoming as possible to this request. The Department recommends that if a senior White House official (hopefully Mr. Baker) has time in his schedule, he participate in the meeting with Lady Olga.

Covey

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL:OADR

NLS 598-002 #549
BY LOS NARA DATE 6/12/02



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

84 JUN 5 11:18 AM '84 June 5, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Request for Senior White House Advisor to Participate
in Meeting with Lady Olga Maitland

Last month, our Embassy in London transmitted a request to meet the President from Lady Olga Maitland. Lady Olga wishes to present a letter of support for the President's policies in her capacity as founder and leading figure in Women and Families for Defense, an organization dedicated to promoting public support for a strong nuclear deterrent and multilateralism in arms control (London 8191). Due to his schedule, the President was unable to meet with her. Assistant Secretary Burt agreed to see her in his stead on Saturday, June 9 (State 114126). Lady Olga has continued to press for the presence of a senior White House official, such as Mr. Baker, when she presents her letter of support in London. Foreign Minister Howe has asked that the USG be as forthcoming as possible to this request. The Department recommends that if a senior White House official (hopefully Mr. Baker) has time in his schedule, he participate in the meeting with Lady Olga.

Covey

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL:OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLS 598-002#550
BY *hjt* NARA, DATE 6/12/02

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ID 8404477

RECEIVED 04 JUN 84 17

TO POINDEXTER

FROM COBB

DOCDATE 04 JUN 84

By CAS

10/8/98

KEYWORDS GREAT BRITAIN

HANNAY, DAVID

THOMAS, DEREK

SUBJECT: APPT REQUEST W/ POINDEXTER FOR HANNAY & DEREK 5 JUN RE US - UK
RELATIONSHIPS / TALKERS

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

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FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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The White House

1196 JF

System # I

Package # 4477

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8 4 P2:33

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	<u>1</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>JK</u>	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>		<u>N</u>
Situation Room			

= Information
 A = Action
 R = Retain
 D = Dispatch
 N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

4477

INFORMATION

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 4, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: TYRUS W. COBB *me*
SUBJECT: Meeting with David Hannay

NOTED

You have agreed to meet with David Hannay and Derek Thomas tomorrow at 2:30 p.m. Hannay is replacing Thomas as the U.K. DCM here and the meeting is essentially a courtesy call. Jack Matlock will sit in on the session.

Hannay has extensive experience in Mid-East and European Community affairs. He studied Farsi in Tehran, was posted in Kabul before taking the CENTO/Afghan desk in London, and later served as the acting head of the Mid-East Department (1979). He was on the negotiating team handling the British entry into the EC, and since 1979 has served as the Assistant Under Secretary for European Communities.

You will probably wish to reiterate that we greatly value our special relationship with the Brits and the consultative process we have developed through such excellent channels as Derek Thomas. You might note that the President thinks highly of Prime Minister Thatcher and recently wrote to her expressing appreciation for her strong words of support for the U.S.-U.K. relationship (excerpt of Thatcher speech at Tab B). Given Hannay's background, he may wish to discuss Persian Gulf developments with you. We would want to emphasize that we should maintain pressure on Iraq and Iran to deescalate and defuse the crisis and to insure that the Strait of Hormuz remains open. We will rely principally on diplomatic action, but if the GCC requests our assistance, we will have to respond firmly.

I understand Hannay, in his initial consultations around town, has been asking our views of the future of the U.K.-U.S. relationship and where we see the American-European tie going in the future. East-West relations is also a possible topic and you will wish to stress our appreciation for the consistent British support for our balanced and realistic approach to the Soviet Union. Given Hannay's last position, you might ask him to provide you with a British perspective on the UK's troubled relationship with the EC, and for London's view on the probable evolution of European-American relations.

Suggested talking points are at Tab A and an excerpt of Thatcher's May 11 speech is at Tab B.

Attachments

Tab A - Talking Points
Tab B - Excerpt of Thatcher's Speech

598-002 dSSI
CAS 7/21/00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

TALKING POINTS -- MEETING WITH DAVID HANNAY

- Welcome to Washington, David. I look forward to a productive relationship with you -- like the one we had with Derek Thomas.

- I understand that you have had extensive experience in Middle Eastern affairs. Our consultations with the UK have been excellent, particularly with respect to the Persian Gulf. We agree that our emphasis should be on diplomatic action to insure the Strait remains open and to deescalate the Iraq/Iran conflict. If the GCC requests our assistance, we will have to respond firmly. How do you see the crisis evolving?

- The President values highly the special relationship he has with Mrs. Thatcher and the strong support London has consistently given to Washington. The President was especially impressed by Mrs. Thatcher's speech at Perth on May 11.

- I know that Britain is experiencing difficulty with the EC and that Mitterrand has openly criticized London's behavior. How do you see the UK's role in the EC developing in the future?

CAS 598-002 / RELEASED
#552
7/11/00

- Our relations with Europe are particularly good at the present time, although we have some continuing frictions in the economic arena. Still, I anticipate that the London Economic Summit will go well.

- Thanks for dropping by and best of luck in your Washington assignment.

UNCLASSIFIED
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 LONDON 1924
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E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: UK
S [REDACTED]

1. THE PRIME MINISTER DELIVERED A SPEECH AT PERTH ON MAY

11. I THOUGHT YOU WOULD ESPECIALLY APPRECIATE THE FOLLOW-
ING EXCERPT: QUOTE WE ARE PART OF THE FREE WORLD. WE MUST
ACT WITH THE FREE WORLD. AND THAT MEANS, FIRST AND FORE-
MOST, THAT WE SHOULD WORK WITH OUR GREAT ALLY ACROSS THE
ATLANTIC THE UNITED STATES. WHERE WOULD EUROPE HAVE BEEN
IN THAT MOST DIFFICULT AND DANGEROUS PERIOD AFTER THE LAST
WAR WITHOUT AMERICA> WHERE WOULD WE HAVE BEEN SINCE WITH-
OUT AMERICA'S MASSIVE CONTRIBUTION TO FREEDOM AND SECURITY
OF EUROPE>

2. QUOTE WE CANNOT GO ON DRAWING ENDLESSLY ON AMERICAN
GOODWILL AND GENEROSITY WITHOUT OURSELVES TRYING TO UNDER-
STAND THEIR CONCERNS AND THE BURDENS WHICH FALL TO THEM.
FOR THEY ARE THE CHAMPIONS OF ALL THE BELIEFS AND IDEALS

UNCLASSIFIED
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 LONDON 1924

DTG: 251535Z MAY 84 PSN: 066040

WHICH WE CHERISH MOST DEEPLY.

3. QUOTE I BELIEVE PROFOUNDLY THAT THE ALLIANCE BETWEEN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES IS VITAL TO THE DEFENCE OF THE FREE WORLD. CONSERVATIVES WILL WORK FOR A EUROPE WHICH IS A STRONG PARTNER OF THE UNITED STATES AND WHICH USES ITS EXPERIENCE AND AN INCREASING PART OF ITS RESOURCES. TO REDUCE THE AREAS OF TENSION AND CONFLICT, TO IMPROVE THE PROSPECTS FOR THE POORER COUNTRIES AND TO DEFENCE AND SPREAD BELIEFS AND IDEALS WHICH ARE SHARED BY THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES. THAT IS OUR VISION FOR EUROPE.
UNQUOTE

4. WE LOOK FORWARD TO HAVING YOU AND NANCY WITH US AT WINFIELD HOUSE. ALL THE BEST. PRICE
BT

NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET~~

ID 8403743

RECEIVED 12 MAY 84 11

TO MCFARLANE

FROM MARTIN

DOCDATE 09 MAY 84

ROBINSON

09 MAY 84

KEYWORDS: GAS

GREAT BRITAIN

NORWAY

SUBJECT. POTENTIAL PROBLEM IN DEVELOPMENT OF NORTH SEA GAS FIELD

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 598-002 # 553

BY LOJ NARA, DATE 9/1/84

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE

DUE: 14 MAY 84 STATUS X FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

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NSCIFID

(CM)

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DECLASSIFIED

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598-002 #554

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3743

BY

LOT

DATE

9/1/06

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 17, 1984

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE DONALD P. HODEL
Secretary of Energy

SUBJECT: UK-Norway Natural Gas (S)

I am deeply concerned that the "understanding" negotiated between the British Gas Corporation and the Norwegians over purchases from the Sleipner gas field may fall through as a result of reluctance on the part of the UK Treasury to approve the deal. As you are aware, failure to develop North Sea gas reserves would increase the potential for additional Soviet gas sales to Western Europe in the 1990's. We must be prepared to stress to our allies that we take the May 1983 guidelines on energy security established by the International Energy Agency seriously, and that development of indigenous European resources must proceed with all due speed. (S)

British failure to approve quickly the favorable terms negotiated over the past 2 years could significantly delay development of the Sleipner gas field. If Sleipner is postponed, there will be no incentive for Norway to proceed with plans to develop the more costly Troll gas field. Development of Troll is essential to reducing the possibility for increased Soviet gas sales in the 1990's. (S)

Furthermore, if BGC is unable to complete the Sleipner deal, the UK will have to depend heavily on the development of substantial additional volumes of domestic productive capacity. If as seems likely, domestic output falls short of demand requirements, the UK would be forced to bid for the limited quantities of Dutch gas available to the rest of Western Europe. This would improve the market for Soviet gas in Europe and increase the likelihood of increased European dependence on Russian gas. (S)

I know your staff has been monitoring these developments closely, and I appreciate your raising the issue during your recent meeting with UK Energy Secretary Walker and Norwegian Petroleum and Energy Minister Kristiansen. I would like to emphasize my concern that we not allow the President's hard-fought victory on European energy security to be endangered. I have asked Secretary Shultz to be prepared to approach the British at a senior level if it appears that the Sleipner deal is going to collapse. I would urge you to pursue the technical side, in particular, to press the British

about the feasibility of their ability to serve all UK gas needs from UK sources, especially noting that until recently the UK Department of Energy had strongly questioned the geological possibility and policy wisdom of such a development. (S)



Robert C. McFarlane

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

May 9, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

SIGNEDFROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN *WFM*
ROGER ROBINSON *RWR*SUBJECT: Potential Problem in the Development of
North Sea Gas Field

We believe our concerns over the potential collapse of the "understanding" negotiated by the British Gas Corporation for the purchase of natural gas from Norway's Sleipner field in the North Sea should be officially conveyed to Secretary Hodel at the Department of Energy. These concerns were spelled out in the package attached at Tab II that we prepared for your use with Secretary Shultz.

Messrs. Peter Sommer, Ty Cobb and Jack Matlock *PS* concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to Secretary Hodel at Tab I requesting that he pursue with the British the technical side of the implications of a failure to develop the Sleipner gas field.

Approve Disapprove

Tab I Memo to Hodel
II April 13 memo to Farlane

cc: Ben Bonk

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 598-002#555BY LOTDATE 9/1/06

MEMORANDUM

BY MDT NARA, DATE 9/1/06
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL~~SECRET~~

April 13, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN ^{WFM}
ROGER W. ROBINSON ^{RWR}SUBJECT: Potential Problem in the Development of North
Sea Gas Field

Summary. The British Gas Corporation (BGC) has negotiated a favorable "understanding" for the purchase of natural gas from Norway's Sleipner field in the North Sea. The British Exchequer, concerned about potential financial implications, has voiced opposition to the deal in favor of imports from the Netherlands and increased reliance on domestic output. This could delay or prevent development of Sleipner. Failure to proceed with Sleipner could indefinitely postpone development of other North Sea gas fields which will be needed in the 1990s to help prevent further inroads by the Soviet Union into the European gas market. We believe you should request State Department to continue to monitor the situation closely in order to be prepared to make an appropriate demarche should it appear that the Sleipner deal is about to fall through.

Discussion. If purchases from Sleipner are approved soon, gas could begin to flow late in 1990. Sleipner gas would roughly offset British purchases from the Norwegian Frigg gas field where output is expected to begin declining significantly in 1990. The British Treasury may be attempting to delay approval of the deal in the hope of upsetting the timetable for the project and causing the deal, which has been negotiated over the past two years, to collapse.

Without development of Sleipner, the UK gas sector would have to find and develop the equivalent of about three-quarters of its current output just to meet present demand levels. To meet such an ambitious target, UK offshore gas would have to be developed much faster over the next 10 years than it was during the boom years of the 1970s.

To meet demand requirements without Sleipner would necessitate the purchase of Dutch gas. The Dutch have offered the British less than half the gas that would be available from Sleipner at a price about 20 percent higher than the one agreed upon by BGC for Norwegian gas. This higher price could reduce the British Treasury's enthusiasm for imports from the Netherlands.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

Implications. If BGC is unable to complete the Sleipner deal, the UK will have to depend heavily on the development of substantial additional volumes of domestic productive capacity. If, as seems likely, domestic output falls short of demand requirements, the UK would be forced to bid for the limited quantities of Dutch gas available to the rest of Western Europe. This would improve the market for Soviet gas in Europe and increase the likelihood of increased European dependence on Russian gas.

Furthermore, if the Norwegians fail to find a market for Sleipner gas, there will be no incentive for them to proceed with plans to develop the more costly Troll gas field. Development of Troll is essential to reducing the possibility for increased Soviet gas sales in the 1990s.

We need to stress to our allies that we take the May 1983 IEA guidelines on energy security very seriously and will not wait for a series of events to demonstrate that European indigenous energy resources are not going to be developed at the required pace. We should immediately send the attached memo to Secretary Shultz requesting that appropriate demarches be prepared for use in the event it appears the Sleipner deal will fall through.

Messrs. Peter *Peter* Sommer, Ty *Tue* Cobb and Jack *Jack* Matlock concur. -

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to Secretary Shultz at Tab I requesting that development plans for Sleipner be closely monitored in order to be prepared to make an appropriate demarche to the British if it appears the deal is in danger of falling through.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Memo to Shultz

cc: Ben Bonk

TAB I

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
Secretary of State

SUBJECT: UK-Norway Natural Gas (S)

I am deeply concerned that the "understanding" negotiated between the British Gas Corporation and the Norwegians over purchases from the Sleipner gas field may fall through as a result of reluctance on the part of the UK Treasury to approve the deal. As you are aware, failure to develop North Sea gas reserves would increase the potential for additional Soviet gas sales to Western Europe in the 1990s. We must be prepared to stress to our allies that we take the May 1983 guidelines on energy security established by the International Energy Agency seriously, and that development of indigenous European resources must proceed with all due speed. (S)

British failure to approve quickly the favorable terms negotiated over the past two years could significantly delay development of the Sleipner gas field. If Sleipner is postponed, there will be no incentive for Norway to proceed with plans to develop the more costly Troll gas field. Development of Troll is essential to reducing the possibility for increased Soviet gas sales in the 1990s. (S)

Furthermore, if BGC is unable to complete the Sleipner deal, the UK will have to depend heavily on the development of substantial additional volumes of domestic productive capacity. If, as seems likely, domestic output falls short of demand requirements, the UK would be forced to bid for the limited quantities of Dutch gas available to the rest of Western Europe. This would improve the market for Soviet gas in Europe and increase the likelihood of increased European dependence on Russian gas. (S)

I know your staff has been monitoring these developments quite carefully and I applaud the recent demarche by Deputy Assistant Secretary Wendt which stressed our security concerns. I would like to emphasize my concern that we not allow the President's hard-fought victory on European energy security to be endangered and would urge you to continue to monitor the situation in order to be prepared to approach the British at a senior level if it appears the Sleipner deal is going to collapse. (S)

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 598-002#557

BY LOJ DATE 9/1/06



PR

EXTRACT FROM A SPEECH MADE BY MRS MARGARET THATCHER TO THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY IN PERTH ON 11 MAY 1984

Once we settle Europe's internal problems, Europe can look more to its global responsibilities. We are part of the free world. We must act with the free world. And that means, first and foremost, that we should work with our great ally across the Atlantic, the United States. Where would Europe have been in that most difficult and dangerous period after the last war without America? Where would we have been since without America's massive contribution to freedom and security of Europe?

We cannot go on drawing endlessly on American goodwill and generosity without ourselves trying to understand their concerns and the burdens which fall to them. For they are the champions of all the beliefs and ideals which we cherish most deeply.

I believe profoundly that the alliance between Europe and the United States is vital to the defence of the free world. Conservatives will work for a Europe which is a strong partner of the United States and which uses its experience and an increasing part of its resources, to reduce the areas of tension and conflict, to improve the prospects for the poorer countries and to defend and spread beliefs and ideals which are shared by the Western democracies. That is our vision for Europe.

RECEIVED 13 APR 84 19

TO MCFARLANE

FROM MARTIN

DOCDATE 13 APR 84

ROBINSON

13 APR 84

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN

USSR

NORWAY

GAS

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 898-002#558

BY LET NARA, DATE 9/1/06

SUBJECT. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF NORTH SEA GAS FIELD

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE

DUE: 17 APR 84 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (DW)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

Martin S 4/14 For Aids

Mcfarlane X 4/17 For Signature

C APR 21 1984 Mcfarlane approved WAA, RO, index

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
Secretary of State

SUBJECT: UK-Norway Natural Gas (S)

I am deeply concerned that the "understanding" negotiated between the British Gas Corporation and the Norwegians over purchases from the Sleipner gas field may fall through as a result of reluctance on the part of the UK Treasury to approve the deal. As you are aware, failure to develop North Sea gas reserves would increase the potential for additional Soviet gas sales to Western Europe in the 1990s. We must be prepared to stress to our allies that we take the May 1983 guidelines on energy security established by the International Energy Agency seriously, and that development of indigenous European resources must proceed with all due speed. (S)

British failure to approve quickly the favorable terms negotiated over the past two years could significantly delay development of the Sleipner gas field. If Sleipner is postponed, there will be no incentive for Norway to proceed with plans to develop the more costly Troll gas field. Development of Troll is essential to reducing the possibility for increased Soviet gas sales in the 1990s. (S)

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I know your staff has been monitoring these developments quite carefully and I applaud the recent demarche by Deputy Assistant Secretary Wendt which stressed our security concerns. I would like to emphasize my concern that we not allow the President's hard-fought victory on European energy security to be endangered and would urge you to continue to monitor the situation in order to be prepared to approach the British at a senior level if it appears the Sleipner deal is going to collapse. (S)

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

April 13, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN ^{WFM}
ROGER W. ROBINSON ^{RWR}SUBJECT: Potential Problem in the Development of North
Sea Gas Field

Summary. The British Gas Corporation (BGC) has negotiated a favorable "understanding" for the purchase of natural gas from Norway's Sleipner field in the North Sea. The British Exchequer, concerned about potential financial implications, has voiced opposition to the deal in favor of imports from the Netherlands and increased reliance on domestic output. This could delay or prevent development of Sleipner. Failure to proceed with Sleipner could indefinitely postpone development of other North Sea gas fields which will be needed in the 1990s to help prevent further inroads by the Soviet Union into the European gas market. We believe you should request State Department to continue to monitor the situation closely in order to be prepared to make an appropriate demarche should it appear that the Sleipner deal is about to fall through.

Discussion. If purchases from Sleipner are approved soon, gas could begin to flow late in 1990. Sleipner gas would roughly offset British purchases from the Norwegian Frigg gas field where output is expected to begin declining significantly in 1990. The British Treasury may be attempting to delay approval of the deal in the hope of upsetting the timetable for the project and causing the deal, which has been negotiated over the past two years, to collapse.

Without development of Sleipner, the UK gas sector would have to find and develop the equivalent of about three-quarters of its current output just to meet present demand levels. To meet such an ambitious target, UK offshore gas would have to be developed much faster over the next 10 years than it was during the boom years of the 1970s.

To meet demand requirements without Sleipner would necessitate the purchase of Dutch gas. The Dutch have offered the British less than half the gas that would be available from Sleipner at a price about 20 percent higher than the one agreed upon by BGC for Norwegian gas. This higher price could reduce the British Treasury's enthusiasm for imports from the Netherlands.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

D U . F I E D
NLS 598-002#560BY WFIDATE 9/1/06

Implications. If BGC is unable to complete the Sleipner deal, the UK will have to depend heavily on the development of substantial additional volumes of domestic productive capacity. If, as seems likely, domestic output falls short of demand requirements, the UK would be forced to bid for the limited quantities of Dutch gas available to the rest of Western Europe. This would improve the market for Soviet gas in Europe and increase the likelihood of increased European dependence on Russian gas.

Furthermore, if the Norwegians fail to find a market for Sleipner gas, there will be no incentive for them to proceed with plans to develop the more costly Troll gas field. Development of Troll is essential to reducing the possibility for increased Soviet gas sales in the 1990s.

We need to stress to our allies that we take the May 1983 IEA guidelines on energy security very seriously and will not wait for a series of events to demonstrate that European indigenous energy resources are not going to be developed at the required pace. We should immediately send the attached memo to Secretary Shultz requesting that appropriate demarches be prepared for use in the event it appears the Sleipner deal will fall through.

Messrs. Peter Sommer, Ty Cobb and Jack Matlock concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to Secretary Shultz at Tab I requesting that development plans for Sleipner be closely monitored in order to be prepared to make an appropriate demarche to the British if it appears the deal is in danger of falling through.

Approve *TCM*

Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I

Memo to Shultz

I will give it to Ben's
TCM *Cherry*

cc: Ben Bonk

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER ~~12~~ ¹⁵ LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

RECEIVED 19 MAR 84 14

TO PRESIDENT FROM WEINBERGER, C

DOCDATE 29 FEB 84

By CAS Date 10/8/94

KEYWORDS GREAT BRITAIN

WEINBERGER, C

SUBJECT: SEC WEINBERGER 29 FEB CABLE TO PRES

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE: STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS NO DISTRIBUTION PER KIMMITT AND WEINBERGER

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**National Security Council
The White House**


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Package #

2246

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Bill Martin			
Bob Kimmitt	1	K	
John Poindexter	2		I
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt	3	K	
NSC Secretariat	4		N
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

Bud has original. No distribution,
per Cap's request.

2246

~~TOP SECRET~~



OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

February 29, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Secretary Weinberger asked that the attached NODIS cable, which was transmitted from his air plane enroute to Washington, D.C., today be provided to the President.

[Handwritten signature]

R. J. Zlatoper
Captain, U.S. Navy
Military Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense

Attachment
a/s

~~TOP SECRET~~

as 10/8/98

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

RECEIVED 18 APR 84 17

TO MCFARLANE

FROM SOMMER

DOCDATE 17 APR 84

ILS 598-002 #563

BY CAS R/ DATE 7/21/00

KEYWORDS GREAT BRITAIN

AM

MACKINTOSH, MALCOLM

SUBJECT: TALKERS FOR MACKINTOSH MTG W/ MCFARLANE APR 18

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (CM)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
C	APR 18 1984	<i>Mcfarlane noted</i>		PS ✓

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE PA (C) MR

National Security Council
The White House

1121 JFE

ED System # I
Package # 3163

8 APR 17 P 3:44

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep. Exec. Sec'y	<u>1</u>	<u>I</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull	<u>3</u>	<u>M</u>	
Wilma Hall	<u>4</u>		
Bud McFarlane	<u>5</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>I</u>
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>		<u>N</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: 4/18 6⁰⁰ pm
(Date/Time) mb



REC'D

84 APR 17 7:00

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

RCM HAS SEEN

INFORMATION

April 17, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. MCFARLANE

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *Peter*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting With Malcolm Mackintosh

Your meeting with Malcolm Mackintosh is set for 6 p.m. on Wednesday, April 18. Mackintosh currently works for the British Cabinet Office -- somewhat akin to the NSC staff -- though he has a special situation allowing him to "sit outside" the normal British intelligence assessments process. Mackintosh is a career intelligence official; I believe he has worked at the Cabinet Office for six or seven years.

Mackintosh has earned his unique position in the Cabinet Office through his expertise, experience, hard work, and contacts. By reputation, Mackintosh has a close working relationship with Mrs. Thatcher. He travels frequently in a liaison role. Indeed that is what has brought him to Washington. [REDACTED] but in addition to Perle, he is seeing Don Gregg and a number of people at State.

Reportedly, Mackintosh's view is that the Soviets currently feel beleaguered. They have suffered setbacks in Europe (INF), Poland remains a problem, Afghanistan is not going well, and Eastern Europe is increasingly showing signs of being restless, especially the Hungarians and the Romanians. As a result, particularly when coupled with their handling of the KAL shoot-down, the Soviets have been rude and recalcitrant, i.e., their's is a policy of diffidence. Even though the Soviets expect the President to be reelected, Mackintosh believes they will follow this policy through mid-1985. I expect his advice to us will be to remain firm, but to keep the rhetoric low and the channels of communications open. This all sounds in line with our thinking, and you should have an interesting discussion.

Mackintosh will be accompanied by Stephan Gomersall from the British Embassy, and DCM Derek Thomas may join as well. I recommend that you include Jack Matlock, and if possible, I would like to sit in.

Jack Matlock *SM* concurs.

RECEIVED IN PART
598-063 #564
OAS LARA, Date 7/21/00

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 19 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

RECEIVED 05 MAR 84 07

TO MCFARLANE

FROM HILL, C

DOCDATE 03 MAR 84

White House
By as

at 20 1984
10/8/84

KEYWORDS GREAT BRITAIN

AP

WILSON, HAROLD

SUBJECT: FORMER BRITISH PM WILSON REQUEST MTG W/ PRES

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 08 MAR 84 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

SOMMER

FORTIER

MATLOCK

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COMMENTS

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<u>Mcfarlane</u>	<u>X</u>	<u>3/6</u>	<u>For Decision</u>		
		<u>MAR 1 2 1984</u>	<u>Pondexter approved</u>		<u>✓</u>
		<u>MAR 1 2 1984</u>	<u>Kimmitte sgl</u>		<u>BS, Ct, Rk</u>

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_____ Sit. Room	_____ Mr. Helm	_____ Mr. Martin	_____ Gen. Russell	_____ Mr. Wattering
_____ Mr. Bailey	_____ Mr. Kemp	_____ Mr. Matlock	_____ Col. Rye	_____ Exec. Secretary
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_____ Sit. Room	_____ Mr. Helm	_____ Mr. Martin	_____ Gen. Russell	_____ Mr. Wattering
_____ Mr. Bailey	_____ Mr. Kemp	_____ Mr. Matlock	_____ Col. Rye	_____ Exec. Secretary
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_____ Ltc. Cobb	_____ Mr. R. Lehman	_____ Mr. North	_____ Mr. Shull	_____ NSC MSG Center
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The White House

1630 lml

System # I
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MAR 5 P 4: 26

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	<u>1</u>	<u>WPM</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>4</u>	<u>[Red scribble]</u>	<u>A</u>
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt	<u>5</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>A</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>	<u>MAR 1 2 1984</u>	<u>DIS D/LOX</u>
Situation Room			
Tom Shull			
<u>Rosie</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>done</u>	<u>TP markings (C) for both</u>

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

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THE WHITE HOUSE



DEPT OF STATE
MAR 12 P5:08

MAR 12 P 4: 07

304

MESSAGE NO. 900 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CTS 10/8/19 PAGES 1

FROM Bob K... (NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	EXTENSION
<u>B</u>	<u>Chels Hill</u>		

REMARKS:

Original sent to State
 1730 MAR 1 2 1984
PKM

1829

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VIA LDX

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

1829

March 12, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Harold Wilson's Request to Meet With the
President ~~(C)~~

Thank you for forwarding Harold Wilson's request to meet with
the President on April 2. The President's schedule will
prevent him from meeting with Harold Wilson. ~~(C)~~

Robert M. Kimmitt
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

By ^W CIS

⁸⁷ 10/8/9V

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1829

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 5, 1984

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *Peter*

SUBJECT: Harold Wilson's Request to Meet With the President

Former Labor Party Prime Minister, Harold Wilson (now Lord Wilson) will be in the U.S. next month and has asked to meet briefly with the President on April 2.

In forwarding the request, State notes that there is no particular foreign policy reason for the President to meet with Wilson (Tab II), who currently wields little influence in the U.K. I have also checked informally with the British Embassy, which portrayed its role as simply "conveying Wilson's request."

RECOMMENDATION

Against this background, I recommend that you authorize Bob Kimmitt to sign the memo to Hill at Tab I, noting that the President's schedule will prevent him from meeting with Harold Wilson.

Approve *[Signature]* Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Memo to Hill
- Tab II State's incoming

598-002 #546
CS *7/2/00*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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8406389

1829

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 3, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSESUBJECT: Former British Prime Minister Requests Meeting
With the President

Harold Wilson, the former Labour Party Prime Minister (now Lord Wilson), will be in the United States making a lecture tour in a month's time. The British Embassy has informed us that during his stay in Washington, March 31 - April 2, he would like to call on the President. The Department of State is aware of no foreign policy consideration which would argue in favor of such a meeting taking place. The President may nevertheless wish to receive Lord Wilson for a brief call on April 2 as a matter of courtesy.

for *Tomckinley*
for Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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NLS 598-002#567
BY LOI NARA, DATE 6/12/82

RECEIVED 21 FEB 84 15

TO MCFARLANE FROM SOMMER
SOMMER

DOCDATE 21 FEB 84

06 MAR 84

White House
By *AS*

10/4/94

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN AM PRICE, CHARLIE

SUBJECT REQUEST FOR APPT W/ CHARLIE PRICE US AMB TO UK W/ MCFARLANE ON
MAR 5 - 8

ACTION: FOR DECISION DUE: 07 MAR 84 STATUS IX FILES WH

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John Poindexter

Wilma Hall

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Bud McFarlane

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Bob Kimmitt

NSC Secretariat

6 N

Situation Room

Tom Shull

3 gs

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

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(Date/Time)

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

1420
ADD-ON

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~
INFORMATION

March 6, 1984

Mary Chanks

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *Peter*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Ambassador Price -- 4:20 p.m., March 8, 1984

You have agreed - at his request - to meet with Charlie Price at 4:20 p.m. on Thursday, March 8. The U.K. desk is not aware of any particular topic that Price wishes to raise. You are well versed on the most logical subjects: East-West relations and the Middle East, including cooperation in the Gulf. Indeed I am told that Price has developed a special interest in the Middle East

I suspect that Price will wish to put down a marker on consultations. He sent you a note earlier this winter asking to be kept informed of any message relayed to Mrs. Thatcher via the privacy channel. Consultations have also become an issue in Embassy London's dealing with SACEUR on INF deployment schedules. General Rogers recently dealt directly with British Defense Minister Heseltine concerning GLCM dispersal training.

Price argued forcefully that INF remains very much a political issue and that Embassy London should maintain political-military control through the London Working Group, which includes Embassy, U.S. military, and British reps. Eagleburger reportedly planned to speak directly to General Rogers about the need to maintain existing political military coordination arrangements, but I understand Rogers remains intent on working INF directly with the MOD. Price will surely refer to this matter. He may also bring up the inter-relationship between controlling the transfer of technology and trade.

ag see

You may wish to probe Price on Mrs. Thatcher's current political position, her approach to East-West relations and British attitudes toward the emerging theme of greater European defense cooperation.

I will assume, unless otherwise advised, that you would like to continue your past practice of meeting with Price one-on-one.

~~SECRET~~
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598-002 #568 7/21/00 CAS

RECEIVED 24 JAN 84 18

TO KIMMITT

FROM SOMMER

DOCDATE 24 JAN 84

KIMMITT

25 JAN 84

SOMMER

26 JAN 84

White House
By *CS*

10/11/98

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN

AP

KINNOCK, NEIL

SUBJECT PRES MTG W/ BRITISH LABOR PARTY LEADER 14 FEB

ACTION. FOR SIGNATURE

DUE. 13 FEB 84 STATUS X FILES PA

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COMMENTS

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<i>Pres</i>	<i>FEB 11 1984</i>	<i>for info</i>		<i>VP, G, TB, W</i>
	<i>FEB 14 1984</i>	<i>Pres noted</i>		<i>PS</i>

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~~SECRET~~

The President has seen _____

713

NR 594-002 #569

CS DATE 7/21/00

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

OR

~~SECRET~~

February 11, 1984

VISIT OF BRITISH OPPOSITION LEADER NEIL KINNOCK

DATE: February 14, 1984
 LOCATION: Oval Office
 TIME: 4:00 - 4:20 p.m.
 FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE *rcm*

I. PURPOSE: To keep open our lines of communication with the British Labor Party.

II. BACKGROUND: The British Labor Party, particularly under Michael Foot, increasingly took positions inimical to U.S. interests. Following Mrs. Thatcher's landslide victory last June, Neil Kinnock succeeded Foot as Labor Party leader in October, 1983.

Kinnock, a red-haired Welshman, who has long been considered a comer in the Labor Party, appears determined to moderate his party's policies (except for nuclear disarmament -- he is a committed unilateralist) and reestablish Labor as a credible alternative to the Thatcher government. Whether he can do this is very much an open question. His visit to Washington is designed to burnish his international credentials and to signal to us and to Labor Party activists his desire to develop closer ties with the U.S. Kinnock will be around for a long time and it is in our interest to establish some form of dialogue, and hopefully take the edge off Labor's anti-american bent.

Kinnock will be making the full rounds in Washington. His schedule includes meetings with George Shultz, Cap Weinberger, Larry Eagleburger, leading Democrats, Senator Lugar, private think tanks, an appearance on MacNeil-Lehrer, and an address to the National Press Club. You may recall that we had second thoughts about him meeting with you, but, after checking informally with Mrs. Thatcher's office, agreed to continue the long-established tradition of Presidential meetings with British opposition leaders.

In his session with you, our Embassy in London expects Kinnock to focus on defense, arms control, and East-West relations. On defense, he will try to reassure us of his commitment to NATO and to the requirement to improve NATO's conventional forces. He will also seek "understanding" for his goal of a non-nuclear Britain, which carried to its furthest extreme would close U.S.

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

cc Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

~~SECRET~~

bases in Great Britain. He has been critical of our arms control policies in the past. Hence, Kinnock will be looking for assurances that you will continue to seek reductions in both armaments and tensions. These are all familiar topics. Suggested talking points are attached.

State's more comprehensive memo, which also addresses Central American and the Middle East, along with Kinnock's bio, are at Tab A. Given the events of this week, and Labor's opposition to a British military presence in Lebanon, Kinnock may opt to concentrate on the Middle East.

III. PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President

The Vice President

Secretary Shultz

Robert C. McFarlane

Assistant Secretary Burt

Peter R. Sommer, NSC

Meese, Baker, Deaver will attend at their discretion.

British

Neil Kinnock, Labor Party Leader

Patricia Hewitt, Kinnock's Press Secretary

Richard Clements, Kinnock's Executive Assistant

IV. PRESS PLAN

Photo opportunity at beginning of meeting.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

4:00 - 4:05 p.m. Photo opportunity

4:05 - 4:20 p.m. Meeting

TAB A State's memo and Kinnock's bio

Prepared by:
Peter R. Sommer

TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH NEIL KINNOCK

- I am delighted to exchange views with you. I would, however, be remiss if I did not express disappointment over the Labor Party's position on a number of vital issues.

- Allow me to assure you that I am determined to improve East-West relations and to reduce both tensions and armaments. Indeed, I dream of getting the Soviets on the road to significant cuts in nuclear weapons. I have no more compelling priority. But cuts by one side and not the other will not enhance the peace we so ardently seek.

- It is only through Alliance unity and resolve that the Soviets will negotiate seriously with us. Wavering on our part is not the answer. It is a sad irony that it is deterrence through military strength that prevents war.

- As I stressed in my January speech, we challenge the Soviets to join us in an intensified search for peace. We are ready for progress. We seek dialogue with substance, dialogue that takes the interests of both sides into account.

1
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#570
7/21/00

-- The dramatic events in Lebanon over the last week only strengthen our determination to promote a just and lasting solution. If a moderate government is overthrown because it had the courage to turn in the direction of peace, what hope can there be that other moderates in the region will risk committing themselves to a similar course.

-- This is why our joint efforts with our European partners have not been in vain. We understand why the United Kingdom, like ourselves, had to redeploy its small peacekeeping force. We were impressed with the professionalism of the British soldier.

-- We will not yield to violence and terrorism. Recent events have not deterred us. We will protect our forces on the ground. Indeed, our recent initiatives are designed to enable us to more effectively support the forces of moderation and to promote reconciliation.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

~~SECRET~~

THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH
BRITISH LABOR PARTY LEADER NEIL KINNOCK

I. SETTING

During the past two decades, US Administrations of both parties have maintained close contact and cordial relations with leaders of Britain's opposition party, whether Tory or Labor. The one exception to this long standing practice was former British Labor Party Leader Michael Foot, under whose left-wing leadership once strong Labor ties to the US withered. Shortly after his election as party leader last October, Kinnock affirmed his desire to move his party back to its traditional support for strong Atlantic ties.

Under Kinnock's leadership, the Labor Party is beginning to pull out of its post-election depression, and has moved back toward the political mainstream. He will want to burnish his image as Labor Leader by being seen to deal with senior American officials on an equal basis. Kinnock also sees his visit as an important opportunity to reassure the US about his foreign policy orientation. He intends to leave his Washington interlocutors with no doubt about his commitment to NATO and a strong conventional defense for Britain.

Nevertheless, for both philosophical and domestic political reasons, Labor has criticized US policy on INF deployment, arms control, and East-West relations. The most vehement attacks have been made by Labor's Shadow Foreign Secretary Denis Healey. In public, Kinnock has taken the high road, but he has made no secret of his opposition to the Administration's policies. Last month, Kinnock told a delegation headed by Congressman Lantos that Labor's mood was "anti-Reagan" not "anti-American."

Kinnock maintains that Britain can no longer afford nuclear armaments, and a Labor government should make the transition to a non-nuclear defense before it is forced on Britain by economic necessity. Such a defense policy would include the removal of US nuclear weapons from the UK. Britain would remain an active partner in NATO but, by unilaterally abandoning nuclear weapons, could play a bridging role between the West and the third world.

Kinnock claims that the US and the USSR are equally responsible for the breakdown of arms control talks. He will seek assurances that the President's message of January 16 is part of a coherent plan to ease East-West tension and to reduce levels of nuclear weapons. Kinnock will reportedly visit the Soviet Union in the spring.

~~SECRET~~

DECL:OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLS 598-002 #571
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 6/12/02

~~SECRET~~

-2-

On Central America, Kinnock will argue that US policy in the region is one of the main causes for anti-Americanism in Britain. Kinnock welcomes the basic political, social, and economic goals of the Kissinger report, but differs strongly on the role of military aid and support for the Contras.

In the Middle East, Labor has criticized the MNF, complaining that it put British lives to risk for no good purpose. Kinnock recently told a group of US Congressmen that he recognized Israel's requirement for safety and security on its borders, but he could see no sense in Israel's policy of creating security by threat of "counter-annihilation."

Kinnock is distressed that the US did not provide full funding for IDA replenishment and appears uninterested in flexible dialogue with the third world to resolve trade and debt problems. Labor identifies the present US and British governments as opponents of North-South economic cooperation.

II. OBJECTIVES

Despite strong policy differences with the Administration, both Kinnock's desire to begin a new, more constructive relation with the United States, and his inexperience in foreign affairs, offer the opportunity to:

-- Demonstrate that the close ties and good will, which are the basis of trust and cooperation in the US-UK relations, transcend partisan differences in both countries.

-- Educate Labor's inexperienced leader on the realities of world politics, especially on security issues.

-- Reaffirm our commitment to strengthen NATO's ability to deter war and maintain the peace, while seeking verifiable arms reductions with the Soviet Union.

-- Underscore your willingness to establish a meaningful dialogue and an improved working relationship with the Soviet Union.

-- Stress that the Anglo-American ideals of democratic pluralism and individual freedom are what we wish to see prosper elsewhere, particularly in Latin America and the Middle East.

~~SECRET~~

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

February 7, 1984

ACTION

By CAS Date 10/8/94

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

SIGNED

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *Peter*

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Neil Kinnock, Leader of the British Labor Party: February 14, 1984, 4:00 - 4:20 p.m.

Attached for your signature is the briefing memorandum for the President's use in preparing for his twenty minute meeting, February 14, with Neil Kinnock.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

- TAB I - Memo to the President
- TAB A - State's Memo
- TAB II - Clearance List

~~SECRET~~

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TO KIMMITT

FROM SOMMER

DOCDATE 24 JAN 84

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25 JAN 84

SOMMER

26 JAN 84

White House C

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ED

August 28 1997

date 10/2/98

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN

AP

KINNOCK, NEIL

SUBJECT PRES MTG W/ BRITISH LABOR PARTY LEADER 14 FEB

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE

DUE 27 JAN 84 STATUS X

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Wilma Hall	<u>4</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>5</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

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(Date/Time)

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION



January 26, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: PETER SOMMER *Peter*

SUBJECT: Neil Kinnock Requests an Appointment

In addition to his meeting with the President, which is set for February 14, Neil Kinnock has asked to meet with you. Given his meeting with the President and the views you expressed in the course of arranging the Presidential meeting, I see no need to set up a separate appointment for you.

RECOMMENDATION

That I inform Kinnock's office (via the British Embassy) that you regrettably cannot meet with him.

Approve *PCM*

Disapprove _____

RECEIVED 24 JAN 84 18

TO KIMMITT

FROM SOMMER

DOCDATE 24 JAN 84

GIS

*August 28, 1987
le 10/1/94*

KEYWORDS GREAT BRITAIN

AP

KINNOCK, NEIL

SUBJECT: PRES MTG W/ BRITISH LABOR PARTY LEADER 14 FEB

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE

DUE: 25 JAN 84 STATUS X FILES

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**National Security Council
The White House**

84 JAN 24 P 4: 50

System # I

Package # 0713

CT

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	<u>1</u>	<u>WFM</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	<u>1/25 done</u>	<u>B/LDX</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information	<u>A = Action</u>	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

We gave S/S a heads-up phone case per form instruction
1/25 - I had WHOR LOK - who will send receipt -

RAS

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 24, 1984

August 28, 1987

10/8/96

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *PS*SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting with British Labor Party
Leader, Neil Kinnock

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to Charles Hill informing the Department of State of the President's scheduled meeting with Neil Kinnock.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I to Charles Hill.

Approve K Disapprove

Attachment:


Tab I Proposed memorandum to State

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506CONFIDENTIAL

January 24, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of StateSUBJECT: Presidential Meeting with British Labor Party
Leader, Neil Kinnock (U)The President will meet with British Labor Party leader Neil
Kinnock, on Tuesday, February 14, 1984, from 4:30 to 4:50 p.m.
(C)Please provide briefing materials, suggested talking points and
biographical information on Mr. Kinnock by February 9. Thank
you. (U)
Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

DEC ASSIFIED

White H
CIS+3
10/1/94CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~

AFBAD 004
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ZNY TTTT
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FM SECRETARY WEINBERGER ABOARD SECRETARY'S AIRCRAFT
TO PRESIDENT REAGAN
BT
~~TOP SECRET~~/NODIS

RR

NODIS

NO DISTRIBUTION

I AM ENROUTE BACK TO WASHINGTON AFTER TWO DAYS IN LONDON AND THE VISIT TO OUR FORCES IN LEBANON THAT I MENTIONED TO YOU LAST WEEK.

WHILE IN LONDON I MET WITH MRS. THATCHER WHO BEGAN OUR MEETING BY OBSERVING THAT US-UK RELATIONS WERE SOUND AND THAT WE MUST CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN CONSISTENCY IN OUR CONSULTATIVE PROCESS. SHE SPOKE BRIEFLY OF HER TRIP TO HUNGARY AND TO THE ANDROPOV FUNERAL. SHE SAID THAT BOTH THE HUNGARIANS AND SOVIETS WERE PREDICTABLY CRITICAL OF THE U.S. THE SOVIETS ARGUED TO HER THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO FORESEE ARMS CONTROL PROGRESS SINCE WE HAD NOT RATIFIED SALT II. WE COVERED A NUMBER OF MID-EAST ISSUES. SHE AGREED THAT THE POSITION OF THE MNF HAD INDEED BECOME UNTENABLE. SHE NOTED THAT THE SHAMIR GOVERNMENT WAS SHAKEY AND WONDERED IF CURRENT ISRAELI POLICIES WERE ACCEPTABLE TO AMERICAN JEWISH OPINION. SHE WAS QUITE FRANK AND CRITICAL OF ISRAELI POLICIES. SHE ALSO ENCOURAGED OUR STRONG SUPPORT OF KING HUSSEIN. I REVIEWED OUR LEBANON POLICY AND OUTLINED THE SUPPORT WE ARE PROVIDING TO PRESIDENT GEMAYEL. I ALSO OUTLINED OUR SUPPORT FOR KING HUSSEIN TO INCLUDE THE JLP.

MRS. THATCHER EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR. SHE NOTED THAT THE WEST DID NOT NEED ANOTHER SUCCESS BY MUSLIM FUNDAMENTALISTS. IF THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ WERE CLOSED AND IT BECAME NECESSARY TO TAKE MILITARY ACTION TO REOPEN THEM, SHE SAID WE MIGHT DISCUSS THIS BEFOREHAND WITH THE SOVIETS TO MAKE IT CLEAR TO THEM WE WERE SOLELY INTERESTED IN FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND NOT A WIDER CONFLICT. I REVIEWED FOR THE PRIME MINISTER OUR POLICIES IN CENTRAL AMERICA, THE PRC, AND THE GENERAL ISSUE OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER.

I ALSO MET SEPARATELY WITH FOREIGN MINISTER HOWE, MINISTER OF STATE FOR DEFENSE HESELTINE, AND LORD CARRINGTON, THE NEW NATO SECRETARY GENERAL, WITH WHOM I TALKED AT OUR EMBASSY FOR ABOUT AN HOUR BEFORE CHARLEY PRICE'S VERY NICE LUNCH FOR US.

598002 #573
CAS 7/21/00

~~TOP SECRET~~

Rey No. ~~R-1~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

February 29, 1984

AS EN

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

Secretary Weinberger asked that the attached NODIS cable,
which was transmitted from his air plane enroute to Washington,
D.C., today be provided to the President.

R. J. Zlatoper

R. J. Zlatoper
Captain, U.S. Navy
Military Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense

Attachment
a/s

UPON REMOVAL OF
DOCUMENT BECOMES

UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

AS 10/1/94