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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

DLB 10/20/2006

File Folder UNITED KINGDOM (05/02/1983-09/19/1983) [TOO LATE TO FILE]

FOIA

F02-071/1

Box Number 20

COLLINS

64

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
29149	FORM	NSC PROFILE SHEET <i>R 2/2/2010 F02-071/1</i>	1	5/12/1983	B1
29150	MEMO	DUPLICATE OF #22567; DENNIS BLAIR TO ROBERT MCFARLANE, RE: REVISED US-UK PROCEDURES ON NUCLEAR RELEASE	1	5/12/1983	B1
29151	MEMO	DUPLICATE OF #22568; ROBERT MCFARLANE TO LAWRENCE EAGLEBURGER, RE: REVISED US-UK PROCEDURES	1	ND	B1
29152	MEMO	DUPLICATE OF #22569; LAWRENCE EAGLEBURGER TO ROBERT MCFARLANE, FRED IKLE, RE: REVISED US-UK PROCEDURES	1	5/12/1983	B1
29153	CABLE	DUPLICATE OF #22570; #091300Z MAY 83, NOT COMPLETE	2	ND	B1
29154	LETTER	DUPLICATE OF #22571; LAWRENCE EAGLEBURGER TO DAVID [GOODALL]	1	ND	B1
29155	FORM	DUPLICATE OF #22572; NSC PROFILE SHEET	1	5/23/1983	B1
29156	MEMO	DUPLICATE OF #22573; LAWRENCE EAGLEBURGER TO ROBERT MCFARLANE, FRED IKLE, RE: US-UK PROCEDURES	1	5/18/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
29157	PAPER	DUPLICATE OF #22574; PROCEDURAL UNDERSTANDINGS	3	5/17/1983	B1
29158	MEMO	RON LEHMAN TO WILLIAM CLARK, RE: BRITISH AND FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES AND ARMS CONTROL <i>R 12/5/2011 F2002-071/1</i>	4	9/7/1983	B1
29159	PAPER	THIRD COUNTRY NUCLEAR FORCES AND ARMS CONTROL <i>R 12/5/2011 F2002-071/1</i>	4	ND	B1
29160	PAPER	EXCLUSION OF BRITISH AND FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES FROM INF NEGOTIATIONS <i>R 12/5/2011 F2002-071/1</i>	2	ND	B1
29161	PAPER	BRITISH AND FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES CONSIDERED <i>R 12/5/2011 F2002-071/1</i>	3	ND	B1
29162	PAPER	THE QUESTION OF BRITISH AND FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES <i>R 12/5/2011 F2002-071/1</i>	2	ND	B1
29163	MEMO	GEORGE SHULTZ TO THE PRESIDENT, RE: POSSIBLE EVOLUTION IN UK AND FRENCH VIEWS ON INCLUSSION OF THEIR NUCLEAR FORCES IN ARMS CONTROL <i>R 7/31/2008 NLRRF02-071/1</i>	2	9/19/1983	B1

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RW 2/3/10

2949

NSC/S PROFILE

~~TOP SECRET~~

ID 8390618

RECEIVED 12 MAY 83 18

DOCDATE 12 MAY 83

TO MCFARLANE

FROM BLAIR

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

SUBJECT: REVISED US - UK PROCEDURES ON NUCLEAR RELEASE

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE DUE: STATUS X FILES SII

FOR ACTION
MCFARLANE

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F02-07111 #29149

BY RW NARA DATE 2-3-10

COMMENTS

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ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

BLAIR S 5/16 any further action
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29150	MEMO DUPLICATE OF #22567; DENNIS BLAIR TO ROBERT MCFARLANE, RE: REVISED US-UK PROCEDURES ON NUCLEAR RELEASE	1	5/12/1983	B1

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29151	MEMO DUPLICATE OF #22568; ROBERT MCFARLANE TO LAWRENCE EAGLEBURGER, RE: REVISED US-UK PROCEDURES	1	ND	B1

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29152	MEMO DUPLICATE OF #22569; LAWRENCE EAGLEBURGER TO ROBERT MCFARLANE, FRED IKLE, RE: REVISED US-UK PROCEDURES	1	5/12/1983	B1

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29153	CABLE DUPLICATE OF #22570; #091300Z MAY 83, NOT COMPLETE	2	5/9/1983	B1

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29154	LETTER DUPLICATE OF #22571; LAWRENCE EAGLEBURGER TO DAVID [GOODALL]	1	ND	B1

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29155	FORM DUPLICATE OF #22572; NSC PROFILE SHEET	1	5/23/1983	B1

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National Security Council
The White House

9

Package # 90665
545 IT

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>J</u>	<u></u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>m</u>	<u>I</u>
Jacque Hill	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
Judge Clark	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
John Poindexter	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
Staff Secretary	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
Sit Room	<u></u>	<u></u>	<u></u>
<u>BLAIR/Forster</u>	<u>3</u>	<u></u>	<u>I</u>

Lin hood

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

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29156	MEMO DUPLICATE OF #22573; LAWRENCE EAGLEBURGER TO ROBERT MCFARLANE, FRED IKLE, RE: US-UK PROCEDURES	1	5/18/1983	B1

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29157	PAPER DUPLICATE OF #22574; PROCEDURAL UNDERSTANDINGS	3	5/17/1983	B1

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SYSTEM II PROFILE

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

ID 8391065

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 08 SEP 83 11

TO CLARK

FROM LEHMAN, R

dlb 10/2/04

DOCDATE 07 SEP 83

KEYWORDS GREAT BRITAIN FRANCE
 ARMS CONTROL STRATEGIC FORCES
 NUCLEAR WEAPONS

SUBJECT BRITISH & FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES & ARMS CONTROL

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION DUE: STATUS IX FILES SII

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO
 CLARK

COMMENTS

REF# LOG *8391103* NSCIFID (B / *B*)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>R Lehman</i>	<i>S</i> SEP 08 1983	<i>Coordinate w/ Sommer per RMK</i>		
	<i>C</i> JAN 17 1984	<i>NFAR per R Lehman</i>		

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

~~SECRET~~

System II
91065

29158

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

NO HAS SEE

September 7, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: RON LEHMAN *R. Lehman*

SUBJECT: British and French Nuclear Forces and Arms Control

ISSUE: Over the years, the Soviet Union has sought negotiating leverage in SALT I, SALT II, and START by claiming the right to compensation for the existence of the British and French nuclear forces. Such claims have also been part of a more general geopolitical campaign to divide the United States from its allies. Although consideration of the British and French systems has been at the margin of U.S./Soviet relations in the past, compensation for such systems is now the counting rule mechanism in the Soviet position on INF which they use to justify high numbers of SS-20s for themselves and zero missiles for the United States. Thus, the INF talks have given the British and French systems far more importance to the Soviets than they actually have in the overall nuclear equation. Because the British and French systems issue is seen as a hurdle to reaching an INF agreement and because the issue is complex with no "one-liners" to put the issue to rest, diverse political figures and commentators have been "thinking out loud" on ways to address the problem. Many of the ideas that are being casually thrown around could have a disastrous effect on the security of the United States and the unity of the NATO alliance.

FACTS: See Attachments.

DISCUSSION: In demanding direct, one-for-one compensation for the British, French, and (in less direct terms) the Chinese, the Soviet Union is insisting that it be granted, in treaty forces equal to all of the other nuclear powers in the world combined. This codification in international law of a right to Soviet superiority over any one power undercuts America's nuclear deterrent upon which the ultimate guarantee of peace rests and would even further encourage other nations to look to nuclear forces of their own. To the degree that the U.S. weakens its forces to permit larger allied forces, it raises even greater doubts about the credibility of the U.S. extended "nuclear umbrella" for our friends and allies, both nuclear and non-nuclear.

This weakening of the U.S. nuclear deterrent will not only encourage our nuclear allies to place greater reliance on their own nuclear

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SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

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BY RW
NRR 02-0711 #29158
NARA DATE 12/5/11

DECLASSIFIED

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SECRET

2

SENSITIVE

forces which, depending on how the compensation was drafted, but would also result in the U.S. and its nuclear allies arguing further over whose forces should be emphasized. Inevitably, this will lead to "Gaullist" tensions of the sort that prompted the European independent nuclear deterrents in the first place. At the same time, our non-nuclear allies--seeing that the extended deterrent that they now have from U.S. nuclear forces is weakened and cannot be replaced in the face of overwhelming Soviet power by Britain and France-- will begin to look at the prospect of developing nuclear forces of their own. In an age of actual reductions in nuclear forces from START or INF, such dangers are even more serious.

Given that the governments of the United States and its major allies understand the serious consequences of compensating the Soviet Union for British and French systems, it is unlikely that the West would take any dramatic steps in this regard. Nevertheless, pressure will develop to address the issue in some way. Britain, France, and West Germany have taken extremely hard stands on this issue because they recognize that any formal acceptance in negotiations of the concept of compensation, direct or indirect, could be devastating. Britain and France have been willing to state that they would review their strategic forces in light of any nuclear arms reductions taken by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. They have also indicated in public that their forces cannot substitute for American nuclear forces, including forces in Europe, as a "nuclear umbrella" for the non-nuclear nations of the alliance. Indeed, that is what the whole INF issue has been about, namely, deployments to guarantee the "coupling" of the alliance to the U.S. nuclear deterrent. And that is why the Soviet Union has stressed the British and French systems in the INF talks with a passion that was never seen in the SALT talks. By demanding compensation for the British and French systems, the Soviets not only gain negotiating leverage but they add credence to the argument that a U.S. nuclear presence in Europe is really not required.

Although not all audiences are satisfied with the quick "one-liners" that have been used to defuse the British and French systems campaign of the Soviet Union, numerous statements do exist, for example:

-- Why should the Soviet Union be granted superiority over all of the other nuclear nations of the world?

-- Why should we weaken our deterrent simply because a few other nations maintain a small independent nuclear deterrents, especially when it is the U.S. deterrent that really guarantees the peace for everyone?

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SENSITIVE

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SECRET

3

SENSITIVE

-- Why should the Soviet Union receive compensation for the small British and French forces when the overall nuclear forces of the Soviet Union are more than adequate to deter any conceivable attack, and, in fact, pose a threat to the West even if all of the Western forces were combined and coordinated?

-- These are bilateral negotiations. The United States cannot negotiate away its allies' forces, small forces whose very existence is the result of uncertainty over the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent.

-- The British and French forces are not INF forces, but even if they were, the Soviet Union has overwhelming forces in Europe with which to counter these small independent deterrents.

-- If the Soviets were to be compensated for the British and French, then are we to be compensated for the Chinese? And what happens if other nations go nuclear--who gets compensation? And should we then raise questions of compensation for geographical advantages that the Soviets enjoy and all the other compensation issues which will only make negotiations more difficult?

-- The demand for compensation for the British and French systems is a negotiating ploy designed to gain leverage in the negotiations and create tensions in the alliance. In the end, the Soviets didn't require compensation before agreeing to SALT I or SALT II and we shouldn't bow to this tactic now.

There are a few arguments that are sometimes made which are very dangerous. For example, it is sometimes said that, because the British and French systems are strategic forces that they belong in START. Bringing the British and French systems into START would put into play all of the dangers described above. Forcing our allies into START talks would create for them and for us incredible pressures. Among the telling differences between the freedom of the West and the tyranny of the Soviet camp is the fact that the U.S. permits its allies to have independent nuclear forces. If we were to count the British and French systems within the U.S. quota, we would be effectively eliminating this difference in appearance, but in reality create a less stable balance and greater problems within the alliance. Furthermore, such multilateral negotiations would only make it more difficult to reach an actual agreement even if both allies agreed to participate, which they now oppose. The Chinese issue would also have to be settled. If we include French and British systems within the U.S. count, will the Soviets consent to counting the Chinese systems within their total? We can assume that they will not, and even in the unlikely event that they did, the Chinese would never agree to such an arrangement and it is not in our interest to lump the Chinese with the Russians in a treaty.

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Including other national systems within the U.S. count would open a Pandora's box of complications with respect to other potential nuclear weapons states. These could include, depending on the information used as the basis, Israel, South Africa, India, Pakistan, Argentina, Brazil, and even, perhaps, Japan. Indeed, there is a danger that the increased status associated with participating in the negotiations might encourage nuclear proliferation (Iraq? Pakistan?) or create great pressures for international investigations of nations like Israel and South Africa whose nuclear status remains uncertain.

The consequences of even small but undesirable steps in addressing the British and French systems compensation question could be serious. The French will resent the implication that they are within U.S. command scope and inevitably will have to take at least symbolic anti-U.S. action to reaffirm their national independence, all at a time when we are trying to improve cooperation quietly. This might hold true for the British public as well, forcing the Thatcher government also to take a visibly independent stand in force in which we are counting on their support. Does the U.S. truly wish to place reliance on the willingness of any other national government to accept its nuclear weapons decisions, much less a socialist government such as presently governs France? And can the British and French governments afford to accept the implication that it is willing to subject itself to U.S. nuclear weapons utilization decisions? The problems we now face holding together the consensus on INF modernization serve to demonstrate how difficult this is likely to become in the face of compensation or combined negotiations.

Attachments

Tab A Eagleburger Article on French and British Missiles
Tab B Interagency Fact Sheets and Talking Points

19

Tab A

Lawrence S. Eagleburger

B 8

Why We Don't Count the French and British Missiles 20

A fundamental element of the Soviet position in the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) is that the nuclear systems of Britain and France must be "taken into account," in effect, by their inclusion under a ceiling on U.S. forces. Both the NATO allies, whose security rests on a strong U.S. nuclear deterrent tied inseparably to the defense of Europe, and the United States have rejected this Soviet claim.

The Soviet demand to address these forces in bilateral negotiations is procedurally inappropriate and substantively without merit. Britain and France are sovereign countries, over whose forces the United States has no control. The Soviet demand to include British and French forces is groundless on military terms, would divide the NATO alliance and undercut the U.S. strategic guarantee to Europe. Its effect has been to slow progress in the negotiations.

In pressing their claim on British and French forces, spokesmen for the Soviet Union emphasize the principle of "equality and equal security" as being basic to their approach to arms control. They assert that in applying the principle of "equality and equal security" in the context of the INF negotiations, they must "take account" of British and French forces in assessing their own security. Therefore, they maintain they are justified in demanding unequal forces between the United States and the U.S.S.R.; specifically, they propose that the number of British and French "medium-range nuclear systems" be subtracted from the ceiling they propose be set for U.S. systems.

In practice, however, the Soviet Union does not follow its principle of "equality and equal security." It does not apply that principle evenhandedly to the security of the United States and its allies, but one-sidedly to the security of the Soviet Union. The result is to produce inequality and unequal security. The Soviet spokesmen, in describing this principle, have stressed that in applying it all factors affecting Soviet security must be taken into account, including not only the manifold military factors but also geographic and other considerations. When asked what they mean by "other considerations," they respond that these include "political" considerations.

The INF negotiations involve issues central to security in Europe—that is, on the one side, the security of the territory of the NATO allies in Europe and, on the other, the security of the territory of the members of the Warsaw Pact, including the Soviet Union, in Europe. Let us begin by examining, as the Soviet spokesmen say one should, the full range of factors bearing upon "equal security."

With respect to geography, the territory of the NATO countries in Europe is small com-

pared to that of the Warsaw Pact states in Europe—some 925,000 square miles on the NATO side to about 2.5 million square miles on the Warsaw Pact side. The depth of front is a few hundred kilometers on the NATO side; on the Warsaw Pact side, it can be measured in thousands. Moreover, the Soviet Union has direct access to NATO Europe unimpeded by natural barriers. It can move its forces up to Western Europe over secure interior lines of communication. In contrast, forces in the United States are separated from Europe by 5,000 kilometers of ocean. Thus, in the context of "equal security," geography favors the Soviet Union.

The political asymmetries between NATO and the Warsaw Pact are striking. The NATO Alliance is a voluntary alliance. The Brezhnev doctrine makes it clear that the Warsaw Pact is of quite a different character. The Warsaw Pact operates under central direction, tight coordination and strict discipline. Such rigid conformity would be inconsistent with the nature of the NATO alliance and with the characters of its member states. Those states have freely elected parliaments responsive to public opinion informed by an independent press and vigorously expressed. Anyone in Moscow need only read the Western press to be confident that no NATO country can acquire arms beyond those its people consider the minimum necessary for collective defense against aggression and that no one of them, alone or in concert, would consider initiating an attack on the Soviet Union or any of its associated states.

It is not possible for anyone in the West to have similar confidence that he truly understands what is going on in the inner decision-making circles in Moscow. None of us in the West would embrace the political system of the Warsaw Pact countries. Nevertheless, such a system is efficient in terms of building and directing military forces and dictating a unified strategy and fully coordinated tactics, both military and political. Thus, in the context of "equal security," political asymmetries favor the U.S.S.R. and the Warsaw Pact, not the United States and NATO.

In assessing the military factors, it is appropriate to begin with those bearing most immediately on the INF negotiations and then proceed to those more generally affecting the security balance in Europe. It was the deployment of SS20 missiles by the Soviet Union in 1977 that brought about NATO's 1979 decision to respond to that deployment with its own deployment of U.S. Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe. NATO's determination to proceed with deployments brought the Soviets to accept the U.S. offer to seek an arms control solution to the INF problem.

The only systems that both the United States and the U.S.S.R. agree should be limited

in an INF agreement are ground-launched nuclear missile systems of intermediate range. The current imbalance between the United States and the U.S.S.R. in longer-range INF missile systems is not in dispute. The Soviets have approximately 600 such systems with 1,300 warheads, of which approximately 500 with 1,000 warheads are in or on the fringes of Europe. The United States has none.

If we then proceed to those systems that one side asserts should be limited in an INF agreement and the other side believes should not be limited, we are brought to consider nuclear-capable aircraft in Europe. The Soviets propose counting only such aircraft as have a combat radius greater than 1,000 kilometers, though they exclude a number of their own aircraft with a combat radius more than 1,000 kilometers, while including some U.S. aircraft with a combat radius of less than 1,000 kilometers.


However, in the context of "equal security," all aircraft capable of hitting the territory of the NATO or the Warsaw Pact countries in Europe should be counted. On this basis, and using counting rules developed in previous arms control agreements, the U.S.S.R. has 6,300 such aircraft in Europe; the United States has 400. To take account of the fact that most of the Soviet planes used for training and those in storage are in Europe while the comparable U.S. planes are in the United States, it is appropriate to refer to a NATO study that compares NATO and Warsaw Pact aircraft on the basis of counting only those assigned to combat squadrons manned by trained crews and believed assigned nuclear roles. On this basis, the balance is 2,500 such aircraft on the Warsaw Pact side as opposed to about 800 on the NATO side.

We are now brought to systems that neither side proposes should be limited in an INF agreement, but that the U.S.S.R. asserts must be taken account of by subtraction from the Soviet-proposed ceiling for U.S. INF systems.

These are the British and French nuclear systems—both missile systems and nuclear-capable aircraft. The bulk of these are submarine-based missile systems. Their characteristics are identical to those of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. SLBMs, which both the United States and U.S.S.R. agree should be classed as being "strategic" systems. They are not "intermediate range" systems.

Even the Soviet spokesmen, in arguing for the proposition that British and French systems be taken into account, base their case on the assertion that the U.S.S.R. must take them into account in assessing its security in the context of "equal security," not on the basis of the balance in systems to be limited in an INF agreement.

CONT.



By Tom Bruna

tary factors: the conventional military balance in Europe, the balance in chemical warfare weapons, the balance in nuclear weapons of shorter range than those under discussion in INF and those of inter-continental range—those under discussion in the START negotiations.

There can be little doubt that the conventional balance in Europe favors the Warsaw Pact. All the major indicators of relative combat strength favor the Warsaw Pact, including the numbers of combat divisions and of planes, tanks, artillery tubes and other major categories of military equipment.

The balance in chemical weapons is entirely one-sided in favor of the Warsaw Pact.

The balance in tactical nuclear systems also favors the Warsaw Pact. NATO has a tenuous advantage in the number of artillery tubes capable of firing nuclear shells, but NATO tactical missile systems are outnumbered and outranged by Soviet systems having a range of 120 to 300 kilometers.

In the START negotiations, it is the U.S. hope and anticipation that the sides will eventually be able to agree on substantial reductions to equality in the most significant measures of capability. At the present time, however, it is evident that in most of the indices of effectiveness, the balance in systems of intercontinental range does not favor the United States.

In summation of this part of the analysis, there is no basis whatever for the Soviet assertion that they are entitled to compensation for British and French nuclear systems in the context of the full range of factors bearing on "equal security."

On the other hand, there are very strong reasons why British and French systems should not only be limited in a bilateral agreement between the United States and the U.S.S.R., but

why their systems should not be "taken into account" in an INF agreement.

Along with the United States, the U.S.S.R. and China, Britain and France constitute the five members of the U.N. Security Council with the power of veto. They historically have taken an independent view of their national security and have maintained the unilateral military means, as do the United States and the U.S.S.R., to protect this independence. They have both declared that they do not wish their nuclear forces to be limited or to be "taken into account" in bilateral negotiations between the United States and the U.S.S.R.

They consider their nuclear forces to constitute the minimum nuclear deterrent necessary to protect their own national interests. The non-nuclear NATO countries cannot count on the relatively small U.K. or French nuclear forces to provide adequate deterrence of aggression or the threat of aggression against their territory; they must look to the nuclear forces of the United States for that measure of deterrence.

In past bilateral arms control agreements, the U.S.S.R. has attempted to obtain compensation for U.K. and French systems, and the United States has firmly resisted such attempts. The U.S.S.R. has nevertheless found it possible to enter into such agreements.

The Soviet public-relations campaign on this issue is based on suggesting that Western spokesmen have said what they have not said, and then demonstrating that this is untrue. Soviet spokesmen loudly assert that British and French nuclear systems exist, as though someone had denied that fact. They assert that Britain and France are members of NATO as though that were a great discovery. They assert that British and French forces are "aimed at them," as though any other nation constituted a security threat to NATO. None of these facts is in dispute; the point is these facts are overwhelmed by a series of much more significant facts, such as the geographic, political and military asymmetries outlined above. The United States is fully aware of the advantages these asymmetries confer on the Soviet Union. However, we have not proposed to take them into account by unequal limits between the United States and U.S.S.R.

The essence of the Soviet position is that the only country whose security really counts is the U.S.S.R. If it is secure, then all other countries or parties in its orbit are secure. It asserts the unilateral right to security because of the uniqueness of its socializing mission; it is carrying out a mission allotted to it by history; it is entitled to forces equal to or superior to the aggregate of those of all other states combined since all other states are potential objectors to its hegemony. The Soviet claim is thus a claim for absolute security. The obverse of absolute security for the U.S.S.R. is absolute insecurity for all other nations in the world.

The writer is undersecretary of state for political affairs.

Tab B



United States Department of State

Director of Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs


Washington, D.C. 20520

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August 15, 1983

MEMORANDUM TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION
SUBJECT: IG Paper on UK/French Forces

Attached is the final paper of the INF Working Group on "Third Country Nuclear Forces and Arms Control". The IG will take up consideration of this paper at its next meeting.


Jonathan T. Howe
RADM, U. S. Navy

Attachment:

As stated.

DISTRIBUTION:

Office of the Vice President - Mr. Doran
National Security Council - Dr. Lehman
Office of the Secretary of Defense - Mr. Perle
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Office of Management and Budget - Mr. Burman
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EA - Mr. Gardner

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DECL: OADR

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Department of
By dlb

10/20/06

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Third Country Nuclear Forces and Arms Control

As in the previous SALT negotiations, third country nuclear forces have been raised by the Soviets as an issue in the INF negotiations. It is the assumption of this paper that the US will wish to continue firmly to reject Soviet demands for compensation for UK and French forces.

Previous Negotiations

The Soviets attempted to have nuclear weapons in Europe included in both SALT I and SALT II. They sought inclusion of both US "Forward Based Systems" and the British and French nuclear forces. In both cases, they finally agreed to treaties that did not directly limit or compensate them for either FBS or the independent deterrent forces.

o In the Interim Offensive Agreement (SALT I) the Soviets sought to include UK and French systems. The US proposed limiting Soviet IRBMs. Both finally dropped those positions. The Soviets did, however, table a unilateral statement saying that they would consider that they had a right to increase their SSBNs to the extent that the United Kingdom and France increased their SSBN forces. The United States rejected the unilateral statement. In what was seen as a separate move in the talks, however, Kissinger informed the Soviets that 1) we did not plan to build up to the ceiling on SSBNs that the draft IOA gave us and 2) that we would not count toward the Soviet SSBN total the 22 Golf-class diesel submarines in the Soviet force. Some commentators have suggested that these two statements were partial compensation or at least made it possible for the Soviets to accept the American rejection of their unilateral statement on third countries. Officially, the US maintained that these were not to be viewed as compensation, although the Soviets may have taken them as such.

o In SALT II the Soviets continued to press for inclusion of French and British systems, but fell off that insistence at Vladivostok. The US had argued that the third country systems were more comparable to the unlimited Soviet IRBMs (SS-4/5/20) than to US strategic systems. In the subsequent detailed negotiations of SALT II, the Soviets said that they planned to use SALT III to deal with the "FBS" and third country issues. The Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Further Negotiations...contains vague wording allowing either side to raise new issues in SALT III. The US, however, did not

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BY RW NARA DATE 12/5/11

commit to limitations on "FBS" or third country systems in SALT III. Now that the Soviets have agreed to negotiate limits on their IRBMs, they may think the US past position means we should agree to compensate them for British and French systems in INF.

Current Soviet Position

The Soviet's position in INF was originally that the US should not deploy any new INF systems because there is an existing balance between NATO systems on the one hand, and Soviet systems on the other. They assert that additional US deployments would have to be met with further Soviet deployments. The Soviet offer to reduce Soviet missiles to the level of the UK and France, implicitly conceded that an imbalance exists in INF missiles in Europe. However, the current Soviet position is that they will reduce their missiles to the level of the British and French missiles only if the US agrees not to deploy.

The Soviets apparently see the Chinese missile threat as one that they would rather not deal with in the INF talks. Their "Europe only" position excludes the Chinese missiles and their hint of separate Asian nuclear talks appears to be little more than a propaganda counter to the US global position in the INF talks.

Best US Responses

The United States has made several arguments in refutation of the Soviet claim for compensation. None is totally convincing to publics; indeed, one of the main problems is that the US rationale is so complex. These arguments include:

o Not Ours: The most straight-forward US argument is that the British and French systems are not ours and we have no right to negotiate about them. The Soviets note in response that the US is willing in MBFR to include French numbers within the count of forces on the NATO side and to pledge to adjust for any increases in French forces in order to maintain the common ceiling level, even though France is not a part of MBFR. The Soviets have also claimed that we effectively control or strongly influence deployment and use of third country systems. In response, the US has noted that the British systems, though pledged to NATO, revert to total national control; French systems are under national control also. Moreover, both countries have explicitly stated that their systems are not to be included in any way in INF. Therefore, we do not control them and should not compensate for them.

o Strategic Systems: We have claimed in INF that the French and British SLBMs are dissimilar to the missiles being discussed in INF and more similar to US and Soviet, strategic systems. The Soviets have not, however, accepted that INF should only address land based missiles and have rejected this US argument against compensation.

o US-Soviet Equality: As superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union must be treated as equals. This means that the US and the Soviet Union must have equal rights and obligations in any agreement. Compensation would involve numerical inequality of obligations.

o Soviet Problem: A rhetorical point that we have made is that it is not our fault if the Soviets have made enemies of France, China, and the United Kingdom. The line of argument continues that the US should not have to pay for this Soviet problem, which the Soviets should handle directly with the countries concerned. A corollary argument is that the Soviets are using this device to seek strategic superiority by claiming the right to have as many nuclear forces as the rest of the world combined.

o Soviets Have Other Forces: We have also noted that the Soviets are looking at this category of weapon systems in isolation. The Soviets maintain a larger force of conventional weapons, nuclear capable aircraft, and SRINF missiles than does NATO, including France, in addition to their large strategic forces. Thus, the Soviets have no legitimate claim to deploying LRINF missiles to "counter" British and French forces.

Other Arguments Used by NATO

The British, Germans, and French have added three more arguments:

o Relative Importance. The British have argued that historically, the UK forces at one point amounted to some 8% of the total world nuclear arsenals. Since this peak, it has dropped to 3%; even with full UK planned modernization, and with START-limits, it would only return to its previous 8% total.

o Threat to Britain and France. The French have recently turned the Soviet definition of "strategic" to their advantage. They argue that if a balance between Soviet and French systems is to be drawn, all Soviet systems capable of striking French territory should be taken into account. Soviet systems not limited by either INF or START, or only indirectly limited, are so numerous that there is a massive superiority in the Soviet favor.

o Third Country Weapons Not Coupling. The Germans (and the US) have made the point that the PII and GLCM are intended chiefly to couple the US strategic deterrent to NATO's theater nuclear weapon systems. British and French systems cannot perform that coupling mission.

Recommendations to the IG

Both the British and French governments have indicated that in the context of significant reductions in US and Soviet strategic arsenals, they would review their position. If it were decided that it could be helpful to the INF negotiations, we could encourage the British and French to be more explicit.

WANG # 1867P



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington D.C. 20520

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CONFIDENTIAL

June 20, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: INF - Talking Points on UK and French Systems

Attached are proposed talking points on the exclusion of UK and French systems from the INF talks. These points were requested earlier today by the NSC Staff for the public use of the Vice President on his coming trip to Europe.

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

as stated

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DECL: OADR

By dlb

10/20/04

29160

EXCLUSION OF BRITISH AND FRENCH
NUCLEAR FORCES FROM INF NEGOTIATIONS

The demand that British and French nuclear forces be "taken into account" is the cornerstone of the Soviet position in the INF negotiations. In essence, they are proposing that British and French nuclear systems be included under the ceiling on US forces. The practical -- and intended -- effect of the Soviet position would be to preserve Soviet SS-20 deployments while preventing US longer-range INF missile deployments, and to achieve the virtual elimination of a major portion of the US nuclear presence in Europe.

There is some sentiment among Western publics that the Soviet demand is "fair." The following talking points address questions on this issue likely to be raised with the Vice President during his trip to Europe.

Q. Why does the United States refuse to include British and French nuclear forces in the INF negotiations?

-- Britain and France are sovereign nations over whose forces the US has no control. It would be inappropriate to discuss their systems in a negotiation in which they are not represented and have no wish to be.

-- The Soviets assert that they need the SS-20 to counter British and French forces. However, British and French forces constitute minimum independent national deterrents, and when one considers the massive size of the Soviet nuclear arsenal arrayed against Europe, it is evident that this Soviet assertion is militarily groundless.

-- In effect, the Soviets are asking for the right to have nuclear forces equal to those of all others combined, in complete contradiction of the long-established principle of equal rights and limits.

-- The Soviet demand to include the independent nuclear forces of Britain and France is a tactical negotiating ploy designed to justify the Soviet proposal for unequal limits between the US and the USSR, allowing the Soviets to maintain a large SS-20 force while prohibiting a countering US missile deployment. One should recall that in previous bilateral arms control negotiations, the Soviets accepted agreements applicable only to US and Soviet forces.

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BY RW NARA DATE 12/5/11

Q. Is the US consulting with its Allies on the inclusion of British and French nuclear forces in the INF talks?

-- We are consulting closely with our Allies on the INF negotiations. We have not discussed inclusion of British and French forces in the talks, however, as the December 1979 decision made very clear that third country forces should be excluded from the talks. The US, Britain, France and other NATO Allies have repeatedly stated that they consider the Soviet demand to be unacceptable.

Q. If the US is not prepared to discuss British and French forces in the INF talks, is it prepared to address them in START or in some other negotiating forum?

-- INF and START are bilateral talks aimed at securing reductions in US and Soviet nuclear forces and achieving a more stable balance. Third country forces are not an appropriate subject for either negotiation.

-- The Soviet demand to maintain nuclear forces as large as all other countries in the world combined is tantamount to a demand to legitimize Soviet superiority and to accept Soviet hegemony, a step which the United States is not prepared to consider.

Drafted:EUR/RPM:SKPifer
(0935A)
Cleared:EUR/RPM:JHawes
PM/TMP:MLekson
EUR:JDobbins

Q: SHOULDN'T THE SOVIETS RECEIVE COMPENSATION FOR BRITISH AND FRENCH FORCES? AREN'T THESE AN INTEGRAL PART OF NATO'S NUCLEAR FORCES?

A: -- The Soviet argument that an INF agreement must include British and French nuclear forces is intended to substantiate a highly contrived Soviet assertion that a balance in so-called "medium range" forces presently exists in Europe. This claim is basic to the Soviet negotiating position, which seeks an outcome which would drive a wedge between Britain and France and the non-nuclear states of Europe and decouple the U.S. strategic deterrent from the defense of Europe.

There are many reasons why the Soviet claim for compensation is unjustified:

-- It is procedurally incorrect to include third country systems in bilateral negotiations between the US and the Soviet Union. This has not been done in prior U.S.-Soviet arms control agreements.

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BY RW NARA DATE 12/5/11

-- Britain and France are sovereign nations, each with strategic security interests of its own. The U.S. does not determine the composition of or control the employment of their independent process. Soviet demands that the U.S. negotiate an agreement which includes these forces in a U.S. ceiling are unacceptable not only to the U.S., but to the allies concerned.

-- Moreover, the forces of Britain and France represent minimum national deterrents. They differ in role and characteristics from the U.S. and Soviet longer-range INF missiles which are the focus of the INF negotiations. UK and French systems do not provide the vital linkage between Europe and the U.S. strategic forces.

-- In addition, there is no justification for any such compensation.

-- British and French nuclear forces are small in comparison with the total size of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. The assertion that SS-20s are necessary to counter British and French forces is militarily groundless. Even were all Soviet longer-range INF missiles removed from consideration, the Soviet Union would still have thousands of INF aircraft and other nuclear systems including strategic nuclear forces arrayed against Britain and France and in effect threatening

all of Europe.

-- In essence, the Soviet position amounts to a demand that the USSR be granted the right to have nuclear forces equal to those of all other powers combined. Such a demand completely contradicts the principle of equality which is fundamental to U.S.-Soviet arms control and is patently unacceptable.

-- Besides, in the context of the security situation in Europe, there already are substantial geographic, political and security factors the Warsaw Pact favoring the USSR. Geography favors the Warsaw Pact. Moreover, ^{the Warsaw Pact,} /dominated by a single power, can better direct and coordinate both strategic and tactical decisions than can a loose, voluntary and democratic alliance such as NATO. With respect to the military hardware, the situation is equally clear. The Soviet Union has over 500 intermediate-range missiles. The U.S. none. It also has some 2500 aircraft assigned to nuclear missions to NATO's 800. The balance in conventional and chemical forces also favors the Warsaw Pact, as do most indications of relative capability in the strategic field.

29162

The Question of British and French Nuclear Forces

The Soviet Union has requested "compensation" for British and French nuclear forces in its negotiations with the United States. As the accompanying charts show, the Soviet Union has no need of compensation. Its ballistic missile forces far exceed those of the United States, the United Kingdom and France in both warheads and equivalent megatonnage, or the destructive force of those warheads.

There is yet a more complex explanation of the United States position:

Since the conclusion of the Second World War and the formation of NATO, the principle foreign policy goal of the Soviet Union has been to separate the United States from its European allies. By driving the United States out of Europe, the US guarantee to defend Europe would lose all credibility. Without a strong commitment from the United States, the Soviet Union would be in a position to deal with the allies not as members of a strong collective security alliance, but individually. The Soviet Union could then use its enormous military apparatus to influence the political behavior of the entire continent.

We should understand that NATO is a political-military alliance and that nuclear weapons are political-military instruments. They can be used to prevent war by threatening retaliation -- we call this deterrence -- or they can be used to intimidate those incapable of retaliation.

The NATO deterrent is based on allied conventional forces and US nuclear and conventional forces stationed in the United States and in Europe. With US participation in the alliance, NATO has the strength to prevent war and has done so for 37 years. The US has over 300,000 troops stationed in Europe to reinforce the US guarantee and, in 1979, President Jimmy Carter promised that 572 new nuclear weapons would be deployed to Europe to underline our pledge to prevent Soviet aggression and to counteract an increasing Soviet missile threat.

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Today, only US nuclear forces have the mission of defending all of the NATO countries and only US forces have that capability.

British and French nuclear forces have not been designed to defend NATO Europe, nor have they been pledged to defend NATO Europe. The British and French systems are sovereign and independent forces designed for the exclusive use of the United Kingdom and France. They are not under US or NATO control. Furthermore, the governments of neither the United Kingdom nor France are engaged in negotiations to reduce their forces, nor have they authorized the United States to negotiate in their behalf. Still, the Soviet Union maintains that it must be compensated for these systems since France and the United Kingdom are NATO members.

As the attached data (derived from unclassified, non-governmental sources) show, the Soviet Union's claim for compensation has no basis in reality. The Soviet Union already possesses overwhelming conventional forces on the continent, it has clear superiority in intermediate range nuclear delivery systems, and it possesses an enormous strategic force.

The Soviet claim for "compensation" must be seen for what it is. The facts are clear. The claim is made to confuse the facts. It is propaganda.

The Soviet Union does not wish to see US deployments because they reinforce US guarantees to defend the alliance. US deployments give the NATO alliance a believable deterrent.

BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS

UNITED STATES

2152 ICBM
4768 SLBM
0 LRINF

6920

U.S.S.R

5554 ICBM
2416 SLBM
1236 LRINF*

9206

U.K.

64 SLBM

FRANCE

80 SLBM
18 INF

7082

* Does not include reloads
Source: IISS Military Balance 1982-83

Chart-1

5

EQUIVALENT MEGATONNAGE

UNITED STATES

929 ICBM

786 SLBM

0 LRINF

1715

U.K

64 SLBM

FRANCE

4 SLBM

18 INF

1801

U.S.S.R.

4661 ICBM

1261 SLBM

558 LRINF*

6481

* Does not include reloads
Source: IISS Military Balance 82-83

SOURCE: International Institute for Strategic Studies
 "The Military Balance 1982-1983"
 London 1982

(No official, unclassified U.S. Government source has
 all of the figures necessary.)

United States

<u>System</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>RVs</u>	<u>Yield</u>	<u>Total</u>	
				<u>RVs</u>	<u>EMT</u>
ICBM					
Titan II	52	1	9 MT	52	156
Minuteman II	450	1	1-2	450	551
Minuteman III	250	3	.17	750	77
	300	3	.335	900	145
U.S. ICBM				2,152	929
SLBM					
Poseidon C-3	304	10	.050	3,040	414
Poseidon C-4	192	8	.100	1,536	331
Trident C-4	24	8	.100	192	41
U.S. SLBM				4,768	786
U.S. Missiles				6,920	1,715

U.S.S.R.

System	Number	RVS	Yield	RVS	EMI
ICBM					
Soviet ICBM					
SS-11	570	1	1	570	570
SS-13	60	1	.75	60	50
SS-17	150	4	.75	600	495
SS-18	308	8	.90	2,464	2,297
SS-19	310	6	.550	1,860	1,249
Total					
				5,554	4,661
SLBM					
Soviet SLBM					
SS-N-5	16	1	1	16	16
SS-N-6	406	1	1	406	406
SS-N-8	286	1	.8	286	247
SS-N-17	12	1	1	12	12
SS-N-18	208	7	.2	1,456	498
SS-NX-20	20	12	.2 est	240	82
Total					
				2,416	1,261
IRBM					
Soviet IRBM					
SS-4	275	1	1	275	275
SS-5	16	1	1	16	16
SS-20	315	3	.15	945	267
Total					
				1,236	558
U.S.S.R. Total					
				9,206	6,480

United Kingdom

<u>System</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>RVs</u>	<u>Yield</u>	<u>Total</u>	
				<u>RVs</u>	<u>EMT</u>
SLBM					
Polaris A-3	64	3 (1 x 1 EMT)	.2 (MRV)	64	64
<u>France</u>					
IRBM					
S-3	18	1	1	18	18
SLBM					
M-20	80	1	.01	80	4
France Total				98	22
U.S./U.K./France Total				7,082	1,801

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TO PRESIDENT

FROM SHULTZ, G

dlb 10/20/84

DOCDATE 19 SEP 83

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN

FRANCE

ARMS CONTROL

STRATEGIC FORCES

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

SUBJECT: EVOLUTION IN BRITISH & FRENCH VIEWS ON NUCLEAR FORCES & ARMS CONTROL

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE:

STATUS S

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FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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COMMENTS

REF# 8328431

LOG 8391065

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ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

C JAN 17 1984 See 8391065 for final action

DISPATCH

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FILE

(C)

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

18 P 6: 23

~~SECRET~~

September 19, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: George P. Shultz *mps*

Subject: Possible Evolution in UK and French Views on Inclusion of Their Nuclear Forces in Arms Control

In London earlier this week, Assistant Secretary Burt was told by British officials that Prime Minister Thatcher is considering a shift in the current British position on eventual inclusion of UK forces in some form of arms control, and that she will want to discuss the issue with you when she visits later this month. We also understand President Mitterrand may be considering some change in the French position on the same issue.

Both the British and the French governments, as you know, currently refuse to countenance inclusion of their nuclear forces in any form of arms control, although both state that at some point in the future, were U.S. and Soviet nuclear capabilities to be vastly reduced, they might reconsider their positions. As INF deployment approaches, and as the Soviets insist that they will agree to no INF limitations unless they are compensated for UK and French forces, other European Allies, particularly the basing countries, have begun to press the British and French to take a more flexible position.

The Germans and other non-nuclear Allied governments do not want the United States to compensate the Soviets for UK and French forces in INF, nor are they pressing to include these forces in START. These Allies do wish, however, the British and French governments to be more explicit regarding their willingness to enter multilateral negotiations with the United States, the Soviet Union and China to control nuclear arms at some future time, perhaps after the successful conclusion of the START and INF talks.

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We understand that Prime Minister Thatcher and perhaps also President Mitterrand may be considering adopting and enunciating some such formulation in the coming weeks. Such statements could be helpful in sustaining European support for INF deployment, while at the same time highlighting the bilateral nature of the current U.S.-Soviet dialogue, and thus supporting our argument for U.S.-Soviet equality in any INF and START agreements. It would, however, be counter-productive for us to be seen putting any pressure on the UK or France to modify their stand on this issue. At this stage, therefore, I believe U.S. interests are best served by allowing the non-nuclear Allies to take the lead with Paris and London in pressing those governments to adopt a more flexible formulation on the future inclusion of UK and French forces in arms control, while we continue to make clear to all concerned the unacceptability of any compensation to the Soviets in START and INF.

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United States Department of State

Director of Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs

Washington, D.C. 20520


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August 15, 1983

MEMORANDUM TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: IG Paper on UK/French Forces

Attached is the final paper of the INF Working Group on "Third Country Nuclear Forces and Arms Control". The IG will take up consideration of this paper at its next meeting..


Jonathan T. Howe
RADM, U. S. Navy

Attachment:

As stated.

DISTRIBUTION:

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Department
By dlb

10/30/06