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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

DLB 10/19/2006

File Folder UNITED KINGDOM (01/31/1983-02/05/1983) [TOO LATE TO FILE]

FOIA

F02-071/1

Box Number 20

COLLINS

59

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
29081	FORM	NSC PROFILE SHEET <i>R</i> 9/21/2011 M337/1	1	2/1/1983	B1
29082	MEMO	BOB LINHARD TO WILLIAM CLARK, RE: PROPOSED MESSAGE IN US-UK CHANNEL <i>R</i> 6/9/2010 M193/1	1	1/31/1983	B1
29083	MEMO	ROBERT BLACKWILL TO THE ACTING SECRETARY, RE: INF: DEALING WITH ALLIED PRESSURES <i>PAR</i> 6/9/2010 M193/1; UPHELD 3/4/2013 M10-337 #29083	4	1/28/1983	B1
29084	LETTER	LAWRENCE EAGLEBURGER TO SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG, EDITED <i>R</i> 6/9/2010 M193/1	3	ND	B1
29085	FORM	NSC PROFILE SHEET <i>R</i> 2/2/2010 F02-071/1	1	2/7/1983	B1
29086	MEMO	BOB LINHARD TO WILLIAM CLARK, RE: GROUP PAPER <i>R</i> 12/5/2011 F2002-071/1	1	2/5/1983	B1
29087	PAPER	RE: INF (DRAFT - 3RD REVISE) <i>D</i> 3/4/2013 M337/1	18	2/3/1983	B1
29088	PAPER	CONTINGENCY PLANNING - ITALY <i>D</i> 3/4/2013 M337/1	2	2/4/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
29089	PAPER	CONTINGENCY PLANNING - UNITED KINGDOM <i>R 6/9/2010 M193/1</i>	1	2/4/1983	B1
29090	MEMO	DUPLICATE OF #29082 <i>R 6/9/2010 M193/1</i>	1	1/31/1983	B1
29091	PAPER	DUPLICATE OF #29083 <i>PAR 6/9/2010 M193/1; UPHELD 3/4/2013 M10-337 #29091</i>	4	1/28/1983	B1
29092	LETTER	DUPLICATE OF #29084 <i>R 6/9/2010 M193/1</i>	3	ND	B1
29093	CABLE	DRAFT CABLE RE: ITALY <i>D 3/4/2013 M337/1</i>	3	2/2/1983	B1
29094	CABLE	#050716Z FEB 83 - SAME TEXT AS 29093 <i>D 3/4/2013 M337/1</i>	2	2/5/1983	B1

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

RECEIVED 01 FEB 83 13

TO CLARK

FROM LINHARD

DOCDATE 31 JAN 83

BOVERIE

31 JAN 83

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN

INF

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

ARMS CONTROL

SUBJECT: US MSG TO UK RE DUAL KEY ISSUES

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M10-337# 29081
BY RW NARA DATE

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(B / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	FEB 0 1 1983	<i>McFarlane approved</i>		
	FEB 0 1 1983	<i>msg sent by Set Room</i>		

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

National Security Council
The White House

524

Package #

90113

2

'83 JAN 31 P3:47

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	1	X	A
Bud McFarlane	2	M	A
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark			
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary	4		R
Sit Room	3		A

FEB 01 1983

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

WHSR,
 Transmit Tab B via Cab O
 line. Then return package to
 Brian for file ^{without cable.} Return a copy of
 cable to me. J

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II 2908
90113

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

January 31, 1983

SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

THROUGH: RICHARD BOVERIE

FROM: BOB LINHARD *RL*

SUBJECT: Proposed Message in US-UK Channel on Dual Key

The attached package was provided to me by State. It recommends that we use the US-UK channel (to Cabinet Secretary Armstrong) to raise the issue of "dual-key" control of GLCM to establish the fact that any discussion of this issue should occur in that channel, and thus (hopefully) avoid having it raised in an inappropriate fashion with the Vice President during his visit.

The proposed message (TAB B) stresses the importance of the nuclear release issue, our willingness to consult with the UK on this issue, the great difficulties which new methods of physical control (i.e., dual-key) could entail, and the essentiality of keeping the issue confidential.

State/EUR has also provided a copy of this package to Richard Perle and they report that he concurs with this approach. I also find the approach appropriate at this time.

The package is now on its way to Larry Eagleburger for approval. If he agrees, it will then be forwarded to the Situation Room for transmission. It could arrive as early as close of business today.

Recommendation

That you approve the transmission of this message.

Approve

RCN/Har

Disapprove _____

Concurrence: Fortier

DF as mod

Attachments:

TAB A - Internal State Department Decision Paper (S)

TAB B - Proposed Message to Cabinet Secretary Armstrong (S)

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR *mo8-193 #29082*

BY KML NARA DATE 6/10/10

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~

4

TAB A

~~SECRET~~

Department of State



ACTION MEMORANDUM

~~S/S~~

29083
DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR M08-193#29083

BY KML NARA DATE 6/10/10

~~SECRET~~/ SENSITIVE


TO: The Acting Secretary
THRU: P - Lawrence S. Eagleburger
FROM: EUR - Robert Blackwill, Designate
SUBJECT: INF: Dealing with Allied Pressures for Dual Key

Issue for Decision:

Whether to authorize the attached message to the UK on the nuclear control question.

Essential Factors:

When you were in London in December Pym raised with you the question of UK control over the release of US nuclear weapons based in the UK. The UK concern was also raised with Secretary Weinberger. Mrs. Thatcher has spoken to the issue recently in Parliament, indicating that she is satisfied with existing arrangements. The British embassy has informed us, however, that the Prime Minister's statements are a holding action, pending decisions on whether additional arrangements may be needed to deal with public opinion on the GLCM issue. We were informed that she would be meeting with her advisors on the issue January 28. It is likely that she will raise it during the Vice President's visit February 9-10.



~~SECRET~~

DECL: OADR

~~SECRET~~

E. O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.3 (b) (6)



Need for a Strategy

As we move closer to GLCM and Pershing II deployments, the political sensitivity of the nuclear control issue will continue to grow. We have not received specific pressure on this issue from other allied countries, but we may as deployment approaches. And anything we do with one country will affect the situation elsewhere. We need a strategy to manage the issue to avoid damage to the nuclear deterrent and negative political fallout on INF.

Central to any strategy will be Mrs. Thatcher's judgement of the minimum arrangements necessary to manage political problems in the UK. She may be satisfied by US public reendorsement of the already publicized UK-US agreement embodied in the 1952 Truman-Churchill communique, which provided that release of US nuclear weapons based in the UK would be the subject of joint decision; but she could also require a UK presence at the base, which could be highly troublesome. In any event, if we were able to work out an agreement with the UK,

[REDACTED] We would also be well placed to contain pressures from other Allies.

E. O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.3 (b)(6)

We and other interested agencies have begun to examine ideas for dealing with the control issue. If we are to develop a successful strategy, it is important that we seek to dissuade Mrs. Thatcher from posing demands which we will be unable or unwilling to meet, or that would complicate our problems with other Allies. Specifically, we would not want the UK to confront the Vice President with specific and unacceptable proposals when he gets to London.

Thus, as a holding action while we review the issue, we recommend sending a message to the UK stressing the importance of the issue, our willingness to consult with them on it, the great difficulties which physical measures could entail, and the essentiality of keeping the issue confidential. We suggest that this message be conveyed in the channel we have established for discussion of nuclear release issues with the UK, between Under Secretary Eagleburger and Cabinet Secretary Armstrong. DoD and NSC concur in this approach.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you authorize the attached cable, informing the UK that we are prepared to work with them on the nuclear control issue, underlining the problems involved, and seeking their agreement to keep the question confidential.

APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE _____

Attachment:
as stated

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

- 4 -

INF: Handling UK Interest in a Dual Key

Drafted by:EUR/RPM:JHHawes
1/28/83 (6032A) ext. 21626

Cleared by:
EUR:JDobbins
PM:ARaphel
OSD:RHanmer
NSC:RLinhard/DBlair

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

f

TAB B

~~SECRET~~

29084

TO UK CABINET SECRETARY SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG
FROM UNDER SECRETARY LAWRENCE S. EAGLEBURGER

Dear Sir Robert:

As you know, there have been discussions over the past two months between George Shultz and Francis Pym, and between Cap Weinberger and John Knott on the issues related to control of ground launched cruise missiles to be based in the UK. We are aware of the difficulties your government has faced on this issue, and appreciate the firm public line which the Prime Minister, and Defence Secretary Heseltine have taken. We also understand that this issue remains under consideration within your government.

I know you appreciate that matters related to control over nuclear weapons are a most sensitive and difficult issue in all of the INF basing countries, and indeed in all of the countries in which U.S. nuclear weapons are located. I know you also share our ^{overriding} ~~primary~~ objective, which is to sustain the deterrent effect of these forces, and agree that we must avoid any step which would call into question their possible use, in response to Soviet aggression, under circumstances envisaged in agreed Alliance strategy.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M08-193 #29084

~~SECRET~~

BY KML NARA DATE 6/10/10

~~SECRET~~

-2-

We are anxious to work with you to sustain British and European public support for INF deployment. In this context we are ready to examine ~~together ideas about~~ how we can most effectively respond to public ^{questions} ~~concerns~~ about control of these new nuclear systems. The line taken by your Prime Minister in this regard -- that the procedures of the past 30 years have been and will remain fully satisfactory -- ^{and safe} strikes us as the best and perhaps only sustainable line of defense. If there are ways in which we can help you make this case, we are ready to consider them.

In our view we must avoid, ^{anything} ~~however, fundamental changes of a sort~~ which suggests that the existing arrangements have not or will not be satisfactory. ~~In particular, we do not believe it would be productive to consider new arrangements for physical control of nuclear weapons systems.~~ New arrangements could not be limited to only one ally, nor indeed to any one class of nuclear weapons systems. To move in this direction would consequently undermine the deterrent effect of America's theater nuclear forces in a comprehensive way. Perhaps equally important, the lack of trust which such arrangements would suggest would weaken public faith in our common commitment to collective defense and strike a major blow at Alliance cohesion.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3-

We hope in the next several weeks to complete our own review of this issue which we initiated as a result of the discussions which Secretary Shultz and Weinberger have had with your Ministers. We will then be in a position to work with you closely to sustain a defensible ^{public} posture on this difficult issue.

Best regards,

Sincerely,

Lawrence S. Eagleburger

~~SECRET~~

29085

NSC/S PROFILE

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ *and 2/3/10*

ID 8390138

~~UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)~~

RECEIVED 07 FEB 83 11

TO CLARK

FROM LINHARD

DOCDATE 05 FEB 83

BOVERIE

05 FEB 83

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

SUBJECT: SPECIAL DUAL KEY GRP PAPER

ACTION: FOR DECISION DUE: STATUS C FILES SII

FOR ACTION
CLARK

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BLAIR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR E02-07111 #29085

BY RW NARA DATE 2-3-10

COMMENTS

REF# LOG 8390113 NSCIFID (B / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	FEB 16 1983	<i>Clark approved</i>		<i>RW</i>

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

National Security Council
The White House

Package # 92138

83 FEB -5 A10:48

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>I</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>I</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room	<u>5</u>		

done
Please get transmitted version of TABC for me.

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Copy probably has seen cable on back page - double check call that Cop receives all this info -

Done.

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

~~TOP SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SENSITIVEINFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

February 5, 1983

THROUGH: RICHARD BOVERIE *to*FROM: BOB LINHARD *lv*

SUBJECT: Special "Dual Key" Group Paper

Attached is the current version of the "dual key issue paper" being developed in the small, special group which Dennis Blair and I established to do some creative contingency planning in the sensitive area of nuclear release/control agreements. Per the ground rules of the group, the paper has no formal Interdepartmental status. However, those who are cleared for this very sensitive information in each agency are drawing upon the paper to frame agency positions.

The first 18 pages of the paper are now being treated by the group as complete for the time being. They represent the group's understanding of the problem, and a discussion of the various options that are available to the U.S.

The last 3 pages represent the group's current best thinking on how to handle the dual key problem in the UK and in Italy over the next few weeks. As you can see, the formal system has taken our advice and implemented portions of this plan already. We will focus our thinking on longer term solutions after Dennis and I both return from the INF meeting in London on 15-16 February.

Recommendation

That you review the paper to refresh yourself with the details of this sensitive area.

Approve _____ ✓

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab A - Current informal paper (TS)

Tab B - Implementing Message to UK (TS)

Tab C - Implementing Message to Italy (TS)

~~TOP SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

CC: Dennis Blair

SENSITIVE~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
 NLRR FD2-0711 #29086
 BY RW NARA DATE 12/5/11

TAB A

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

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DLB 10/19/2006

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UNITED KINGDOM (01/31/1983-02/05/1983) [TOO LATE TO FILE]

FOIA

F02-071/1
COLLINS

Box Number

20

59

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
29087	PAPER RE: INF (DRAFT - 3RD REVISE)	18	2/3/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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29088	PAPER CONTINGENCY PLANNING - ITALY	2	2/4/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DECLASSIFIED

Contingency Planning: Over the next month.

NLRR M08-193 #29089

United Kingdom:

BY KML NARA DATE 6/10/10

US Short-term Objective: Shift the discussion of nuclear control back into the special channel established for this purpose. This will:

- ensure that the messages received from the UK reflect the views of Prime Minister Thatcher;
- show US sensitivity to UK concerns, and willingness to help, but at the same time put the ball in the UK's court; and,
- if timed correctly, forestall inappropriate questions being posed to the Vice President during his visit.

US Action Required: We should send a message to UK telling them to use the special channel to discuss these matters.

NOTE: This was accomplished on January 31 as documented in the package at Tab B.

Further Action Required: Agree on contingency actions once the UK does respond on the special channel. Current thinking is that should they respond the US should be prepared to:

- listen carefully;
- if appropriate, suggest that we could study further how to improve the communications needed to support a "joint decision";
- not criticize the UK (as we would usually do) for their most recent openness about our sensitive bilateral agreements (which will likely be recognized as a small but useful shift in the US position);
- explain why we feel the current agreements adequately protect both US and UK interests; and,
- present in detail why British control over US nuclear systems is unacceptable to the US.

Should the British either insist on dual key control or should they ask if the 1979 offer to sell GLCM to the UK is still valid, the US should be prepared to say:

- dual key of US nuclear systems remains unacceptable;
- in principle, the 1979 offer to sell GLCM to the UK remains valid -- and under this condition, a dual key along the lines of normal US Program of Cooperation procedures would be appropriate; however,
- there are a number of significant implementing details that would have to be worked out before this course of action could be taken (see section on Italy for more detail).

As of: February 4, 1983

✓

TAB B

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II
90113

29090

Unhored

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

January 31, 1983

SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

THROUGH: RICHARD BOVERIE

FROM: BOB LINHARD *RL*

SUBJECT: Proposed Message in US-UK Channel on Dual Key

The attached package was provided to me by State. It recommends that we use the US-UK channel (to Cabinet Secretary Armstrong) to raise the issue of "dual-key" control of GLCM to establish the fact that any discussion of this issue should occur in that channel, and thus (hopefully) avoid having it raised in an inappropriate fashion with the Vice President during his visit.

The proposed message (TAB B) stresses the importance of the nuclear release issue, our willingness to consult with the UK on this issue, the great difficulties which new methods of physical control (i.e., dual-key) could entail, and the essentiality of keeping the issue confidential.

State/EUR has also provided a copy of this package to Richard Perle and they report that he concurs with this approach. I also find the approach appropriate at this time.

The package is now on its way to Larry Eagleburger for approval. If he agrees, it will then be forwarded to the Situation Room for transmission. It could arrive as early as close of business today.

Recommendation

That you approve the transmission of this message.

Approve

RCM/for

Disapprove _____

Concurrence: Fortier

DF as mod

Attachments:

TAB A - Internal State Department Decision Paper (S)

TAB B - Proposed Message to Cabinet Secretary Armstrong (S)

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M08-193 # 29090

BY KML NARA DATE 6/10/10

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~

0

1

0

~~SECRET~~

Department of State

29091



ACTION MEMORANDUM

~~S/S~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR M08-193 #29091

BY KML NARA DATE 10/10/10

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

TO: The Acting Secretary
THRU: P - Lawrence S. Eagleburger
FROM: EUR - Robert Blackwill, Designate
SUBJECT: INF: Dealing with Allied Pressures for Dual Key

Issue for Decision:

Whether to authorize the attached message to the UK on the nuclear control question.

Essential Factors:

When you were in London in December Pym raised with you the question of UK control over the release of US nuclear weapons based in the UK. The UK concern was also raised with Secretary Weinberger. Mrs. Thatcher has spoken to the issue recently in Parliament, indicating that she is satisfied with existing arrangements. The British embassy has informed us, however, that the Prime Minister's statements are a holding action, pending decisions on whether additional arrangements may be needed to deal with public opinion on the GLCM issue. We were informed that she would be meeting with her advisors on the issue January 28. It is likely that she will raise it during the Vice President's visit February 9-10.



E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.3 (b)(6)

~~SECRET~~

DECL: OADR

~~SECRET~~

Need for a Strategy

As we move closer to GLCM and Pershing II deployments, the political sensitivity of the nuclear control issue will continue to grow. We have not received specific pressure on this issue from other allied countries, but we may as deployment approaches. And anything we do with one country will affect the situation elsewhere. We need a strategy to manage the issue to avoid damage to the nuclear deterrent and negative political fallout on INF.

Central to any strategy will be Mrs. Thatcher's judgement of the minimum arrangements necessary to manage political problems in the UK. She may be satisfied by US public reendorsement of the already publicized UK-US agreement embodied in the 1952 Truman-Churchill communique, which provided that release of US nuclear weapons based in the UK would be the subject of joint decision; but she could also require a UK presence at the base, which could be highly troublesome. In any event, if we were able to work out an agreement with the UK,

E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.3(b)(6)

We would also be well placed to contain pressures from other Allies.

We and other interested agencies have begun to examine ideas for dealing with the control issue. If we are to develop a successful strategy, it is important that we seek to dissuade Mrs. Thatcher from posing demands which we will be unable or unwilling to meet, or that would complicate our problems with other Allies. Specifically, we would not want the UK to confront the Vice President with specific and unacceptable proposals when he gets to London.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 3 -

Thus, as a holding action while we review the issue, we recommend sending a message to the UK stressing the importance of the issue, our willingness to consult with them on it, the great difficulties which physical measures could entail, and the essentiality of keeping the issue confidential. We suggest that this message be conveyed in the channel we have established for discussion of nuclear release issues with the UK, between Under Secretary Eagleburger and Cabinet Secretary Armstrong. DoD and NSC concur in this approach.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you authorize the attached cable, informing the UK that we are prepared to work with them on the nuclear control issue, underlining the problems involved, and seeking their agreement to keep the question confidential.

APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE _____

Attachment:
as stated

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 4 -

INF: Handling UK Interest in a Dual Key

Drafted by:EUR/RPM:JHHawes
1/28/83 (6032A) ext. 21626

Cleared by:
EUR:JDobbins
PM:ARaphel
OSD:RHanmer
NSC:RLinhard/DBlair

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

10

0

~~SECRET~~

29092

TO UK CABINET SECRETARY SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG
FROM UNDER SECRETARY LAWRENCE S. EAGLEBURGER

Dear Sir Robert:

As you know, there have been discussions over the past two months between George Shultz and Francis Pym, and between Cap Weinberger and John Knott on the issues related to control of ground launched cruise missiles to be based in the UK. We are aware of the difficulties your government has faced on this issue, and appreciate the firm public line which the Prime Minister, and Defence Secretary Heseltine have taken. We also understand that this issue remains under consideration within your government.

I know you appreciate that matters related to control over nuclear weapons are a most sensitive and difficult issue in all of the INF basing countries, and indeed in all of the countries in which U.S. nuclear weapons are located. I know you also share our primary objective, which is to sustain the deterrent effect of these forces, and agree that we must avoid any step which would call into question their possible use, in response to Soviet aggression, under circumstances envisaged in agreed Alliance strategy.

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NLRR M08-193 #29092

BY KML NARA DATE 6/10/10

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-2-

We are anxious to work with you to sustain British and European public support for INF deployment. In this context we are ready to examine together ideas about how we can most effectively respond to public concerns about control of these new nuclear systems. The line taken by your Prime Minister in this regard -- that the procedures of the past 30 years have been and will remain fully satisfactory -- strikes us as the best and perhaps only sustainable line of defense. If there are ways in which we can help you make this case, we are ready to consider them.

In our view we must avoid, however, fundamental changes of a sort which suggests that the existing arrangements have not or will not be satisfactory. In particular, we do not believe it would be productive to consider new arrangements for physical control of nuclear weapons systems. New arrangements could not be limited to only one ally, nor indeed to any one class of nuclear weapons systems. To move in this direction would consequently undermine the deterrent effect of America's theater nuclear forces in a comprehensive way. Perhaps equally important, the lack of trust which such arrangements would suggest would weaken public faith in our common commitment to collective defense and strike a major blow at Alliance cohesion.

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-3-

We hope in the next several weeks to complete our own review of this issue which we initiated as a result of the discussions which Secretary Shultz and Weinberger have had with your Ministers. We will then be in a position to work with you closely to sustain a defensible posture on this difficult issue.

Best regards,

Sincerely,

Lawrence S. Eagleburger

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TAB C

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